The character of the country which was the scene of operations has been described in the preceding chapter. For a successful effort to conquer it much and timely preparation was necessary. Several circumstances had made this impossible. It will be remembered, in the first place, the Government of India had viewed the enterprise askance. The head of an Indian province looks mainly to his own affairs; and not having a free hand, and being without direct responsibility for the financing of a military expedition, he presses hard for what he wants. To the Supreme3 Government, far from the scene of raids and disorder4, and less directly concerned with the causes and consequences of them, the financial aspect looms5 largest. The Government of India were beginning to take alarm at the heavy burden with which the annexation6 of the new province was loading them. They were aware of the very wide extent of territory under the nominal7 sway of the dethroned King, and of the distant boundaries, ill-defined and seemingly endless, marching not only with China and Siam, but with savage8 peoples of whom hardly the names were known. They feared, naturally enough, that the local authorities might allow their zeal9 to push[309] them on too hastily if not too far. Little was known about the relations of the King's Government to the wide region lying between the Irrawaddy Valley and the Mekong. The northern and north-eastern boundaries were very indistinctly defined, and no thought had been given to the great wedge of mountainous country between Burma proper and Bengal.
The end of 1888 found us engaged in all these outlying regions. Active operations were going on in the Shan States, in the difficult hills east of Bhamo, and in the rugged10 country about the Ruby11 Mines. In the far north there were disturbances13 all around Mogaung, which was inadequately14 garrisoned15 and difficult to get at. Added to this, there were still districts of Upper Burma which were harassed17 by gangs of guerillas. There was more than enough work for every soldier and every civilian19 in the country and for every penny that the Treasury20 could afford. Facts, however, had proved strong, and the Chins themselves forced us to act. But General Faunce's force started too late, and therefore without adequate preparation for a big campaign. Added to this came the unfortunate Gangaw affair, which interrupted his supplies and called off some of his best troops.
In the summer of 1889 the position at Fort White was hardly encouraging. The place had proved very unhealthy, and the garrison16 had few men fit for service. Not only had we failed to touch the Tashons, who had been chiefly responsible for the troubles of the past year, but we were far from having come to terms with the Siyins and Kanhows, on which tribes our hand had been heavy. The political officer, indeed, still believed that hunger would bring them in. The Kanhows had made a partial and half-hearted submission21, retaining, however, most of their Burman captives. The others would have no truck with us, and treated our demands, as well as our advances, with obstinate22 silence. Their courage was higher, and the pressure on them less than had been thought. The Baungshès, moreover, to the south of the Tashons, including the Yokwa Haka and Thetta clans24, had been continuously on the warpath, and had had no communication with our officers since the winter of 1887.
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There were only two courses open—either to make a well-prepared systematic25 advance into the Chin Hills and bring these people under British rule, not necessarily administration in the full meaning; or to retire altogether and leave an enclave of savagery26 between Burma and Bengal, trusting for the protection of the Burman villages to frontier posts and spasmodic expeditions. The long history of the dealings of the Bengal Government with the Lushais and Nagas, very similar people, had proved the futility28 of the latter course. The inclination29 in Burma was all for the former, and this met with the thorough approval of the Supreme Government. The work was to be undertaken in a whole-hearted manner that would ensure success.
During the inactive season of 1889, the scheme of operations was carefully worked out. The plan of campaign approved by the Supreme Government was very much on the lines sketched31 in the Chief Commissioner32's minute of the 21st of July, 1888. The central object was the Tashon tribe. On their north we already had in Fort White a footing in the hills with communications secured to Kalewa, on the Chindwin. It was decided33 to make the attack from the Burma side in two strong columns. The Northern Column was to gather at Fort White, and was to deal in the first instance with the still refractory34 tribes in its immediate35 neighbourhood. The Southern Column was to muster36 at Pakokku and, making its base at Kan in the Myittha Valley, to move up deliberately38 into the hills to Yokwa and Haka, subjugating39 the villages as the force advanced and securing the release of the captives. Then, leaving a garrison in Haka, it was to move northward40 and, in combination with the Fort White Column, to make a simultaneous attack on Falam, the Tashon capital, from both sides. Meanwhile, a third force was to enter the hills from Bengal territory and open communications or, if necessary, join hands with the Burma columns. For the operations of this last force the Burma Administration had no responsibility.
To protect the villages in the plains from raids and to keep open communications while the expeditions were in progress, it was decided to establish ten posts along the more northern portion of the Chin-Burman frontier. The[311] force to be employed from Burma was to be nearly four thousand fighting men, besides some military police. The number of transport animals and of coolies necessary for such a body would be very great. Carts were useless after the first few marches from the Irrawaddy. Some fodder41 for ponies42 and bullocks might be procurable43, but it was certain that once in the hills almost every ounce of food for man and beast would have to be sent up from the Irrawaddy Valley.
The success of the campaign, therefore, was a question of transport and supply. Kan, which was to be the base of the Southern Column, was to be fed from Pakokku on the Irrawaddy, distant 165 miles through difficult and sparsely44 inhabited country. Work had been begun in 1888 on the road; but labour was scarce and the cart-track was not open for more than half the distance. Provisions for Fort White and its communications, as well as for the frontier posts, could be sent up by steamer to Kalewa on the Chindwin. The difficulty was to move them thence to Kalemyo within reach of the troops. If the Myittha were navigable, it would be invaluable45; all the frontier posts from Kalemyo to Kan were on that river, but its waters were unknown. Mules46 and coolies in large numbers, men from Assam and from the Northern Punjab able to carry loads on hill paths, were promised by India. Arrangements for collecting some eight or nine hundred carts at Pakokku were put in train; and contracts for the hire of country boats, of which Pakokku is the great building centre, were given.
In August I went up the Chindwin to Kalewa to meet Major Raikes, who had been stationed at Fort White since the close of the active operations, and had been busy acquiring information of the people and country and endeavouring to induce the Chins to come to terms. I brought with me two naval49 officers—Captain Wilson, R.N., then Port Officer at Rangoon, and Commander Holland, of the Royal Indian Marine50 Service. These officers were deputed to ascertain51 how far the Myittha could be navigated52; and, as their inquiries53 gave reason for hoping that the river might be navigable, the task of exploring it was entrusted54 to Commander Holland. The results of his work were[312] encouraging, and he was directed to organize a transport service of boats.
But to return to Kalewa. The Chief Commissioner, after discussing matters closely with Major Raikes, resolved to inform the Tashons that the British Representative, with an armed force, would proceed to Falam, their head village, and there receive the submission of the tribe, and if necessary enforce it. A proclamation to that effect was sent to the chiefs in the following terms:—
"A British army will march to the Tashon Ywama. The British Government wishes to preserve your tribe, and does not desire to punish you as it has punished the Kanhows and Siyins who have resisted the British forces.
"The British Government desires from you only two things: First, that the captives taken from Burman villages shall be released. Secondly55, that you shall in the future behave peacefully, and cease to attack the subjects of the Government.
"Therefore the Chief Commissioner hereby declares and promises that you will be excused from punishment for the past if you comply with the following terms:—
"(i) That you shall assist the British troops in their march through your country to your Ywama, and that you will neither attack nor oppose them;
"(ii) That you shall to the utmost of your power compel the Siyin and Kanhow tribes to surrender their captives.
"(iii) That the chiefs shall meet the officer in command of the British forces at the Ywama, and deliver up to him all the captives in the possession of your tribe and pay a fine of 10,000 rupees.
"(iv) That you shall render annually56 a tribute of two elephant tusks57 and ten silk pieces to the British Government.
"If you comply with these terms your lives and property will be spared, and the former orders requiring you to deliver up the Shwègyobyu and other rebels will not be enforced.
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"On the other hand, if you will not comply with these conditions the Chief Commissioner will direct the troops to punish you severely58."
Up to this time the surrender of the Burman outlaws59 had been made a condition of peace with the Tashons. It was now said by those who knew them best that the surrender of the refugees was repugnant to Chin honour; and in the hope of making it easier for them to yield, the Chief Commissioner consented to waive60 this demand. Permission was also given to Major Raikes to reduce the fine, if it would make negotiations61 more hopeful. But on the other points, especially the condition that the troops should march to Falam, their capital, and there receive the formal and public submission of the chiefs to the British Government, no concession62 whatever was to be made. Negotiations on this basis continued between the political officer and the Tashons without result.
In the beginning of December the chiefs agreed to meet Major Raikes at Sihaung. The terms of the proclamation were explained to them, and they were made to understand that they were final and would be enforced. The chiefs were impracticable. They affirmed that if our men advanced they could not control their tribesmen. The ex-Sawbwa of Kalè was present at this meeting, having come down with the Chins. He wisely took the opportunity of surrendering to Major Raikes, and was sent to Pakokku, where he lived afterwards in receipt of a pension from the Government. His surrender exploded a theory which had been started, that the Tashons were holding out in order to procure63 his reinstatement in Kalè.
A proclamation in similar terms was sent to the Haka and Yokwa Chins.
Meanwhile the work of collecting transport and forwarding stores was pushed on; the boat service on the Myittha was organized, and was worked by Commander Holland with great energy and success.
Brigadier-General Faunce had left Burma. He was succeeded in command of the brigade by Colonel W. P. Symons (well known as General Sir W. Penn Symons), who met his death in the first action of the Boer War. Colonel Symons had made his reputation already as an[314] active and able soldier. He was much more. He was peculiarly fitted by temper, tact64, and administrative65 ability to conduct a difficult business like that now in hand. The command of the Chin-Lushai expedition was given to him by the Chief Commissioner's request. The question arose whether he should have also the control of the negotiations and arrangements with the Chins.
For some time the feeling in India had been, as it still is, against the division of authority in expeditions of this kind. No doubt, as a rule, the man who holds the military command should have control of the negotiations also. At the same time the circumstances of each case and the qualifications of the man must be taken into account. In Burma hitherto it had been found more convenient, if not necessary, to divide the duties and to give what is called the political business to a civil officer acquainted with the language and customs of the people to be dealt with. In the present instance it happened that Major Raikes had from the beginning dealt, under the Chief Commissioner's orders, with the Chin tribes. He had had more opportunities than any one of acquiring a knowledge of their character and politics. It was somewhat difficult to ask him now to work in subordination to the military commander who had had no part in the business.
The Chief Commissioner was ready to brush aside this personal difficulty and to allow Major Raikes to resign his post if he preferred to go. He would willingly have placed the chief authority unreservedly in General Symons's hands. The question was carefully considered and discussed. Finally, by General Symons's desire it was arranged to leave to the civil officer the negotiations with the Chins and the arrangements to be made with them when they submitted. It happened, however, that before the advance into the hills had well begun, Major Raikes was compelled by illness to go away. General Symons was then put in undivided control of the whole business, under the Chief Commissioner's orders. Two civil officers were selected to serve as his assistants, absolutely in subordination to him. Mr. D. Ross was posted to the Southern Column and Mr. B. S. Carey to the Northern. This arrangement worked admirably.
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The rains of 1889 were unfortunately late. The Southern Column, 1,869[56] strong, was concentrated at Pakokku. From Pakokku to Kan, which was to be the base for the operations, was one hundred and sixty-five miles. Shelters had been erected67 at the halting-places, and such provisions as could be procured68 were gathered and stored by the civil district officers. The troops began to move on the 23rd of November, and the march was successfully carried out in fifteen days, by detachments of one hundred fighting men with followers69 marching in succession daily. The first detachment left Pakokku on the 23rd of November, and the leading columns were only just able to get through the falling rivers and the drying country. The ground was heavy and the heat great. Nevertheless, troops and followers arrived at Kan in good condition, with only a nominal sick list.
By the middle of November the Northern Column, 1,622[57] strong, was ready at Fort White and was waiting for the hill-coolies who were to form the transport, before it should move out.
The garrisons70 for the ten posts which were to protect the frontier were sent up the Chindwin to Kalewa, and had to march down the Myittha Valley. Late rains had flooded the Kalè Valley, and as late as the end of November the country was impassable to anything but an elephant. On the 24th of October it took fifteen hours to get one hundred and seventy fresh mules, with elephants to carry their saddles and gear, through the bogs71 and swamps on the last five and a half miles of the road into Kalemyo, which was the distributing base for supplies for Fort White and for the posts in the Kalè Valley. By the end of December these ten posts were built, occupied, and rationed—a testimony72 to the qualities of the officers and men who overcame such difficulties.
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By the end of January, 1890, five hundred and fifty-one tons of stores had been sent by road to Kan, and six hundred and thirty-eight tons landed at Kalemyo by water. The river transport service not only did this, but also provided, as a by-work, carriage for many men joining their corps73 and for sick sent down to the rear. From the beginning of February, when the country had become dry, all supplies for the Southern Column were brought in carts from Pakokku to Kan and on to Haka on hired pack-bullocks and Government transport animals. To add to the difficulties, virulent74 cattle disease broke out in the Myittha and Kalè Valleys, and caused enormous loss.
One-third of the pack-bullocks had died. The sickness was not confined to the transport animals. It was said that the villagers in the Kalè State lost 90 per cent. of their buffaloes75.
The first troops of the Southern Column reached Kan on the 7th of December. On the 9th the sappers, with a covering escort, commenced work on the road to Haka, which was sixty-four miles distant. Every one thought that our men would be in Haka in ten or twelve days, and all calculations were based on this estimate. It was sixty-six days before the leading files entered Haka, and the mule-road did not reach that place until the seventy-seventh day. This, although the whole strength of the force was devoted76 to road work: every man who could dig was set to it. The country opposed to the engineers a tumbled network of steep hills and deep ravines. The climate proved deadly. Soldiers and coolies were ill with fever. Out of seven Royal Engineer officers, at the end of December six were lying ill. In comparison with the difficulties caused by the nature of the country and the climate, the fiercest opposition77 of the Chins was insignificant78.
"This disappointing delay," wrote General Symons, "was not without its compensating79 advantages in dealing27[317] with the Chins. They expected us to make a quick advance, do some damage, and retire. The steady, persistent80 advance, together with the pains that were taken to get into touch with them and to explain our objects and intentions, paralysed their spirits and efforts for resistance, and thus tribe after tribe submitted and yielded to our terms."
This is, no doubt, the true way of dealing with savages81. They are like children. They are terrified if they see a person approaching them steadily82, with measured steps and outstretched arms. But it is much more difficult and requires more resources in money and men and transport to advance into a difficult country, making each step good and permanent, than to rush in, burn, slay83, and retire. The latter method of warfare84 the savage understands. His enemies appear suddenly, set fire to his village, kill those they come across, and are away again. He flees into the jungle at the first alarm, and comes back little the worse as soon as the other side retires. That the better method was not followed in 1887-8, and that the more barbarous system was adopted, was not voluntary. Circumstances forced it upon the authorities in Burma, as the only means at their disposal for protecting the peaceful population in the plains. Besides, it is only fair to say that the tribes dealt with the former year, the Siyins and Kanhows, were by far the most warlike and bloodthirsty of the Chins. The severe chastisement85 inflicted86 on them, and the maintenance of the garrison in Fort White during the year, had brought home to all the folly87 of trying conclusions with disciplined and well-armed troops.
On the 17th of December the advance-guard of the Southern Column occupied Taungtek on the road to Haka. From that date to the 28th of December the Chins from time to time made feeble attempts to resist, harassing88 the troops by firing into camp. On the 28th, near Taungtek, they had a considerable number of men in action; according to their own account five hundred men, of whom three hundred had fire-arms. But they could do nothing. From that day they gave up the fight and made no further opposition.
On the 8th of January two Yokwa Chins came into camp. The objects of our coming and the conditions of[318] peace were explained to these two men, and they were sent back to repeat them to their chiefs. But therein lay the difficulty. Who were the real chiefs? There were numbers of chiefs, each with his own following, each bitterly jealous of his fellows. To negotiate under such conditions required the tact and patience which General Symons fortunately possessed89. The most intelligent and influential of the rivals had to be discovered, and his position strengthened by dealing through him.
Henceforth affairs progressed well, and there was no combined opposition to the advance. One unfortunate incident, however, occurred. Some Chins lying in ambush90 shot Lieutenant91 Foster, of the King's Own Scottish Borderers. The tribes had been fully30 warned that acts of treachery would meet with punishment. The nearest village was destroyed. This, happily, was the sole occasion on which the Southern Column was compelled to use violence.
A few days afterwards Yokwa was occupied, and this section of the Baungshès yielded. The terms imposed on them were the surrender of the captives, the payment of a fine and of an annual tribute, and an engagement to keep the peace in future. The mule-path, meanwhile, was being pushed forward on to Haka, the headquarters of an important section. The same tactics soon led to their submission. The subjugation of the whole Baungshè clan23 was now complete, for the minor92 sections followed the lead of the premier93 communities. The headquarters of the expedition were fixed94 henceforward at Haka, and negotiations for the surrender of the captives were begun.
This was not an easy or speedy business. Nominal rolls of the persons held in durance by the Chins had been prepared, and it was known by which tribe and by which village the captives had been taken. But some of the raids had been committed months before. Slaves were current coin in the hills, and passed from hand to hand as easily as a bank-note in more civilized95 regions. Their value was fixed with reference to the customary ransom96 paid by their Burmese relatives, and seems to have averaged ten or twelve pounds sterling97. In barter98, according to Mr. Carey, a slave would exchange for three or four head of[319] cattle, a good gun, a dozen pigs, or a wife. However willing the tribe or the village, or even the original captor, might be to keep faith, it was often difficult to trace the slave and obtain his release from the present holder99, who had bought him with a price and did not see why he should be at a loss. A view not unreasonable100 from a Chin point of view, but quite inadmissible from our side.
While these negotiations were proceeding101 at Haka, and the mule-road was being completed to that place, reconnaissance parties were sent out to the west, the country was explored, the submission of a western tribe, the Klanklangs, was secured, and communication with the Chittagong Column, under Brigadier-General Tregear,[58] was opened. The advance parties of General Symons and General Tregear's forces met on the 26th of February, at Tao village, fifty-two miles west of Haka. This meeting was notable for the recovery of the heads of Lieutenant John Stewart, of the Leinster Regiment103, and the soldiers (two British and one Indian) who had been killed by Hoswata Shendoos on the 3rd of February, 1888, when surveying in the Chittagong Hill tracts48. Their skulls104 had decorated the village of some Chin chief at Haka ever since. As to how they came to Haka nothing is known. The chief may have taken them himself, or he may have purchased the trophies105 from the real heroes. No inquiry106 was made, and no retaliation107 was inflicted on the accomplices108 in the murder of our fellow-countrymen.
The Southern Column being thus engaged, the Northern Column, under Colonel Skene, with Mr. Bertram Carey as civil officer, had not been idle. Mr. Carey had to do with a very difficult position. The tribes with whom he was immediately concerned were as defiant109 in December, 1889, as they had been a year before; and he had no medium of communication with them. Gradually, by patience and skilful110 handling, the Sagyilain Chins living in the nearest villages were induced to bring supplies of eggs and fowls111 to market. Trading led to closer intercourse112. Mr. Carey established himself at Yawlu on the road from Fort White to Falam, the chief Tashon village, and very soon Tashons as well as Sagyilains came to Yawlu daily to sell their produce, and the situation became less strained, while the troops procured better food. After a little Mangl?n, the chief of the Sagyilains, came to see Mr. Carey, and made his submission to the British Government. This was a most welcome event. Mangl?n became a medium in all negotiations with the Siyins, and remained loyal and trustworthy in subsequent troubles.
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No progress, however, was made with the Siyins, who promised to surrender if the Tashons made peace. The best months for active operations were passing. But it was thought inexpedient to adopt rough methods against them until a settlement had been made with the Tashons.[59] After some negotiations with the chief of Mwebingyi (an important village), who promised to surrender and invited a visit, Mr. Carey, with Colonel Skene and a small force, guided by Sagyilain men, marched to Mwebingyi. Three miles from the village they were fired on by Chins from all sides. A sharp skirmish followed. The Chins, driven back to their village, set it on fire and took to the hillsides. We lost two men severely wounded owing to this treacherous113 attack.
The time had now come when the much-delayed advance of the Southern Column made the combined movements of the Northern and Southern Columns upon the Tashon Ywama possible. The reduction of this tribe was the main object of the campaign, to which all the other operations were leading. It was important to avoid a hostile collision with it. It would have been easy enough to harass18 and punish the tribe village by village, but at the cost of life, destruction of property, and misery114. General Symons's instructions were to accept no surrender and to conclude no negotiations except at Falam, the Tashon head village; and his purpose was to make resistance hopeless by placing the forces from Haka and Fort White simultaneously115 on the north and south of the Ywama. Accordingly, on the 8th of March a force 350 strong, with one gun, under Colonel Skene, left Fort White. On the 9th General Symons, with 290 rifles and two mountain-guns, marched from Haka. The Southern Column had suffered so much from sickness that its strength in fighting-men and transport coolies had been seriously reduced. Without the aid of the Northern Column, it could not have given enough men to garrison Haka and at the same time to deal with the Tashons. It was a matter of moment, therefore, that the two columns should operate in concert. A successful and rapid reconnaissance to within eight miles of the Ywama was affected116, and the two forces arrived on the opposite banks of the Manipur, or Nankathe River, within an hour of each other on the 11th of March.
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The Tashons had not intended to yield without a fight.
"Innumerable stockades117, breastworks, and obstructions119, extending over some nine miles of country, but chiefly intended against an enemy advancing from the north, had been freshly erected at every commanding point. Large numbers of armed men watched both columns as they advanced, but there was no collision. It is difficult to estimate their numbers; but on the south of Manipur River near the Ywama there were not less than 5,000 men, of whom two-thirds were armed with guns, the rest with spears."[60]
Disregarding the protests of some of the chiefs who came out to meet him, General Symons marched his men to a spot within one thousand yards of the Ywama, and fixed his camp there. The chiefs were assembled and asked if they agreed to our terms. With the inconsequence of savages, after allowing us to advance unopposed, they rejected our conditions, refusing firmly to pay tribute and demurring120 even to the fine. General Symons warned them of the risk they were incurring121 and dismissed them.
The scene on this occasion was dramatic, and is thus described by Mr. Bertram Carey, who was present:—
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"The whole valley, in which formerly122 lay the original village of Falam, was full of armed Chins, numbering not less than 3,000 men, gathered from all sides; the host seemed to settle itself in groups of from 10 to 100 men. They were quiet in demeanour, but held their heads high and seemed quite prepared for whatever might be the result of the negotiations. The crowd was a motley one, the Tashon chiefs dressed in the gaudy123 tartan of the tribe, well armed with bright guns, vermilion and black parti-coloured dah scabbards, and beautifully inlaid powder-horns. The Whenohs were conspicuous124 by their chignons, which contrasted with the lofty head-dress of their neighbours, the Yahows, who were present carrying the strange shendu, chopper-shaped dahs in basketwork scabbards. Scattered125 around in bunches were the scowling126 Siyins, the half-breeds from Tawyan and Mintèdaung, the semi-independent clique127 of Kwungli, and the trans-Nankathè tribesmen of Sokte and 'Poi' origin. The congregation was armed with a variety of weapons; spears and flint-lock guns predominated, but bows and quivers of barbed arrows were carried by not a few. Each man bore his food-supply for a few days on his back."[61]
The next two days were spent in wearisome negotiations which might have driven a less patient man to the use of force. His forbearance was rewarded, and the chiefs gave way. The tribute for 1889 was delivered, and five thousand rupees, the amount to which he had thought right to reduce the fine, was paid.
The Tashons admitted that until a few days before the forces reached Falam they had intended to fight. Their position as head of the Chin tribes and the fear of losing prestige impelled128 them to resist. When they found their enemies coming from two sides, they began to lose heart. All their outlying villages, who knew they must suffer first and most, prayed them to make peace.
It is evident that the rough handling of the Siyins by General Faunce had given a salutary lesson to these people. The event proved also the wisdom of marching to the headquarters of the tribe, and there compelling the public submission of their leaders.
The object of the combined march having been attained129, the columns separated, the Southern returning to Haka and the Northern to Fort White. During the remaining months of open weather General Symons was occupied in gathering130 in the captives, improving his relations with the Chins, and in exploring the country. In April, accompanied by the Haka chief, he visited many villages to the South and was everywhere well received. On the 15th of April General Tregear met him at Haka, now linked up with Fort Tregear by a mule-track, which was brought into Haka, a distance of eighty-one miles, on the 13th of April. The Chittagong Column had met with no opposition. Their work was mainly road-making, reconnoitring, and surveying—work of the first importance in securing permanent peace. The Lushai country was as difficult as any on the Burma side.
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"There is the dense131 jungle, which prevents one seeing a dozen yards ahead; rocks extending over large portions of the hillside are constantly met with, and when it was found impossible to avoid them much time was taken up in blasting operations. Range upon range of precipitous hills, running at right angles to the line of advance, had to be crossed, and the question of a sufficient supply of water at the different camps had to be considered in determining the trace of the road."[62]
Two large rivers had to be bridged.
It is not within the scope of the present narrative133 to describe the work done by the Chittagong Column. Its approach from the west had beyond doubt made General Symons's task easier, and success more certain.
On returning to Fort White, Mr. Carey resumed his immediate duty of bringing the Siyins within the fold. They had promised to submit if the Tashons made peace. He called upon them now to keep their word. Only one chief came in, and, as he brought no captives, Mr. Carey sent him away. So far from submitting, they cut the telegraph wires daily and annoyed our people. A policy of waiting and conciliation134 had failed. Several of the worst villages were therefore singled out and destroyed, not without some fighting, in which several sepoys were killed. Unfortunately, in two cases, in which some troops from Kalemyo were engaged, the bodies were allowed to fall into the enemies' hands. The Chin braves were able to return with two heads, more expressive135 of victory than guns or standards, and no doubt published in their fashion jubilant bulletins. The triumph was short-lived. A month afterwards a detachment of the 42nd Gurkhas, marching down on their way to India, destroyed the villages concerned. Before the end of April all the Siyins had made outward submission and had accepted our terms, which were that a yearly tribute should be paid and that the captives should be surrendered. Each clan was to be allowed to rebuild its villages when the captives held by it had been released, and not before. The cut telegraph wire and the two heads were brought in, and the captives were being gradually surrendered.
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The results of the campaign were good and permanent. The foundation was laid for an effective control over these troublesome hill-men, and peace with security was given to the Burmans in the plains and to the Chins themselves. Raiding and slavery as institutions were condemned136, and were soon to disappear altogether. Before the troops left the field one hundred and thirty-eight captives were liberated137. There were a few raids made after General Symons finished his task, but they were promptly138 punished. There were some disturbances among the Chin tribes. They were easily checked, and systematic disarmament here, as in Burma proper, changed the temper and habits of the people.
This success had been achieved almost without bloodshed, but at a great cost to our men of suffering and loss of life from disease. The sickness among troops and followers was appalling139, and the transport animals perished by hundreds. Nine men, of whom two were officers, were killed in action; two hundred and seven, of whom seventy-two were fighting-men, perished of disease. And two thousand one hundred and twenty-two were invalided140, of whose seven hundred and nine were fighting-men—one-fifth of the whole force.
A permanent post was built at Haka, which was found to be a healthy place; and the headquarters of a civil officer, with control over the Baungshès and Tashons, was established there.
Fort White continued for some time to be the headquarters of the civil and military staff in the north. But the garrison was reduced, and as the site was always sickly, the fort was moved back to the Letha Range, retaining the name which it had received from Sir George White. Falam, the chief village of the Tashons, is now the headquarters of the civil administration of the Chin Hills.
Burmese ladies making a call.
[325]
It is worth while, perhaps, to give some account of the Chins in these the first years of British rule.
At the time of General Symons's expedition the Chins were a savage race. They had arms in abundance, flint-lock guns of English make, and spears. They were armed not so much against strangers as against each other. In former times, when they were ill-provided with fire-arms, the Burmans used to oppress them; but for a long time the position had been reversed. Intertribal feuds142, however, and feuds between villages and families of the same tribe, were very common and made it unsafe to move without arms. No man who owned a gun ever left his house without it. While the fields were worked by women and slaves, armed men stood guard. So it was even less than a century ago in parts of India. What caused the feuds was a matter for speculation143. Apparently144 disputes about debts were the most frequent; commerce, in fact, as among Western peoples, led to quarrels. As for government, even the most primitive145 form of tribal141 or village organization appears to have been imperfect. There were many chiefs, and if any one of them, as Jahoota,[63] for instance, was pre-eminent, he could not count on the obedience146 or support of the others. Their jealousies147 interfered148 with everything. Of their manners and customs not much was put on record in the earlier reports, which were necessarily more concerned with military matters. They made forays on the Burmans for heads and slaves. They were much given to sacrifices, and sometimes to human sacrifices. For example, it was usual to sacrifice slaves at the funerals of persons accidentally killed. Of their marriage-customs nothing is said in the early reports.
The country was not rich. There were no forests that it would pay to work, and no minerals had been discovered. The cultivation149 was of the primitive kind—"Taungya," or "Jhoom"—that is to say, felling the trees, burning them when dry, and sowing hill-rice and other crops in the ash. In the forests they had plenty of game, and much fish—Mahseer and other kinds—in the rivers; and the jungles were rich in fruits and roots that would support life if the grain failed. Metal of all kinds was very scarce. The hills produced none, and the Burmese Government had forbidden the export of metals from the plains. The trouble the Chins gave by cutting the telegraph wire was caused by their desire to procure metal, rather than to cause annoyance150. Mr. Carey compared the attraction felt by the Chin for the unprotected wire to that felt by an English boy for an unfenced apple-orchard. The insulator151 spikes152 were beaten into hoes and the wire melted to make bullets, or bangles for the damsels. Their wants were blankets, cottons and other cloths, iron and steel for tools, lead for bullets, needles and thread and salt. In exchange they were able to offer honey, beeswax, chillies, mats, and a little lac.
[326]
The reports of 1889 were more concerned with the measures carried out for their subjugation than with descriptions of the people and their manners. In the main, what is written in the Burma Gazetteer153 published in 1908 is true of the Chins of twenty years ago:—
"They are a sturdy, warlike, hospitable154 people, slow of speech, grave of habit, paying great regard to rank and to the ties of clan, but spoilt by their intemperance155, their vindictiveness156, their treachery, their greed, their lack of persistence,[64] and their personal uncleanliness."
There is a quaint66 humour about this description which is refreshing157 in a Gazetteer. A race would have to be good indeed if, with such an array of vices158, there was anything left to spoil.
Their villages are described as built on the hill-slopes, some of them fortified159; and their houses are often solid, elaborate structures. Their dress is the reverse—a loin-cloth, none too ample, and a blanket for the men; a short skirt and jacket for the women. Home-woven check plaids are seen in a good many costumes, and some tribes have distinctive160 plaids, as in Scotland. The people are mainly vegetarians161, but they will eat anything, from a dog to an elephant. They smoke tobacco in pipes, and they make a liquor from fermented162 grain, presumably rice, which is called zu. They suck up this, in the most approved fashion, through a hollow reed, out of the original still-pot. Enormous quantities of zu are consumed at Chin entertainments, which usually end in disgusting orgies.
[327]
The Chinb?ks and Chinbons.
Tribes called the Chinb?ks, claiming to be of the same stock as the Hakas but speaking a different language, are found at the head-waters of the Maw and Yaw Rivers. Farther south, at the sources of the Saw and Salin and on the eastern slopes of the M?n Valley, live the Yendus. Below them, and southernmost of all the Chins, are the Chinbons, who from the M?n on the east extend along the border of the Mimbu district into the Akyab and Kyaukpyu districts of Lower Burma.
These three tribes were less fierce than their kindred to the north, and possessed only the arms of savage warfare—the bow and arrow and spear. Some of them, those on the borders of the Tilin township at the headquarters of the Maw River, were noted163 for cattle-lifting. But the Chinb?ks on the Yaw and the Yendus on the Saw and Salin Rivers rivalled the Siyins as slave-raiders. At the commencement of the winter of 1889 there were twenty-one captives in the possession of these tribes. They had made twelve raids since December, 1888, in which five villagers had been killed and sixteen carried off. Many had been wounded in resisting or escaping, and large sums had been extracted as ransom.
It was decided, in making up the account against these savages, not to go back behind December, 1888. In that month a notable raid had been committed on Taunggyo in the Pauk township, in which thirty-two persons were carried off and held to ransom at nine pounds sterling each, which appears to have settled down as the sum beyond which the ability or affection of the Burman would not go (see p. 318). After this crime trade with the plains had been prohibited to the Chinb?ks, so far as lay in our power.
The difficulty in dealing with them lay in their want of cohesion164 and the absence of any sort of tribal bond. With the Shans there were the Sawbwas; with the Chins to the north there were the tribal divisions, more or less marked, with chiefs who could speak, or at any rate profess165 to speak, for their people. But with the people with whom[328] we were now to come in contact there was an absence of political organization beyond the village, which was usually very small. It was necessary to visit as many as possible of the villages concerned in the raids, to receive the submission of each, and to impose fines for misconduct; and as an obligatory166 condition to insist on the surrender of captives, and the repayment167 of ransoms168, not going back farther than December, 1888. Substantial guarantees for the future were also to be exacted.
It had been intended to make the dealings with these three tribes part of the operations under General Symons's control, and to give to Mr. Ross, under his orders, the immediate conduct of the negotiations. When the full proportions of the task assigned to General Symons were seen, it became plain that he could not undertake the Chinb?ks; and in consequence of Major Raikes's illness, Mr. Ross had to remain with the Southern Column. Fortunately the Chin Frontier Levy169 had now been raised, and had had a little time to fit itself for service. Their posts at Kalemyo, Kan, and Gangaw were wanted by the regular troops of the Southern Column. This freed the Levy opportunely170, and gave the Chief Commissioner a sufficient force for the expedition into the Chinbok country. An admirable officer was at hand to conduct it, in Lieutenant R. M. Rainey (now Colonel Rainey-Robinson), the Commandant of the Levy. To him was entrusted the conduct of the business.
Lieutenant Rainey began, on the 16th of December, 1889, by dealing with twenty-one Chinbok villages, consisting of two hundred and eighty-three houses, situated171 on the Maw Chaung, the southernmost affluent172 of the Myittha, on which Tilin, the headquarters of the Tilin township, is situated. The claim against them was for cattle stolen. But cattle thefts and slaves were mere173 questions of accounts. They set up and proved a counterclaim for the price of slaves sold to the plaintiffs before the British occupation. Lieutenant Rainey thought it best to admit the counterclaim and let bygones be bygones, but to provide for the future. He induced the twenty-one villages to appoint a chief as their spokesman and agent in dealing with us, and to agree to pay a small[329] tribute in kind leviable174 from each village as an acknowledgment of fealty175 to the British Government.
So far there had been no opposition. Lieutenant Rainey then moved his headquarters from Tilin to Chaungu or Yawdwin, some twenty miles south. This village is situated on an affluent of the Yaw River, and made a good base for the next part of the business. The Chins in the valley of the Yaw and its tributaries176 were raiders. They attempted to harass the force, and Captain Willcocks (now Lieutenant-General Sir James Willcocks, K.C.M.G., C.B., D.S.O.), the Intelligence Officer, who was surveying and reconnoitring for a further move to the south, was attacked. This compelled a resort to punitive177 measures, and several offending villages were destroyed. A defensible advanced post was established at Chaungzon, in the heart of their hills. These methods brought the hostile Chins to reason. From this until the close of the operations the work progressed, bloodless and unopposed. The villages submitted, captives were delivered up, headmen were appointed, and fines exacted from all villages which had raided since December, 1888.
Lieutenant Rainey then returned to Chaungu; and moving his base still farther south to Laungshe, came into contact with the Yindus and Chinbons. By the exercise of tact and patience he succeeded in bringing these sections to submit to the British Government and to release their captives. As before, headmen were appointed, the payment of tribute was promised, and guarantees for good conduct given. The work was thoroughly178 well done. General Symons, in his despatch179 on the Chin-Lushai Campaign, wrote:—
"The Chinbok operations, though in no way under my direction or command, but ably, even brilliantly, conducted by Lieutenant Rainey, Commandant of the Chin Levy Military Police Battalion180, have squared well with our work and settled an adjoining belt of country beyond our capability181 to touch."
Lieutenant Rainey was another of the young soldiers who aided the civil administration in difficult times and showed their fitness for affairs. The country which submitted to him was made a separate civil charge, known[330] as "The Pakokku Hill Tracts," the headquarters of which were for some years at Yawdwin and are now at Kanpetlet on Mount Victoria.
It is noticeable that the Chinb?ks and their confrères had been excluded from trading and from all intercourse with the plains since the beginning of 1889. On making their submission they begged that the blockade might be raised. It was evidently a useful weapon. If it had failed in the case of the Tashons and the more northern tribes, it was because it had not been effective.
We had now made ourselves felt by most of the tribes. There remained unvisited a stretch of hills separating the Minbu district of Upper Burma from Arakan. The Chins dwelling182 in this tract47 preyed183 on the peasantry in the neighbouring districts. During the preceding two years sixteen villages had been raided in Minbu, twenty-one persons killed and thirty-nine carried into slavery. Of these captives sixteen had been ransomed184 by their friends at a very heavy price. In the adjoining township of the Pakokku district there had been several forays, and seventeen persons had been captured and carried off. It was not possible at this time to find men for a comprehensive expedition against these Chins. Civil officers from the three districts of Akyab, Kyaukpyu, and Minbu were deputed, with small bodies of police, to meet at a central point. They assembled the chiefs and village headmen. The Chins were peaceful and submissive, but very few of the captives were restored. These clans belonged to the Akyab district geographically185, and had not yet realized that their eastern borders had come under the British Government and were no longer to afford a happy hunting-ground for the pursuit of human game. They were found to be by no means formidable, badly armed, and little inclined to fight.
The following year (1890-1) saw the beginning of the systematic control of the Chin tribes. For administrative purposes they were roughly divided into three parts. The northern tribes were governed from Fort White, the central tribes from Haka, and the southern from Yawdwin. Captain F. M. Rundall commanded the garrison at Fort White, and also held charge of our relations with the[331] Chins when Mr. Carey had to take leave. Our knowledge of these people was at first far from accurate, and the then recognized divisions of the tribes controlled from Port White were roughly as follows:—[65]
1. The Siyins and Sagyilains who lived in five villages, of which Koset, Sagyilain, and T?klaing were the chief. The first Port White was built on the site of T?klaing, which was afterwards given back to them when the fort was moved.
2. The Kanhows, inhabiting between thirty and forty villages north of Fort White, of which Tunzan, on the left bank of the Manipur River, is the capital.
3. The Mobingyis, as they were called from the Burmese name for their chief village, Molbem, which lies on a spur overlooking the Manipur River on the left bank, and was a very large village.
4. The Nwi-tes and other minor tribes akin37 to the Kukis of Manipur.
It is now known that the right name of the Mobingyis is Sok-te, a very large tribe, of whom the Kanhows are only a powerful clan.
5. The Ngwite and Late, who occupy the hills between Mwelpi and Manipur.
6. The Haitsi Lope, who live on the eastern slope of the Letha Range bordering the Kabaw Valley.
At the end of the last season's operations Mr. Carey had reported the submission of the Siyins and the acceptance of our terms. At the same time he had little trust in their good faith, and when Captain Rundall succeeded him at Fort White their attitude was more or less hostile. They continued to cut the telegraph wire and to give petty annoyance to the troops. The capture of some of the wire cutters gave some help to diplomacy186. The Siyins submitted in order to get their brethren released. They surrendered their captives and agreed to pay tribute and keep the peace. The Kanhows proved more difficult. Captain Rundall took advantage of a dispute about the succession to the leadership of the tribe to open communication with one of the claimants.
[332]
But before anything came of it the Kanhows raided a Burman village, killing187 eight persons and carrying off twelve. They were ordered to restore all captives, to give up the heads taken in the raid, to pay a fine of Rs. 4,000, to submit to the Government, and to bind188 themselves to pay an annual tribute of Rs. 300. These terms were not complied with. Captain Rundall, therefore, marched with three hundred rifles and two guns against the village of Tungzang. The Chins fought, and lost twelve men killed and twenty-one prisoners, including some of their chief men. They had now tried conclusions and were satisfied. Thirty-nine captives were surrendered and the fine and tribute paid in full. Some of the chiefs were sent to Rangoon, and shown over some large steamers, mills, and the like, and, it is said, were impressed by the sight. However that may be, they have not given much trouble since. Some useful road work was done during this year by the Madras Pioneers. A road from Fort White to Falam, the Tashon mother-village, was constructed. As the old site of Fort White still continued to be very unhealthy, the garrison and headquarters of the civil officer were moved back to a post hitherto known as No. 5 Stockade118 on the Letha Range.
The Chins to be controlled from Haka were found to be divisible into five tribes:—
1. The Tashons, a large tribe having their headquarters at Falam, half-way between Haka and Fort White.
2. The Hakas, lying south of the Tashon country and round about Haka.
3. The Klanklangs, to the west of the Haka tribe and between them and Fort Tregear, on the Chittagong side.
4. The Yokwas, who lie to the south and east of the Hakas; and lastly,
5. The independent tribes, known generally by the nickname of Baungshè, in the hills south of the Yokwas.
Mr. D. Ross,[66] the Assistant Commissioner who had accompanied General Symons's expedition, held Haka until March, 1891, when he had to leave on account of his health. He was succeeded by Mr. D. J. C. Macnabb,[67] Assistant Commissioner, a young soldier of a well-known stock. Friendly relations with the Chins were maintained. The road from Kan, in the Myittha Valley, to Haka, was kept open by Chin labour, and the regular postal189 service was performed by Chins. The Myittha Valley was not raided, and generally the Haka Yokwa tribes were well behaved. Trouble, however, came from the independent Baungshès, with whom, owing to their want of cohesion, it was difficult to deal.
[333]
General Symons had left one weak spot in his work. There was a powerful village called Thetta, eight miles south of Yokwa. Of it he wrote:—
"It has resisted all our efforts to bring it to complete submission, although some captives have been given up and a fine paid.... It is a blot190 on our work to have left this village unsettled, but it commands the Kan to Yokwa road, and I considered it better to leave it to stew102 in its obstinacy191 and isolation192 rather than resort to drastic measures which would have had the effect of driving the inhabitants into the jungles and making the road unsafe. The boon193 of convoys194 and traders and others being able to use safely and freely the road between Kan and Haka without escorts was too great to risk the loss of it for the satisfaction of an exercise of our power which, at the best in my opinion, would have had but little effect in bringing about the desired result."
At the same time he recorded his opinion that unless the Thetta people gave in, the political officer would have to visit and compel them.
It was the old story. The Thettas thought forbearance was the sign of weakness and fear. In November, 1890, they became openly hostile. They committed a series of outrages195, and at last brought matters to a head by killing Mr. Wetherell, a young police officer, and attempting the life of the political officer, Mr. Macnabb. In January, 1891, a force of one hundred and forty rifles started from Haka to punish the village. They had no guns. The village was strongly stockaded. Lieutenant James, R.E., and two Gurkha sepoys were killed, and the officer commanding[334] decided that he could not storm the defences without heavy loss. The Chins were invited to a parley196, and they agreed to pay a small fine for their misconduct and to yield an annual tribute in future.
Such an arrangement was for us equivalent to a defeat. It was decided to take up the coercion197 of the Baungshès in a businesslike manner. Two strong columns, with guns, were despatched, one from Haka with Mr. Ross as political officer, the other from Gungaw with Mr. Macnabb. They met at Thetta without opposition, and recovered the fine which the Thetta villagers had promised to pay, and traversed the Baungshè country, receiving the submission of the villagers.
Thetta, however, was not yet subdued198. They had defied us, killed our men, and escaped with a small fine. In 1894 they began to rob and murder, and when they were called to account they behaved themselves proudly. On the 1st of January, 1895, a force under Major Keary, D.S.O., of the 6th Burma Rifles, with Mr. H. N. Tuck as political officer, occupied the village, arrested the chiefs, and disarmed199 the villagers. The chiefs were afterwards degraded in open Durbar.
But the year 1891 was not to close without further difficulty. General Symons, reporting to the Chief Commissioner from Haka, dated the 1st of May, 1890, wrote (para. 9):—
"The Klanklangs are almost a separate tribe, but they are Baungshès and live on fairly good terms with the Hakas. The Yokwas do not march with the Klanklangs, neither are they friendly with them. (10) The Klanklangs, finding themselves at the beginning of the year between the Burma and Chittagong Columns, made haste to submit to the troops entering their country, and readily agreed to easy terms imposed. (11) The settlement with the Klanklangs and their chief, Ya Hnit—whom, to suit the convenience of the Chittagong officials, we are now agreed to call 'Jahoota'—was very rightly left to me as the representative of the local Government of Burma. The Klanklang Ywama (chief village) is only sixteen miles from Haka, and Jahoota and other head chiefs live there.... I do not think this tribe will give us any more trouble. The meeting of the[335] Eastern and Western Columns in their territory, and the continual passing of troops backwards200 and forwards without committal of harm or excess, has had the best effect."
In March, 1891, Mr. Macnabb, with Lieutenant Mocatta and one hundred rifles, set out to visit the Klanklangs and to meet an official from Port Tregear at Tao. The tribe, which had surrendered to General Symons, was held to be friendly. The road passed through their hills, and there was no thought of interfering201 with them. They had, however, been raiding on the Lushai side, and it was intended to warn them to abstain202 from this. On the outward march to Tao the Klanklang chiefs did not appear. They were said to be occupied in propitiating203 their Nats, or guardian204 spirits, and to be very drunk. Mr. Macnabb, therefore, postponed205 his interview until he came back from Tao. On the return march a large body of Chins, said to have been seven or eight hundred, suddenly fell upon the small column, which fought its way on to Klanklang with some difficulty, losing five men killed and ten wounded, and one British officer (Lieutenant Forbes) wounded. Reinforcements from Haka, under Colonel Mainwaring, met the returning column at Klanklang and saved them from further loss. Officers and men had behaved admirably. A fine of guns and money was imposed on the tribe, and preparations were made for enforcing it.
Before the preparations were complete Jahoota came suing for peace. He proved that he had been away and had had no concern in the treacherous attack, which had been organized by two subordinate chiefs in his absence. He brought in guns and other valuables in part payment of the fine, and was ordered to produce the two offenders206 and to raze207 their houses to the ground. As the culprits were not surrendered, the political officer, with three hundred rifles, visited Klanklang in May. He found that the houses had been destroyed, but the two men had fled. Some of the villages paid their shares of the fines; but others held out, and owing to the lateness of the season and want of transport, it was impossible to coerce208 them. Jahoota, in proof of his good faith, gave up his eldest209 son as a hostage, and he was left to re-establish his authority. There has been no difficulty since in managing these Baungshè tribes, and in[336] the years 1894-5 they, as well as all the southern tribes, were disarmed.
The control of the rude southernmost Chins, known as Chinb?ks, Chinbons, and Yendus, was exercised at first by a subdivisional officer stationed at Yawdwin. From Lieutenant Rainey's expedition up to January, 1891, no disturbance12 occurred. In that month a very daring raid was made on Yawdwin itself, and the place looted under the eyes of the police garrison. Further raids followed, and a strong force of regular troops had to be sent to restore order. A military post was established within the hills. In 1896 this post also was attacked. The country was then placed under efficient administrative control. Posts were established in suitable places. A civil officer with sufficient powers was appointed to live in the hills and govern the people. His headquarters are now at Kanpetlet, on the slopes of Mount Victoria, some 6,000 feet above the sea-level. And a small force of Gurkha military police under a British officer is maintained there. Raiding has ceased, and the people have been disarmed. In other respects twenty years have not changed them much. In the Burma Gazetteer (of 1908, vol. ii. p. 393) it is recorded:—
"The inhabitants of the tract are practically all animists. The Chinbok men wear a very scanty210 loin-cloth, and are seldom seen without their bows and arrows. The women's dress consists of a smock and a short skirt. The females have their faces tattooed211."
It may be doubted whether Western civilization will make them happier. Tattooing212 is more lasting132 and more conducive213 to domestic peace than paint and powder. It is cheaper in the long run.
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influential
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| adj.有影响的，有权势的 | |
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subjugation
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| n.镇压，平息，征服 | |
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supreme
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| adj.极度的，最重要的；至高的，最高的 | |
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disorder
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| n.紊乱，混乱；骚动，骚乱；疾病，失调 | |
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looms
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| n.织布机( loom的名词复数 )v.隐约出现，阴森地逼近( loom的第三人称单数 )；隐约出现，阴森地逼近 | |
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annexation
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nominal
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| adj.名义上的；(金额、租金)微不足道的 | |
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savage
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| adj.野蛮的；凶恶的，残暴的；n.未开化的人 | |
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zeal
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rugged
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| adj.高低不平的，粗糙的，粗壮的，强健的 | |
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ruby
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| n.红宝石，红宝石色 | |
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disturbance
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| n.动乱，骚动；打扰，干扰；(身心)失调 | |
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disturbances
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| n.骚乱( disturbance的名词复数 )；打扰；困扰；障碍 | |
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inadequately
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| ad.不够地；不够好地 | |
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garrisoned
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| 卫戍部队守备( garrison的过去式和过去分词 )； 派部队驻防 | |
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garrison
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| n.卫戍部队；驻地，卫戍区；vt.派(兵)驻防 | |
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harassed
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| adj. 疲倦的，厌烦的 动词harass的过去式和过去分词 | |
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harass
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civilian
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treasury
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submission
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obstinate
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clan
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clans
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| 宗族( clan的名词复数 )； 氏族； 庞大的家族； 宗派 | |
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systematic
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savagery
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dealing
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futility
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inclination
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fully
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sketched
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commissioner
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decided
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refractory
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immediate
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| adj.立即的；直接的，最接近的；紧靠的 | |
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36
muster
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| v.集合，收集，鼓起，激起；n.集合，检阅，集合人员，点名册 | |
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37
akin
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| adj.同族的，类似的 | |
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38
deliberately
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| adv.审慎地；蓄意地；故意地 | |
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39
subjugating
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| v.征服，降伏( subjugate的现在分词 ) | |
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40
northward
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| adv.向北；n.北方的地区 | |
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41
fodder
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| n.草料；炮灰 | |
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42
ponies
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| 矮种马，小型马( pony的名词复数 )； ￡25 25 英镑 | |
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43
procurable
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| adj.可得到的，得手的 | |
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44
sparsely
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| adv.稀疏地；稀少地；不足地；贫乏地 | |
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45
invaluable
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| adj.无价的，非常宝贵的，极为贵重的 | |
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46
mules
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| 骡( mule的名词复数 )； 拖鞋； 顽固的人； 越境运毒者 | |
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47
tract
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| n.传单，小册子，大片(土地或森林) | |
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48
tracts
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| 大片土地( tract的名词复数 )； 地带； （体内的）道； （尤指宣扬宗教、伦理或政治的）短文 | |
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49
naval
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| adj.海军的，军舰的，船的 | |
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50
marine
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| adj.海的；海生的；航海的；海事的；n.水兵 | |
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51
ascertain
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| vt.发现，确定，查明，弄清 | |
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52
navigated
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| v.给（船舶、飞机等）引航，导航( navigate的过去式和过去分词 )；（从海上、空中等）横越；横渡；飞跃 | |
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53
inquiries
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| n.调查( inquiry的名词复数 )；疑问；探究；打听 | |
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54
entrusted
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| v.委托，托付( entrust的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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55
secondly
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| adv.第二，其次 | |
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56
annually
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| adv.一年一次，每年 | |
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57
tusks
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| n.（象等动物的）长牙( tusk的名词复数 )；獠牙；尖形物；尖头 | |
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58
severely
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| adv.严格地；严厉地；非常恶劣地 | |
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59
outlaws
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| 歹徒，亡命之徒( outlaw的名词复数 )； 逃犯 | |
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60
waive
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| vt.放弃，不坚持(规定、要求、权力等) | |
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61
negotiations
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| 协商( negotiation的名词复数 )； 谈判； 完成（难事）； 通过 | |
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62
concession
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| n.让步，妥协；特许(权) | |
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63
procure
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| vt.获得，取得，促成；vi.拉皮条 | |
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64
tact
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| n.机敏，圆滑，得体 | |
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65
administrative
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| adj.行政的，管理的 | |
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66
quaint
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| adj.古雅的，离奇有趣的，奇怪的 | |
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67
ERECTED
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| adj. 直立的，竖立的，笔直的 vt. 使 ... 直立，建立 | |
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68
procured
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| v.（努力）取得， （设法）获得( procure的过去式和过去分词 )；拉皮条 | |
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69
followers
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| 追随者( follower的名词复数 )； 用户； 契据的附面； 从动件 | |
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70
garrisons
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| 守备部队，卫戍部队( garrison的名词复数 ) | |
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71
bogs
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| n.沼泽，泥塘( bog的名词复数 )；厕所v.（使）陷入泥沼， （使）陷入困境( bog的第三人称单数 )；妨碍，阻碍 | |
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72
testimony
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| n.证词；见证，证明 | |
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73
corps
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| n.(通信等兵种的)部队；(同类作的)一组 | |
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74
virulent
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| adj.有毒的，有恶意的，充满敌意的 | |
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75
buffaloes
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| n.水牛（分非洲水牛和亚洲水牛两种）( buffalo的名词复数 )；（南非或北美的）野牛；威胁；恐吓 | |
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76
devoted
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| adj.忠诚的，忠实的，热心的，献身于...的 | |
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77
opposition
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| n.反对，敌对 | |
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78
insignificant
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| adj.无关紧要的，可忽略的，无意义的 | |
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79
compensating
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| 补偿，补助，修正 | |
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80
persistent
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| adj.坚持不懈的，执意的；持续的 | |
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81
savages
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| 未开化的人，野蛮人( savage的名词复数 ) | |
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82
steadily
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| adv.稳定地；不变地；持续地 | |
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83
slay
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| v.杀死，宰杀，杀戮 | |
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84
warfare
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| n.战争(状态)；斗争；冲突 | |
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85
chastisement
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| n.惩罚 | |
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86
inflicted
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| 把…强加给，使承受，遭受( inflict的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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87
folly
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| n.愚笨，愚蠢，蠢事，蠢行，傻话 | |
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88
harassing
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| v.侵扰，骚扰( harass的现在分词 )；不断攻击（敌人） | |
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89
possessed
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| adj.疯狂的；拥有的，占有的 | |
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90
ambush
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| n.埋伏(地点)；伏兵；v.埋伏；伏击 | |
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91
lieutenant
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| n.陆军中尉，海军上尉；代理官员，副职官员 | |
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92
minor
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| adj.较小(少)的，较次要的；n.辅修学科；vi.辅修 | |
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93
premier
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| adj.首要的；n.总理，首相 | |
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94
fixed
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| adj.固定的，不变的，准备好的；(计算机)固定的 | |
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95
civilized
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| a.有教养的，文雅的 | |
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96
ransom
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| n.赎金，赎身；v.赎回，解救 | |
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97
sterling
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| adj.英币的(纯粹的，货真价实的)；n.英国货币(英镑) | |
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98
barter
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| n.物物交换，以货易货，实物交易 | |
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99
holder
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| n.持有者，占有者；(台，架等)支持物 | |
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100
unreasonable
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| adj.不讲道理的，不合情理的，过度的 | |
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101
proceeding
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| n.行动，进行，(pl.)会议录，学报 | |
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102
stew
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| n.炖汤，焖，烦恼；v.炖汤，焖，忧虑 | |
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103
regiment
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| n.团，多数，管理；v.组织，编成团，统制 | |
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104
skulls
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| 颅骨( skull的名词复数 )； 脑袋； 脑子； 脑瓜 | |
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105
trophies
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| n.（为竞赛获胜者颁发的）奖品( trophy的名词复数 )；奖杯；（尤指狩猎或战争中获得的）纪念品；（用于比赛或赛跑名称）奖 | |
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106
inquiry
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| n.打听，询问，调查，查问 | |
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107
retaliation
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| n.报复，反击 | |
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108
accomplices
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| 从犯，帮凶，同谋( accomplice的名词复数 ) | |
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109
defiant
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| adj.无礼的，挑战的 | |
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110
skilful
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| (=skillful)adj.灵巧的，熟练的 | |
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111
fowls
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| 鸟( fowl的名词复数 )； 禽肉； 既不是这； 非驴非马 | |
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112
intercourse
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| n.性交；交流，交往，交际 | |
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113
treacherous
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| adj.不可靠的，有暗藏的危险的；adj.背叛的，背信弃义的 | |
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114
misery
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| n.痛苦，苦恼，苦难；悲惨的境遇，贫苦 | |
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115
simultaneously
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| adv.同时发生地，同时进行地 | |
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116
affected
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| adj.不自然的，假装的 | |
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117
stockades
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| n.（防御用的）栅栏，围桩( stockade的名词复数 ) | |
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118
stockade
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| n.栅栏，围栏；v.用栅栏防护 | |
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119
obstructions
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| n.障碍物( obstruction的名词复数 )；阻碍物；阻碍；阻挠 | |
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120
demurring
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| v.表示异议，反对( demur的现在分词 ) | |
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121
incurring
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| 遭受，招致，引起( incur的现在分词 ) | |
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122
formerly
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| adv.从前，以前 | |
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123
gaudy
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| adj.华而不实的；俗丽的 | |
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124
conspicuous
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| adj.明眼的，惹人注目的；炫耀的，摆阔气的 | |
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125
scattered
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| adj.分散的，稀疏的；散步的；疏疏落落的 | |
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126
scowling
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| 怒视，生气地皱眉( scowl的现在分词 ) | |
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127
clique
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| n.朋党派系，小集团 | |
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128
impelled
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| v.推动、推进或敦促某人做某事( impel的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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129
attained
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| （通常经过努力）实现( attain的过去式和过去分词 )； 达到； 获得； 达到（某年龄、水平、状况） | |
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130
gathering
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| n.集会，聚会，聚集 | |
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131
dense
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| a.密集的，稠密的，浓密的；密度大的 | |
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132
lasting
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| adj.永久的，永恒的；vbl.持续，维持 | |
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133
narrative
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| n.叙述，故事；adj.叙事的，故事体的 | |
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134
conciliation
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| n.调解，调停 | |
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135
expressive
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| adj.表现的，表达…的，富于表情的 | |
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136
condemned
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| adj. 被责难的, 被宣告有罪的 动词condemn的过去式和过去分词 | |
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137
liberated
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| a.无拘束的，放纵的 | |
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138
promptly
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| adv.及时地，敏捷地 | |
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139
appalling
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| adj.骇人听闻的，令人震惊的，可怕的 | |
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140
invalided
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| 使伤残（invalid的过去式与过去分词形式） | |
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141
tribal
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| adj.部族的，种族的 | |
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142
feuds
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| n.长期不和，世仇( feud的名词复数 ) | |
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143
speculation
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| n.思索，沉思；猜测；投机 | |
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144
apparently
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| adv.显然地；表面上，似乎 | |
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145
primitive
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| adj.原始的；简单的；n.原(始)人，原始事物 | |
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146
obedience
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| n.服从，顺从 | |
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147
jealousies
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| n.妒忌( jealousy的名词复数 )；妒羡 | |
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148
interfered
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| v.干预( interfere的过去式和过去分词 )；调停；妨碍；干涉 | |
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149
cultivation
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| n.耕作，培养，栽培（法），养成 | |
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150
annoyance
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| n.恼怒，生气，烦恼 | |
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151
insulator
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| n.隔离者；绝缘体 | |
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152
spikes
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| n.穗( spike的名词复数 )；跑鞋；（防滑）鞋钉；尖状物v.加烈酒于( spike的第三人称单数 )；偷偷地给某人的饮料加入（更多）酒精（ 或药物）；把尖状物钉入；打乱某人的计划 | |
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153
gazetteer
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| n.地名索引 | |
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154
hospitable
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| adj.好客的；宽容的；有利的，适宜的 | |
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155
intemperance
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| n.放纵 | |
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156
vindictiveness
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| 恶毒；怀恨在心 | |
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157
refreshing
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| adj.使精神振作的，使人清爽的，使人喜欢的 | |
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158
vices
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| 缺陷( vice的名词复数 )； 恶习； 不道德行为； 台钳 | |
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159
fortified
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| adj. 加强的 | |
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160
distinctive
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| adj.特别的，有特色的，与众不同的 | |
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161
vegetarians
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| n.吃素的人( vegetarian的名词复数 )；素食者；素食主义者；食草动物 | |
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fermented
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| v.（使）发酵( ferment的过去式和过去分词 )；（使）激动；骚动；骚扰 | |
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noted
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| adj.著名的，知名的 | |
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cohesion
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| n.团结，凝结力 | |
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165
profess
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| v.声称，冒称，以...为业，正式接受入教，表明信仰 | |
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166
obligatory
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| adj.强制性的，义务的，必须的 | |
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167
repayment
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| n.偿还，偿还款；报酬 | |
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168
ransoms
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| 付赎金救人，赎金( ransom的名词复数 ) | |
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169
levy
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| n.征收税或其他款项，征收额 | |
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170
opportunely
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| adv.恰好地，适时地 | |
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171
situated
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| adj.坐落在...的，处于某种境地的 | |
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172
affluent
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| adj.富裕的，富有的，丰富的，富饶的 | |
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mere
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| adj.纯粹的；仅仅，只不过 | |
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174
leviable
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| （税等）可征收的，（商品等）应纳税的 | |
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175
fealty
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| n.忠贞，忠节 | |
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176
tributaries
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| n. 支流 | |
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177
punitive
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| adj.惩罚的，刑罚的 | |
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178
thoroughly
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| adv.完全地，彻底地，十足地 | |
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179
despatch
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| n./v.(dispatch)派遣；发送；n.急件；新闻报道 | |
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180
battalion
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| n.营；部队；大队(的人) | |
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181
capability
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| n.能力；才能；(pl)可发展的能力或特性等 | |
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182
dwelling
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| n.住宅，住所，寓所 | |
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183
preyed
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| v.掠食( prey的过去式和过去分词 )；掠食；折磨；（人）靠欺诈为生 | |
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184
ransomed
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| 付赎金救人，赎金( ransom的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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185
geographically
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| adv.地理学上，在地理上，地理方面 | |
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186
diplomacy
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| n.外交；外交手腕，交际手腕 | |
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187
killing
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| n.巨额利润；突然赚大钱，发大财 | |
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188
bind
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| vt.捆，包扎；装订；约束；使凝固；vi.变硬 | |
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postal
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| adj.邮政的，邮局的 | |
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190
blot
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| vt.弄脏（用吸墨纸）吸干；n.污点，污渍 | |
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191
obstinacy
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| n.顽固；（病痛等）难治 | |
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192
isolation
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| n.隔离，孤立，分解，分离 | |
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boon
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| n.恩赐，恩物，恩惠 | |
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194
convoys
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| n.（有护航的）船队( convoy的名词复数 )；车队；护航（队）；护送队 | |
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195
outrages
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| 引起…的义愤，激怒( outrage的第三人称单数 ) | |
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196
parley
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| n.谈判 | |
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197
coercion
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| n.强制，高压统治 | |
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198
subdued
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| adj. 屈服的，柔和的，减弱的 动词subdue的过去式和过去分词 | |
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disarmed
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| v.裁军( disarm的过去式和过去分词 )；使息怒 | |
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200
backwards
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| adv.往回地，向原处，倒，相反，前后倒置地 | |
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interfering
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| adj. 妨碍的 动词interfere的现在分词 | |
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202
abstain
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| v.自制，戒绝，弃权，避免 | |
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203
propitiating
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| v.劝解，抚慰，使息怒( propitiate的现在分词 ) | |
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204
guardian
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| n.监护人；守卫者，保护者 | |
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postponed
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| vt.& vi.延期，缓办，（使）延迟vt.把…放在次要地位；[语]把…放在后面（或句尾）vi.（疟疾等）延缓发作（或复发） | |
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206
offenders
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| n.冒犯者( offender的名词复数 )；犯规者；罪犯；妨害…的人（或事物） | |
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207
raze
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| vt.铲平，把(城市、房屋等)夷为平地，拆毁 | |
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208
coerce
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| v.强迫，压制 | |
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209
eldest
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| adj.最年长的，最年老的 | |
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210
scanty
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| adj.缺乏的，仅有的，节省的，狭小的，不够的 | |
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211
tattooed
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| v.刺青，文身( tattoo的过去式和过去分词 )；连续有节奏地敲击；作连续有节奏的敲击 | |
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212
tattooing
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| n.刺字，文身v.刺青，文身( tattoo的现在分词 )；连续有节奏地敲击；作连续有节奏的敲击 | |
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213
conducive
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| adj.有益的，有助的 | |
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