Our train drew into the Berlin station on the morning of February 3rd, 1916. The date is worth mentioning, for that marked an important crisis in German-American relations. Almost the first man I met was my old friend and colleague, Ambassador James W. Gerard. Mr. Gerard told me that he was packing up, and expected to leave Berlin at any moment, for he believed that a break between Germany and the United States was a matter only of days, perhaps of hours. At that time Germany and the United States were discussing the settlement of the Lusitania outrage1. The negotiations2 had reached a point where the Imperial Government had expressed a willingness to express her regrets, pay an indemnity3, and promise not to do it again. But the President and Mr. Lansing insisted that Germany should declare that the sinking of the Lusitania had been an illegal act. This meant that Germany at no time in the future could resume submarine warfare4 without stultifying5 herself and doing something which her own Government had denounced as contrary to international law. But our Government would accept nothing less, and the two nations were therefore at loggerheads.
“I can do nothing more,” said Mr. Gerard. “I want to have you talk to Zimmerman and von Jagow, and perhaps you can give them a new point of view.”
I soon discovered from my many callers that the atmosphere in Berlin was tense and exceedingly anti-American. Our country was regarded everywhere as practically an ally of the Entente6, and I found that the most absurd ideas prevailed concerning the closeness of our relations with England. Thus it was generally believed that Sir Cecil Spring-Rice, the British Ambassador in Washington, met regularly with President Wilson’s Cabinet and was consulted on all our national policies.
At three o’clock Mr. Gerard took me to the Foreign Office and we spent an hour there with von Jagow. Von Jagow was a small, slight man of nervous disposition7. He lighted cigarette after cigarette during our interview. He was apparently8 greatly worried over the American situation. Let us not suppose that{262} the German Government regarded lightly a break with the United States. At that time their newspapers were ridiculing9 and insulting us and making fun of the idea that Uncle Sam would go to war. The contrast between these journalistic vapourings and the anxiety, even the fear, which this high German official displayed much impressed me. The prospect10 of having our men and our resources thrown on the side of the Entente he did not regard indifferently, whatever the Berlin Press might say.
“It seems to us a shame that Mr. Lansing should insist that we declare the Lusitania sinking illegal,” von Jagow began. “He is acting11 like a technical lawyer.”
“If you want the real truth,” I replied, “I do not think that the United States is particular or technical about the precise terms that you use. But you must give definite assurances that you are sorry for the act, say that you regard it as an improper12 one, and that it will not occur again. Unless you do this, the United States will not be satisfied.”
“We cannot do that,” he answered. “Public opinion in Germany would not permit it. If we should make a declaration such as you outline the present Cabinet would fall.”
“But I thought that you had public opinion here well under control,” I answered. “It may take a little time, but certainly you can change public sentiment so that it would approve such a settlement.”
“As far as the newspapers are concerned,” said von Jagow, “that is true. We can absolutely control them. However, that will take some time. The newspapers cannot reverse themselves immediately; they will have to do it gradually, taking two or three weeks. We can manage them. But there are members of Parliament whom we can’t control, and they would make so much trouble that we would all have to resign.”
“Yet it seems to me,” I rejoined, “that you could get these members together, explain to them the necessity of keeping the United States out of the war, and that they would be convinced. The trouble is that you Germans don’t understand conditions in my country. You don’t think that the United States will fight. You don’t understand President Wilson; you think that he is an idealist and a peace man, and that under no circumstances will he take up arms. You are making the greatest and most costly13 mistake that any nation could make. The President has two sides to his nature. Do not forget that he has Scotch14-Irish blood in him. Up to the present you have seen only the Scotch side of him. That makes him very cautious, makes him weigh every{263} move, makes him patient and long-suffering. But he has also all the fire and combativeness15 of the Irish. Let him once set his jaws16 and it takes a crowbar to open them again. If he once decides to fight, he will fight with all his soul, and to the bitter end. You can go just so far with your provocations17 but no farther. You are also greatly deceived because certain important members of Congress, perhaps even a member of the Cabinet, have been for peace. But there is one man who is going to settle this matter—that is the President. He will settle it as he thinks right and just, irrespective of what other people may say or do.”
Von Jagow said that I had given him a new impression of the President. But he still had one more reason to believe that the United States would not go to war.
“How about the German-Americans?” he asked.
“I can tell you all about them,” I answered, “because I am one of them myself. I was born in Germany and spent the first nine years of my life here. I have always loved many things German, such as its music and its literature. But my parents left this country because they were dissatisfied and unhappy here. The United States gave us a friendly reception and a home, and made us prosperous and happy. There are many millions just like us; there is no business opportunity and no social position that is not open to us. I do not believe that there is a more contented18 people in the world than the so-called German-Americans. We have one loyalty19 and one love, and that is for the United States. Take my children—they are German-Americans of the second generation. Their sympathies all through this war have been with England and her Allies. My son is here with me; he tells me that if the United States goes to war he will enlist20 immediately. Do you suppose in case we should go to war with Germany that they would side with you? The idea is simply laughable. And the overwhelming mass of German-Americans feel precisely21 the same way.”
“But I am told,” said von Jagow, “that there will be an insurrection of German-Americans if your country makes war on us.”
“Dismiss any such idea from your mind,” I replied. “The first one who attempts it will be punished so promptly22 and so drastically that such a movement will not go far. And I think that the loyal German-Americans themselves will be the first to administer such punishment.”
“We wish to avoid a rupture23 with the United States,” said von Jagow, “but we must have time to change public sentiment here. There are two parties here, holding diametrically{264} opposed views on submarine warfare. One believes in pushing it to the limit, irrespective of consequences to the United States or any other Power. The present Cabinet takes the contrary view; we wish to meet the contentions24 of your President, but the militaristic faction25 is pushing us hard. They will force us out of office if we declare the Lusitania sinking illegal or improper. I think that President Wilson should understand this. We are working with him, but we must go cautiously. I should suppose that Mr. Wilson, since he wishes to avoid a break, would prefer to have us in power. Why should he take a stand that will drive us out of office and put in here people who will make war inevitable26 between Germany and the United States?”
“Do you wish Washington to understand,” I asked, “that your tenure27 of office depends on your not making this declaration?”
“We certainly do,” replied von Jagow. “I wish that you would telegraph Washington to that effect. Tell the President that, if we are displaced now, we shall be succeeded by people who advocate unlimited28 submarine warfare.”
He expressed himself as amazed at my description of President Wilson and his willingness to fight. “We regard him,” said von Jagow, “as absolutely a man of peace. Nor do we believe that the American people will fight. They are far from the scene of action, and what, after all, have they to fight for? Your material interests are not affected29.”
“But there is one thing that we will fight for,” I replied, “and that is moral principle. It is quite apparent that you do not understand the American spirit. You do not realise that we are holding off, not because we have no desire to fight, but because we wish to be absolutely fair. We first wish to have all the evidence in. I admit that we are reluctant to mix in foreign disputes, but we shall insist upon our right to use the ocean as we see fit, and we don’t propose to have Germany tell us how many ships we can sail and where they are to go. The American is still, perhaps, a great powerful youth, but, once he gets his mind made up that he is going to defend his rights, he will do so irrespective of consequences. You seem to think that Americans will not fight for a principle; you apparently have forgotten that all our wars have been over matters of principle. Take the greatest of them all—the Civil War, from 1861 to ’65. We in the North fought to emancipate30 the slaves; that was purely31 a matter of principle, our material interests were not involved. And we fought that to the end, although we had to fight our own brothers.”{265}
“We don’t want to be on bad terms with the United States,” von Jagow replied. “There are three nations on whom the peace of the world depends—England, the United States, and Germany. We three should get together, establish peace and maintain it. I thank you for your explanation; I understand the situation much better now. But I still don’t see why your Government is so hard on Germany and so easy with England.”
I made the usual explanation that we regarded our problem with each nation as a distinct matter, and could not make our treatment of Germany in any way conditional32 on our treatment of England.
“Oh yes,” replied von Jagow rather plaintively33. “It reminds me of two boys playing in a yard. One is to be punished first and the other is waiting for his turn. Wilson is going to spank34 the German boy first and, after he gets through, then he proposes to take up England.
“However,” he concluded, “I wish you would cable the President that you have gone over the matter with me and now understand the German point of view. Won’t you please ask him to do nothing until you have reached the other side and explained the whole thing personally?”
I made this promise and cabled immediately.
At three o’clock I had an engagement to take tea with a director of the Orient Bank and his wife. I had been there only a few minutes when Zimmerman was announced. He was a different kind of man from von Jagow. He impressed me as being much stronger, mentally and physically35. He was tall, even stately in his bearing, masterful in his manner, direct and searching in his questions, but extremely pleasing and insinuating36.
Zimmerman, discussing the German-American situation, began with a statement which I presume he thought would be gratifying to me. He told me how splendidly the Jews had behaved in Germany during the war and how deeply under obligations the Germans felt to them.
“After the war,” he said, “they are going to be much better treated in Germany than they have been.”
Zimmerman told me that von Jagow had told him about our talk, and asked me to repeat part of it. He was particularly interested, he said, in my statements about the German-Americans, and he wished to learn from me himself the facts upon which I based my conclusions. Like most Germans, he regarded the Germanic elements in our population as almost a part of Germany.
“Are you sure that the mass of German-Americans would be{266} loyal to the United States in case of war?” he asked. “Aren’t their feelings for the Fatherland really dominant37?”
“You evidently regard those German-Americans as a distinct part of the population,” I replied, “living apart from the rest of the people and having very little to do with American life as a whole. You could not make a greater mistake. You can purchase a few here and there who will make a big noise and shout for Germany, but I am talking about the millions of Americans of German ancestry38. These people regard themselves as Americans and nothing else. The second generation particularly resent being looked upon as Germans. It is practically impossible to make them talk German; they refuse to speak anything but English. They do not read German newspapers and will not go to German schools. They even resent going to Lutheran churches where the language is German. We have more than a million German-Americans in New York City, but it has been a great struggle to keep alive one German theatre; the reason is that these people prefer the theatres where English is the language. We have a few German clubs, but their membership is very small. The German-Americans prefer to belong to the clubs of general membership, and there is not a single one in New York, even the finest, where they are not received upon their merits. In the political and social life of New York there are few German-Americans who, as such, have acquired any prominent position, though there are plenty of men of distinguished39 position who are German in origin. If the United States and Germany go to war, you will not only be surprised at the loyalty of our German people, but the whole world will be. Another point: if the United States goes in, we shall fight to the end, and it will be a very long and a very determined40 struggle.”
After three years I have no reason to be ashamed of either of these prophecies. I sometimes wonder what Zimmerman now thinks of my statements.
After the explanation, Zimmerman began to talk about Turkey. He was very interested in finding out whether the Turks were likely to make a separate peace. I bluntly told him that the Turks felt themselves to be under no obligations to the Germans. This gave me another opportunity.
“I have learned a good deal about German methods in Turkey,” I said. “I think it would be a great mistake to attempt similar tactics in the United States. I speak of this because there has been a good deal of sabotage41 there already. This in itself is solidifying42 the German-Americans against you, and is, more than anything else, driving the United States into the arms of England.”{267}
“But the German Government is not responsible,” said Zimmerman. “We know nothing about it.”
Naturally I could not accept that statement on its face value—recent developments have shown how mendacious43 it was—but we passed to other topics. The matter of the submarine came up again.
“We have voluntarily interned44 our Navy,” said Zimmerman. “We can do nothing at sea except with our submarines. It seems to me that the United States is making a serious mistake in so strongly opposing the submarine. You have a long coastline and you may need the U-boat yourself some day. Suppose one of the European Powers, and particularly Japan, should attack you. You could use the submarine to good purpose then. Besides, if you insist on this proposed declaration in the Lusitania matter, you will simply force our Government into the hands of the Tirpitz party.”
Zimmerman now returned again to the situation in Turkey. His questions showed that he was much displeased45 with the new German Ambassador, Graf von Metternich. Metternich, it seemed, had not made a success of winning the goodwill46 of the reigning47 powers in Turkey and had been a trial to the German Foreign Office. Metternich had shown a different attitude toward the Armenians from Wangenheim, and he had made sincere attempts with Talaat and Enver to stop them. Zimmerman now told me that Metternich had made a great mistake in doing this and had destroyed his influence at Constantinople. Zimmerman made no effort to conceal48 his displeasure over Metternich’s manifestation49 of a humanitarian50 spirit. I now saw that Wangenheim had really represented the attitude of official Berlin, and I thus had confirmation51, from the highest German authority, of my conviction that Germany had silently acquiesced52 in those deportations.
In a few days we had taken the steamer at Copenhagen, and on February 22nd I found myself once more sailing into New York Harbour.
The End
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1
outrage
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| n.暴行，侮辱，愤怒；vt.凌辱，激怒 | |
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negotiations
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| 协商( negotiation的名词复数 )； 谈判； 完成（难事）； 通过 | |
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indemnity
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| n.赔偿，赔款，补偿金 | |
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4
warfare
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| n.战争(状态)；斗争；冲突 | |
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5
stultifying
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| v.使成为徒劳，使变得无用( stultify的现在分词 ) | |
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6
entente
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| n.协定；有协定关系的各国 | |
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7
disposition
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| n.性情，性格；意向，倾向；排列，部署 | |
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apparently
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| adv.显然地；表面上，似乎 | |
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ridiculing
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| v.嘲笑，嘲弄，奚落( ridicule的现在分词 ) | |
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10
prospect
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| n.前景，前途；景色，视野 | |
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11
acting
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| n.演戏，行为，假装；adj.代理的，临时的，演出用的 | |
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12
improper
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| adj.不适当的，不合适的，不正确的，不合礼仪的 | |
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costly
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| adj.昂贵的，价值高的，豪华的 | |
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14
scotch
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| n.伤口，刻痕；苏格兰威士忌酒；v.粉碎，消灭，阻止；adj.苏格兰(人)的 | |
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15
combativeness
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| n.好战 | |
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jaws
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| n.口部；嘴 | |
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provocations
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| n.挑衅( provocation的名词复数 )；激怒；刺激；愤怒的原因 | |
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18
contented
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| adj.满意的，安心的，知足的 | |
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loyalty
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| n.忠诚，忠心 | |
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enlist
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| vt.谋取(支持等)，赢得；征募；vi.入伍 | |
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precisely
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| adv.恰好，正好，精确地，细致地 | |
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promptly
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| adv.及时地，敏捷地 | |
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rupture
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| n.破裂；(关系的)决裂；v.(使)破裂 | |
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contentions
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| n.竞争( contention的名词复数 )；争夺；争论；论点 | |
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faction
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| n.宗派，小集团；派别；派系斗争 | |
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inevitable
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| adj.不可避免的，必然发生的 | |
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tenure
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| n.终身职位；任期；(土地)保有权，保有期 | |
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28
unlimited
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| adj.无限的，不受控制的，无条件的 | |
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affected
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| adj.不自然的，假装的 | |
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30
emancipate
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| v.解放，解除 | |
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31
purely
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| adv.纯粹地，完全地 | |
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32
conditional
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| adj.条件的，带有条件的 | |
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33
plaintively
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| adv.悲哀地，哀怨地 | |
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34
spank
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| v.打，拍打(在屁股上) | |
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35
physically
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| adj.物质上，体格上，身体上，按自然规律 | |
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36
insinuating
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| adj.曲意巴结的，暗示的v.暗示( insinuate的现在分词 )；巧妙或迂回地潜入；（使）缓慢进入；慢慢伸入 | |
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dominant
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| adj.支配的，统治的；占优势的；显性的；n.主因，要素，主要的人(或物)；显性基因 | |
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ancestry
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| n.祖先，家世 | |
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distinguished
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| adj.卓越的，杰出的，著名的 | |
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determined
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| adj.坚定的；有决心的 | |
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41
sabotage
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| n.怠工，破坏活动，破坏；v.从事破坏活动，妨害，破坏 | |
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42
solidifying
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| （使）成为固体，（使）变硬，（使）变得坚固( solidify的现在分词 )； 使团结一致； 充实，巩固； 具体化 | |
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mendacious
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| adj.不真的，撒谎的 | |
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44
interned
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| v.拘留，关押( intern的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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45
displeased
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| a.不快的 | |
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46
goodwill
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| n.善意，亲善，信誉，声誉 | |
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47
reigning
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| adj.统治的，起支配作用的 | |
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48
conceal
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| v.隐藏，隐瞒，隐蔽 | |
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49
manifestation
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| n.表现形式；表明；现象 | |
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50
humanitarian
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| n.人道主义者，博爱者，基督凡人论者 | |
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51
confirmation
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| n.证实，确认，批准 | |
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52
acquiesced
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| v.默认，默许( acquiesce的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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