It was in my own home, the German Embassy in London, where the atmosphere was entirely1 political, that I learned my first steps in politics. My father did not belong to that class of diplomats2, so prevalent to-day, who treat politics as an occupation to be pursued only in their spare time. His whole life was consecrated3 to the cause of the German nation, and from my earliest childhood my mind was filled with the same idea, to the exclusion4 of all others.
Owing to my father's share in the negotiations6 which brought about the marriage of the Emperor Frederick with the Princess Royal of England, the Imperial couple became closely connected with my parents, and, as Crown Prince and Princess, frequently resided at the Embassy in London. It was the entourage of the Emperor Frederick that first inspired in me those political views, which, during a long diplomatic career, gradually crystallized into the deep-rooted convictions of my political outlook. I believed Germany's salvation7 to lie in the direction of a liberal development of Unification and Parliamentary Government, as also in an attitude of consistent friendliness8 towards England and the United States of America. Thus, to use a modern phrase, I Page 2 was an avowed9 supporter of the Western Policy. At the present moment, while we are standing10 as mourners at the grave of our national hopes, I am more than ever convinced, that had this policy been steadily11 pursued, we should have been spared the catastrophe12 that has overtaken us.
On the other hand, I will not deny, that even the Oriental Policy would have proved a feasible political scheme, if only we had decided13 to pursue it in good time. Albeit14, I am of opinion that even Bismarck had already started us in the direction of the Western Policy, when in 1879 he decided in favor of Austria-Hungary and not Russia. Despite all that the careworn15 recluse16 of Friedrichsruhe may have written against Caprivi's policy, which was decidedly Western in tendency, he was himself the founder17 of the Triple Alliance, which, without the good-will of England, could not have come into existence. Had we pursued an Eastern Policy, though it would ultimately have led to the sacrifice and partition of Austria-Hungary, it would not have secured us those advantages in the Orient of which Marschall speaks. Nevertheless, I have always regretted that we sent such a first-rate man to Constantinople, for him ultimately to become the able director of the false policy which we pursued there. There is an Oriental proverb which says: "Never lay your load on a dead camel's back."
If, as I always used to hope, we had resolved to adopt the Western Policy, we should in any case have had to be prepared, in certain circumstances, to venture with England's help upon a war against Russia. And the experiences of the Five-Years War have taught us that we should have won such a conflict with ease. I never wanted a war with Russia, and was never an enemy of that country; but I believed that our position among the nations of the world would compel us to decide one way Page 3 or the other, and I felt, just as Caprivi did, that we should not very well be able to avoid war. Even if, in the event of a war between the Triple Alliance and Russia and France, England had only maintained an attitude of friendly neutrality, this would have proved very much more favorable for us than the situation which developed out of the Encirclement Policy (Einkreisungspolitik). Furthermore, had we pursued the Western Policy, we should have had to reckon with the possibility of England's wishing to moderate, even in a perfectly18 friendly manner, our somewhat explosive economic development. I should not, however, have regarded this altogether as a disadvantage. For, truth to tell, we grew a little too rapidly. We ought, as "junior partners" in Britain's world-empire, to have gathered our strength more slowly. As an example of what I mean, take the policy which France and Japan have pursued since the beginning of the present century. If we had done the same, we should, at all events, have been saved from so seriously overheating the boilers19 of our industrial development, we should not have outstripped20 England as quickly as we undoubtedly21 could have done if we had been left to develop freely, but we should also have escaped the mortal danger which we drew upon ourselves by provoking universal hostility22.
It is impossible now for me to demonstrate retrospectively that we should have been able to conclude an alliance with England. Prince Bülow denies that this was ever the case. Maybe that during his tenure23 of office this possibility did not offer a sufficient guarantee of future security to warrant our incurring24 the hostility of Russia. I am convinced, however, that an alliance with England would have been within our power, if we had pursued Caprivi's policy consistently, and the Kruger telegram had never been dispatched. Unfortunately Page 4 we have always had statesmen at the helm in Germany,—Bismarck not excepted,—the bulk of whose views and knowledge were essentially25 continental26, and who never felt quite at home with English ways of thinking. I feel perfectly satisfied on this point, however, that English commercial jealousy27, with which we naturally had to reckon, would not have proved an insuperable obstacle to a good understanding with England, provided that we had declared ourselves ready, if necessary, to fight Russia.
The policy of the free hand, which we pursued until the outbreak of war, aimed at the highest possible results. Prince Bülow, who was the inaugurator of this policy, might possibly have known how to steer28 us through the "Danger-Zone" without provoking war. And then in a few years to come, we should have become so strong and should have left the Danger-Zone so very far behind us, that, as far as human judgment29 could tell, we should no longer have had any need to fear war. German naval30 construction from the beginning of the present century certainly made our relationship to England very much worse, while it also materially increased the danger of our position from the standpoint of world-politics. The Bülow-Tirpitz notion of a Risikoflotte,[*] may, however, only have been practicable on condition that our diplomacy31 were sufficiently32 skilful33 to avoid war, as long as the "risk" idea in England was not able, of itself, to maintain peace.
[Footnote *: Literally34: a fleet for risks or for taking risks; a fleet to be used at a venture.]
German foreign policy had been ably conducted by Bismarck; but, in keeping with the times, it had been almost exclusively Continental and European. At the very moment when Bismarck withdrew from the arena35, Germany's era of world-politics began. It was not the Page 5 free bloom of our statesmen's own creative powers; but a bitter necessity, born of the imperative36 need of providing Germany's increasing population with sufficient foodstuffs37. But it was not our world-politics, as such, that brought about our downfall; but the way we set to work in prosecuting38 our policy. The Triple Alliance, with its excellent Reinsurance Treaty, did not constitute a sufficiently powerful springboard from which to take our plunge39 into world-politics. The Reinsurance contract could not be anything but a makeshift, which merely deferred40 the inevitable41 choice which had to be made between Russia and Austria-Hungary. In the course of time, we should either have had to decide entirely in favor of Russia, in the manner outlined above, or we should have had to try to come to an understanding with England, upon terms which, at all events, we should not have been at liberty to choose for ourselves. Unfortunately, however, it was an axiom of post-Bismarckian German politics, that the differences between Russia and England were irreconcilable42, and that the Triple Alliance would have to constitute the needle-index of the scales between these two hostile Powers. This proposition was incessantly43 contested both verbally and in writing by Herr von Holstein, who was then the leading spirit at the Foreign Office. He perceived that its chief flaw was the weak point in the Triple Alliance itself,—that is to say, the differences between Austria-Hungary and Italy on the one hand, and Italy's dependence44 upon England's superior power in the Mediterranean45 on the other. Furthermore, he recognized the prodigious46 possibility, which was not beyond the art of English statesmanship, of a compromise between England and Russia. He did not see, however, how the hostility of the French to ourselves would serve as a medium for this universal coalition47 against us.
Page 6 In the last Entente48 Note of the Five-Years War there is the following passage:
"For many years the rulers of Germany, true to the Prussian tradition, strove for a position of dominance in Europe. They required that they should be able to dictate49 and tyrannize to a subservient50 Europe, as they dictated51 and tyrannized over subservient Germany."
We Germans know that this indictment52 is a lie; but unfortunately all unprejudiced Germans must acknowledge that for years this lie has been believed outside Germany. We, for our part, cherished similar views about our enemies, nor did we make a sufficient effort to dissipate their prejudices. On the contrary we constantly lent color to them by means of the extravagant53 and high-flown speeches, which formed the accompaniment to our world and naval policy, and by means of our opposition54 to pacifism, disarmament, and arbitration55 schemes, etc., etc. The extent to which our attitude at the Hague Conference damaged us in the eyes of the whole world is no longer a secret to anybody. As Heinrich Friedjung rightly observes:
"At the Hague Conference German diplomacy delivered itself up to the vengeance56 of the pacifists, like a culprit."
During my tenure of office in Washington I succeeded on three occasions in coming to an agreement with the Government there regarding the terms of an arbitration treaty. All three treaties were, however, rejected in Berlin, and consequently in America I never ceased from being questioned reproachfully as to the reason why the United States had been able to conclude arbitration Page 7 treaties with every other State in the world, but not with Germany.
The Entente Note, already quoted above, contained this further statement:
"As soon as their preparations were complete, they encouraged a subservient ally to declare war against Serbia at forty-eight hours' notice, knowing full well that a conflict involving the control of the Balkans could not be localized and almost certainly meant a general war. In order to make doubly sure, they refused every attempt at conciliation58 and conference until it was too late, and the world war was inevitable for which they had plotted, and for which alone among the nations they were fully57 equipped and prepared."
The leaders of the Entente Powers would like to exalt59 this distortion of history into a dogma, in order that their various peoples may not bring any unpleasant charges against them. And yet the historical truth is already pretty clear to all who look for it honestly and without prejudice. The German Government believed that the Serbian propaganda would annihilate60 Austria-Hungary, and hoped, moreover, that her last faithful ally would experience a political renaissance61 as the result of her chastisement62 of Serbia. That is why they gave Count Berchtold a free hand, in the belief that Count Bülow's success over the Bosnian crisis could be repeated. Meanwhile, however, the situation had changed. Russia and France, relying upon England's help, wanted to risk a war. When the German Government saw this they tried, like a driver of a car about to collide with another vehicle, to jam on all breaks, and to drive backwards63. But it was then too late. The mistake our Government made was to consent to Austria-Hungary's Page 8 making so daring an experiment, at a moment of such critical tension.
It is not true either that we were thoroughly64 equipped and prepared for war. We had neither sufficient supplies of munitions65, foodstuffs and raw materials, nor any plan of campaign for a war with England. Be this as it may, we should not have been defeated if we had abided firmly by our defensive66 policy. The heroic spirit displayed by the German people surpassed all bounds, and they believed quite honestly that they were fighting a war of defence. If our policy had been conducted with corresponding consistency67 we should have saved our position in the world. We ought always to have borne in mind the analogy of the Seven Years War, in order to have been ready at any moment to extricate68 ourselves from the hopeless business with the least possible amount of loss.
After the first battle of the Marne, President Wilson consistently maintained that a decision was no longer possible by force of arms. This view, which I also shared, gave us some common ground, upon which, despite our other differences, we were able to some extent to work together.
Regarding Dr. Wilson's personality certain doubts have been and are still entertained by many people. He is the most brilliant and most eloquent69 exponent70 of the American point of view. But he does not devote the same energy and consistency to the execution of his various programmes as he does to their formation. There can be no question that, as a result both of his origin and his training, the President is very much under the sway of English thought and ideals. Nevertheless, his ambition to be a Peacemaker and an Arbiter71 Mundi certainly suggested the chance of our winning him over to our side, in the event of our being unable to achieve a Page 9 decisive victory with the forces at our disposal. In this case, Wilson, as the democratic leader of the strongest neutral Power, was the most suitable person to propose and to bring about a Peace by arrangement.
After the opening of the U-boat campaign, two alternatives remained open to us, one of which we were compelled to choose. If the prospects73 of a U-boat war promised to secure a victory, it was naturally incumbent74 upon us to prosecute75 it with all possible speed and energy. If, as I personally believed, the U-boat war did not guarantee a victory, it ought, owing to the enormous amount of friction76 to which it could not help giving rise, under all circumstances to have been abandoned; for, by creating American hostility, it did us more harm than good.
I, as the German Ambassador, in the greatest neutral State, with the evidences of American power all about me, could not help feeling it my duty to maintain our diplomatic relations with the United States. I was convinced that we should most certainly lose the war if America stepped in against us. And thus I realized ever more and more the supreme77 importance of preventing this from taking place.
My communications to the Central Government were framed with a view to inducing them also to adopt this attitude; but they, of course, had to form their conclusions, not from one source, but from all the sources of information they possessed78. At all events, isolated79 as I was at Washington, I could not confine myself merely to the task of furnishing my Government with information; but was compelled on occasion to act on my own initiative, in order to prevent any premature80 development in the diplomatic situation from becoming utterly81 hopeless.
The policy for which I stood not only promised the negative success of keeping America out of the war, but Page 10 it also offered the only prospect72 there was of obtaining, with neutral help, a Peace by arrangement. My belief that such a peace could have been obtained through Dr. Wilson is, of course, no longer susceptible82 of proof to-day. It may perhaps sound improbable in view of the President's behavior at Versailles. It is my opinion, however, that, previous to the 31st of January, 1917, Dr. Wilson's attitude towards us was radically83 different. I base my assumption that Wilson might in those days have assisted us in obtaining a Peace by negotiation5 upon the following points:
(1) A Peace by mediation84 was the only way in which the United States could avoid becoming involved in the war, and this is what the American public opinion of the day wished above all to prevent.
(2) It is true that even if he had wished to do so, Wilson could not have declared war on England, neither could he by any exercise of force have prevented the delivery of munitions to the Allies, or have compelled England to observe the rights of nations. He could, however, have obliged England to conclude a Peace by arrangement with us; not only because in so doing he would have had the support of American public opinion, but also because such a policy was in keeping with the best political interests of the United States.
I therefore pursued the policy of Peace with undeviating consistency, and to this day I still believe it to have been the only right policy. A thorough prosecution85 of the U-boat campaign was also a feasible scheme. But the worst thing that we could possibly do, was, to steer the zigzag86 course; for by so doing we were certain not only to cause constant vexations to America, but, by our half measures and partial pliancy87, also to drive Mr. Page 11 Wilson even further and further into the inflexible88 attitude of a policy of prestige. Unfortunately, however, it was precisely89 this zigzag course that we adopted; and thus, in addition to destroying the prospects which my policy had offered, according to the view of the Naval people, we also crippled the effects of the U-boat campaign.
My policy might best be described as that of "a silent resolve to obtain Peace." It was utterly wrong to publish our readiness for Peace broadcast. We should have presented a strong front to the outside world, and we should have increased the powers of resistance which we actually possessed by emphasizing our strength both to our people at home and to other States. According to my view, we ought, after the first battle of the Marne, to have recognized in our heart of hearts that victory was out of the question, and consequently we should have striven to conclude a Peace, the relatively90 unfavorable terms of which might perhaps have temporarily staggered public opinion in Germany and created some indignation. It was not right, however, to allow deference91 to public opinion to outweigh92 other considerations, as it did in our case. The political leaders of the Empire ought to have kept the High Military Command, which from its point of view naturally demanded firmer "assurances" than the general situation warranted, more thoroughly within bounds, just as Bismarck did. Presumably the High Military Command would have been able to perform its duties quite as efficiently93 if it had been prevented from exercising too much influence on the policy which aimed at a conclusion of peace.
As a politician I consider that the ultimate cause of our misfortune was our lack of a uniform policy both before and during the war. If, at the time of Bismarck's retirement94, we had made a timely and resolute95 decision Page 12 either in favor of the Western Policy that he advocated, or in favor of the Eastern Policy, we should have prevented the development of a situation in the politics of the world which ultimately led to our own undoing96. If, during the war, however, we had completely abandoned the U-boat campaign, and had made every possible effort to come to an understanding with America, we should, in my opinion, have been able to extricate ourselves from it satisfactorily. Be this as it may, it is also possible that if the U-boat campaign had been prosecuted97 resolutely98, and without any shilly-shallying—a thing I never wished—we should not have suffered so complete a collapse99 from the military, economic, political and moral point of view, as we must otherwise have done. According to my view it is the hesitating zigzag course that we pursued which is chiefly to blame for the fact that of all possible results of the epoch100 of German world-politics, the unhappiest for ourselves has come to pass. The Wilhelminian Age perished owing to the fact that no definite objects were either selected or pursued in good time, and, above all, because both before and during the war, two systems in the Government of the country were constantly at variance101 with each other and mutually corroding102.
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1
entirely
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| ad.全部地，完整地；完全地，彻底地 | |
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diplomats
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| n.外交官( diplomat的名词复数 )；有手腕的人，善于交际的人 | |
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consecrated
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| adj.神圣的，被视为神圣的v.把…奉为神圣，给…祝圣( consecrate的过去式和过去分词 )；奉献 | |
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exclusion
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| n.拒绝，排除，排斥，远足，远途旅行 | |
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negotiation
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| n.谈判，协商 | |
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negotiations
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| 协商( negotiation的名词复数 )； 谈判； 完成（难事）； 通过 | |
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salvation
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| n.（尤指基督）救世，超度，拯救，解困 | |
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friendliness
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| n.友谊，亲切，亲密 | |
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avowed
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| adj.公开声明的，承认的v.公开声明，承认( avow的过去式和过去分词) | |
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standing
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| n.持续，地位；adj.永久的，不动的，直立的，不流动的 | |
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steadily
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| adv.稳定地；不变地；持续地 | |
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catastrophe
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| n.大灾难，大祸 | |
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decided
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| adj.决定了的，坚决的；明显的，明确的 | |
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albeit
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| conj.即使；纵使；虽然 | |
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careworn
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| adj.疲倦的，饱经忧患的 | |
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recluse
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| n.隐居者 | |
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Founder
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| n.创始者，缔造者 | |
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perfectly
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| adv.完美地，无可非议地，彻底地 | |
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boilers
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| 锅炉，烧水器，水壶( boiler的名词复数 ) | |
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outstripped
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| v.做得比…更好，（在赛跑等中）超过( outstrip的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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undoubtedly
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| adv.确实地，无疑地 | |
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hostility
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| n.敌对，敌意；抵制［pl.］交战，战争 | |
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tenure
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| n.终身职位；任期；(土地)保有权，保有期 | |
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incurring
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| 遭受，招致，引起( incur的现在分词 ) | |
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essentially
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| adv.本质上，实质上，基本上 | |
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continental
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| adj.大陆的，大陆性的，欧洲大陆的 | |
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jealousy
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| n.妒忌，嫉妒，猜忌 | |
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steer
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| vt.驾驶，为…操舵；引导；vi.驾驶 | |
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judgment
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| n.审判；判断力，识别力，看法，意见 | |
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naval
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| adj.海军的，军舰的，船的 | |
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diplomacy
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| n.外交；外交手腕，交际手腕 | |
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sufficiently
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| adv.足够地，充分地 | |
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skilful
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| (=skillful)adj.灵巧的，熟练的 | |
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literally
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| adv.照字面意义，逐字地；确实 | |
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arena
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| n.竞技场，运动场所；竞争场所，舞台 | |
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imperative
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| n.命令，需要；规则；祈使语气；adj.强制的；紧急的 | |
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foodstuffs
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| 食物，食品( foodstuff的名词复数 ) | |
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prosecuting
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| 检举、告发某人( prosecute的现在分词 )； 对某人提起公诉； 继续从事（某事物）； 担任控方律师 | |
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plunge
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| v.跳入，(使)投入，(使)陷入；猛冲 | |
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deferred
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| adj.延期的，缓召的v.拖延，延缓，推迟( defer的过去式和过去分词 )；服从某人的意愿，遵从 | |
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inevitable
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| adj.不可避免的，必然发生的 | |
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irreconcilable
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| adj.（指人）难和解的，势不两立的 | |
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incessantly
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| ad.不停地 | |
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dependence
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| n.依靠，依赖；信任，信赖；隶属 | |
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Mediterranean
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| adj.地中海的；地中海沿岸的 | |
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prodigious
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| adj.惊人的，奇妙的；异常的；巨大的；庞大的 | |
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coalition
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| n.结合体，同盟，结合，联合 | |
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entente
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| n.协定；有协定关系的各国 | |
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dictate
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| v.口授；(使)听写；指令，指示，命令 | |
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subservient
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| adj.卑屈的，阿谀的 | |
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dictated
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| v.大声讲或读( dictate的过去式和过去分词 )；口授；支配；摆布 | |
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52
indictment
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| n.起诉；诉状 | |
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53
extravagant
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| adj.奢侈的；过分的；(言行等)放肆的 | |
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opposition
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| n.反对，敌对 | |
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arbitration
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| n.调停，仲裁 | |
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vengeance
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| n.报复，报仇，复仇 | |
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fully
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| adv.完全地，全部地，彻底地；充分地 | |
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conciliation
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| n.调解，调停 | |
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exalt
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| v.赞扬，歌颂，晋升，提升 | |
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annihilate
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| v.使无效；毁灭；取消 | |
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renaissance
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| n.复活，复兴，文艺复兴 | |
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chastisement
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| n.惩罚 | |
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backwards
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| adv.往回地，向原处，倒，相反，前后倒置地 | |
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thoroughly
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| adv.完全地，彻底地，十足地 | |
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munitions
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| n.军火，弹药；v.供应…军需品 | |
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defensive
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| adj.防御的；防卫的；防守的 | |
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consistency
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| n.一贯性，前后一致，稳定性；(液体的)浓度 | |
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extricate
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| v.拯救，救出；解脱 | |
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eloquent
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| adj.雄辩的，口才流利的；明白显示出的 | |
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exponent
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| n.倡导者，拥护者；代表人物；指数，幂 | |
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arbiter
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| n.仲裁人，公断人 | |
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prospect
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| n.前景，前途；景色，视野 | |
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prospects
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| n.希望，前途(恒为复数) | |
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incumbent
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| adj.成为责任的，有义务的；现任的，在职的 | |
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prosecute
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| vt.告发；进行；vi.告发，起诉，作检察官 | |
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friction
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| n.摩擦，摩擦力 | |
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supreme
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| adj.极度的，最重要的；至高的，最高的 | |
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possessed
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| adj.疯狂的；拥有的，占有的 | |
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isolated
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| adj.与世隔绝的 | |
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premature
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| adj.比预期时间早的；不成熟的，仓促的 | |
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utterly
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| adv.完全地，绝对地 | |
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susceptible
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| adj.过敏的，敏感的；易动感情的，易受感动的 | |
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radically
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| ad.根本地，本质地 | |
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mediation
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| n.调解 | |
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prosecution
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| n.起诉，告发，检举，执行，经营 | |
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zigzag
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| n.曲折，之字形；adj.曲折的，锯齿形的；adv.曲折地，成锯齿形地；vt.使曲折；vi.曲折前行 | |
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pliancy
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| n.柔软，柔顺 | |
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inflexible
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| adj.不可改变的，不受影响的，不屈服的 | |
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precisely
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| adv.恰好，正好，精确地，细致地 | |
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relatively
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| adv.比较...地，相对地 | |
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deference
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| n.尊重，顺从；敬意 | |
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outweigh
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| vt.比...更重，...更重要 | |
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efficiently
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| adv.高效率地，有能力地 | |
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retirement
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| n.退休，退职 | |
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resolute
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| adj.坚决的，果敢的 | |
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undoing
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| n.毁灭的原因，祸根；破坏，毁灭 | |
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prosecuted
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| a.被起诉的 | |
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resolutely
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| adj.坚决地，果断地 | |
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99
collapse
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| vi.累倒；昏倒；倒塌；塌陷 | |
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epoch
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| n.(新)时代；历元 | |
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variance
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| n.矛盾，不同 | |
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102
corroding
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| 使腐蚀，侵蚀( corrode的现在分词 ) | |
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