Anyone who has lived some time in the United States will feel with Goethe that "America is better off than our own Continent." Owing to the almost perfect autarchy existing there, grave economic problems never really arise. Nowhere else, during the whole course of my various diplomatic wanderings, have I ever seen a happier people, who looked more cheerfully into the future. In view of the comparatively sparse3 population of the country, intensive agricultural production has only become necessary in a few isolated4 districts; there are always purchasers in plenty for the rich surplus of raw materials available, and industry has not yet been directed solely5 towards export. As a result of these happy conditions, the American citizen feels but little interest for what goes on in other countries. In the period preceding the Five-Years War, if the political interests of the United States ever happened to cross those of Europe, it was almost exclusively in regard to American questions. As a proof of this we have only to think of the Spanish-American War, and of the various incidents relating to Venezuela; whereas it was only with difficulty that the German Government succeeded in inducing President Roosevelt's Administration to take part in the Algeciras Conference, at which the presence of the United States representative in no way alleviated6 our task.
Page 14 Up to the time of the Five-Years War, the Foreign Policy conducted from Washington was almost entirely7 Pan-American, and the Monroe Doctrine8 was the beginning and end of it; for even if that versatile9 man, President Roosevelt, was fond of extending his activities to other spheres, as, for instance, when he brought the Russo-Japanese War to an end by the Peace of Portsmouth, the Panama Canal scheme remained his favorite child. But in the case of the Russo-Japanese War, it was home politics, which in America are chiefly responsible for turning the scales in regard to Foreign Policy, that again played the principal part. Mr. Roosevelt wished to win over to his side the very strong pacifist element in America; whereas the Imperialists—particularly later on—deprecated these successful attempts at mediation10, because they prevented a further weakening of both of the belligerent11 parties. Even Roosevelt's Secretary of State, John Hay, concerned himself actively12 with the Far East, and was known in America as the spiritual founder13 of the policy of the "Open Door." In this particular matter, the German Government frequently acted hand in hand with the American, and it was owing to this circumstance that the Foreign Office at Berlin very much wished to have the United States represented at the Algeciras Conference. The German Government believed that the Americans would also declare themselves in favor of the "Open Door" even in Morocco. This assumption, however, turned out to be a false one, owing to the fact that the political and economic interest shown by the United States for countries on the other side of the Atlantic Ocean was not sufficiently14 keen. The Algeciras Conference was a fairly trustworthy forecast of all that subsequently happened at the Peace Conference at Versailles. Equally lacking in foundation was also the assumption, so prevalent in Germany, Page 15 that, as the result of their energetic Far-Eastern policy, the Americans would plunge15 themselves into a serious conflict with Japan.
The question of the Philippines, which arose out of the Spanish-American War and the Cuban affair, constitutes a certain contrast to the customary Pan-American Foreign Policy of the United States. A large number of Americans—possibly the majority—would like to relinquish16 the Philippines as soon as the inhabitants of these islands are in a position to rule themselves. At its inception17, the question of the Philippines brought us into a conflict with the United States, which was remembered by Americans for years. Heinrich Friedjung, referring to this incident, says:
"Quite superfluously18 it occurred to the German Government to make our East-Asiatic Squadron, under Admiral Diederichs, appear before Manila precisely19 at the moment when, in 1898, the decision was made regarding the Philippines. This was done simply out of a pointless consciousness of power, without any intention to cause offence."
This criticism is partly justified20. And yet the affair was somewhat different from the version of it which the American Ambassador, Andrew White, allowed to filter through; for, seeing that, as the United States did not intend to retain the Philippines, they could raise no objection to Germany's wishing to acquire them. Thanks to his friendly attitude towards Germany, Andrew White had, on his own initiative, exceeded his instructions and was duly censured21 by his Government for his zeal22. Nevertheless, a misunderstanding had occurred, as the result of which the Berlin Foreign Office had acted in perfect good faith. In the public mind in the United States, however, Page 16 the feeling still rankled23 that Germany had wished to make a demonstration24 against their Government; and the English Press, which at that time was hostile to us, applied25 the bellows26 enthusiastically to the glowing embers of American ill-humor.
The Venezuela affair, in the year 1902, which was a matter of lodging27 certain complaints against the Venezuelan Government, ended in a similar manner. Germany and England together sent their ultimatum28 to Venezuela, and when no heed29 was paid to it, they instituted a blockade of a number of Venezuelan ports. It was at this time that I was appointed Secretary to the Embassy in London, where I had to conduct a good deal of the negotiations31 regarding the Venezuela question, with the Foreign Office. The whole affair, as initiated32 by ourselves, was, in proportion to the German claims, much too elaborate. The first suggestion which led to the common action on the part of the British and ourselves, came from the English side; but we should have been wiser, from the point of view of our own advantage, if we had not listened to the suggestion. It was absolutely clear from the start that the American Government would raise objections to this sort of procedure, on the part of European powers, in South America, and that England, true to her usual custom, would climb down before the United States the moment she recognized plainly the latter's displeasure. And when public opinion in America raised a violent protest, and, incidentally, resolutely33 assumed that Germany wished to obtain a footing in Venezuela, the English Press attacked us in the rear by asserting that the whole affair had been engineered by Germany, in order to embroil34 England with the United States. At President Roosevelt's wish the matter was finally settled with America's help; but in the United States it left behind the widely Page 17 prevalent impression that Germany would infringe35 the Monroe Doctrine the moment she had the power to do so.
President Taft, who in the year 1909 took President Roosevelt's place, endeavored, with his Secretary of State, Philander36 Knox, to develop still further the policy of the "Open Door," inaugurated by John Hay. Both gentlemen felt the keenest interest in the Far East. The former had been Governor of the Philippines, the latter had been closely connected with the Pittsburgh iron industry, and knew the need of extending its sphere of activities. Mr. Knox suggested the proposal of internationalizing the railways of Manchuria. When, however, this American notion met with response in Germany, and apart from its general rejection37 elsewhere, had the further effect of drawing Japan and Russia together again, Mr. Knox abandoned his active Far-Eastern policy, and confined himself to stimulating38 the large banks of America into becoming interested in the building of railways and other economic means of development in China. This policy was described as "Dollar Diplomacy39" by the Democratic Opposition40, and violently opposed. When, therefore, the votes went against the Republican Party, and President Wilson came to the helm, he let the Far-Eastern policy drop. High Finance immediately seized this opportunity in order to extricate41 itself from Chinese undertakings43. It had only embarked44 upon "Dollar Diplomacy" at the request of the Government, and the venture had yielded but little profit, owing to the fact that Americans are not inclined to invest in foreign securities.
Secretary of State Knox's policy, which was always supported by us, accounted for the fact that the official relations between the German and American Governments were never more cordial than during the years 1909-13, Page 18 in spite of a short disturbance45 resulting from a dispute over our potash exports to the United States. The best proof of how friendly the official relations of the two Governments were is shown by the ease with which this quarrel was settled. We were also successful in concluding a commercial agreement which was satisfactory to both sides, and overcame the danger of a customs war as the result of America's new customs tariffs46; whereas Taft's economic plans, which aimed at reciprocity and union with Canada, came to grief for political reasons, as the result of Canadian Opposition, and left behind a bitter after-taste both in the United States, Canada and England.
Official diplomatic communications excepted, however, it must unfortunately be admitted, that mutual47 misunderstanding has been the principal feature of German-American relations. In Germany there was no understanding for the curious mixture of political sagacity, commercial acumen48, tenacity49 and sentimentality, which goes to make up the character of the American people. The power of the union was therefore underestimated by us, and the high-spirited utterances51 of American youthful strength were more disapproved52 of than was necessary, because they were interpreted as mere53 "bluff54" and arrogance55. We never sufficiently allowed for the fact that the Americans are very "emotional"—that is to say, that they are easily carried away by their feelings and then become uncertain. Political surprises in the United States are almost the rule.
On the other hand, Americans never give themselves time to learn to understand a foreign nation. A knowledge of foreign languages is by no means general in the United States. The Americans unconsciously borrow their thoughts and ideas from England, because it is the only nation whose literature and Press are accessible Page 19 to them in the original tongue. Naturally this fact contributed very considerably56, before the Five-Years War, towards making the comprehension of Germany difficult; because in those days German-English relations were growing more and more unfavorable every day, and this decline in friendliness57 found a powerful echo in the English Press and other literature. The English language exercises more absolute power in the United States than even in England itself. For example, it would never occur to any diplomat1 in Washington to transact58 his business in any other language than English. Whereas, in London, I never once heard the French Ambassador pronounce one word of English—even in an after-dinner speech—M. Jusserand in Washington always spoke59 English. But, in spite of the claim that the French make, that their language prevails in diplomatic circles, he could not have done otherwise; because I have never, during the whole of the eight years of my official activities in Washington, met one Secretary of State who had mastered any other language than English. It is obvious that this state of affairs opens all doors and avenues to English political and cultural influences.
Thus, before the outbreak of the Five-Years War, the majority of Americans already looked upon the Germans, however unconsciously, through the optics of the English Press and English literary publications. A large number of people in the United States honestly believed, moreover, in the rumored60 German scheme to seize the empire of the world. Our enormous successes in the economic field provoked unbounded admiration61 and led, on the one hand, to an over-estimation of our power, which did not prove favorable to us politically, while, on the other hand, the Americans who frequently indulged in generalizations62 about Germany were prone63 to judge us according to the German-American Beer-Philistine, whom they Page 20 disdainfully called a "Dutchman." The Americans' view of the German people wavered between these two extremes; but every year opinion tended to incline more and more in the direction of the former. The phantom64 of a German world-empire, extending from Hamburg to Bagdad, had already taken possession of the American mind long before the war; and in the United States it was feared that the next step would be that this world-empire would infringe the Monroe Doctrine and found colonies in South America. Professor Baumgarten, in an entertaining book, has pointed30 out to what extent the publications of the Pan-German party contributed towards promoting such conceptions in America.
Our Press was a little too fond of making attacks on the Monroe Doctrine in particular. I was always of the opinion that we ought, openly and officially, to have recognized this American article of faith. As regards the Monroe Doctrine, the question is not one of Right, but one of Power. We certainly had not the power to infringe the Monroe Doctrine, even if we had had the intention, which was never the case. It would, therefore, have been more wise to acknowledge it, and thus to improve the political attitude, towards ourselves, of a country on which we were so very much dependent for a number of our raw-material supplies. I have often wondered whether the Imperial Government would not have regarded it as its duty to avoid war at all costs, if our economic dependence65 upon foreign countries had been more clearly recognized. German prosperity was based to a great extent on the Germans overseas, who had settled down in every corner of the earth, just as in former days the Greeks had settled all over the Roman Empire. The Germans overseas constituted a colonial empire, which was a far more precious source of wealth than many a foreign possession belonging to other Powers. Page 21 In my opinion not sufficient allowance was made for this state of affairs.
Finally, a further cause of misunderstandings, as I have already mentioned in the Introduction, was to be found in the general disfavor with which American pacifist tendencies were regarded in Germany. Nine-tenths of the American nation are pacifists, either through their education and sentimental50 prepossession in favor of the principle, or out of a sense of commercial expediency66. People in the United States did not understand that the German people, owing to their tragic67 history, are compelled to cultivate and to uphold the martial68 spirit of their ancestors. The types of the German officer of the reserve and of the members of the student corps69 are particularly unsympathetic to the American, and, for certain German foibles, all sign of that understanding that readily forgives, is entirely absent in the United States, owing to the fact that our historical development is not realized over there.
Although the Americans are largely and unconsciously swayed by the influence of English ideas, we must be careful to avoid falling into the error, so common in Germany, of regarding them as Anglo-Saxons. The Americans themselves, in their own country, scarcely ever call themselves Anglo-Saxons. This term is used by the English when they are anxious to claim their American cousins as their own. Occasionally, too, an American may use the expression when making an after-dinner speech at some fraternizing function. As a rule, however, the Americans insist on being Americans, and nothing else. On the 11th May, 1914, at a memorial service for the men who fell at Vera Cruz, President Wilson, in one of his finest speeches, said:
"Notice how truly these men were of our blood. I mean of our American blood, which is not drawn70 from Page 22 any one country, which is not drawn from any one stock, which is not drawn from any one language of the modern world; but free men everywhere have sent their sons and their brothers and their daughters to this country in order to make that great compounded nation which consists of all the sturdy elements and of all the best elements of the whole globe. I listened again to this list of the dead with a profound interest, because of the mixture of the names, for the names bear the marks of the several national stocks from which these men came. But they are not Irishmen or Germans or Frenchmen or Hebrews or Italians any more. They were not when they went to Vera Cruz; they were Americans; every one of them, with no difference in their Americanism because of the stock from which they came. They were in a peculiar71 sense of our blood, and they proved it by showing that they were of our spirit, that no matter what their derivation, no matter where their people came from, they thought and wished and did the things that were American; and the flag under which they served was a flag in which all the blood of mankind is united to make a free nation."
The above words of President Wilson are the key to the attitude of the Americans who are of German origin. True, these people, almost without exception, still cling to their old home with heartfelt affection; but they are Americans, like the rest of the nation. "Germania is our mother, and Columbia is our bride," said Carl Schurz, and with these words he described the situation in a nutshell. Just as a man shall "leave his father and his mother, and shall cleave72 unto his wife," so the man who is generally styled the German-American decides in favor of his new home-land, when a conflict arises between America and Germany. He will, however, do anything Page 23 in his power to avoid such a conflict. Even before the war, we in Germany entirely failed to understand the difficult and delicate position of the American of German origin. And during the war this was more than ever the case. The question of the "German-Americans" has never been dealt with tactfully in Germany. Our greatest mistake was to expect too much from them. The Americans of German origin have retained in their new home all the failings and virtues73 of the German people. We could not, therefore, blame them if they showed less interest and less understanding in regard to political questions than the rest of America; for did they not, on the other hand, distinguish themselves by their respect for the established order of things, and by the fidelity74 and industry with which they pursued their various callings? The inevitable75 consequence of these national qualities was that they did not exercise the political influence which would have been only in keeping with their numerical superiority. For instance, I might mention that, on the occasion when I first visited Milwaukee, I was welcomed by an Irish mayor, a circumstance which somewhat surprised me, seeing that at the time the town contained from 300,000 to 400,000 Germans.
In consequence of the state of affairs described above, the principal object of German policy in the United States before the war was to try to bring about a more satisfactory understanding between the two peoples. Prince Henry's journey to America, the exchange of University professors and school teachers, which took place on this occasion, the visits of the two fleets, the American Institute in Berlin, and similar more or less successful undertakings served the same purpose. German diplomatic representatives were instructed to promote this policy with all their power. When I was appointed Ambassador in Washington, the Kaiser's and Page 24 the Chancellor76's principal injunction, in taking leave of me, was that I should enlighten public opinion in the United States regarding the peaceful and friendly intentions of German policy. Prince Bülow also said to me that I must without fail bring the negotiations about an Arbitration77 Treaty with the United States, which had been left unfinished owing to the death of my predecessor78, to a satisfactory conclusion. Despite these definite instructions, the German Government, as I have already pointed out, ultimately blundered and stumbled over legal quibbles. In any case, however, Prince Bülow had meanwhile vacated his office. The effect upon the American mind of our obstruction79 of this matter should not be under-estimated. It helped not a little to convince public opinion in the United States of the alleged80 warlike intentions of the German people.
In accordance with American custom, the semi-official and semi-private activities concerned with fostering a better understanding between the two States had to be published to the whole world, and this had the inevitable disadvantage of provoking opposition, both in Germany and in the United States, among all those who had reasons for being hostile. Unfortunately, the official representatives of Germany in Washington were always a thorn in the side of a certain section of the German Press, whenever they tried, in consideration of the American attitude of mind and social customs, to introduce a warmer feeling into the relations between the two sides. Even in the time of my predecessor, Speck81 von Sternburg, the German Embassy was on such occasions charged with softness and an excessive desire to become adapted to American ways; and this remained the case during my tenure82 of office.
Our Press in general, moreover, never revealed a sufficient amount of interest or understanding in regard to Page 25 American affairs. There were only a very few German newspaper correspondents in the United States, and those that did happen to be there were too poorly paid to be able to keep properly in touch with American social life. About twelve months before the war, the well-known wealthy German-American, Hermann Sielcken, offered to help me out of this difficulty by undertaking42 to pay the salary of a first-rate American journalist, of German origin, who was to reside in Washington, and act as the representative there of Wolff's telegraphic bureau. I immediately took steps to organize this telegraphic service. Very shortly afterwards, however, I was informed by Berlin, that the telegrams would be too expensive, as the subject was not of enough interest, and in this case the Wolff Bureau would only have had to defray the cost of the actual telegrams. This was the way the supply of news was organized in a country that imagined it was practising world-politics.
Mr. Wilson took up his quarters in the White House, Washington, about a year before the war, and opened his period of office with several internal reforms. Then came the American-Mexican crisis, and relations with Europe in general, and Germany in particular, therefore, fell somewhat into the background.
Woodrow Wilson was a University don and an historian. His works are distinguished83 by their brilliant style and the masterly manner in which he wields84 the English language—a power which was also manifested in his political speeches and proclamations. Mr. Wilson sprang into political and general fame when he was President of the University of Princeton, and was elected as Governor of the State of New Jersey85. Even in those days he displayed, side by side, on the one hand, his democratic bias86 which led him violently to oppose the aristocratic student-clubs, and on the other, his egocentric and autocratic Page 26 leanings which made him inaccessible87 to any advice from outside, and constantly embroiled88 him with the governing council of the University. As Governor of New Jersey, The Holy Land of "Trusts," Mr. Wilson opened an extraordinarily89 sharp campaign against their dominion90. Mr. Roosevelt, it is true, had spoken a good deal against the trusts, but he had done little. He could not, however, have achieved much real success, because the Republican Party was too much bound up with the trusts, and dependent on them. At the time when Mr. Roosevelt wanted to take action, he also succeeded in splitting up his party, so that real reform could only be expected from the Democratic side. The conviction that this was so was the cause of Mr. Wilson's success in the Presidential election of 1912.
In regard to external politics, Mr. Wilson was pacifistic, as was also his party; whereas the Imperialists belonged almost without exception to the Republican Party. In spite of "Wall Street," and the influence of English ideas and opinions upon American society, Pacifist tendencies largely prevailed in the United States before the outbreak of the Five-Years War; how much more was this the case, therefore, when Mr. Wilson, in accordance with American custom, gave the post of Secretary of State to the politician to whose influence he owed his nomination91 as candidate for the Presidency92 by the Democratic Party. Thus did Mr. William Jennings Bryan attain93 to the dignity of Secretary of State after he had thrice stood as a candidate for the Presidency without success.
In all political questions, Mr. Bryan followed a much more radical94 tendency than Mr. Wilson. His opponents call him a dishonest demagogue. I, on the contrary, would prefer to call Mr. Bryan an honest visionary and fanatic95, whose passionate96 enthusiasm may go to make Page 27 an exemplary speechmaker at large meetings, but not a statesman whose concern is the world of realities. He who in his enthusiasm believes he will be able to see his ideal realized in this world next Thursday week is not necessarily dishonest on that account, even if he overlooks the fact that things are going very badly indeed.
It was believed in a large number of circles that Mr. Bryan would not accept the post of Secretary of State, for even at that time everybody who was in the know was already aware that Mr. Wilson could only tolerate subordinates and not men with opinions of their own. Mr. Bryan, however, felt the moral obligation, at least to attempt to give his radical views a chance of succeeding, and declared, as he took over the post, that so long as he was Secretary of State the United States would never go to war. He even wanted this principle to be generally accepted by the rest of the world, and with this end in view, submitted to all foreign Governments the draft of an Arbitration and Peace-Treaty, which was to make war utterly97 impossible in the future. As is well known, the German Government, unlike all the others, refused to fall in with Mr. Bryan's wishes. The Secretary of State was a little mortified98 by this, even though he still hoped that we should ultimately follow the example of the other Powers. Every time we met, he used to remind me of his draft Arbitration Treaty, which I had forwarded to Berlin. Later on I often regretted that we did not fall in with Mr. Bryan's wishes; who, by the by, during the war, again returned to the question, but in vain. If the treaty had been signed by us, it would most probably have facilitated the negotiations about the U-boat campaign.
The diplomatic corps in Washington thus found itself confronted by an entirely new situation. The Republican Party had been at the helm for sixteen years, and Page 28 had now to vacate every one of the administrative99 posts. Even our personal intercourse100 with the President was governed by different formalities from those which existed in the days of his predecessors101. Mr. Roosevelt liked to maintain friendly relations with those diplomats102 whose company pleased him. He disregarded the old traditional etiquette103, according to which the President was not allowed to visit the Ambassadors or any private houses in Washington. The friendly relations that existed between Mr. Roosevelt and Baron104 Speck von Sternburg are well known. When in the year 1908, after this gentleman's decease, I assumed his post at Washington, Mr. Roosevelt invited me to the White House on the evening after my first audience, to a private interview, in which every topic of the day was discussed. Invitations of this kind were of frequent occurrence during the last two months of Roosevelt's administration, which, at the time of my entering office, was already drawing to its close. For instance, Mr. Roosevelt showed me the draft of the speech which after his retirement105 he delivered at the University of Berlin.
My dealings with President Taft were on the same footing; for he also was in favor of an amicable106 and unconventional relationship. On one occasion he invited me to join him in his private Pullman on a journey to his home in Cincinnati, where we attended the musical festival together. On another occasion, he suddenly appeared, without formal notice, at the Embassy, while we were holding a ball in honor of his daughter, and later on he accepted an invitation to my daughter's wedding.
President Wilson, who by inclination107 and habit is a recluse108 and a lonely worker, does not like company. He re-introduced the old etiquette and confined himself only to visiting the houses of Cabinet members, which had been the customary tradition. He also kept himself aloof109 Page 29 from the banquets, which are such a favorite feature of social life in America, and severely110 limited the company at the White House. Thus the New Year Reception was discontinued entirely. This attitude on the part of the President was the outcome of his tastes and inclinations111. But I certainly do not believe that he simply developed a theory out of his own peculiar tastes, as so often happens in life. I am more inclined to believe that Mr. Wilson regarded the old American tradition as more expedient112, on the grounds that it enabled the President to remain free from all intimacy113, and thus to safeguard the complete impartiality114 which his high office demanded. The peculiar friendship which unites Mr. Wilson with Mr. House is no objection to this theory, for the latter has to some extent always been in the position of a minister without portfolio115. An adviser116 of this sort, who incurs117 no responsibility by the advice he gives, is more readily accepted by American opinion than by any other, because the President of the United States is known to be alone and exclusively responsible, whereas his ministers are only looked upon as his assistants.
Generally speaking, the political situation in the United States before the Five-Years War was as follows: On the one hand, owing to the influence of English ideas, which I have already mentioned, it was to be expected that a feeling of sympathy with the Entente118 would probably preponderate119 in the public mind; while on the other hand, owing to the general indifference120 that prevailed with regard to all that happened in Europe, and to the strong pacifist tendencies, no interference in the war was to be expected from America, unless unforeseen circumstances provoked it. At all events it was to be feared that the inflammability of the Americans' feelings would once again be under-estimated in Germany, as it had been already. It has never been properly Page 30 understood in our country, despite the fact that the Manila and Venezuela affairs might have taught us a lesson in this respect. The juxtaposition121 in the American people's character of Pacifism and an impulsive122 lust123 of war should have been known to us, if more sedulous124 attention had been paid in Germany to American conditions and characteristics. The American judges affairs in Europe, partly from the standpoint of his own private sentiment of justice, and partly under the guidance of merely emotional values; but not, as was generally supposed in Germany, simply from a cold and business-like point of view. If this had been reckoned with in Germany, the terrible effect upon public opinion in America of the invasion of Belgium and of the sinking of the Lusitania—particularly in view of the influence of English propaganda—would have been adequately valued from the start.
On May 17th, 1915, in a report addressed to the Imperial Chancellor, I wrote as follows:
"It is not a bit of good glossing125 over things. Our best plan, therefore, is frankly126 to acknowledge that our propaganda in this country has, as the result of the Lusitania incident, completely collapsed127. To everyone who is familiar with the American character this could have been foreseen. I therefore beg leave to point out in time, that another event like the present one would certainly mean war with the United States. Side by side in the American character there lie two apparently128 completely contradictory129 traits. The cool, calculating man of business is not recognizable when he is deeply moved and excited—that is to say, when he is actuated by what is here called 'emotion.' At such moments he can be compared only to an hysterical130 woman, to whom talking is of no avail. The only hope is to gain time while the attack Page 31 passes over. At present it is impossible to foresee what will be the outcome of the Lusitania incident. I can only hope that we shall survive it without war. Be this as it may, however, we can only resume our propaganda when the storm has subsided131."
Here I should like to intrude132 a few of my own views regarding the importance of public opinion in the United States.
In Europe, where people are constantly hearing about the truly extraordinary and far-reaching authority of the American President—the London Times once said that, after the overthrow133 of the Russian Czar, the President of the United States was the last remaining autocrat—it is difficult to form a correct estimate of the power of public opinion in the union. In America, just as no mayor can with impunity134 ignore the public opinion of his city, and no governor the public opinion of his state, so the President of the Republic, despite his far-reaching authority, cannot for long run counter to the public opinion of his country. The fact has often been emphasized by Mr. Wilson himself, among others, that the American President must "keep his ear to the ground"—that is to say, must pay strict attention to public opinion and act in harmony with it. For the American statesman, whose highest ambition consists either in being re-elected, or at least in seeing his party returned to power, any other course would amount to political suicide; for any attempt at swimming against the tide will certainly be avenged135 at the next elections.
It must be remembered that public opinion in the United States is seldom so homogeneous and unanimous a thing as, for example, in England. Particularly in questions of foreign politics, public opinion in the union, stretching, as it does, over a whole continent, reacts in Page 32 widely varying ways in different localities, and to a very different degree. Thus, in the States bordering on the Atlantic coast, which are more closely in touch with the Old World, there is, as a rule, a very definite public opinion on European questions, while the West remains136 more or less indifferent. On the other hand, in the Gulf137 States a very lively interest is taken by the public in the Mexican problem, and the Pacific States are closely concerned with the Japanese question, matters which arouse hardly more than academic interest in other localities. This is also reflected in the American Daily Press, which does not produce papers exerting equal influence over the whole nation, but rather, in accordance with the customary geographical138 division of the union into seven economic spheres of interest—namely, New York, New England, Middle Atlantic States, Southern States, Middle West, Western and Pacific States, comprises seven different daily presses, each of which gives first place to quite a different problem from the rest. It is true that the New York Press is certainly the most important mirror of American public opinion on European questions. Nevertheless, this importance should not lead to the erroneous assumption that the American Press and the New York Press are synonymous terms. The perusal139 of the latter does not suffice for the formation of a reliable judgment140 of American public opinion, with regard to certain questions which concern the whole nation; rather it is necessary also to study the leading papers of New England, the Middle Atlantic States, and particularly the West. The reports of German and English correspondents on feeling in America, which, as so often happens, are based purely141 on the New York Press, frequently play one false, if one relies on them for an estimate of the public opinion of the whole nation. The "Associated Press," therefore, Page 33 makes it a rule with all questions of national importance, not only to reproduce extracts from the New York Press, but also to publish précis of the opinions of at least fifty leading journals from all parts of the union.
The American daily papers are more important as a medium for influencing public opinion than as a mirror for reflecting it. The United States is the land of propaganda par2 excellence142! Every important enterprise, of no matter what nature, has its Press agent; the greatest of all is the propaganda lasting143 for months, which is carried on before the biennial144 elections, and of the magnitude of which it is difficult for the average European to gain any conception. It is therefore not surprising that the political leaders of the country make very wide use of the Press in important questions of foreign politics, to influence public opinion in favor of the Government policy. Not only the great news agencies, but also all leading newspapers of the union maintain their permanent special correspondents in Washington, and these are received almost daily by the Secretary of State, and as a rule once a week by the President. The information that they receive at these interviews they communicate to their papers in the greatest detail, without naming the high officials from whom it has emanated145, and in this way they naturally act as megaphones through which the views of the Government are spread throughout the whole country. In foreign questions it was often striking how newspapers would hold back their comments until they had received in this way a mot d'ordre from Washington.
Of course this possibility for the Government to create opinion on concrete questions only applies so long as a firm public opinion has not already set in. As soon as the process of "crystallization," as it is called, is complete, there is nothing left for the Government but to Page 34 follow the preponderating146 public opinion. Even a man like Mr. Wilson, who possesses an unusually high degree of self-will, has always followed public opinion, for the correct interpretation147 of which—apart from his own proverbial instinct—he commands the services of his secretary, Mr. Tumulty, and a large staff, as well as the organization of the Democratic party, which spreads through the length and breadth of the country. If, in a few exceptional cases, the President has set himself in opposition to public opinion, we might be sure that it would not be long before he again set his course on theirs.
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diplomat
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par
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4
isolated
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| adj.与世隔绝的 | |
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5
solely
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| adv.仅仅，唯一地 | |
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6
alleviated
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| 减轻，缓解，缓和( alleviate的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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7
entirely
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| ad.全部地，完整地；完全地，彻底地 | |
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8
doctrine
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| n.教义；主义；学说 | |
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9
versatile
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| adj.通用的，万用的；多才多艺的，多方面的 | |
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10
mediation
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| n.调解 | |
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11
belligerent
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| adj.好战的，挑起战争的；n.交战国，交战者 | |
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12
actively
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| adv.积极地，勤奋地 | |
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13
Founder
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| n.创始者，缔造者 | |
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14
sufficiently
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| adv.足够地，充分地 | |
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15
plunge
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| v.跳入，(使)投入，(使)陷入；猛冲 | |
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16
relinquish
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| v.放弃，撤回，让与，放手 | |
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17
inception
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| n.开端，开始，取得学位 | |
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18
superfluously
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| 过分地； 过剩地 | |
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19
precisely
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| adv.恰好，正好，精确地，细致地 | |
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20
justified
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| a.正当的，有理的 | |
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21
censured
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| v.指责，非难，谴责( censure的过去式 ) | |
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22
zeal
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| n.热心，热情，热忱 | |
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23
rankled
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| v.（使）痛苦不已，（使）怨恨不已( rankle的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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24
demonstration
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| n.表明，示范，论证，示威 | |
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25
applied
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| adj.应用的；v.应用，适用 | |
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26
bellows
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|
| n.风箱；发出吼叫声，咆哮（尤指因痛苦）( bellow的名词复数 )；（愤怒地）说出（某事），大叫v.发出吼叫声，咆哮（尤指因痛苦）( bellow的第三人称单数 )；（愤怒地）说出（某事），大叫 | |
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27
lodging
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| n.寄宿，住所；(大学生的)校外宿舍 | |
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28
ultimatum
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| n.最后通牒 | |
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29
heed
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| v.注意，留意；n.注意，留心 | |
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30
pointed
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| adj.尖的，直截了当的 | |
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31
negotiations
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|
| 协商( negotiation的名词复数 )； 谈判； 完成（难事）； 通过 | |
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32
initiated
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|
| n. 创始人 adj. 新加入的 vt. 开始，创始，启蒙，介绍加入 | |
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33
resolutely
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| adj.坚决地，果断地 | |
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34
embroil
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| vt.拖累；牵连；使复杂 | |
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35
infringe
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| v.违反，触犯，侵害 | |
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36
philander
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| v.不真诚地恋爱，调戏 | |
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37
rejection
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|
| n.拒绝，被拒，抛弃，被弃 | |
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38
stimulating
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|
| adj.有启发性的，能激发人思考的 | |
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39
diplomacy
|
|
| n.外交；外交手腕，交际手腕 | |
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40
opposition
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| n.反对，敌对 | |
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41
extricate
|
|
| v.拯救，救出；解脱 | |
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42
undertaking
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| n.保证，许诺，事业 | |
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43
undertakings
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| 企业( undertaking的名词复数 )； 保证； 殡仪业； 任务 | |
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44
embarked
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| 乘船( embark的过去式和过去分词 )； 装载； 从事 | |
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45
disturbance
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| n.动乱，骚动；打扰，干扰；(身心)失调 | |
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46
tariffs
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|
| 关税制度； 关税( tariff的名词复数 )； 关税表； （旅馆或饭店等的）收费表； 量刑标准 | |
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47
mutual
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|
| adj.相互的，彼此的；共同的，共有的 | |
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48
acumen
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|
| n.敏锐，聪明 | |
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49
tenacity
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|
| n.坚韧 | |
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50
sentimental
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|
| adj.多愁善感的，感伤的 | |
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51
utterances
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| n.发声( utterance的名词复数 )；说话方式；语调；言论 | |
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52
disapproved
|
|
| v.不赞成( disapprove的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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53
mere
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| adj.纯粹的；仅仅，只不过 | |
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54
bluff
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|
| v.虚张声势，用假象骗人；n.虚张声势，欺骗 | |
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55
arrogance
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|
| n.傲慢，自大 | |
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56
considerably
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|
| adv.极大地；相当大地；在很大程度上 | |
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57
friendliness
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|
| n.友谊，亲切，亲密 | |
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58
transact
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|
| v.处理；做交易；谈判 | |
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59
spoke
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|
| n.（车轮的）辐条；轮辐；破坏某人的计划；阻挠某人的行动 v.讲，谈（speak的过去式）；说；演说；从某种观点来说 | |
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60
rumored
|
|
| adj.传说的，谣传的v.传闻( rumor的过去式和过去分词 )；[古]名誉；咕哝；[古]喧嚷 | |
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61
admiration
|
|
| n.钦佩，赞美，羡慕 | |
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62
generalizations
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|
| 一般化( generalization的名词复数 )； 普通化； 归纳； 概论 | |
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63
prone
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|
| adj.(to)易于…的，很可能…的；俯卧的 | |
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64
phantom
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|
| n.幻影，虚位，幽灵；adj.错觉的，幻影的，幽灵的 | |
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65
dependence
|
|
| n.依靠，依赖；信任，信赖；隶属 | |
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66
expediency
|
|
| n.适宜；方便；合算；利己 | |
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67
tragic
|
|
| adj.悲剧的，悲剧性的，悲惨的 | |
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68
martial
|
|
| adj.战争的，军事的，尚武的，威武的 | |
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69
corps
|
|
| n.(通信等兵种的)部队；(同类作的)一组 | |
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70
drawn
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|
| v.拖，拉，拔出；adj.憔悴的，紧张的 | |
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71
peculiar
|
|
| adj.古怪的，异常的；特殊的，特有的 | |
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72
cleave
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|
| v．(clave；cleaved)粘着，粘住；坚持；依恋 | |
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73
virtues
|
|
| 美德( virtue的名词复数 )； 德行； 优点； 长处 | |
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74
fidelity
|
|
| n.忠诚，忠实；精确 | |
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75
inevitable
|
|
| adj.不可避免的，必然发生的 | |
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76
chancellor
|
|
| n.(英)大臣；法官；(德、奥)总理；大学校长 | |
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77
arbitration
|
|
| n.调停，仲裁 | |
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78
predecessor
|
|
| n.前辈，前任 | |
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79
obstruction
|
|
| n.阻塞，堵塞；障碍物 | |
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80
alleged
|
|
| a.被指控的，嫌疑的 | |
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81
speck
|
|
| n.微粒，小污点，小斑点 | |
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82
tenure
|
|
| n.终身职位；任期；(土地)保有权，保有期 | |
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83
distinguished
|
|
| adj.卓越的，杰出的，著名的 | |
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84
wields
|
|
| 手持着使用（武器、工具等）( wield的第三人称单数 )； 具有； 运用（权力）； 施加（影响） | |
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85
jersey
|
|
| n.运动衫 | |
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86
bias
|
|
| n.偏见，偏心，偏袒；vt.使有偏见 | |
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87
inaccessible
|
|
| adj.达不到的，难接近的 | |
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88
embroiled
|
|
| adj.卷入的；纠缠不清的 | |
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89
extraordinarily
|
|
| adv.格外地；极端地 | |
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90
dominion
|
|
| n.统治，管辖，支配权；领土，版图 | |
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91
nomination
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|
| n.提名，任命，提名权 | |
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92
presidency
|
|
| n.总统(校长，总经理)的职位(任期) | |
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93
attain
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|
| vt.达到，获得，完成 | |
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94
radical
|
|
| n.激进份子，原子团，根号；adj.根本的，激进的，彻底的 | |
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95
fanatic
|
|
| n.狂热者，入迷者；adj.狂热入迷的 | |
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96
passionate
|
|
| adj.热情的，热烈的，激昂的，易动情的，易怒的，性情暴躁的 | |
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97
utterly
|
|
| adv.完全地，绝对地 | |
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98
mortified
|
|
| v.使受辱( mortify的过去式和过去分词 )；伤害（人的感情）；克制；抑制（肉体、情感等） | |
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99
administrative
|
|
| adj.行政的，管理的 | |
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100
intercourse
|
|
| n.性交；交流，交往，交际 | |
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101
predecessors
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|
| n.前任( predecessor的名词复数 )；前辈；（被取代的）原有事物；前身 | |
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102
diplomats
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|
| n.外交官( diplomat的名词复数 )；有手腕的人，善于交际的人 | |
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103
etiquette
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|
| n.礼仪，礼节；规矩 | |
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104
baron
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|
| n.男爵；(商业界等)巨头，大王 | |
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105
retirement
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|
| n.退休，退职 | |
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106
amicable
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|
| adj.和平的，友好的；友善的 | |
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107
inclination
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| n.倾斜；点头；弯腰；斜坡；倾度；倾向；爱好 | |
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108
recluse
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| n.隐居者 | |
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109
aloof
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| adj.远离的；冷淡的，漠不关心的 | |
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110
severely
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| adv.严格地；严厉地；非常恶劣地 | |
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111
inclinations
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| 倾向( inclination的名词复数 )； 倾斜； 爱好； 斜坡 | |
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112
expedient
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|
| adj.有用的，有利的；n.紧急的办法，权宜之计 | |
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113
intimacy
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|
| n.熟悉，亲密，密切关系，亲昵的言行 | |
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114
impartiality
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| n. 公平, 无私, 不偏 | |
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115
portfolio
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|
| n.公事包；文件夹；大臣及部长职位 | |
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116
adviser
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| n.劝告者，顾问 | |
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117
incurs
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| 遭受，招致，引起( incur的第三人称单数 ) | |
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118
entente
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| n.协定；有协定关系的各国 | |
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119
preponderate
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| v.数目超过；占优势 | |
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120
indifference
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| n.不感兴趣，不关心，冷淡，不在乎 | |
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121
juxtaposition
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| n.毗邻，并置，并列 | |
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122
impulsive
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| adj.冲动的，刺激的；有推动力的 | |
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123
lust
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|
| n.性(淫)欲；渴(欲)望；vi.对…有强烈的欲望 | |
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124
sedulous
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| adj.勤勉的，努力的 | |
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125
glossing
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| v.注解( gloss的现在分词 )；掩饰（错误）；粉饰；把…搪塞过去 | |
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126
frankly
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| adv.坦白地，直率地；坦率地说 | |
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127
collapsed
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| adj.倒塌的 | |
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128
apparently
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| adv.显然地；表面上，似乎 | |
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129
contradictory
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|
| adj.反驳的，反对的，抗辩的；n.正反对，矛盾对立 | |
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130
hysterical
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| adj.情绪异常激动的，歇斯底里般的 | |
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131
subsided
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| v.（土地）下陷（因在地下采矿）( subside的过去式和过去分词 )；减弱；下降至较低或正常水平；一下子坐在椅子等上 | |
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132
intrude
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| vi.闯入；侵入；打扰，侵扰 | |
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133
overthrow
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| v.推翻，打倒，颠覆；n.推翻，瓦解，颠覆 | |
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134
impunity
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| n.(惩罚、损失、伤害等的)免除 | |
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135
avenged
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| v.为…复仇，报…之仇( avenge的过去式和过去分词 )；为…报复 | |
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136
remains
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| n.剩余物，残留物；遗体，遗迹 | |
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137
gulf
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| n.海湾；深渊，鸿沟；分歧，隔阂 | |
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138
geographical
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| adj.地理的；地区(性)的 | |
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139
perusal
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| n.细读，熟读；目测 | |
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140
judgment
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| n.审判；判断力，识别力，看法，意见 | |
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141
purely
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| adv.纯粹地，完全地 | |
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142
excellence
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| n.优秀，杰出，(pl.)优点，美德 | |
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143
lasting
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| adj.永久的，永恒的；vbl.持续，维持 | |
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144
biennial
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| adj.两年一次的 | |
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145
emanated
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| v.从…处传出，传出( emanate的过去式和过去分词 )；产生，表现，显示 | |
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146
preponderating
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| v.超过，胜过( preponderate的现在分词 ) | |
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147
interpretation
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| n.解释，说明，描述；艺术处理 | |
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