When I received the news of the murder of Archduke Francis Ferdinand, I was dining with the Spanish Ambassador at the Metropolitan1 Club in Washington. Signor Riano and I were not for a moment in doubt as to the very serious, peace-menacing character of the incident, but we found little interest in the matter among the Americans in the club, who, as always, regarded European affairs with indifference2. As to the results of the murder, I received in Washington no information, either officially or through the Press.
I therefore, on the 7th July, began my usual summer leave, which had been granted a few weeks before. For the last time I crossed the ocean on one of the proud German liners, and, indeed, on the finest of our whole merchant fleet, the Vaterland. For the last time I saw, on my arrival, the port of Hamburg and the lower Elbe in all their glory. Germans who live at home can hardly imagine with what love and what pride we foreign ambassadors and exiled Germans regarded the German shipping3-lines.
A few days after I had arrived in my home at Starnberg there began strong public excitement and uneasiness over the political situation. However, of late years so many crises had been successfully averted5 at the eleventh hour, that this time, too, I hoped up to the last minute that a change for the better would set in. It seemed as though the responsibility for a war was too great to be Page 36 borne by anyone man—whoever he might be—who would have to make the final decision.
On the wonderful, still summer evening of the 1st August, we heard across the Starnberger Lake, in all the surrounding villages, the muffled6 beat of drums announcing mobilization. The dark forebodings with which the sound of the drums filled me have fixed7 that hour indelibly in my memory.
The following day was devoted8 to preparations for the journey to Berlin, where I had to receive instructions before returning with all possible speed to Washington. The journey from Munich to Berlin, which could only be made in military trains, occupied forty-eight hours.
In the Wilhelmstrasse I had interviews with the authorities, the substance of which was instructions to enlighten the Government and people of the United States on the German standpoint. In doing so I was to avoid any appearance of aggression9 towards England, because an understanding with Great Britain had to be concluded as soon as possible. The Berlin view on the question of guilt11 was even then very much the same as has been set down in the memorandum12 of the commission of four of the 27th May, 1919, at Versailles, namely, that Russia was the originator of the war.
Further, I was informed at the Foreign Office, that in addition to some other additions to the staff of the Washington Embassy, the former Secretary of State of the Colonial Office, Dr. Dernburg, and Privy13 Councillor Albert, of the Ministry14 of the Interior, were to accompany me; the former as representative of the German Red Cross, the latter as agent of the "Central Purchasing Company." Dr. Dernburg's chief task, however, was to raise a loan in the United States, the proceeds of which were to pay for Herr Albert's purchases for the aforesaid company. For this purpose the Imperial Treasury15 Page 37 supplied us with Treasury notes, which could only be made negotiable by my signature. This gave rise later to the legend that Dr. Dernburg was armed with millions for propaganda purposes.
Our journey was wearisome but passed off without incident. In forty-eight hours we reached Rotterdam, where we boarded the Dutch steamer Noordam. As we went aboard we were all in high spirits, for we had seen everywhere in Germany a wonderful, self-sacrificing and noble enthusiasm. On the steamer, however, which incidentally was badly overloaded16, the picture changed. We suddenly found ourselves surrounded by hostile feeling, and among our fellow-passengers there were only a few friendly to the German cause. The bitter daily struggle toward which we were travelling was to begin on the ship. We plunged17 straight into it, and tried as far as possible to influence our fellow passengers.
At Dover the ship was inspected by a British officer; the inspection18, however, passed off without any inconvenience to us, as in those first days of the war the regulations of international law were still to some extent respected. We had already made all preparations to throw the Treasury notes overboard, in case we were searched. As a curiosity I mention a comic interlude that occurred after we had left Dover Harbor. A friendly German-American from a Western State, who did not know who I was, but had recognized me as a German, accosted19 me with the remark: "Take care that you don't expose yourself to annoyance20; the people on board think you are the German Ambassador in Washington." The excellent man was overcome with amazement21 when I admitted my identity. We had not had our names entered on the passengers' list, but apart from this made no secret of our journey, as it was already known in Rotterdam.
After an eleven days' voyage, we landed in New York Page 38 on the 23rd August. Our arrival was a relief, as during the journey we had been overwhelmed exclusively with enemy wireless22 reports of French victories. Every day we had received news of the annihilation of a fresh German Army Corps23. In comparison with this mental torture, the cross-fire of questions from countless24 American Pressmen, not altogether friendly towards Germany, was comparatively easy to bear.
As is known, American public opinion at that time had been given a one-sided view of the causes and course of the war, for England, who, immediately after the declaration of war, had cut our Transatlantic cable, held the whole of the Transatlantic news apparatus25 in her hands. Apart from this, however, our enemies found from the beginning very important Allies in a number of leading American newspapers, which, in their daily issue of from three to six editions, did all they could to spread anti-German feeling. In New York the bitterest attacks on Germany were made by the Herald26 and the Evening Telegram, which were in close touch with France, as well as the Tribune and Times, which followed in England's wake; somewhat more moderate were the Sun and the Globe; the only neutrals were the Evening Post and the American. Outside New York the Press raged against us, particularly in New England and the Middle-Atlantic States. In the South and West we were also baited by the Press, but with considerably27 less intensity28. The only papers which could be called neutral were those of the Hearst Press, which took up an outspoken29 National-American standpoint, and, in addition, the Chicago Tribune, the Washington Post, and a few minor30 newspapers. It was already very significant that papers like the Boston Transcript31, the Brooklyn Eagle, the Baltimore Sun, and a few others opened their letter-boxes to anti-German articles, which, it is true, they condemned32 with fair Page 39 regularity33 in their leading articles or editorial notes. Against this campaign, fed systematically34 and daily with British propaganda information—especially on the subject of German atrocities35 in Belgium—the small number of papers in the German language, which, moreover, were little heeded36 by public opinion, and at the head of which stood the old New Yorker Staatszeitung and the courageous37 weekly Fatherland, founded shortly after the outbreak of war by the young German-American, G. S. Vierick, could make but little headway.
On my arrival in New York, and during the next few weeks, I made an honest effort by daily interviews of the representatives of the leading daily newspapers to explain the German standpoint to the American public. I soon noticed, however, that these efforts were not only practically fruitless but that they were even fraught38 with certain dangers for me. The daily struggle with the Press was threatening to undermine my official position and to compromise my relations with the Washington Government so seriously that I should not have been in a position to carry through with success the diplomatic negotiations39 which were likely to be called for. I therefore considered it as my duty to the German people to give up, as far as I personally was concerned, all propaganda in favor of the German cause. Certainly I have had a good deal further to do with American journalists until the final rupture40; but I categorically refused to grant interviews or to receive newspaper correspondents who were not prepared to treat my statements purely41 as confidential42, private information.
I should like to take this opportunity to remark that the American journalist is far better than the reputation he enjoys in Europe. In spite of the hostile atmosphere which surrounded me in America I have never had to complain of an indiscretion. True, many minor New Page 40 York reporters whom I did not receive invented statements which I had never made; but such experiences are common to all politicians in America. Moreover, the results of these journalistic tricks were almost always local and were easily contradicted. In Washington such things never occurred. The journalists there were quite extraordinarily43 capable and trustworthy men, who always behaved like "gentlemen." My relations with them remained very friendly to the last. In so far as I was not forced to keep silence for political reasons I have always told them the real truth. Of course, I was as little capable as the American journalists of foreseeing that the policy I was representing was doomed44 to ultimate failure.
Just at the time when I gave up personal propaganda in order to devote myself to my political and diplomatic activities in Washington, the financial mission of Secretary of State Dr. Dernburg had failed. President Wilson had stated clearly that it would be an unneutral act for loans to be raised in the union by the combatant States. Our friends in high financial circles in New York regarded this decision as favorable to Germany, for they foresaw—what actually happened—that for every million received by us, our enemies would raise a hundred millions. As a result of this decision of the President, Privy Councillor Albert had to finance his purchases as far as possible privately45, while Dr. Dernburg, whose time was not fully4 occupied by his duties as delegate of the Red Cross, which had meanwhile been organized by Geheim Oberregierungrat Meyer Gerhardt and Rittmeister Hecker, would have left America if there had remained any possibility of doing so. There was not, however, as the English inspected all neutral ships shortly after they left the American ports and—in flagrant contravention of international law, which only allows the Page 41 arrest of persons who are already enrolled46 in the fighting forces—summarily arrested and interned47 every German capable of bearing arms. As Dr. Dernburg was thus an unwilling48 prisoner in New York he began to write articles on the world-war for the daily Press. He had a gift for explaining the causes of the war in a quiet, interesting manner, and particularly for setting out the German standpoint in a conciliatory form. His propaganda work therefore met with extraordinary success. The editors of newspapers and periodicals pressed him to contribute to their columns, and the whole New York Press readily printed all the articles he sent in to contradict the statements of the anti-Germans.
Out of this activity developed, in co-operation with the Foreign Office, Dr. Dernburg's New York Press Bureau, a solution of the propaganda question which was exceedingly welcome to me. As a private person Dr. Dernburg could say and write much that could not be said officially and therefore could not come from me. Consequently I took it for granted that—in spite of certain suggestions to the contrary—Dr. Dernburg would not be attached to the Embassy, which would only hamper49 his work, and also that the Press Bureau would retain its independent and unofficial character. I may take it as a well-known fact that Washington is the political, and New York the economic, capital of the United States, which has always resulted in a certain geographical50 division of the corresponding diplomatic duties. It naturally had its disadvantages that there should be, apart from the Consulate-General, four other independent German establishments in New York, namely, the offices of Dr. Dernburg, Privy Councillor Albert, the military attaché Captain von Papen and the naval51 attaché Commander Boy-Ed. In order to keep, to some extent, in touch with these gentlemen, I occasionally travelled to New York and Page 42 interviewed them together in the Ritz-Carlton Hotel, where I usually stayed and in which Dr. Dernburg lived; for their offices, scattered52 as they were over the lower town, and which, moreover, I never entered, were unsuitable for the purpose. Our mutual53 personal relations were always of the best. On the other hand, it was naturally difficult to make any headway with our official business, since each received independent instructions from Berlin. This was least the case with Dr. Dernburg, because his responsible authority as far as propaganda was concerned was partly the Foreign Office itself and partly the semi-official "Central Office for Foreign Service." The other three gentlemen, however, were all responsible to home departments other than mine. Captain von Papen and Commander Boy-Ed frequently held back from me the instructions they had received from Berlin in order not to embarrass the Embassy by passing on military or naval information. Financially, too, the four officials were completely independent and had their own banking54 accounts, for which they had to account individually to their respective departments at home. Only Privy Councillor Albert had, for the purchase on a large scale of raw material, definite funds which were in any event under my control. Concerning the activities of these four gentlemen, countless legends have been spread in America and in part have found their way to Germany. In spite of all the reproaches levelled against them, and indirectly55 against myself, with regard to propaganda—I shall speak of the so-called conspiracies56 in Chapter V.—nothing has reached my ears of which these gentlemen need in any way be ashamed. Individual mistakes we have, of course, all made; in view of the ferocity and protraction of the struggle they were inevitable57. But in general the German propaganda in America in no way deserves the abuse with which it has been covered, in Page 43 part, too, at home. If it had really been so clumsy or ineffective as the enemy Press afterwards claimed, the Entente58 and their American partisans60 would not have set in motion such gigantic machinery61 to combat it. One need only read G. Lechartier's book, "Intrigues62 et Diplomaties à Washington," to see what importance was attached to our propaganda by the enemy. In spite of all the bitterness which the author infuses into his fictitious63 narration64, admiration65 for the German activity in the United States shines through the whole book. Further, at the end of 1918 a Commission of the Senate appointed to investigate German propaganda, as a result of the publication of protocols66 on this subject, repeatedly stated that its work had in no way been in vain, but rather its after effects had made themselves strongly felt "like poison gas" long after America's entry into the war. One may well venture to say that, had it not been for the serious crisis caused by the submarine war, it would probably in time have succeeded in completely neutralizing67 the anti-German campaign.
As regards our justification68 for openly championing the German cause before the people of the United States by written and spoken word, this is self-evident in a country which recognizes the principles of freedom of the Press and free speech. Apart from this, however, the American Government have themselves provided a precedent69 in this connection during the civil war, when President Lincoln in 1863 sent to England the famous preacher, Henry Ward10 Beecher, whose sympathies were strongly on the side of the Federals. Through his speeches, afterwards published as "Patriotic70 Addresses," he did much towards swaying public opinion in favor of the Northern States. In this war, too, America, after abandoning her neutrality, has carried out vigorous propaganda in neutral countries, as is shown Page 44 by the mission of the well-known New York supporter of woman suffrage71, Mrs. Norman Whitehouse, under the auspices72 of the official Press Bureau and with the special approval of Secretary of State Lansing. Moreover our justification has been expressly upheld by a statement of Commissioner73 Bruce Bielaski of the American Law Department, who appeared as chief witness against us before the above mentioned Commission of Inquiry74. He declared that there was no law in the United States which, before her entry into the war, rendered illegal German or any other foreign propaganda. Why all this noise then?—it is reasonable to ask. Why, then, has the suggestion persisted at home and abroad, almost from the appearance of Dr. Dernburg until the present day, that we had, with our propaganda campaign, made ourselves guilty of treachery to the United States?
From the moral point of view, too, no exception can be taken to the German propaganda. The United States was neutral and wished to remain so. The German propaganda was working for the same end. I have never heard of a single case of bribery75 by our representatives. If money was spent on our side, it was purely for the purpose of spreading articles and pamphlets pleading United States neutrality. Applications were frequently made to us by writers and editors who from inner conviction were ready to write and circulate articles of this kind, but were not financially in a position to do so. The leaders of German propaganda would surely have been neglectful of their duty if in such cases they had not provided the necessary funds. All Governments in the world have always proceeded in a similar way, and in particular that of the United States since their entry into the war, as is shown by the case of the Freie Zeitung of Bern—therefore equally in a neutral country. These facts must throw a strange light on the inquiry of the Page 45 American Senate into German propaganda, delayed as it was until last winter and carried through with such elaborate machinery. It is obvious that beneath it all there lay—what irony76!—a purely propagandist purpose, namely, that of humiliating Germany in the person of her late official representative accredited77 to the United States, and to make her appear contemptible78 in the eyes of the uncritical public!
Whereas in the first months of the war no one in America had thought of connecting "German Propaganda" with anything shocking, our opponents afterwards succeeded in disseminating79 the idea that a few offences against the law committed by Imperial and American Germans represented an important, even the most important, part of the German propaganda work. So it was brought about that even in the time before America's entry into the war, everyone who openly stood up for Germany's cause was stamped by the expression "German Propagandist" as a person of doubtful integrity. The gradual official perpetuation80 of this admittedly misleading identification of our absolutely unexceptionable propaganda with a few regrettable offences against the American penal81 code—this and no other was the object of that inquiry by the Senate. The prejudicial headlines under which the published articles were printed, such as "Brewery82 and Brandy Interests" and "German-Bolshevist Propaganda," themselves sufficed to indicate that our propaganda was to be crucified between two "malefactors"; for to the average American citizen there is nothing more horrifying83 than the distillery on the one hand and Bolshevism on the other. In this connection I must not omit to mention that the great majority of the documents laid before the Commission had been secured by means of bribery or theft. It is also worth while to remind the reader of the significant words Page 46 of Senator Reed, a member of the Commission, who said at one point in the examination: "I am interested in trying to distil84 some truth from a mass of statements which are so manifestly unfair and distorted that it is hard to characterize them in parliamentary language."
As for the fantastic figures with which the Americans have undertaken to estimate the cost of our propaganda, they rest—in so far as they are not simply the fruit of a malicious85 imagination—on the, to say the least of it, superficial hypothesis that all the money paid out by the different German offices from the outbreak of war until the breaking off of diplomatic relations between Germany and America, the amount of which has been arrived at on the strength of a minute scrutiny86 of the books of all the banks with which these offices have done business, were used for purposes of propaganda. As a matter of fact, of course, far the greater part of this outlay87 went to finance the very extensive purchases of Privy Councillor Albert as well as certain business transactions concluded by Captain von Papen, which will be discussed later. In comparison with this the sum we devoted to propaganda work was quite small. The Press Bureau was frequently very appreciably88 hampered89 by the fact that even for quite minor expenditure90 outside the fixed budget, previous sanction had to be obtained from Berlin. Consequently much useful work would have had to remain undone91 if, particularly in the first months of the war, self-sacrificing German-Americans to whom it was only of the slightest interest that the German point of view should be accurately92 and emphatically explained, had not placed small sums at the disposal of the leaders of our propaganda. In the two and a half years between the outbreak of war and the rupture between Germany and America the sums paid out from official funds for propaganda work in the union—including minor contributions Page 47 for other countries, as, for example, the pictures distributed from New York over South America and Eastern Asia—do not, all told, exceed a million dollars. That is surely only a small fraction of what England and France have expended93 during the war in order, in spite of very thorough preparation in peace time, to win over American public opinion to their cause. It is actually only a sixth of what, according to the Chicago Tribune on the 1st November, 1919, the official American Press Bureau of Mr. George Creel has spent in order to "cement enthusiasm for the war" during the eighteen months between America's entry into the war and the conclusion of the Armistice94. The thirty-five to fifty million dollars which, according to the statements of our enemies, were swallowed up by German propaganda in the United States belong, therefore, to the realms of fable95.
In this connection I must mention yet another, far more malicious legend, namely, the slander96 widely spread in America last year, that the funds collected in America for the German Red Cross were used to finance German propaganda. It is a fact that every dollar that went to the German Red Cross Delegation97 in New York was remitted98 to the home organization for which it was intended. Of course these funds were in the first place paid into the various New York banking accounts from which Dr. Dernburg drew the funds for the Press Bureau. But, as Captain Hecker has most definitely stated, their equivalent was remitted to Germany through the bank, regardless of the changes in the exchange.
Dr. Dernburg, in organizing the Press Bureau, availed himself of the assistance he found in New York. The suggestion, widely current in America and repeated by a member of the American Secret Service before the Senatorial inquiry, that this Press Bureau had formed, Page 48 as it were, a part of the German mobilization, and that, therefore, the most skilled propaganda experts from Europe and the Far East had been gathered together in New York in order that, after a preliminary run there, they might be let loose on the American world, is a ridiculous invention. Just as Dr. Dernburg himself became a propagandist without any premeditation, so it was also the case with his colleagues. At first his only assistants were the New York Press Agent of the Hamburg-Amerika line, Herr M. B. Claussen, and after the entry of Japan into the war a Government official from that country who was unable to continue his journey to Germany, because the passport across the Atlantic granted him through the instrumentality of the State Department was rejected by the British authorities. This official, Dr. Alexander Fuehr, the interpreter of the Consulate-General in Yokohama, who had great experience in Press matters and possessed99 an intimate knowledge of American affairs, assisted by quite a small staff of assistants engaged in New York, issued the daily bulletins of the "German Information Service," which appeared for a year and consisted of translations of the substance of the German newspapers, comments on daily events and occasional interviews with people who had returned from Europe. It was Herr Claussens's duty to circulate the bulletins, the arrival of which was in no way kept secret, among the American Press, and to see to it that they should be reproduced as fully as possible, which was done, especially in the provincial100 Press.
Later, when the propaganda movement had developed to the extent of publishing and circulating leaflets, brochures and longer pamphlets, Dr. Dernburg decided101 to employ in the Press Bureau a well-known American publicist in the person of Mr. William Bayard Hale, who Page 49 had already done good work, by speaking and writing, towards an unbiassed appreciation102 of the German point of view, and he was assisted by two younger New York journalists. Later, when the bureau took up war-picture and war-film propaganda, these were joined by two more young German Government officials, Dr. Mechlenburg and Herr Plage, who also were held up in America on their way from Japan. More than a dozen persons, including messengers, have never been employed by the Press Bureau at a time. Of the thirty-one trained propagandists imported from Germany who, according to Captain Lester's evidence before the Senatorial Commission, were supposed to have worked in the Press Bureau, in so far as their names were given in the protocols of the inquiry, we are assured by Herr Fuehr that not one was employed there!
In addition to his direction of the Press Bureau Dr. Dernburg, who continued with inexhaustible energy to write articles for the periodicals and instructive letters for the daily Press, was responsible for keeping in touch with the directors of the American Press. He also availed himself of invitations to speak in American and German circles, and sometimes in other places than New York. As far as I know he never founded any societies for propaganda purposes. On the other hand, when such societies which had arisen, without his influence turned to him, he of course supported them by word and deed.
For all questions of propaganda Dr. Dernburg had the assistance of a small committee nominated by himself and consisting, in addition to Herren Albert, Meyer Gerhardt and Fuehr, of a few American journalists and business men. It was his custom to confer with this committee once or twice a month, when the general situation, the prevailing103 fluctuations104 of public opinion and Page 50 the probable influence of the propaganda material about to be published, were discussed in detail.
With this entirely105 improvised106 and, as will be seen, very modest machinery, Dr. Dernburg began his campaign. The enemy statement that the German propaganda in the United States had been actually organized many years before the war, so that in 1914 we might have ready at our disposal an organization with branches in every part of the country, is unfortunately devoid107 of any foundation. It is a regrettable fact that, in spite of my repeated warnings to the authorities, nothing was ever done on the German side before the war. It is well known that at that time the power of public opinion in democratic countries was very little understood in Germany. It was thought at home—which is typical of the objective, matter-of-fact German national character—that it was much more important that the right should be done than that it should be recognized as right by the public. Added to this was the under-estimation of the influence of the United States on the development of world politics.
Before the war no one in Germany had thought it possible that the union would have to be reckoned with as a factor, much less a decisive factor, in a European war. This was a mistake, the effect of which unfortunately was felt until well into 1917—the result was that there was never enough money available to keep in touch and co-operate with the American Press. As a matter of fact I had, in the course of my activities in Washington, personally entered into certain social relations with the proprietors108 of a few great American newspapers. But from Berlin no advances were made. Even with the German-American papers there was no organized connection, and they themselves did not work together in any way. It is true that for years there had been Page 51 a business connection between the greatest American news-agency, the Associated Press, and the Wolff Telegraphic Bureau; as, however, the agency was not served direct with Berlin Wolff-telegrams, but by its own representatives there, this did not amount to much. England, on the other hand—quite apart from the close relationship resulting from a common language—had for years maintained and systematically cultivated the closest contact with the American Press. It followed, then, that on the outbreak of war the English influence on the American daily Press was enormous. It did not rest as exclusively as has been assumed in Germany on direct proprietary109 rights. I do not think that, with the exception of a single newspaper in one of the smaller cities any great American paper was directly bought by England. Here and there considerable blocks of American newspaper shares may have been in English hands and influenced the tendency of certain papers. If, however, it is true—as was credibly110 stated in Irish-American quarters during the first year of the war—that Lord Northcliffe boasted a year or two before the war of "controlling" seventeen American papers, it is difficult to believe that this influence of the English press-magnates was based on hard cash. Rather is it the case that certain newspapers received their otherwise very costly111 private news-service from England on very advantageous112 terms. To others, English writers of leading articles are said to have been attached, without cost to the newspaper—a scheme of which I have often heard in America, but which is difficult to prove, as all American newspapers maintain the strictest secrecy113 as to the origin of their leading articles. It is, however, common knowledge that with regard to European affairs the American news service was swayed by this entirely English organization. Until the outbreak of the war the American news agencies drew exclusively Page 52 from English sources. Moreover, those newspapers which in the United States play a very important part, inasmuch as they are the fount of most of the new ideas by which the tone of the Press in influenced, were in a very considerable degree served from England. On the other hand, the wide field of cinematographic production was strongly influenced by the French film. In this way our enemies in the United States had, at the outbreak of war, a boundless114 and excellently prepared field for the propagation of their news, and the representation of their point of view, but more particularly for their attack on the German cause. In spite of this, however, they immediately inundated115 the union with propagandist literature, particularly through the agents of the English shipping lines, who were scattered all over the country, and the well-known author and politician, Sir Gilbert Parker, sent from London tons of this matter to well-known American business men, professors and politicians.
On our side, it is true, and I should like to emphasize this to their credit, that on the outbreak of war the German-American newspapers took up our cause unhesitatingly and as one man. Further, they have, until America's entry into the war, honestly striven to win full justice for the American point of view, and to combat the unneutral leanings of the majority of the Americans and the slanderous116 attacks of our enemies. As, however, they are not accessible to the general public, who do not know German, and in particular scarcely ever come into the hands of the authoritative117 American political circles, their support remained more or less academic. Very valuable services were rendered to the German cause by the already-mentioned weekly paper Fatherland, which was printed in English; in view, however, of its reputation as a partisan59 journal, it naturally Page 53 could not exert so deep an influence as the local daily papers, which carried on the English propaganda without allowing it to become too conspicuous118. For telegraphic communication from Germany to America we had to rely solely119 on the two German wireless stations at Sayville and Tuckerton, erected120 shortly before the outbreak of war, and we soon succeeded, subject to American censorship, in getting a regular Press-service, which was spread, not only over the whole of the United States, but was also passed on to South America and East Asia. But in the first place, in spite of repeated extension and strengthening, these two stations were quite inadequate121; in the second place, the Press-service never succeeded in adapting itself thoroughly122 to American requirements. The same may be said of most of the German propaganda literature which reached America in fairly large quantities since the third month of the war, partly in German and partly in not always irreproachable123 English. This, like the Press telegrams, showed a complete lack of understanding of American national psychology124. The American character, I should like to repeat here, is by no means so dry and calculating as the German picture of an American business man usually represents. The outstanding characteristic of the average American is rather a great, even though superficial, sentimentality. There is no news for which a way cannot be guaranteed through the whole country, if clothed in a sentimental125 form. Our enemies have exploited this circumstance with the greatest refinement126 in the case of the German invasion of "poor little Belgium," the shooting of the "heroic nurse," Edith Cavell, and other incidents. Those who had charge of the Berlin propaganda, on the other hand, made very little of such occurrences on the enemy side, e.g., the violation127 of Greece, the bombing of the Corpus Christi procession Page 54 in Karlsruhe, etc. One thing that would have exerted a tremendous influence in America, if its publicity128 had been handled with only average skill, was the sufferings of our children, women and old people as a result of the British hunger blockade—that they have made no attempt to bring to the notice of the world.
On the other hand they put themselves to the greatest possible trouble to lay "The Truth About the War" before American public opinion. This, however, fell on unfavorable ground, for the American does not care to be instructed. He had no interest in learning the "truth" which the German Press communications and explanatory pamphlets were so anxious to impress upon him. The American likes to form his own opinions and so only requires facts. The possibility of exerting influence therefore lies rather in the choice of the facts and the way in which they are presented, than in logical and convincing argument. It is all the easier to influence him by the well-timed transmission of skilfully129 disposed facts, since his usually very limited general knowledge and his complete ignorance of European affairs deprive him of the simplest premises130 for a critical judgment131 of the facts presented to him from the enemy side. It is quite incredible what the American public will swallow in the way of lies if they are only repeated often enough and properly served up. It all turns on which side gets the news in first; for the first impression sticks. Corrections are generally vain, especially as they appear as a rule in small print and in inconspicuous places. When, for example, the American Press got the first news of the "destruction" of Rheims cathedral from London and in the English version, no German correction, however well-founded, would succeed in removing the first impression.
Particularly ineffective in their influence on American Page 55 public opinion—as may be said here in anticipation—have been the majority of our official Notes. In view of the subsequent ever-increasing interruption of the news service from Germany, they were the last and only means by which the German standpoint could be brought before the American people. Their effectiveness depended entirely on the impression that they made on American public opinion and not on the Washington Government; yet they were nearly always drawn132 up in Berlin in the form of juristic précis, propagandist but quite futile133.
All these factors must be taken into consideration in attempting to estimate the success of our propaganda in the United States. They show that on the one hand the prevailing conditions of American public opinion were extraordinarily unfavorable to our propaganda, and that the support it received from home, with a few exceptions, was misguided.
Dr. Dernburg, then, had not a chance during the eight months of his activity in America of transforming her into a pro-German country, and it is certain that no one else could have done it in his place. But he succeeded to a great extent, and within a comparatively short time, in more or less crippling the enemy propaganda, and at least in gradually rendering134 ineffective the grossest misrepresentations of our enemies. By his own writings and other methods of spreading the truth, and particularly by the numerous brochures and books, which at his suggestion were written by American supporters of the German cause and distributed in thousands directly or indirectly by the Press Bureau with the help of a skilfully compiled address-book, he succeeded in exerting very considerable influence. By keeping in touch with American journalists and other influential135 persons he did much good work, particularly in the first months Page 56 of the war. His connection with Irish leaders laid the foundation for a co-operation which in the following year was of great importance to our position in the United States, and which, with a somewhat more intelligent backing by our Government departments at home, might have been more fruitful still.
One branch of our propaganda which was also initiated136 under Dr. Dernburg, but was chiefly developed after his departure, was the moving-picture propaganda, for which a very efficient company was floated by Privy Councillor Albert. At first it was intended to be an agency for the circulation of films from Germany. As, however, suitable material for the American market could not be obtained there, the "American Correspondent Film Co." decided to send its own agents to Germany and Austria with a view to making suitable films for their purpose. In this way several important film-dramas were produced which have had great success in hundreds of American cinemas. In spite of this the company had finally to be liquidated137, chiefly owing to lack of support from the military authorities at home.
With the sinking of the Lusitania our propaganda of enlightenment in the United States substantially came to an end. Henceforward the principal aim of its activity, which, after Dr. Dernburg's departure, came under the direction of Privy Councillor Albert, was to keep the United States out of the war. Side by side with this, an attempt was made to influence public feeling against the export of arms and ammunition138 and against the Anglo-French loan, and to demonstrate the increasingly prejudiced effect wrought139 by England on American economic interests. In November, 1915, I urged, as I cabled at the time to Chancellor140 Bethmann-Hollweg, the complete suppression of propaganda. The Press Bureau in New York continued under the direction Page 57 of Dr. Fuehr, until the breaking off of relations between America and Germany. It concerned itself, however, apart from certain regular literary contributions to certain journals, less with propaganda work than with keeping an eye on the American Press and the development of the news service to and from Germany as well as to South America and Eastern Asia.
点击
收听单词发音
收听单词发音 |
1
metropolitan
|
|
| adj.大城市的，大都会的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
2
indifference
|
|
| n.不感兴趣，不关心，冷淡，不在乎 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
3
shipping
|
|
| n.船运（发货，运输，乘船） | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
4
fully
|
|
| adv.完全地，全部地，彻底地；充分地 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
5
averted
|
|
| 防止，避免( avert的过去式和过去分词 )； 转移 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
6
muffled
|
|
| adj.（声音）被隔的；听不太清的；（衣服）裹严的；蒙住的v.压抑，捂住( muffle的过去式和过去分词 )；用厚厚的衣帽包着（自己） | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
7
fixed
|
|
| adj.固定的，不变的，准备好的；(计算机)固定的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
8
devoted
|
|
| adj.忠诚的，忠实的，热心的，献身于...的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
9
aggression
|
|
| n.进攻，侵略，侵犯，侵害 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
10
ward
|
|
| n.守卫，监护，病房，行政区，由监护人或法院保护的人（尤指儿童）；vt.守护，躲开 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
11
guilt
|
|
| n.犯罪；内疚；过失，罪责 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
12
memorandum
|
|
| n.备忘录，便笺 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
13
privy
|
|
| adj.私用的；隐密的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
14
ministry
|
|
| n.(政府的)部；牧师 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
15
treasury
|
|
| n.宝库；国库，金库；文库 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
16
overloaded
|
|
| a.超载的，超负荷的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
17
plunged
|
|
| v.颠簸( plunge的过去式和过去分词 )；暴跌；骤降；突降 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
18
inspection
|
|
| n.检查，审查，检阅 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
19
accosted
|
|
| v.走过去跟…讲话( accost的过去式和过去分词 )；跟…搭讪；（乞丐等）上前向…乞讨；（妓女等）勾搭 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
20
annoyance
|
|
| n.恼怒，生气，烦恼 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
21
amazement
|
|
| n.惊奇，惊讶 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
22
wireless
|
|
| adj.无线的；n.无线电 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
23
corps
|
|
| n.(通信等兵种的)部队；(同类作的)一组 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
24
countless
|
|
| adj.无数的，多得不计其数的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
25
apparatus
|
|
| n.装置，器械；器具，设备 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
26
herald
|
|
| vt.预示...的来临，预告，宣布，欢迎 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
27
considerably
|
|
| adv.极大地；相当大地；在很大程度上 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
28
intensity
|
|
| n.强烈，剧烈；强度；烈度 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
29
outspoken
|
|
| adj.直言无讳的，坦率的，坦白无隐的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
30
minor
|
|
| adj.较小(少)的，较次要的；n.辅修学科；vi.辅修 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
31
transcript
|
|
| n.抄本，誊本，副本，肄业证书 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
32
condemned
|
|
| adj. 被责难的, 被宣告有罪的 动词condemn的过去式和过去分词 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
33
regularity
|
|
| n.规律性，规则性；匀称，整齐 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
34
systematically
|
|
| adv.有系统地 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
35
atrocities
|
|
| n.邪恶，暴行( atrocity的名词复数 )；滔天大罪 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
36
heeded
|
|
| v.听某人的劝告，听从( heed的过去式和过去分词 )；变平，使（某物）变平( flatten的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
37
courageous
|
|
| adj.勇敢的，有胆量的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
38
fraught
|
|
| adj.充满…的，伴有(危险等)的；忧虑的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
39
negotiations
|
|
| 协商( negotiation的名词复数 )； 谈判； 完成（难事）； 通过 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
40
rupture
|
|
| n.破裂；(关系的)决裂；v.(使)破裂 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
41
purely
|
|
| adv.纯粹地，完全地 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
42
confidential
|
|
| adj.秘（机）密的，表示信任的，担任机密工作的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
43
extraordinarily
|
|
| adv.格外地；极端地 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
44
doomed
|
|
| 命定的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
45
privately
|
|
| adv.以私人的身份，悄悄地，私下地 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
46
enrolled
|
|
| adj.入学登记了的v.[亦作enrol]( enroll的过去式和过去分词 )；登记，招收，使入伍（或入会、入学等），参加，成为成员；记入名册；卷起，包起 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
47
interned
|
|
| v.拘留，关押( intern的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
48
unwilling
|
|
| adj.不情愿的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
49
hamper
|
|
| vt.妨碍，束缚，限制；n.(有盖的)大篮子 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
50
geographical
|
|
| adj.地理的；地区(性)的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
51
naval
|
|
| adj.海军的，军舰的，船的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
52
scattered
|
|
| adj.分散的，稀疏的；散步的；疏疏落落的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
53
mutual
|
|
| adj.相互的，彼此的；共同的，共有的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
54
banking
|
|
| n.银行业，银行学，金融业 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
55
indirectly
|
|
| adv.间接地，不直接了当地 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
56
conspiracies
|
|
| n.阴谋，密谋( conspiracy的名词复数 ) | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
57
inevitable
|
|
| adj.不可避免的，必然发生的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
58
entente
|
|
| n.协定；有协定关系的各国 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
59
partisan
|
|
| adj.党派性的；游击队的；n.游击队员；党徒 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
60
partisans
|
|
| 游击队员( partisan的名词复数 )； 党人； 党羽； 帮伙 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
61
machinery
|
|
| n.(总称)机械，机器；机构 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
62
intrigues
|
|
| n.密谋策划( intrigue的名词复数 )；神秘气氛；引人入胜的复杂情节v.搞阴谋诡计( intrigue的第三人称单数 )；激起…的好奇心 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
63
fictitious
|
|
| adj.虚构的，假设的；空头的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
64
narration
|
|
| n.讲述，叙述；故事；记叙体 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
65
admiration
|
|
| n.钦佩，赞美，羡慕 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
66
protocols
|
|
| n.礼仪( protocol的名词复数 )；（外交条约的）草案；（数据传递的）协议；科学实验报告（或计划） | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
67
neutralizing
|
|
| v.使失效( neutralize的现在分词 )；抵消；中和；使（一个国家）中立化 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
68
justification
|
|
| n.正当的理由；辩解的理由 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
69
precedent
|
|
| n.先例，前例；惯例；adj.在前的，在先的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
70
patriotic
|
|
| adj.爱国的，有爱国心的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
71
suffrage
|
|
| n.投票，选举权，参政权 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
72
auspices
|
|
| n.资助，赞助 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
73
commissioner
|
|
| n.（政府厅、局、处等部门）专员，长官，委员 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
74
inquiry
|
|
| n.打听，询问，调查，查问 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
75
bribery
|
|
| n.贿络行为，行贿，受贿 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
76
irony
|
|
| n.反语，冷嘲；具有讽刺意味的事，嘲弄 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
77
accredited
|
|
| adj.可接受的；可信任的；公认的；质量合格的v.相信( accredit的过去式和过去分词 )；委托；委任；把…归结于 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
78
contemptible
|
|
| adj.可鄙的，可轻视的，卑劣的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
79
disseminating
|
|
| 散布，传播( disseminate的现在分词 ) | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
80
perpetuation
|
|
| n.永存，不朽 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
81
penal
|
|
| adj.刑罚的；刑法上的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
82
brewery
|
|
| n.啤酒厂 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
83
horrifying
|
|
| a.令人震惊的，使人毛骨悚然的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
84
distil
|
|
| vt.蒸馏；提取…的精华，精选出 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
85
malicious
|
|
| adj.有恶意的，心怀恶意的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
86
scrutiny
|
|
| n.详细检查，仔细观察 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
87
outlay
|
|
| n.费用，经费，支出；v.花费 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
88
appreciably
|
|
| adv.相当大地 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
89
hampered
|
|
| 妨碍，束缚，限制( hamper的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
90
expenditure
|
|
| n.(时间、劳力、金钱等)支出；使用，消耗 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
91
undone
|
|
| a.未做完的，未完成的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
92
accurately
|
|
| adv.准确地，精确地 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
93
expended
|
|
| v.花费( expend的过去式和过去分词 )；使用（钱等）做某事；用光；耗尽 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
94
armistice
|
|
| n.休战，停战协定 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
95
fable
|
|
| n.寓言；童话；神话 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
96
slander
|
|
| n./v.诽谤，污蔑 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
97
delegation
|
|
| n.代表团；派遣 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
98
remitted
|
|
| v.免除（债务），宽恕( remit的过去式和过去分词 )；使某事缓和；寄回，传送 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
99
possessed
|
|
| adj.疯狂的；拥有的，占有的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
100
provincial
|
|
| adj.省的，地方的；n．外省人，乡下人 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
101
decided
|
|
| adj.决定了的，坚决的；明显的，明确的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
102
appreciation
|
|
| n.评价；欣赏；感谢；领会，理解；价格上涨 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
103
prevailing
|
|
| adj.盛行的；占优势的；主要的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
104
fluctuations
|
|
| 波动，涨落，起伏( fluctuation的名词复数 ) | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
105
entirely
|
|
| ad.全部地，完整地；完全地，彻底地 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
106
improvised
|
|
| a.即席而作的,即兴的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
107
devoid
|
|
| adj.全无的，缺乏的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
108
proprietors
|
|
| n.所有人，业主( proprietor的名词复数 ) | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
109
proprietary
|
|
| n.所有权，所有的；独占的；业主 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
110
credibly
|
|
| ad.可信地；可靠地 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
111
costly
|
|
| adj.昂贵的，价值高的，豪华的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
112
advantageous
|
|
| adj.有利的；有帮助的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
113
secrecy
|
|
| n.秘密，保密，隐蔽 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
114
boundless
|
|
| adj.无限的；无边无际的；巨大的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
115
inundated
|
|
| v.淹没( inundate的过去式和过去分词 )；（洪水般地）涌来；充满；给予或交予（太多事物）使难以应付 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
116
slanderous
|
|
| adj.诽谤的，中伤的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
117
authoritative
|
|
| adj.有权威的，可相信的；命令式的；官方的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
118
conspicuous
|
|
| adj.明眼的，惹人注目的；炫耀的，摆阔气的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
119
solely
|
|
| adv.仅仅，唯一地 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
120
ERECTED
|
|
| adj. 直立的，竖立的，笔直的 vt. 使 ... 直立，建立 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
121
inadequate
|
|
| adj.(for,to)不充足的，不适当的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
122
thoroughly
|
|
| adv.完全地，彻底地，十足地 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
123
irreproachable
|
|
| adj.不可指责的，无过失的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
124
psychology
|
|
| n.心理，心理学，心理状态 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
125
sentimental
|
|
| adj.多愁善感的，感伤的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
126
refinement
|
|
| n.文雅；高尚；精美；精制；精炼 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
127
violation
|
|
| n.违反(行为)，违背(行为)，侵犯 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
128
publicity
|
|
| n.众所周知，闻名；宣传，广告 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
129
skilfully
|
|
| adv. (美skillfully)熟练地 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
130
premises
|
|
| n.建筑物，房屋 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
131
judgment
|
|
| n.审判；判断力，识别力，看法，意见 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
132
drawn
|
|
| v.拖，拉，拔出；adj.憔悴的，紧张的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
133
futile
|
|
| adj.无效的，无用的，无希望的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
134
rendering
|
|
| n.表现，描写 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
135
influential
|
|
| adj.有影响的，有权势的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
136
initiated
|
|
| n. 创始人 adj. 新加入的 vt. 开始，创始，启蒙，介绍加入 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
137
liquidated
|
|
| v.清算( liquidate的过去式和过去分词 )；清除（某人）；清偿；变卖 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
138
ammunition
|
|
| n.军火，弹药 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
139
wrought
|
|
| v.引起；以…原料制作；运转；adj.制造的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
140
chancellor
|
|
| n.(英)大臣；法官；(德、奥)总理；大学校长 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
| 欢迎访问英文小说网 |