As I mentioned in the first chapter, it was to be expected that public opinion in America would range itself overwhelmingly on the side of the Entente1. As a result of the violation2 of Belgian neutrality, this happened far in excess of expectation. The violence of the statements of the anti-German party called forth3 strong replies from those who desired a strict neutrality on the part of the United States. The adherents5 of the latter party were always stigmatized6 as pro-Germans, although even the German-Americans never called for anything more than an unconditional7 neutrality. This also was the aim for which the German policy was working through its representatives in America. We never hoped for anything further.
The waves of excitement ran so high that even the private relations of the adherents of both parties contending suffered. President Wilson, therefore, on the 18th August, 1914, issued a proclamation to the American people which is of special interest because it lays down in a definite form the policy to which he logically and unwaveringly adhered until the rupture8.
In this proclamation the following sentences occur: "Every man who really loves America will act and speak in the true spirit of neutrality, which is the spirit of impartiality9 and fairness and friendliness11 to all concerned." And further: "The people of the United Page 59 States ... may be divided in camps of hostile opinion.... Such divisions among us would be fatal to our peace of mind and might seriously stand in the way of the proper performance of our duty as the one great nation at peace, the one people holding itself ready to play a part of impartial10 mediation12 and speak the counsels of peace and accommodation, not as a partisan13, but as a friend."
The policy outlined in these quotations14 from Mr. Wilson's proclamation won the approval of an overwhelming majority of the American people, for even among the supporters of the Entente there was only a small minority who desired an active participation15 in the war by the United States. Apart from the fact that the traditional American policy seemed to preclude16 any such intervention17 in European affairs, it was to the interest of the United States to play with unimpaired power the r?le of Arbiter18 mundi, when the States of ancient Europe, tired of tearing one another to pieces, at last longed for peace again. America could not but hope that neither of the two warring parties would come out of the war in a dominating position. There is, therefore, a certain modicum19 of truth in the view frequently expressed in Germany that the United States would in any case finally have entered the war to prevent the so-called "German Peace." But the question is whether such a peace was possible in face of the superior strength of our enemies. If we had won the first battle of the Marne and had then been prepared to restore Belgium and conclude a moderate peace, it is conceivable that we might have come to terms with England on the basis of a kind of Treaty of Amiens. After the loss of the battle of the Marne a "German Peace" was out of the question. The possibility of such a peace has never recurred20. It was therefore necessary for the German Page 60 policy to strive for a peace by understanding on the basis of the status quo. Just as Frederick the Great defended Prussia's newly won position as a great Power against overwhelming odds21, so we were fighting under similar conditions for the maintenance of Germany's position in the world.
Our Government had declared urbi et orbi that they were waging a defensive22 war, and were therefore obliged to regulate their policy accordingly. If we had desired a peace like that of Hubertusburg we should have won. It is often contended in Germany to-day that it would still have been possible to attain23 this end. I have struggled for it in America for two and a half years and am as convinced to-day as I was then, that by acquiescing24 in the policy of the United States we should have obtained a peace which would have met the needs of the German people, if only those who desired the same thing at home had been in a position to carry their wishes through.
In Germany it is also alleged25, contrary to my own opinion, that the German people could not have held out if they had not been driven on by the "Will to conquer." I regard this view as an injustice26 to the German nation. If our home propaganda, instead of continually awakening27 vain hopes, had insisted on telling the real truth, the German people would have faced danger to the last. We ought to have repeated constantly that our situation was very serious, but that we must clench28 our teeth, and our Government must be ready to seize the first opportunity to end the defensive war by a corresponding peace.
The controversy29 about the "German peace" or "peace by negotiation30" must be touched on here because it formed the nucleus31 of the diplomatic struggle in Washington. At the beginning of the war these catchwords Page 61 had not yet been invented, but their substance even then controlled the situation. The attitude of the American Government and public opinion towards us depended in the first place on whether they thought that we were striving for world-mastery or were waging a defensive war.
Immediately after my return from Europe I called on President Wilson, who had taken the opportunity of the war and the death of his first wife, to withdraw even more than ever from the outer world. He was generally known as the recluse33 of the White House. He only received people with whom he had political business to settle. Particularly from diplomats34 and other foreigners Mr. Wilson kept very aloof35, because he was anxious to avoid the appearance of preference or partiality.
After the disillusionment of Versailles it is difficult for a German to form an unbiassed judgment36 of Mr. Wilson. We must not forget, however, that no serious attempt has ever been made in Germany to get an unprejudiced estimate of Mr. Wilson's personality. In the course of the war he has come to be regarded more and more as unneutral and anti-German, whereas, to the average American public opinion, he appeared in quite a different light. Later, after the defeat of our arms, we hailed Mr. Wilson as the Messiah who was to save Germany and the whole world from dire37 distress38. When, therefore, at Versailles, the President, instead of unfolding and carrying through a far-reaching programme for the general reconstruction39 of the world, approved all the ultra-chauvinistic and nationalistic mistakes of the European statesmen and proclaimed as the aim of the peace the punishment of Germany, Mr. Wilson was set down in Germany without more ado as a hypocrite.
I think that through all the phases of the war the German Page 62 opinion of Mr. Wilson has suffered from sheer exaggeration. The chief mistake lay in separating Wilson's personality from public opinion in the United States. In spite of his strong will and his autocratic leanings, Mr. Wilson is still, in the first place, a perfect type of the American politician. In his speeches he always tries to voice public opinion, and in his policy to follow its wishes.
He certainly tries to direct and influence public opinion. But he changes his front at once if he notices that he has strayed from the way that the aura popularis would have him follow. In order to form a correct judgment of Mr. Wilson's actions and speeches it is always necessary to ask oneself, in the first place, what end he has in view for his own political position and that of his party in America. He proclaims in a most dazzling way the ideals of the American people. But their realization40 always depends on his own actual political interests and those of the Democratic party. Mr. Wilson's attitude has always been synonymous with that of his party, because the latter can produce no other personality capable of competing with the President. Therefore, Mr. Wilson always met with little or no opposition41 within the Democratic party, and he was able to follow for a long time his own inclination42 to adopt a quite independent policy.
Socially the President is very congenial when once he has made up his mind to emerge from his narrow circle. He has not the reputation of being a loyal friend, and is accused of ingratitude43 by many of his former colleagues and enthusiastic adherents. In any case, however, Mr. Wilson is an implacable enemy when once he feels himself personally attacked or slighted. As a result of his sensitiveness he has a strong tendency to make the mistake of regarding political differences of Page 63 opinion as personal antipathy44. The President has never forgiven the German Government for having caused the failure of his peace-policy of 1916-17, which was supported by public opinion in America. In Germany his later speeches, in which he drew a distinction between the German people and the Imperial Government, were regarded as hypocrisy45. Such a differentiation46 was at that time based on American public feeling, which held autocracy47 and militarism responsible for the disasters which had been brought upon the world. The question has, however, never been answered why this distinction was abandoned by Mr. Wilson at Versailles. Without wishing in any way either to accuse or defend him I consider the answer to this riddle48 to be that the President allowed himself to be convinced of the complicity of the German people by the statesmen of the Entente. He was at the time in a mood with regard to us which predisposed him to such influences. Mr. Wilson was by origin, up-bringing and training a pacifist. When it is remembered that with us and in neutral countries it was the pacifists themselves who were the most indignant at the Peace of Versailles, that they were the very people who for the most part advised against the signature of this peace, one can imagine the feelings aroused in a disillusioned49 pacifist like Wilson by those whom he regards as responsible for having thwarted50 the possibility of an ideal pacifist peace.
Apart from this, Mr. Wilson at Versailles no longer dominated American public opinion, and his political power consequently collapsed51. In the United States the old indifference52 to European affairs regained53 the upper hand. Men were satisfied with having brought about a victory over autocracy and militarism. They wanted nothing further. The American troops were crowding home, and, finally, feeling in the United States was still Page 64 so strongly against us that no one would have understood the President if he had caused a rupture with his Allies on our behalf.
At Versailles, too, an outstanding peculiarity55 of Mr. Wilson's may have played a part which even during the earlier negotiations56 had been of great importance. He is a man who is slow to make up his mind, and likes to postpone57 decisions until they are inevitable58. He is always ready to wait and see whether the situation may not improve or some unexpected event occur. How often during the Washington negotiations did, first I and then our enemies, believe that we had set President Wilson on a definite course. But again and again the requisite59 decision would be postponed60. In Washington it was generally taken under the strong pressure of public opinion. In Versailles the Entente statesmen may well have forced a decision by displaying a stronger will and a wider knowledge of European affairs. Mr. Wilson was at Versailles in the position of the giant Ant?us, who drew his strength from his native soil. Once away from American ground Hercules (Clemenceau) was able to crush him.
At the time I am now describing the circumstances were quite different, because at that time Mr. Wilson had a reliable support for his policy in American public opinion. In Germany, at the very beginning of the war, great resentment61 was felt against Mr. Wilson for the cold negative in his reply to the Emperor's telegram in which Mr. Wilson was asked to condemn62 the atrocities63 perpetrated by the Belgian population and francs-tireurs. It was not, however, noticed in Germany that the President at the same time likewise refused to receive a Belgian deputation which came to America to beg for his help.
During my conversation with the President already Page 65 mentioned, he made a statement on the lines of his proclamation of neutrality of which I have already given the substance. My reply that the American neutrality seemed to us to be tinged64 with sympathy for our enemies Mr. Wilson contradicted emphatically. He thought that this appearance was the result of England's naval65 power, which he could do nothing to alter. In this connection the President made the following remark, which struck me very forcibly at the time:
"The United States must remain neutral, because otherwise the fact that her population is drawn66 from so many European countries would give rise to serious domestic difficulties."
My remark about the benevolence67 of the United States' neutrality towards our enemies was at the time chiefly prompted by the differences that had arisen with regard to the wireless68 stations.
The fact that this question arose gives yet another proof of how little we were prepared for war. By German enterprise two wireless stations had been erected70 on the east coast of the United States as a means of direct communication with Europe, one at Sayville (Long Island), the other at Tuckerton (New Jersey). Both were partly financed by American and French capital. As at the beginning of the war the cable fell entirely71 into English hands and was destroyed by them, we had no telegraphic communication with home at our disposal. We had to fall back exclusively on the wireless stations, when, as frequently happened, we were unable to make use of the circuitous72 routes via neutral countries. Unfortunately it appeared that the legal position with regard to the proprietorship73 of the two stations was not clear. Actions were immediately brought on the French side, and the closing of the stations by decree of the Page 66 courts demanded. Under these circumstances it was fortunate for us that the American Government, after tedious negotiations with me, took over possession of both stations. Otherwise they would have been closed and we should have been unable to use them.
Our satisfaction at this decision was modified by the establishment of a censorship of radio-telegrams on the part of the American Government on the strength of the Hague Convention, which prohibits the communication by wireless from a neutral country with the military or naval forces of a combatant. If the stations had been publicly used before the war we should have stood on firm legal ground, for such cases are excepted by the Hague Convention. Unfortunately the stations were in 1914 only partially74 completed, and the application of the clauses in question was therefore doubtful. It is true that the stations were ready for immediate32 use, but as a result of the French protest the American Government held strictly75 to the legal standpoint. In these negotiations we had to content ourselves with pointing out that whereas our enemies could pass on military information to their Governments by means of coded cablegrams, we should be confined to the use of the wireless stations. Finally we came to an agreement with the American Government that they should have a copy of the code which we used for the wireless telegrams. In this way their contents were kept secret from the enemy, but not from the Washington Government. This course we only agreed to as a last resource as it was not suitable for handling negotiations in which the American Government was concerned.
The course of this controversy was typical of the fate of German interests in America throughout the whole period of American neutrality. Unfortunately we had absolutely no means at hand for putting any pressure on Page 67 America in our own favor. In comparison with the public opinion in the Eastern States, which followed in the wake of the Entente, and with the authoritative76 circles of New York, Wilson's Administration without question strove for an honorable neutrality. In spite of this most of their decisions were materially unfavorable to us, so that a German observer from a distance might, not without reason, obtain the impression that the neutrality of the American Government was mere77 hypocrisy and that all kinds of pretexts78 were found for helping79 England.
This was not the chief impression made on a near observer. In politics the Americans are first and foremost jurists, and indeed in a narrower and more literal sense than the English Imperialists, with whom, according to their old traditions, justice only serves as a cloak for their political ambitions. I cannot judge how far the Americans have become full-blooded Imperialists since their entry into the war, i.e., since about 1917. At the time of which I speak this was far from being the case. If, moreover, it is a fact that the majority of the decisions of the United States turned out unfavorably to us, the question of the American motives80 should have been carefully differentiated82 from the other question as to what inferences may be drawn from the state of affairs. Even if we had had just reason to complain of unfair treatment it was for us to be as indulgent towards America as was compatible with our final aim not to lose the war. The question is not whether we had cause for resentment and retaliation83, but simply what benefit could be extracted for Germany out of the existing situation.
At this visit to the White House, the only question that was acute was that of the wireless stations. This and the negotiations which I shall mention later, dealing84 with the coaling of our ships of war and the American export of arms and ammunition85, I discussed with Secretary of Page 68 State Bryan. The first time I visited this gentleman he exclaimed with great warmth: "Now you see I was right when I kept repeating that preparation for war was the best way of bringing war about. All the European Powers were armed to the teeth and always maintained that this heavy armament was necessary to protect them from war. Now the fallacy is obvious. We alone live in peace because we are unarmed."
Mr. Bryan has always been a genuine pacifist, and later sacrificed his Ministerial appointment to his convictions. So long as he remained in office he continued to influence the American Government to maintain neutrality and constantly strove to bring about peace.
A first attempt in this direction was made from Washington immediately after the outbreak of the war, but met with no response from the combatant Powers. At the beginning of September, Mr. Bryan repeated the offer of American mediation.
At that time a vigorous agitation87 had begun in New York for the restoration of peace. Mr. William Randolph Hearst, the well-known editor of widely circulated newspapers, and other well-known personalities88, called together great meetings at which America's historical mission was said to be the stopping of the wholesale89 murder that was going on in Europe. At this time I was, together with several other gentlemen, staying with James Speyer, the banker, at his country house. The host and the majority of the guests, among whom was the late ambassador in Constantinople, Oscar Straus, were supporters of the prevailing90 pacific movement. The question of American mediation was eagerly discussed at the dinner table. Mr. Straus was an extremely warm adherent4 of this idea. He turned particularly to me because the German Government were regarded as opponents of the pacifist ideas. I said that we had not Page 69 desired the war and would certainly be ready at the first suitable opportunity for a peace by understanding. Thereupon Mr. Straus declared that he would at once travel to Washington and repeat my words to Mr. Bryan. Immediately after dinner he went to the station and on the following day I received a wire from the Secretary of State, asking me to return to Washington as soon as I could to discuss the matter with him. There we had a long interview in his private residence, with the result that an American offer of mediation was sent to the Imperial Chancellor91. Meanwhile Mr. Straus had gone to the ambassadors of the other combatant Powers, who all more or less rejected the proposal. The friendly reply of the German Government coincided in principle with what I had said, but added that Mr. Bryan should first address himself to the enemy, as the further course of the negotiations depended on their attitude, which was not yet known. The American Government never returned to the question and I had no reason to urge them to do so. Any importunity92 on our side would have given an impression of weakness. Nevertheless this interlude was so far favorable to us that it contrasted our readiness for negotiation with the enemy's refusal.
In consequence of the failure of their first attempt to intervene the American Government thought it necessary to exercise more restraint. In spite of this, however, President Wilson, before the end of the winter of 1914-15, sent his intimate friend, Colonel Edward M. House, to London, Paris and Berlin, in order to ascertain93 semi-officially whether there were any possibilities of peace.
Mr. House, who lived in an unpretentious abode94 in New York, occupied a peculiar54 and very influential95 position at the White House. Bound to the President by intimate friendship, he has always refused to accept any Page 70 Ministerial appointment, either at home or abroad, although he was only possessed96 of modest means and could certainly have had any post in the Cabinet or as an ambassador that he had liked to choose. In this way he remained entirely independent, and since President Wilson's entry into office, was his confidential97 adviser98 in domestic, and particularly in foreign politics. As such Colonel House had a position that is without precedent99 in American history. During his stay in London, at this time, he is said to have described himself to the wife of an English Cabinet Minister, herself not favorably disposed towards America, as the "eyes and ears of the President." I know from my own experience how thoroughly100 and effectively he was able to inform his friend on the European situation, and how perfectly101 correctly, on the other hand, he interpreted Mr. Wilson's views.
It was not easy to become more closely acquainted with Colonel House, whose almost proverbial economy of speech might be compared with the taciturnity of old Moltke.
Unlike the majority of his fellow-nationals, and particularly his immediate fellow-countrymen of the Southern States, Colonel House, while possessing great personal charm and the courtesy that is characteristic of the Southern States, is reserved and retiring. It took a considerable time before I got to know this able and interesting man at all intimately. I did not become intimate with him until the time of the journey to Berlin already mentioned. Even then it was the earnest wish of Colonel House to obtain for his great friend the chief credit of being the founder102 of peace. Colonel House was particularly well fitted to be the champion of the President's ideas. I have never known a more upright and honorable pacifist than he. He had a horror of war because he regarded it as the contradiction of his ideals Page 71 of the nobility of the human race. He often spoke103 with indignation of the people who were enriching themselves out of the war, and added that he would never touch the profits of war industry. He afterwards repeatedly told me that he had spoken as energetically in London against the blockade, which was a breach104 of international law, as against the submarine war in Berlin. Both these types of warfare105 were repugnant to the warm, sympathetic heart of Colonel House. He could not understand why women and children should die of hunger or drowning in order that the aims of an imperialist policy, which he condemned106, might be attained107. At the same time he was convinced that neither of these types could decide the war, but would only serve to rouse in both the combatant countries a boundless108 hatred109 which would certainly stand in the way of future co-operation in the work of restoring peace. In many of his remarks at that time, Colonel House proved to be right, since the war was decided110 mainly by the entry of America and the consequent overwhelming superiority in men, money and material.
Meanwhile, as a result of the traffic in munitions111, feeling in Germany had turned sharply against the United States. Our position with regard to this question was very unfavorable as we had no legal basis for complaint. The clause of the Hague Convention which permitted such traffic had been included in the second Hague Convention at our own suggestion. Nevertheless it was natural that the one-sided support of our enemies by the rapidly growing American war industry roused strong feeling in Germany. As a result there began a controversy with the American Government similar to that with England during the war of 1870-71. Even in the United States there was a considerable minority which disapproved112 of the munitions traffic, though on moral Page 72 rather than political or international grounds. It goes without saying that the agitation of this minority was supported in every way by the German representatives. There was no law in America to prohibit such support, which could not, moreover, be regarded as a breach of American neutrality. It is true that in this way a few Germans got themselves into an awkward position because they were suspected of stirring up the German-Americans, who together with the Irish played a leading part in the agitation against the Government. In particular, Dr. Dernburg became unpopular in America, since he began to address meetings in addition to his journalistic work. The Washington Government regarded him as the leader of the "hyphenated Americans" who were opposing the policy of the President's Administration, because the latter took up the strict legal standpoint that the traffic in munitions was permissible113, and that it would therefore be a breach of neutrality in our favor if such traffic were forbidden after the outbreak of hostilities114. President Wilson himself even had an idea of nationalizing the munition86 factories, which would have rendered traffic with the combatant Powers a breach of international law. When, however, he sounded Congress on this matter, it became evident that a majority could not be obtained for such a step. The United States had already brought forward a similar proposal at the Hague Conference with the intention of conceding one of the chief demands of the pacifists. It was in wide circles in America an axiom that the munitions factories were the chief incentives115 to war. As during the first winter of the war there were very few such factories in America the President's plan was not merely Utopian but meant in all seriousness, in which connection it should be noted116 that American industrial circles were among Mr. Wilson's bitterest opponents. If Mr. Wilson's Page 73 proposal had been known to German public opinion he would have been more favorably judged.
The negotiations which I had to carry out on this question of the munitions traffic concerned themselves also with the question of the coaling of our ships of war. This was based on an agreement between the American Government and the Hamburg-Amerika line. The port authorities had at first shown themselves agreeable. As a result of the English protest the attitude of the American Government became increasingly strict. With the actual coaling I had nothing to do. That came within the sphere of the Naval Attaché, who, for obvious reasons connected with the conduct of the war at sea, kept his actions strictly secret. My first connection with this question was when I was instructed to hand over to the American Government the following memorandum117, dated 15th December, 1914:
"According to the provisions of general international law, there is nothing to prevent neutral States from allowing contraband118 of war to reach the enemies of Germany through or out of their territory. This is also permitted by Article VII. of the Hague Convention of the 19th October, 1907, dealing with the rights and duties of neutrals in the case of land or sea war. If a State uses this freedom to the advantage of our enemies, that State, according to a generally recognized provision of international law, which is confirmed in Article IX. of the two aforesaid Conventions, may not hamper119 Germany's military power with regard to contraband through or out of its territory.
"The declaration of neutrality of the United States takes this view fully81 into account since the furnishing of contraband of war to all combatants is likewise permitted: 'All persons may lawfully120 and without restriction121 Page 74 by reason of the aforesaid state of war, manufacture and sell within the United States, arms and ammunitions of war and other articles ordinarily known as contraband of war.'
"This principle has been accepted in the widest sense by the public declaration of the American State Department of the 15th October, 1914, with regard to neutrality and contraband.
"Nevertheless different port authorities in the United States have refused to supply the necessary fuel to merchant vessels122 in which it might be carried to German ships of war on the high seas or in other neutral ports. According to the principles of international law already mentioned, there is no need for a neutral State to prevent the transport of fuel in this way; such a State then ought not to hold up merchant ships loaded in this way nor interfere123 with their freedom of movement, once it has countenanced124 the supply of contraband to the enemy. The only case in which it would be the duty of such a nation to hamper the movements of these ships in this one-sided fashion would be one in which such traffic might be turning the ports into German naval bases. This might perhaps have been the case if German coal depots125 had been situated126 at these ports, or if the ships used them for a regular calling port on their way to the German naval forces. It is, however, unnecessary to urge that the occasional sailing of a merchant ship with coal for German ships of war does not make a port into a base for German naval enterprises out of keeping with neutrality.
"Our enemies are obtaining contraband of war from the United States, in particular rifles, to the value of many milliards of marks; this is within their rights. But toleration becomes serious injustice if the United States refuses to allow the occasional provisioning of our Page 75 ships of war from her ports. This would mean unequal treatment of the combatants and a recognized rule of neutrality would be infringed127 to our disadvantages."
This memorandum played an important part in the subsequent negotiations, because Mr. Flood, the president of the Committee for Foreign Affairs of the American House of Representatives, interpreted it as amounting to a German agreement to the supply of arms and ammunition to her enemies.
In view of the situation in the United States, it was to our interest to leave the struggle for a prohibition128 of the munitions traffic to our American friends. The efforts of Senator Stone in this direction are well known, and have been recently quoted before the Commission of the German National Assembly. If a considerable number of influential Americans took up the case for the prohibition there was far more hope of bringing it about than if it was apparent that the American Government were surrendering to German pressure. The pacifist Mr. Bryan was very sensitive on this point and visited me frequently to assert his neutrality.
I therefore advised the Imperial Government in this matter not to send an official Note for the moment, so that the American agitation in favor of the prohibition of munition traffic might have full freedom for development. As, however, our enemies continually harked back to the idea that the Imperial Government did not take exception to the supply of munitions, I was forced, as the result of continual pressure from our American friends, to alter my attitude, and, after receiving permission from Berlin, to hand to the Washington Government on 4th April, 1915, a memorandum, of which I give the most important part here.
"Further I should like to refer to the attitude of the Page 76 United States towards the question of the export of arms. The Imperial Government is convinced that the Government of the United States agree with them on this point, that questions of neutrality should be dealt with not merely with regard to the strict letter, but the spirit also must be taken into consideration, in which neutrality is carried through.
"The situation arising out of the present war cannot be compared with that in any previous war. For this reason no reference to supplies of arms from Germany in such wars is justified129; for then the question was not whether the combatants should be supplied with material but which of the competing States should secure the contract.
"In the present war all the nations which possess a war-industry of any importance are either themselves involved in the war, or occupied with completing their own armament, and therefore have prohibited the export of war material. The United States are accordingly the only neutral State in a position to supply war-material. The idea of neutrality has, therefore, assumed a new significance, which is quite independent of the strict letter of the laws that have hitherto prevailed. On the other hand the United States are founding a gigantic war industry in the broadest sense, and they are not only working the existing plant but are straining every nerve to develop it and to erect69 new factories. The international agreement for the protection of the rights of neutrals certainly arose from the necessity of protecting the existing branches of industry in neutral countries as far as possible against an encroachment130 upon their prerogatives131. But it can in no way accord with the spirit of honorable neutrality, if advantage is taken of such international agreements to found a new industry in a neutral State, such as appears in the development in the Page 77 United States of an arms-industry, the output of which can, in view of the existing situation, be solely132 to the advantage of the combatant powers.
"This industry is at present only delivering its wares133 to the enemies of Germany. The readiness, in theory, to do the same for Germany, even if the transport were possible, does not alter the case. If it is the desire of the American people to maintain an honorable neutrality, the United States will find the means to stop this one-sided traffic in arms, or at least to use it for the purpose of protecting legitimate134 commerce with Germany, particularly in respect of foodstuffs135. This conception of neutrality should appeal all the more to the United States in view of the fact that they have allowed themselves to be influenced by the same standpoint in their policy in regard to Mexico. On the 4th February, 1914, President Wilson, according to a statement of a member of Congress on 30th December, 1914, before the commission for foreign affairs with regard to the withdrawal136 of the prohibition of the export of arms to Mexico, said: 'We shall be observing true neutrality by taking into consideration the accompanying circumstances of the case.... He then took up the following point of view: 'Carranza, in contrast to Huerta, has no ports at his disposal for the importation of war-material, so in his case we are bound, as a State, to treat Carranza and Huerta alike, if we are to be true to the real spirit of neutrality and not mere paper neutrality.'
"This point of view, applied137 to the present case, indicates prohibition of the export of arms."
Although during the war all Notes were at once made public, the American Government were very annoyed at my publishing this memorandum, which in any case would have met with no success. The agitation for the prohibition of the export of arms and munitions was Page 78 vigorously pressed, and in spite of the "Lusitania incident" never completely subsided138. But the American Government held to their point of view, which they explained to me on the 21st April, as follows:
"In the third place, I note with sincere regret that, in discussing the sale and exportation of arms by citizens of the United States to the enemies of Germany, Your Excellency seems to be under the impression that it was within the choice of the Government of the United States, notwithstanding its professed139 neutrality and its diligent140 efforts to maintain it in other particulars, to inhibit141 this trade, and that its failure to do so manifested an unfair attitude toward Germany. This Government holds, as I believe Your Excellency is aware, and as it is constrained142 to hold in view of the present indisputable doctrines143 of accepted international law, that any change in its own laws of neutrality during the progress of a war which would affect unequally the relations of the United States with the nations at war would be an unjustifiable departure from the principle of strict neutrality by which it has consistently sought to direct its actions, and I respectfully submit that none of the circumstances urged in Your Excellency's memorandum alters the principle involved. The placing of an embargo144 on the trade in arms at the present time would constitute such a change and be a direct violation of the neutrality of the United States. It will, I feel assured, be clear to Your Excellency that, holding this view and considering itself in honor bound by it, it is out of the question for this Government to consider such a course."
In the meantime, Colonel House returned from Europe without having met with any success, but he had opened useful personal relations. The Governments of all the combatant Powers then held the opinion that the time had not yet come when they could welcome the mediation Page 79 of President Wilson. Colonel House, however, did not allow the lack of success of his first mission to deter145 him from further efforts, and remained to the last the keenest supporter of American mediation. Since this journey Colonel House and I became on very friendly and intimate terms, which should have helped to bring about such a peace.
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entente
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| n.协定；有协定关系的各国 | |
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violation
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| n.违反(行为)，违背(行为)，侵犯 | |
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forth
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| adv.向前；向外，往外 | |
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adherent
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| n.信徒，追随者，拥护者 | |
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adherents
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| n.支持者，拥护者( adherent的名词复数 )；党羽；徒子徒孙 | |
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stigmatized
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| v.使受耻辱，指责，污辱( stigmatize的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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7
unconditional
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| adj.无条件的，无限制的，绝对的 | |
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8
rupture
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| n.破裂；(关系的)决裂；v.(使)破裂 | |
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impartiality
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| n. 公平, 无私, 不偏 | |
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impartial
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| adj.(in,to)公正的，无偏见的 | |
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11
friendliness
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| n.友谊，亲切，亲密 | |
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12
mediation
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| n.调解 | |
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13
partisan
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| adj.党派性的；游击队的；n.游击队员；党徒 | |
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quotations
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| n.引用( quotation的名词复数 )；[商业]行情（报告）；（货物或股票的）市价；时价 | |
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15
participation
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| n.参与，参加，分享 | |
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16
preclude
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| vt.阻止，排除，防止；妨碍 | |
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17
intervention
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| n.介入，干涉，干预 | |
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18
arbiter
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| n.仲裁人，公断人 | |
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19
modicum
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| n.少量，一小份 | |
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20
recurred
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| 再发生，复发( recur的过去式和过去分词 )； 治愈 | |
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21
odds
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| n.让步，机率，可能性，比率；胜败优劣之别 | |
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22
defensive
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| adj.防御的；防卫的；防守的 | |
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23
attain
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| vt.达到，获得，完成 | |
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24
acquiescing
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| v.默认，默许( acquiesce的现在分词 ) | |
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25
alleged
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| a.被指控的，嫌疑的 | |
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26
injustice
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| n.非正义，不公正，不公平，侵犯（别人的）权利 | |
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27
awakening
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| n.觉醒，醒悟 adj.觉醒中的；唤醒的 | |
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28
clench
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| vt.捏紧（拳头等），咬紧（牙齿等），紧紧握住 | |
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29
controversy
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| n.争论，辩论，争吵 | |
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30
negotiation
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| n.谈判，协商 | |
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31
nucleus
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| n.核，核心，原子核 | |
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32
immediate
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| adj.立即的；直接的，最接近的；紧靠的 | |
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33
recluse
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| n.隐居者 | |
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34
diplomats
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| n.外交官( diplomat的名词复数 )；有手腕的人，善于交际的人 | |
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35
aloof
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| adj.远离的；冷淡的，漠不关心的 | |
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36
judgment
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| n.审判；判断力，识别力，看法，意见 | |
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37
dire
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| adj.可怕的，悲惨的，阴惨的，极端的 | |
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38
distress
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| n.苦恼，痛苦，不舒适；不幸；vt.使悲痛 | |
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39
reconstruction
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| n.重建，再现，复原 | |
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40
realization
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| n.实现；认识到，深刻了解 | |
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41
opposition
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| n.反对，敌对 | |
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42
inclination
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| n.倾斜；点头；弯腰；斜坡；倾度；倾向；爱好 | |
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43
ingratitude
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| n.忘恩负义 | |
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44
antipathy
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| n.憎恶；反感，引起反感的人或事物 | |
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45
hypocrisy
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| n.伪善，虚伪 | |
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46
differentiation
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| n.区别，区分 | |
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47
autocracy
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| n.独裁政治，独裁政府 | |
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48
riddle
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| n.谜，谜语，粗筛；vt.解谜，给…出谜，筛，检查，鉴定，非难，充满于；vi.出谜 | |
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49
disillusioned
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| a.不再抱幻想的，大失所望的，幻想破灭的 | |
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50
thwarted
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| 阻挠( thwart的过去式和过去分词 )； 使受挫折； 挫败； 横过 | |
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51
collapsed
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| adj.倒塌的 | |
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52
indifference
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| n.不感兴趣，不关心，冷淡，不在乎 | |
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53
regained
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| 复得( regain的过去式和过去分词 )； 赢回； 重回； 复至某地 | |
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54
peculiar
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| adj.古怪的，异常的；特殊的，特有的 | |
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55
peculiarity
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| n.独特性，特色；特殊的东西；怪癖 | |
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56
negotiations
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| 协商( negotiation的名词复数 )； 谈判； 完成（难事）； 通过 | |
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57
postpone
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| v.延期，推迟 | |
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58
inevitable
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| adj.不可避免的，必然发生的 | |
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59
requisite
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| adj.需要的，必不可少的；n.必需品 | |
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60
postponed
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| vt.& vi.延期，缓办，（使）延迟vt.把…放在次要地位；[语]把…放在后面（或句尾）vi.（疟疾等）延缓发作（或复发） | |
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61
resentment
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| n.怨愤，忿恨 | |
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62
condemn
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| vt.谴责，指责；宣判(罪犯)，判刑 | |
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63
atrocities
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| n.邪恶，暴行( atrocity的名词复数 )；滔天大罪 | |
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64
tinged
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| v.（使）发丁丁声( ting的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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65
naval
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| adj.海军的，军舰的，船的 | |
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66
drawn
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| v.拖，拉，拔出；adj.憔悴的，紧张的 | |
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67
benevolence
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| n.慈悲，捐助 | |
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68
wireless
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| adj.无线的；n.无线电 | |
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69
erect
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| n./v.树立，建立，使竖立；adj.直立的，垂直的 | |
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70
ERECTED
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| adj. 直立的，竖立的，笔直的 vt. 使 ... 直立，建立 | |
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71
entirely
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| ad.全部地，完整地；完全地，彻底地 | |
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72
circuitous
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| adj.迂回的路的，迂曲的，绕行的 | |
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73
proprietorship
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| n.所有（权）；所有权 | |
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74
partially
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| adv.部分地，从某些方面讲 | |
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75
strictly
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| adv.严厉地，严格地；严密地 | |
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76
authoritative
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| adj.有权威的，可相信的；命令式的；官方的 | |
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77
mere
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| adj.纯粹的；仅仅，只不过 | |
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78
pretexts
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| n.借口，托辞( pretext的名词复数 ) | |
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79
helping
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| n.食物的一份&adj.帮助人的，辅助的 | |
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80
motives
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| n.动机，目的( motive的名词复数 ) | |
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81
fully
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| adv.完全地，全部地，彻底地；充分地 | |
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82
differentiated
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| 区分，区别，辨别( differentiate的过去式和过去分词 )； 区别对待； 表明…间的差别，构成…间差别的特征 | |
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83
retaliation
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| n.报复，反击 | |
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84
dealing
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| n.经商方法，待人态度 | |
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85
ammunition
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| n.军火，弹药 | |
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86
munition
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| n.军火；军需品；v.给某部门提供军火 | |
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87
agitation
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| n.搅动；搅拌；鼓动，煽动 | |
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88
personalities
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| n. 诽谤，（对某人容貌、性格等所进行的）人身攻击； 人身攻击；人格, 个性, 名人( personality的名词复数 ) | |
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89
wholesale
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|
| n.批发；adv.以批发方式；vt.批发，成批出售 | |
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90
prevailing
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| adj.盛行的；占优势的；主要的 | |
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91
chancellor
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| n.(英)大臣；法官；(德、奥)总理；大学校长 | |
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92
importunity
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| n.硬要，强求 | |
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93
ascertain
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| vt.发现，确定，查明，弄清 | |
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94
abode
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| n.住处，住所 | |
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95
influential
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| adj.有影响的，有权势的 | |
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96
possessed
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| adj.疯狂的；拥有的，占有的 | |
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97
confidential
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| adj.秘（机）密的，表示信任的，担任机密工作的 | |
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98
adviser
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| n.劝告者，顾问 | |
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99
precedent
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| n.先例，前例；惯例；adj.在前的，在先的 | |
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100
thoroughly
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| adv.完全地，彻底地，十足地 | |
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101
perfectly
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| adv.完美地，无可非议地，彻底地 | |
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102
Founder
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| n.创始者，缔造者 | |
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103
spoke
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| n.（车轮的）辐条；轮辐；破坏某人的计划；阻挠某人的行动 v.讲，谈（speak的过去式）；说；演说；从某种观点来说 | |
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104
breach
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| n.违反，不履行；破裂；vt.冲破，攻破 | |
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105
warfare
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| n.战争(状态)；斗争；冲突 | |
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106
condemned
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| adj. 被责难的, 被宣告有罪的 动词condemn的过去式和过去分词 | |
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107
attained
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| （通常经过努力）实现( attain的过去式和过去分词 )； 达到； 获得； 达到（某年龄、水平、状况） | |
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108
boundless
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| adj.无限的；无边无际的；巨大的 | |
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109
hatred
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| n.憎恶，憎恨，仇恨 | |
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110
decided
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| adj.决定了的，坚决的；明显的，明确的 | |
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111
munitions
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| n.军火，弹药；v.供应…军需品 | |
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112
disapproved
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| v.不赞成( disapprove的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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113
permissible
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| adj.可允许的，许可的 | |
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114
hostilities
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| n.战争；敌意(hostility的复数)；敌对状态；战事 | |
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115
incentives
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| 激励某人做某事的事物( incentive的名词复数 )； 刺激； 诱因； 动机 | |
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116
noted
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| adj.著名的，知名的 | |
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117
memorandum
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| n.备忘录，便笺 | |
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118
contraband
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| n.违禁品，走私品 | |
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119
hamper
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| vt.妨碍，束缚，限制；n.(有盖的)大篮子 | |
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120
lawfully
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| adv.守法地，合法地；合理地 | |
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121
restriction
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| n.限制，约束 | |
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122
vessels
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| n.血管( vessel的名词复数 )；船；容器；（具有特殊品质或接受特殊品质的）人 | |
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123
interfere
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| v.(in)干涉，干预；(with)妨碍，打扰 | |
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124
countenanced
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| v.支持，赞同，批准( countenance的过去式 ) | |
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125
depots
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| 仓库( depot的名词复数 )； 火车站； 车库； 军需库 | |
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126
situated
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| adj.坐落在...的，处于某种境地的 | |
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127
infringed
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| v.违反（规章等）( infringe的过去式和过去分词 )；侵犯（某人的权利）；侵害（某人的自由、权益等） | |
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128
prohibition
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| n.禁止；禁令，禁律 | |
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129
justified
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| a.正当的，有理的 | |
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130
encroachment
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| n.侵入，蚕食 | |
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131
prerogatives
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| n.权利( prerogative的名词复数 )；特权；大主教法庭；总督委任组成的法庭 | |
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132
solely
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| adv.仅仅，唯一地 | |
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133
wares
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| n. 货物, 商品 | |
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134
legitimate
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| adj.合法的，合理的，合乎逻辑的；v.使合法 | |
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135
foodstuffs
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| 食物，食品( foodstuff的名词复数 ) | |
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136
withdrawal
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| n.取回，提款；撤退，撤军；收回，撤销 | |
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137
applied
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| adj.应用的；v.应用，适用 | |
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138
subsided
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| v.（土地）下陷（因在地下采矿）( subside的过去式和过去分词 )；减弱；下降至较低或正常水平；一下子坐在椅子等上 | |
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139
professed
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| 公开声称的，伪称的，已立誓信教的 | |
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140
diligent
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| adj.勤勉的，勤奋的 | |
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141
inhibit
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| vt.阻止，妨碍，抑制 | |
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142
constrained
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| adj.束缚的,节制的 | |
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143
doctrines
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| n.教条( doctrine的名词复数 )；教义；学说；（政府政策的）正式声明 | |
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144
embargo
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| n.禁运（令）；vt.对...实行禁运，禁止（通商） | |
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145
deter
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| vt.阻止，使不敢，吓住 | |
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