In the preceding chapter I mentioned that Dr. Dernburg's plan for raising a loan in the United States had failed. Later the direction of all our economic and financial affairs passed into the hands of Geheimrat Albert. His original task was to organize in New York extensive shipments of foodstuffs1, particular wheat and fats, which were to be exported through the New York office of the Hamburg-Amerika line. This depended, in the first place, on the possibility of raising the necessary funds, and in the second, on the possibility that England, out of regard for the neutrals, and particularly the United States, would be compelled to abide2 by the codified3 principles of international law. Neither of these premises4 materialized.
As the necessary means for carrying through the scheme could not be raised it might have been possible to finance it if the Government had taken over the not inconsiderable funds of the German banks and the great industrial enterprises, e.g., the chemical factories in the United States, and used them for the shipments. The suggestions we made to this effect were not answered until the end of August, when we arrived in New York and had already lost many weeks in trying to negotiate the loan. One organ, which immediately after the war had taken up these questions on its own initiative, failed, and so nothing was done in the whole wide sphere of credit, supply of raw materials and foodstuffs and shipping6 until my arrival with the other gentlemen, so that Page 81 the most favorable opportunity was lost. Remittances9 from Germany did not arrive until long afterwards, and then only to a very modest extent. Consequently the whole economic scheme was considerably10 narrowed and hampered11 from the beginning.
The second assumption, that the United States, in consideration of her great commercial connections with Germany, would maintain her rights as a neutral State to unrestricted sea trade within the provisions of international law, proved to be unfounded. The United States, at any rate according to the view of some very distinguished13 Americans, as, for example, in the journal New Republic, violated the spirit of neutrality when she allowed commerce of the neutrals one with another to be strangled by England. To the interest in traffic with the neutral States, and indirectly14 with Germany, was opposed the interest in the still greater trade with our enemies, to which was added, and indeed to a rapidly increasing extent, the supply of war material. The United States did not realize the extent of their economic power in respect of England, as the inexperienced, newly-appointed Democratic Government had no statistics to which to refer, and from a military point of view were defenceless for want of an army or fleet. So England was able, slowly and cautiously, but surely, to cut off the Central Powers from the American market. In view of this state of things the important thing was to pass all shipments off as neutral. The exporter had to be an American or a subject of neutral Europe. The financing had also to be European, at any rate outwardly. The destination could only be a port in Holland, Scandinavia, Spain or—at that time—Italy. Consequently it was not long before the consignments18 could no longer be made through the New York representative of the Hamburg-Amerika line, but were taken in hand by Herr Albert Page 82 himself, who merely availed himself of the professional advice of the Hamburg-Amerika line.
All decisions therefore could emanate19 from the same source, which prevented loss of time, especially as the financial responsibility also rested with Herr Albert. The most important thing, however, was that attention was distracted from the shipping, as for a long time Herr Albert remained unknown, whereas the Hamburg-Amerika line from the first was kept under the closest observation by England. On the other hand, this arrangement exposed the cargoes21 to condemnation23 by the English prize courts as they were now State-owned. But Herr Albert could assume—and, as it turned out, rightly—that so long as the English respected neutral property, it would be difficult as a rule to trace the shipments back to him. Otherwise there would have been no security for a German private undertaking24.
In carrying out his task, Herr Albert at first shipped the purchased goods by the usual lines (Scandinavia-American line). Soon, however, difficulties arose, because these lines, in order to avoid being held up in English ports, would no longer accept cargoes which were intended, if possible, for Germany, so a special line was formed sailing under the American flag. The direction of this line was in the hands of an American firm who represented themselves as the owners, whereas, in reality, the ships were chartered by Herr Albert. As, at the beginning of the war, the American flag was more respected by the English than those of the other neutrals, a number of these ships got through without much delay. Later this method of shipping also became impossible. Then single ships were chartered—mostly under the American flag—and when the owners, from fear of loss, refused the charter, or when outrageous25 conditions Page 83 made chartering impossible, they were bought outright26. The ships were consigned27 as blockade runners to a neutral port, and later either made direct for Germany or were taken in by a German ship of war. As the most important examples I may mention the Eir, Maumee, Winneconne, Duneyre, Andrew, Welch and Prince Waldemar.
With the tightening28 up of the English measures and blockade these undertakings29 became increasingly difficult, and finally had to be abandoned. Moreover the cost and the trouble of preparation grew out of all proportion to the results. Every individual shipment had to be prepared long beforehand. Out of ten attempts often only one would succeed. Very often an attempt which had cost weeks of work would fall through at the last moment owing to the refusal of credit by the banks, particularly when the political position was strained, or to an indiscretion, or English watchfulness30, or difficulties with the American port authorities.
The English surveillance had assumed dimensions that would not have been possible without the tacit connivance31, which at times became active support, of the American authorities. Not only did the English consuls32 demand that in each individual case the bills of lading should be submitted to them, but in addition to this an efficient surveillance and spy service was organized, partly by American detective bureaus and partly by a separate and wide-reaching service. The English had confidential33 agents in all the shipping offices, whose services had for the most part been acquired by bribery34. At various times attempts were made to break into Herr Albert's office, to learn the combination for opening his safe, to get hold of papers through the charwomen and other employees, and even to rob him personally of papers. The control of the American port authorities was within the letter of the law, but in practice it worked Page 84 very unfavorably to us. The regulation was that ship and cargo22 must be consigned to a definite port. This regulation was drawn35 up purely36 for purposes of statistics, and consequently no importance was attached to it before the war. As a rule the bills of lading were filled in by subordinate employees of the exporter. Soon after the outbreak of the war a special "neutrality squad37" was attached to the "Collector of the Port of New York" whose duty it was to maintain strict neutrality by seeing that the said laws were properly observed. This led, in cases where there was a suspicion that the cargo was not intended for the given port of destination, but for Germany, to an exhaustive inquiry38. This measure could not fail to act as a deterrent39, and even Herr Albert was seriously hampered in his enterprises. The whole system amounted to a complement40 of the English blockade. When Herr Albert finally succeeded in coming to an agreement with the Customs authorities in this matter a great number of opportunities had been missed and the shipments had been made practically impossible by the tightening of the English blockade.
There was no question of entrusting41 the shipping to American exporters who had had long experience of German trade. Herr Albert from the first considered it advisable to interfere42 as little as possible with the existing business relations between the two countries, and he left it to the firms trading with Germany to carry through their commissions as best they could. This method of supplying Germany with food, however, completely failed. The fault also lies partly with the importers in Germany. In these circles it was for a long time hoped, but in vain, to obtain consignments from American firms. Further, they clung too long to the business methods of peace, demanded estimates, bargained about prices, and, most important of all, did not realize Page 85 that the risk to the exporter as a result of the English blockade made special compensation or payment necessary. In consequence the valuable time at the beginning of the war was lost. Very soon, however, the American exporters withdrew completely, because those who had had previous business relations with Germany were known to the English, and so were suspected and finally placed on the black list. A shipment by one of these firms would then at once have been marked down as destined43 for Germany, and would have run risk of capture. Herr Albert, therefore, made use of special agencies. At first, in addition to employing Danish firms, he founded several new American export companies. These new organizations were of course only available for a short time, and, as soon as they came under English suspicion and were consequently rendered useless, had to be replaced by others.
The reproach that has been made from time to time that these enterprises were confined to a small clique44 of confidential persons and firms seems to be unjustified by the facts. The circumstances demanded the closest possible secrecy46, for otherwise the origin and destination of the cargoes would have been discovered by the English secret service before they left New York. This would have involved the complete loss of the cargo as a result of the English embargo47. That firms already engaged, even though for a short time, in German-American commerce could not be considered is obvious. Not only were they known to the English, but in some cases their German names already laid them open to suspicion. Accordingly, their occasional requests that they should carry through enterprises of this nature were consistently refused. This criticism is only made by a small circle of German-American firms grouped round the German union and the so-called German-American Chamber48 of Page 86 Commerce, and originated in an anxiety, understandable but based on an inadequate49 knowledge of the facts, to participate in the undertakings.
Although the export of raw material did not actually come within the scope of Herr Albert's original commission, it often became necessary, at special request or from the nature of the case, to lend a helping50 hand in the export of raw material, particularly wool and cotton. In this way, in the autumn of 1914, the American steamer Luckenbach was successfully run through direct to Germany with several million pounds of wool on board. With regard to cotton, Herr Albert, also in the autumn of 1914, by negotiations51 which he carried on through me with the State Department and the Foreign Trade Adviser52, succeeded in obtaining English recognition that cotton should not be regarded as contraband53 of war. Even after this recognition, England made the export of cotton practically impossible by intimidating54 the cotton exporters in every possible way, among others by spreading the rumor55 that the ships would be captured nevertheless, and by prohibiting English insurance companies from underwriting such cargoes. Here Herr Albert intervened by effecting the insurance through German insurance companies, and proved by the loading and arming of cotton ships, e.g., the American ship Carolyn, that the threat of capture was not to be taken seriously but was simply an attempt at intimidation56 on the part of the English. In this way, confidence was so far restored that in the autumn of 1914 and the beginning of 1915 a large number of other firms joined in the business. When, later, cotton was made unconditional57 contraband of war, Herr Albert made attempts to fit out blockade runners—which ended with the arrival at a German port of the Eir with 10,000 bales of cotton.
The various attempts to export copper59, rubber and Page 87 other raw materials which were unconditional contraband, apart from the cases already mentioned of wool and cotton, proved impossible, in spite of repeated, extensive and very cautious preparation. A very ambitious scheme of this kind with the S.S. Atlantic had to be abandoned at the last moment owing to difficulties with the port authorities.
All these enterprises, the purchase, sale and shipment of foodstuffs and raw material, the chartering, buying and selling of ships, the founding of shipping lines, new companies, etc., as well as the financial business had their political as well as their purely business side. They were either intended to serve as precedents60 in the definite phases of development of international maritime61 law or to exert influence on American public opinion from an economic point of view.
When the result of these shipping enterprises is weighed after the event, it will be seen that they did not play a decisive part in the supply of Germany with foodstuffs and raw material. Germany would during the first year of war have managed to get along even without the few hundred thousand tons which in this way were brought in via neutral countries. Nevertheless, in conjunction with the imports from neutral countries, they several times served to relieve the situation. Very important in this respect was the successful struggle for the free import of cotton at the end of 1914 and the beginning of 1915, quite apart from our own shipments. Without this we should have come to an end of our supplies considerably earlier.
The question of war and marine62 insurance very soon called for particular attention to the interests of our own shipping. The American insurance market was dominated by the English companies. The latter not only conducted about two-thirds of the whole insurance business Page 88 of the country, but also exerted a decisive influence on the American companies. In addition to this, they held an authoritative63 position as holding a share of the capital. England very soon gave instructions that English insurance companies should not participate in any business in which German interests were in any way involved. Consequently in making shipments to neutral countries, we were faced with great difficulties, for the power of the German insurance companies and the few American companies that were independent of England did not suffice.
The two most important German companies with branches in New York, the Norddeutsche Versicherungsgesellschaft and the Mannheimer Versicherungsgesellschaft, which was excellently, actively64, and very loyally represented in New York by the firm F. Hermann & Co., at first offered an insurance limit of about 75,000 dollars, that is 150,000 dollars together, which in any case was insufficient65. At first they had no authority to undertake war insurance.
The economic importance of the insurance question is obvious on the face of it. No marine insurance was possible without war insurance. In particular the American Government bureau for war insurance made the covering of the marine insurance an essential condition. This example was followed by all the American insurance companies. A satisfactory settlement of the insurance—both war and marine—on the other hand was a necessary condition for the financing of the shipments. The shippers only obtained credit from the bank on handing over the insurance policies. In addition to this it came about later that the few American shipping lines which remained independent of England, and so were on the black list, were no longer in a position to cover the "Hull66 Insurance," i.e., the insurance of the ship herself, and Page 89 therefore the solution of the insurance question became a necessary condition for obtaining freight space. Here too, then, it was to our interest to come to the rescue, because otherwise the lines in question would have been forced to come to an understanding with the English firms, which would have placed their tonnage at the service of our enemies.
To begin with, Herr Albert himself undertook the insurance in cases of exceptional importance. It was at most a question of a small balance, by the furnishing of which an immediate5 risk or a dangerous delay in shipment was avoided. Our chief efforts were directed towards raising the insurance limit of the German companies. As a result a pool of German insurance companies was formed whose limit for marine and war insurance was gradually raised more and more. In this way it was possible to carry through a number of shipments to European countries, to keep a not inconsiderable tonnage—about 30,000 tons—out of the hands of the Allies, as well as to enable a number of important German firms in South America to carry on extensive trade between North and South America, and so to maintain their business activity in spite of the measures adopted by the English.
About our propaganda I have already spoken in detail in the second chapter. It may be mentioned again here that the centre of gravity of our active propaganda lay in the economic question, which was to a certain extent the key to the understanding of our American policy during the war.
Though the vast and rapid development of American export trade through the trade in war material, and the change in position from debtor67 to creditor68, was only effected gradually, and the loss of the German market at first made itself adversely69 felt both actively and passively, Page 90 the size of the contracts from the Allies and the consequent profits at once acted like a narcotic70 on public opinion. This was all the more the case as a result of the extraordinarily71 skilful72 way in which the English handled the question. They always proceeded cautiously and gradually. For instance, they at first accepted the Declaration of London in principle, but made several alterations73 which to the public, who did not realize the extent of their effect, seemed unimportant and which yet formed the basis for the gradual throwing overboard of the Declaration of London. After public opinion had grown accustomed to the English encroachments and the interests affected74 had been pacified75 by the Allied76 contracts, the blockade was introduced after careful preparation in the Press; it was not at first described as a blockade, but was gradually and systematically77 tightened79. Among other things, the export of cotton to Germany was expressly agreed to at the end of 1914, but was afterwards hampered in practice by various measures, as, for example, the holding up of individual ships, and the refusal of marine insurance, and finally brought to an end by the declaration of cotton as unconditional contraband. It is characteristic that the declaration of cotton as unconditional contraband was made public on the very day on which the whole American Press was in a state of great excitement over the Arabic case, so that this comparatively unimportant incident filled the front pages and leading articles of the newspapers, while the extremely important economic measure was published in a place where it would hardly be noticed.
We made vigorous efforts to oppose this English step. We got into touch with the importers of German goods, who formed an association and forwarded a protest to Washington. Without attracting attention, we gave the association the assistance of a firm of solicitors81, whose Page 91 services were at our disposal, as legal advisers82. Relations were entered into with the cotton interest, which, through the political pressure of the Southern States, exerted great influence on public opinion and in Congress. Various projects for buying cotton on a large scale for Germany were considered, discussed with the cotton interest and tested by small purchases. In the same way negotiations were entered upon with the great meat companies, the copper interest and others by systematic78 explanation and emphasis of the interests with regard to the German market. The result, partly for the reasons given, partly owing to the political development of the general relations between Germany and the United States, was small. This, however, can hardly be taken as an argument against the expediency83 of the steps taken as at that time. No one could foresee the later development of the war and particularly the length of time it was going to last; whereas had the war been shorter there is no doubt that these measures would have attained84 their object.
An important part of the economic propaganda was the institution of the so-called "Issues," i.e., the attempt by carefully construing85 individual incidents to make clear to public opinion the fundamental injustice86 of the English encroachments and their far-reaching consequences in practice. The most important case in this direction is that of the Wilhelmina. According to the prevailing87 principles of international law, foodstuffs were only conditional58 contraband. They might be imported into Germany if they were intended for the exclusive use of the civil population. As, however, England succeeded in restraining the exporters from any attempt to consign16 foodstuffs to Germany, especially as in view of the enormous supplies that were being forwarded to our enemies they had little interest in such shipment, the question Page 92 never reached a clear issue. Herr Albert therefore induced an American firm to ship foodstuffs for the civil population of Germany on the American steamer Wilhelmina, bound for Hamburg, by himself undertaking the whole risk from behind the scenes. This was arranged in such a way as to preserve in appearance the good faith of the American firm, and to make the shipment seem purely American in the eyes of the American Government and the English.
The Wilhelmina was taken by the English into Falmouth and detained on the grounds that Hamburg was a fortified88 town, and that, according to the measures adopted by Germany for supplying the civil population with food—requisitioning, centralization of distribution, etc.—there was no longer any distinction between the supply of the military and the civil population. While the negotiations on this question were still in the air, and seemed to be progressing favorably for us, England resorted to a general blockade. Consequently the case lost its interest, both practical and as a question of principle, especially as England declared her readiness to pay for the goods at Hamburg prices. As, on the other hand, insistence89 on the purely theoretical claims would give rise to the danger that the English or American secret service might in the end succeed in proving the German origin of the undertaking, Herr Albert accepted the proffered90 payment of the English Government, and received as compensation a sum which covered all the expenses.
Such incidents could have been construed91 in several ways. One of the most important, and also the most popular, was the shipment of cotton to Germany for the civilian92 population between the autumn of 1915 and the middle of 1916. The declaration of cotton as absolute contraband was at first only on paper, as no American Page 93 exporters had hitherto ventured to ship cotton. Consequently, detailed93 discussions took place as to whether such an undertaking should be entered upon in the full light of publicity94. Great excitement among the cotton growers proved the extremely keen and widespread interest. England would have been forced to act on her declaration at a time when the American Government could not afford to ignore the interests of the cotton industry, with its influence on domestic politics. The full effect of the meagreness of the crops, and on the other hand the increase of consumption in the United States, and consequent rise in price, was not yet realized by the public, nor even in cotton circles. The cotton industry viewed with anxiety the increased difficulty of finding a market, and were anxious for a reopening of that of the Central Powers.
Certainly a shipment of cotton to Germany would only have been justified45 in conjunction with comprehensive other measures, particularly purchases on the American cotton market on German account. As a result of detailed discussion with American interested parties, who repeatedly urged us to such a step, we forwarded proposals to Berlin on these lines. Their general purport95 was that about a million bales of cotton should be bought outright on behalf of Germany, and that in addition options should be secured on a further million or two million bales on the understanding that the taking up of the options should be dependent on the possibility of shipment to Germany. On the strength of these measures the shipment of one big consignment17 should have been undertaken. The plan had sound prospects96 of success. In any case there would have been no risk worth mentioning, as, to the initiated97, there was no doubt as to the rise of prices. In view of the new bank legislation (Federal Reserve Act), no insuperable difficulties would have stood in the way of Page 94 financing the shipment. The indirect political pressure on the American Government and public opinion, with its reaction on England, would have been considerable.
Unfortunately the plan was frustrated98 by the taking up of the matter in America direct from Germany, without regard to the shipment difficulty, without going into the question of the options and without knowledge of the political or economic situation. Bremen actually placed a contract in New York for one million bales to be delivered in Bremen at a fixed99 price. It was, however, clear from the first to anyone acquainted with the circumstances that such a step was bound to be futile100. The whole thing turned on the question of shipping. The American Press, again under English influence, at once pointed15 the finger of scorn, saying that the contract was not meant seriously, but was merely a piece of bluff101 for purposes of German propaganda.
After this had brought about the collapse102 of the more ambitious plan, the shipment of a single cargo still continued to be discussed and detailed preparations were made. The idea had, however, to be abandoned, because the difficulties of passing off the shipment as a purely American enterprise were practically insuperable without the background of great economic measures, which placed the cost out of all proportion to the chances of success. The whole cost, as in the "Wilhelmina case" would have to be guaranteed from Germany, and would of course have been lost if the English secret service succeeded in establishing the German connection.
The propaganda for preventing and hampering103 the supply of war material to our enemies turned at first on the question of principle whether such supplies were reconcilable with neutrality. The attempt was made—as has been briefly104 mentioned already—with the special support of the German-American circles, to impress upon the Page 95 American people the immorality105 and essentially106 unneutral nature of the supplies, especially in view of the vast scale they were assuming. It is well known that these attempts, which extended to a strictly107 legal exertion108 of influence on Congress, failed. The lack of unity7 and limited political experience of the German-Americans contributed to this result, but the economic interest of the nation in the supplies, in which the whole American Administration and industry were finally concerned, formed the decisive factor.
Attempts too were very soon made to hamper12 the supplies in a practical way. In August, 1914, it might perhaps have been possible to buy up the Bethlehem Steel Works, if the outlay109 of the necessary capital had been promptly110 decided111 upon. At that time the Americans themselves did not foresee what a gigantic proportion these supplies were to assume. The purchase of these works would have deprived the whole munition112 industry of its main support. Similar proposals have repeatedly been worked out by us, as, for example, the proposal to amalgamate113 the whole shrapnel industry of the United States. The fear, well grounded in itself, that such an arrangement was scarcely within the bounds of practical politics and could have been got round, could be ignored. In case of disputes as to the validity of such a step we should have gained more by the publicity than we stood to lose. At that time, however, the Berlin Government took up a negative attitude, and did not interest itself in the question until the beginning of 1915, when the vast supplies of material from America began to make themselves felt and the concentration of German industry on the production of munitions114 was not yet complete. The Military Attaché received instructions to do everything possible to hamper the fulfilment of the great outstanding French and Russian contracts for shrapnel, which Page 96 was at that time still the chief shell used by the Allies. This was done successfully, if on a small scale, by founding an undertaking of our own, called the Bridgeport Projectile115 Company, and entering into contracts to establish the most important machinery116 for the manufacture of powder and shrapnel. Through this company, which originally passed as entirely117 American, the special machinery required for the manufacture of shrapnel was bought on a scale which seriously affected the American output, and in particular hindered the acceptance and carrying through of further contracts from the Allies for a considerable time. Herr Albert assisted and advised the Military Attaché in making these contracts, arranged the financing of the enterprise later on, and worked at its development after Herr von Papen's departure.
Still more successful were the efforts to remove from the market the surplus benzol, which is the raw product for the production of picric acid. The benzol was bought up by a company specially20 formed for the purpose, who sent it to a chemical works under German management to be manufactured into salicylic preparations. These products were sold for the most part for the American market, and also, with the approval of the Ministry118 for War, exported to neutral countries. The undertaking was eventually closed down after making considerable profits for the Imperial Treasury119. In the same way, for some time, all the bromine coming on to the market, the products of which were used to manufacture and increase the density120 of gas, were bought up.
To these efforts to hamper and delay the supply of war material belonged also the much-discussed agreement with the Bosch Magneto Company, the American branch of the Stuttgart firm. The substance of the arrangement was that this company, which was under Page 97 German direction, should not immediately refuse Allied contracts for fuses, but should appear to accept them and delay their fulfilment, and, to complete the deception121, even occasionally deliver small quantities, and finally, at the last moment, refuse to complete the contract. This procedure was attacked at the time by a German-American journalist, von Skal. On the strength of short notices which Herr von Skal published in the German Press, in ignorance of the real state of the case, public opinion in Germany turned against the parent firm, the Bosch works in Stuttgart. The question then became the subject of my reports, and was submitted to an inquiry by the home authorities and the courts. I still hold to my opinion that the whole affair was unnecessarily exaggerated by German public opinion, and that the detailed investigation122 into its legality by the home authorities and courts was unnecessary, as the managing director of the American branch and the directors of the German company had acted in perfect good faith in an attempt to advance the interests of the German cause. It was merely a question of the result. If their policy of procrastination123 had succeeded in delaying the contracts and had kept our enemies for a considerable time from building their own factory for fuses and aeroplane magnetoes, their action would have been justified; in the contrary event it would have been vain, but blameless from a moral and legal point of view. The fact that at the beginning the English relied on the possibility of the production and supply of such fuses from America, and only later gradually came to a decision to build and fit out their own factories, consequently under much more difficult circumstances, offered an opening for this procedure. That difficulties were caused to the enemy in this respect until quite recently is unmistakably shown by the messages that reached America from England.
Page 98 As a result of the extensive purchases of the Allies, there came about a gradual change in the attitude of the American Government to the question of issuing loans. At the end of March, 1915, we succeeded, acting80 on instructions from Berlin, in raising a small loan. It involved an unusual amount of trouble. The American financial world was already completely dominated by the Morgan trust. This domination resulted from the fact that the Allied commissions were concentrated in English hands and were placed by England in the hands of J. P. Morgan & Co., who acted as the agents of the English Government. As these commissions finally included every sphere of economic life, all the great American banks and bankers were called upon, and so drawn into the Morgan circle. The result was that no big firm could be induced to undertake a German loan. However, several trust companies of repute, who already had or wished to have business relations with Germany, declared their readiness to become partners in a syndicate if we succeeded in finding a "Syndicate Manager." A certain New York firm which afterwards made a name for itself, but at that time was comparatively unknown, seemed suited for this position. When all the preparations and preliminary agreements had been carried through, the trust companies, under the pressure of the Morgan influence, declared that their names must not be associated with the syndicate. Meanwhile the matter had gone so far that withdrawal124 would have meant a moral surrender which would have been dangerous for our credit. Consequently, we had to make up our minds to negotiate the loan under the signature of this one firm, which was naturally undesirable125 for the general interest.
Looking back, I am of the opinion that we should have done better not to consider a loan in the United States, but to remit8 the necessary funds from Berlin. This had Page 99 to be done later to redeem126 the loan, and at a time when the rate of exchange was much more unfavorable. When the loan was raised we had certainly no idea that it would have to be redeemed127 during the war, as we had reckoned on a shorter duration of hostilities128. On the other hand there is no truth in the statement that this loan in some way cleared the way for further Allied loans. These loans, which were the natural result of the great supplies of material to the Allies, would have come in any case. We did, however, deprive ourselves by this loan of an argument to prove the defective129 neutrality of the United States.
In 1916 we succeeded in getting hold of some five millions in Treasury notes without formal loan negotiations.
Another economic question which occupied my attention was connected with the export of German dye-stuffs to the United States. In Berlin it was held that German dye-stuffs should be withheld130 from the United States as a lever for inducing them to protest against the English blockade, and possibly have it raised. The same point of view was adopted with regard to other goods which were necessities for the United States, as, for example, potassic salt, sugar beetroot seed and other commodities. A change of view did not occur until the spring of 1916 at my suggestion. It is my belief that the withholding131 of these goods proved a serious mistake. The political aim of bringing pressure to bear on England with a view to the raising of the blockade was not realized. The American industry partly got over the difficulty by obtaining dye-stuffs in other ways—importation of German dyes from China, where they had been systematically bought, smuggling132 of German dyes via neutral countries, importation of Swiss dyes, introduction of natural Page 100 dyes and dye-substitutes—but more especially by the foundation of a dye industry of their own. In the case of potash, they had simply to do with what little they could get; which was all the easier as the American manure133 manufacturers and dealers134 had already in their own interests begun a systematic propaganda to prove that potash was not indispensable, but could be replaced by their own products. It might be observed as a generalization135 that ultimately no individual product has proved to be really indispensable. The result of holding back our exports was therefore simply—apart from a quite unnecessary straining of political relations, since England succeeded in diverting all the odium on to us—a scarcity136 of important German commodities in the United States and the substitution of their own production.
In negotiating the German loan, the chief difficulty was that grasping speculators got hold of the market, discredited137 the war loan by underbidding one another and in part by direct dishonorable dealing138, and also that owing to the impossibility of producing ready money, interest in the war loan flagged. Early on I suggested the issue of bills ad interim139. The scheme, however, failed, because the representative of the Deutsche Bank opposed it, and because the natural opposition140 of two great institutions, who were making a profitable business out of the sale of war loans and the speculations141 on the value of the mark, which were closely connected with it, could not be overcome. I am still of the opinion that with well-timed organization the sum raised by the war loan could have been increased by several millions.
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foodstuffs
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| 食物，食品( foodstuff的名词复数 ) | |
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abide
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| vi.遵守；坚持；vt.忍受 | |
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codified
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| v.把（法律）编成法典( codify的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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premises
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immediate
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| adj.立即的；直接的，最接近的；紧靠的 | |
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shipping
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| n.船运（发货，运输，乘船） | |
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unity
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| n.团结，联合，统一；和睦，协调 | |
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remit
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| v.汇款，汇寄；豁免（债务），免除（处罚等） | |
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remittances
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| n.汇寄( remittance的名词复数 )；汇款，汇款额 | |
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10
considerably
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| adv.极大地；相当大地；在很大程度上 | |
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11
hampered
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| 妨碍，束缚，限制( hamper的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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hamper
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| vt.妨碍，束缚，限制；n.(有盖的)大篮子 | |
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13
distinguished
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| adj.卓越的，杰出的，著名的 | |
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14
indirectly
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| adv.间接地，不直接了当地 | |
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15
pointed
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| adj.尖的，直截了当的 | |
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16
consign
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| vt.寄售（货品），托运，交托，委托 | |
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17
consignment
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| n.寄售；发货；委托；交运货物 | |
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18
consignments
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| n.托付货物( consignment的名词复数 )；托卖货物；寄售；托运 | |
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19
emanate
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| v.发自，来自，出自 | |
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20
specially
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| adv.特定地；特殊地；明确地 | |
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21
cargoes
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| n.（船或飞机装载的）货物( cargo的名词复数 )；大量，重负 | |
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22
cargo
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| n.(一只船或一架飞机运载的)货物 | |
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23
condemnation
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| n.谴责; 定罪 | |
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24
undertaking
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| n.保证，许诺，事业 | |
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25
outrageous
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| adj.无理的，令人不能容忍的 | |
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26
outright
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| adv.坦率地；彻底地；立即；adj.无疑的；彻底的 | |
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27
consigned
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| v.把…置于（令人不快的境地）( consign的过去式和过去分词 )；把…托付给；把…托人代售；丟弃 | |
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28
tightening
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| 上紧，固定，紧密 | |
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29
undertakings
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| 企业( undertaking的名词复数 )； 保证； 殡仪业； 任务 | |
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30
watchfulness
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| 警惕，留心； 警觉（性） | |
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31
connivance
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| n.纵容；默许 | |
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32
consuls
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| 领事( consul的名词复数 )； （古罗马共和国时期）执政官 （古罗马共和国及其军队的最高首长，同时共有两位，每年选举一次） | |
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33
confidential
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| adj.秘（机）密的，表示信任的，担任机密工作的 | |
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34
bribery
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| n.贿络行为，行贿，受贿 | |
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35
drawn
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| v.拖，拉，拔出；adj.憔悴的，紧张的 | |
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36
purely
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| adv.纯粹地，完全地 | |
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37
squad
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| n.班，小队，小团体；vt.把…编成班或小组 | |
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38
inquiry
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| n.打听，询问，调查，查问 | |
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39
deterrent
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| n.阻碍物，制止物；adj.威慑的，遏制的 | |
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40
complement
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| n.补足物，船上的定员；补语；vt.补充，补足 | |
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41
entrusting
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| v.委托，托付( entrust的现在分词 ) | |
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42
interfere
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| v.(in)干涉，干预；(with)妨碍，打扰 | |
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43
destined
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| adj.命中注定的；(for)以…为目的地的 | |
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44
clique
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| n.朋党派系，小集团 | |
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45
justified
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| a.正当的，有理的 | |
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46
secrecy
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| n.秘密，保密，隐蔽 | |
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47
embargo
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| n.禁运（令）；vt.对...实行禁运，禁止（通商） | |
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48
chamber
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| n.房间，寝室；会议厅；议院；会所 | |
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49
inadequate
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| adj.(for,to)不充足的，不适当的 | |
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50
helping
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| n.食物的一份&adj.帮助人的，辅助的 | |
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51
negotiations
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| 协商( negotiation的名词复数 )； 谈判； 完成（难事）； 通过 | |
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52
adviser
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| n.劝告者，顾问 | |
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53
contraband
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| n.违禁品，走私品 | |
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54
intimidating
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| vt.恐吓，威胁( intimidate的现在分词) | |
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55
rumor
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| n.谣言，谣传，传说 | |
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56
intimidation
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| n.恐吓，威胁 | |
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57
unconditional
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| adj.无条件的，无限制的，绝对的 | |
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58
conditional
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| adj.条件的，带有条件的 | |
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59
copper
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| n.铜；铜币；铜器；adj.铜(制)的；(紫)铜色的 | |
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60
precedents
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| 引用单元； 范例( precedent的名词复数 )； 先前出现的事例； 前例； 先例 | |
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61
maritime
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| adj.海的，海事的，航海的，近海的，沿海的 | |
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62
marine
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| adj.海的；海生的；航海的；海事的；n.水兵 | |
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63
authoritative
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| adj.有权威的，可相信的；命令式的；官方的 | |
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64
actively
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| adv.积极地，勤奋地 | |
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65
insufficient
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| adj.(for，of)不足的，不够的 | |
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66
hull
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| n.船身；(果、实等的)外壳；vt.去(谷物等)壳 | |
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67
debtor
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| n.借方，债务人 | |
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68
creditor
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| n.债仅人，债主，贷方 | |
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69
adversely
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| ad.有害地 | |
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70
narcotic
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| n.麻醉药，镇静剂；adj.麻醉的，催眠的 | |
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71
extraordinarily
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| adv.格外地；极端地 | |
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72
skilful
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| (=skillful)adj.灵巧的，熟练的 | |
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73
alterations
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| n.改动( alteration的名词复数 )；更改；变化；改变 | |
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74
affected
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| adj.不自然的，假装的 | |
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75
pacified
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|
| 使（某人）安静( pacify的过去式和过去分词 )； 息怒； 抚慰； 在（有战争的地区、国家等）实现和平 | |
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76
allied
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|
| adj.协约国的；同盟国的 | |
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77
systematically
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| adv.有系统地 | |
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78
systematic
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|
| adj.有系统的，有计划的，有方法的 | |
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79
tightened
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|
| 收紧( tighten的过去式和过去分词 )； （使）变紧； （使）绷紧； 加紧 | |
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80
acting
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| n.演戏，行为，假装；adj.代理的，临时的，演出用的 | |
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81
solicitors
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| 初级律师( solicitor的名词复数 ) | |
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82
advisers
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| 顾问，劝告者( adviser的名词复数 )； （指导大学新生学科问题等的）指导教授 | |
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83
expediency
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|
| n.适宜；方便；合算；利己 | |
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84
attained
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| （通常经过努力）实现( attain的过去式和过去分词 )； 达到； 获得； 达到（某年龄、水平、状况） | |
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85
construing
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|
| v.解释（陈述、行为等）( construe的现在分词 )；翻译，作句法分析 | |
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86
injustice
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|
| n.非正义，不公正，不公平，侵犯（别人的）权利 | |
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87
prevailing
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| adj.盛行的；占优势的；主要的 | |
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88
fortified
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| adj. 加强的 | |
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89
insistence
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| n.坚持；强调；坚决主张 | |
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90
proffered
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| v.提供，贡献，提出( proffer的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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91
construed
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| v.解释（陈述、行为等）( construe的过去式和过去分词 )；翻译，作句法分析 | |
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92
civilian
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| adj.平民的，民用的，民众的 | |
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93
detailed
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| adj.详细的，详尽的，极注意细节的，完全的 | |
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94
publicity
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| n.众所周知，闻名；宣传，广告 | |
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95
purport
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| n.意义，要旨，大要；v.意味著，做为...要旨，要领是... | |
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96
prospects
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| n.希望，前途(恒为复数) | |
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97
initiated
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| n. 创始人 adj. 新加入的 vt. 开始，创始，启蒙，介绍加入 | |
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98
frustrated
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|
| adj.挫败的，失意的，泄气的v.使不成功( frustrate的过去式和过去分词 )；挫败；使受挫折；令人沮丧 | |
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99
fixed
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| adj.固定的，不变的，准备好的；(计算机)固定的 | |
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100
futile
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| adj.无效的，无用的，无希望的 | |
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101
bluff
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| v.虚张声势，用假象骗人；n.虚张声势，欺骗 | |
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102
collapse
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| vi.累倒；昏倒；倒塌；塌陷 | |
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103
hampering
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| 妨碍，束缚，限制( hamper的现在分词 ) | |
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104
briefly
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| adv.简单地，简短地 | |
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105
immorality
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| n. 不道德, 无道义 | |
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106
essentially
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| adv.本质上，实质上，基本上 | |
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107
strictly
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| adv.严厉地，严格地；严密地 | |
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108
exertion
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| n.尽力，努力 | |
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109
outlay
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| n.费用，经费，支出；v.花费 | |
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110
promptly
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| adv.及时地，敏捷地 | |
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111
decided
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| adj.决定了的，坚决的；明显的，明确的 | |
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112
munition
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| n.军火；军需品；v.给某部门提供军火 | |
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113
amalgamate
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| v.(指业务等)合并，混合 | |
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114
munitions
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| n.军火，弹药；v.供应…军需品 | |
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115
projectile
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| n.投射物，发射体；adj.向前开进的；推进的；抛掷的 | |
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116
machinery
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| n.(总称)机械，机器；机构 | |
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117
entirely
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| ad.全部地，完整地；完全地，彻底地 | |
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118
ministry
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| n.(政府的)部；牧师 | |
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119
treasury
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| n.宝库；国库，金库；文库 | |
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120
density
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| n.密集，密度，浓度 | |
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121
deception
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| n.欺骗，欺诈；骗局，诡计 | |
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122
investigation
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| n.调查，调查研究 | |
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123
procrastination
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| n.拖延，耽搁 | |
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124
withdrawal
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| n.取回，提款；撤退，撤军；收回，撤销 | |
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125
undesirable
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| adj.不受欢迎的，不良的，不合意的，讨厌的；n.不受欢迎的人，不良分子 | |
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126
redeem
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| v.买回，赎回，挽回，恢复，履行（诺言等） | |
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127
redeemed
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| adj. 可赎回的，可救赎的 动词redeem的过去式和过去分词形式 | |
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128
hostilities
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| n.战争；敌意(hostility的复数)；敌对状态；战事 | |
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129
defective
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| adj.有毛病的，有问题的，有瑕疵的 | |
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130
withheld
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| withhold过去式及过去分词 | |
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131
withholding
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| 扣缴税款 | |
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132
smuggling
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| n.走私 | |
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133
manure
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| n.粪，肥，肥粒；vt.施肥 | |
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134
dealers
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| n.商人( dealer的名词复数 )；贩毒者；毒品贩子；发牌者 | |
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135
generalization
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| n.普遍性，一般性，概括 | |
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136
scarcity
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| n.缺乏，不足，萧条 | |
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137
discredited
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| 不足信的，不名誉的 | |
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138
dealing
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| n.经商方法，待人态度 | |
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139
interim
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| adj.暂时的，临时的；n.间歇，过渡期间 | |
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140
opposition
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| n.反对，敌对 | |
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141
speculations
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| n.投机买卖( speculation的名词复数 )；思考；投机活动；推断 | |
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