On August 6th, 1914, the Government of the United States proposed to all the belligerent1 Powers that the laws of war at sea, as laid down in the Declaration of London of 1909, should be observed throughout the present war. This reasonable suggestion, which, had it been generally observed, would have saved the world much distress2, came to nothing, owing to the refusal of Great Britain to accept it as it stood without reservation. The United States Government thereupon withdrew its proposal on October 24th, and announced that "It was resolved in future to see that the rights and duties of the Government and citizens of the United States should be settled in accordance with the accepted principles of international law and the treaty obligations of the United States, without reference to the provisions of the Declaration of London." Moreover, the American Government drew up protests and demands for compensation, for use in case of any infringement3 of these rights, or of any interference with their free exercise on the part of the belligerent Powers.
On November 3rd, 1914, Great Britain declared the whole of the North Sea a theatre of war, and thereupon instituted, in flagrant violation4 of the Law of Nations, a blockade of the adjoining neutral coasts and ports. General disappointment was felt in Germany that the Page 128 United States made no attempt to vindicate5 her rights in this matter, and confined herself to demanding compensation in individual cases of infringement.
Both in Germany and elsewhere it was clearly recognized that England's design was to use this illegal blockade for the purpose of starving out the German people. During a discussion between myself and Mr. Lansing, later Secretary of State, on the matter of assistance to be sent by America to Belgium, he expressed the opinion that nothing would come of the scheme, as Lord Kitchener had adopted the attitude that no food supplies could under any circumstances be sent to territory in German occupation. I answered that I had expected this refusal, as it was England's intention to starve us out, to which Mr. Lansing replied: "Yes, the British frankly6 admit as much." It will be remembered that, as a matter of fact, Lord Kitchener withdrew his refusal in view of the pressure of English public opinion, which demanded that relief should be sent to Belgium on account of the distress prevalent there, and despite the fact that such a measure was of indirect assistance to us. A subsequent proposal from the American Government for the dispatch of similar relief to Poland was declined in London.
We Germans had hoped that the neutral States would vigorously claim their right to freedom of mutual7 trade, and would take effective measures, in conjunction with the leadership of the United States, to force the British Government to suspend the oppressive and extra-legal policy. This they failed to do, at any rate, in time to forestall8 the fateful decision on our part to undertake submarine warfare9. It is now impossible to tell whether this policy might not have had more favorable results, had not the growing estrangement10 between Germany and America caused by the new campaign nipped in the Page 129 bud any possibility of serious Anglo-American differences. In the other neutral countries this submarine warfare alienated11 all sympathy for us, and no doubt was one reason why the neutral States, which in previous wars had always attempted to vindicate their rights as against the Power which had command of the sea, now refrained from any concerted action to this end. Such a procedure on their part would have indirectly12 influenced the situation in favor of Germany, as the weaker Power at sea; it will be remembered that the United States, during their War of Independence against England, drew much advantage from a similar attitude on the part of the European Powers. My knowledge of America leads me to believe that, had we not incurred13 such odium by our infringement of Belgian neutrality and our adoption14 of submarine warfare, the action of the Washington Government might have been other than it was; had it even raised a finger to protest against England's methods, the latter must instantly have given way, as had so frequently happened during the last twenty-five years, when the United States took up on any point an attitude hostile to Britain. The contrast between this passive attitude on the part or the President and the traditional forward policy of America vis-à-vis England, goes far to support the contention15 of Wilson's detractors in Germany—that these two countries were in league and were playing a preconcerted game.
It is impossible to convince one's political foes16 on any point except by positive proof, and until the time comes when the enemy's archives are published, such proof cannot, of course, be adduced on this particular matter. This time is still far distant. Why should the enemy publish their archives? They have won and have therefore no reason to grumble17 at the course of events. Thus Page 130 I can at present only combat with counter-arguments the contention that I misunderstood the true state of affairs in America. The hypothesis of secret collusion between America and England seems in the present case unnecessary; the attitude of public opinion in America is in itself sufficient explanation of the situation at the time. Sympathy for us from the very first day of the war there was none; but had the general feeling been as strongly for us as it actually was against us, no doubt the Government would have kicked against the English illegalities, and enforced an embargo18 against her. I still hold to my view that Mr. Wilson made a real effort to maintain the observance of a strict neutrality; but the decisive factor was that he found himself, as a result of his efforts, in increasing measure in conflict with the overwhelming Germanophobe sentiment of the people, and continually exposed to the reproach put forward in the Eastern States that he was a pro-German.
The American public, indifferent as it was to the affairs of Europe and entirely19 ignorant of its complicated problems, failed to understand the full extent of the peril20 to the very existence of the German Empire, which compelled its rulers, much against their will and with heavy hearts, to have recourse to the invasion of Belgium. They themselves, living in perfect security and under pleasant conditions, had no means of realizing the perilous21 position of a comparatively small people, such as the Germans, surrounded by greedy foes, and straitened within narrow frontiers; their judgment22, as already remarked, was swayed by their individual sentiments of justice and humanity. The attitude of the Allied23 and Associated Powers at Versailles might have enlightened the American people as to the peril of dismemberment which threatened a defeated Germany; but such realization24, even supposing it to have taken place, Page 131 has come too late to affect the consequences of the war. I am convinced that they will in a few years be forced to admit that Germany during the course of her struggle was, contrary to the generally accepted view of to-day, quite as much sinned against as sinning.
The German Government, then, decided25 upon the adoption of submarine warfare, and issued a declaration to this effect. This document, together with explanatory memorandum26, was delivered by me on February 4th, 1915, to the Secretary of State, Mr. Bryan; it was to the effect that the territorial27 waters of Great Britain and Ireland, including the whole of the English Channel, were declared a war area. From February 18th onwards every enemy merchant ship encountered in this area was liable to be sunk, without any guarantee that time could be given for the escape of passengers and crew. Neutral shipping28 in the war zone was likewise liable to the same dangers, as owing to the misuse29 of neutral flags resulting from the British Government's order of January 31st, and the chances of naval30 warfare, the possibility of damage to other shipping as a result of attacks on hostile vessels32 might sometimes be unavoidable.
I regarded it as my main duty, when handing this document to Mr. Bryan, to recommend to the United States Government that they should warn all American citizens of the danger to the crews, passengers and cargoes33 of hostile merchant ships moving within the war area from this time onwards. Further, I felt it necessary to draw attention to the advisability of an urgent recommendation that American shipping should keep clear of the danger zone, notwithstanding the express statement in the memorandum that the German naval forces had orders to avoid any interference with neutral vessels clearly recognizable as such.
Page 132 Mr. Secretary Bryan was at first incredulous; he believed a submarine campaign of this nature to be unthinkable, and my statements to be merely bluff36. The American Government therefore resolved to take no measures of precaution, but to dispatch a Note to Berlin on February 12th, summarizing the two conflicting points of view, which remained irreconcilable37 throughout the whole controversy38, on the subject of the submarine war. Germany, on the one hand, defended her course of action as a reprisal39 justified40 by the British blockade, which both parties to the discussion agreed to be contrary to the Law of Nations. The United States, for her part, maintained that as long as the blockade of Great Britain was not made effective, neutral shipping had the right to go where it wished unharmed, and that the German submarines were empowered only to hold up merchant ships for search purposes, unless these same ships offered resistance or endeavored to escape.
The chief germ of dissension lay in the fact that the British blockade, which was defended by its authors as being merely an extension of the rights of sea warfare to square with the progress of the modern military machine, was met on America's part only by paper protests, while our own extension of the same rights by means of submarine warfare was treated as a casus belli. At a later period of the war the Imperial Government made certain proposals to the United States, who might, by accepting them, have safeguarded all their commercial and shipping interests, not to mention the lives of their citizens, to the fullest possible extent, and yet have allowed us a free field for our submarine warfare. These proposals the United States rejected; thus she set herself to combat with all her strength any continuance of the blockade restrictions41 through our submarines, while conniving42 at the similar restrictions exercised by England, although Page 133 these latter infringed43 far more seriously the rights of neutral Powers.
The following extract from the American Note of February 12th clearly presaged44 the conflict to come:
"This Government has carefully noted46 the explanatory statement issued by the Imperial German Government at the same time with the proclamation of the German Admiralty, and takes this occasion to remind the Imperial German Government very respectfully that the Government of the United States is open to none of the criticisms for unneutral action to which the German Government believe the governments of certain other neutral nations have laid themselves open; that the Government of the United States has not consented or acquiesced47 in any measures which may have been taken by the other belligerent nations in the present war which operate to restrain neutral trade, but has, on the contrary, taken in all such matters a position which warrants it in holding those governments responsible in the proper way for any untoward48 effects upon American shipping which the accepted principles of international law do not justify49; and that it, therefore, regards itself as free in the present instance to take with a clear conscience and upon accepted principles the position indicated in this Note.
"If the commanders of German vessels of war should act upon the presumption50 that the flag of the United States was not being used in good faith and should destroy on the high seas an American or the lives of American citizens, it would be difficult for the Government of the United States to view the act in any other light than as an indefensible violation of neutral rights which it would be very hard indeed to reconcile with the Page 134 friendly relations now so happily subsisting51 between the two Governments.
"If such a deplorable situation should arise, the Imperial German Government can readily appreciate that the Government of the United States would be constrained52 to hold the Imperial German Government to a strict accountability for such acts of their naval authorities, and to take any steps it might be necessary to take to safeguard the American lives and property and to secure to American citizens the full enjoyment53 of their acknowledged rights on the high seas."
The Imperial Government reaffirmed its standpoint in a further Note, dated February 16th, the gist54 and conclusion of which was as under:
"If the American Government, by reason of that weight which it is able and entitled to cast into the balance which decides the fate of peoples, should succeed even now in removing those causes which make the present action of the German Government an imperious duty; if the American Government, in short, should succeed in inducing the Powers at war with Germany to abide55 by the terms of the Declaration of London, and to permit the free importation into Germany of foodstuffs56 and raw material, the Imperial Government would recognize in such action a service of inestimable value, tending to introduce a spirit of greater humanity into the conduct of the war, and would willingly draw its own conclusions from the resulting new situation."
This Note was effective, in that it induced the American Government to dispatch on February 22nd an identical Note to Great Britain and Germany, with the object of arriving at a modus vivendi in the matter. Their proposal was as follows: Submarines were not to be Page 135 employed in any attack on merchant ships of whatever nationality, save in execution of the rights of detention57 or search; merchant ships, for their part, were not to make use of neutral flags, whether as a ruse58 de guerre or to avoid identification. Great Britain would give free passage to provisions and food supplies consigned59 to certain agents in Germany, to be named by the United States. These agents would receive all goods thus imported and dispatch them to specially60 licensed61 distributing firms, who were to be responsible that they were issued exclusively to the civilian62 population.
The above project was concurred63 in by the German Government in a Note of February 28th, which added that "The Imperial Government considered it right that other raw materials, essential to manufacture for peaceful purposes, and also fodder64, should also be imported without interference."
The British Government, as was to be expected, rejected the American proposal on somewhat flimsy pretexts65, for England's sea supremacy66 was at stake in this as in her previous wars. "Britannia rules the waves" was, and ever must be, the guiding principle of all her policy, while her world-Empire endures. On this vitally important question England could not be expected ever to yield an inch of her own free will.
Thus the American attempt at mediation67 died a natural death.
Our adoption of submarine warfare was to be regarded, according to our Note of February 16th, as a measure of reprisal in answer to the English blockade. From a tactical point of view, this contention was unfortunate, as it afforded America the opportunity of agreeing at once, and thus of conceding us a point which benefited us not at all, but merely gave the United States all the more right to renew its protests against the submarine Page 136 war. It would have been wiser for us to have initiated68 the submarine campaign simply as a new weapon of war without reference to the English blockade; still better, to put it into operation without declaring a blockade of Great Britain and Ireland, which could never be really effective, and caused constant friction69 between ourselves and America. Our declaration that the territorial waters of Great Britain were to be regarded as a war area was a legal formality modelled on the earlier English proclamation of the barred zones, and at once antagonized public opinion in the United States. By adopting the point of view we did with regard to reprisals70, we laid ourselves open to the charge of illegality, and added to the ill-feeling already excited by the submarine campaign. If the contention of certain naval authorities that the observance of the Declaration of London by our enemies would have brought us no important material advantage is correct, the issue of our Note of February 16th becomes even less comprehensible. Having admitted in this Note that the declaration of the barred zones was caused by the fact that all was not well with us, we could hardly expect England would fall in with the proposal made at our suggestion by Mr. Wilson, and thus allow us so easy a diplomatic triumph. The President, however, after his rebuff from England, was bound, in order to maintain his prestige, to bring all possible pressure to bear on us, in the hope of compensating71 by diplomatic success in Berlin for his failure in London. My subsequent attitude was laid down, but at the same time made more difficult, by this interchange of Notes; but, generally speaking, my personal action in the matter began with the Lusitania incident; previous to this the negotiations72 had been entirely in the hands of Berlin.
The Washington Government then for the present assumed Page 137 a waiting attitude, until such time as loss of American lives through our submarine activities should compel its intervention73. With regard to damage to property, the standpoint was consistently maintained that claims for compensation for financial loss must be fully45 met. Every day might see a serious conflict, and this possibility was a source of constant anxiety to us Germans in the United States. The American Government, we thought, still underestimated the dangers of the situation, and failed to take any measures of precaution. In the middle of April I held a meeting in New York, with the representatives of the other German administrative74 departments, and in view of the great responsibility incumbent75 on us, we resolved on the motion of Dr. Dernburg to issue a warning to the Press in the form usually adopted for shipping notices. As a rule, these shipping notices were published by the Consulate76 as a matter of routine. Dr. Dernburg having, however, been unable to come to an agreement with the New York Consulate on the matter, I took upon myself to issue the advertisement as from the German Ambassador. It ran as follows:
"Travellers intending to embark77 for an Atlantic voyage are reminded that a state of war exists between Germany and her Allies and Great Britain and her Allies; that the zone of war includes the waters adjacent to the British Isles78; that, in accordance with the formal notice given by the Imperial German Government, vessels flying the flag of Great Britain or any of her Allies are liable to destruction in those waters; and that travellers sailing in the war zone in ships of Great Britain or her Allies do so at their own risk."
"Imperial German Embassy, Washington.
"April 22nd, 1915."
Page 138 This notice was intended to appear in the Press on April 24th and the two following Saturdays. By one of those fatal coincidences beloved of history, it happened that owing to technical difficulties the communiqué was not actually published until May 1st—the very date on which the Lusitania left New York harbor. This conjunction was bound to appear intentional79 rather than fortuitous, and even to-day the majority of Americans believe that I must have known beforehand of the design to torpedo80 the Lusitania.
As the true facts of the matter are not yet clear, and were never explained officially, I have no means of saying whether the destruction of the Lusitania was the result of a deliberate purpose on the part of our naval authorities. To the best of my belief technical factors render it impossible for a submarine commander to make any one particular ship the object of his attack, so that the officer responsible for the sinking of the Lusitania could not have been certain what vessel31 he had to deal with. In any case, whether the action of our naval authorities was planned out beforehand or not, we in America had no knowledge of any such plan; indeed, until it actually occurred, I believed the destruction of the Lusitania to be unthinkable, not merely for humanitarian81 reasons, but because it was obviously sound policy to refrain as far as possible from any attack on passenger ships. I did not at the time realize how difficult it was for our naval forces to insure the safety of such vessels without impairing82 the efficiency of the submarine blockade. Again, I did not believe it possible to torpedo a rapidly-moving ship like the Lusitania if she were going at full speed; and, finally, I supposed that a modern liner, if actually struck, would remain afloat long enough to allow of the rescue of her passengers. The captain of the Lusitania himself seems to have been quite Page 139 at ease in his mind on the matter; at all events, he took no precautionary measures to avoid the danger threatening him, or to insure the safety of the people on board in case of need. The rapidity with which the ship went down and the resulting heavy death-roll can only be attributed to the explosion of the masses of ammunition83 which formed part of the cargo34.
Let me once more lay stress on the fact that our notice to the Press had no particular reference to the Lusitania, but was simply a general warning, the publication of which was motived simply by humanity and wise policy, and was rendered necessary by the apathetic84 behavior of the Washington authorities in the matter. We rightly imagined that many Americans had not taken the trouble to read the Notes officially exchanged, and would thus rush blindly into danger. Our failure to achieve any result by our efforts may be appreciated from an extract from the London Daily Telegraph of May 3rd, which is before me as I write. The New York correspondent of this paper dealt with our warning in the following headlines:
"German Threat to Atlantic Liners."
"Berlin's Latest Bluff."
"Ridiculed85 in America."
On May 7th I travelled to New York in the afternoon—a fact in itself sufficient to prove that I was not expecting the disaster to the Lusitania. It chanced that Paul Warburg and another American banker were on the same train. I bought an evening paper at Philadelphia, and there read the first news about the sinking of the great liner; I read them to my two travelling companions, both of whom disbelieved the story at the time; but Jacob Schiff met us in New York with the news that Page 140 it was all too true, and that in the first moment of excitement he had hurried to the station to inform his brother-in-law, Warburg, of what had happened. I had come to New York with the intention of being present at a performance of The Bat, given by a German company for the benefit of the German Red Cross; but when I learned on my arrival at the Ritz-Carlton Hotel that over one hundred Americans, including many women and children, had lost their lives in the sinking of the Lusitania, I at once gave up all idea of attending the performance. As the hotel was soon surrounded on all sides by newspaper reporters, I remained indoors until my departure on the morrow; I should have returned to Washington at once, but for having to interview certain German gentlemen in New York.
Unfortunately it so happened that Dr. Dernburg was then away at Cleveland, addressing a meeting; he took the opportunity of defending the destruction of the Lusitania on the ground that she was carrying munitions86 of war. This speech aroused a storm of execration87 throughout the country, which was already indignant enough over the fatal event itself. Even to-day no German seems to realize the full violence of the passion thus aroused; we, accustomed as we have been to daily reports of battles and casualties, were little impressed by the destruction of a solitary88 passenger ship. America, however, execrated89 us whole-heartedly as murderers of women and children, oblivious90 of the fact that the victims of the submarine campaign were far less numerous than the women and children killed by the English blockade, and that death by drowning is no more dreadful than slow starvation. Everyone naturally realizes his own misfortunes more vividly91 than those of others, and the Lusitania incident first brought home to the United States the horrors of war, and convinced all her people Page 141 that a flagrant injury had been done them. On my departure from New York I found myself at once face to face with this immense popular excitement. I left my hotel by a side door, but did not manage to escape notice; several cars filled with reporters followed me to the station, and pressed round me so persistently92 that I was unable to shake them off. I could only refuse to make any statement, which only increased the excitement of the reporters; but had I said anything at that time, I should but have added fuel to the fire which was already raging in the minds of all. Finally I succeeded in forcing my way through the infuriated and howling mob of pressmen and reaching the train.
For the first few days after my return to Washington I remained in seclusion93, so as to avoid any possibility of unpleasant incidents. Those Germans who live in the congenial surroundings of their homes can have little conception of the hostility94 with which we in America had to contend. We had many true friends, who right up to the final breach95 between the two countries never deserted96 us. To them I shall ever feel myself indebted, more particularly in view of their harsh treatment at the hands of their fellow-countrymen and enemy diplomatists, as a result of their staunchness. The pro-Entente97 elements of the country proposed not only to boycott98 us socially, but also to terrorize all pro-German Americans. In this connection it is of interest to note that a certain neutral representative was accused by his Government of having taken our part; he was led to believe that this charge had originated in the Russian Embassy, and taxed M. Bakmetieff with the fact. The latter had no better proof of it to adduce than the report that the Dutch Ambassador—for he it was who had been thus attacked—occasionally had breakfast with me at my club, and always stayed at the German headquarters, the Ritz-Carlton Page 142 Hotel, whenever he came to New York. The above example is typical of the attitude usually adopted towards us; despite it all, throughout the war I never wanted for true and loyal friends in America, even though, particularly after the Lusitania incident, one or other shrank from braving the resulting public odium. Such halfhearted champions we could easily dispense99 with; the situation at the moment was so strained that we had no use for any save trustworthy and reliable men on our side. I may take this opportunity to place it on record that my relations with all the State Departments remained to the last of the friendliest; I should be doing them an injustice100, did I not expressly affirm this.
President Wilson must certainly have under-estimated the spirit of angry hostility towards Germany which then held sway over his people's minds, otherwise he would probably not have gone directly counter to it, as he did in a speech which has now become famous. On May 10th at Philadelphia he gave evidence of his peaceful inclinations101 in the following words:
"The example of America must be a special example. The example of America must be the example not merely of peace because it will not fight, but of peace because peace is the healing and elevating influence of the world and strife102 is not. There is such a thing as a man being too proud to fight. There is such a thing as a nation being so right that it does not need to convince others by force that it is right."
This speech did but increase the indignation raging throughout the country, and the phrase "Too proud to fight" became the favorite joke of the Jingo and Entente party against Mr. Wilson. Public opinion with one voice demanded the severance103 of diplomatic relations with Page 143 Germany; and before this powerful pressure the President deemed it advisable to explain away his words.
It may be said, perhaps, in answer to the above, that America was indeed bitterly angry, but still not resolved on war; and that public opinion was indignant, not at Wilson's desire to keep the peace, but at the unfortunate expression "Too proud to fight."
This view was held, for example, by von Tirpitz, and also found expression more than once in the reports of the so-called German Chamber104 of Commerce in New York, which were regularly transmitted to Germany, and exercised considerable influence on opinion in that country, although their author was a man of no political insight, and the Chamber of Commerce had, as a matter of fact, no actual existence.
They were simply a journalistic device on the part of the paper which published these reports. During the war, and under the influence of the passions which it aroused, there was continually going on in America any amount of mischievous105 gossip and intrigue106 concerning which many interesting stories might be told. I have no intention, however, of concerning myself with these unworthy matters now, any more than I allowed them at the time to color my official reports to the home Government; I can only say that if the reports of the Chamber of Commerce had any sort of influence on German opinion, it was much to be regretted. The opinion, therein expressed, that the United States would never, under any circumstances, embark on hostilities107 against us was unfortunately belied108 by later events, and the idea that America was at that time compelled to keep the peace by defects in her military equipment, had no foundation in fact. Admittedly, she was in the year 1917 insufficiently109 equipped for war, and the question of making Page 144 good her deficiencies had not got beyond the stage of discussion. I should, of course, have been only too pleased if my repeated warnings as to the danger of war with America had proved to be unfounded; in point of fact, after the Lusitania incident, America was, for a period of three weeks, on the verge110 of breaking off diplomatic relations, and panic reigned111 on the Stock Exchanges throughout the country. The fact that Congress was not sitting at the time prevented a flood of speeches which would only have increased the tension. It will be remembered that by the American Constitution the annual sessions of Congress are short and long alternately; the short session had come to an end on March 4, 1915, and the President had refrained from summoning Congress again, as he wished to avoid discussion on the question of war.
The irresistible112 strength of the popular indignation may be accurately113 estimated from the fact that even the German-Americans were terror-stricken by its violence. Not only did our propaganda collapse114 completely, but even our political friends dared not open their mouths, and only ventured to assert themselves once more after the settlement of the Arabic case. Germanism in America may be said to have been absolutely killed by the Lusitania incident, and only gradually came to life again.
The first expressions of opinion which I received from the President and Mr. Bryan gave me good grounds for hope that these gentlemen would do everything in their power to preserve peace. I append the two telegrams which I sent to the Foreign Office:
(1). "Washington, May 9th, 1915.
"Lusitania incident has caused great excitement, especially in New York, which is most affected115, but I hope that no serious consequences will ensue. Mr. Wilson Page 145 regards matters calmly. I recommend expression of regret for loss of so many American lives, in whatever form may be possible without admission of our responsibility."
(2). "Washington, May 10th, 1915.
"Bryan spoke116 to me very seriously concerning Lusitania incident. His influence will, in any case be exercised in favor of peace. This influence is great, as Wilson depends on Bryan for his re-election. Roosevelt, on the other hand, is beating the patriotic117 drum, in order to win over the Jingo elements. It is significant of Bryan's real views that he regrets that we did not support his well-known attempt at mediation; therefore, I again recommend that we should endeavor to bring about an attempt at mediation in some form, in case the position here becomes critical. This would be a good argumentum ad hominem in order to avoid war. Another way out, which is recommended, is that we should renew our offer to give up submarine warfare provided that England adheres to the principles of International Law, and gives up her policy of starvation. The position is in any case very serious; I hope and believe that we shall find a way out of the present crisis, but in case of any such recurrence118, no solution can be guaranteed."
American indignation was directed particularly against Dr. Dernburg, who had defended, in public, the torpedoing119 of the Lusitania. I had, therefore, no other resource but to advise him to leave the country of his own accord. He would probably have been deported120 in any case, and his continued presence in America could no longer serve any useful purpose, while it was to be hoped that his voluntary departure would appease121 the popular wrath122 in some degree, and postpone123 the imminent124 rupture125 of diplomatic relations. The sea was raging Page 146 and demanded a sacrifice. I sent the following report to Berlin on the subject of Dr. Dernburg's resolve to leave the country:
"Washington, May 17th, 1915.
"As I have already wired to your Excellency, Dr. Dernburg has decided to leave the country of his own free will. I believe that, in so doing, he is rendering126 a great service to the Fatherland, a service rendered easier by the fact that he could no longer hope to continue in the exercise of his former duties. As I have already reported, he had exposed himself to attack by our enemies by his action in going counter to the present outbreak of hysterical127 feeling in a speech and an interview which were, unfortunately, not in accordance with your Excellency's instructions, received by me on the following day. So long as Dernburg only wrote articles for the papers, he rendered distinguished128 and highly appreciated service, but when he commenced to deliver speeches at German-American meetings he trod on very dangerous ground. On this point we are all in agreement here. In any case, in war every possible method must be tried, and if any individual is sacrificed it must be regarded as unfortunately unavoidable.
"When I informed Mr. Bryan that Dr. Dernburg had decided to return home if the American Government would secure him a safe conduct from our enemies, the satisfaction of the Secretary of State was even more pronounced than I had expected. He remarked that Dr. Dernburg's speeches had given rise to the suspicion that the German Government wished to inflame129 the minds of the American people against President Wilson's administration. It might be possible, now that there were no longer any grounds for this idea, to avoid an immediate130 rupture of diplomatic relations."
Page 147 On May 13th the American Government dispatched a strongly worded Note to Berlin, which restated their point of view, as previously132 given. I reproduce textually the following passage from the Note, which, from the point of view of subsequent events, is of fundamental importance.
"The Government of the United States, therefore, desires to call the attention of the Imperial German Government with the utmost earnestness to the fact that the objection to their present method of attack against the trade of their enemies lies in the practical impossibility of employing submarines in the destruction of commerce without disregarding those rules of fairness, reason, justice, and humanity, which all modern opinion regards as imperative133. It is practically impossible for the officers of a submarine to visit a merchantman at sea and examine her papers and cargo. It is practically impossible for them to make a prize of her; and, if they cannot put a prize crew on board of her, they cannot sink her without leaving her crew and all on board of her to the mercy of the sea in her small boats.... Manifestly submarines cannot be used against merchantmen, as the last few weeks have shown, without an inevitable134 violation of many sacred principles of justice and humanity.
"American citizens act within their indisputable rights in taking their ships and in travelling wherever their legitimate135 business calls them on the high seas, and exercise those rights in what should be the well-justified confidence that their lives will not be endangered by acts done in clear violation of universally acknowledged international obligations, and certainly in the confidence that their own Government will sustain them in the exercise of their rights.
Page 148 "There was recently published in the newspapers of the United States, I regret to inform the Imperial German Government, a formal warning, purporting136 to come from the Imperial Germany Embassy at Washington, addressed to the people of the United States, and stating, in effect, that any citizen of the United States who exercised his right of free travel upon the seas, would do so at his peril if his journey should take him within the zone of waters within which the Imperial German Navy was using submarines against the commerce of Great Britain and France, notwithstanding the respectful, but very earnest protests of his Government, the Government of the United States. I do not refer to this for the purpose of calling the attention of the Imperial German Government at this time to the surprising irregularity of a communication from the Imperial Germany Embassy at Washington addressed to the people of the United States through the newspapers, but only for the purpose of pointing out that no warning that an unlawful and inhumane act will be committed can possibly be accepted as an excuse or palliation for that act or as an abatement138 of the responsibility for its commission.
"The Government of the United States cannot believe that the commanders of the vessels which committed these acts of lawlessness did so except under a misapprehension of the orders issued by the Imperial German naval authorities.... It confidently expects, therefore, that the Imperial German Government will disavow the acts of which the Government of the United States complains, that they will make reparation so far as reparation is possible for injuries which are without measure, and that they will take immediate steps to prevent the recurrence of anything so obviously subversive139 of the principles of warfare for which the Imperial German Page 149 Government have in the past so wisely and firmly contended.
"The Imperial German Government will not expect the Government of the United States to omit any word or any act necessary to the performance of its sacred duty of maintaining the rights of the United States and its citizens and of safeguarding their free exercise and enjoyment."
The demands contained in the above Note would have made the continuance of the submarine campaign impossible, and this was, no doubt, the intention of the union Government. The German answer of May 28th, which defended the torpedoing of the Lusitania on the grounds that she should be considered as an auxiliary140 cruiser and provided with guns, changed the situation in no way. Besides, the Lusitania had ammunition and Canadian troops on board; there can be no doubt that the main reason why she sank so rapidly was the exploding of her cargo of ammunition by the torpedo which struck her. With regard to the loss of human life, the German Government had already expressed, to the neutral Powers concerned, its deep regret for the death of their subjects—I had in person conveyed these regrets to the United States Government a few days after the destruction of the Lusitania.
After this first exchange of Notes, the gulf141 between the two points of view appeared fixed142, and was bound in face of the prevalent excitement to lead to a severance of diplomatic relations, unless sufficient time were gained to allow the storms of passion to abate137. Telegraphic communication between the German Government and the Embassy at Washington was carried out by a circuitous143 route, which made it extremely slow; thus I was compelled Page 150 to decide on my own responsibility and take immediate action. I fully realized that the rupture of diplomatic relations would mean war. In America we were face to face with a vigorous hostile propaganda, which had as its sole object to draw the United States into war, and thus bring about a decision by force of arms. From the time of the Lusitania incident onwards, the diplomatic struggle between ourselves and the Entente was centred entirely around the question of the future action of the United States. The threatened rupture of relations between that country and Germany would have left the field open for hostile propaganda, by taking from us all chance of combating it. War would thus have been inevitable sooner or later. The first and most urgent necessity was, therefore, the avoidance of such a rupture at whatever cost, and my efforts were now solely144 directed to this end. As things turned out, it might, perhaps, have been better if the United States had actually gone to war at this moment. Her military pressure, and our consequent defeat, would have come two years earlier, before the German people had been demoralized and exhausted145 by four years of war and blockade. But at that time I had good hopes of being able to bring about peace through American mediation, and consequently wished to gain time at all costs.
I resolved, without waiting for instructions from Berlin, to make use of my privileged position as Ambassador to demand an audience with the President. I heard later, among other things when I was at Manila, that on this very day, June 2nd, all preparations had been made for breaking off relations, and for the inevitable resulting war. As a result of my interview, however, they were cancelled. I had a long conversation with the President and two of his advisers146. Mr. Wilson felt the position acutely, and was animated148 solely by a desire to preserve Page 151 peace. We both realized that it was a question of gaining time, and succeeded in coming to an agreement on the measures to be taken to mitigate149 the crisis. We took the view that the isolation150 of Germany had given rise to an atmosphere of misunderstanding between her and the United States, and that the establishment of some sort of personal relationship might be expected to ease this tension; I, therefore, proposed, and the President agreed, that Meyer Gerhardt, a member of the Privy151 Council, who had accompanied Dr. Dernburg to America, and was then acting152 on behalf of the German Red Cross, should at once go to Germany and report in person to the Government. Mr. Wilson, for his part, undertook that no final decision should be taken until Meyer Gerhardt had reported the results of his mission.
At the end of this interview I was convinced in my own mind that the President would never enter on war with Germany, otherwise I could not conceive why he should have concurred in my proposals instead of breaking off relations at once. He would, had he chosen the latter course, have had American public opinion more decidedly behind him than it was later, at the time of the final breach. Not a voice would have been raised in opposition153, except that of the Secretary of State, Mr. Bryan, who, as it was, resigned his office on the ground that the exchange of Notes threatened to involve the United States in war, and could not be reconciled, therefore, with his own pacific intentions.
It is certain that if I had not at this stage of the Lusitania crisis had my interview with the President, relations would have been broken off and war between the United States and Germany must inevitably154 have followed. The view is still held in many quarters that we might safely have disregarded American susceptibilities, as President Wilson was entirely averse155 to war and would Page 152 have avoided it by whatever means; then we should have been free to carry on our submarine campaign. This was not the opinion held by myself or any of my colleagues at the Embassy, and later events proved us to have been in the right, as against those Germans and German-Americans, who, in May, 1915, and afterwards, averred156 that the United States would never declare war on us, and maintained the same view in January and February, 1917. The principles of my later policy were based on the events of this Lusitania crisis; I had then gathered the conviction that Mr. Wilson wanted peace but the country wanted war; that the President alone had prevented an immediate rupture, but that as the responsible leader of the American people, he would be compelled to bow eventually to public opinion. When Mr. Wilson had to explain away his unlucky speech at Philadelphia, no action was taken from the German side, and no information given him which might lead him to understand that Germany desired to avoid a casus belli at all costs, for fear of giving Mr. Wilson an opportunity to gain a cheap triumph over Germany in a verbal wrangle157.
I believe it unjust to Mr. Wilson to suppose that he wished to bluff us into surrender at this time. He had, while fully realizing the danger of war, sought all ways and means to avoid it, and on this hypothesis my whole policy was founded. Moreover the President had then mentioned to me for the first time that he was considering an attempt at mediation between the belligerents158.
After my audience at the White House I sent the following wire to the Foreign Office:
Cipher159
"Washington, June 2nd, 1915.
"Seriousness of the present situation here induced me to seek interview with President Wilson. In most cordial Page 153 exchange of views, in course of which we repeatedly emphasized our mutual desire to find some solution of the present difficulties, Wilson always came back to point that he was concerned purely160 with humanitarian aspect of matter, and that question of indemnification for loss of American lives in Lusitania was only of secondary importance. His main object was complete cessation of submarine warfare, and from point of view of this ultimate aim, smaller concessions161 on our part could only be regarded as half measures. It behooved162 us by giving up submarine campaign to appeal to moral sense of world; for issue of the war could never be finally decided by armies but only by peace of understanding. Our voluntary cessation of submarine warfare would inspire Wilson to press for a raising of English hunger blockade. Reliable reports from London state that present Cabinet would agree to this. Wilson hopes that this might be first stage in a peace movement on large scale, which he would introduce as head of leading neutral Powers.
"American reply may be expected to lay little stress on purely legal aspect of matter and to dwell rather on question of humanity, emphatically enough, but as Wilson told me, in a sharper form.
"President remarked that on one point at least we should be in agreement, as both Germany and United States of America had always been in favor of freedom of seas.
"Cordiality of conversation must not blind our eyes to seriousness of situation. If our next Note does not tend to tranquilize matters, Wilson is bound to recall his Ambassador. I recommend most earnestly that this should be avoided at all costs, in view of its disastrous163 moral effect and fact that this result would be immediate increase in export of munitions, and in financial support Page 154 for our enemies on immense scale. Good prospect164 exists of success of present movement for forbidding export of arms should understanding be reached; and also movement by Wilson in direction of peace is sure to follow. Decisive factor in result is that our reply should strike correct note from point of view of public opinion, which is decisive factor in balance here. For this essential to leave out legal details and to lift discussion to level of humanitarian standpoint. Meyer Gerhardt leaves tomorrow for Germany as Red Cross representative; he will report fully in Berlin on situation. Beg that our reply be held up till his arrival. Wilson concurs165 in this."
Meyer Gerhardt was in a position to give for the first time a full and accurate review of the American situation to the Berlin authorities. I had given him most precise information of my own views and had placed him in full possession of the details of my interview with Mr. Wilson. For the rest I had to content myself with short telegrams by circuitous routes. During our conversation, however, the President offered for the first time to permit me to dispatch a cipher telegram through the State Department, to be sent on by the American Embassy in Berlin. My reports as a matter of fact were somewhat infrequent and always short, as we had to put all our messages into cipher, and this was not always possible. In explanation of the inevitable incompleteness of my communication with the Foreign Office, I may remark that the telegrams of the Wolff and Trans-Ocean Bureaus were regarded as the main sources of information for either side, and that I made use of various arrangements of words, to which the Foreign Office alone had the key, for the purpose of making my own views easily distinguishable in these telegrams.
Page 155 Meyer Gerhardt, armed with a certificate from Mr. Bryan, to the effect that he was undertaking166 his journey at the express desire of the American Government, crossed over to Germany with all possible speed. It may be doubted if the English authorities would have taken any notice of this safe conduct, but by good fortune the Norwegian vessel which took him over escaped the attention of their cruisers. His mission was so far successful that the excitement in the United States had time to die down somewhat and the first crisis in German-American relations was thereby167 tided over satisfactorily. Apart from that, Meyer Gerhardt's mission had no effect on the future course of negotiations. The exchange of Notes between Washington and Berlin continued without an understanding being arrived at; both Governments persisting in their original points of view.
The second American Note, dispatched on June 10th, led to the resignation of Mr. Bryan, the Secretary of State. He considered that American citizens should be forbidden to take passage in vessels bearing the flag of any belligerent nation, and holding these views as he did, declined to make himself responsible for a further exchange of Notes which he believed was bound in the end to result in war.
The resignation of the Secretary of State had another diplomatic prelude168 of a tragi-comic character. The Austro-Hungarian Ambassador, Dr. Dumba, besought169 Mr. Bryan to discuss the German-American conflict with him; both gentlemen wished to find some solution to the dispute and hoped that the Ambassadors not directly concerned in it might profitably try to mediate131. It was said later and probably with truth, that there was a mutual misunderstanding on this subject; but whatever be the truth of that, Dr. Dumba took upon himself to Page 156 send a radiogram to Vienna, by way of Nauen, in which he gave the following résumé of Mr. Bryan's views:
"The United States desire no war. Her Notes, however strongly worded, meant no harm, but had to be written in order to pacify170 the excited public opinion of America. The Berlin Government therefore need not feel itself injured, but need only make suitable concessions if it desires to put an end to the dispute."
This telegram from Dr. Dumba had just reached the German Foreign Office at the moment when the American Ambassador arrived to inform the Under Secretary of State, Zimmermann, in his customary blunt and abrupt171 manner, that Germany must yield to America's demands or war would inevitably follow. Zimmermann thereupon, with the object of causing Mr. Gerard to moderate his tone, showed him Dumba's wire, which pointed172 to the inference that the attitude of the American Ambassador was merely a bluff. Mr. Gerard, as in duty bound, reported the facts to Washington; mutual recriminations ensued and the Press got hold of the story (nothing ever remained a secret for long in the American capital). The general impression there was that Germany, once she were convinced of America's serious intentions to appeal if necessary to arms, would back down; and that now Mr. Bryan was made to appear as a wrecker of the President's policy. His resignation thus became more necessary than ever, and Mr. Lansing, hitherto head of the State Department of Justice, replaced him. American opinion, however, laid the chief blame for what had occurred on Dr. Dumba, who was henceforward regarded as a dangerous intriguer173.
Mr. Lansing was a lawyer, not a politician, and looked at everything from the point of view of a lawyer and his Page 157 position as the President's sole legal adviser147. He was, so to speak, Mr. Wilson's legal conscience. My personal relations with him were always extremely cordial.
Mr. Bryan's point of view was in every sense that of a neutral. The only really effective way of safeguarding American interests was, of course, to forbid the use of hostile passenger ships by citizens of the United States, who could perfectly174 well travel on their own vessels, or those of Holland or Scandinavia. However, the greater part of American public opinion did not accept this strict view of neutrality, and Mr. Wilson, therefore, adapted himself to the predominant opinion. It was useless for us to demand that the President should interpret his neutrality in the manner most convenient to us; we had to accept the fact that his ideas on this subject were neither ours nor Mr. Bryan's, and, on this basis, endeavor to come to an understanding with Mr. Wilson, if we did not intend to bring the United States into the war. It must be remembered that, as I have already said, we had no means of bringing pressure to bear on America, whereas from her point of view war with Germany would be a comparatively simple affair, which would involve no vital risks for her, but would, on the contrary, greatly benefit her from an industrial point of view, besides gratifying the jingoes, by giving them an opportunity of making full use of their long-desired Army, Navy and commercial fleet. There could be considered, as factors tending to the preservation175 of peace, only the pacific sentiment of the majority of the people working in alliance with the dilatory176 policy of the President, who still nourished a hope that some favorable turn or other in events, or perhaps the advent177 of peace, would give him a chance to avoid breaking of relations with Germany.
The diplomatic incident, mentioned above, made such Page 158 an impression on Mr. Gerard, as to induce him to make, on his own initiative in Berlin, at the time when the American Note of 10th June had to be answered, a proposal which met with a by no means cordial reception. His suggestion was that a certain number of passenger ships, detailed178 beforehand for the purpose, and rendered clearly recognizable, should be used for the transport of Americans to England; but though this scheme was embodied179 in the German Note of 8th July, it was at once rejected at Washington. Any assent180 to it would no doubt have involved a further departure from the principles laid down by the American Government—principles which it desired should be generally accepted, but which had already been in some measure compromised. The vessels which it was suggested should be employed in this service were to be marked in red, white and blue stripes, and as barbers' shops in the United States are decorated in this manner, they were called "Barber Ships."
On the 21st of July, the final American Note on the Lusitania case was dispatched. The Washington Government modified their position to the extent that they recognized the legality of submarine warfare, provided that before the sinking of any merchant ship, the crew and passengers were given a chance to leave in safety; in the main, however, the Note maintained the original American point of view. It read as follows:
"If a belligerent cannot retaliate181 against an enemy without injuring the lives of neutrals as well as their property, humanity as well as justice and due regard for the dignity of neutral Powers should dictate182 that the practice be discontinued. If persisted in it would in such circumstances constitute an unpardonable offence against the Sovereignty of the neutral nation affected ... the Government of the United States cannot believe Page 159 that the Imperial Government will longer refrain from disavowing the wanton act of its naval commander in sinking the Lusitania or offering reparation for the American lives lost, so far as reparation can be made for the needless destruction of human life by that illegal act.
"In the meanwhile the very value which this Government sets upon the long, unbroken friendship between the people and Government of the United States and the people and Government of the German nation, impels183 it to press most solemnly upon the Imperial German Government the necessity for the scrupulous184 observance of neutral rights. This is a critical matter. Friendship itself prompts it to say to the Imperial Government that repetition by the commanders of German naval vessels of acts in contravention of those rights must be regarded by the Government of the United States when they affect American citizens as deliberately185 unfriendly."
The first act of the German-American negotiations on the subject of submarine warfare thus closed with this open threat that war would follow any further action by Germany on the lines of the torpedoing of the Lusitania.
I think it well to reproduce here four of my reports, dated from Cedarhurst, a suburb of New York, where the Embassy usually had its headquarters during the hot summer months.
(1) Cipher
"Cedarhurst, June 9th, 1915.
"The political outlook in America appears at present as calm as a summer's day. The position abroad is perhaps reacting on internal affairs to some extent, as Mr. Wilson, as is usual in this country, considers foreign Page 160 affairs primarily from the point of view of their influence on the prospects186 of next year's presidential campaign.
"The tide of anti-German feeling aroused by the Lusitania incident is still running pretty high, but it may now be regarded as certain, that neither the President nor the American people want a war with Germany. Mr. Wilson, then, will, I believe, have public opinion on his side, if he can find an honorable solution to his differences with us, and make use of this solution as the basis for a peace movement on a large scale. I am now even more convinced than I was a short time ago, at the time of my long interview with him, that the President's ideas are developing in this direction, and that this is the cause of his suddenly taking up the Mexican question again, as he hopes to find in it a means of diverting public opinion. I am unwilling187 to give any grounds for exaggerated optimism, but my recent observations incline me to the belief that the President and his Cabinet are more neutral than is commonly supposed. England's influence here is tremendous, permeating188 as it does through many channels, which we have no means of closing; but the Central Government, none the less, is really trying to maintain a neutral attitude. It is an astonishing thing, no doubt, but well established none the less, that all influential189 Americans who come from New York, Boston, and Philadelphia, the English headquarters in this country, to Washington, complain about the pro-German feeling there. I feel sure in my own mind that the Government hopes, by reviving the Mexican question, to diminish the export of arms and munitions to Europe. Public opinion, apart from the anti-German clique190, would probably welcome such a move, as it is widely felt that the traffic in arms and munitions is hardly consistent with the continual appeals to humanity sent out all over the world from Washington. My general impression, as will Page 161 be seen from the above, is that Mr. Wilson considers his best chance of re-election lies in bringing peace to Europe and restoring order in Mexico; for the latter purpose he will probably employ General Iturbide, who spent the whole of last winter in New York and Washington. He was at one time governor of the district of Mexico City, where he acquitted191 himself with courage and credit. He impressed me personally as a man of great ability. He should be able to find sufficient partisans192 in Mexico to enable him to raise an army, and the bankers of New York would be prepared to advance him the necessary sums. General Iturbide enjoys the full confidence of the present Administration, but only the future can show whether he will succeed in establishing a stable Government in Mexico, without the intervention of the United States."
(2) Cipher
"Cedarhurst, 12th June, 1915.
"Since the publication of President Wilson's second Note on the Lusitania incident, the daily Press has been busy with conjectures193 as to the real reasons for Mr. Bryan's resignation. It is generally agreed that the Note itself could hardly have been the occasion of the Cabinet crisis; as Bryan had concurred in the first Note, and there was no reason, therefore, why he should not have assented194 to the second one as well. On the other hand, no one can believe that the controversy with Germany was in reality simply an excuse for a personal trial of strength between Wilson and Bryan, after the manner of the earlier rivalry195 between Taft and Roosevelt.
"Bryan has now published in the World a manifesto196 addressed to the German-American community defending his attitude in this matter; but it is fortunately couched in terms which are unlikely to find favor in the Page 162 eyes of those for whose benefit it was written. It would certainly be undesirable197 from our point of view that Bryan should be regarded as the champion of the German cause in this country; no useful result could follow from such advocacy. We must use all our efforts to come to an understanding with Mr. Wilson, if possible without compromising our present point of view; he is undoubtedly198 at the moment the most influential man in the country, and if he is antagonized we shall be powerless against him!"
(3) Cipher
"Cedarhurst, July 2nd, 1915.
"In spite of the English interference with the American mails reported here to-day, I hope that the reports dispatched in the ordinary course of my duty have all reached your Excellency safely. In case they have not done so, I may report that since my audience with Mr. Wilson, the removal of the 'agitator199' Dernburg, the mission of Meyer Gerhardt, and the arrival of the Press telegrams from Berlin giving details of the last-named, things have been pretty quiet generally; the situation has reverted200 to the normal, and will remain normal if our next Note shows a conciliatory disposition201. I might even go further, and say that the Lusitania incident, taking it all in all, despite the manner in which we dealt with it, has exercised and will exercise in the future a favorable influence on our mutual relations. Of course it has brought us into even greater odium with our avowed202 enemies; Anglophile 'Society' in New York, Philadelphia and Boston is infuriated, and the Wall Street magnates are little better; but these two cliques203 have always been inveterate204 supporters of England. The Government has lost ground for the first time as a result of the Lusitania incident, and it now fully realizes the importance of these Page 163 questions of sea warfare; whereas when I first spoke in February, March and April to various exalted205 personages about the submarine campaign and kindred matters, no one would listen to me, and the full seriousness of the situation was quite unrealized. Now, however, 'the freedom of the seas' has become the test question of American politics. Every preparation has been made to take energetic measures with regard to England if our answer to the last American Note renders further negotiations possible. Even the New York Press has become more reasonable, and capable of discussing war questions impartially206; and this was notably207 the case over the torpedoing of the Armenian. In a word, at no time since the outbreak of war have the omens208 been so favorable for a rational policy on the part of America."
"Cedarhurst, July 22nd, 1915.
"If we ask what have-been the results of our eleven weeks' negotiations over the Lusitania incident, and which involved the employment of all our available arts of persuasion209, we may well reply that we have, despite our grave difficulties, averted210 the severance of diplomatic relations and the inevitable war that must have followed. The former possibility, at all events, was at one time considerably211 more probable than most people in Germany are aware of.
"There could have been but one opinion among those I who saw and felt it as to the popular attitude of mind during the first few weeks following the Lusitania incident. In such circumstances we had only one possible resource left to us, to gain time, and hope for the restoration of a more friendly disposition in this country. The continuation of negotiations rendered this contingency212 possible; and so matters eventually turned out.
"We can hope for further results only if the American Page 164 Government decides to institute simultaneous negotiations with Berlin and London, with the object of bringing about a settlement. Our own views and those of America are radically213 divergent, and no mere35 one-sided discussion between us can bridge the gulf. The American Government went too far in its first Note to allow of its withdrawing now; although it admits our submarine campaign to have been a legitimate form of reprisal against the English hunger blockade, it still persists in holding us responsible for damage to American lives and limbs resulting from these reprisals. Put briefly214 the demands of the United States are therefore:
"1. A full apology in some form or other, and indemnification for the lives lost in the Lusitania.
"2. An undertaking that no passenger ships shall in future be sunk without preliminary warning.
"The latest Note from America, which is already on its way to Berlin, will in a sense bring the negotiations to a conclusion, as the Government want to have a definite basis of agreement which may form the foundation of their discussions with England. In my conversations with Mr. Lansing I have been given to understand that the Government wish to know verbally or in writing whether we are in a position to incline somewhat to the American point of view, and whether we can see our way to assist the present Government to secure by means of joint215 conversations with Germany and England the freedom of the seas, which has always been the main object of Mr. Wilson's endeavors."
Dr. Dernburg returned to Germany in the middle of June, having been provided, by request of the American Government, with a safe conduct from the Entente. I Page 165 went to New York to take leave of Dr. Dernburg and invited a few friends to dinner in the roof-garden of the Ritz-Carlton Hotel on the eve of his departure. One incident of our gathering216 may be regarded as typical of the atmosphere of these Lusitania days: a party of people for whom the next table to ours had been reserved refused to take it, as they declined to sit down in the neighborhood of Germans.
After Dr. Dernburg's departure I deemed it advisable, in view of the popular hostility towards us, to redistribute the greater part of Dr. Dernburg's duties. I did so, therefore, in agreement with the Foreign Office, and with the assistance of Dernburg's former colleague, Councillor Albert took over, in addition to his former business with the Central Purchasing Company, all financial and economic affairs, and was attached to the Embassy as commercial adviser. Dr. Alexander Fuehr became Chief of the Press Bureau and Captain Hecker took over the duties connected with the German Red Cross. Unfortunately the generosity217 of many in America, and particularly those of German descent, has not been fully recognized or appreciated by the people of Germany. The total sum remitted218 to Germany for our Red Cross and other similar societies amounts to over 20,000,000 marks. The disillusion219 of our people at home when they realized the slight political influence exercised by the German-American element in the United States has led them to overlook their great achievements in the cause of charity, which were inspired by a heartfelt sympathy with the sufferings of the German nation.
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belligerent
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| adj.好战的，挑起战争的；n.交战国，交战者 | |
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distress
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| n.苦恼，痛苦，不舒适；不幸；vt.使悲痛 | |
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infringement
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| n.违反；侵权 | |
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violation
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| n.违反(行为)，违背(行为)，侵犯 | |
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vindicate
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| v.为…辩护或辩解，辩明；证明…正确 | |
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frankly
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| adv.坦白地，直率地；坦率地说 | |
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mutual
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| adj.相互的，彼此的；共同的，共有的 | |
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forestall
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| vt.抢在…之前采取行动；预先阻止 | |
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warfare
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| n.战争(状态)；斗争；冲突 | |
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estrangement
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| n.疏远，失和，不和 | |
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alienated
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| adj.感到孤独的，不合群的v.使疏远( alienate的过去式和过去分词 )；使不友好；转让；让渡（财产等） | |
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indirectly
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| adv.间接地，不直接了当地 | |
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incurred
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| [医]招致的，遭受的； incur的过去式 | |
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adoption
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| n.采用，采纳，通过；收养 | |
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contention
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| n.争论，争辩，论战；论点，主张 | |
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foes
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| 敌人，仇敌( foe的名词复数 ) | |
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grumble
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| vi.抱怨；咕哝；n.抱怨，牢骚；咕哝，隆隆声 | |
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embargo
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| n.禁运（令）；vt.对...实行禁运，禁止（通商） | |
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entirely
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| ad.全部地，完整地；完全地，彻底地 | |
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peril
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| n.(严重的)危险；危险的事物 | |
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perilous
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| adj.危险的，冒险的 | |
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judgment
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| n.审判；判断力，识别力，看法，意见 | |
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allied
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| adj.协约国的；同盟国的 | |
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realization
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| n.实现；认识到，深刻了解 | |
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decided
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| adj.决定了的，坚决的；明显的，明确的 | |
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memorandum
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territorial
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| adj.领土的，领地的 | |
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shipping
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| n.船运（发货，运输，乘船） | |
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misuse
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| n.误用，滥用；vt.误用，滥用 | |
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30
naval
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| adj.海军的，军舰的，船的 | |
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31
vessel
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| n.船舶；容器，器皿；管，导管，血管 | |
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32
vessels
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| n.血管( vessel的名词复数 )；船；容器；（具有特殊品质或接受特殊品质的）人 | |
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33
cargoes
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| n.（船或飞机装载的）货物( cargo的名词复数 )；大量，重负 | |
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34
cargo
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| n.(一只船或一架飞机运载的)货物 | |
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35
mere
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| adj.纯粹的；仅仅，只不过 | |
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36
bluff
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| v.虚张声势，用假象骗人；n.虚张声势，欺骗 | |
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37
irreconcilable
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| adj.（指人）难和解的，势不两立的 | |
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38
controversy
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| n.争论，辩论，争吵 | |
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39
reprisal
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| n.报复，报仇，报复性劫掠 | |
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40
justified
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| a.正当的，有理的 | |
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41
restrictions
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| 约束( restriction的名词复数 )； 管制； 制约因素； 带限制性的条件（或规则） | |
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42
conniving
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| v.密谋 ( connive的现在分词 )；搞阴谋；默许；纵容 | |
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43
infringed
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| v.违反（规章等）( infringe的过去式和过去分词 )；侵犯（某人的权利）；侵害（某人的自由、权益等） | |
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44
presaged
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| v.预示，预兆( presage的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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45
fully
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| adv.完全地，全部地，彻底地；充分地 | |
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46
noted
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| adj.著名的，知名的 | |
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47
acquiesced
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| v.默认，默许( acquiesce的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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48
untoward
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| adj.不利的，不幸的，困难重重的 | |
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49
justify
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| vt.证明…正当(或有理)，为…辩护 | |
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50
presumption
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| n.推测，可能性，冒昧，放肆，[法律]推定 | |
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51
subsisting
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| v.（靠很少的钱或食物）维持生活，生存下去( subsist的现在分词 ) | |
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52
constrained
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| adj.束缚的,节制的 | |
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53
enjoyment
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| n.乐趣；享有；享用 | |
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54
gist
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| n.要旨；梗概 | |
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55
abide
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| vi.遵守；坚持；vt.忍受 | |
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56
foodstuffs
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| 食物，食品( foodstuff的名词复数 ) | |
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57
detention
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| n.滞留，停留；拘留，扣留；(教育)留下 | |
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58
ruse
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| n.诡计，计策；诡计 | |
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59
consigned
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| v.把…置于（令人不快的境地）( consign的过去式和过去分词 )；把…托付给；把…托人代售；丟弃 | |
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60
specially
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| adv.特定地；特殊地；明确地 | |
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61
licensed
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| adj.得到许可的v.许可，颁发执照(license的过去式和过去分词) | |
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62
civilian
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| adj.平民的，民用的，民众的 | |
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63
concurred
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| 同意（concur的过去式与过去分词形式） | |
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64
fodder
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| n.草料；炮灰 | |
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65
pretexts
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| n.借口，托辞( pretext的名词复数 ) | |
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66
supremacy
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| n.至上；至高权力 | |
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67
mediation
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| n.调解 | |
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68
initiated
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|
| n. 创始人 adj. 新加入的 vt. 开始，创始，启蒙，介绍加入 | |
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69
friction
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| n.摩擦，摩擦力 | |
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70
reprisals
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| n.报复（行为）( reprisal的名词复数 ) | |
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71
compensating
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| 补偿，补助，修正 | |
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72
negotiations
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|
| 协商( negotiation的名词复数 )； 谈判； 完成（难事）； 通过 | |
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73
intervention
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| n.介入，干涉，干预 | |
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74
administrative
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| adj.行政的，管理的 | |
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75
incumbent
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| adj.成为责任的，有义务的；现任的，在职的 | |
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76
consulate
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| n.领事馆 | |
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77
embark
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| vi.乘船，着手，从事，上飞机 | |
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78
isles
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| 岛( isle的名词复数 ) | |
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79
intentional
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| adj.故意的，有意（识）的 | |
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80
torpedo
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| n.水雷，地雷；v.用鱼雷破坏 | |
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81
humanitarian
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| n.人道主义者，博爱者，基督凡人论者 | |
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82
impairing
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| v.损害，削弱( impair的现在分词 ) | |
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83
ammunition
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| n.军火，弹药 | |
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84
apathetic
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| adj.冷漠的，无动于衷的 | |
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85
ridiculed
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|
| v.嘲笑，嘲弄，奚落( ridicule的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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86
munitions
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|
| n.军火，弹药；v.供应…军需品 | |
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87
execration
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| n.诅咒，念咒，憎恶 | |
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88
solitary
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| adj.孤独的，独立的，荒凉的；n.隐士 | |
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89
execrated
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| v.憎恶( execrate的过去式和过去分词 )；厌恶；诅咒；咒骂 | |
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90
oblivious
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|
| adj.易忘的，遗忘的，忘却的，健忘的 | |
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91
vividly
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|
| adv.清楚地，鲜明地，生动地 | |
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92
persistently
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| ad.坚持地；固执地 | |
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93
seclusion
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| n.隐遁，隔离 | |
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94
hostility
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| n.敌对，敌意；抵制［pl.］交战，战争 | |
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95
breach
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| n.违反，不履行；破裂；vt.冲破，攻破 | |
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96
deserted
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|
| adj.荒芜的，荒废的，无人的，被遗弃的 | |
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97
entente
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| n.协定；有协定关系的各国 | |
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98
boycott
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| n./v.(联合)抵制，拒绝参与 | |
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99
dispense
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| vt.分配，分发；配(药)，发(药)；实施 | |
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100
injustice
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| n.非正义，不公正，不公平，侵犯（别人的）权利 | |
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101
inclinations
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| 倾向( inclination的名词复数 )； 倾斜； 爱好； 斜坡 | |
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102
strife
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| n.争吵，冲突，倾轧，竞争 | |
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103
severance
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| n.离职金；切断 | |
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104
chamber
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| n.房间，寝室；会议厅；议院；会所 | |
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105
mischievous
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| adj.调皮的，恶作剧的，有害的，伤人的 | |
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106
intrigue
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| vt.激起兴趣，迷住；vi.耍阴谋；n.阴谋，密谋 | |
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107
hostilities
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| n.战争；敌意(hostility的复数)；敌对状态；战事 | |
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108
belied
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|
| v.掩饰( belie的过去式和过去分词 )；证明（或显示）…为虚假；辜负；就…扯谎 | |
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109
insufficiently
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| adv.不够地，不能胜任地 | |
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110
verge
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| n.边，边缘；v.接近，濒临 | |
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111
reigned
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| vi.当政，统治（reign的过去式形式） | |
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112
irresistible
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| adj.非常诱人的，无法拒绝的，无法抗拒的 | |
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113
accurately
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| adv.准确地，精确地 | |
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114
collapse
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| vi.累倒；昏倒；倒塌；塌陷 | |
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115
affected
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| adj.不自然的，假装的 | |
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116
spoke
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| n.（车轮的）辐条；轮辐；破坏某人的计划；阻挠某人的行动 v.讲，谈（speak的过去式）；说；演说；从某种观点来说 | |
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117
patriotic
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| adj.爱国的，有爱国心的 | |
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118
recurrence
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| n.复发，反复，重现 | |
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119
torpedoing
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| 用爆破筒爆破 | |
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120
deported
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| v.将…驱逐出境( deport的过去式和过去分词 )；举止 | |
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121
appease
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| v.安抚，缓和，平息，满足 | |
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122
wrath
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| n.愤怒，愤慨，暴怒 | |
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123
postpone
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| v.延期，推迟 | |
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124
imminent
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| adj.即将发生的，临近的，逼近的 | |
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125
rupture
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| n.破裂；(关系的)决裂；v.(使)破裂 | |
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126
rendering
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| n.表现，描写 | |
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127
hysterical
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| adj.情绪异常激动的，歇斯底里般的 | |
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128
distinguished
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| adj.卓越的，杰出的，著名的 | |
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129
inflame
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| v.使燃烧；使极度激动；使发炎 | |
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130
immediate
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| adj.立即的；直接的，最接近的；紧靠的 | |
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131
mediate
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| vi.调解，斡旋；vt.经调解解决；经斡旋促成 | |
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132
previously
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| adv.以前，先前（地） | |
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133
imperative
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| n.命令，需要；规则；祈使语气；adj.强制的；紧急的 | |
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134
inevitable
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| adj.不可避免的，必然发生的 | |
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135
legitimate
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| adj.合法的，合理的，合乎逻辑的；v.使合法 | |
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136
purporting
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| v.声称是…，（装得）像是…的样子( purport的现在分词 ) | |
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137
abate
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| vi.(风势，疼痛等)减弱，减轻，减退 | |
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138
abatement
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| n.减(免)税，打折扣，冲销 | |
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139
subversive
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| adj.颠覆性的，破坏性的；n.破坏份子，危险份子 | |
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140
auxiliary
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| adj.辅助的，备用的 | |
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141
gulf
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| n.海湾；深渊，鸿沟；分歧，隔阂 | |
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142
fixed
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| adj.固定的，不变的，准备好的；(计算机)固定的 | |
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143
circuitous
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|
| adj.迂回的路的，迂曲的，绕行的 | |
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144
solely
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| adv.仅仅，唯一地 | |
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145
exhausted
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| adj.极其疲惫的，精疲力尽的 | |
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146
advisers
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| 顾问，劝告者( adviser的名词复数 )； （指导大学新生学科问题等的）指导教授 | |
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147
adviser
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| n.劝告者，顾问 | |
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148
animated
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| adj.生气勃勃的，活跃的，愉快的 | |
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149
mitigate
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| vt.（使）减轻，（使）缓和 | |
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150
isolation
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| n.隔离，孤立，分解，分离 | |
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151
privy
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| adj.私用的；隐密的 | |
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152
acting
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| n.演戏，行为，假装；adj.代理的，临时的，演出用的 | |
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153
opposition
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| n.反对，敌对 | |
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154
inevitably
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| adv.不可避免地；必然发生地 | |
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155
averse
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| adj.厌恶的；反对的，不乐意的 | |
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156
averred
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| v.断言( aver的过去式和过去分词 )；证实；证明…属实；作为事实提出 | |
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157
wrangle
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| vi.争吵 | |
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158
belligerents
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| n.交战的一方（指国家、集团或个人）( belligerent的名词复数 ) | |
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159
cipher
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| n.零；无影响力的人；密码 | |
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160
purely
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| adv.纯粹地，完全地 | |
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161
concessions
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| n.（尤指由政府或雇主给予的）特许权( concession的名词复数 )；承认；减价；（在某地的）特许经营权 | |
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162
behooved
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| v.适宜( behoove的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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163
disastrous
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| adj.灾难性的，造成灾害的；极坏的，很糟的 | |
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prospect
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| n.前景，前途；景色，视野 | |
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165
concurs
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| 同意（concur的第三人称单数形式） | |
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166
undertaking
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| n.保证，许诺，事业 | |
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167
thereby
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| adv.因此，从而 | |
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168
prelude
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| n.序言，前兆，序曲 | |
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169
besought
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| v.恳求，乞求（某事物）( beseech的过去式和过去分词 )；(beseech的过去式与过去分词) | |
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170
pacify
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| vt.使(某人)平静(或息怒)；抚慰 | |
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171
abrupt
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| adj.突然的，意外的；唐突的，鲁莽的 | |
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172
pointed
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| adj.尖的，直截了当的 | |
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173
intriguer
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| 密谋者 | |
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174
perfectly
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| adv.完美地，无可非议地，彻底地 | |
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175
preservation
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| n.保护，维护，保存，保留，保持 | |
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176
dilatory
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| adj.迟缓的，不慌不忙的 | |
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177
advent
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| n.(重要事件等的)到来，来临 | |
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178
detailed
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| adj.详细的，详尽的，极注意细节的，完全的 | |
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embodied
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| v.表现( embody的过去式和过去分词 )；象征；包括；包含 | |
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180
assent
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| v.批准，认可；n.批准，认可 | |
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181
retaliate
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| v.报复，反击 | |
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182
dictate
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| v.口授；(使)听写；指令，指示，命令 | |
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183
impels
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| v.推动、推进或敦促某人做某事( impel的第三人称单数 ) | |
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184
scrupulous
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| adj.审慎的，小心翼翼的，完全的，纯粹的 | |
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185
deliberately
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| adv.审慎地；蓄意地；故意地 | |
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186
prospects
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| n.希望，前途(恒为复数) | |
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187
unwilling
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| adj.不情愿的 | |
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188
permeating
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| 弥漫( permeate的现在分词 )； 遍布； 渗入； 渗透 | |
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189
influential
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| adj.有影响的，有权势的 | |
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190
clique
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| n.朋党派系，小集团 | |
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191
acquitted
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| 宣判…无罪( acquit的过去式和过去分词 )； 使（自己）作出某种表现 | |
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192
partisans
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| 游击队员( partisan的名词复数 )； 党人； 党羽； 帮伙 | |
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193
conjectures
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| 推测，猜想( conjecture的名词复数 ) | |
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194
assented
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| 同意，赞成( assent的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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195
rivalry
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| n.竞争，竞赛，对抗 | |
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196
manifesto
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| n.宣言，声明 | |
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197
undesirable
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| adj.不受欢迎的，不良的，不合意的，讨厌的；n.不受欢迎的人，不良分子 | |
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198
undoubtedly
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| adv.确实地，无疑地 | |
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199
agitator
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| n.鼓动者；搅拌器 | |
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200
reverted
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| 恢复( revert的过去式和过去分词 )； 重提； 回到…上； 归还 | |
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201
disposition
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| n.性情，性格；意向，倾向；排列，部署 | |
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202
avowed
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| adj.公开声明的，承认的v.公开声明，承认( avow的过去式和过去分词) | |
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203
cliques
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| n.小集团，小圈子，派系( clique的名词复数 ) | |
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204
inveterate
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| adj.积习已深的，根深蒂固的 | |
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205
exalted
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| adj.(地位等)高的，崇高的；尊贵的，高尚的 | |
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206
impartially
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| adv.公平地，无私地 | |
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207
notably
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| adv.值得注意地，显著地，尤其地，特别地 | |
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208
omens
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| n.前兆，预兆( omen的名词复数 ) | |
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209
persuasion
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| n.劝说；说服；持有某种信仰的宗派 | |
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210
averted
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| 防止，避免( avert的过去式和过去分词 )； 转移 | |
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211
considerably
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| adv.极大地；相当大地；在很大程度上 | |
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212
contingency
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| n.意外事件，可能性 | |
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213
radically
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| ad.根本地，本质地 | |
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214
briefly
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| adv.简单地，简短地 | |
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215
joint
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| adj.联合的，共同的；n.关节，接合处；v.连接，贴合 | |
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216
gathering
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| n.集会，聚会，聚集 | |
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217
generosity
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| n.大度，慷慨，慷慨的行为 | |
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218
remitted
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| v.免除（债务），宽恕( remit的过去式和过去分词 )；使某事缓和；寄回，传送 | |
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219
disillusion
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| vt.使不再抱幻想，使理想破灭 | |
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