A few days after the dispatch of the last American Note concerning the Lusitania incident, on July 21st, 1915, Mr. Lansing asked me to call on him. He then told me that the American Government had come to the end of its resources, and if any further cases occurred of loss of American lives by the torpedoing2 of merchant ships, war must inevitably3 result. The United States Government intended to write no more Notes, which had been proved useless, but would request me to undertake further negotiations4 in person. My action in the Lusitania incident had given proof of my earnest desire to avoid war, and the American Government were confident that I should succeed, even under such difficult conditions in finding some way out of the present impasse6.
From this time onwards, Mr. Lansing agreed with me that, as a regular thing, I should be permitted, whatever negotiations were going on, to send cipher7 dispatches to my Government through the channels of the State Department and the American Embassy in Berlin. It will be remembered that a similar privilege had been granted me at the time of the Lusitania incident.
My sole ground of hope for success lay in one passage of the American Note of July 21st, which read as follows:
"The Government of the United States and the Imperial German Government, contending for the same great object, long stood together in urging the very principles Page 167 on which the Government of the United States now so solemnly insists. They are both contending for the freedom of the seas. The Government of the United States will continue to contend for that freedom from whatever quarter it is violated, without compromise and at any cost. It invites the practical co-operation of the Imperial German Government at this time, when co-operation may accomplish most, and this great common object can be most strikingly and effectively achieved. The Imperial German Government expresses the hope that this object may in some measure be accomplished8 even before the present war ends. It can be.
"The Government of the United States not only feels obliged to insist upon it, by whomsoever it is violated or ignored, in the protection of its own citizens, but it is also deeply interested in seeing it made practicable between the belligerents9 themselves. It holds itself ready at any time to act as a common friend who may be privileged to suggest a way."
It seemed possible to reach some sort of agreement on the basis of the above request from America that we should co-operate in endeavoring to restore the freedom of the seas; but there remained the question of finding a formula which should serve as a basis for the settlement of the Lusitania question and prevent any repetition of such incidents.
I was aware that there were two political counter-currents in Berlin: the one party desiring at all costs to prevent war with the United States, the other preferring to risk war for the sake of continuing the submarine campaign. I was clearly bound to co-operate with the first named, as I was convinced that America's participation11 in the war would certainly result in our eventual12 defeat; this view was, I knew, that Von Jagow, Secretary Page 168 of State for Foreign Affairs, whose opinion on this point was identical with mine. Up to January 31st, 1917, however, I could never ascertain13 which of these two views was the accepted one in Berlin, although, of course, I always hoped that the party of common sense would eventually prevail, nor was I able to discover what degree of success, if any, Meyer Gerhardt, who had been sent to represent my views to the authorities in Berlin, or Dr. Dernburg, who was working for the same end, had managed to achieve. As will be seen from my account of the subsequent course of events, my information on this point was very insufficient14, and I was not even made acquainted with the views of the Berlin Government, on the conduct of the submarine campaign, or on the subsequent peace proposals put forward by the President. I was never informed beforehand as to the real intentions of Berlin, and I cannot understand, even to-day, why I was not told, until after the Arabic incident, that the German submarine commanders had been instructed immediately after the torpedoing of the Lusitania not to attack liners. A knowledge of this fact at the time would have assisted me greatly in my dealings with Washington. I do not intend to assert that in all this there was any deliberate neglect on the part of the Berlin Government but neither, on, the other hand, can I credit the commonly accepted explanation that the technical difficulties of transmitting reports were insuperable. It should have been possible to give me definite information on these matters by any one of the various channels of communication which were available between the Foreign Office and the Embassy at Washington. No other explanation is possible, except that which is to be found in the conflict of the two parties in Germany. The head of the Foreign Office was well aware that my policy in Washington was the same as his own in Berlin, but he Page 169 was frequently unable to send me definite and early information because he, himself, could not tell whether his own views could be accepted and acted upon.
At this time I sent the following report to Berlin:
"Cedarhurst, 28th July, 1915.
"I have on more than one occasion respectfully begged your Excellency to be so good as to wait for my report before deciding whether the last American Lusitania Note is to be answered, and if a reply is to be sent, in what sense it should be drafted. Neither the Government nor public opinion considers such a reply absolutely necessary, so that there is no danger in delay; but I respectfully request that I may be permitted at all events to undertake further negotiations here, verbally and confidentially18, even if my instructions have to be sent by letter. Experience has proved that negotiations, if they are to have any prospect20 of success with the American Government, must be carried on in Washington. Both President Wilson and Mr. Lansing are now prepared to attempt to reach an agreement by this means. In Germany, where the tone of the American Note must have appeared unnecessarily abrupt21, this fact is perhaps not realized the explanation of course is that Mr. Wilson was carried away by the popular excitement over the Lusitania incident, and was, thus, compelled to adopt an intransigent attitude, from which he cannot now recede22, without making his position impossible here. Then besides the resignation of Mr. Bryan, and that unfortunate telegram of Dr. Dumba's, which has become known here has convinced him that we are not in earnest. Finally, he wishes to come to some kind of settlement with us by means of this exchange of Notes, in order that he may then turn his attention to England; and his well-known pride confirms him in the view that only after he Page 170 has concluded his negotiations with us, can he take up the matter with her. It should be clearly understood that Mr. Wilson does not want war with us, nor does he wish to side with England, despite all statements to the contrary in the Press of the Eastern States. This Press, in agreement with other powerful and influential24 circles is Anglophile to a degree and not altogether averse25 to a war with Germany; but this view is not shared by Mr. Wilson, or the large majority of the American people.
"The great danger of the present situation is that we may be driven to war, either by the efforts of this Press, or by a new Lusitania incident. What Mr. Wilson wants is to satisfy public opinion here, by the serious tone of the Note sent to us, and at the same time to induce us to make certain concessions26 and thus carry out his darling project of the freedom of the seas, by finding some middle course between the German and English views. In his last note, the President has certainly modified his views in our favor by his admission that submarine warfare27 is legitimate28, whereas he formerly29 maintained that it could not be regarded as permissible30 from the point of view of international law.
"It is not my business, even were I in possession of all the necessary facts, to say whether it would be better policy from our point of view, to reply to this Note, or to leave it unanswered; I can only describe the situation, as it appears to me at the moment. From that point of view the decision must depend very largely on the results which we expect to follow from the submarine campaign. If this campaign is regarded as an end in itself, and we are justified31 in believing that it can bring about the overthrow32 of England, it would be wiser to leave the American note unanswered, and carry on with the submarine campaign and turn a deaf ear to neutral protests. If, on the other hand, this campaign is only a means to an end, the Page 171 end being the removal or slackening of the British blockade restrictions33, then I beg respectfully to urge that it would be worth our while to make some concessions to President Wilson's convictions, in the hope of achieving our object through his co-operation. He is reported by a witness in whom I have complete confidence, to have said: 'If I receive a favorable answer from Germany I will see this thing through with England to the end.'
"Before this report reaches your Excellency, Wilson's Note will have been delivered to the English Government. If this is couched in as peremptory34 a tone as the one addressed to us, then I urgently recommend that we should endeavor to come to an agreement with the American Government on the basis of the following draft note. I hope that your Excellency will send me an authorization35 by wireless36—it should be sent in duplicate for greater safety's sake—to enter into negotiations on this basis; I believe that I can guarantee to find a satisfactory principle to serve as a weapon for Wilson in his attack on England. If we show ourselves ready to help him out of his present difficulties, I am sure he for his part will energetically prosecute37 against England his design of vindicating38 the validity of international law. 'It can be,' said the President himself in his last Note. In these three words may be seen the conviction of Mr. Wilson, that he can impose his will upon England in this matter.
"As I have already reported, I earnestly hope that it will be decided39 to reply to the American note; and a reply should, to my mind, deal with these three points:
"(1) Settlement of the Lusitania incident. In this connection it would be well to state that from the point of view of reprisals40 we were entirely41 justified in attacking the Lusitania. In so doing, however, we had no intention of taking American lives, and deeply regret that through a combination of unfortunate circumstances this has Page 172 actually occurred. If any distress42 still exists among the survivors43 of the disaster, we should be quite prepared to leave the amount of financial compensation to be decided by a later agreement.
"(2) We propose in the future course of the submarine campaign to abide44 by the practice recently adopted. As things stand at present, the arrangement is that no liner is to be torpedoed45 without warning.
"(3) We should be prepared to support to the utmost of our power the efforts of President Wilson, to insist on the observation of the dictates46 of international law during the present conflict, and leave it to his discretion47 to enter into conversations to this end with the British Government. The Declaration of London might serve as a basis for these conversations, more especially as it was drawn49 up at the time by the American Government.
"If we act in accordance with these my respectful recommendations, the breakdown50 of the negotiations with England is the worst that can happen; and then it would be clear for all the world to see that our enemies were to blame for this breakdown, and Mr. Wilson would come over to our side. Knowing the President as I do, I have not the slightest doubt of this."
I gather from the account in Karl Helfferich's "World War," Vol. II., p. 322, that the Secretary of the Treasury51 in Berlin was in favor of this policy, which I held to be the only possible one. When he stated, as before mentioned, that his proposal had found no support from the Foreign Office, I was much astonished.
I was instructed to commence negotiations verbally and confidentially with Mr. Lansing on these lines, and was convinced myself that these would lead to nothing, so long as we persisted in carrying on our submarine campaign on the old lines. Policy should be based on what is Page 173 possible; now it was not really possible to unite these two contradictory52 methods, and to come to an understanding with the United States over the freedom of the seas, and at the same time to bring her to agree to the continuation of submarine warfare on the existing lines. We were bound to decide once for all on the one policy or the other. I supposed that Berlin had decided for the former course of action, as I knew that our submarine commanders had lately been ordered to arrange for the rescue of noncombatants before torpedoing merchantmen, and I was confirmed in my supposition by the very fact that I had been authorized54 to open conversations with Mr. Lansing.
Scarcely had these conversations begun, when on August 19th the passenger steamer Arabic was sunk, and again some American lives were lost. Excitement at once attained55 a high pitch, and once more we seemed to be on the brink56 of war.
On August 20th I dispatched by one of my usual routes the following wire (written for reasons of safety in French) to the Foreign Office:
"I fear I cannot prevent rupture57 this time if our answer in Arabic matter is not conciliatory; I advise dispatch of instructions to me at once to negotiate whole question. Situation may thus perhaps be saved."
At the same time, without writing for instructions, I explained both officially and also through the Press that on our side the United States would be given full compensation, if the commander of the Arabic should be found to have been treacherously58 dealt with. It was my first preoccupation to calm the public excitement before it overflowed59 all bounds; and I succeeded in so calming it. The action I thus took on my own responsibility turned out later to have been well advised, as, although Page 174 I did not know this at the time, the submarine commander's instructions had, in fact, been altered as a result of the disaster to the Lusitania.
On the 24th of August, in accordance with instructions from Berlin, I wrote to Mr. Lansing the following letter, which was immediately published:
"I have received instructions from my Government to address to you the following observations: Up to the present no reliable information has been received as to the circumstances of the torpedoing of the Arabic. The Imperial Government, therefore, trusts that the Government of the United States will refrain from taking any decided steps, so long as it only has before it one-sided reports which my Government believe do not in any way correspond to the facts. The Imperial Government hopes that it may be allowed an opportunity of being heard. It has no desire to call in question the good faith of those eyewitnesses60 whose stories have been published by the European Press, but it considers that account should be taken of the state of emotion, under the influence of which, this evidence was given, and which might well give rise to false impressions. If American subjects have really lost their lives by the torpedoing of this ship, it was entirely contrary to the intentions of my Government, which has authorized me to express to the Government of the United States their deepest regrets, and their most heartfelt sympathy."
Fortunately, as already mentioned, orders had been given before the torpedoing of the Arabic, to all submarine commanders that no liner should be sunk before preliminary warning had been given, and the non-combatants had been placed in safety, unless any ships tried to escape or offered resistance. At the end of August I Page 175 received an official statement to this effect, intended for my use in the negotiations over the Lusitania question. This statement caused the first hitch61 in these negotiations. The American Government regarded the term "liner" as comprising every steamer plying62 on recognized routes as distinguished63 from the so-called "tramp steamer." The German Naval64 authorities, on the other hand, averred65 that their reservation only applied66 to the large ships of the regular passenger services. However, this divergence67 of opinion only became important at a later date, and was not for the moment an obstacle to our proceedings69.
On the other hand, it was certainly unfortunate for us that up to the 31st January, 1917, neither of the two contending parties in Berlin were able to gain complete control in the matter of policy. I, myself, was never in favor of the submarine campaign, because I was convinced that it could not fulfil its avowed70 object, and would probably involve us in hostilities71 with the United States; but bad as this policy was, it would have been better to follow it consistently than to halt between two opinions.
The submarine campaign was in the end gradually and unwillingly73 sacrificed, owing to our desire to placate74 the United States. If we had made a clean sweep of it, once and for all, after the Lusitania incident, or, at any rate, after the sinking of the Arabic, as we actually did after the torpedoing of the Sussex, considerable advantages would have been gained from the diplomatic point of view. To my mind, there was now only one thing to be done—to abandon our pretensions75 that the submarine campaign was being conducted in accordance with the recognized principles of cruiser warfare, laid down by international law, and to offer compensation for the loss of the Lusitania and the Arabic. Having done this, we could then proceed to recall to the American Government Page 176 their oft-expressed original view of the freedom of the seas. As a matter of fact, immediately after the settlement of the Arabic incident, Mr. Lansing sent a peremptory Note to England. But the prospect of any favorable result for ourselves from this exchange of Notes was never fulfilled, as our methods of war at sea always resulted in fresh incidents and fresh conflicts. There was, of course, a second possibility: that is, while persisting in the submarine campaign to recognize that it was inevitably bound to lead to friction76 with America, and to discount all the ensuing consequences.
Neither of these two courses was consistently followed in our policy. We were for ever trying to square the circle, and to conduct a submarine campaign which should be from a military point of view effective, without at the same time leading to a breach77 with America. The order that "liners" should not be torpedoed under any circumstances was regarded simply as a piece of red tape, and not applicable to war conditions, as the submarine was not in a position to distinguish through its periscope78 between "liners" and other craft. We thus contrived79 at one and the same time to cripple our submarines, and yet to fail to give satisfaction to America. Probably the German Government did not venture in face of public opinion in the country to desist altogether from the use of submarines.
It has been said that "the freedom of the seas" was an unattainable ideal, a mere80 phrase, a red herring drawn across our track; but it was in reality none of these things. America attached to this phrase a definite and concrete meaning; namely, the abolition81 of the law of capture at sea, and I am convinced that after the World War America will yet fall out with England over this question, and will not rest till she has achieved her object. Certainly the original sin of the United States against Page 177 the spirit of neutrality lay in the fact that she suffered the violation82 of her admitted rights by England's interference with the reciprocal trade of the neutral States. Messrs. Wilson and House often talked with me about this matter of the law of capture at sea. It would be a complete misconception of American policy to deny that in this phrase, "the freedom of the seas," one of their dearest desires found expression.
When I informed Mr. Lansing confidentially at the end of August of the latest instructions to our submarine commanders, he was much gratified, but explained at once that the fact of its being confidential19 would deprive the information of all its value; something must, at all costs, be done to reassure84 public opinion. I could not but admit that the view of the Secretary of State was correct in this respect. The factor of public opinion obviously appeared of less importance in Berlin than in Washington; besides, I knew from experience that no secret could be kept in Washington for long, and that in a few days this, our first sign of yielding, would be common knowledge. I thought it best, therefore, to get the full diplomatic advantage from the new situation, and took it upon myself, on September 1st, to publish my instructions. This exercise of initiative got me a reprimand from Berlin, but I attained my object none the less, in that I avoided any immediate15 danger of war.
Concerning these negotiations the following correspondence took place with Berlin:
(1) Cipher
"Cedarhurst, August 30th, 1915.
"I have tried to wire reports to your Excellency by the route placed at our disposal, and inform you as to the progress of the negotiations between myself and Mr. Lansing over the Arabic incident. In consequence of the Page 178 instructions given to me and the information given by your Excellency to the Associated Press in Berlin, the general situation here has taken a turn for the better. The prospect of war is becoming more remote; there are signs of returning confidence on the Stock Exchange, and I have even succeeded in inducing the Press to see things in a more reasonable light.
"Thus up to the present, everything seems to be going well, and a rupture of diplomatic relations appears once more to be indefinitely postponed85. None the less, our difficulties are really much greater than at the time of the Lusitania incident. The American Government's intentions are undoubtedly86 peaceful, and the case of the Arabic, involving as it did the loss of only two American lives, may be said to be in itself comparatively unimportant. There are other factors, however, to be considered. Both the Government and the people are beginning to have shrewd suspicions, which for reasons of policy they refrain from expressing at present, that we cheated the United States in the matter of the Lusitania, that we spun87 out the discussion as long as possible, and then replied to President Wilson's last and most peremptory Note, by torpedoing the Arabic. I am convinced that Mr. Lansing, who is an able lawyer, and as a result of his American training alive to every possible move of an opponent, expects us to follow the same policy over the matter of the Arabic. He has thus no great confidence in our good faith, though the President, I am told, is more optimistic, his friend House having informed him that his policy of the 'freedom of the seas' commands general assent88 in Berlin. The facts of the situation, then, are that the President will not permit any procrastination89 in the negotiations over the Arabic affair, for should no more satisfactory conclusion be reached now than was the case after the Lusitania incident, Wilson would Page 179 forfeit90 the respect of his countrymen, and would have no other resource but to forego his cherished design with what face he might, or else break off diplomatic relations with Germany. There can be no doubt in the minds of any who are well versed91 in American affairs that he would elect for the latter course. The Spanish-American War arose out of just such a situation.
"The following conclusions result from the above: I gather from the Berlin reports of the Associated Press that your Excellency has decided to settle the present dispute with the United States on the lines which I have respectfully suggested to you. If this be so I urge the utmost expedition in the matter, that confidence here may be restored, and the way opened for negotiations with England. It is not so much a matter of making apologies or giving explanations, but rather of making a full statement to this Government as to the instructions given to our submarine commanders. If we can prove by this means that after the Lusitania incident, orders had been given to attack no passenger ships while negotiations with the United States were going on, or to do so only under certain conditions, all outstanding questions could be solved without difficulty."
(2) Cipher Dispatch
"Berlin, September 10th, 1915.
"Daily Telegraph of September 2nd publishes what purports92 to be extract from your aforesaid letter to Mr. Lansing, informing him of instructions issued to submarine commanders. Extract ends as follows:
"'I have no objection to your making any use you please of the above information.'
"If Daily Telegraph has reproduced your letter correctly, Page 180 above statement is contrary to instructions, which authorized you only to give information confidentially to American Government. Premature93 publication in American Press places us in difficult position here, especially as no official report of actual contents of your communication to Mr. Lansing has reached us. I beg that you will kindly94 furnish an explanation.
(Signed) Jagow."
(3) Cipher Report
"Cedarhurst, October 2nd, 1915.
"Reference your wire No. A 129 of September 10th, I ask your Excellency to be kind enough to pardon me for having taken upon myself to act on my own responsibility over the submarine question. The position at the end of August rendered some action to pacify95 public opinion imperative96, if a breach were to be avoided. Owing to the difficulties of communication with Berlin I could do nothing but acquaint Mr. Lansing with a portion of my instructions concerning the case of the Lusitania—the only ones which had then reached me. I at once reported my action to your Excellency in my wireless message, No. 179, and in a previous telegram, No. 165, and requested approval of my action; probably these messages have been delayed in transit97, or have not reached Berlin. In further explanation, I may add that in this country, confidential matter, in the European sense, does not exist, and such matter can never be kept a secret from the Press. Sometimes I have been able to come to an agreement with the Government over the wording of their communiqués to the Press; that is one of the great advantages of conducting the negotiations on the spot. Had the whole American Press entirely refused to accept Page 181 our official explanations, nothing further could have been done with the Government."
While my negotiations with Mr. Lansing in Washington for a simultaneous settlement of the Arabic and Lusitania questions were still in progress, a memorandum98 was handed to Mr. Gerard, the American Ambassador in Berlin which purported99 to justify100 the action of the offending submarine commanders. Thus the situation once more became acute. The contents of this document were as follows:
"On August 19th a German submarine held up the English steamer Dunele about sixty miles south of Kinsale, and having ordered the crew to leave the ship, were about to sink it by gun-fire when the commander observed a large steamer heading directly towards him. This latter, which afterwards proved to be the Arabic, bore no ensign, or other marks of neutrality, and was thus obviously an enemy. Approaching nearer, she altered her original course, and again made directly for the submarine thus leading the commander of the latter to suppose that she was about to attack and ram23 him. In order to parry this attack, the submarine dived and fired a torpedo1 which struck the ship. The submarine commander observed that those on board got away in fifteen boats.
"According to his instructions, the German commander was authorized to attack the Arabic without warning, and without allowing time for the rescue of her crew, in case of an attempt at flight or resistance. The action of the Arabic undoubtedly gave him good grounds for supposing that an attack on him was intended. He was the more inclined to this belief, by the fact that a few days before, on the 14th, he had been fired at from long range Page 182 by a large passenger steamer, apparently101 belonging to the British Royal Mail Steam Packet Company, which he saw in the Irish Sea, but which he had made no attempt to attack or hold up.
"The German Government deeply regrets that loss of life should have resulted from the action of this officer, and it desires that these sentiments should be conveyed more particularly to the Government of the United States, as American citizens were among the missing. No obligation to make compensation for the damage done can, however, be admitted, even on the hypothesis that the submarine commander mistook the intentions of the Arabic. In the event of an insoluble difference arising on this point between the German and American Governments, the German Government suggests that the matter in dispute should be referred to the Hague Tribunal as a question of international law, in accordance with Article 38 of the Hague convention for the peaceful solution of differences between nations; but it can do so only with this reservation, that the arbitrator's award shall not have the validity of a general decision as to the international legality or otherwise of the German submarine warfare."
The following three reports or telegrams dispatched by me to the Imperial Chancellor102 describe the situation in Washington at this juncture103:
(1) Cipher
"Washington, September 14th, 1915.
"Lansing has given me permission to wire you by this route, without the messages being seen by him; he will also forward your Excellency's reply, and from this it appears to be the Government's view, that any further exchange of Notes, the subsequent publication of which, Page 183 in both countries, would merely involve further misunderstandings, is bound to lead to a breach. It considers the present system of confidential negotiations with me as the only promising104 method of arriving at an agreement. The memorandum on the Arabic is not understood here, and in so far as it is understood, is considered to be a manifestation105 of German bad faith—a sign that we may perhaps give way in principle, but will always in practice seek to evade106 our obligations thus incurred107.
"Lest this telegram should, by its length, give offence to the British, Mr. Lansing is forwarding the evidence in the Arabic case to Mr. Gerard for transmission to your Excellency; he is himself quite convinced that the submarine commander was not compelled in self-defense to torpedo the Arabic, and that his action in so doing was therefore unjustified. He hopes that your Excellency will after study of the evidence, agree with him in this.
"To obtain full and complete agreement it is first of all necessary that I should be empowered to publish in full those instructions given to our submarine commanders in so far as these were not given in my previous summaries on the matter. If we still consider ourselves bound to maintain that the officer concerned in the Arabic case was only obeying orders, we can never hope to come to an agreement, for no one can possibly feel any confidence in the sincerity109 of our intentions. In the meantime I shall try to reach a settlement on the matters now in dispute by means of arbitration110. Finally, the question of compensation must, in accordance with my instructions for the Lusitania case, be referred to the Hague Tribunal.
"I am quite certain that if we fail to reach an agreement, severance111 of diplomatic relations cannot but follow.
"Lansing will not reply to the Arabic memorandum, and, as I said before, will conduct the diplomatic exchanges on this matter only through me. He considers Page 184 this as the only possible course on the ground that Wilson and I are alike committed to the policy of 'the freedom of the seas.'
"Finally, I may observe that everyone here would be much gratified if we could see our way to extend the scope of our latest instructions to our submarines so as to include all merchant shipping112. It is argued that these vessels113 are slow moving and could easily be warned; the advantage of acting114 without warning is only of importance in the case of swift passenger ships, which we have, none the less, undertaken not to attack without notice. The suggested proposal, therefore, could not harm us; it would, on the other hand, make us very popular here and give the United States a very strong position in her negotiations with England. Of course, I may be able to effect an agreement without this. The main point in dispute is the verdict on the action of the commander in the Arabic case, because this involves the whole question of our good faith. Anyway, there is no doubt whatever that a second Arabic case is bound to result in war."
(2) Cipher Telegram
"Cedarhurst, September 22nd, 1915.
"As position is still very difficult, I am carrying on conversations in strict confidence through personal friend of Wilson's. Request, therefore, that no directions be sent as regards question of responsibility for Arabic incident, till your Excellency hears again from me. Lansing at present gone on leave. Personally I do not believe that I shall manage to secure International Commission of Inquiry115. According to present view, main point of dispute is question of disavowing action of submarine commander. I hope, however, that after reviewing American evidence, your Excellency will be able to find formula for Page 185 such disavowal, agreeable to both Governments, especially if I can get concurrence116 of Wilson before press gets hold of it. Request, therefore, that American correspondents in Germany be told nothing more than that American evidence being carefully gone into in Berlin."
(3) Cipher Report
"Cedarhurst, September 28th, 1915.
"The negotiations about the submarine campaign are at a standstill at present. From the fact that Lansing has not been recalled from leave and that President Wilson does not seem over-eager to give an opinion on the proposals which I have put forward for his consideration, I consider myself justified in concluding that the Americans do not consider the situation to be any longer critical. Even the Press is no longer agitated117, as in all recent cases of attack by German submarines. Their commanders have acted quite in accordance with our assurances. Under these circumstances Mr. Wilson may possibly fall in with our proposal that the particular case of the Arabic should be dealt with by an International Commission of Inquiry. In any case, some means must be found of finishing once for all with the Arabic and Lusitania incidents; only then shall we be in a position to see whether President Wilson will keep his word, and take energetic measures vis à vis England.
"The Anglo-French Loan Commission, assisted by their agency, the Morgan group, are working at high pressure. Stories of Allied118 victories in Europe are sedulously119 spread abroad in order to enlist120 the support of public opinion. Despite these efforts the commission found Chicago so invincibly121 hostile that they were compelled to proceed there in person, but they will probably, in any case, manage to raise a loan, as the Morgan group Page 186 are quite strong enough for the purpose. The rate of interest they are demanding is very high, as up till now they have financed all English purchases here. By these means, they are, no doubt, making considerable profits, but in order to secure them, they will, of course consolidate122 their floating debt and unload it on to the public. The only question is to what extent they will be able to do this. Opinion varies as to the size of England's present debt; a prominent banker here, in close touch with the Morgan group, estimated the total to 500,000,000 dollars; if this estimate is correct, a loan of 500,000,000 dollars would only just cover the liabilities hitherto existing.
"The Morgan group certainly had to make two great concessions: first, that the proceeds of the new loan shall not be employed for the purchase of munitions124, and second, that Russia shall be excluded from the loan; only by these means could they overcome the opposition125 of the German-Americans and the Jews. Our Jewish friends here are in no easy position. Their action, or rather inaction, takes the form of what is commonly known as 'egg-dancing,' or 'pussyfooting'; they wish to stand well with all sides, but have not the courage of their convictions, and are very anxious to make money. All this is very easily understood, when one remembers the ambiguous position of these gentlemen. A regular devil's dance around the 'Golden calf126' is now going on here. All the European Governments are coming to buy in the American market, and usually paying double for their goods, as they only purchase what they urgently need. One lesson we may learn for future reference from the present state of affairs, and that is that we must not allow ourselves again to be left to the tender mercies of the German-Jew bankers here. After the war, we must have branches of our large banks in New York just as we Page 187 have in London. All evidence goes to show that New York will then be the center of world-finance, and we should, therefore, take all steps to act on this assumption as soon as possible."
The Foreign Office in Berlin, who naturally wished to avoid a rupture with the United States, accordingly dispatched to me the following telegraphic instructions:
"We have no doubt that in this instance submarine commander believed Arabic intended to ram and had every reason for such belief. However, German Government prepared to give credence127 to sworn evidence of English officers of Arabic and agree that in reality no such intention existed.
"Attack of submarine thus was unfortunately not in accordance with instructions; communication to this effect will be made to commander. German Government is for sake of final settlement by friendly agreement prepared without admission of responsibility from point of view of international law, to give indemnification for death of American citizens. Your Excellency is empowered to notify American Government of above, and to negotiate with them in case of acceptance concerning amount of compensation, subject to our concurrence. Confidently expect that incident will thus be finally liquidated128, as above is limit of possible concessions."
"The American Government during verbal negotiations with me on this matter considered it essential that a phrase expressing Germany's disapproval129 of the commander's action should be incorporated in the explanation which I proposed to publish. I was not sure whether I was really authorized by the above instructions to comply with this condition, but in view of the fact that it was the only hope of avoiding a breach and further Page 188 delay in the negotiations would profit us nothing, as we were bound to make some sort of reply to the American demand within a certain definite time, I acted once more on my own responsibility and gave the following explanation to Mr. Lansing:
"The Government of his Majesty130 the Kaiser, in its orders with which I previously131 made you acquainted, has so framed its instructions to its submarine commanders as to avoid any repetition of incidents such as that of the Arabic. According to the report of the officer who sank the Arabic and his sworn evidence, together with that of his crew, this commander believed that the Arabic intended to ram the submarine. On the other hand, the Imperial Government does not desire to call in question the good faith of the English officers of the Arabic, who have given evidence on oath that the Arabic had no intention of ramming132. The action of the submarine was therefore contrary to orders, and the Imperial Government both disapproves133 of it and regrets it. A communication to this effect has been made to the officer in question. Under these circumstances my Government is prepared to give compensation for the lives of American subjects drowned, to their great regret, in the Arabic. I am empowered to discuss with you the amount of this compensation."
The above explanation finally resolved the second crisis. The German naval authorities naturally complained of my action, as the "disapproval" stuck in their throats, and I was once more taken to task—a matter which weighed little with me. For I felt that my interpretation134 of the instructions from the Foreign Office was the only one which could have saved us from war, and that now the road was open for the final settlement of the Page 189 Lusitania incident and the discussion of the great question of "the freedom of the seas." The outlook for us was most promising. Opinion in America as a result of the solution of the Arabic question was once more favorable to us. A leading American paper, the New York Sun, said at this time in its leading article:
"The successful issue of the conversations with Germany over the submarine campaign cannot fail to be of benefit to an nations, as a proof of the possibilities of diplomacy135 as against war. It has been a personal triumph for both the participants, President Wilson and Count Bernstorff."
The position of both men has been much strengthened thereby136, and what they have already achieved is no doubt only a presage137 of still greater results in the future.
The following four reports to the Foreign Office deal with the settlement of the Arabic case:
(1) Cipher
"Cedarhurst, October 6th, 1915.
"The settlement of the Arabic case reported to your Excellency in my wire, has caused great satisfaction in all circles here. Of course a few avowedly138 Anglophile papers, such as the New York Herald139 and the New York Tribune, reveal the cloven hoof140, and are clearly disappointed that a rupture of diplomatic relations between America and Germany has been averted142; for the rest, at no time since the outbreak of war have we had such a good Press as at this moment.
"History alone will be in a position to say whether the settlement of the Arabic case really prevented a war with the United States or not; but your Excellency knows my Page 190 views that without this settlement a conflict must eventually have become inevitable143. I respectfully submit that the preservation144 of peace alone was a sufficient motive145 to induce us to come to terms; but you also know that this was by no means my sole object. I wished also to induce the Government of the United States to take energetic proceedings against England, with the object of translating into fact its idea of the freedom of the seas. I trust we shall not be disappointed in this regard, and I shall, certainly, leave no stone unturned to keep Mr. Wilson on the right path. Whatever may be one's personal opinion of the President, whether one believes him to be really neutrally-minded, or not, his great services to the cause of peace cannot be denied. A Republican President would certainly not have stood up, as he has done, against the united forces of anti-Germanism represented by Wall Street, the Press, and so-called Society.
"At the present moment it looks as if the American Government are ready to let the Lusitania matter drop altogether, provided we agree to refer the question of compensation to the Hague Tribunal after the war. The general belief here is that judicial146 proceedings are out of the question during the continuance of hostilities. At least I gather as much, indirectly147, of course, from one of the President's friends."
(2) Cipher
"Cedarhurst, October 15th, 1915.
"I much regret that owing to a mistake on the part of the State Department, your Excellency was not earlier informed of the settlement of the submarine question. Mr. Lansing left my letter, which should have accompanied the telegram, in his writing-table by mistake, for which oversight148 he afterwards apologized to me. The Imperial Embassy was in no way to blame.
Page 191 "The importance attached by the President, from the very first, to those main points on which we were unable to make concessions rendered the task of arriving at an agreement by no means an easy one. Thus on three of the most important points no agreement has been reached and over these we must, for the present, draw the veil. Only a few of the most rabid of the pro-English papers venture openly to reproach President Wilson with having achieved nothing but the security of passenger-ships, but all Americans are prepared to admit in confidence that the Government has completely departed from its original position.
"The three important questions still in dispute, as mentioned above, are the following:
"(1) The German Government's responsibility for American lives lost in the torpedoing of British Ships.
"(2) The responsibility for the payment of compensation for the American lives so lost.
"(3) The American demand that all merchant ships should be warned by our submarines before being attacked.
"This demand was at first so worded as to imply that submarines, like other warships149, had only the right of search.
"The Government, realizing that we could not make concessions on the above three points, had to be content with our admission that the case of the Arabic should be regarded as exceptional. This very fast rendered it impossible to reach a similar settlement in the case of the Lusitania, in which no error on the part of the submarine commander concerned could be adduced. However, the Government seemed to be only too satisfied to have come so well out of their difficulties, and have no wish to raise Page 192 any further obstacles because of the Lusitania incident. This matter, as I have already had the honor to report, may now well be left to drag on indefinitely, and can be referred in the end to the Hague Tribunal after the war. Our Press should, therefore, be warned that further discussion of the controversy150 between Germany and America over the submarine campaign is undesirable151."
(3) Cipher
"Cedarhurst, October 20th, 1915.
"Your Excellency's last wireless requested me to render a report on the settlement of the Arabic question. I have already complied with these instructions, and the documents are now on their way to you, and should have reached you. However, it may be advisable to explain briefly152 the more important points of the matter.
"From the date of the sinking of the Lusitania, America has always been on the verge68 of breaking off diplomatic relations with us. The German people, I am convinced, have no idea of the full danger of the situation, at least, if one may judge from our Press. On two occasions we were compelled to sacrifice individuals in order to avoid a breach, Dernburg and Dumba being our scapegoats153. Their mistakes would under normal circumstances have been overlooked, but their removal was at the time necessary in order to give the American Government the opportunity of showing its strength without breaking off diplomatic relations with us.
"As I have more than once explained in my reports, no solution of the Lusitania question, agreeable to the Americans, could be found, so long as we were not prepared to admit the responsibility of the Imperial Government for the disaster, or its obligation to make reparation, and so long as our views on the principles of Page 193 submarine warfare differed from those held by the American Government.
"By dint154 of drawing out the negotiations as long as possible, and by the employment of all my persuasive155 powers, I succeeded in tiding over the moment of acute tension. Then came the incident of the Arabic. My laboriously156 constructed diplomatic edifice158 came tumbling about my ears, and things looked blacker than ever. The American Government regarded the Arabic incident most seriously, believing as they did that it was typical of the whole German policy vis-à-vis America. They argued that either the whole affair had been prearranged as a manifestation of our intention to have our own way in the matter of submarine warfare, or else it was a blunder which could be dealt with in the ordinary course of diplomacy. Negotiation5 became possible when your Excellency notified this Government that satisfaction would be given in the event of the submarine commander being proved to have acted contrary to his instructions. Further negotiations followed on this basis, and it was finally agreed that we should admit the exceptional nature of the Arabic case, without yielding our ground on the main points. Such agreement would have been impossible had President Wilson adhered to his previous position, but he wished to have done with the whole business, and could only do so by throwing dust in the eyes of the American public. He hoped by these means to get rid of the Lusitania incident unostentatiously, and told me, through one of his personal friends, 'to let it drift.' The idea at the back of his mind is that it shall be left to an international tribunal sitting after the war, to decide whether we shall pay compensation or not.
"The only really important question as regards the settlement of the Arabic case, is whether it is worth while for us to risk a rupture of relations with the United Page 194 States, for the sake of this affair. I still persist in my opinion, that it would infallibly have led us into a new war."
(4) Cipher
"Washington, 1st November, 1915.
"Your Excellency's last wire on the matter of the submarine campaign raises two points of the highest importance.
"First, as to Wilson's policy of the 'freedom of the seas;' this has been the idea underlying159 all our recent negotiations over the submarine warfare. Our agreement with this policy has been constantly emphasized in all my conversations with leading men here; but it is of course necessary carefully to choose our moment for the public declaration of our agreement with Wilson's point of view, as people here naturally fear that if England believes us to be behind any agitation160 for the freedom of the seas she will resist it all the more firmly. I respectfully recommend, therefore, that we should leave Mr. Wilson to carry on his present controversy with England, for the present at all events, unaided. We shall lose nothing by so doing, and if an opportunity comes for our participation, we can make use of it.
"After this expression of opinion, let me pass on to the second point I have always clearly stated here, that we reserve to ourselves full liberty of decision, if England refuses to receive our advances. At present, now that the Arabic case has been recognized as exceptional, this 'freedom' is only being encroached upon from one direction as we have undertaken not to sink passenger ships without warning, etc. By this undertaking161 we must abide, unless we wish to go to war with the United States of America. Any future destruction of passenger ships with Americans on board, especially if such took place Page 195 without warning, and with the approval of the Imperial Government, would inevitably cause a rupture."
The political sky in the United States was thus becoming more propitious162 day by day; but our enemies' exertions163 for the purpose of undermining the present friendly relations, redoubled in proportion. The German Embassy became the chief object of attack, owing to the fact being clearly realized by our foes164, that so long as its influence in Washington political circles remained unimpaired, no rupture of diplomatic relations could be hoped for. Entente165 diplomacy left no stone unturned which could be of service against us; lies, robbery, personal defamation166, gossip, were all used to discredit167 us.
The conduct of a British officer on duty in Washington affords a good example of the unscrupulous policy of our foes. According to the evidence of Dr. Fuehr, this gentleman, now holding a high position in London, attempted in the early months of 1916 to corrupt168 a messenger of our Press Bureau in New York, one Alfred Hoff, whose daily duty it was to take newspaper cuttings to Councillor Albert's office. Two of his people stopped this boy in the street and invited him to the British Consular169 offices; here he was received by the Captain himself, who showed him a bag filled with bank notes and promised him a liberal reward, if he would undertake to obtain some letters from Dr. Fuehr's desk. Hoff pretended to fall in with this suggestion, but at once informed his employer of the incident. The Captain then made a second effort to bribe170 Hoff by the promise of a money reward for every document from the Press Bureau, and also a ride in a motor for the letters which it was his duty to take from the Bureau to the German Embassy at Cedarhurst, during the coming summer. One of the British agents told Hoff that he would be well paid if he handed over the letters of Dr. Fuehr, which he often Page 196 used to seal and frank, and also certain other documents of a specially48 confidential nature. Dr. Fuehr finally put an end to this unsavory episode, which had been fully17 investigated by private detectives, by publishing a detailed171 account of the whole affair in the Hearst papers. At the same time he brought the matter before the Public Prosecutor172, who, however, was unwilling72 to interfere83 in the matter unless it should be further discussed in the Press. This limited comprehension of duty Dr. Fuehr could hardly be expected to agree with.
During my encounters at this time with the Entente, I entirely lost any respect I may previously have felt for their moral character, which was reputed to be so high. I came then to realize that we could expect nothing better from them in the hour of our defeat, than a Peace of Versailles, which would make of no account all their earlier loftier professions. We, in Washington, were therefore, in duty bound, to strain every nerve to avert141 such a catastrophe173 to our country. Unfortunately the activities of the agents dispatched from home invariably deranged174 our plans in a most unfortunate manner, and, while affording our foes the desired opportunities for damaging our cause, achieved nothing of advantage in compensation. The English Secret Police, and all the detective agencies of the United States which were in their pay, were always at our heels, endeavoring to establish some collusion on the part of the German Embassy in these isolated175 cases of sabotage176. However, all this subterranean177 plotting and counter-plotting was but so much lost labor157. It was the decision on the policy of continuing or not continuing the submarine campaign which finally turned the scale.
At the beginning of August one of these agents managed to steal a portfolio178 of documents from Councillor Albert while he was traveling on the New York elevated Page 197 railway, and its contents were published in the World from the 15th of August onwards. We always thought the perpetrator of this theft was an Entente agent, but it now appears from Senator Frelinghuysen's evidence before the Senate Committee of Enquiry on 13th July, 1919, that the guilty individual was really a member of the American Secret Police. It would certainly have been an unheard-of thing for an American agent to have robbed a member of the diplomatic corps179 and sold the proceeds of his deed to the Press. Probably what really happened was that the man was in the pay of the Entente. The investigations180 at the Senate Committee disclosed a number of cases of corruption182 and theft which the agents of the Entente did not scruple183 to use in their efforts to compromise and discredit the German Embassy; so this supposition is in itself by no means improbable. The affair was merely a storm in a tea-cup; the papers as published afforded no evidence of any action either illegal or dishonorable; otherwise the American Government would certainly have demanded the recall of Albert as they did later in other cases. The Press manufactured a considerable sensation out of the contents of the portfolio, but generally speaking the efforts of the Entente in this affair proved completely without effect.
The Entente agents, however, were more successful in their next attack, to which the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador fell a victim. Dumba had already in the winter of 1914-15 recommended to me the American war correspondent James Archibald, who had been at the Austro-Hungarian Front, as having German sympathies. Thereupon I also recommended this gentleman in Berlin, where he was granted all facilities. In the Summer of 1915 Archibald returned to America, to lecture on his experiences. As he was anti-Entente, these lectures brought us financial profit, and therefore we paid Archibald's traveling Page 198 expenses. At the beginning of September, 1915, he went once more to Europe, and dined on the eve of his departure with Dumba and myself on the roof-garden of the Ritz-Carlton Hotel in New York. By this means our personal connection with Archibald was openly recognized. The Austro-Hungarian Ambassador, confiding184 in his character and his American nationality, gave him certain political reports which were not even in cipher, to take to Vienna. Archibald had also offered to take papers to Berlin for me. I, however, declined with thanks, as I scented185 danger, and I would have warned Dumba also, if I had known that he intended to entrust186 dispatches to Archibald. The English seized the latter in Kirkwall and took away all his papers.
Since then I have never set eyes on Archibald, and I could not help suspecting that there was something uncanny about the case. By arresting Archibald the English undoubtedly thought they would compromise me. I cannot prove that there was anything wrong with Archibald, but in all the circumstances he could easily have destroyed the papers, had he wished to do so. In the meanwhile a report was found among the dispatches of the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador transmitting to his Government a memorandum from the Hungarian journalist, Warm. In this note Warm recommended propaganda to induce a strike among the Hungarian workers in arms and munitions factories, and demanded money for this object.
The statement of Dumba's report that the Ambassador had shown the suggestion to Captain von Papen, who had thought it very valuable, was very compromising for us.
The German Military Attaché was therefore placed in an awkward position; the letter contained several other blazing indiscretions. Thus, for instance, in one paper Dumba described President Wilson as self-willed, and Page 199 von Papen in a letter to his wife spoke187 of the "imbecile Yankees."
As I previously mentioned, the position of the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador was much shaken by the Dumba-Bryan episode. His defence, that he had only forwarded the note of an Hungarian journalist, without identifying himself with it, was not favorably received by the American Government. A few days later his passport was presented to him; at the same time the Entente granted him a safe conduct.
Previous to his departure from New York similar scenes took place to those which followed the sinking of the Lusitania.
The Hotel St. Regis, in which the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador lived, was surrounded day and night by innumerable reporters.
When I called on him there to take leave of him, I had to make use of a back entrance to the hotel in order to avoid numerous impertinent questions. Dumba himself was followed at every step by reporters, who among other things often chased him for hours on end in motor-cars.
In the meanwhile Rintelen (mentioned in the fifth chapter) had been taken prisoner in England. Further, the case of Fay led to a disagreeable discussion in public, and lastly action was taken against the Hamburg-Amerika Line for supplying our squadron of cruisers with coal and provisions. Thus it was easy for the Entente agents to establish connection between these offenders188 and the Military and Naval Attachés of the German Embassy. How far these gentlemen were really implicated189 I did not know at the time, nor do I now. In this they must plead their own case. As far as I am concerned both gentlemen always denied that they in any way transgressed190 against the American law. It cannot, Page 200 however, be denied that they were, in fact, compromised by their relations with these guilty parties; I do not think that anything beyond this can be authenticated191.
Captain von Papen's reputation, therefore, suffered from the time of the Dumba-Archibald incident; both he and Captain Boy-Ed were constantly attacked in the anti-German Press, and accused of being behind every fire and every strike in any munition123 factory in the United States. The New York Herald and the Providence192 Journal took the leading parts in this business. At the same time a campaign was begun against the German-Americans, who were accused of being practically without exception disloyal citizens of the United States. All the various incidents, accusations193, so-called conspiracies194, etc., were grist to the Entente's mill, and were exploited to the full. Congress was about to assemble, and it was therefore to be expected that the Government would take steps to strengthen its position.
Mr. Lansing asked me on 1st December to call on him and informed me that the American Government had requested that von Papen and Boy-Ed should be recalled, as they were no longer person? grat?!
To my inquiry as to the reasons for this action, Lansing refused to reply; he merely remarked that any Government was within its rights in simply stating that a member of a diplomatic corps was not persona grata. In the course of further conversation, however, I discovered one thing at least, that Capt. Boy-Ed was supposed to have been conspiring195 with the Mexican General Huerta—an obviously baseless charge, considering that Boy-Ed had never made the acquaintance of the ex-President. It is true, however, that Rintelen had had dealings with Huerta, and it was known that Rintelen had received from Boy-Ed the sum of half a million dollars previously mentioned.
Page 201 My first message—written in English—to Berlin on this affair ran as follows:
Cipher Message
"Washington, 4th December, 1915.
"In an official Note of to-day's date American Government, as stated in previous conversations with me, request immediate recall of Military and Naval Attachés, on the ground of various facts brought to notice of Government, particularly implication of these Attachés in illegal and doubtful activities of certain individuals within United States. Government deeply regrets necessity for this step, and trusts Imperial Government will understand that no other course seems to them to be compatible with the interests of the two Governments and their reciprocal friendly relations."
I also telegraphed as follows to my Government on September 5th:
"Explanations of von Papen and Boy-Ed herewith as requested by Military and Naval Authorities:
"'State Department request my recall. Reasons for this given to Ambassador. Case of Stegler and my two supposed meetings with Huerta. Stegler case settled since March. Stegler in matter of his pass proved a liar196. Had nothing to do with his transactions; not the least proof that I ever had; see my report No. 4605, March 20th, and others. I have never in my life met Huerta; I have never concerned myself with Mexican affairs in any way; I have never to my knowledge acted contrary to the interests or laws of the United States. Conjectures197 and absurd newspaper stories about me result of English Page 202 influence and money. Must therefore request my recall be considered unjustifiable.
"'Boy-En.'
"'No illegal action can be laid to my charge; demand for recall unjustified. Importance of military interests of our enemies here renders necessary effective representation of Central Powers, so long as America officially neutral. Therefore it should be insisted on that American Government secure safe-conduct for my successor.
"'Papen.'"
In view of the approaching session of Congress, the Government, on December 5th, published the fact that they had demanded the recall of the Attaches. This fact, with slight foundation for the American Government's suspicions, made a bad impression in Berlin; I went therefore, to see Mr. Lansing on December 8th, and obtained from him this letter:
"As I have already stated, the demand for recall of the two Attachés of your Embassy was made as a result of the careful investigation181 of a number of facts and circumstances, which convinced this Government that they could no longer consider these two officers as person? grat?, and that their continued residence in the United States was, therefore, no longer compatible with diplomatic propriety198. This being the considered and deliberate view of this Government, it would seem that the mere fact of Captains von Papen and Boy-Ed being no longer acceptable, should have been sufficient justification199 for their immediate recall by the German Government without further discussion. The expectations of the United States Government, in this respect, were in accordance with all diplomatic precedent200 in cases where such requests Page 203 have been made, and there seemed to be, therefore, no reason why this demand should have been kept a secret. It is regretted that the Imperial Government should have regarded the publication of the American request as an act of discourtesy towards itself. The United States Government does not share this view of its action, and, therefore, cannot be expected to express its regret for having acted as it has done.
"This Government is surprised that the Imperial Government should not have complied at once with its request for the recall of the two Attachés, who are no longer person? grat? here. It seems to me obvious that whatever may have been the reasons for such request, it is for this Government, and not for the German Government, to say whether the charges alleged201 against the members of a German diplomatic mission appear sufficiently202 well-founded to justify action such as that now taken. In other words, the causes of the demand are legitimate and sufficient, as being based on suppositions or suspicions of undesirable activities on the part of these two officers.
"In any case, the fact remains203, that Boy-Ed and von Papen are no longer acceptable to this Government.
"As I already apprised204 you by word of mouth, and in my letter of 4th of this month, the relations of the two Attachés with individuals who participated in illegal and questionable205 activities, are established. The names of von Wedell, Rintelen, Stegler, Bur?de, Archibald and Fay may be mentioned as some of those who have transgressed against our laws. I could also name other men and cite other examples of their activities, but as these are at present the object of an official inquiry, I, by this means, should only prevent the arrest of those who violated our laws and still continue to violate them.
"Although I have already said that this Government Page 204 does not want to do anything further than to request the recall of Boy-Ed and von Papen, since they are no longer person? grat?, I, nevertheless, do not desire to go beyond the above declaration; so that your Government may be in a position to institute an inquiry into the manner of dealing16 with your Attachés, should it wish to do so. If I should go into further details on this matter I might interfere with the inquiry which is now being taken up by this Government, dry up very valuable sources of information, and thus hinder the course of justice. On the other hand there might thus be raised other grounds for suspicion, serving rather to disturb than to improve the present friendly relations between the two countries. I need not tell your Excellency, that it is the sincere wish of this Government to avoid difficulties of this kind, so far as may be consistent with its dignity and its responsibilities."
Besides dispatching a copy of the above letter, I wired to Berlin on 8th December, as follows:
Cipher
"Convinced that Rintelen is the main cause of the Attachés' recall. Immediate categorical disavowal is absolutely necessary. Only possible connection with us is matter of 500,000 dollars, received from the Naval Attaché and demanded for the exportation of goods."
Thereupon I received the following wireless message in English:
Cipher
"You are empowered to disclaim206 connection with Rintelen, who had no orders to do anything whatsoever207, which was an offence against the American law.
"Jagow."
Page 205 The peculiar208 relations of the Naval and Military Attachés with the Embassy had, even in times of peace, often led to diplomatic difficulties. For instance, it has often happened to us and to other countries to have to recall Military or Naval Attachés for spying. The diplomatic standing53 of the head of the Mission would not generally be affected209 thereby, but, in view of the passions of wartime, and the general tension of nerves, I realized that I might be compromised by the demand for the recall of the Attachés. I questioned Lansing outright210 on this point, and added that I should immediately hand in to my Government my resignation, if I was considered to be myself "tarred with the same brush." The Secretary of State assured me that I was by no means involved, and that I should not on any account give up my post, since I had to carry on the momentous211 negotiations now in course, and the American Government had full confidence in me. Under the circumstances I saw no reason why the enforced recall of the Attachés should have any further results, and I was confirmed in this view a few days later when House repeated to me Lansing's assurance with even greater emphasis. His exact words were as follows:
"You must not dream of going home before peace is declared. You are the one tie that still binds212 us to Germany. If this tie should break, war would be inevitable."
Both Attachés returned to Berlin under safe-conduct from the Entente at the end of December, 1915. Their offices were taken over by their representatives, but only for the purpose of settling up any outstanding matters.
At the beginning of 1916, there was in the United States no single German organization which merited the name of "propaganda." Thus no activities which could compromise us in any way ensued henceforward.
Page 206 The political situation had become so serene213 that we had no need for propaganda. The pacifist elements in the United States did this work for us. The only question was as to whether we would remain really at one with them, or whether we meant to persist in submarine warfare, which must inevitably lead us into war.
President Wilson opened Congress on 7th December, 1915, with a message, in which he set forth214 the new programme for national defence. "Preparedness" became the order of the day in the United States. The message demanded that the Army and Navy should be increased, and added:
"The urgent question of our mercantile and passenger shipping is closely connected with the problem of national supply. The full development of our national industries, which is of such vital importance to the nation, pressingly calls for a large commercial fleet. It is high time to make good our deficiencies on this head and to restore the independence of our commerce on the high seas."
In this message may be recognized the second important point in the Presidential programme for the next election. "Peace and Preparedness" was to be the battle-cry of the Democratic Party. The Mexican imbroglio215 of 1913-14 had proved that the armed forces of the United States were unequal even to the demands of a comparatively small campaign; and the American Government, for lack of means, had been unable to impose its will on Mexico. Now the European War stirred all imaginations and offered a favorable occasion for overcoming the prejudices of the pacifist section against military armaments. It was not so long since the song "I didn't raise my boy to be a soldier," was sung with fervor216 all the land over; but now events had too clearly proved the powerlessness of any but well-armed nations Page 207 even to follow their own lines of policy; and the necessity of a mercantile marine10 of their own grew daily clearer to the people of the United States. Hitherto the Americans had always found enough of foreign vessels for the transport of their goods, had found it cheaper to make use of these facilities than to supply their own under the conditions existing in the States. Now, however, the shortage of merchant tonnage was acute, and American goods were piled roof high in all the warehouses217 of New York harbor. It was clear that now or never was the time to seize the chance afforded by the war of persuading Congress to sanction the provision of a strong Army and Fleet.
The Presidential message also touched on the "conspiracies," but without any mention of the German Embassy's supposed share in them. The period of these so-called "conspiracies" thus closed with a sharp reprimand addressed by Mr. Wilson to the German-Americans, and with my official recommendation to the Germans in the United States to abstain218 from all forms of illegal action. The after-effects of this period, however, may be traced in the subsequent lengthy219 trials of the various offenders. I cannot be sure that since the beginning of 1916, not one single incident which could be comprised under the term "conspiracy220" came to light; but these trials and Entente propaganda kept the recollection of such affairs alive, and the American war propaganda service had no difficulty subsequently in retelling the old tales which, but for the entry of the United States into the war, would have passed into oblivion.
The paragraphs of the message dealing with this subject ran as follows:
"We are at peace with all the nations of the world, and there is reason to hope that no question in controversy Page 208 between this and other Governments will lead to any serious breach of amicable221 relations, grave as some differences of attitude and policy have been and may yet turn out to be. I am sorry to say that the gravest threats against our national peace and safety have been uttered within our own borders. There are citizens of the United States, I blush to admit, born under other flags, but welcomed by under our generous naturalization laws to the full freedom and opportunity of America, who have poured the poison of disloyalty into the very arteries222 of our national life; who have sought to bring the authority and good name of our Government into contempt, to destroy our industries wherever they thought it effective for their vindictive223 purposes to strike at them, and to debase our politics to the uses of foreign intrigue224. Their number is not great as compared with the whole number of those sturdy hosts by which our nation has been enriched in recent generations out of virile225 foreign stocks; but it is great enough to have brought deep disgrace upon us and to have made it necessary that we should promptly226 make use of processes of law by which we may be purged227 of their corrupt distempers.
"But the ugly and incredible thing has actually come about and we are without adequate federal laws to deal with it. I urge you to enact228 such laws at the earliest possible moment, and feel that in doing so I am urging you to do nothing less than save the honor and self-respect of the nation. Such creatures of passion, disloyalty and anarchy229 must be crushed out. They are not many, but they are infinitely230 malignant231, and the hand of our power should close over them at once. They have formed plots to destroy property, they have entered into conspiracies against the neutrality of the Government, they have sought to pry232 into every confidential transaction of the Government in order to serve interests alien to our own. Page 209 It is possible to deal with these things very effectually. I need not suggest the terms in which they may be dealt with."
The message, up to a point, maintained an impartial233 attitude, for it not only blamed the German-Americans but continued in the following words, aimed solely234 at the many Americans in London and Paris who disapproved235 of Wilson's policy of peace and neutrality:
"I wish that it could be said that only a few men, misled by mistaken sentiments of allegiance to the governments under which they were born, had been guilty of disturbing the self-possession and misrepresenting the temper and principles of the country during these days of terrible war, when it would seem that every man who was truly an American would instinctively236 make it his duty and his pride to keep the scales of judgment237 even and prove himself a partisan238 of no nation but his own. But it cannot. There are some men among us, and many resident abroad who, though born and bred in the United States and calling themselves Americans, have so forgotten themselves and their honor as citizens as to put their passionate239 sympathy with one or the other side in the great European conflict above their regard for the peace and dignity of the United States. They also preach and practise disloyalty. No laws, I suppose, can reach corruptions240 of the mind and heart; but I should not speak of others without also speaking of these and expressing the even deeper humiliation241 and scorn which every self-possessed and thoughtfully patriotic242 American must feel when he thinks of them and of the discredit they are daily bringing upon us."
About the turn of the year 1915-16, the severance of diplomatic relations between the American and Austro-Hungarian Page 210 Governments had become imminent243. The Italian liner Ancona was torpedoed on November 7th in the Mediterranean244 Sea by an Austro-Hungarian submarine and went down before all the passengers could succeed in escaping; many lives were lost, American citizens being among them. In consequence, the Washington Government dispatched to Vienna a Note couched in far stronger terms than any it had yet sent; demanding that the action should be admitted to be unlawful and inexcusable, that compensation should be made, and that the officer responsible should be punished for his deed, which would be branded by the whole world as inhuman245 and barbarous, and would incur108 the abhorrence246 of all civilized247 nations.
The Austro-Hungarian representative, Baron248 Zwiedeeneck von Suedenhorst, found himself in an extremely difficult position. Owing to the fact that he only ranked as chargé d'affaires, and that his appointment only dated from Dr. Dumba's departure, he was not empowered to enter into negotiations. He had always proved himself a very loyal colleague and acted in close co-operation with me, but in this instance, as the matter was one solely for Vienna's decision, I could be of little service to him. I counselled him to telegraph frankly249 to his Government, that if the American demands were not conceded, a breach was to be expected. I was myself inclined to believe that, as in the case of our Naval and Military Attachés, Mr. Wilson's real purpose was to give the lie to those accusations of weakness which the Entente party was constantly casting in his teeth, and this, I thought, accounted for the unwonted sternness of the American Note, which seemed absolutely to challenge a rupture. It was not conceivable that the Austrian Government could swallow this bitter pill, while from the point of view of the American Government, the breaking-off of relations would be a real Page 211 diplomatic victory; for on the one hand the political situation would remain unchanged so long as the German Embassy was in Washington, and on the other hand, Mr. Wilson would have achieved his object and shown the Berlin Government that his threats of war were seriously meant.
However, the Austro-Hungarian Government, after a short further exchange of Notes, complied under protest with the American demands. I learned after my return home that in so doing, they acted under pressure from the German Foreign Office. Thus, this crisis also blew over, not, however, without a serious loss of prestige for the Central Powers, who had been compelled to yield to demands generally regarded as utterly250 unacceptable. Nothing could be more fatal to our position in the world than this alternation of defiance251 and submission252, which served no diplomatic object and merely betrayed infirmity of purpose.
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1
torpedo
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| n.水雷，地雷；v.用鱼雷破坏 | |
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2
torpedoing
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| 用爆破筒爆破 | |
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3
inevitably
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| adv.不可避免地；必然发生地 | |
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negotiations
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| 协商( negotiation的名词复数 )； 谈判； 完成（难事）； 通过 | |
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negotiation
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| n.谈判，协商 | |
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impasse
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| n.僵局；死路 | |
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cipher
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| n.零；无影响力的人；密码 | |
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accomplished
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| adj.有才艺的；有造诣的；达到了的 | |
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belligerents
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| n.交战的一方（指国家、集团或个人）( belligerent的名词复数 ) | |
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marine
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| adj.海的；海生的；航海的；海事的；n.水兵 | |
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participation
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| n.参与，参加，分享 | |
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eventual
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| adj.最后的，结局的，最终的 | |
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ascertain
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| vt.发现，确定，查明，弄清 | |
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14
insufficient
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| adj.(for，of)不足的，不够的 | |
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immediate
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| adj.立即的；直接的，最接近的；紧靠的 | |
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dealing
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| n.经商方法，待人态度 | |
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fully
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| adv.完全地，全部地，彻底地；充分地 | |
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confidentially
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| ad.秘密地，悄悄地 | |
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confidential
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| adj.秘（机）密的，表示信任的，担任机密工作的 | |
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prospect
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| n.前景，前途；景色，视野 | |
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abrupt
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| adj.突然的，意外的；唐突的，鲁莽的 | |
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recede
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| vi.退(去)，渐渐远去；向后倾斜，缩进 | |
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ram
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| (random access memory)随机存取存储器 | |
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influential
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| adj.有影响的，有权势的 | |
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averse
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| adj.厌恶的；反对的，不乐意的 | |
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concessions
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| n.（尤指由政府或雇主给予的）特许权( concession的名词复数 )；承认；减价；（在某地的）特许经营权 | |
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27
warfare
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| n.战争(状态)；斗争；冲突 | |
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legitimate
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| adj.合法的，合理的，合乎逻辑的；v.使合法 | |
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formerly
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| adv.从前，以前 | |
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permissible
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| adj.可允许的，许可的 | |
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justified
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| a.正当的，有理的 | |
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overthrow
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| v.推翻，打倒，颠覆；n.推翻，瓦解，颠覆 | |
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restrictions
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| 约束( restriction的名词复数 )； 管制； 制约因素； 带限制性的条件（或规则） | |
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peremptory
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| adj.紧急的，专横的，断然的 | |
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authorization
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| n.授权，委任状 | |
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wireless
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| adj.无线的；n.无线电 | |
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prosecute
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| vt.告发；进行；vi.告发，起诉，作检察官 | |
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38
vindicating
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| v.澄清（某人/某事物）受到的责难或嫌疑( vindicate的现在分词 )；表明或证明（所争辩的事物）属实、正当、有效等；维护 | |
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decided
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| adj.决定了的，坚决的；明显的，明确的 | |
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reprisals
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| n.报复（行为）( reprisal的名词复数 ) | |
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entirely
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| ad.全部地，完整地；完全地，彻底地 | |
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42
distress
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| n.苦恼，痛苦，不舒适；不幸；vt.使悲痛 | |
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43
survivors
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| 幸存者，残存者，生还者( survivor的名词复数 ) | |
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44
abide
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| vi.遵守；坚持；vt.忍受 | |
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45
torpedoed
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| 用鱼雷袭击（torpedo的过去式与过去分词形式） | |
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46
dictates
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| n.命令，规定，要求( dictate的名词复数 )v.大声讲或读( dictate的第三人称单数 )；口授；支配；摆布 | |
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47
discretion
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| n.谨慎；随意处理 | |
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48
specially
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| adv.特定地；特殊地；明确地 | |
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49
drawn
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| v.拖，拉，拔出；adj.憔悴的，紧张的 | |
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50
breakdown
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| n.垮，衰竭；损坏，故障，倒塌 | |
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51
treasury
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| n.宝库；国库，金库；文库 | |
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52
contradictory
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| adj.反驳的，反对的，抗辩的；n.正反对，矛盾对立 | |
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53
standing
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| n.持续，地位；adj.永久的，不动的，直立的，不流动的 | |
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54
authorized
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| a.委任的，许可的 | |
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55
attained
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| （通常经过努力）实现( attain的过去式和过去分词 )； 达到； 获得； 达到（某年龄、水平、状况） | |
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56
brink
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| n.(悬崖、河流等的)边缘，边沿 | |
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57
rupture
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| n.破裂；(关系的)决裂；v.(使)破裂 | |
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58
treacherously
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| 背信弃义地； 背叛地； 靠不住地； 危险地 | |
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59
overflowed
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| 溢出的 | |
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60
eyewitnesses
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| 目击者( eyewitness的名词复数 ) | |
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61
hitch
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| v.免费搭(车旅行)；系住；急提；n.故障；急拉 | |
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62
plying
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| v.使用（工具）( ply的现在分词 )；经常供应（食物、饮料）；固定往来；经营生意 | |
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63
distinguished
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| adj.卓越的，杰出的，著名的 | |
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64
naval
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| adj.海军的，军舰的，船的 | |
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65
averred
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| v.断言( aver的过去式和过去分词 )；证实；证明…属实；作为事实提出 | |
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66
applied
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| adj.应用的；v.应用，适用 | |
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divergence
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| n.分歧，岔开 | |
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68
verge
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| n.边，边缘；v.接近，濒临 | |
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proceedings
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| n.进程，过程，议程；诉讼(程序)；公报 | |
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avowed
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| adj.公开声明的，承认的v.公开声明，承认( avow的过去式和过去分词) | |
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71
hostilities
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| n.战争；敌意(hostility的复数)；敌对状态；战事 | |
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72
unwilling
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| adj.不情愿的 | |
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unwillingly
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| adv.不情愿地 | |
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placate
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| v.抚慰，平息(愤怒) | |
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pretensions
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| 自称( pretension的名词复数 )； 自命不凡； 要求； 权力 | |
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76
friction
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| n.摩擦，摩擦力 | |
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77
breach
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| n.违反，不履行；破裂；vt.冲破，攻破 | |
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78
periscope
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| n. 潜望镜 | |
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contrived
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| adj.不自然的，做作的；虚构的 | |
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mere
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| adj.纯粹的；仅仅，只不过 | |
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81
abolition
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| n.废除，取消 | |
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82
violation
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| n.违反(行为)，违背(行为)，侵犯 | |
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83
interfere
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| v.(in)干涉，干预；(with)妨碍，打扰 | |
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84
reassure
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| v.使放心，使消除疑虑 | |
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postponed
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| vt.& vi.延期，缓办，（使）延迟vt.把…放在次要地位；[语]把…放在后面（或句尾）vi.（疟疾等）延缓发作（或复发） | |
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undoubtedly
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| adv.确实地，无疑地 | |
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87
spun
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| v.纺，杜撰，急转身 | |
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88
assent
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| v.批准，认可；n.批准，认可 | |
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89
procrastination
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| n.拖延，耽搁 | |
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forfeit
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| vt.丧失；n.罚金，罚款，没收物 | |
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versed
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| adj. 精通，熟练 | |
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purports
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| v.声称是…，（装得）像是…的样子( purport的第三人称单数 ) | |
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premature
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| adj.比预期时间早的；不成熟的，仓促的 | |
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kindly
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| adj.和蔼的，温和的，爽快的；adv.温和地，亲切地 | |
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95
pacify
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| vt.使(某人)平静(或息怒)；抚慰 | |
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96
imperative
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| n.命令，需要；规则；祈使语气；adj.强制的；紧急的 | |
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97
transit
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| n.经过，运输；vt.穿越，旋转；vi.越过 | |
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memorandum
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| n.备忘录，便笺 | |
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purported
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| adj.传说的，谣传的v.声称是…，（装得）像是…的样子( purport的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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100
justify
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| vt.证明…正当(或有理)，为…辩护 | |
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101
apparently
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| adv.显然地；表面上，似乎 | |
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102
chancellor
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| n.(英)大臣；法官；(德、奥)总理；大学校长 | |
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103
juncture
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| n.时刻，关键时刻，紧要关头 | |
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104
promising
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| adj.有希望的，有前途的 | |
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105
manifestation
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| n.表现形式；表明；现象 | |
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106
evade
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| vt.逃避，回避；避开，躲避 | |
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incurred
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| [医]招致的，遭受的； incur的过去式 | |
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108
incur
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| vt.招致，蒙受，遭遇 | |
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109
sincerity
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| n.真诚，诚意；真实 | |
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110
arbitration
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| n.调停，仲裁 | |
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severance
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| n.离职金；切断 | |
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112
shipping
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| n.船运（发货，运输，乘船） | |
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113
vessels
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| n.血管( vessel的名词复数 )；船；容器；（具有特殊品质或接受特殊品质的）人 | |
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114
acting
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| n.演戏，行为，假装；adj.代理的，临时的，演出用的 | |
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115
inquiry
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| n.打听，询问，调查，查问 | |
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116
concurrence
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| n.同意；并发 | |
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117
agitated
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| adj.被鼓动的，不安的 | |
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118
allied
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| adj.协约国的；同盟国的 | |
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119
sedulously
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| ad.孜孜不倦地 | |
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120
enlist
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| vt.谋取(支持等)，赢得；征募；vi.入伍 | |
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121
invincibly
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| adv.难战胜地，无敌地 | |
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122
consolidate
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| v.使加固，使加强；(把...)联为一体，合并 | |
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123
munition
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| n.军火；军需品；v.给某部门提供军火 | |
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124
munitions
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| n.军火，弹药；v.供应…军需品 | |
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125
opposition
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| n.反对，敌对 | |
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126
calf
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| n.小牛，犊，幼仔，小牛皮 | |
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127
credence
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| n.信用，祭器台，供桌，凭证 | |
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128
liquidated
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| v.清算( liquidate的过去式和过去分词 )；清除（某人）；清偿；变卖 | |
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129
disapproval
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| n.反对，不赞成 | |
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130
majesty
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| n.雄伟，壮丽，庄严，威严；最高权威，王权 | |
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131
previously
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| adv.以前，先前（地） | |
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132
ramming
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| n.打结炉底v.夯实（土等）( ram的现在分词 )；猛撞；猛压；反复灌输 | |
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133
disapproves
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| v.不赞成( disapprove的第三人称单数 ) | |
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134
interpretation
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| n.解释，说明，描述；艺术处理 | |
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135
diplomacy
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| n.外交；外交手腕，交际手腕 | |
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136
thereby
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| adv.因此，从而 | |
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137
presage
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| n.预感，不祥感；v.预示 | |
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138
avowedly
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| adv.公然地 | |
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139
herald
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| vt.预示...的来临，预告，宣布，欢迎 | |
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140
hoof
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| n.(马，牛等的)蹄 | |
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141
avert
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| v.防止，避免；转移(目光、注意力等) | |
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142
averted
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| 防止，避免( avert的过去式和过去分词 )； 转移 | |
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143
inevitable
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| adj.不可避免的，必然发生的 | |
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144
preservation
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| n.保护，维护，保存，保留，保持 | |
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145
motive
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| n.动机，目的；adv.发动的，运动的 | |
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146
judicial
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| adj.司法的，法庭的，审判的，明断的，公正的 | |
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147
indirectly
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| adv.间接地，不直接了当地 | |
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148
oversight
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| n.勘漏，失察，疏忽 | |
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149
warships
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| 军舰，战舰( warship的名词复数 )； 舰只 | |
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150
controversy
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| n.争论，辩论，争吵 | |
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151
undesirable
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| adj.不受欢迎的，不良的，不合意的，讨厌的；n.不受欢迎的人，不良分子 | |
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152
briefly
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| adv.简单地，简短地 | |
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153
scapegoats
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|
| n.代人受过的人，替罪羊( scapegoat的名词复数 )v.使成为替罪羊( scapegoat的第三人称单数 ) | |
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154
dint
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| n.由于，靠；凹坑 | |
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155
persuasive
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| adj.有说服力的，能说得使人相信的 | |
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156
laboriously
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| adv.艰苦地；费力地；辛勤地；（文体等）佶屈聱牙地 | |
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157
labor
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| n.劳动，努力，工作，劳工；分娩；vi.劳动，努力，苦干；vt.详细分析；麻烦 | |
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158
edifice
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| n.宏伟的建筑物(如宫殿，教室) | |
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159
underlying
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| adj.在下面的，含蓄的，潜在的 | |
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160
agitation
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| n.搅动；搅拌；鼓动，煽动 | |
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161
undertaking
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| n.保证，许诺，事业 | |
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162
propitious
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| adj.吉利的；顺利的 | |
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163
exertions
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| n.努力( exertion的名词复数 )；费力；（能力、权力等的）运用；行使 | |
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164
foes
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| 敌人，仇敌( foe的名词复数 ) | |
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165
entente
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| n.协定；有协定关系的各国 | |
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166
defamation
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| n.诽谤；中伤 | |
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167
discredit
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| vt.使不可置信；n.丧失信义；不信，怀疑 | |
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168
corrupt
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| v.贿赂，收买；adj.腐败的，贪污的 | |
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169
consular
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| a.领事的 | |
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170
bribe
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| n.贿赂；v.向…行贿，买通 | |
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171
detailed
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| adj.详细的，详尽的，极注意细节的，完全的 | |
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172
prosecutor
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| n.起诉人；检察官，公诉人 | |
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173
catastrophe
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| n.大灾难，大祸 | |
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174
deranged
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| adj.疯狂的 | |
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175
isolated
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| adj.与世隔绝的 | |
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176
sabotage
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| n.怠工，破坏活动，破坏；v.从事破坏活动，妨害，破坏 | |
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177
subterranean
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|
| adj.地下的，地表下的 | |
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178
portfolio
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| n.公事包；文件夹；大臣及部长职位 | |
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179
corps
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| n.(通信等兵种的)部队；(同类作的)一组 | |
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180
investigations
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| （正式的）调查( investigation的名词复数 )； 侦查； 科学研究； 学术研究 | |
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181
investigation
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| n.调查，调查研究 | |
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182
corruption
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| n.腐败，堕落，贪污 | |
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183
scruple
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| n./v.顾忌，迟疑 | |
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184
confiding
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| adj.相信人的，易于相信的v.吐露（秘密，心事等）( confide的现在分词 )；（向某人）吐露（隐私、秘密等） | |
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185
scented
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| adj.有香味的；洒香水的；有气味的v.嗅到(scent的过去分词) | |
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186
entrust
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| v.信赖，信托，交托 | |
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187
spoke
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| n.（车轮的）辐条；轮辐；破坏某人的计划；阻挠某人的行动 v.讲，谈（speak的过去式）；说；演说；从某种观点来说 | |
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188
offenders
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| n.冒犯者( offender的名词复数 )；犯规者；罪犯；妨害…的人（或事物） | |
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189
implicated
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|
| adj.密切关联的；牵涉其中的 | |
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190
transgressed
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| v.超越( transgress的过去式和过去分词 )；越过；违反；违背 | |
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191
authenticated
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| v.证明是真实的、可靠的或有效的( authenticate的过去式和过去分词 )；鉴定，使生效 | |
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192
providence
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| n.深谋远虑，天道，天意；远见；节约；上帝 | |
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193
accusations
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| n.指责( accusation的名词复数 )；指控；控告；（被告发、控告的）罪名 | |
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194
conspiracies
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| n.阴谋，密谋( conspiracy的名词复数 ) | |
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195
conspiring
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| 密谋( conspire的现在分词 )； 搞阴谋； （事件等）巧合； 共同导致 | |
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196
liar
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| n.说谎的人 | |
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197
conjectures
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| 推测，猜想( conjecture的名词复数 ) | |
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198
propriety
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| n.正当行为；正当；适当 | |
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199
justification
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| n.正当的理由；辩解的理由 | |
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200
precedent
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| n.先例，前例；惯例；adj.在前的，在先的 | |
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201
alleged
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| a.被指控的，嫌疑的 | |
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202
sufficiently
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| adv.足够地，充分地 | |
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203
remains
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| n.剩余物，残留物；遗体，遗迹 | |
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204
apprised
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| v.告知，通知( apprise的过去式和过去分词 )；评价 | |
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205
questionable
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| adj.可疑的，有问题的 | |
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206
disclaim
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| v.放弃权利，拒绝承认 | |
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207
whatsoever
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| adv.（用于否定句中以加强语气）任何；pron.无论什么 | |
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208
peculiar
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| adj.古怪的，异常的；特殊的，特有的 | |
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209
affected
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| adj.不自然的，假装的 | |
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210
outright
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| adv.坦率地；彻底地；立即；adj.无疑的；彻底的 | |
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211
momentous
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| adj.重要的，重大的 | |
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212
binds
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| v.约束( bind的第三人称单数 )；装订；捆绑；（用长布条）缠绕 | |
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213
serene
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| adj. 安详的，宁静的，平静的 | |
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214
forth
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| adv.向前；向外，往外 | |
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215
imbroglio
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| n.纷乱，纠葛，纷扰，一团糟 | |
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216
fervor
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| n.热诚；热心；炽热 | |
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217
warehouses
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| 仓库，货栈( warehouse的名词复数 ) | |
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218
abstain
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| v.自制，戒绝，弃权，避免 | |
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219
lengthy
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| adj.漫长的，冗长的 | |
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220
conspiracy
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| n.阴谋，密谋，共谋 | |
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221
amicable
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| adj.和平的，友好的；友善的 | |
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222
arteries
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| n.动脉( artery的名词复数 )；干线，要道 | |
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223
vindictive
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| adj.有报仇心的，怀恨的，惩罚的 | |
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224
intrigue
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| vt.激起兴趣，迷住；vi.耍阴谋；n.阴谋，密谋 | |
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225
virile
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| adj.男性的；有男性生殖力的；有男子气概的；强有力的 | |
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226
promptly
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| adv.及时地，敏捷地 | |
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227
purged
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| 清除（政敌等）( purge的过去式和过去分词 )； 涤除（罪恶等）； 净化（心灵、风气等）； 消除（错事等）的不良影响 | |
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228
enact
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| vt.制定(法律)；上演，扮演 | |
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229
anarchy
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| n.无政府状态；社会秩序混乱，无秩序 | |
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230
infinitely
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| adv.无限地，无穷地 | |
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231
malignant
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| adj.恶性的，致命的；恶意的，恶毒的 | |
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232
pry
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| vi.窥(刺)探，打听；vt.撬动(开，起) | |
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233
impartial
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| adj.(in,to)公正的，无偏见的 | |
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234
solely
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| adv.仅仅，唯一地 | |
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235
disapproved
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| v.不赞成( disapprove的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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236
instinctively
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| adv.本能地 | |
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237
judgment
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| n.审判；判断力，识别力，看法，意见 | |
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238
partisan
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| adj.党派性的；游击队的；n.游击队员；党徒 | |
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239
passionate
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| adj.热情的，热烈的，激昂的，易动情的，易怒的，性情暴躁的 | |
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240
corruptions
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| n.堕落( corruption的名词复数 )；腐化；腐败；贿赂 | |
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241
humiliation
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| n.羞辱 | |
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242
patriotic
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| adj.爱国的，有爱国心的 | |
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243
imminent
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| adj.即将发生的，临近的，逼近的 | |
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Mediterranean
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| adj.地中海的；地中海沿岸的 | |
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inhuman
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| adj.残忍的，不人道的，无人性的 | |
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abhorrence
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| n.憎恶；可憎恶的事 | |
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civilized
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| a.有教养的，文雅的 | |
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baron
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| n.男爵；(商业界等)巨头，大王 | |
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frankly
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| adv.坦白地，直率地；坦率地说 | |
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utterly
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| adv.完全地，绝对地 | |
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defiance
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| n.挑战，挑衅，蔑视，违抗 | |
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submission
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| n.服从，投降；温顺，谦虚；提出 | |
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