Ever since the late civil war ended the general of the army has annually1 given us earnest and intelligent warning as to the incomplete state of our fortifications, and the inability of our artillery2 for offensive and defensive3 operations against the improved armaments with which other nations have amply supplied themselves. The admiral of the navy has made similar reports. For a little while this looked like unnecessary precaution or what a distinguished5 Congressman6 once called old woman’s fussiness7. Hadn’t we just triumphed over the largest armies that had been brought into the field, except by ourselves, in half a century? Hadn’t we organized a navy out of nothing, armed it splendidly, and done with it whatever was desirable that the naval8 power of the country should attempt? To be sure, our forts were few, but so were our harbors. The construction{304} of some of the harbor forts in the United States was admired by the engineers of all the other civilized9 powers only thirty years ago, and the public knew of it. To afterward10 be told that these splendid and expensive structures were of no use, that they were inadequate11, that two or three guns on a second or third-rate ship of some second or third-rate naval power could knock them to pieces would have been humiliating had it not been enraging12.
Attempts were made from time to time, in the earlier years following the close of the war, to keep our military and naval establishment in fine condition. We had admirable staff departments, and large “plants” for the manufacture of almost everything required in ordnance13 and ammunition14. We had the nucleus15 of a navy and army from which a peace establishment unequalled by any on the face of the earth might have been selected. But we let it all go. No such spectacle as the disbandment and disappearance16 of the great armies of the North and South was ever before seen, and historians have glorified17 in this. Soldiers, however, whose opinions we may yet be called upon to respect, regarded the spectacle in entirely18 a different light. We had once before been caught—by England—napping in a most unexpected way, said these old fellows; we paid dearly for our neglect; but now we are repeating exactly the same blunder. Excellent men who{305}
Image not available: MINES BUILDING.
MINES BUILDING.
were willing to remain in the service were allowed to go, material of every kind was disposed of at auction19 as rapidly as possible, and nothing was provided to take its place. The numerical force of the standing20 army was reduced more and more until even the Indians held us in contempt. Indian massacres21 on the border have frequently been charged to the rascality22 or duplicity of the white men. Undoubtedly23 the Indians have had a great many provocations24, but, so far as restraint through fear is concerned, they have been subjected to very little of this very necessary discipline. Large bands of armed Indians have been able to keep brave but small detachments of United States troops within small camps or forts, to isolate25 them and taunt26 them for days in succession, to steal cattle, murder settlers, desolate27 the country, all because they had contempt for an army which was so small that it never could oppose more than a handful to any Indian raid which might suddenly be made.
Just look at some of the warnings we have had during recent years. In his last report as commander of the army (1887), General Sheridan said: “The condition of our sea-coast defences has continued to deteriorate28 during the year, and the majority of them, both as regards the material of which they are built, their location and present armament, would prove of but little real service in time of foreign war.”{306}
What was done about it? Nothing.
General Sheridan further advised that we should adopt some modern magazine rifle for our soldiers, as all foreign nations had refitted their armies with these guns.
What was done about it? Nothing.
General Sheridan further said: “I am strongly in favor of the general movement extending all possible aid to the National Guard of the different States, as they constitute a body of troops that in any great emergency would form an important part of our military force.”
What was done about it? Nothing.
Before Sheridan, General Sherman made clear, vigorous, sensible protests every year against our neglect to maintain good defences, but nothing came of it in the way of improvement. After Sheridan’s death, General Schofield, the ranking officer of the army, continued the good work; only two or three months ago General Schofield said in his report that the new guns we are making will make an increase in the number of artillerists indispensable, and he urged the formation of two new regiments29 at once. Does any one expect to see them?
Admiral Porter has been hammering away valiantly31 for years at Congressional thick-heads for the neglect of the navy, but it was not until the late Samuel J. Tilden gave his own party a blast on the subject did we begin to construct a{307} navy. Even now there is persistent32 halting; Congress, regarding the navy, is like the girl of a certain class regarding her suitors—so anxious to get the very best that she is in danger of not getting any.
Both political parties seem agreed on the reduction of the regular army to the smallest possible numerical force. While the Republicans were in power some officers of the army used to hope for a change of administration, and consequently change of party at the head of affairs so that the army might “have a show.” But when the Democrats33 came in with President Cleveland, there was no perceptible difference, except that there was more trouble than before in obtaining ammunition with which to salute34 the flag morning and evening. The army, small as its maximum strength is according to law, has not been full in years, and there are grave doubts among some of the higher officers of the army as to whether it can be made full.
Why? Because men desert—run away at a rate unheard of in the army of any other nation. General Schofield, in his annual report, says there were two thousand four hundred and thirty-six desertions last year—more than ten per cent. of the entire army! Fear of punishment seems to have no effect, and General Schofield felt obliged to recommend that a full half of each enlisted36 man’s pay shall be retained until the end{308} of the period of enlistment37. Isn’t this a humiliating state of affairs for the army of the freest nation in the world?
There must be serious reason for this anomalous38 condition of the military force. Our soldiers are better fed, better clothed, and far better paid than those of any other country. An American soldier receives, outside of his allowance for rations4 and clothing, more money in a day than the British soldier can show to his credit in a week. His term of enlistment is shorter and his possibilities of duty are pleasanter, or should seem so to men of intelligence. Yet to enlist35, which is the first suggestion that presents itself to a man out of work in a foreign country, seems to be the least popular in the United States.
Undoubtedly one reason is, that among the inducements to enlist, we are entirely lacking in anything that approaches the glory of war. Our only enemies are Indians, the meanest, most sneaking39, most treacherous40 foemen that any civilized nation is fighting at the present time, and there is less glory in capturing one of them or a great many of them than in any taking of prisoners in ordinary war. The soldiers of other countries see at least a great deal of the pomp of war, if very little of its circumstance. Showy dresses, frequent parades, numerous occasions of display, encampment in the vicinity of large cities and towns, freedom to go about and spend money{309} among civilized people, are all inducements to men to join and remain in a foreign army at the present time.
But what inducement is offered the American soldier? He is put in a camp of instruction as soon as he enlists41, and sent to the border as soon as he is fit for service. The border is a delightful42 country, according to dime43 novels, but no sober man with his eyes open finds it anything but dull. It is a sparsely44 settled country, uninteresting to every one but the speculator and hunter. The soldier has nothing to speculate with, and is very seldom allowed to go hunting. He is kept within narrow bounds, sees almost no one but his own officers and comrades, has nothing but camp duty to do, except when on long scouts45 outside camp lines, or, still more unpleasant, when detailed46 for police, gardening, or other laborious47 duties within the camp. It naturally occurs to the American soldier that if he is to work eight hours a day in building houses or stables, or digging wells, or throwing up embankments, or ploughing the soil, or hoeing garden crops for the benefit of the post, that he might as well be doing the same sort of work in the States at a dollar and a half a day, and have his freedom between sunset and sunrise.
Except that police precautions against the Indians are still necessary, the only excuse that any one, except the military officer, seems inclined to{310} discover for the existence of our army at all, is that we should have a nucleus of a military establishment in case of necessity. But what is the nucleus worth? Two thousand officers, among whom undoubtedly are a number of the best educated soldiers in the world, constitute nearly all of our military force upon whom we could confidently rely in case of trouble. The enlisted man, taking him as an average character, is practically worthless at a time when the enlargement of the army may suddenly become necessary. In France or Germany officers may at any time be selected from the ranks. Of course the systems of the two countries differ greatly from ours. Conscription and the requirement that every adult man shall serve a portion of his time in the army, makes a soldier of every one.
But is it not rather significant that the better class of men, to whom we would have to look for additional officers in case of the necessity of suddenly making a large army, are seldom found among our own regulars? Some of the reasons for this deplorable deficiency of valuable material have already been suggested. There is nothing to induce a man to enter military life, and the enlisted man is too frequently used as a common laborer48.
But beside this, there is a greater grievance49. It is that ours is as aristocratic an army as any{311} in the world, and that the distance of the officers from the enlisted men is so great as to be simply immeasurable. Volunteers used to grumble50 that some of their officers “put on airs.” It is scarcely fair to say that regular officers put on airs, but it certainly is true that the enlisted man, as a rule, is generally treated by his superiors as a being of an entirely different order. Few men rise from the ranks. Some men now high up on regimental rosters51 used to be private soldiers, and a few instances of the kind occur nowadays, but the vacancies52 are too few to attract good men to the ranks. Let any one live at a military post a little while and explain, if he can, how any one with sufficient self-respect to be fit for military rank of any kind can bring himself to enlist in the United States army at all.
All this could be changed, without increasing the numerical strength of the army, by an entire change of method which would not create any friction53, disorganization or reorganization, but which nevertheless would encourage a better class of young men to enlist—a change which, indeed, would secure some of the very best in the country. An army so small as ours should be in the highest sense a military school. There is nothing to prevent it. There is no army which has more leisure at its disposal or officers more competent to act as instructors54. No army in the world has a greater percentage of highly educated{312} officers. No country can show a larger proportion of well-educated, restless, unemployed55, aspiring56 young men. There is no engineering party for a railroad, a mine, a river improvement association, a drainage company or anything else requiring applied57 mathematical and mechanical skill but can secure a large staff of intelligent young men at an expense not exceeding that of the ordinary soldier. These men generally work harder and fare worse, regarding personal comfort, than the meanest of soldiers, yet they are not only entirely satisfied with their chance, but elbow each other fiercely in their desire to get it.
Suppose that instead of selecting men merely for their physical quality and their supposed capacity for obedience59, the standard of admission to the ranks of the army should be as high as that of admission to West Point. Suppose the Government were to assure the people that the recruits would be treated as well as the cadets at the military or naval academy; in an instant the army might have its choice from a hundred thousand intelligent, well-born, well-bred, honorable, aspiring young men. As already said, there is no trouble in getting any quantity of men of this class to go out under the control of engineers for hard and unpleasant duty. The inducement, beside the financial compensation, is that they will be enabled to fit themselves, at least to some extent,{313} for the class of work which their superiors are already engaged in. They are close observers, earnest students, intelligent assistants, and the beginning of many an engineer, now prominent, has been in just such parties.
The United States army might as well be one great school of engineering and military tactics. It is well known that the mere58 company drill, which is almost all the drill the American soldier is ever subjected to, thanks to the distribution of the force in such a way that scarcely any regiment30 has been together within a single period of enlistment of any soldier in the army, requires very little time. It is no harder to become proficient61 in than that of the militia62 of the various States and cities. Indeed, with company drills once a week, almost any militia regiment or company can present a finer appearance upon parade than any but two or three “show” companies of regulars. The remainder of military life consists in guard duty, the details of camp duty and of applied engineering, which each man can learn as rapidly by experience as an equal number of assistants in a construction party anywhere else. It is known well enough at the West that the construction parties of railways contain, beside a mass of common laborers63, a great many intelligent young fellows who have put on flannel64 shirts and cow-hide boots, have taken pick and shovel65 and wheelbarrow, not so much for the wages that{314} are paid them as for what they are learning of the art of railroad building. If such men can put up with the treatment ordinarily accorded the section hands of a railway constructing party, they certainly would be satisfied with the manners of officers of the United States army.
But—and here is an important distinction—no railway boss, however much of a tyrant66 he may be, would dare to order one of his hands to cook his supper or wait at his table or groom67 his horse or do any other service of the quality commonly known as menial, but the American soldier in the regular army is sometimes obliged to regard such demands as a matter of course.
A plan was suggested a short time ago, by a military officer of experience, by which the army might be reorganized on this basis without any additional expense and without any possibility of friction. Several years ago Major Sumner, of the regular army, himself a son of an old regular of national fame, suggested a similar plan regarding a single branch of the service—the cavalry68. His plan was to select from among the floating population of wild boys of the different cities a number of the more intelligent, and organize from them a single regiment of cavalry, to be carefully trained and specially69 educated, the more promising70 and deserving recruits to be placed in the line of promotion71, and all to be encouraged to look to possible rank, responsibility,{315} and position as part of the compensation for the necessary restraint to which they might be subjected. This restraint could by no possibility be more severe and continuous than that of West Point.
All that has been said about the army applies with equal force to the navy. When the apprentice72 system was formulated73 there was hope expressed by hundreds of officers who had served in one branch or other of the service during the late civil war, that it might afford a stepping-stone to ambitious young men who wished to adopt a seafaring career, but were unable to obtain admission to the naval academy, or in any other way to gain a sufficient education in seamanship and gunnery, which are the two principal requirements of the American naval officer. But if any number of naval apprentices74 have yet reached officers’ uniforms or see before them any hope of such advancement75, the country has not heard of it; neither has the naval department. The boys are treated kindly76, well fed, well clothed, educated to a certain extent and trained by officers carefully selected for their intelligence, forbearance, patience, and tact60. But has any one seen any recommendation either to the naval department or to members of Congress that the apprentice ships should be schools for naval officers?
The consequence is that in case of our becoming{316} suddenly involved in war with any power we would be in as bad a position as we were when the civil war broke out. At that time there was a sudden demand for twenty times as many trained military officers as the regular army and the graduating class at West Point could supply, and the demand became greater every month during the time in which our first million of men were enlisted. The scarcity77 of available material was so deplorable that many lieutenants78 of regulars were called to the command of volunteer regiments. Did any one think to go to the ranks of the regular army for officers? At that time there were in the army thousands of sergeants79, any one of whom, had he been in the militia in a corresponding position, would have been considered amply fit to organize, drill, and otherwise care for a company of a hundred men. But there were no such demands, and had they been made the proper men would not have been forthcoming to any extent. The lack was not of military skill, but of the many other qualities which go to the make-up of a soldier. And first among these is a high degree of self-respect—a quality which has never been nourished among enlisted men of the regular army of the United States.
The real trouble is lack of proper public spirit. During a recent chat with Admiral Porter, that{317} fine old sea-dog and fighter bemoaned80 the lack of any proper public sense of caution.
“Why don’t you write up the subject yourself?” I asked.
“Write!” exclaimed the veteran, in his energetic way; “I’ve almost written my finger-nails off, and do not believe it has done a particle of good. Nothing would please me more than to be able to infuse a patriotic81 spirit into the American people—make them feel that they have a flag and need a navy to protect it. I wish we had some of the energy and patriotism82 exhibited by our forefathers83, for, according to present indications, we will one day be humiliated84 by some fifth-rate naval power which will come to our shores and teach us a lesson. No reason exists why we should be exempt85 from war, for we are easily excited, and, like the school-boy, dare any one to knock the chip from our shoulder, though not able to fight.”
So say we all of us—all who give the subject intelligent thought.
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1
annually
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| adv.一年一次，每年 | |
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artillery
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| n.(军)火炮，大炮；炮兵(部队) | |
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defensive
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| adj.防御的；防卫的；防守的 | |
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rations
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| 定量( ration的名词复数 )； 配给量； 正常量； 合理的量 | |
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distinguished
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| adj.卓越的，杰出的，著名的 | |
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Congressman
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| n.（美）国会议员 | |
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fussiness
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| [医]易激怒 | |
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naval
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| adj.海军的，军舰的，船的 | |
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civilized
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| a.有教养的，文雅的 | |
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afterward
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| adv.后来；以后 | |
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inadequate
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| adj.(for,to)不充足的，不适当的 | |
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enraging
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| 使暴怒( enrage的现在分词 ) | |
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ordnance
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| n.大炮，军械 | |
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ammunition
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| n.军火，弹药 | |
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nucleus
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| n.核，核心，原子核 | |
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disappearance
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| n.消失，消散，失踪 | |
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glorified
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| 美其名的，变荣耀的 | |
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entirely
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| ad.全部地，完整地；完全地，彻底地 | |
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auction
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| n.拍卖；拍卖会；vt.拍卖 | |
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standing
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| n.持续，地位；adj.永久的，不动的，直立的，不流动的 | |
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massacres
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| 大屠杀( massacre的名词复数 )； 惨败 | |
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rascality
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undoubtedly
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| adv.确实地，无疑地 | |
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provocations
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| n.挑衅( provocation的名词复数 )；激怒；刺激；愤怒的原因 | |
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isolate
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| vt.使孤立，隔离 | |
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taunt
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| n.辱骂，嘲弄；v.嘲弄 | |
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desolate
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| adj.荒凉的，荒芜的；孤独的，凄凉的；v.使荒芜，使孤寂 | |
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deteriorate
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regiments
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| （军队的）团( regiment的名词复数 )； 大量的人或物 | |
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regiment
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| n.团，多数，管理；v.组织，编成团，统制 | |
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valiantly
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| adv.勇敢地，英勇地；雄赳赳 | |
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persistent
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democrats
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| n.民主主义者，民主人士( democrat的名词复数 ) | |
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salute
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| vi.行礼，致意，问候，放礼炮；vt.向…致意，迎接，赞扬；n.招呼，敬礼，礼炮 | |
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enlist
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| vt.谋取(支持等)，赢得；征募；vi.入伍 | |
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enlisted
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enlistment
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| n.应征入伍，获得，取得 | |
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anomalous
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sneaking
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| a.秘密的，不公开的 | |
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treacherous
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| adj.不可靠的，有暗藏的危险的；adj.背叛的，背信弃义的 | |
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enlists
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| v.（使）入伍， （使）参军( enlist的第三人称单数 )；获得（帮助或支持） | |
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delightful
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| adj.令人高兴的，使人快乐的 | |
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dime
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| n.（指美国、加拿大的钱币）一角 | |
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sparsely
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| adv.稀疏地；稀少地；不足地；贫乏地 | |
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scouts
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| 侦察员[机，舰]( scout的名词复数 )； 童子军； 搜索； 童子军成员 | |
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detailed
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| adj.详细的，详尽的，极注意细节的，完全的 | |
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laborious
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| adj.吃力的，努力的，不流畅 | |
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laborer
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| n.劳动者，劳工 | |
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grievance
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| n.怨愤，气恼，委屈 | |
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grumble
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| vi.抱怨；咕哝；n.抱怨，牢骚；咕哝，隆隆声 | |
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rosters
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| n.花名册( roster的名词复数 )；候选名单v.将（姓名）列入值勤名单( roster的第三人称单数 ) | |
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vacancies
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| n.空房间( vacancy的名词复数 )；空虚；空白；空缺 | |
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friction
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| n.摩擦，摩擦力 | |
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instructors
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| 指导者，教师( instructor的名词复数 ) | |
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unemployed
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| adj.失业的，没有工作的；未动用的，闲置的 | |
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aspiring
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| adj.有志气的；有抱负的；高耸的v.渴望；追求 | |
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applied
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| adj.应用的；v.应用，适用 | |
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mere
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| adj.纯粹的；仅仅，只不过 | |
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obedience
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| n.服从，顺从 | |
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tact
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| n.机敏，圆滑，得体 | |
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proficient
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| adj.熟练的，精通的；n.能手，专家 | |
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militia
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| n.民兵，民兵组织 | |
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laborers
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| n.体力劳动者，工人( laborer的名词复数 )；（熟练工人的）辅助工 | |
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flannel
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| n.法兰绒；法兰绒衣服 | |
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shovel
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| n.铁锨，铲子，一铲之量；v.铲，铲出 | |
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tyrant
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| n.暴君，专制的君主，残暴的人 | |
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groom
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| vt.给（马、狗等）梳毛，照料，使...整洁 | |
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cavalry
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| n.骑兵；轻装甲部队 | |
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specially
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| adv.特定地；特殊地；明确地 | |
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promising
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| adj.有希望的，有前途的 | |
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promotion
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| n.提升，晋级；促销，宣传 | |
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apprentice
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| n.学徒，徒弟 | |
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formulated
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| v.构想出( formulate的过去式和过去分词 )；规划；确切地阐述；用公式表示 | |
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apprentices
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| 学徒，徒弟( apprentice的名词复数 ) | |
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advancement
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| n.前进，促进，提升 | |
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kindly
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| adj.和蔼的，温和的，爽快的；adv.温和地，亲切地 | |
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scarcity
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| n.缺乏，不足，萧条 | |
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lieutenants
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| n.陆军中尉( lieutenant的名词复数 )；副职官员；空军；仅低于…官阶的官员 | |
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sergeants
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| 警官( sergeant的名词复数 )； （美国警察）警佐； （英国警察）巡佐； 陆军（或空军）中士 | |
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bemoaned
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| v.为（某人或某事）抱怨( bemoan的过去式和过去分词 )；悲悼；为…恸哭；哀叹 | |
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patriotic
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| adj.爱国的，有爱国心的 | |
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patriotism
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| n.爱国精神，爱国心，爱国主义 | |
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83
forefathers
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| n.祖先，先人；祖先，祖宗( forefather的名词复数 )；列祖列宗；前人 | |
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humiliated
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| 感到羞愧的 | |
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exempt
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| adj.免除的；v.使免除；n.免税者，被免除义务者 | |
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