Can it be supposed that four men, thus opposite in their personal views and interests, and thus independent of each other, should heartily5 concur6 in general measures; or should cordially unite in a system of common defence? Common sense informs us that they will not; and experience convinces us that they do not. For it hath been known that one, of these settlements, hath furnished arms and ammunition7; and hath otherwise befriended a power, at open war with one of the others. And, in the case of any one of these settlements being attacked, the others are extremely backward in supporting it; because each, of the four governors, giving the preference to his own particular 158charge, in which his own personal interest is more immediately concerned, considers all communication of his force, to any of the other settlements, as a diminution8 of his own security, and even of his importance. So that, upon such terms, the union betwixt these four distinct, and mutually independent, governments, can scarcely be termed federal.
Moreover, each of these four governors possesses, within the limits of his own government, the discretionary power of making war and peace. And, so, hath the opportunity, whenever it shall suit the purpose of his own personal interest, to pick a quarrel, and engage his government in war, with some one of the neighbouring native states. Nor is this an imaginary evil; or a simple supposition of what may possibly happen; it is a real case; an abuse that hath actually existed. For we can produce several instances where these governors, more particularly on the coast of Cormondel, have commenced, and industriously9 protracted10, wars with the neighbouring states, expressly for the purpose of plunder11 and peculation12.
159And, from this discretionary power of peace and war lodged13 in the hands of these several governors, and the consequent abuse thereof, flow the following evils to the sovereign. First, the governor, thus warring, exhausts and consumes the treasure of his constituent14; to the end that he and his associates, may gain occasion to pocket a part. Second, by these offensive wars, he wastes and destroys that force, which was intended by the sovereign for defence: and, thereby15, exposes his own charge, naked and defenceless, to the attack of other enemies. And third, by these wanton unnecessary and unjust wars, he provokes the hatred16 and jealousy17 of all the neighbouring states; and, thus, converts into enemies, those native powers, who would, otherwise, be amicable18 and friendly to the sovereign.
To correct these, and many other abuses of a like nature, which flow from this absurd military system of the Company, it is evidently and indispensably necessary, that there should be instituted, one supreme19 head of military government. Which, being vested with the supreme power of making peace and war in India, 160shall restrain these several territorial20 governors, from engaging in unnecessary wars with their neighbours. And which, possessing the supreme direction of the common force, shall, in the case of particular or general danger, apply that force to the most proper and necessary purposes.
Now it is naturally proper, that the same intermediate supreme power, which superintends the political government, should likewise supremely21 superintend the military government, and defence, of those Indian dominions22. And, for this latter purpose, the choice of a proper situation, for the residence of that supreme power, becomes likewise a point of most essential consequence. For it is evident, on the one hand, that this military superintending power ought not to exist in any one of these territorial governments; nay24 it ought not to reside in the immediate3 neighbourhood of any one rich native state; because, in either of these two situations, it is liable to be tempted25, by views of avarice26 or ambition, to apply the general force, to its own personal purposes; and, if so, the cure would be worse than the disease: and, on the other hand, it is 161no less evident, (from the reasons assigned on the similar head in the political system) that this supreme military power ought to be situated27 so centrically near, to all the several territorial governments, as that it may, at all times and seasons, be capable of keeping up a ready and speedy correspondence with each.
The distant and unconnected situation, of these four capital governments, is likewise a mighty28 obstruction29 to a secure system of defence. For, the wind, blowing in those seas for six months from one quarter of the compass, and for the other six months from the opposite quarter, doth, alternately, cut off in a great measure all naval30 communication betwixt these four governments. For instance, during the violence of the south west monsoon31, that is, from the middle of April till the middle of July, it is almost impracticable for ships to pass from Bengal to Madrass: and, during the three more moderate months of that monsoon, this passage is difficult and tedious. And during the north east monsoon, the passage is much the same from Madrass to Bengal. But the communication betwixt Bombay, and these 162two settlements, is still more obstructed32. For Bombay, being situated in lat. 19 deg. north, on the west side of the peninsula of India, it is almost impossible, from the latter end of November till the middle of February, for ships from Bombay, bound for the Bay of Bengal, to round the island of Ceyloan: and, for the other three months of the north east monsoon, they are obliged, in order to weather Ceyloan, to stand over to the eastward33 almost as far as Atchen head, and back again to the island; a run of about 20 degrees. From the end of April till August, it is almost impracticable for ships from the Bay and bound for Bombay, to round Ceyloan; and in the other three months of the south west monsoon, that passage is difficult and tedious. And, even in the fair passage, the run betwixt Bengal and Bombay is seldom made in less than a month. Moreover, during the force of the south west monsoon on the west side of the peninsula, that is, from the middle of May till the middle of August, it is extremely dangerous for ships to attempt running in for Bombay: the weather being then so extremely thick, that sometimes a solar observation 163cannot be obtained for several days together: and if a ship should, in such circumstances, run in for the land, which in such weather is not distinguishable at three leagues distance, and should miss the opening of the harbour, which is but small, it is more than probable that she would not be able to clear the shore, with the wind blowing fiercely right on, and rolling before it a heavy sea. As to Bencolen, circumstances are nearly the same with it, as betwixt Bengal and Madrass.
Now it is evident, that this obstructed naval communication, betwixt the four chief governments must, in many respects, greatly weaken the common defence: and must greatly augment34, to the sovereign, the charge, in both men and money, of maintaining and defending those dominions and possessions. Seeing it must necessitate35 him to keep up, in each of those governments, a force sufficient to defend it against the whole united strength of an offensive enemy, without trusting to any aid from the others: because, otherwise, he runs the risk of losing them all 164singly, to a force that can overpower but one of them.
But all the danger, inconveniences, and extraordinary expence, arising from this obstructed naval communication, may be obviated36 and removed, by establishing one supreme center of military defence; so situated, with respect to the several parts of those truly valuable territorial dominions, as that the communication betwixt it and them shall, in either monsoon, be not only practicable but speedy and easy. For it is evident that, in such a situation, this supreme center of defence could, at all times, receive speedy notice of any impending37 danger, or actual attack; and that, upon such notice, it could immediately transport its own garrison38, by sea; as well as collect aid from the other settlements. So that the garrison of this supreme center of defence would act as an army of observation; ever ready to pour in, at any quarter, on the back of an aggressive enemy. And, of course, such a center of defence must connect, and unite, the strength of all the several parts of British dominion23 in India.
165Now it appears that, the situation of residence, becomes a circumstance, highly essential to the efficacy of each purpose, proposed from this supreme intermediate power. And it farther appears that one, and the same, situation is required, for all these several purposes: seeing that, from a convenient naval port, situated at a proper distance from the limits of all the territorial governments; and, at the same time, so centrically near to each, that the communication with all the several parts of dominion will be speedy and easy; this supreme power would, in the first place, completely and effectually, faithfully and honourably39 superintend, enforce, and controul the measures of political government, as well as the conduct of military government: and, in the second place, it would unite and connect the general strength of those dominions, and completely secure the defence of the whole.
But, of the several settlements possessed40 by the Company in India, Bengal and Madrass are evidently disqualified for this seat of residence; not only because the communication betwixt them and the other settlements is, at certain seasons, altogether cut 166off; but because they are, themselves, territorial governments; and therein, the very object to be controuled. Bencolen is, in every respect, out of the question. And, there then remains42 only Bombay; which is so far possessed of the properties requisite43 to this residence, in that it is, at present, not greatly embarked44 in territorial dominion; and is, likewise, a sea port. But in respect of communication, with the truly valuable possessions of Britain in India, Bombay is altogether unfit to be either the residence of the supreme controuling power, or yet the center of defence; as must appear from the preceding description; which was more particularly enlarged, for the express purpose of evincing this. Far from being a proper center of defence, all the force that is lodged at Bombay becomes detached, and completely lost to the defence of Britain’s truly valuable possessions; at least on any sudden emergency. Indeed Bombay is, in every thing, respecting either dominion or commerce, a dead load, and useless settlement; saving it be for the sole purpose of a naval port, or a place for refitting our squadrons.
167But the choice of Bombay for a naval port, is the most dangerous and fatal error, in the whole absurd system of the Company’s defence: seeing that, by this absurd choice, Britain loses the use of her naval force; which is her capital strength of defence, against the attack of France, her only dangerous enemy in India—As will appear—It is impossible that ships, the best fitted from Europe, can subsist45, in those seas, for two years, without a thorough repair: and more particularly in time of war; when action hath happened, and is again expected. And this thorough repair they cannot obtain but in a naval port, properly filled with docks, or careening platforms. Bombay is the only naval port, thus fitted by Britain, in India; consequently the squadron of Britain must retire, at least every second year, to Bombay, for repair. But the British squadron being once retired46 to Bombay, (as is common, in October,) which is situated in lat. 19 degrees north, on the west side of the peninsula; it is as effectually excluded, for five months, from the bay of Bengal, and more particularly from Bengal itself, as if it was still in Europe. And, 168during these five months, the enemy may either scour47 that Bay with single cruizers, or she may transport, and, without opposition48, land a force in Bengal; and these said five months are the very fittest in the whole year for land operations. This must be thoroughly49 understood by all those who are acquainted with the navigation of those seas: and could be here readily demonstrated; was it not that, by publickly pointing out our own weakness, we should point out to the enemy her strength. It is most certain that, if France understands her own advantage, (and it is to be apprehended50 she is but too well acquainted with it): she may either waste and consume the British squadron, through preventing its repair; or otherwise she may effect every purpose, against Bengal, nay against Madrass, with as great security, as if there was no British squadron in India: ever so long as Britain shall continue her only naval port at Bombay. Nor is there any alternative. For as to that ridiculous notion, of carrying a squadron of large ships up the river of Bengal to repair, no commander in his senses would, in the time of war, when he expected to be equally 169matched by the enemy, so soon as the season arrived, incur51 the risk of losing some of his ships, in the passage up and down that incredibly dangerous river; and still less would he subject himself to the certainty of losing half his hands, by that putrid52 unhealthy air at Culpee, or Ingelee. Neither would he be mad enough, in the while of a hot war, to use that dangerous expedient53, of half repairing at Trincamalay; where he is liable to be surprized by an enemy, in the act of repairing. In fine, so long as Bombay continues to be our only naval port, our commanders must, of necessity, either waste and lose their squadron; or else they must retire to Bombay, at the least, once in two years; and, thereby leave the seas, with all our valuable possessions in the Bay of Bengal, freely exposed to the attack of an enemy, for five months.
It therefore follows that, if Britain means to avail herself of her naval force, which is the principal defence of her dominion and commerce in India, she must establish a proper naval port, on the east side of the peninsula; because, on that side lay all her truly valuable possessions, 170and commerce. And that port, which I mean to propose, is in every respect completely qualified41 for this purpose: though I cannot, in this publication, specify54 the place; lest the enemy should anticipate, and take the advantage of our shameful55 neglect.
I am sensible it will be immediately exclaimed that we have already too many possessions in India; and that this is no time to increase our settlements there; and thereby to increase the drain of our native strength, as well as the expence of treasure.
But, to this, I answer, that this new establishment would not encrease the number of our capital settlements in India: on the contrary, it would diminish it, from four to three: for it would suppress, in the first place, Bombay; which is in every respect a truly useless settlement; and would therefore be exchanged for this new settlement; which would serve to connect the whole strength of this dominion; as well as to promote a variety of other very important purposes. In the second place, Bencolen would be reduced to the degree of a subordinate, immediately under the 171direction of the resident at this new settlement; and completely secure under its protection.
As to the drain of native strength, this establishment would, instead of adding, considerably56 decrease it: for the garrison, together with the artillery57, &c. of Bombay, would be transported thither58; as likewise would the better part of the garrison at Bencolen: and these two garrisons59, being placed there, would form an army of observation, for all our valuable possessions, as hath been described; consequently the territorial governments would not demand that degree of force, which is requisite at present, when each stands on its own bottom.
And with regard to the expence of treasure, I shall only observe that, it is most unaccountably absurd in Britain to send out to India, a squadron of 17 ships of the line, besides frigates60, (as she did in last war,) for the protection of her dominion and commerce in that country; which squadrons become evidently unprofitable to that purpose, through the circumstance of wanting a properly situated naval port; when less than a single year’s charge, of 172such squadron, would suffice to completely fit up a naval port, so situated as that, from thence, her naval force would completely effect its intended purpose. For I affirm, that the port which I propose would be completely fitted up, in every respect, as a naval port, for less expence than one year’s charge of such squadron; seeing that I do not propose docks, but platforms for careening, as at Batavia; and these are prepared, in infinitely61 less time, and at much less charge than docks; whilst they are far more convenient and expeditious62 for repairing large ships, than these docks at Bombay. And, as to the fortification immediately requisite, it would be but little expensive, and would demand but little time to rear it: because it would be perfectly accessible to the ships; and so, whilst it protected them, would be protected by them.
Moreover no part of the treasure, expended63 on originally fitting this naval port, would come immediately out of Britain’s proper treasury64; for the whole would be defrayed by the dependent dominion in India. And this new establishment would, in a very little time, not only support its 173own charge, but would richly reimburse65 Britain for her original cost. Seeing it would, in the first place, as a colony or settlement, yield her immediate treasure, together with sundry66 commodities peculiar67 to itself; and, in a little time, it would, under proper conduct, produce rich manufactures. In the second place, it would, as an Emporium, (for which purpose it is perfectly adapted by its situation,) greatly improve the commerce of Britain in India: and as a centrical magazine or warehouse68, for the commodities of China as well as India, it would reduce the term of the Company’s voyages to one year; and, thereby, reducing the expence of her carriage nearly one third, it would enable her to sell cheaper; and consequently advance her commerce in Europe. Likewise the Company’s ships rendezvousing69 and departing from this port for Europe, under proper convoy70, this would secure her trade from that imminent71 danger to which it is exposed, from her ships rendezvousing singly, at that button of an island, St. Helena: a circumstance that may, in the very first year of a French war, completely ruin this Company; as 174that enemy is now perfectly acquainted with her route. Now Bombay is perfectly useless to all these, and indeed to every other purpose; as can be readily demonstrated: and the whole benefit derived72 from it, as a colony or settlement, in the year, doth not suffice to defray one month’s expence.
But this new establishment, being once fitted up as a naval port, from whence the squadrons of Britain can, in either monsoon, command all her valuable possessions; this same establishment would, at same time, completely suit for the residence of that supreme intermediately superintending power. For this port is situated, at such a distance from all the territorial governments, as would suffice to effectually prevent the controuling power, from interfering73 in the immediate execution of government. And, having said that it is perfectly well situated for a naval port, it follows that the communication, betwixt it and all the parts of the British dominion in India, must be speedy and easy, in either monsoon: and consequently that, from this residence, this supreme power can effectually superintend, enforce, and controul the measures of political, as well 175as of military, government, in this whole dominion. And, being the center of naval defence, it must be the only proper center of land defence: seeing the squadron will be ever at hand, to transport its land force, to any part of this dominion, that may be in danger.
And thus have I accomplished74 that which I proposed: having planned the design of an intermediate power which, in such a situation as hath been described, would establish a completely regular system of government, civil as well as military, in the whole present or future dominion of Britain in India: nay which would, in the hands of national government, render the task of governing this Indian dominion, as facil and easy, as it is to govern the small Isle75 of Man. And, the seat of its residence being at same time the center of naval and land defence, it would completely connect the, otherwise, divided strength of the several governments: and would establish the general defence, upon a footing so secure, that no enemy, either European or native, would dare to attack British dominion in India. It likewise appears that the drain of native 176strength, requisite to maintain this whole dominion, would but little exceed that which Britain expends76 on maintaining the two barren fortresses77, of Gibraltar and St. Philips’s. Whilst no part of the pecuniary78 charge, of either establishing or afterwards supporting this system of government, nor yet of the land and even naval defence, would come out of the treasury of Britain; but would all be defrayed by the dependent dominion.
I have farther demonstrated the moral impossibility of governing and maintaining this Indian dominion, by means of the Company; upon any other terms, than these, of constituting her sovereign at home as well as abroad; and of conferring, upon her Directors, the sovereign execution of government in Britain, as well as in that dependent dominion.
And I have endeavoured to rouze and awake the nation, to some sense of, and regard to, the interest she holds in this Indian dominion; by a slight descriptive sketch79 of the nature, and degree, of benefit received by her from it, for some years past. And, as the sensation received from fact and experience makes ever a stronger 177impression on the mind, than that which is conveyed by speculative80 argument, I shall here again apply to the experience of the public, on this topic; which cannot be too much inculcated, nor presented in too many different points of view; at this truly critical juncture81, when nothing less than the most speedy application, of the most vigorous measures, can prevent the total loss, of this most important object to Britain; either through the final ruin of the countries themselves; or, otherwise, by the assault of enemies.
Britain feels a general failure of credit, not only in the East India Company, but in individuals: and this failure of credit she can ascribe to no other cause, than to some extraordinary defect of numerical circulation, or a deficiency of numerical specie, sufficient to support the wonted credit of paper. How happens this want of numerical specie to be so severely82 felt, all of a sudden; or from whence should such defect arise? Assuredly from a decrease of her wonted influx83 of numerical specie; whilst her drain of that specie continues to be at least the same as formerly84. But what channel or source, of 178Britain’s influx, hath been dried up so suddenly, as to create this surprizing failure of numerical circulation? We have shown it to originate in Indian dominion; which being, through misgovernment, reduced to a ruinous state, the consequent wonderful decrease of revenue, hath obliged the Company, to absorb and dry up that channel of Indian private fortunes; which, till within these two years, used to convey into Britain, by foreign Company’s bills, &c. at least 700,000 l. per annum, in numerical specie, or what is equivalent. And as Britain hath, during the two years that this channel was dried up, been continuing that drain, which she could barely support, when aided by that private fortune influx, it is plain that, within these two years, she must have diminished the standing85 stock of her numerical circulation, at least, 1,400,000 l. And one year, more of only an equally decreased degree of influx, will diminish her circulating stock 2,100,000 l. and so on. But a total deprivation86 of the influx received, for some years past, from Indian dominion, will, annually87, double the diminution of circulating stock.
179And, from this view, the nation may draw the following just inferences: first, the mighty value and importance, of this Indian dominion, to Britain; in point of financial aid; as well as in other weighty respects. Second, the mighty alteration88 of circumstances, in these Indian countries, since the time they became subjected to the dominion of the Company; as also, the present ruinous state of that dominion. And from these two inferences she may deduce, that conclusion which hath been just mentioned, that nothing less than the most speedy application of the most vigorous and effectual measures, can possibly save those countries from final ruin; and Britain from consequent bankruptcy89, poverty, loss of credit, of commerce, navigation, naval power, &c.
I have, in this hasty production, sketched90 out the nature of the necessary measures; but the application of these measures depends entirely91 upon the nation’s exerting her own attention. I am far from meaning to work upon the passions, I apply only to the reason and understanding of men; for had not respect to decorum, and to the dignity of government, restrained me, I 180might, on this subject, have thrown out many things, that must have excited discontent and indignation. Nevertheless the importance and urgency of the case obliges me to add, (and, without this, all I have said can avail nothing,) that unless the nation shall exert herself most vigorously in this her own dearest concern, she must not look for any such effectual measures, as will suffice to prevent these disasters.
For the nation must consider, that her present administration consists of the very men who transacted92, and (by their truly reverberating93 eccho) confirmed, to the Company, the second[2] grant of the Dewanny: knowing that this Dewanny was nothing other than the sovereignty of a 181mighty dominion, dependent upon the Crown, and Nation, of Britain: and, consequently that, by subjecting the numerous inhabitants of those countries to the dominion of a few merchants, incapable94 of administring any sort of government, they were consigning95 over to tyranny and anarchy96, intolerable oppression and ruin, many millions of men, who were, to all intents and purposes, subjects of Britain. And they are the men who, during the four years that elapsed since that grant, have furnished the force to support this tyranny and anarchy: and, in spite of——enacting a farce97, wherein the Directors were compelled to perform the same part in Europe, that the native Nabobs have exhibited in India. It cannot, therefore, be expected that they will, willingly, change their plan of conduct: seeing that, besides their former motives98, they have the additional one of obstinacy99; or shame of standing self-condemned, for past mismanagement, should they now alter their measures. It is rather to be supposed that they will continue the cloke of the Company; together with the Directorial farce: and that, to support 182the broken credit of the Company, (broken by collusive management,) they will, through eccho, grant her a power, to force her paper upon the public, for its money. As also that, under the pretext100 of honouring the nation with some share in the charge of this sovereignty, (under the Company, but no share in the profits,) they will gradually thrust her shoulders under that whole load, which, as the Company must manage it, will soon become intolerable. And, by the aid of these fresh reinforcements, they will juggle101 it and bungle102 it, and bungle it and juggle it on, for one, or possibly two, years longer: and then Nation and Company will both tumble together, into the pit of bankruptcy, perdition, and despair.
But shall the nation, with eyes open, suffer the pilot to crowd stemlings on the rocks, which have already grazed the ship’s bottom? No, we must about ship, and call another hand to the helm. Matters, it is to be hoped, are not yet past remedy; the channel is obvious; if the nation will but put to her hand. His Majesty103 can have no real interest but what is common with that of his people: and, 183however the views of the Crown may, in some cases, differ a little from these of the people; in this particular case they must both exactly concur. He will, here, hearken to the voice of his people: and a little popular heat will force into administration something of that patriotic104 ambition, fire, spirit, and enterprize, which alone can save this nation from dreadful impending misfortunes.
But if the nation, sunk in the bed of slavish sloth105, inebriated106 with the transforming Circean cap, enervated107 and emasculated by the lewd108 embraces of sensual pleasure, shall slight and disregard her own dearest concerns: like the prodigal109 debauchee, who chides110 from him the faithful friend that attempts recalling him to sober reflection; and implicitly111 confides112 in the management of a steward113, who hath already wasted the better part of his fair patrimony114: then let the nation, some two or three years hence, recollect115, that she was advised of her danger, by a hasty production, issued about the middle of January, 1773: though not thought of, until that most disinterested116 of all possible ministers had, by way of remedying all evils, 184dispatched his Secret Committee to the India House: there to inspect the Company’s private ?conomy: a thing, with which neither law, justice, government, nor nation hath any thing to do; and which, unless in cases of bankruptcy, is sacred to the meanest individual. As if, from the Company’s books of accounts, it was possible to discover the cause of abuse in the government of those Indian dominions: or, as if schemes of saving to the Company, one shilling per ton, freight of her cargoes117: or, three pence per pound, in warehouse room, would retrieve118 the, almost ruined, Interest of Britain in India.
FINIS.
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defective
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| adj.有毛病的，有问题的，有瑕疵的 | |
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perfectly
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| adv.完美地，无可非议地，彻底地 | |
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immediate
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extravagant
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heartily
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concur
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| v.同意，意见一致，互助，同时发生 | |
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ammunition
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| n.军火，弹药 | |
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diminution
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industriously
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protracted
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plunder
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| vt.劫掠财物，掠夺；n.劫掠物，赃物；劫掠 | |
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peculation
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lodged
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| v.存放( lodge的过去式和过去分词 )；暂住；埋入；（权利、权威等）归属 | |
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constituent
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thereby
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hatred
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jealousy
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amicable
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supreme
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territorial
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supremely
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dominions
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| 统治权( dominion的名词复数 )； 领土； 疆土； 版图 | |
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dominion
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nay
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tempted
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avarice
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situated
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28
mighty
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| adj.强有力的；巨大的 | |
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29
obstruction
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| n.阻塞，堵塞；障碍物 | |
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30
naval
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| adj.海军的，军舰的，船的 | |
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31
monsoon
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| n.季雨，季风，大雨 | |
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32
obstructed
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| 阻塞( obstruct的过去式和过去分词 )； 堵塞； 阻碍； 阻止 | |
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33
eastward
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| adv.向东；adj.向东的；n.东方，东部 | |
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34
augment
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| vt.(使)增大，增加，增长，扩张 | |
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35
necessitate
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| v.使成为必要，需要 | |
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36
obviated
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| v.避免，消除（贫困、不方便等）( obviate的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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37
impending
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| a.imminent, about to come or happen | |
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38
garrison
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| n.卫戍部队；驻地，卫戍区；vt.派(兵)驻防 | |
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39
honourably
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| adv.可尊敬地，光荣地，体面地 | |
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40
possessed
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| adj.疯狂的；拥有的，占有的 | |
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41
qualified
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| adj.合格的，有资格的，胜任的，有限制的 | |
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42
remains
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| n.剩余物，残留物；遗体，遗迹 | |
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43
requisite
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| adj.需要的，必不可少的；n.必需品 | |
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44
embarked
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| 乘船( embark的过去式和过去分词 )； 装载； 从事 | |
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45
subsist
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| vi.生存，存在，供养 | |
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46
retired
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| adj.隐退的，退休的，退役的 | |
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47
scour
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| v.搜索；擦，洗，腹泻，冲刷 | |
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48
opposition
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| n.反对，敌对 | |
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49
thoroughly
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| adv.完全地，彻底地，十足地 | |
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50
apprehended
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| 逮捕，拘押( apprehend的过去式和过去分词 )； 理解 | |
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51
incur
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| vt.招致，蒙受，遭遇 | |
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52
putrid
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| adj.腐臭的；有毒的；已腐烂的；卑劣的 | |
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53
expedient
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| adj.有用的，有利的；n.紧急的办法，权宜之计 | |
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54
specify
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| vt.指定，详细说明 | |
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55
shameful
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| adj.可耻的，不道德的 | |
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56
considerably
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| adv.极大地；相当大地；在很大程度上 | |
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57
artillery
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| n.(军)火炮，大炮；炮兵(部队) | |
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58
thither
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| adv.向那里；adj.在那边的，对岸的 | |
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59
garrisons
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| 守备部队，卫戍部队( garrison的名词复数 ) | |
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60
frigates
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| n.快速军舰( frigate的名词复数 ) | |
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61
infinitely
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| adv.无限地，无穷地 | |
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62
expeditious
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| adj.迅速的，敏捷的 | |
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63
expended
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| v.花费( expend的过去式和过去分词 )；使用（钱等）做某事；用光；耗尽 | |
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64
treasury
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| n.宝库；国库，金库；文库 | |
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65
reimburse
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| v.补偿，付还 | |
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66
sundry
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| adj.各式各样的，种种的 | |
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67
peculiar
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| adj.古怪的，异常的；特殊的，特有的 | |
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68
warehouse
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| n.仓库；vt.存入仓库 | |
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69
rendezvousing
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| v.约会，会合( rendezvous的现在分词 ) | |
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70
convoy
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| vt.护送，护卫，护航；n.护送；护送队 | |
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imminent
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| adj.即将发生的，临近的，逼近的 | |
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72
derived
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| vi.起源；由来；衍生；导出v.得到( derive的过去式和过去分词 )；（从…中）得到获得；源于；（从…中）提取 | |
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73
interfering
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| adj. 妨碍的 动词interfere的现在分词 | |
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74
accomplished
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| adj.有才艺的；有造诣的；达到了的 | |
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75
isle
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| n.小岛，岛 | |
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76
expends
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| v.花费( expend的第三人称单数 )；使用（钱等）做某事；用光；耗尽 | |
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77
fortresses
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| 堡垒，要塞( fortress的名词复数 ) | |
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78
pecuniary
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| adj.金钱的；金钱上的 | |
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79
sketch
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| n.草图；梗概；素描；v.素描；概述 | |
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speculative
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| adj.思索性的，暝想性的，推理的 | |
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81
juncture
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| n.时刻，关键时刻，紧要关头 | |
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82
severely
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| adv.严格地；严厉地；非常恶劣地 | |
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83
influx
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| n.流入，注入 | |
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84
formerly
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| adv.从前，以前 | |
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85
standing
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| n.持续，地位；adj.永久的，不动的，直立的，不流动的 | |
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86
deprivation
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| n.匮乏；丧失；夺去，贫困 | |
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87
annually
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| adv.一年一次，每年 | |
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88
alteration
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| n.变更，改变；蚀变 | |
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89
bankruptcy
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| n.破产；无偿付能力 | |
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90
sketched
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| v.草拟（sketch的过去式与过去分词形式） | |
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91
entirely
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| ad.全部地，完整地；完全地，彻底地 | |
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92
transacted
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| v.办理（业务等）( transact的过去式和过去分词 )；交易，谈判 | |
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93
reverberating
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| 回响，回荡( reverberate的现在分词 )； 使反响，使回荡，使反射 | |
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94
incapable
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| adj.无能力的，不能做某事的 | |
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95
consigning
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| v.把…置于（令人不快的境地）( consign的现在分词 )；把…托付给；把…托人代售；丟弃 | |
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96
anarchy
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| n.无政府状态；社会秩序混乱，无秩序 | |
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97
farce
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| n.闹剧，笑剧，滑稽戏；胡闹 | |
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98
motives
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| n.动机，目的( motive的名词复数 ) | |
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99
obstinacy
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| n.顽固；（病痛等）难治 | |
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100
pretext
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| n.借口，托词 | |
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101
juggle
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| v.变戏法，纂改，欺骗，同时做；n.玩杂耍，纂改，花招 | |
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102
bungle
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| v.搞糟；n.拙劣的工作 | |
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103
majesty
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| n.雄伟，壮丽，庄严，威严；最高权威，王权 | |
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104
patriotic
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| adj.爱国的，有爱国心的 | |
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105
sloth
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| n.[动]树懒；懒惰，懒散 | |
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106
inebriated
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| adj.酒醉的 | |
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107
enervated
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| adj.衰弱的，无力的v.使衰弱，使失去活力( enervate的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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108
lewd
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| adj.淫荡的 | |
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109
prodigal
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| adj.浪费的，挥霍的，放荡的 | |
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110
chides
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| v.责骂，责备( chide的第三人称单数 ) | |
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111
implicitly
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| adv. 含蓄地, 暗中地, 毫不保留地 | |
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112
confides
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| v.吐露（秘密，心事等）( confide的第三人称单数 )；（向某人）吐露（隐私、秘密等） | |
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113
steward
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| n.乘务员，服务员；看管人；膳食管理员 | |
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114
patrimony
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| n.世袭财产，继承物 | |
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115
recollect
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| v.回忆，想起，记起，忆起，记得 | |
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116
disinterested
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| adj.不关心的，不感兴趣的 | |
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117
cargoes
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| n.（船或飞机装载的）货物( cargo的名词复数 )；大量，重负 | |
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118
retrieve
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| vt.重新得到，收回；挽回，补救；检索 | |
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