But we find that, upon the Company’s system, the distance of situation renders 109the influence of the sovereign altogether impotent to this effect: and if we should take it for granted that her system hath been just or complete, then must we conclude, that this sovereign impotence is a consequence naturally and unavoidably arising from the distance; and, therefore, above the remedy of art. But, if we consult our own reason, we shall perceive that the Company’s impotence, in that particular respect, proceeded from a radical11 defect or error in her system; which might have been remedied by art. For, it is evident, that the distance of situation was in every circumstance similarly and equally obstructive to the Company’s immediately or personally executing the government of that Indian dominion, as it was to her immediately restraining or enforcing the manner of execution: and yet we find that the Directors could discover a remedy for the first of these obstructions13, by the succedaneum of appointing a deputed executive government. And, as the second sprung from the same cause, and was exactly similar in its nature, common sense must surely have instructed her, that it was to be removed by a similar remedy; 110it being certain that, if the Directors had thought proper to institute in India a deputation properly qualified15 to controul their executive deputation, the measures of those Indian governments might have been enforced or retrained by the sovereign rending16 in Europe, as effectually as they have been executed by the same sovereign: that is to say, as effectually, as the defective17 constitution of the Company, (which equally disqualified her for controuling as for executing,) could admit.
But it could not be ignorance, or want of common sense, that prevented the Directors from instituting a controuling deputation of this nature: seeing they had before them the precedent18 of these other European nations, who hold any possessions in India: all of whom have provided something of this kind: for instance, the Dutch government at Batavia. Sound policy quickly pointed19 out to the Dutch, the absurdity20 of committing the charge of their dispersed21 concerns in India, to a multiplicity of distinct heads, all acting22 under no other constraint23, or restraint, than that of the Company’s Directors residing in 111Europe. Therefore, so soon as the Dutch Company began to extend her possessions in India, she instituted one supreme government at Batavia, with full powers, and authority, to direct and controul the executive government of all her other settlements. And this government acts in India as an intermediate power, betwixt the Company residing in Europe, and her various possessions in that distant country; and as the perpetual residentiary supervisor24 of all her interests there. The Directors communicate all their purposes immediately to it; and it disperses25 orders and instructions to all the subordinate governments; which again transmit to it a regular account of their situation, wants, or transactions. All governors, chiefs, &c. are immediately responsible to it: all appointments to, and removals from, office in the subordinates, are made immediately by it: and all complaints or appeals, against the misconduct or injustice26 of these governors, are immediately addressed to it. In fine, it may be termed the center of the Dutch government in India. And though this government can in no shape be termed the complete model of a deputation, fit 112to controul or enforce the execution of sovereign government, in various territorial27 dominions28; yet, to this institution, defective as it is, the Dutch owe it, that the government of their numerous subordinate possessions in India hath been conducted, for about two hundred years, clear of any enormous abuse.
But if the Dutch and other European nations, which hold little other concern in India than a few settlements established there for the purpose of commerce, found it necessary, for the regular management of these commercial concerns, to institute a sort of intermediate supreme power, as a local check on the rest of their settlements: how much more incumbent29 was it on the English Company, to constitute an immediate directing and controuling power, over the conduct of her deputies, who were entrusted30 with the charge of executing the sovereign government, of sundry31 mighty32 states; a charge of such superior intricacy, weight, importance, and delicacy33; and so very liable to be abused.
What may have been the motive34 of the Directors for thus wilfully35 omitting an institution 113so evidently useful and necessary, I shall not pretend to determine. Possibly they might apprehend37 that if, upon their acquiring this mighty sovereign dominion, they should alter that which had been all along their commercial system, such alteration38 might induce the nation to enquire39 into the cause of it, and so discover the nature of their dominion, which they have ever carefully hid from the public. Though, it is more probable, they might perceive, that the institution of such an intermediate power would greatly interfere40 with their own personal influence, power, and emoluments41; seeing it must have possessed43 the immediate disposal of places and posts, as well as a considerable share in the direction of affairs: and, in order to prevent this, they preserved to themselves the power, of immediately superintending, and directing, the execution of government in those Indian dominions.
But whatever the motive of the Directors may have been, it is certain, that the want of a deputed controuling power in India, hath been a radical and grievous defect in their system: which hath produced 114a number of those evils that have been falsely ascribed to the distance of situation. And though we are far from alledging, that it was possible for the Company to establish in those countries a government in any degree regular, seeing that the numerous natural defects in her constitution, unavoidably producing many destructive abuses, must have ever proved an insuperable obstacle to that; yet do we affirm that, the institution of a duly qualified intermediate controuling power, would have totally prevented some, and would have greatly diminished most, of these enormous abuses which, upon the system of the Directors, have served to ruin those countries.
Now we have seen that the national government would, by taking upon itself the charge of administring that Indian government, remedy or suppress all the abuses that have sprung from the defective constitution of the Company, (besides creating other circumstances of high utility, that could not exist under the Company’s government.) And as the distance of situation, preventing the sovereign from immediately exerting his supreme influence 115over the deputed executive government, is the only remaining cause of evil or abuse; it is plain that, if it is possible to construct in India, a deputed power, upon such principles, as that it shall effectually and completely supply the place of the sovereign, in immediately directing, enforcing, and controuling the measures of the deputed executive government, then must the only obstruction14 to the establishment of a regular political system, be remedied and removed. Consequently the grand desideratum, the only thing that is wanting, to enable the national government of Britain to regularly administer the government of those Indian dominions, is the institution of a deputed controuling power in India, properly qualified to fulfil the purposes that have been here specified44.
And that it is possible, to constitute an intermediate power in India, that shall effectually and faithfully direct, enforce, and controul the measures of the deputed executive government in those Indian dominions, I doubt not to evince: though, at same time, I am fully36 sensible of the many real difficulties, arising from nature 116and circumstance, to obstruct12 it; as likewise of the many artificial difficulties proceeding45 from the endeavours of those who have an interest to obstruct such a measure; and who have influence to enforce their objections, however futile46, on the understanding of others.
But before we proceed to describe the plan upon which we mean to construct this controuling deputation, it will be necessary to explain the extent of its charge, or number of the government’s composing that dominion which it is meant to controul. For tho’, in our description of the Company’s government in India, we confined our account to that of Bengal alone, as being the most important and best known part of her dominion; yet doth the Company possess, besides Bengal, certain other territorial governments, of no small value and importance, in respect of either revenue or commerce. All which governments being formed upon the same system as that of Bengal, do not less demand reform, supervision48, and controul.
For, in the first place, the government of Madrass possesses a very considerable 117and valuable territorial dominion, avowedly49 in the name and right of the Company. This same government doth likewise, in every thing beside the name, possess the absolute sovereignty of that rich commercial province of Arcot, or the Carnatic, in which it is situated50: for, notwithstanding it tolerates a nominal51 Nabob, whose name it uses in most acts of government; and who, consequently, for the Company’s convenience, possesses the shadow of sovereignty; yet, as the government of Madrass holds the charge of defending the country, and maintains the military force requisite52 thereto, it is the actual sovereign: seeing that, in all Indian or Asiatic governments, he who holds the sword must be the absolute lord and master. And, notwithstanding all the Company’s parade of appearances, this Nabob of Arcot is, in respect of sovereign power, as much a pageant53 as he of Bengal: a mere54 screen or blind, placed before the Company’s sovereignty.
Bombay is likewise embarked55 in dominion, since it seized on the rich commercial city of Surat, with its district, &c. Though sound policy must direct Britain 118to reprobate56 all territorial dominion on that side of the peninsula; as causing a dangerous division and weakening of her force and defence.
But the same policy will instruct Britain to regard dominion on the east side of that peninsula in an opposite light; because, on that side lay all the truly valuable dominions which she already possesses.
To fully explain what is the true interest of Britain, respecting territorial dominion in India, would be, here, foreign and tedious; and, to slightly touch on that subject, might afford ground for censure57 and criticism: we shall only observe, in the general, that Britain ought to value only such dominion in India as is maritime58: because, in the first place, these are ever trading and manufacturing countries; and, as such, are highly useful to her proper commerce; they are likewise capacitated, by their own active foreign trade, to richly reimburse59 her for her expence of native strength in defending them, as well as for her trouble in governing them: and, in the second place, being accessible to her naval60 force, they are easily maintained and defended by her. Therefore, so much 119of this maritime dominion as she can maintain and defend, without creating any additional expence of native strength; and, upon a footing so connected with that truly valuable dominion which she already possesses, as not to cause any dangerous division of that original strength, so much of this maritime dominion in India may be truly useful and advantageous61 to her; on any other terms it may be detrimental63.
Such is the present state of British dominion in India: and such is the interest of Britain, with respect to future augmentation of dominion in that country. And we have undertaken to plan the construction of an intermediate power or deputation, which, under the national government of Britain, shall effectually and faithfully superintend, enforce, and controul the measures of these several governments that, at present are, or in future may be, subjected to Britain: and which deputation shall of course, in the first place, enable the national government of Britain to establish a regular system of political government over this whole present or future dominion: and, in the second place, shall constitute a complete system of 120military government, and secure defence, for all the several branches of this dominion. At present we are on the subject of political government.
The properties requisite to qualify this intermediate power, or deputation, for effectually superintending, enforcing, and controuling the political government of dominion in India, are, first, virtue64 and integrity, to faithfully and honestly discharge the duties of its office: and, second, power or ability, to effectually fulfil the purpose of its institution. The latter is more easily conferred; but the former is rendered difficult, by sundry obstructions, arising from the nature or disposition of the persons who must necessarily be employed to compose this deputation. For it is needless to observe, that this controuling power cannot be lodged65 in the subjects native of the dependent dominion; the nature of the government, as well as the nature of their disposition, rendering66 that impracticable; (as hath been shewn): otherwise this difficulty might be more easily surmounted67. But, the Indian subjects being set aside, there remains68 no choice; this controuling deputation must, 121per force, be composed of British born subjects: whilst the several governments, which it is meant to controul, are at same time executed by British born subjects. And, from this circumstance, it follows, that the personal interest of the party controuling must naturally be the very same, with that of the party controuled: and, of course, the views of both must likewise be the same.
This similarity or sameness of personal interest and views it is that creates the difficulty of conferring virtue, integrity, honour, and fidelity69, on the controuling deputation. For it is morally certain, that the similarity of interest and views will, naturally and invariably, draw the party controuling, to concur70 and join, instead of controuling or opposing, the measures of the party executing, (seeing such measures tend to promote that which is their common interest) provided that this party controuling shall possess the power, and opportunity of so joining interest, with the party executing. And it is no less certain, that this controuling deputation must, unavoidably, possess the opportunity of thus joining interests, unless it can, 122by some means, be prevented and restrained from joining and uniting the action of its own proper powers, with the action of these powers that are proper to the executive office. Whereas, if it shall be found possible to divide and separate the action of these two different powers, the one from the other, in a manner so distinct, that each shall act, in the sphere assigned to it, with freedom and liberty; and neither shall have the opportunity of transgressing71 the limits prescribed, to its own proper department, by the sovereign; then, and in such case, it is not only possible, but certain, that this controuling deputation may, and will be, prevented from joining interests, with the executive deputation; and, consequently, from promoting the very measures which it was meant to restrain. And, from thence I conclude, that the only possible and certain means of conferring, on this controuling deputation, virtue and integrity to faithfully and honestly discharge the duties of its office, is to cut it off from all opportunity of joining the powers of its office, with those of the executive; or of assuming any share in the executive government: 123in other words, it must be restrained from interfering72, either directly or indirectly73, personally or by proxy74, in the immediate execution of measures, in any one of these governments which it is meant to controul.
But it is evident that, if this controuling deputation shall exist or reside within any one of those dominions whose government it is meant to controul, it will be morally impossible to prevent it from joining its powers, and, consequently, its interests, views, and measures, with the deputed executive power of that government where it resides. For, by virtue of its authority, which from the nature of its office must needs be supreme over the executive deputation, it will usurp75 at least a part if not the whole power of execution: or otherwise it will, by consent, join and unite its powers with those of the executive, in order to promote their mutual76 interest, by measures diametrically repugnant to the purpose of its institution. Nor is it possible, in this case, by any art, device or separation into parts, to prevent this usurpation77 or union: let the controuling power be termed judges, supervisors78, 124officers of the revenue, or what else; and let the office of controuling be divided, into as many parts as can be conceived; still, the difference of term, will not alter the nature of the men employed; nor will the division of parts separate their interest. All the various persons, composing this office, will still be Europeans; the same as these who compose the executive office; and so, all the persons in both offices will be foreign to the country governed, acting by an authority which is deputed mutable and temporary; consequently they will all hold the same view; which is, to amass79 all the money they can during the short term of their office, in order to transport it to their own country: and as all of them would, by virtue of their residing within the same government, possess the same powers, and the same opportunities of exerting them, they would all be irresistably attracted, by the omnipotent80 sympathy of self-interest, to join their several powers, in promoting that which is the common view of one and all of them. In fine, if these controuling and executive deputations, which thus, from the community of the natale 125solum, hold one and the same interest, shall both reside together in one and the same government, and thereby81 possess the same opportunities, it will be equally impossible to prevent these two deputations, however artfully separated into parts, from joining and uniting their different powers, &c. as it is to preserve separate the gutt? of quicksilver; which, however gently and carefully they are dropt upon the same confined and smooth surface, will meet, join, and conglobate into one united mass. But if the controuling deputation shall be thus permitted to join its powers with these of the executive, and consequently forfeit82 its virtue and integrity, with respect to that one territorial government where it resides, it thereby becomes disqualified and unfit to controul the measures of any one other government: for the judge who is himself corrupt83, is but little qualified to judge or punish corruption84 in others. I therefore conclude that, in order to preserve the virtue and integrity of this controuling deputation, it is indispensably necessary that it should not reside within the limits of any one of these territorial governments; 126these being the governments which it is meant to controul.
On the other hand, it is equally certain, that this controuling deputation cannot execute in person, or assume any personal share in the execution of measures, in any one of those governments where it doth not actually reside; it being impossible that it can act personally where it is not personally present. It therefore follows that, by situating or placing this controuling deputation at a sufficiently85 proper distance from all these several territorial governments, it may be prevented from assuming a personal share in the immediate execution of measures in any one of them. And being thus, by the situation of its residence, cut off from all opportunity of acting personally, it may likewise be precluded86 from acting secondarily, or usurping87 by proxy any influence, in the immediate execution of these governments, if it shall, after the manner of the Dutch government at Batavia, be strictly88 prohibited from exercising its supervising authority any where without the limits of its own fixed89 residence; and from delegating or deputing its powers to any person or persons, 127its own members or others, who shall reside, or may be beyond these prescribed bounds. For though the system of the Dutch government at Batavia is, in many respects, far too rude and unpolished; yet is it, in this particular, most nicely circumscribed90: that government being restrained, in the most precise manner, from delegating and transferring its authority; or from deputing any power to examine into cases, of even the most dubious91 nature, within the subordinates: but to obviate92 any inconvenience, that might otherwise arise from such restraint, it hath a power to call before it, from the subordinates, all persons or records necessary to information. For the Dutch were well aware, that the supreme government, if it should be permitted to carry its supervising authority on any pretext93 into the subordinates, would gain an occasion of interfering in the execution of those measures which it was intended to controul.
We must then perceive, that this controuling deputation being seated at a properly sufficient distance from all these territorial governments, and the exercise of its powers being expressly confined to that 128particular seat of residence, it will, by such means, be effectually restrained from interfering, in any shape, either directly or indirectly, in the execution of any one of those governments which it is intended to controul. And we must farther perceive that, by virtue of such effectual restraint, that clear separation of office, which alone can prevent the junction94 or union of the powers, interests, and views of this controuling deputation with those of the executive, will be completely accomplished95. Seeing that, the action of the controuling power being strictly confined within the limits of its own proper sphere, the executive power must remain at full liberty to act distinctly and freely in the office assigned to it by the sovereign.
The principal source of corruption, and grand stumbling block of virtue, being thus removed, the integrity of this controuling deputation may be established on a firm and solid basis, by skilfully96 dividing the parts which go to compose it: and, in particular, by clearly separating the political and judicial98 powers: which, if they shall be judiciously99 divided into two distinct departments, mutually independent and 129uninfluenced, will, each of them, act as an effectual check, and powerful impulse, on the other: so as to prevent either from abusing its authority, or neglecting its duty. Whereas, if the political power should, at same time, possess the power of judging, trying and determining, or should even possess any influence over the judicature, there is danger that it might, on some occasions, sacrifice its duty to its interest. And this is the very capital error of the Dutch system at Batavia, inasmuch as that government, possessing the judicial power, hath thereby the opportunity of perverting101 justice, sometimes to the prejudice of its constituent102, and often to the detriment62 of its subordinates.
Nor would we be here understood to signify, by judicial power, a simple court of judicature, established for the purpose of deciding litigated cases of property; the judicial power here meant, must extend to every thing that respects a due execution of the jurisdiction103 and police, in the subordinate governments. Therefore its authority must not be passive, and confined to such matter as shall come before it by complaint; but it must be active, assuming 130cognizance of all public nuisance, trespass104, or delinquency, that may be brought before it by information. For, here, juries may exist with great propriety105 and efficacy, seeing that the Company will, on account of her commerce, keep a number of servants at this supreme settlement; there will likewise be, no doubt, many free merchants (as they are termed): and, consequently, there will never be wanting a choice of persons unconnected with, and uninfluenced by the political government; and therefore fit to form a grand inquest; as well as petit or special juries, to decide in either criminal cases, or disputes of property. And this judicial power must farther be endued106 with all proper and necessary officers; particularly an attorney general: it must likewise be divided into distinct courts; resembling, as nearly as circumstances will admit, or occasion requires, the courts of justice in the sovereign country.
Nevertheless, we do not presume to dictate107 or prescribe the exact or complete form of this judicial power: we would only hint at the main purposes of its institution; a due consideration of which will readily 131suggest the particular form, to those whose province it may be to construct it. We shall only observe that, in order to confer a due weight on the judicial power, it is not sufficient that it should be independent, in its corporate108 capacity; the judges and officers composing it must, in their personal capacity, be placed as far as possible beyond the influence of the political power. The salaries annexed109 to their offices must be such as will afford dignity, as well as independance: whilst, on the other hand, they shall be debarred, under the severest penalties, from holding, either directly or indirectly, any place, post, emolument42, or employment, of any nature, distinct from that of its own proper department. Moreover, the political power should hold no voice in conferring the degrees of this department: that should be vested in the judicial power itself, with reference to the confirmation110 of the sovereign.
This judicial power may be termed the supreme Court of Judicature, for the whole British dominion in India: to which all the subjects, under the several governments, whether natives or Europeans, may 132readily appeal, against the oppression of their governors, or the perversion111 of justice: and, on which they may securely depend for redress112; provided it shall be placed above the influence of the political power. This supreme court of judicature would likewise be of inexpressible utility, as a check on the power, and an impulse on the will, of the political branch.
We may add, that a judicious100 subdivision of the political power, into different departments, might contribute considerably113 to its virtue.
These are the outlines of that measure, by which we propose to preserve this controuling deputation free from corruption: and we doubt not but, upon this plan, when meliorated and improved by the superior understanding of others, a controuling power may be constructed, which shall be completely qualified, in point of virtue and integrity, to faithfully and honourably114 superintend, enforce, and controul the execution of political government in those Indian dominions. And this is, by far, the most difficult, delicate, and important part of the undertaking115.
133For, as to the power and ability, requisite to qualify this deputation for effectually fulfilling the purpose of its institution, that is readily bestowed116. The degree of power is altogether in the disposal of the sovereign. And, its efficacy or ability depends, principally, upon the choice of such a situation for the seat of its residence, as shall enable it to keep up, at all seasons, a ready and speedy correspondence with the several subordinate governments,
With regard to the choice of situation proper for the residence of this controuling power; (which is indeed a point of high importance,) we shall readily conceive, from adverting117 to its nature and the purposes of its institution, that this residence ought to be some convenient sea port; situated at a considerable distance from the limits of all these territorial governments; but, at same time, so centrically near to each, that the communication, to and from it, shall, in either monsoon118, be not only practicable, but certain and speedy. I shall reserve the farther explanation of this intended seat of residence, till I come to treat of the military 134system; because there are some properties, particularly requisite to a proper centre of military defence: and it is proposed that the same power, and consequently the same residence, that superintends the political government, should likewise direct the military government and defence, of this dominion.
But this supreme controuling power being thus centrically situated, with respect to the several subordinates, as that it shall at all times hold a ready and speedy correspondence with each, will be thereby enabled to effectually superintend, enforce, and controul the execution of political government in that whole dominion. For, in the first place, the ready and speedy communication with all the subordinates, affording to the supreme power an opportunity of obtaining, from each, the most early intelligence of every transaction, incident, or occurrence; as likewise of immediately transmitting the orders and instructions, that may be suitable to the occasion; will cut off from the several governors of the territorial dominions all pretext for acting discretionally. And, in consequence, that despotic and arbitrary 135power, which hath subsisted120 under the Company’s system, will be completely suppressed. And, from adverting to this circumstance, we shall perceive the importance of a proper choice of situation, for this supreme center of government.
In the second place, this ready correspondence with all the subordinate governments, enabling the supreme power to acquire a minute and complete knowledge of every circumstance, respecting the state and nature of the general police, in this whole dominion, will qualify it for originally planning, and for afterwards improving, all such designs and measures as can contribute to the institution of regularity121 and good order. It will likewise attain122 an intimate knowledge of the whole manoeuvre123 of finance, respecting the mode of collecting as well as appropriating the revenue and taxes: and it will be thereby enabled to project judicious forms, with different offices, as mutual checks upon each other, in that branch: which will serve to remedy that incredible extortion, rapine, and peculation124: which, by ruining the farmer of the lands, hath almost totally suppressed agriculture, and greatly 136depopulated those miserable125 countries; whilst it hath grievously defrauded126 the sovereign of his right. And all these planned modes, being approved and confirmed by the sovereign, would be continued in vigorous and perpetual action, by the vicinity of the supreme political power: and all these several measures, being enacted127 into laws, the strict observance of them would be effectually enforced by the same vicinity. And thus, that supreme power will, not only establish, but perpetually conserve128 a just regularity in police, and an exact oeconomy in finance.
In the third place, the supreme judicial power will, by its neighbourhood to these dependent dominions, acquire a just knowledge of the modes, customs, and dispositions129 of the inhabitants; and, by that, it will be enabled to devise the best forms or offices, together with skilful97 rules for administring the jurisdiction, in a manner truly effectual, and at same time consonant130 and agreeable to the humour of the subject. It will likewise be capable of afterwards improving and adding to these forms and rules, as future occasion may require, or better information may suggest. All 137which forms or offices may, by the approbation131 of the sovereign, be established into standing47 courts; and the rules enacted into laws. And a punctual observance of all these laws enacted, either for the regular administration of justice, or conservance of the police, will be completely enforced, by the awe132 of this supreme tribunal: the communication with which, from all parts of that dependent dominion, being easy and speedy, will afford a ready access and opportunity to all the subjects, of presenting their complaints, against any oppression of their government, or denial, or perversion of justice: whilst the same ready communication will render the trial of all litigated cases, speedy and easy. A mighty innovation this, from the former mode of justice in those dominions; when it was impossible for even Europeans to obtain redress, in our distant precise European courts, against the most glaring oppression of government: and the natives were excluded from even that distant and deceitful prospect133 of remedy.
And in order that the course of justice may be rendered thoroughly134 complete, it 138may be enacted, after the manner of the Dutch, that no person, who hath held any office of power or trust within the subordinates, shall depart immediately from thence for Europe; but shall be obliged to repair to the supreme residence; there to remain for three months; to the end that any person or persons who may, by any means, have been restrained, during the existence of his office, from preferring their complaint against him, on the score of either public or private trespass, may there have the free opportunity of prosecuting135 him.
The supreme political power shall immediately appoint to all offices, as well political as military, within the subordinate governments; with reference held to the future approbation, and confirmation, of the sovereign: and it shall preserve regular minutes of all such appointments, orders, and other transactions made in its supreme capacity; which minutes, together with regular and properly vouched136 accounts of the collection, as well as the appropriation137 of the revenue, shall be punctually transmitted, by every occasion, to the sovereign. The judicial power 139shall likewise keep an exact register of all trials, causes, and proceedings138; more particularly those of the grand inquest and assizes: this latter to be signed by all the judges and officers of the court, and attested139 by the foremen, with a majority of the juries: two copies of which shall be regularly transmitted to Britain; one to the sovereign; and the other to the Company; which, as holding a material interest and share in these law proceedings, hath a claim to such participation140 of knowledge. All which minutes, accounts, and proceedings, being communicated to the sovereign, will enable him to act as an ultimate check on the political government, the finance, and the jurisdiction of that Indian dominion.
Such is the form of this intermediate power, through which I propose to convey, into the execution of government in those distant Indian dominions, that plenary exertion of the sovereign’s restraining and compelling power, which, alone, can suffice to prevent tyranny and anarchy. And notwithstanding the materials are, through hurry and want of time, rude, unpolished and coarsely arranged, yet do I flatter myself, 140that candour will allow them to be solidly good, proper, and fully sufficing to construct, at least, the groundplot, or basis, of a regular political system. Sure I am, the high propriety, nay141 the indispensable necessity of such a measure, must immediately strike every person who employs his own judgment142, however slightly, to consider, first, the nature, interests, and views of the executive government in those Indian dominions; as being foreign, deputed, mutable, and temporary. Second the timid, passive, and slavishly submissive disposition of the native subjects. And third, the distance of situation, betwixt the sovereign residence, and the scene of government; which, rendering the immediate restraint and constraint of the sovereign perfectly143 impotent, confers on this foreign executive deputation an unlimited and arbitrary power, of promoting its own personal views and interest, by measures, which tend to the intolerable oppression of the wretched inhabitants, and the utter ruin of those subjected countries; as well as to the mighty detriment of Britain’s dearest interest, and the blackest reproach 141to her reputation. Nor can all this be remedied or prevented, but by such a measure as is here proposed.
And now we shall take a slight glance at the operation of this measure, on the jurisdiction, and police, of the subordinate dominions. And though, for the sake of perspicuity144, we confine the view to Bengal alone, as being the most eminent145 part, yet will the effects be equally felt through the whole.
As to the fundamental establishments of Governors, Councils, &c. these are sufficiently obvious; as likewise are the proper chambers146 of revenue: and these, with the minuti? appointments of inferior offices, will be more properly provided and improved, by the better judgment, true information, and future experience of the supreme controuling power. Here we mean to offer only one or two hints on the mode of jurisdiction and police.
And first, with regard to the courts of justice, I should propose that the mayor’s court at Culcutta should still subsist119, as a court of equity147 for the whole country: and a most equitable148 court it is, if properly regulated: for the truth of which assertion, 142I appeal to all those who knew it previous to that alteration of the Company’s charter of justice, which rendered it dependent on, and subservient149 to, the Governor and Council: never was justice more exactly or more expeditiously150 administered, than it was by this court, previous to that alteration. In order therefore to restore it to its primitive151 utility, it ought to be restored to its original state. Let the judges or aldermen, who at present compose it, continue such: being servants to the Company, or free merchants, they must be unconnected with, and uninfluenced by the national government. And, in the case of death, or removal, the vacuum to be supplied by the court itself, from amongst the Company’s servants, or free merchants only: and if any alderman shall, subsequent to entering on his office, accept of any post or place under government, let that be an express disqualification and vacation of his office; which is to be immediately made good, by the choice of another person, properly qualified. The newly elected aldermen to be presented, for acceptance, to the supreme 143court of judicature only. And the officers of this court to be chosen by itself.
But as it would be impossible for the mayor’s court to dispatch all the business that might be brought before it, there ought likewise to be a court of law; consisting of a chief justice, with three judges; to be appointed by the sovereign. And this court should guide itself, by such laws as may be enacted for the jurisdiction of those countries; otherwise by equity.
Appeals from this court of law, as well as that of equity, to be made immediately to the supreme court of judicature; and from thence to his Majesty152 in council.
If it is thought proper, there might be another mayor’s court, of the same nature, established at Cossimbuzar, in the neighbourhood of the old capital, Maxadavad.
And as to the forms, for the more universal distribution of justice to the natives, these will be adjusted by the supreme supervising power; as before mentioned. We shall only observe, that their courts of Zemindary and Cutchery are, as they stand at present, a grievous nuisance.
144But the noblest institution for protecting the liberty and property of the subject, from the extortion and oppression of their foreign government, and of its inferior train of native harpies, who are infinitely153 more rapacious154 than the Europeans, would be that of juries, properly constructed. Let the grand inquest of the country be held at Culcutta, four times in the year: and let the juries, both grand and petit, be expresly composed of Company’s servants, or free merchants, Europeans, and none others: the judges of law, or at least two of them, to sit on the assizes: the sheriff to be chosen annually155, from amongst the Company’s servants.
The powers of this grand inquest, if adapted to the situation of things, must be enlarged beyond these of our juries in Britain; where there are judicial and political aids, that must be wanting in those countries: for instance, the enquiry must not be confined to place, but must extend every where through the country: it must likewise have authority to bring before it all manner of nuisance or trespass committed against the liberty or property of the subject, natives as well as Europeans. 145And the judges should have no power to reject or postpone156 the bills, found by the grand jury: but should bring them on to decision, in turn, as presented. Moreover, as the extent of enquiry may render it impossible for the more distant defendant157 to appear with his evidences, during the sitting of that assize to which the bill hath been presented against him; let summons be issued, upon the bill’s being presented, for such distant defendant to appear at next assizes; or let some other method be found, either by means of the grand jury’s meeting a sufficient time before the commencement of trials, or by some extraordinary power vested in the judges or sheriff to produce such distant defendant with his evidences in due time. And as this same extent of enquiry may, on the other hand, produce inconvenience to the subject, by affording occasion to litigious persons of distressing158 others, by bringing them from a great distance to these assizes, on frivolous159 or ill grounded complaints, it may be ordered that, where the cause shall appear to the court truly litigious, the plaintiff shall be bound over to stand suit at law, for damages to the defendant: and, one or two 146examples, of this nature, will prove a barr to frivolous litigation.
And least the judges should, by any means, be influenced to act that part which the Company’s governor and council commonly act, when they absurdly preside at these assizes, as his Majesty’s judges in their own cause; namely, to dismiss the Court, so soon as the grand jury shall find a bill that may be disagreeable to them; it may be ordered that neither the judges, nor any officer of the Court, shall have power to adjourn160 the assizes, until all the trials shall be decided161; or, otherwise, by the consent of a majority in both juries.
The principal check however upon the conduct of these assizes, would be that of obliging the Court to keep exact registers, of all trials, and proceedings; signed and attested, as before mentioned. And if any part of either jury shall except to the authenticity162 of such register, which shall be publickly exposed in the Court, then, such dissenting163 part shall have a right to protest, and assign its reasons. Three copies of which register, with protest, (if any,) shall be dispatched, by the earliest occasion, after each assize. One copy to 147the supreme Court of Judicature, which will, thereby, have the earliest notice of any abuse; and, with the concurrence164 of the supreme political power, shall have the opportunity of immediately correcting it. A second copy shall be transmitted to the sovereign; who will act as an ulterior check on the supreme controuling power. And a third copy to the Company for the reasons before specified.
But, as this single inquest at Calcutta cannot possibly carry justice to the extremes of that extensive country, circulating assizes may be held, at least once, or if possible twice a year, at Muxadavad as the center, and at Patnah as the northern extreme; two judges to go this northern circuit: and the other two judges to go on an eastern circuit, at Dacca. And, as there may not be a sufficient number of Company’s servants, properly qualified, to form complete juries at these northern and eastern assizes: I would propose that, to make up any such deficiency, natives should be mixed with the Europeans. Which mixture, if it shall be artfully tempered, in the following manner, would produce all the efficacy of entirely165 148European juries; and, at same time, none of the bad effects, that might be apprehended166, from an attempt to confer freedom and impartiality167 on juries entirely native.
Let, at least, one half of both the grand and petit juries be Europeans; and the remaining part natives: and if it should happen, that there cannot be collected, at the assize factory, and from the neighbouring inferior factories, so many Company’s servants as shall make up half the usual number of jurymen; then, let the whole number be diminished, to the sufficing half of Europeans. Let the unanimity168 of verdict, in such mixt juries, be dispensed169 with; and let the majority of voices, in either jury, find the bill or verdict; as is the custom in Scotland. And let an additional provision be made to the oath of the juryman, purporting170 that he shall not, on any account, disclose the opinion given by any individual, in the jury room.
By this artful mixture, and these precautions, the native jurymen would be liberated171 from that slavish dread172, of future revenge from their own countrymen employed 149under government; seeing it would be impossible, for these native officers of government, to discover the particular opinion of each individual; which, if the juries were entirely native, they would infallibly do, to the utter ruin of the poor native jurymen. So that the native Jurymen, acting thus with freedom, under the cloke and protection of the Europeans, would answer all the effectual purposes of Europeans. Whilst, being sensible that they owed their freedom and impartiality, together with all the other benefits arising from juries, to their connection with the Europeans; this freedom conferred on them in the jury room, would not in the least diminish their awe and deference173 to government. The proceedings at these circuit assizes to be registered and transmitted in like manner as at Calcutta.
These juries would prove the Magna Charta, the palladium, and true security of Indian liberty and property, against the despotism and extortion of their foreign government. And it evidently appears that the virtue of these juries, (as being, at one and the same time, truly effectual to the subject, and perfectly safe to the 150sovereign,) entirely depends upon the circumstance, of completely excluding the Company and her servants, from the smallest participation in the executive powers of government. But the efficacy of these juries, and of other inferior institutions made through the supreme controuling power, being once felt and known, would speedily induce the natives to purchase perpetual property in lands: seeing they would perceive themselves thoroughly secured in the produce of those lands. And this, being divulged174 abroad, would draw the inhabitants of the neighbouring countries to the standard of Britain; together with their wealth, and industry. By which means the British dominion in India, which, at present is, through oppression and consequent famine, in a great measure deserted175 and depopulated, would again be completely peopled and cultivated: arts, manufactures, and commerce would soon be restored to their former state; nay, they would be extended to a degree far superior: and these countries would, of course, be enabled to richly repay Britain for the blessings176 conferred by her, of perfect 151security in liberty and property; blessings, never before known in India.
And all this may be effected by means of that intermediate supreme controuling power: which would, not only create, but preserve, the full and vigorous efficacy of all these institutions, in the subordinate dominions. Whereas, if it was even possible, (though indeed it is morally impossible,) to institute, by any temporary means, all these powers, forms, rules, and regulations in those dominions, yet is it evidently certain that, so soon as these temporary means were withdrawn177, the virtue and efficacy of all these institutions would immediately vanish, and be suppressed by the power of the executive government; which, from the nature of things, must unavoidably be, either despotic over the native subjects, or cannot exist at all.
But this same controuling power, as it would, on the one hand, by its fixed residence in the immediate neighbourhood, perpetually preserve the action and motion of all these institutions, like to a power ever present to wind up the springs of the machine; and, so, would check all the 152bad effects of that naturally necessary despotism in executive government: so would it, on the other hand, effectually support the power and authority of that executive government; and prevent its being encroached on, by an over exertion of the privileges conferred on the subject. For, on this side too, there is a danger; which will be readily comprehended, by those who consider the nature of government; and, at same time, the disposition of human nature. But all danger, of preponderating178 either scale, would be prevented, by the vicinity of the controuling power: which, holding the balance in its hands, and nicely diminishing from one, or adding to the other scale, would ever preserve a just equilibrium179, betwixt the liberty of the subject, and the power of government.
Nor would the institution of new regulations be the only means, in the hands of the controuling power, of preventing the dangerous over exertion of privilege: it would likewise possess the instantaneous power of seizing, or otherwise of ordering to its own residence, all such persons as should prove over troublesome, or dangerous 153to the due authority of executive government. For, though it would be extremely absurd to trust a power of this nature, immediately in the hands of executive government; which would, infallibly, employ it to its own worst purposes: yet might such power be safely trusted to this controuling government; which could not have the same motives180 to abuse it.
Nevertheless, we do not mean that this, and all these other powers, should be unlimitedly181 confided182 to this controuling deputation: we still preserve a check over it, in the national government. And a most effectual check too; by means of the beforementioned copies of registers, immediately transmitted to Britain, from the subordinates; as likewise by its own minutes, accounts, and registers.
So that here would be a regular gradation of effectual political checks. The privilege of juries, and other institutions in the subordinate dominions, being preserved in vigorous action, by the influence of the intermediate controuling power, would prove an effectual check on the despotism or extortion of executive government; and would thus completely secure 154the liberty and property of the subject. And the same influence of the controuling power would sufficiently check the luxuriancy of privilege; and support the power of government; thus preserving an exact poise183 betwixt both. Whilst the sovereign, at a distance, could deliberately184 and effectually watch the hand that trimmed the scales.
And thus the institution of this intermediate controuling and impelling power, would completely remove every obstruction arising from the distance of situation: it would serve as an intermediate link of the political chain: or, as a bridge of communication, joining this dependent Indian dominion to the sovereign country. But, all obstruction arising from the distance of situation being thus removed, what difficulty can the national government of Britain find, in administring the political government of that Indian dominion? Upon this plan, that task appears to me more facil, less pregnant with difficulty, charge, or care, than it is to govern any one, the most pretty, of our foreign Colonies: nay it appears equally easy, as it is to govern the neighbouring Isle185 of 155Man: seeing that the opposition186 of the subjects, to the authority of government in this Indian dominion, though they be so infinitely more numerous, is not greater than is the opposition of the few subjects in Man. The only difficulty, that could exist to national government, was that of duly tempering, or abating187, the power of the deputed executive government: and it appears, that this may be completely effected by means of this intermediate controuling power; which, in the hands of the sovereign, would act upon the government of this Indian dominion as the pegs188 or keys upon the strings189 of a musical instrument; of which one being gently strained, and another properly relaxed, would create, and perpetually preserve, a perfect: harmony, or concord190, in this political system.
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1
impelling
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| adj.迫使性的，强有力的v.推动、推进或敦促某人做某事( impel的现在分词 ) | |
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2
anarchy
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| n.无政府状态；社会秩序混乱，无秩序 | |
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3
immediate
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| adj.立即的；直接的，最接近的；紧靠的 | |
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dominion
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| n.统治，管辖，支配权；领土，版图 | |
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5
unlimited
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| adj.无限的，不受控制的，无条件的 | |
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6
inclination
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| n.倾斜；点头；弯腰；斜坡；倾度；倾向；爱好 | |
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7
disposition
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| n.性情，性格；意向，倾向；排列，部署 | |
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8
conducive
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| adj.有益的，有助的 | |
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9
exertion
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| n.尽力，努力 | |
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10
supreme
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| adj.极度的，最重要的；至高的，最高的 | |
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11
radical
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| n.激进份子，原子团，根号；adj.根本的，激进的，彻底的 | |
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12
obstruct
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| v.阻隔，阻塞(道路、通道等)；n.阻碍物，障碍物 | |
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13
obstructions
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| n.障碍物( obstruction的名词复数 )；阻碍物；阻碍；阻挠 | |
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14
obstruction
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| n.阻塞，堵塞；障碍物 | |
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15
qualified
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| adj.合格的，有资格的，胜任的，有限制的 | |
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16
rending
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| v.撕碎( rend的现在分词 )；分裂；（因愤怒、痛苦等而）揪扯（衣服或头发等）；（声音等）刺破 | |
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17
defective
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| adj.有毛病的，有问题的，有瑕疵的 | |
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18
precedent
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| n.先例，前例；惯例；adj.在前的，在先的 | |
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19
pointed
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| adj.尖的，直截了当的 | |
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20
absurdity
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| n.荒谬，愚蠢；谬论 | |
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21
dispersed
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| adj. 被驱散的, 被分散的, 散布的 | |
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22
acting
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| n.演戏，行为，假装；adj.代理的，临时的，演出用的 | |
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23
constraint
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| n.(on)约束，限制；限制(或约束)性的事物 | |
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24
supervisor
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| n.监督人，管理人，检查员，督学，主管，导师 | |
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25
disperses
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| v.（使）分散( disperse的第三人称单数 )；疏散；驱散；散布 | |
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26
injustice
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| n.非正义，不公正，不公平，侵犯（别人的）权利 | |
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territorial
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| adj.领土的，领地的 | |
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dominions
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| 统治权( dominion的名词复数 )； 领土； 疆土； 版图 | |
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29
incumbent
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| adj.成为责任的，有义务的；现任的，在职的 | |
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30
entrusted
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| v.委托，托付( entrust的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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31
sundry
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| adj.各式各样的，种种的 | |
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32
mighty
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| adj.强有力的；巨大的 | |
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33
delicacy
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| n.精致，细微，微妙，精良；美味，佳肴 | |
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34
motive
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| n.动机，目的；adv.发动的，运动的 | |
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35
wilfully
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| adv.任性固执地；蓄意地 | |
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fully
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| adv.完全地，全部地，彻底地；充分地 | |
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apprehend
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| vt.理解，领悟，逮捕，拘捕，忧虑 | |
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alteration
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| n.变更，改变；蚀变 | |
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39
enquire
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| v.打听，询问；调查，查问 | |
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40
interfere
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| v.(in)干涉，干预；(with)妨碍，打扰 | |
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41
emoluments
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| n.报酬，薪水( emolument的名词复数 ) | |
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emolument
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| n.报酬，薪水 | |
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43
possessed
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| adj.疯狂的；拥有的，占有的 | |
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44
specified
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| adj.特定的 | |
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45
proceeding
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| n.行动，进行，(pl.)会议录，学报 | |
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46
futile
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| adj.无效的，无用的，无希望的 | |
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47
standing
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| n.持续，地位；adj.永久的，不动的，直立的，不流动的 | |
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48
supervision
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| n.监督，管理 | |
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49
avowedly
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| adv.公然地 | |
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50
situated
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| adj.坐落在...的，处于某种境地的 | |
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51
nominal
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| adj.名义上的；(金额、租金)微不足道的 | |
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52
requisite
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| adj.需要的，必不可少的；n.必需品 | |
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53
pageant
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| n.壮观的游行；露天历史剧 | |
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54
mere
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| adj.纯粹的；仅仅，只不过 | |
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55
embarked
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| 乘船( embark的过去式和过去分词 )； 装载； 从事 | |
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56
reprobate
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| n.无赖汉；堕落的人 | |
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57
censure
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| v./n.责备；非难；责难 | |
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58
maritime
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| adj.海的，海事的，航海的，近海的，沿海的 | |
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59
reimburse
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| v.补偿，付还 | |
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60
naval
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| adj.海军的，军舰的，船的 | |
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61
advantageous
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| adj.有利的；有帮助的 | |
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62
detriment
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| n.损害；损害物，造成损害的根源 | |
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63
detrimental
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| adj.损害的，造成伤害的 | |
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64
virtue
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| n.德行，美德；贞操；优点；功效，效力 | |
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65
lodged
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| v.存放( lodge的过去式和过去分词 )；暂住；埋入；（权利、权威等）归属 | |
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66
rendering
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| n.表现，描写 | |
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67
surmounted
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| 战胜( surmount的过去式和过去分词 )； 克服（困难）； 居于…之上； 在…顶上 | |
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68
remains
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| n.剩余物，残留物；遗体，遗迹 | |
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69
fidelity
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| n.忠诚，忠实；精确 | |
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70
concur
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| v.同意，意见一致，互助，同时发生 | |
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71
transgressing
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| v.超越( transgress的现在分词 )；越过；违反；违背 | |
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72
interfering
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| adj. 妨碍的 动词interfere的现在分词 | |
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73
indirectly
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| adv.间接地，不直接了当地 | |
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74
proxy
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| n.代理权，代表权；（对代理人的）委托书；代理人 | |
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75
usurp
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| vt.篡夺，霸占；vi.篡位 | |
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76
mutual
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| adj.相互的，彼此的；共同的，共有的 | |
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77
usurpation
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| n.篡位；霸占 | |
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78
supervisors
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| n.监督者，管理者( supervisor的名词复数 ) | |
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79
amass
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| vt.积累，积聚 | |
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80
omnipotent
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| adj.全能的，万能的 | |
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81
thereby
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| adv.因此，从而 | |
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82
forfeit
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| vt.丧失；n.罚金，罚款，没收物 | |
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83
corrupt
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| v.贿赂，收买；adj.腐败的，贪污的 | |
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84
corruption
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| n.腐败，堕落，贪污 | |
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85
sufficiently
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| adv.足够地，充分地 | |
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86
precluded
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| v.阻止( preclude的过去式和过去分词 )；排除；妨碍；使…行不通 | |
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87
usurping
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| 篡夺，霸占( usurp的现在分词 )； 盗用； 篡夺，篡权 | |
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88
strictly
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| adv.严厉地，严格地；严密地 | |
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89
fixed
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| adj.固定的，不变的，准备好的；(计算机)固定的 | |
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90
circumscribed
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| adj.[医]局限的：受限制或限于有限空间的v.在…周围划线( circumscribe的过去式和过去分词 )；划定…范围；限制；限定 | |
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91
dubious
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| adj.怀疑的，无把握的；有问题的，靠不住的 | |
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92
obviate
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| v.除去，排除，避免，预防 | |
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93
pretext
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| n.借口，托词 | |
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94
junction
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| n.连接，接合；交叉点，接合处，枢纽站 | |
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95
accomplished
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| adj.有才艺的；有造诣的；达到了的 | |
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96
skilfully
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| adv. (美skillfully)熟练地 | |
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97
skilful
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| (=skillful)adj.灵巧的，熟练的 | |
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98
judicial
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| adj.司法的，法庭的，审判的，明断的，公正的 | |
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99
judiciously
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| adv.明断地，明智而审慎地 | |
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100
judicious
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| adj.明智的，明断的，能作出明智决定的 | |
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101
perverting
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| v.滥用( pervert的现在分词 )；腐蚀；败坏；使堕落 | |
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102
constituent
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| n.选民；成分，组分；adj.组成的，构成的 | |
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103
jurisdiction
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| n.司法权，审判权，管辖权，控制权 | |
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104
trespass
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| n./v.侵犯，闯入私人领地 | |
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105
propriety
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| n.正当行为；正当；适当 | |
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106
endued
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| v.授予，赋予（特性、才能等）( endue的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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107
dictate
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| v.口授；(使)听写；指令，指示，命令 | |
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108
corporate
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| adj.共同的，全体的；公司的，企业的 | |
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109
annexed
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| [法] 附加的，附属的 | |
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110
confirmation
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| n.证实，确认，批准 | |
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111
perversion
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| n.曲解；堕落；反常 | |
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112
redress
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| n.赔偿，救济，矫正；v.纠正，匡正，革除 | |
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113
considerably
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| adv.极大地；相当大地；在很大程度上 | |
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114
honourably
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| adv.可尊敬地，光荣地，体面地 | |
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115
undertaking
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| n.保证，许诺，事业 | |
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116
bestowed
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| 赠给，授予( bestow的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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117
adverting
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| 引起注意（advert的现在分词形式） | |
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118
monsoon
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| n.季雨，季风，大雨 | |
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119
subsist
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| vi.生存，存在，供养 | |
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120
subsisted
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| v.（靠很少的钱或食物）维持生活，生存下去( subsist的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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121
regularity
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| n.规律性，规则性；匀称，整齐 | |
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122
attain
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| vt.达到，获得，完成 | |
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123
manoeuvre
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| n.策略，调动；v.用策略，调动 | |
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124
peculation
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| n.侵吞公款[公物] | |
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125
miserable
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| adj.悲惨的，痛苦的；可怜的，糟糕的 | |
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126
defrauded
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| v.诈取，骗取( defraud的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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127
enacted
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| 制定（法律），通过（法案）( enact的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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128
conserve
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| vt.保存，保护，节约，节省，守恒，不灭 | |
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129
dispositions
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| 安排( disposition的名词复数 )； 倾向； （财产、金钱的）处置； 气质 | |
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130
consonant
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| n.辅音；adj.[音]符合的 | |
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131
approbation
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| n.称赞；认可 | |
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132
awe
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| n.敬畏，惊惧；vt.使敬畏，使惊惧 | |
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133
prospect
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| n.前景，前途；景色，视野 | |
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134
thoroughly
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| adv.完全地，彻底地，十足地 | |
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135
prosecuting
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| 检举、告发某人( prosecute的现在分词 )； 对某人提起公诉； 继续从事（某事物）； 担任控方律师 | |
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136
vouched
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| v.保证( vouch的过去式和过去分词 )；担保；确定；确定地说 | |
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137
appropriation
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| n.拨款，批准支出 | |
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138
proceedings
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| n.进程，过程，议程；诉讼(程序)；公报 | |
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139
attested
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| adj.经检验证明无病的，经检验证明无菌的v.证明( attest的过去式和过去分词 )；证实；声称…属实；使宣誓 | |
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140
participation
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| n.参与，参加，分享 | |
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141
nay
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| adv.不；n.反对票，投反对票者 | |
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142
judgment
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| n.审判；判断力，识别力，看法，意见 | |
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143
perfectly
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| adv.完美地，无可非议地，彻底地 | |
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144
perspicuity
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| n.（文体的）明晰 | |
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145
eminent
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| adj.显赫的，杰出的，有名的，优良的 | |
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146
chambers
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| n.房间( chamber的名词复数 )；（议会的）议院；卧室；会议厅 | |
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147
equity
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| n.公正，公平，（无固定利息的）股票 | |
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148
equitable
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| adj.公平的；公正的 | |
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149
subservient
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| adj.卑屈的，阿谀的 | |
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150
expeditiously
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| adv.迅速地，敏捷地 | |
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151
primitive
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| adj.原始的；简单的；n.原(始)人，原始事物 | |
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152
majesty
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| n.雄伟，壮丽，庄严，威严；最高权威，王权 | |
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153
infinitely
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| adv.无限地，无穷地 | |
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154
rapacious
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| adj.贪婪的，强夺的 | |
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155
annually
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| adv.一年一次，每年 | |
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156
postpone
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| v.延期，推迟 | |
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157
defendant
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| n.被告；adj.处于被告地位的 | |
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158
distressing
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| a.使人痛苦的 | |
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159
frivolous
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| adj.轻薄的；轻率的 | |
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160
adjourn
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| v.（使）休会，（使）休庭 | |
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161
decided
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| adj.决定了的，坚决的；明显的，明确的 | |
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162
authenticity
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| n.真实性 | |
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163
dissenting
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| adj.不同意的 | |
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164
concurrence
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| n.同意；并发 | |
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165
entirely
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| ad.全部地，完整地；完全地，彻底地 | |
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166
apprehended
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| 逮捕，拘押( apprehend的过去式和过去分词 )； 理解 | |
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167
impartiality
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| n. 公平, 无私, 不偏 | |
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168
unanimity
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| n.全体一致，一致同意 | |
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169
dispensed
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| v.分配( dispense的过去式和过去分词 )；施与；配（药） | |
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170
purporting
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| v.声称是…，（装得）像是…的样子( purport的现在分词 ) | |
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171
liberated
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| a.无拘束的，放纵的 | |
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172
dread
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| vt.担忧，忧虑；惧怕，不敢；n.担忧，畏惧 | |
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173
deference
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| n.尊重，顺从；敬意 | |
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174
divulged
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| v.吐露，泄露( divulge的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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175
deserted
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| adj.荒芜的，荒废的，无人的，被遗弃的 | |
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176
blessings
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| n.（上帝的）祝福( blessing的名词复数 )；好事；福分；因祸得福 | |
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177
withdrawn
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| vt.收回；使退出；vi.撤退，退出 | |
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178
preponderating
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| v.超过，胜过( preponderate的现在分词 ) | |
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179
equilibrium
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| n.平衡，均衡，相称，均势，平静 | |
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180
motives
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| n.动机，目的( motive的名词复数 ) | |
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181
unlimitedly
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| 无限地，无例外地 | |
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182
confided
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| v.吐露（秘密，心事等）( confide的过去式和过去分词 )；（向某人）吐露（隐私、秘密等） | |
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183
poise
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| vt./vi. 平衡，保持平衡；n.泰然自若，自信 | |
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184
deliberately
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| adv.审慎地；蓄意地；故意地 | |
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185
isle
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| n.小岛，岛 | |
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186
opposition
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| n.反对，敌对 | |
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187
abating
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| 减少( abate的现在分词 )； 减去； 降价； 撤消（诉讼） | |
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188
pegs
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| n.衣夹( peg的名词复数 )；挂钉；系帐篷的桩；弦钮v.用夹子或钉子固定( peg的第三人称单数 )；使固定在某水平 | |
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189
strings
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| n.弦 | |
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190
concord
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| n.和谐；协调 | |
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