Few of these prescriptions5 have at all attracted notice; the proposal for protecting the liberty of the subject from the despotism of government, by the institution of native juries, was indeed extremely well calculated to please British speculation7; and therefore, like the device of hanging the bell about the cat’s neck, it was 47highly applauded by those who never adverted9 to the difference betwixt Britain and Bengal, in point of general constitution of government and disposition10 of the natives. But, for practice, it must appear a mere chimera11 to such as consider, on the one hand, that men, who are slaves to their government and its officers in every other capacity, cannot possibly be free in that of jurymen; and that juries, if they are not free and impartial12, avail nothing: and, on the other hand, that if the natives should be actually endowed with the real cap of liberty in the jury room, there is danger, nay13, there is a certainty, that they would make bold to wear it elsewhere; and then, adieu to the English dominion14 in Bengal. In few words, the power of the English government, and the freedom of native juries, are two things that cannot possibly exist together in Bengal; the life of the one must unavoidably cause the death of the other: and, however harsh this doctrine15 may sound in a freeborn English ear, the force and truth of it will immediately strike the politician.
48Equally unavailing is that proposal for securing the liberty and property of the subject, from the oppression and extortion of government, by granting to the native a perpetual property in land; without providing him the smallest security for the free possession of its produce; which, so long as government stands on its present footing, is liable to be wrested17 from him so soon as acquired.
But it would seem, that the reason why these political physicians have been so unlucky in their prescriptions is, that they have proceeded upon false principles; as having mistaken the nature of the malady18. For they have either assigned no one certain cause of evil; or else they have traced it no farther than to the persons who have executed the government of those countries, otherwise to the Directors: as if all the evil had proceeded from some particular viciousness in their disposition, as if they had been sinners above all men, or as if no men would have done the wicked deed but they: whereas he who is the least acquainted with human nature will allow, that few, if any men, would have made any better use of their powers and 49opportunities; nay he will add, that every other government on earth, would act the very part that this Bengal government hath done, provided it held the same views and interests, together with the same powers and opportunities. And, if so, what can be more absurd, than the proposal to remedy the evils and abuses of this government, by sending out Supervisors19, with the same or greater powers, and consequently possessing greater opportunities of promoting their own views and interests; which are exactly the same as these of the persons complained of; seeing that, as the same cause of evil which existed in the Governors, would have existed in the Supervisors, these similar causes must have operated similar effects.
Indeed we shall err20 widely, if we look for the original cause of evil in these Governors: for, on inspecting the preceding description of this Bengal government, we perceive, that their maladministration is itself but an effect, or consequence, naturally flowing from the total want of certain fundamental principles or powers; which, in every other government, serve to restrain the party governing from doing 50or permitting injury, and impel21 it to promote the good of the party governed: and as the want of these restraining and impelling22 powers hath unavoidably produced, the first tyranny, and the latter anarchy23, it is plain, that all the evils and abuses in the government of Bengal have sprung from this deficiency. It farther appears, from the same description, that the want of these restraining and impelling powers arises from two different causes; the first being the particular condition and constitution of the sovereign: and the second is there termed the distance of situation, betwixt the sovereign residence and the country governed; tho’ the sequel will evince this latter to be rather a radical24 defect in the nature of that system, which the Directors have adopted for the government of this distant dominion. That these have been the two original causes of the tyranny and anarchy, and consequently of all the evils and abuses in this Bengal government, including these of the commercial despotism, is sufficiently25 evident. We shall therefore proceed to point out the means of removing these causes, as the only effectual method 51of remedying the evils. And as each of the two causes hath contributed its proper share of the evil, and each demands a distinct remedy, we shall consider them separately.
With regard to the condition and constitution of the Company, we have already mentioned the several circumstances that disqualify her for the office of a supreme26 sovereign; here therefore we shall only recapitulate27, or collect them into one point of view. The first defect is, her impotence, or want of power to promote good government in her dominion: and this proceeds from her being, with respect to her deputed government, a meer fellow subject, totally void of supreme legislative28 and judicial29 powers; and consequently incapable30 of inforcing obedience31; or of punishing disobedience: and this want of authority and power in the sovereign, we have shown to be a principal cause of despotism in the deputed government. A second defect in the constitution of the Company is her want of inclination32, or rather of interest, to discharge the duty of a good sovereign; and this arises from the fluctuating and hourly mutable state 52of the proprietary33, the temporary and short duration of her corporate34 existence, the still shorter tenor35 of this sovereignty, and the annual rotation36 of her executive government; for, in consequence of these several circumstances in her situation, her views are narrow, contracted, and rapacious37; the sole aim of all her measures being to make the most of the present moment. The third defect is the mercantile capacity of this sovereign Company; and from this defect alone flow evils sufficient to ruin the interest of the country subjected to her government: for, in consequence of her mercantile capacity, her deputed government acts as a merchant; and, in consequence of her sovereign capacity, all her mercantile servants assume the authority of sovereigns.
These are the principal defects in the being and constitution of this sovereign Company; and it is evident, that such defects in the sovereign, must have contributed largely towards the existence of abuse, in the deputed government. But these defects might have been, in a great measure, remedied, and their consequences prevented, by a simple act of parliament, 53past by the national government, at the time it thought proper to commit the charge of this important branch of national interest, to the care of the Company. This act might have been entitled, “An act for better enabling the East India Company to administer the political government, and to protect, maintain and defend certain states and countries in India, which have become subjected to the dominion of Britain, and which, for sundry38 weighty considerations, it hath been judged proper to commit to her charge.” And it might have been conceived in the following, or such like terms.
“Whereas it appears, that the want of a proper legislative authority over the ministers and servants, employed by the Company to execute the sovereign government of these subjected dominions39, must be productive of many abuses, detrimental40 as well to the interest of the Company, as to the honour and interest of the British nation. Be it enacted41 by &c. that, from the time of passing this act, the Company shall possess the power of legislation, or making laws, for the government of this foreign dominion: and the laws thus 54enacted by the Company, shall be equally binding42 on all her ministers, servants, and subjects, in that dominion, as are the acts of parliament on the subjects of Britain. And being farther sensible of the many inconveniences, that must arise from the Company’s incapacity of punishing the offences committed by her ministers, and servants abroad, otherwise than by applying to courts of justice that are foreign to her government; where she cannot convict, through the difficulty of obtaining the evidence required by the forms of these courts; and where she is deterred43 from prosecuting45, by the fear of divulging46 the secrets of her government; insomuch that, rather than apply to these courts, she must submit to the most audacious acts of disobedience, and maladministration; and considering that such incapacity in the Company must discourage all good government, and produce tyranny and anarchy in this dominion; be it enacted, that the Company shall have authority to erect47 courts of justice, and appoint judges; with the like powers, as are vested in his majesty48’s judges, and courts of judicature, for trying and judging 55all suits and causes, or offences committed within the limits of this Indian dominion; and for punishing the same, either capitally, or by fine, imprisonment49, and banishment50, though to Europe only. And whereas it is probable, that some of the ministers or servants of the Company may, by various methods, elude51 the justice of her courts abroad, and escape to Europe; in order therefore to prevent such dangerous illusion of justice, it is enacted, that the Company’s court of directors shall, on due information being made to them, have power at all times to call before them such escaping delinquents52, and to try and punish them, for the offences they may have committed within the limits of this Indian dominion, in like manner as they could have been tried or punished by the Company’s courts abroad. And because the liberty of appealing from the Company’s courts of justice, to the judgment53 of any other courts, must be productive of the same inconveniences to the Company, as a trial of the same cause in the first instance would have been, and must therefore deter44 the Company from ever availing herself of the judicial powers 56granted by this act; it is enacted, that delinquents shall have no liberty of appealing from the Company’s courts abroad, excepting to the Court of Directors at home, or to a general court of Proprietors55; whose judgment in all such cases shall be final. And as the Court of Directors have, and may be, discouraged, from prosecuting or punishing the crimes of their rich servants, by the fear of danger to their own private interest, from a combination of the friends and abettors of such rich delinquents at a future annual election, be it enacted, that the 24 Directors, being such at the time of passing this act, shall continue in office, durante vita.
“And whereas it appears, that the liberty of daily selling, transferring, and alienating56 the shares in the Company’s stock, of which this sovereign dominion forms a part, tends to infuse into the proprietors a spirit of rapacity57, that may be productive of much damage to the several interests concerned; and hath many other very pernicious consequences; whilst it reflects disgrace on the dignity of all other sovereigns; be it enacted, that no proprietor54 in this Company’s stock, of which 57the sovereignty forms a part, shall have power to send his share in the said sovereignty to market, like as it were a hog58 or bullock, and to sell, transfer, and alienate59 the same; but that the several proprietors of this stock and sovereignty, being such at the time of passing this act, shall remain and continue proprietors, without the power of alienation60, except in the cases that shall be hereafter specified61.
“And whereas it hath been represented that the Company’s holding this sovereignty by lease, and for a short term, may not only alienate her care and prevent her from studying and promoting the lasting62 welfare of the country, but may induce her to pillage63, plunder64 and waste it; be it enacted, that the Company shall hold the sovereignty of this dominion, quamdiu se bene gesserit; to the end, that she may consider and treat it, not as the property of another, but as her own inheritance.
“And whereas the Company exercises traffic in this dominion; and, in consequence thereof, her ministers do likewise traffic; and whereas the exercise of traffic is evidently repugnant to a due discharge 58of the duties of government, as being unavoidably productive of destructive monopolies and oppression; all which it is impossible to prevent, so long as the Company herself shall continue a merchant; be it enacted, that this Company’s commercial charter shall be dissolved; and she, and her ministers, shall be restrained from trading or trafficking, directly or indirectly65, within the limits of this Indian dominion, under certain penalties to be mentioned in a new charter, which shall be granted to this Company, constituting her the United Company of English East India Sovereigns.”
These powers, grants, limitations, and restrictions66, would have qualified67 the Company, so far as the nature of things could admit, for administring the political government; but, in her military capacity, as the sovereign protector, maintainer and defender68 of this Indian dominion, she hath been still less qualified, and would therefore have required still more extraordinary powers. These however we shall not specify69, as apprehending70, that what hath been already demanded will shock. The grant of supreme legislative and judicial powers 59to subjects, over their fellow subjects, must seem an absurd communication of that which is incommunicable: the prohibition72 of selling and transferring the shares of stock, would be termed a tyrannical restraint on private property: the perpetual grant of this sovereignty to the Company, must be deemed an unjust alienation of the Crown’s and Nation’s rights: and the dissolution of the Company’s commercial charter, would alter her very being and nature. In short, if we regard the proposed act simply, it will appear a collection of absurd inconsistencies, and ridiculous nonsense: but if we consider it conjunctly with the cause or purpose for which it is required, then every absurdity73 vanishes from the act, and centers in the cause that renders it necessary. For we appeal to common sense, whether every circumstance, specified in this proposed act, is not indispensably necessary, to qualify the Company for the sovereign office of administring the political government of this Indian dominion: and, if that necessity is admitted, then doth the act become a rational and necessary consequence, of government’s having previously74 committed 60that sovereign charge to the Company. Nay, we must take the liberty to add, that government, by committing such a charge to the Company, and at same time totally neglecting to capacitate her for supporting it, is in a great measure accessory to all the ruinous consequences that have ensued from her incapacity.
I am sensible it will be urged, that we proceed upon false premises75; for that government never considered these countries as subjected to the dominion of Britain; that it never granted the sovereignty of them to the Company; nor supposed her to be the sovereign; but that it only acquiesced76 in her holding the Dewanny, on condition of her paying a part of the revenues to the nation; and, of consequence, that government never considered the inhabitants of those countries as subjects to the government of Britain. But this is a most flimsy evasion77, like that of shutting our eyes to the sun, that we may deny it is day: government granted to the Company a right or permission to hold the Dewanny; which is explained to be, the power of collecting and appropriating the 61revenues of Bengal; and, in consideration of this grant, government demanded and received a share of these revenues; government therefore, in its legislative capacity, admits a knowledge, that the Company did possess the power of collecting, and also of applying the revenues of Bengal, ad libitum; and, amongst other purposes, to that of defraying the charges of the military, as well as the civil, government: and government well knows, that the power which defrays the charges of the military and civil government, must hold the absolute direction of both: and what constitutes sovereign power, but the absolute direction of the military and civil government, together with the disposal of the revenues? But, exclusive of the Dewanny contract, the Company hath applied78, in every other characteristic of a sovereign, to government, in its legislative capacity: she hath brought a bill into parliament, for the grant of certain military powers and indulgences, for the better enabling her to defend, what she there modestly, though vaguely79, terms her territorial80 acquisitions, (but which, by referring to the Dewanny contract, is explained 62to include Bengal): and she hath applied for certain juridical powers and grants, for the better administration of the jurisdiction81, not in her commercial factories, but over the whole country of Bengal: therefore government hath been informed, in its legislative capacity, by the Company herself, that she administred the military and civil government, and appropriated the revenues of Bengal; consequently that she was, in every sense and respect, the actual sovereign of that country.
Now government could not be ignorant that the Company is a subject to the national government of Britain; and that, as such, she could have neither right, power, nor force to subject this dominion, or afterwards to hold it in subjection, saving what she derived82 from the national government; consequently government, as it understood that these countries were subjected to the Company, must have known that they were subjected to the dominion of Britain. And as government did permit the Company to retain this dominion; and furnished her with a military force, knowing it to be for the purpose of maintaining 63dominion, it is plain, that the Company hath held this dominion, no otherwise than by the grant and support of government.
But if the Company be the sovereign of Bengal, the inhabitants must, per force, be her subjects; and if the Company holds this sovereignty as a subject to the government of Britain, by virtue83 of the grant or permission of that government, and by means of a force furnished by the same government, in what relation can this government regard the inhabitants of Bengal? In that of subjects surely; tho’ the degree hath, by the deed of government, been somewhat implicated84; like that of a child begot85 by the father upon his own daughter. And subjects they have been to the government of Britain, in every sense and meaning; they have yielded obedience to those subjects of this government whom it appointed to rule over them; and they have yielded the fruits, as well as the duties of obedience.
But the government of Britain, which hath thus by force subjected the inhabitants of Bengal to its dominion; which hath, for a series of years, held them in 64subjection; and hath, all along, exacted from them the tribute of subjection; hath withheld86 from them the protection due to subjects. For it hath scrupulously87 withdrawn88 itself from all regard or attention to their government; and hath left it implicitly90 to the guidance of a few merchants; whom it knew to be perfectly91 unqualified for administring any sort of government: in consequence of which these wretched people have, for many years, been ruled, without law, justice, or government. Unhappy subjects, who are forced to obey a sovereign that refuses them protection, and leaves them exposed to all the horrors of tyranny and anarchy.
It will nevertheless be still insisted that government could not, without committing a number of irregularities and absurdities92, endow the Company in the manner specified; as also that the Company, when thus endowed, would still have been altogether unequal to the charge of regularly administring a sovereign government. But surely government, if it would not or could not capacitate the Company to regularly govern those countries, ought not to have furnished her the means of oppressing, 65ravaging, pillaging93, and ruining them; to the disgrace of humanity, and the indelible reproach of the British name. Government would have acted a part far more consistent with the rules of honour and humanity, if, instead of furnishing to the Company this military power, it had restrained her from availing herself of the advantage, gained by force and chance, over that mild, unwarlike, but industrious94 people; and obliged her to leave them to their own government.
But then the situation of affairs in those countries, where the nation and Company held such a valuable commercial interest, rendered it highly improper95 and dangerous to leave the native government to itself: moreover the nation and Company could not, in such case, have acquired the mighty96 wealth and other benefits that have been derived from the conquest, or assumed dominion, of those countries. Oh wealth, basely acquired, and foolishly applied! Was there then no medium, no middle channel, thro’ which government might have steered97 the Nation and Company to this same wealth and benefits, clear of all these irregularities, incongruities98, inhumanities, 66and reproaches? Yes surely; and one so obvious and conspicuous99, that it is impossible to conceive how government could be so industrious as to shun100 or miss it. Had the national government taken upon itself the charge of superintending the government of those countries, as reason and the nature of things directed, then would it have furnished them a sovereign, naturally free from all the defects of the Company, and completely endued101 with all the qualifications of power, ability, and inclination from interest, to protect and regularly govern them.
For it is plain, that the national government, possessing supreme legislative, and judicial power, must have been capable of enforcing obedience to the laws which it might have enacted for the good government of those countries; and of punishing disobedience, not only in the natives, but in the ministers whom it would have employed to execute that government; as these must have been its own subjects. And, on the other hand, the nation being an immutable102 body, and holding this sovereignty in her own right, and by perpetual tenor; her government 67must have been actuated, by the strong motive103 of self interest, to exert itself in promoting the real and lasting welfare of those countries. And as to the commercial despotism, it could never have existed under the national government.
It therefore follows, that the national government, being perfectly free from all the defects of the Company, would, by the simple, natural, and rational act of assuming the administration of government in those countries, have prevented or reformed all the several abuses or evils that have sprung from the defective104 constitution of the Company, as sovereign. But besides the mighty reform of abuses, that must have been immediately caused by thus changing the person of the sovereign; there is another advantage, which, though it cannot be said to spring directly from that change, yet would it have ensued as a natural consequence of the national government’s taking upon itself this sovereign charge; and that is, the creation or institution of a new interest in that country; a sort of middle state, betwixt the native subjects and their foreign government.
68The middle state here meant is the East India Company, (or which is the same, her servants in Bengal;) which, being now reduced to the condition of a subject, tho’ still retaining all her commercial privileges and interests in that country, would have formed an intermediate link in the political chain, serving to connect the natives with their government, and government with the natives. For, in every one circumstance that respected the liberty of the subject, this middle state must have held precisely105 the same interest as the natives; and, in consequence, the same inclination to oppose all oppression of government: and, in every thing that respected the real interest, the power, or honour of the sovereign, the community of Natale Solum must have led it to support the measures of government. Therefore, this middle state, holding a great weight in that dependent dominion, (not indeed from its numbers, but from the powerful support and influence of the Company, which would have been still very respectable in the sovereign country,) must have carried a mighty poise106 into the scale of liberty, in opposition107 to the despotism of government; 69whilst, at same time, it would have created no danger to the power of the sovereign. And a middle state of this nature must have been of inexpressible utility; facilitating, in many respects, the establishment of a regular political ?conomy
in the government of these countries. For, in such case, the sovereign could, with propriety108, efficacy, and safety, have conferred every reasonable privilege on the whole body of subjects in this foreign dominion: seeing that the exertion109 of these privileges might have been artfully confined to this middle state: and, as on the one hand, this finesse111 would not have, in any shape, withheld the benefit of these privileges from the natives; but, on the contrary, would have rendered them more effectually useful to the whole body of subjects, than if they had been committed either entirely112 or in common to the natives; because the Company’s servants would, from interest, have had the same inclination as the natives, to exert these privileges for the common good; and they would have had infinitely113 greater power, from their superior activity, intrepidity114, and firmness, as also from their superior 70opportunities of obtaining redress115 elsewhere against any infringement116 made by government: so, on the other hand, the authority of the sovereign could have incurred118 no risk from these privileges in the hands of Europeans; whereas there is great danger in attempting to confer on the natives a power to controul even the despotism of government. With this middle state the power of juries would have been effectual to the subject, and harmless to the sovereign: however, we shall have occasion to be more particular on this head in the sequel.
But if the national government could, by taking this sovereign charge upon itself, have prevented or reformed these many evils and abuses that have arisen from the defects of the Company; and could have likewise created other such advantages, facilitating the establishment of a regular government in those countries; what reason can be assigned for government’s declining this charge, and devolving it on the Company? Government could not surely suppose that this important concern would be managed to greater national advantage by the Company, than 71by itself: seeing that common sense might have foreseen, what experience hath since proved, that, under the management of the Company, the interest of Britain in those countries would, in the space of a very few years, be completely annihilated119; that the countries themselves would either be completely ruined, or otherwise lost to enemies; and that the wealth, which was extorted120 from them by rapine and general havoc121, being imported into Britain in the hands of a few indiscreet individuals, would create a torrent122 of profusion123, extravagance, luxury, and prodigality124, that would sweep all before it into the gulf125 of bankruptcy126, perdition, and despair. Whereas, under the regular administration of national government, those countries might have been still preserved in a flourishing condition; and, in consequence, still capable of yielding to Britain a tribute little inferior to the surplus revenue which the Company received in the first year of the Dewanny: which tribute, arriving immediately at the public treasury127 of Britain, and being there applied to the diminution128 of taxes, and consequent reduction of the price of necessaries and labour, would have proved a 72gentle universal shower, reviving our decayed and drooping129 manufactures and commerce.
But neither could government be induced to confer this sovereignty on the Company, by any motive of regard to the true interest of the proprietors: seeing it was palpably evident that this charge, being so unmeasurably superior to her powers of supporting it, must unavoidably crush her to ruin, and, along with her, the countries subjected to her rule; and, it is to be feared, even that community of which she forms a part. Whereas, if the national government had taken into its own hands, and carefully administered the government of those countries, whilst it continued the Company in possession of her commercial privileges, she would have continued to divide, in the first place, the six per cent. which her commerce, (unaided by revenue) afforded; even when burdened with the necessary expence of a small military force maintained for the guard of that commerce in those foreign countries, and which must have been equal to four per cent. on her capital: but this commercial military expence being rendered in a great measure unnecessary, 73by the immediate16 protection of national government, the saving thereof would have added two per cent. to her dividend130: and the equivalent, which government would have paid for her fortresses131, munition133, &c. being added to her capital stock, would have encreased her dividend nearly one per cent. more; whilst her stock itself would, at this day, have been really, and intrinsically worth 220 l. instead of ........ its present real and intrinsic value.
It would be insulting the understanding of ministry134, to suppose that it had been restrained from assuming this sovereign charge, by any delicacy135 of regard to the ideal right of the Company; derived from either conquests, as subjects; or from the sham136 grant of a man, who had not power to dispose of a single bega of land, nay, not of a cocoa-nut-tree in that country; and consequently whose grant of the sovereignty of Bengal could contribute nothing more to investiture or possession, than his grant of the crown of Britain could. Though if we should (for the sake of argument) suppose, that ministry had really admitted some such right, we must still 74esteem its acquiescence137 in that right a most absurd and wildly mistaken indulgence; seeing it evidently tended to the ruin of the party whom it meant to favour.
There hath been, however, one weighty argument against government’s assuming this Indian charge, which is, the danger arising to national liberty from government’s, (or, in other words, the crown or ministry’s) acquiring such an accession of influence, as must arise from the possession of the many emoluments138, places, posts, &c. annexed139 to this Indian charge: whereas liberty is completely secured from such danger, whilst the Company possesses it. And the certainty of this double maxim, viz. the danger from government’s possessing this charge, and the security whilst it is in the hands of the Company, is as generally established as almost any one human principle: for, being violently enforced by those whose personal views lead them to oppose administration, and at same time not simply allowed, but even inculcated by ministry itself, it hath been readily credited by those who, their personal interest not being so deeply concerned, were less curious to investigate the truth.
75It may be deemed presumptuous140 in an individual, to question the orthodoxy of a maxim so powerfully enforced by one party, readily allowed by the other, and almost universally credited: tho’ the extraordinary circumstance, of two violent rival parties concurring141 so exactly on a point, where their personal interest seems to be so materially and so oppositely engaged, would lead a bystander to suppose, that either one of the two parties must be mistaken; or otherwise, that one or both must misrepresent: at any rate, that uncommon142 instance of candour, in ministry’s preaching up a doctrine so repugnant to that which it pretends to be its own personal interest, would induce such bystander to suspect its sincerity143. However, as a right understanding of this point may considerably144 import the public, at this critical juncture145, I shall venture disclosing my sentiments, at the risk of censure146 for prolixity147, as well as impertinence.
With regard to the first part of the maxim, I conceive that the danger to liberty, from government’s holding this charge in its own hands, is supposed to arise from the influence which the minister would 76acquire, over the two subject branches of legislature, (those bulwarks148 of liberty) by means of the many emoluments, places, posts, &c. annexed to the possession of that charge. But before we admit that the ministers holding this charge would be creative of that dangerous influence, we ought to be satisfied that he doth not already possess it, by other means; for, if he doth already possess such influence by other means, it is plain that the Indian charge cannot confer it; nor will it avail to shut one door, whilst there are others open to admit him. And that the minister hath long been in full and plenary possession of such influence, we have ever heard asserted by these very men who so loudly enforce the danger of his acquiring it, by means of this Indian charge: nay, we have much better authority than their contradictory149 assertions, (even that of fact and daily experience,) for believing that the minister hath and doth possess posts and places, and that, on any emergency, he hath in his power other means equally effectual, towards creating and holding such influence, in a degree as plenary and complete as his own heart can desire. And, 77if the minister doth already possess such influence by other means, it is plain, that the Indian charge cannot confer it; nor will it avail to shut one door, whilst there are others open to admit him. And that the minister hath been long in full and plenary possession of such influence, we have ever heard asserted by those very men, who so loudly enforce the danger of his acquiring it, by means of this Indian charge: nay, we have much better authority than their contradictory assertions, (even that of fact and daily experience,) for believing that the minister hath and doth possess posts and places, and that on any emergency he hath in his power other means equally effectual, towards creating and holding such influence, in a degree as plenary and complete as his own heart can desire. And, if the minister doth already possess an influence so fully110 sufficient, it must be allowed that, in so much as respects parliamentary influence, this Indian charge would be a thing superfluous150 and useless to him; like meat to a man that hath already filled his belly151; the absence of it can withhold152 nothing that he wants, and the acquisition cannot 78confer more than he already possesses. I may venture to add, that we certainly hold our liberty by some latent security, more powerful than that of parliament itself, which neither the minister’s influence over parliament, nor posts and places, will ever induce him to attack, or enable him to subdue153; for that, otherwise, we should have been divested154 of our privileges and liberty long ago. And, upon considering these several circumstances, I conclude, that if this Indian charge was in the hands of government to-morrow, it would neither enable, nor induce the minister, to attempt a jot155 more against our liberty, than he hath done, can do, and will do, without it. However, by way of reinforcing my argument, I shall add that, if the plan which I mean to propose should be carried into execution, it would leave but few of these emoluments, &c. to the immediate disposal of the minister; and, possibly, this declaration may but little recommend it to his favour.
But still, if we were to admit a real danger to liberty from the minister’s possessing these emoluments, &c. it remains156 79to be proved that liberty hath been, is, and will be secured from such danger, by the Company’s holding that Indian charge. And, when the nature of this security comes to be examined, I apprehend71 it will be found more difficult to prove this latter part of the maxim, than the former. For it is notorious that, ever until the late distraction157 in the Company’s affairs, the arbitrary application of these emoluments, posts, &c. was vested in the Directors; and indeed the entire powers and interests of the Company; insomuch that the Directors might, with propriety, be termed the Company. So that the whole security of national liberty, and, of course, the sole obstruction158 to the minister’s dangerous views, depended on the integrity and independent spirit of 24 Directors; of whom, again, one or two generally leads all the rest. Consequently, to come at the fingering of these dangerous emoluments, &c. the minister had only to subvert159 the integrity, or subdue the independance, of these Directors. And, to effect this, a minister possessed160 more than one infallible recipe. By artfully joining the mighty influence which he held in the 80Company’s stock thro’ his numerous dependants161, to one or other of two parties contending violently for the direction, he could reduce both to a perfect dependance on himself: by the same means he could hold them in subjection: but still more, by the awe162 of wresting163 from them the sweet management of this Indian sovereignty, which they were sensible he could do by a word. And thus he could work upon their fears. But inclination would naturally and powerfully lead the Directors to throw themselves into the arms of a minister; not so much for his immediate assistance; tho’ even that might be of great use, for rendering164 matters easy with the proprietors, as well as parliament and the nation; but because, on these terms, they secured, in him, an omnipotent165 supporter and all powerful advocate, against the day of distress166, which they well knew must come, and that soon: whereas, otherwise, they must lay their account with finding him a severe judge, and bitter prosecutor167.
By these several operations on the hopes and fears of the Directors, it was extremely easy for a minister to render them as 81pliant as a glove; as obedient as a spaniel, to fetch and carry at bidding. And the Directors being once reduced to this state of dependance, it is evident, that the minister must possess a full and arbitrary power over all the emoluments, posts, places, &c. appertaining to this Indian charge. But the disposal of the present emoluments, &c. was a trivial matter, compared with other advantages, which this Indian business, whilst in the hands of the Company, presented to an artful and enterprising minister. For, under the plausible168 and indeed undeniable pretext169 of qualifying the Company for administring this sovereign charge, he might have drawn89 from the legislature certain military as well as political powers; which, being gradually augmented170 as occasion offered, might have at last established a sort of power, in this government, distinct from and independent of the legislature: the exertion of which power, being confided171 to the Directors, would in fact have rested with the minister. Here indeed was a real danger to liberty; provided it had been possible to hold up this Indian business, in the hands of the Company, for 82any length of time; for, notwithstanding I consider national liberty as inexpugnable to the open assaults of a minister, yet, from such a secret convenient and commanding post as this mentioned, he might have made frequent sly and successful incursions on the confines of liberty; which would have greatly straitened her quarters, and wasted her strength.
On the other hand, if that Indian charge had been vested in the national government, liberty must have been perfectly secured from this last mentioned danger; for, in such case, there could have been no pretext for demanding these extraordinary distinct powers; and, consequently, no opportunity of establishing that truly dangerous imperium in imperio. And even in the application of the ordinary powers, emoluments, &c. a minister must have been subjected to many troublesome checks, and restraints. His Majesty, who can have no views distinct from the general interest of his people, must have held a principal voice in every measure; as likewise must some others his counsellors. Parliament too must have proved an inconvenient172 restraint on a minister; particularly 83in the article of estimates and accounts of revenue, which must have been submitted to its inspection173; and notwithstanding the certainty of carrying points by a majority of voices, yet, as there will ever be some refractory174 members, these might have carried tales to the public; which, provided this charge had been in the hands of national government, would have judged itself interested in the affair; and would therefore have taken the liberty to criticise175 his measures, or censure his misconduct. Whereas, this business being secured, as private property, in the hands of the Company, king, parliament, and nation were all excluded from participation176: the proprietors alone had a right to examine measures or accounts; and, the majority of them upon all questions being mercenary retainers to ministry and the direction, they must have ever been a mere servile pecus. So that the business might have been snugly177 confined to three or four ministerial associates, with their faithful dependants in Leadenhall Street; whilst the minister needed never appear in the affair; free from care, charge, or trouble; and irresponsible for 84either measures, or consequences; he might enjoy all the sweets, without the least alloy178 of bitter.
Sure I am if I had been minister, and minded to make a job of this Indian business, I would certainly have exerted myself most sedulously179 to preserve it in the hands of the Company. And, to divert the nation from ever turning her eye towards it, I would have strenuously180 inculcated the rights of the Company, national faith, the impossibility of conducting this business otherwise than through the Company; and, above all things, I would, by my emissaries, have alarmed the public, with fears of danger to their liberty, should this business ever come into the hands of government; whilst, by the same canal, I would have trumpeted181 forth182 my own candour, disinterestedness183 as a minister, indifference184 to power, and delicate regard to national liberty and private property, in thus disclaiming185 an object so replete186 with ministerial advantages, which was within my power. And thus would I have continued the game, until it was up: and then I would have directed the enquiries, which decency187 and regard to appearances 85extorted from me, in such a manner as to suppress, instead of investigating: though, at same time, I would have boldly expressed my indignation at the Company’s misconduct; and loudly denounced vengeance188 against the individuals that had shared in the plunder; not a soul that was guilty should escape. And, to wind up the whole affair dextrously, I would have tasked my own powers, and those of my myrmidons, to represent all these Indian acquisitions as a transitory, casual, and accidental piece of business; which was altogether out of our tract6; and which, if the nation had ever engaged in maintaining them, would have ruined and exhausted189 her: and so the nation was to thank me, for withholding190 her from ruin.
In this manner, I say, would I, who am a reptile191, have acted, had I been minister, and minded to make a job of this business: but I am far from intimating or insinuating192 that our ministers, who are men of high birth and strict honour, could be capable of admitting even a thought of taking such base advantages. 86All that I have said is only meant to show, that a minister, if he had the inclination, possessed an infinitely fairer opportunity, of converting this business to sinister193 purposes, whilst it was in the hands of the Company; than he possibly could have had, from the same business, under the conduct of national government. And, from thence, I would infer that, had this business been in the hands of government, our liberty, nay and our property too, would have been secured from many dangers, to which they have been exposed, whilst this business hath been in the hands of the Company.
I cannot then conceive what other objections could be started against government’s taking upon itself the charge of this Indian dominion: unless it be the old trite194 arguments of timid sluggish195 indolence, want of enterprize, &c. That, the distance of situation rendering it impossible for Britain to properly maintain and govern this dominion, it would become an object of no true value or importance, but rather a heavy load exhausting her strength. But it is now more than time for the nation to recal her faith from men 87whom she hath sufficient ground to suspect of deceit; and, rousing her senses, to take the liberty of trying these matters by the standard of her own reason; which we shall endeavour to aid by the following hints.
To properly demonstrate the true value and importance of this Indian dominion to Britain, would demand a volume; we have, in the first part, presented a slight sketch196 of it; here therefore we shall offer only one or two remarks respecting its importance to our finances; and though we do not offer these remarks as the result of exact calculation, yet will they serve to throw a light on this subject. Ever since the last war Britain hath paid annually197 to foreign creditors198, in interest, about 1,500,000 l. and this is paid, not in paper, but all in hard money; or, otherwise, in what is equivalent, the stoppage of so much hard money as is reckoned to come into Britain by the balance of her trade. On the other hand, the net specie balance of trade with all the world, (exclusive of that part which strictly199 and properly may be termed the produce of Indian dominion,) after deducting200 88the imperceptible and enormous drain of specie made by smuggling201, doth not at this day perhaps amount to 800,000 l. The difference then betwixt her numerical specie disbursement202 and receipt in balance of trade, must needs have been made good from some other fund than the circulating stock of specie, otherwise circulation must in that number of years have totally ceased. And this fund we need not mention to have been the dominion in India. Ever since 1757, the private fortunes acquired there in consequence of dominion or conquest, having been remitted203 either in bills on foreign Indian companies, or in diamonds, have created an annual influx204 of specie, (or what is equivalent,) to the amount of at least 700,000 l.[1] The Company 89too received since that period, and previous to the Dewanny, though by virtue of dominion or conquest, sundry large sums of money; which she invested in merchandize; and, thereby205, saved to Britain so much specie as she would, otherwise, have transmitted for the purchase of such merchandize; and it doth not require demonstration206 to prove, that all such saving is, in every respect, the same as the 90influx of an equal sum. And ever from 1765, till some time in 1770, the Company paid for all her cargoes207, not only in India but in China, with the surplus revenue of Bengal: and of course this surplus revenue hath, for that space, saved, (which is the same as gained) annually to Britain, the whole sums which the Company used to transmit for the purchase of her cargoes in India and China; and which, on an average, may be reckoned 500,000 l. per annum: but these cargoes were, from 1765, encreased to an enormous degree; and if we add only 200,000 l. for such encrease, we shall find that the surplus revenue of Bengal hath, by the return of trade, created an annual influx to Britain of at least 700,000 l. in specie: and this, added to the private fortunes, makes 1,400,000 l. received yearly by Britain, from Indian dominion.
But, for these two years past, the ruinous situation of those countries, and the consequent deficiency of revenue, hath obliged the Company to either transmit money from Europe, or otherwise to borrow money abroad, on bill or bond, for the purchase of all her cargoes in India as 91well as China: and the Company, by thus borrowing, for the purchase of cargoes, and even the expence of her government, hath absorbed the private fortunes, which, till then, had been transmitted to Britain, by bills on foreign companies. We must therefore perceive, without descending208 to tedious investigation209, that the ruined state of those countries, having cut off surplus revenue, hath, for these two years past, diminished the annual influx to Britain from Indian dominion, at least one half, or 700,000 l. And this diminution of influx, whilst our drain continues the same, we already begin to feel in our circulation: though this felt effect is not yet traced up to its cause. Of what mighty importance then must this Indian dominion have been, to the circulation of Britain: when this circulation feels severely210, from only two years partial deprivation211 of the benefit formerly212 derived from that dominion? And what effect must a total deprivation of that benefit operate, in a few years, on this circulation; whilst, we are continuing to pay to our foreign creditors about 1,500,000 l. per annum in numerical specie; exclusive of other less 92noted drains, which, it is most probable mount it up much higher? And yet it is evident, that Britain must, unavoidably, be deprived of this whole benefit, so soon as she shall lose her dominion in India; whether that loss shall be caused by enemies, or by the ruin of the countries subjected. Nay, by losing the dominion of Bengal singly, she must not only incur117 a deprivation of almost the whole dominion benefit; but she must likewise lose by far the most valuable part of that commerce, which was carried on by the Company with those countries, previous to dominion. For the commerce with Bengal, alone, is of much greater value, than that with all the rest of India: and, as to the trade with China, it is the most pernicious and losing trade to the nation; however convenient it may be to government.
And if we shall then advert8 to the benefit and support which the finances of Britain have received from this Indian dominion, for so many years past, though under the most preposterous213 management; but, still more, if we shall advert to the nature and degree of benefit that, under proper management, might have been derived 93in perpetuum from this Indian dominion, in not only the article of finance, but in other weighty respects: and, if we shall, yet farther, look forward to the dismal214 consequences that must unavoidably ensue to Britain in these several respects, from a deprivation of this Indian dominion and its benefits; can we tamely surrender our reason to the ipse dixit of men who are hardy215 enough to tell us, that Indian dominion is of no value nor utility to Britain.
Nor do these men less abuse our understanding, by holding forth the difficulty of maintaining and defending this dominion: seeing that, of all nations in the world, Britain is, by a variety of circumstances, the best qualified to maintain and defend maritime216 or commercial dominion in India. For, as she exceeds all the world in naval217 force, she is, through that circumstance alone, the most capable of defending such dominion, against the assault of European enemies: and had Britain availed herself of evident advantages, had she established her naval and land defence upon the plan that shall be explained, British dominion in India might, at this day, have been secured from even the attempt of 94European rivals: they might have admired and envied, but they would not have dared to attack. And these European rivals are the only dangerous enemies to British dominion in India: for as to the neighbouring native powers, they would, from fear as well as inclination, have been amicable218 to Britain; provided her government in those countries had acted with common honesty, and common decorum, or prudence219; and not as common robbers. And, as to the unhappy native subjects themselves, their loyalty220 hath been sufficiently proved, by so many years patient submission221 to the most intolerable of all possible governments. Wherein then consists the difficulty of maintaining and defending British dominion in India?
And with regard to the so much talked of expence or drain of native strength, we may surely, with good reason, say that this objection militated much stronger against maintaining that dominion under the Company, than under national government: tho’ the nature and extent of even that drain under the Company, is most grossly misrepresented. For I am well informed that the Company’s annual recruit, since the time she completed her dominion force, 95hath never exceeded 1200 men; and I am afraid it hath in general fallen short of 1000; notwithstanding she laboured under many disadvantages, from which national government would be exempted222: such as being obliged to put up with very indifferent and unhealthy recruits, for want of better; too little attention paid to the manner of transporting them; and still less to their health and manner of living in the country: whilst her governors expended223 numbers of them on unnecessary predatory wars. And even this recruit we are not to reckon a drain of real strength from Britain: seeing that, the Company’s recruits have been mostly fellows of the most desperate circumstances, who had no means of subsisting224 at home; and who therefore would, if the Company had not taken them off, have been taken off by the gallows225, or otherwise would have emigrated to America or some other country, in search of bread; and would thus have been equally lost to Britain. So that, upon rationally considering this matter, we shall find that, for the maintenance of dominion in India, the Company hath not drained this country, of 100 men annually, 96that could, in any sense, be termed useful, or a real strength to it. But, setting aside the precedent226 of the Company, it is certain that, to maintain and defend the mighty dominion of Bengal, demands an European force very little superior in number to the garrison227 of that barren fortress132 Gibraltar: and to maintain and defend the whole territorial possessions, together with the commerce of Britain in India, requires a force very little exceeding the aforesaid garrison with that of its filler fortress in Minorca. And the annual recruit, necessary to keep up this force, after allowing largely for climate, and every other circumstance, would, on a complete plan of defence, not exceed 900 or at most 1000 men: and, of this recruit, at least 200, would be wanted annually to maintain commerce, if there was no dominion. Nay, if this is judged too great a drain for Britain, one fourth part of that number may be reduced, by recruiting that proportion of foreign protestants: such being easily procured228; and, in such a low proportion, they can in no respect be dangerous. And can Britain, regard 6 or 700 men annually as too great 97a drain, for the maintenance of that important dominion and commerce, which is as one of the capital limbs of her body; and at same time bestow229 a nearly equal share of her strength on maintaining these two barren, and I had almost said useless, fortresses; the pecuniary230 charge of which she pays out of her proper finance, never to return; whilst Indian dominion defrays its own charge.
The only remaining objection then to Indian dominion is, the difficulty of properly governing it. But this difficulty doth not arise, like that in America, from the indomitably obstinate231 spirit of the subjects; on the contrary, it arises from their over passive or submissive disposition, and incapacity of resisting the power of government: and this, instead of being an objection, is the most valuable qualification of a dependent dominion. To remove this difficulty demands no exterior232 aids, no exertion of powers or force; it depends entirely on the will of the sovereign; and a very little art, a very little care, with a little honesty, would serve to completely remedy it; as we doubt not to evince.
98In fine, Bengal, being one of the richest commercial countries is, to Britain as a commercial nation, the noblest and most truly valuable acquisition that providence233 could possibly bestow on her: by the mild disposition of its inhabitants it is the most facilely governed and maintained; and, by the nature of its situation, it is the most defensible foreign dominion on this globe; particularly to Britain which excels in naval force. And one may almost venture to say that providence, by throwing Bengal into the arms of Britain, seems to have intended that this, the richest commercial state in Asia, which, through the effeminacy of its inhabitants, is incapable of maintaining its own independance, should be subjected to Britain, as being the fittest, through similarity of commercial disposition, interest, and modes, to properly govern it; and, through her superiority in naval force, the best qualified to defend and protect it from all enemies.
In what light then must posterity234 regard the policy of Britain, during the third quarter of the eighteenth century: when it shall find her, in the East, 99slighting and giving up that glorious field, which annually yielded a golden crop, to be rutted up and trodden down by hogs235 and viler236 beasts: whilst, in the West, she was tugging237 with all her might, exerting her utmost study, care and attention, much strength, and more money, on cultivating the sea sands; straining to subdue nature; and forcing the horse to drink in spite of inclination? Will it not be said, that she would have acted a far wiser part, if she had left nature and time to slowly operate in America, the effects which they will unavoidably produce, in spite of all her efforts; and had converted her care and attention, to properly govern, and maintain, that noble, rich, and grateful dependent dominion in India; which, upon such terms, would have poured, into her publick treasury, resources, that would have served to alleviate238 her burden of taxes; and, consequently, to reduce the price of necessaries, of labour, and of manufactures; which, again, would have preserved her commerce, not only with America, but with other countries; and would at same time have preserved to her thousands of industrious and useful subjects, 100who, through want of employment, were forced to emigrate from her to America. And, by the same care and attention to the government and revenue of that Indian dominion, she would have prevented the inundation239 of eastern profusion and extravagance; which chiefly contributed to convert this formerly graniferous island, into a pasture for horses of parade and stately pride; insomuch that, instead of supplying her neighbours as formerly, with some hundred thousand pounds worth of grain annually, she could not feed the greatly reduced number of her own inhabitants; nor furnish the means of living to the industrious agricultor, and peasant; who, in search of livelihood240, fled from her to America; thereby debilitating241 her own best source of strength, and prematurely242 accelerating the manhood of those otherwise infant colonies.
Nevertheless there still remains a possibility of retrieving243 this error in policy; or at least of preventing a farther encrease of the evils that have arisen from it; provided that, in the first place, this Indian dominion shall still be in our possession: and, in the second place, that national 101government shall, by taking upon itself the charge of administring the government thereof, remedy that first and radical cause of evil and abuse which hath existed under the Company’s government: and shall, at same time, with honest and sincere intention, spirit and activity, apply a proper remedy to that which hath been assigned as the second cause of evil, and the nature of which remedy shall be explained in the sequel. For, upon such terms, there is no doubt that a regular system of government may be established in that dependent dominion; under which it may be restored to its pristine244 prosperity, nay, it may be elevated to a state still more flourishing than it ever knew; and, in consequence, to a capacity of yielding a still superior degree of benefit to Britain; and in a manner widely different, and truely salutary to her.
But I must again repeat, that it is vain to expect this reform of evils from the management of the Company; loaded as she is with so many natural defects, which it is out of the power of art to remedy, otherwise than by conferring upon her the sovereign government of Britain, along 102with that of this dependent dominion. For the execution of these two sovereign governments is, by the nature of things, inseparable: it being morally impossible, that any power can execute the sovereign government of those Indian countries, as a dominion dependent upon Britain, unless that power shall possess the sovereign execution of government in Britain.
However, it would be still more vain to look for any good from that extravagant245 fancy of joining the Company, with government, in this sovereign charge. What quota246 of powers, proper to her and wanting to government, can the Company contribute, to render her a necessary or useful associate with government, in this sovereign charge? I doubt not that the proposer’s intentions were good and honest: but his scheme would be so far from promoting his or any one good purpose, that it would produce the very opposite effects. For, instead of checking and contrasting, it would serve, in the first place, to furnish, in the Directors and their governors, a convenient cloke of excuse to ministry and its governors, with the nation; whilst ministry and its governors would serve the Directors 103and their governors a like good turn with the proprietors: they would mutually vouch247 for and screen each other; neither would be responsible, and neither would act; and thus, between stools, &c. in the second place, commercial despotism which, by separating the Company from the powers of government and the consequent jealousy248 of privilege, must have been completely suppressed, would, under this double-headed monster, flourish with redoubled vigour249: the national governors would, by their connection with the Company’s, become merchants as well as tyrants250; and the Company’s governors would, by their power in the government, continue tyrants as well as merchants: and thus the candle would burn at both ends. In the third place, the Company which, by being excluded from the powers of government, would have contributed so essentially251 in the nature of a middle state to the establishment of a regular political system in those countries, must, by being joined in the execution of government, entirely lose that virtue: instead of supporting liberty, she would join in promoting tyranny; and would still continue a ruinous 104pest to those countries. Indeed that strange partnership252 of Nation and Co. in this sovereignty business, is a cure infinitely worse than the disease.
In short, there is no alternative: if Britain means to preserve the possession of that mighty benefit derived from dominion and commerce in India; if she means to prevent the absolute ruin of the Company, and her creditors; if she hath any regard to the loud cry of oppression sent forth to her for a series of years, by her numerous wretched subjects in those countries; and means to save them from final destruction, she must furnish their government with a sovereign, or head, properly qualified to administer it: for this is the foundation, as well as the crowning of all good government; it is the center upon which the machine revolves253, from which every line issues, and in which every line terminates; it is sine qua non, for without it no regular government can exist. And what proper sovereign can Britain furnish to that dependent dominion, unless it be her own sovereign government?
We have shown that the nation and her supreme government are perfectly equal to 105the charge: to them there is not the smallest difficulty in supporting it. Neither is there the smallest difficulty to her executive government or ministry, provided it shall possess an ordinary share of spirit, activity, or enterprize; and shall proceed with sincere and upright intention. For, a regular form of government being once established abroad, and a properly digested office or department formed at home, the business would go on with great smoothness and facility to ministry.
Nevertheless, as I have assumed the liberty of prescribing in this important and almost desperate case, I am sorry, that a sincere regard to the welfare of the patient should compel me to add, (by way of concluding on this head,) that, unless ministry shall act upon a principle, and with a spirit, extremely different from that which it hath hitherto discovered in this business, it would be much more adviseable to continue the charge in the hands of the Company: for it can be but ruined under her. However, in strong hopes of a melioration in these respects, which depends altogether on the will of government, I shall proceed 106to disclose that plan, which, in the hands of a properly qualified sovereign, would, I doubt not, serve to establish a regular system of government in India.
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| n.格言，箴言 | |
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panacea
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| n.万灵药；治百病的灵药 | |
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ware
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mere
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prescriptions
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tract
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speculation
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dominion
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supervisors
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| n.监督者，管理者( supervisor的名词复数 ) | |
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20
err
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| vi.犯错误，出差错 | |
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21
impel
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| v.推动；激励，迫使 | |
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22
impelling
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| adj.迫使性的，强有力的v.推动、推进或敦促某人做某事( impel的现在分词 ) | |
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23
anarchy
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| n.无政府状态；社会秩序混乱，无秩序 | |
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24
radical
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| n.激进份子，原子团，根号；adj.根本的，激进的，彻底的 | |
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25
sufficiently
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| adv.足够地，充分地 | |
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26
supreme
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| adj.极度的，最重要的；至高的，最高的 | |
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27
recapitulate
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| v.节述要旨，择要说明 | |
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28
legislative
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| n.立法机构，立法权；adj.立法的，有立法权的 | |
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29
judicial
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| adj.司法的，法庭的，审判的，明断的，公正的 | |
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30
incapable
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| adj.无能力的，不能做某事的 | |
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31
obedience
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| n.服从，顺从 | |
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32
inclination
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| n.倾斜；点头；弯腰；斜坡；倾度；倾向；爱好 | |
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33
proprietary
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| n.所有权，所有的；独占的；业主 | |
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34
corporate
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| adj.共同的，全体的；公司的，企业的 | |
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35
tenor
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| n.男高音（歌手），次中音（乐器），要旨，大意 | |
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36
rotation
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| n.旋转；循环，轮流 | |
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37
rapacious
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| adj.贪婪的，强夺的 | |
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38
sundry
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| adj.各式各样的，种种的 | |
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39
dominions
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|
| 统治权( dominion的名词复数 )； 领土； 疆土； 版图 | |
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40
detrimental
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|
| adj.损害的，造成伤害的 | |
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41
enacted
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| 制定（法律），通过（法案）( enact的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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42
binding
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| 有约束力的，有效的，应遵守的 | |
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43
deterred
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| v.阻止，制止( deter的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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44
deter
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| vt.阻止，使不敢，吓住 | |
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45
prosecuting
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|
| 检举、告发某人( prosecute的现在分词 )； 对某人提起公诉； 继续从事（某事物）； 担任控方律师 | |
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46
divulging
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|
| v.吐露，泄露( divulge的现在分词 ) | |
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47
erect
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| n./v.树立，建立，使竖立；adj.直立的，垂直的 | |
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48
majesty
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|
| n.雄伟，壮丽，庄严，威严；最高权威，王权 | |
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49
imprisonment
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| n.关押，监禁，坐牢 | |
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50
banishment
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| n.放逐，驱逐 | |
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51
elude
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| v.躲避，困惑 | |
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52
delinquents
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|
| n.（尤指青少年）有过失的人，违法的人( delinquent的名词复数 ) | |
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53
judgment
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| n.审判；判断力，识别力，看法，意见 | |
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54
proprietor
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| n.所有人；业主；经营者 | |
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55
proprietors
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|
| n.所有人，业主( proprietor的名词复数 ) | |
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56
alienating
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|
| v.使疏远( alienate的现在分词 )；使不友好；转让；让渡（财产等） | |
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57
rapacity
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| n.贪婪，贪心，劫掠的欲望 | |
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58
hog
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|
| n.猪；馋嘴贪吃的人；vt.把…占为己有，独占 | |
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59
alienate
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| vt.使疏远，离间；转让(财产等) | |
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60
alienation
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| n.疏远；离间；异化 | |
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61
specified
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| adj.特定的 | |
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62
lasting
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| adj.永久的，永恒的；vbl.持续，维持 | |
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63
pillage
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| v.抢劫；掠夺；n.抢劫，掠夺；掠夺物 | |
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64
plunder
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| vt.劫掠财物，掠夺；n.劫掠物，赃物；劫掠 | |
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65
indirectly
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| adv.间接地，不直接了当地 | |
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66
restrictions
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|
| 约束( restriction的名词复数 )； 管制； 制约因素； 带限制性的条件（或规则） | |
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67
qualified
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| adj.合格的，有资格的，胜任的，有限制的 | |
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68
defender
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| n.保卫者，拥护者，辩护人 | |
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69
specify
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| vt.指定，详细说明 | |
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70
apprehending
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| 逮捕，拘押( apprehend的现在分词 )； 理解 | |
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71
apprehend
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| vt.理解，领悟，逮捕，拘捕，忧虑 | |
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72
prohibition
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| n.禁止；禁令，禁律 | |
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73
absurdity
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|
| n.荒谬，愚蠢；谬论 | |
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74
previously
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|
| adv.以前，先前（地） | |
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75
premises
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|
| n.建筑物，房屋 | |
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76
acquiesced
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|
| v.默认，默许( acquiesce的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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77
evasion
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|
| n.逃避，偷漏(税) | |
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78
applied
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|
| adj.应用的；v.应用，适用 | |
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79
vaguely
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|
| adv.含糊地，暖昧地 | |
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80
territorial
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|
| adj.领土的，领地的 | |
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81
jurisdiction
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|
| n.司法权，审判权，管辖权，控制权 | |
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82
derived
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|
| vi.起源；由来；衍生；导出v.得到( derive的过去式和过去分词 )；（从…中）得到获得；源于；（从…中）提取 | |
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83
virtue
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|
| n.德行，美德；贞操；优点；功效，效力 | |
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84
implicated
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|
| adj.密切关联的；牵涉其中的 | |
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85
begot
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|
| v.为…之生父( beget的过去式 )；产生，引起 | |
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86
withheld
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|
| withhold过去式及过去分词 | |
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87
scrupulously
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|
| adv.一丝不苟地；小心翼翼地，多顾虑地 | |
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88
withdrawn
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|
| vt.收回；使退出；vi.撤退，退出 | |
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89
drawn
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|
| v.拖，拉，拔出；adj.憔悴的，紧张的 | |
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90
implicitly
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|
| adv. 含蓄地, 暗中地, 毫不保留地 | |
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91
perfectly
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|
| adv.完美地，无可非议地，彻底地 | |
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92
absurdities
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|
| n.极端无理性( absurdity的名词复数 )；荒谬；谬论；荒谬的行为 | |
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93
pillaging
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|
| v.抢劫，掠夺( pillage的现在分词 ) | |
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94
industrious
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|
| adj.勤劳的，刻苦的，奋发的 | |
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95
improper
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|
| adj.不适当的，不合适的，不正确的，不合礼仪的 | |
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96
mighty
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| adj.强有力的；巨大的 | |
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97
steered
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| v.驾驶( steer的过去式和过去分词 )；操纵；控制；引导 | |
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98
incongruities
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|
| n.不协调( incongruity的名词复数 )；不一致；不适合；不协调的东西 | |
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99
conspicuous
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|
| adj.明眼的，惹人注目的；炫耀的，摆阔气的 | |
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100
shun
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| vt.避开，回避，避免 | |
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101
endued
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| v.授予，赋予（特性、才能等）( endue的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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102
immutable
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| adj.不可改变的，永恒的 | |
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103
motive
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|
| n.动机，目的；adv.发动的，运动的 | |
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104
defective
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|
| adj.有毛病的，有问题的，有瑕疵的 | |
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105
precisely
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| adv.恰好，正好，精确地，细致地 | |
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106
poise
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| vt./vi. 平衡，保持平衡；n.泰然自若，自信 | |
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107
opposition
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| n.反对，敌对 | |
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108
propriety
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|
| n.正当行为；正当；适当 | |
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109
exertion
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| n.尽力，努力 | |
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110
fully
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| adv.完全地，全部地，彻底地；充分地 | |
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111
finesse
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| n.精密技巧，灵巧，手腕 | |
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112
entirely
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| ad.全部地，完整地；完全地，彻底地 | |
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113
infinitely
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| adv.无限地，无穷地 | |
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114
intrepidity
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| n.大胆，刚勇；大胆的行为 | |
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115
redress
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| n.赔偿，救济，矫正；v.纠正，匡正，革除 | |
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116
infringement
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| n.违反；侵权 | |
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117
incur
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| vt.招致，蒙受，遭遇 | |
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118
incurred
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| [医]招致的，遭受的； incur的过去式 | |
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119
annihilated
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|
| v.（彻底）消灭( annihilate的过去式和过去分词 )；使无效；废止；彻底击溃 | |
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120
extorted
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| v.敲诈( extort的过去式和过去分词 )；曲解 | |
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121
havoc
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| n.大破坏，浩劫，大混乱，大杂乱 | |
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122
torrent
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| n.激流，洪流；爆发，(话语等的)连发 | |
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123
profusion
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| n.挥霍；丰富 | |
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124
prodigality
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| n.浪费，挥霍 | |
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125
gulf
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| n.海湾；深渊，鸿沟；分歧，隔阂 | |
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126
bankruptcy
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| n.破产；无偿付能力 | |
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127
treasury
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| n.宝库；国库，金库；文库 | |
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128
diminution
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| n.减少；变小 | |
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129
drooping
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| adj. 下垂的，无力的 动词droop的现在分词 | |
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130
dividend
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| n.红利，股息；回报，效益 | |
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131
fortresses
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| 堡垒，要塞( fortress的名词复数 ) | |
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132
fortress
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| n.堡垒，防御工事 | |
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133
munition
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| n.军火；军需品；v.给某部门提供军火 | |
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134
ministry
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| n.(政府的)部；牧师 | |
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135
delicacy
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| n.精致，细微，微妙，精良；美味，佳肴 | |
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136
sham
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| n./adj.假冒(的)，虚伪(的) | |
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137
acquiescence
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| n.默许；顺从 | |
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138
emoluments
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| n.报酬，薪水( emolument的名词复数 ) | |
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139
annexed
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| [法] 附加的，附属的 | |
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140
presumptuous
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|
| adj.胆大妄为的，放肆的，冒昧的，冒失的 | |
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141
concurring
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| 同时发生的，并发的 | |
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142
uncommon
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|
| adj.罕见的，非凡的，不平常的 | |
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143
sincerity
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|
| n.真诚，诚意；真实 | |
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144
considerably
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|
| adv.极大地；相当大地；在很大程度上 | |
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145
juncture
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|
| n.时刻，关键时刻，紧要关头 | |
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146
censure
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|
| v./n.责备；非难；责难 | |
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147
prolixity
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| n.冗长，罗嗦 | |
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148
bulwarks
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| n.堡垒( bulwark的名词复数 )；保障；支柱；舷墙 | |
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149
contradictory
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|
| adj.反驳的，反对的，抗辩的；n.正反对，矛盾对立 | |
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150
superfluous
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|
| adj.过多的，过剩的，多余的 | |
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151
belly
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| n.肚子，腹部；(像肚子一样)鼓起的部分，膛 | |
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152
withhold
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| v.拒绝，不给；使停止，阻挡 | |
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153
subdue
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| vt.制服，使顺从，征服；抑制，克制 | |
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154
divested
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| v.剥夺( divest的过去式和过去分词 )；脱去（衣服）；2。从…取去…；1。（给某人）脱衣服 | |
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155
jot
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| n.少量；vi.草草记下；vt.匆匆写下 | |
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156
remains
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| n.剩余物，残留物；遗体，遗迹 | |
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157
distraction
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| n.精神涣散，精神不集中，消遣，娱乐 | |
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158
obstruction
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| n.阻塞，堵塞；障碍物 | |
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159
subvert
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| v.推翻；暗中破坏；搅乱 | |
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160
possessed
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| adj.疯狂的；拥有的，占有的 | |
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161
dependants
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| 受赡养者，受扶养的家属( dependant的名词复数 ) | |
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162
awe
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| n.敬畏，惊惧；vt.使敬畏，使惊惧 | |
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163
wresting
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| 动词wrest的现在进行式 | |
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164
rendering
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| n.表现，描写 | |
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165
omnipotent
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| adj.全能的，万能的 | |
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166
distress
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| n.苦恼，痛苦，不舒适；不幸；vt.使悲痛 | |
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167
prosecutor
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| n.起诉人；检察官，公诉人 | |
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168
plausible
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| adj.似真实的，似乎有理的，似乎可信的 | |
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169
pretext
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| n.借口，托词 | |
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170
Augmented
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| adj.增音的 动词augment的过去式和过去分词形式 | |
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171
confided
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| v.吐露（秘密，心事等）( confide的过去式和过去分词 )；（向某人）吐露（隐私、秘密等） | |
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172
inconvenient
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| adj.不方便的，令人感到麻烦的 | |
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173
inspection
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| n.检查，审查，检阅 | |
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174
refractory
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| adj.倔强的，难驾驭的 | |
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175
criticise
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| v.批评，评论；非难 | |
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176
participation
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| n.参与，参加，分享 | |
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177
snugly
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| adv.紧贴地；贴身地；暖和舒适地；安适地 | |
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178
alloy
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| n.合金，(金属的)成色 | |
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179
sedulously
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| ad.孜孜不倦地 | |
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180
strenuously
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| adv.奋发地，费力地 | |
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181
trumpeted
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| 大声说出或宣告（trumpet的过去式与过去分词形式） | |
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182
forth
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| adv.向前；向外，往外 | |
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183
disinterestedness
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184
indifference
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| n.不感兴趣，不关心，冷淡，不在乎 | |
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185
disclaiming
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| v.否认( disclaim的现在分词 ) | |
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186
replete
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| adj.饱满的，塞满的；n.贮蜜蚁 | |
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187
decency
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| n.体面，得体，合宜，正派，庄重 | |
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188
vengeance
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| n.报复，报仇，复仇 | |
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189
exhausted
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| adj.极其疲惫的，精疲力尽的 | |
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190
withholding
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| 扣缴税款 | |
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191
reptile
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| n.爬行动物；两栖动物 | |
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192
insinuating
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| adj.曲意巴结的，暗示的v.暗示( insinuate的现在分词 )；巧妙或迂回地潜入；（使）缓慢进入；慢慢伸入 | |
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193
sinister
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| adj.不吉利的，凶恶的，左边的 | |
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194
trite
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| adj.陈腐的 | |
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195
sluggish
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| adj.懒惰的，迟钝的，无精打采的 | |
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196
sketch
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| n.草图；梗概；素描；v.素描；概述 | |
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197
annually
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| adv.一年一次，每年 | |
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198
creditors
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| n.债权人，债主( creditor的名词复数 ) | |
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199
strictly
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| adv.严厉地，严格地；严密地 | |
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200
deducting
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| v.扣除，减去( deduct的现在分词 ) | |
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201
smuggling
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| n.走私 | |
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202
disbursement
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| n.支付，付款 | |
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203
remitted
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| v.免除（债务），宽恕( remit的过去式和过去分词 )；使某事缓和；寄回，传送 | |
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204
influx
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| n.流入，注入 | |
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205
thereby
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| adv.因此，从而 | |
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206
demonstration
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| n.表明，示范，论证，示威 | |
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207
cargoes
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| n.（船或飞机装载的）货物( cargo的名词复数 )；大量，重负 | |
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208
descending
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| n. 下行 adj. 下降的 | |
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209
investigation
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| n.调查，调查研究 | |
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210
severely
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| adv.严格地；严厉地；非常恶劣地 | |
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211
deprivation
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| n.匮乏；丧失；夺去，贫困 | |
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212
formerly
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| adv.从前，以前 | |
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213
preposterous
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| adj.荒谬的，可笑的 | |
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214
dismal
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| adj.阴沉的，凄凉的，令人忧郁的，差劲的 | |
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215
hardy
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| adj.勇敢的，果断的，吃苦的；耐寒的 | |
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216
maritime
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| adj.海的，海事的，航海的，近海的，沿海的 | |
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217
naval
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| adj.海军的，军舰的，船的 | |
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218
amicable
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| adj.和平的，友好的；友善的 | |
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219
prudence
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| n.谨慎，精明，节俭 | |
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220
loyalty
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| n.忠诚，忠心 | |
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221
submission
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| n.服从，投降；温顺，谦虚；提出 | |
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222
exempted
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| 使免除[豁免]( exempt的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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223
expended
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| v.花费( expend的过去式和过去分词 )；使用（钱等）做某事；用光；耗尽 | |
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224
subsisting
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| v.（靠很少的钱或食物）维持生活，生存下去( subsist的现在分词 ) | |
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225
gallows
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| n.绞刑架，绞台 | |
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226
precedent
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| n.先例，前例；惯例；adj.在前的，在先的 | |
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227
garrison
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| n.卫戍部队；驻地，卫戍区；vt.派(兵)驻防 | |
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228
procured
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| v.（努力）取得， （设法）获得( procure的过去式和过去分词 )；拉皮条 | |
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229
bestow
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| v.把…赠与，把…授予；花费 | |
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230
pecuniary
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| adj.金钱的；金钱上的 | |
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231
obstinate
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| adj.顽固的，倔强的，不易屈服的，较难治愈的 | |
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232
exterior
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| adj.外部的，外在的；表面的 | |
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233
providence
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| n.深谋远虑，天道，天意；远见；节约；上帝 | |
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234
posterity
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| n.后裔，子孙，后代 | |
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235
hogs
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| n.（尤指喂肥供食用的）猪( hog的名词复数 )；（供食用的）阉公猪；彻底地做某事；自私的或贪婪的人 | |
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236
viler
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| adj.卑鄙的( vile的比较级 )；可耻的；极坏的；非常讨厌的 | |
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237
tugging
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| n.牵引感v.用力拉，使劲拉，猛扯( tug的现在分词 ) | |
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238
alleviate
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| v.减轻，缓和，缓解(痛苦等) | |
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239
inundation
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| n.the act or fact of overflowing | |
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240
livelihood
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| n.生计，谋生之道 | |
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241
debilitating
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| a.使衰弱的 | |
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242
prematurely
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| adv.过早地，贸然地 | |
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243
retrieving
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| n.检索（过程），取还v.取回( retrieve的现在分词 )；恢复；寻回；检索（储存的信息） | |
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244
pristine
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| adj.原来的，古时的，原始的，纯净的，无垢的 | |
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245
extravagant
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| adj.奢侈的；过分的；(言行等)放肆的 | |
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246
quota
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| n.（生产、进出口等的）配额，（移民的）限额 | |
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247
vouch
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| v.担保；断定；n.被担保者 | |
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248
jealousy
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| n.妒忌，嫉妒，猜忌 | |
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249
vigour
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| （=vigor）n.智力，体力，精力 | |
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250
tyrants
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| 专制统治者( tyrant的名词复数 )； 暴君似的人； （古希腊的）僭主； 严酷的事物 | |
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251
essentially
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| adv.本质上，实质上，基本上 | |
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252
partnership
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| n.合作关系，伙伴关系 | |
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253
revolves
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| v.（使）旋转( revolve的第三人称单数 )；细想 | |
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