But it is evident, that the distance of situation must render the immediate5 controul of the Directors perfectly6 impotent, ineffectual, and nugatory7; for it would be absurd to suppose, that the government of Bengal should defer8 the execution of any one purpose until it shall have communicated with, and received the opinion of the Directors, which cannot be effected in the space of a whole year; consequently the directors cannot interfere9 in the direction, or ordering of this government, farther than in some few cases of the most general or invariable nature: but the execution of even these general orders depends upon the will and discretion10 of the deputed government; seeing the Directors cannot, at that distance, enforce it themselves: and the same cause puts it out of their power to prevent or restrain abuse; so that they hold neither positive nor negative authority in the immediate execution of this government. And the condition or situation of these directorial sovereigns 19at home, renders their retrospective controul equally impotent and ineffectual; for they have no power in themselves to inflict11 other punishment on their deputies, for the most audacious disobedience, or for maladministration, than dismission from their service; and this becomes no punishment, because the delinquents14 are previously15 prepared for it, being ready to set out of their own accord with a princely fortune for the mother country; where they set the authority of the Directors at defiance16; for there these sovereigns of India are themselves subjects, and cannot call their quondam ministers to account, except in an ordinary court of justice; and the difficulty of obtaining evidence requisite17 to convict in these courts; the dread18 of bringing to light, in the course of a legal process, some abstruse19 mysteries of government; and the apprehension20 of danger arising to the interest of the present direction from a powerful combination at the next election, will ever deter21 the Directors from seriously prosecuting22 a lawsuit23 against their deputies, even in cases of peculation24 from the sovereign; but if it respects only the interest 20of the subject, they will be more apt to palliate and defend the offence. We must therefore perceive, that this deputed government acts perfectly independent of either the immediate controul, or future awe25 of the sovereign: whilst the sovereign is compelled to blindly support, with its whole power, the authority of this government; and, without choice, to enforce all its measures; seeing that to oppose the will of the deputy, is opposing the authority of the sovereign.
And, as to the native subjects, the power of this deputed government over them is perfectly absolute and complete. For the inhabitants of those countries, being disposed by nature or climate to passive obedience12, and by long custom habituated to despotic authority, and being farther impressed with a particular awe of Europeans, from a notion of their natural superiority, implicitly28 submit to the will of their present government, without once daring to either examine its right, dispute its authority, or question its conduct. The subject therefore holds not the smallest voice in the administration of government; the jurisdiction29, the police, the 21finances, the military government and defence, are all incontroulably directed by the Company’s deputation: and the entire interests of those countries, the lives and property of the inhabitants, are subjected to its discretion, and depend on its will.
So that this deputation of the Company executes the government of Bengal with a power perfectly unlimited30 by any exterior31 controul; and if we consider that it is at the same time foreign to the country governed, mutable, and of very short duration, we shall find that it is equally unrestrained by any internal check. It is therefore the most unlimited government on earth; or rather it is the only government that can, with propriety32, be termed arbitrary and despotic.
For all other deputed governments are sufficiently33 restrained by the authority of the sovereign; and we have no idea of despotism, except in governments that are supreme or sovereign. But the idea of actual despotism in a supreme government is merely imaginary; seeing that, in one and all of these governments, the power of governing is conditional35, limited by 22rule, and subjected to controul both external and internal. For it is evident, that, in all supreme governments, the power of governing, and the means that support this power, must needs be derived36 from the people governed; and therefore cannot exist in despight of their consent; and though, in some of these governments, the condition, upon which this power and these means are granted, is not specially37 expressed, yet is it perfectly understood, and invariably enforced in all of them; inasmuch as there are examples in each, of sovereigns who have suffered the utmost punishment, for attempting to transgress38 the limits of this condition; nay39, there is scarce one instance where the prince, thus transgressing40, escaped the resentment41 of the people; and examples of this nature are most frequent in these governments that are falsely termed despotic. These examples must therefore convince all sovereigns, that there is a power in the people, superior to, and capable of controuling them; and the sense of this must ever prove an effectual external controul on the conduct of a supreme government. But self-interest, 23that primum and perpetuum mobile of human action, which we may term an internal check, operates still more forcibly, constantly, and immediately on the will of a supreme government; not simply restraining it from doing or permitting injury, but impelling42 it to promote the good of the people governed. For a government that is sovereign, and perpetual (or durante vita and hereditary) cannot possibly separate its own private interest from that of the community which it governs; being indeed itself a part of that community: and this is so evident, that no prince ever attempted to advance a distinct interest of his own, at the expence of the general weal, who was not a fool, before he became a tyrant43. But a wise sovereign considers his people as the channel through which alone he can receive substantial good or evil; and, acting44 upon this principle, he will, however absolute and disposed by nature to tyranny, abstain45 from injuring the general interest, because he is sensible that such injury will recoil46 upon himself; and he will exert himself to promote the prosperity of his people, as the only means of advancing his own power, 24grandeur, or wealth. So that a sovereign prince, who understands his own real interest, though otherwise void of virtue47, will ever study to govern well; nay, the private vices48 of such a prince do often operate public good; a striking instance of which we meet with in our Henry the Seventh; whose extreme and sordid49 avarice50 was the source of English commerce and wealth; and his mean self-love, and jealousy51 of power, established universal liberty.
But the nature of this Bengal government differs, in every circumstance, from that of a supreme government; being deputed, foreign, mutable, and temporary, it is no way interested in the lasting52 prosperity of the community which it governs; on the contrary, this government holds an interest which is not only distinct from, but diametrically opposite to that of the subject. For these Governors return to Europe immediately on the expiration53 of their office, which seldom dures above three years, often less; therefore their sole aim is to amass54 all the wealth they can, during the short term of their power, in order to transport it along with their 25persons to their own country. But the wealth which a government amasses55, must needs be extorted56 from the people governed; consequently self-interest leads this government to pillage58 and plunder59 the subject: and we have seen that it is not restrained, by any external controul, from advancing its own distinct interest at the expence of the community which it governs, seeing it is perfectly exempted60 from all awe of either the sovereign or the subject; and it cannot be restrained by any internal check, because it holds no concern in the lasting welfare of the people.
Such then is the ruling principle of this government: nor are the means which it employs to promote its own interest less extraordinary than is its power to enforce them. For this government, which arbitrarily directs the jurisdiction and police, together with the imposition and collection of taxes, doth at same time act in the capacity of a merchant. And this commercial despotism, or despotic power lodged61 in the hands of a few foreign merchants, hath, in its nature and consequences, proved infinitely62 more destructive to the interest of that commercial 26country, than all the operations of political tyranny have been: for from it sprung these cruel monopolies, which struck at the very root of manufacture, commerce, and even population.
To attempt describing the particular methods which this government hath practised to promote its own interest at the expence of the people, in its double capacity, of an absolute sovereign and a despotic merchant, would be a tedious, invidious, and even an unprofitable undertaking63; for it is almost impossible to properly delineate the conduct of a tyranny so various and irregular in its operations; and, to those who are unacquainted with the modes, customs, and interests of the country in question, the recital64 of a few particular instances would only serve to mislead their judgment65, and darken or diminish the truth. By attending to the general description given of the nature views and interests of this government, we shall form a more complete and just notion of its conduct and deportment, than can be acquired from any disjointed account of particulars. Let us suppose a few foreigners sent into a rich commercial 27country, with absolute and unlimited power over the lives and property of the inhabitants; actuated by no other principle than that of acquiring riches, and stimulated66 thereto not only by avarice but ambition, or the desire of excelling; unrestrained by any species of present awe or future apprehension; but on the contrary, encouraged by precedent67 to expect in their own country, titles, dignity, respect, and consequence, each in proportion to the sum he imports; and whatever methods we can suppose would be practised by such foreigners, to accomplish their purpose, within a short limited term, we may suppose to have been actually employed by this Bengal government. The enormous amount of numerous fortunes, imported by the persons employed in this government, together with the rapidity of acquisition, are circumstances seen and known in this country; and these will thoroughly68 warrant our supposing, that the acquirers have availed themselves to the utmost of their powers, as well as their opportunities. However, we shall err69 greatly in our estimate of the damage caused to those countries, by their government’s prosecuting 28its own distinct interest, if we shall confine the reckoning to only the loss of so much specie, as hath been extorted and exported by these foreigners: for this, though in itself a ruinous grievance70, is merely trivial, when compared with the havoc71 and waste committed on the manufacture, the commerce, agriculture, and population, by the methods employed to acquire these sums. A herd72 of hogs73, broke into a well dressed vineyard, will gorge74 their voracious75 maws; but that which they eat and devour76 doth not destroy the vineyard; it is their manner of eating, their rutting up, their tearing down, and trampling77 under foot.
Hitherto we have regarded this government in only one point of view: we have seen it acting for itself; but we have not seen the part it acts for the people, in its capacity of a sovereign ruler, administring the government of a mighty78 state in all its different offices or departments; and entrusted79 with the care of the whole and entire interests of a numerous commercial nation. But, in the discharge of this sovereign trust, we shall find the government of Bengal a mere34 Vis inerti?, void 29of the two efficient principles of action, ability or power of acting, and will or inclination80. For how can we expect to find the ability, of governing well, in the men employed by the Company to execute the government of those countries? to attain81 the knowledge of any one science or mystery, demands an effort of the mind; but it is impossible for the brightest natural genius to arrive at even a moderate degree of skill in the art of governing, which, as it is the most elevated, so is it the most difficult, abstruse, various and complicated of all human sciences, without long and intense application, study, and reflection; and, we may add, a series of practice; and all these gradations to skill, in governing, are wanting to our Bengal governors. Their scholastic82 education extends no farther than to qualify them for merchants clerks; and, immediately on being taken from school, they are dispatched to India; where the manner of life is consonant83 to the climate, voluptuous84 to a degree of dissoluteness, vain, idle, dissipated, and an enemy to study or reflection: the juvenile85 part of their life being spent in this manner, they arrive 30at the charge of government with minds perfectly uninformed, and so very averse86 to application, that they commit and implicitly confide87 the charge of their own private concerns to servants. If such men should possess the skill or address of governing well, it must certainly be acquired instantaneously and supernaturally; infused into them by miracle, like the gift of speech into the ass26 of Balaam.
But the want of will or inclination is an obstacle to their governing well, still more prevalent than is the want of ability. Labour, fatigue88, and difficulty are evils, to which the human mind is so naturally averse, that, unless it is urged by some strong impulse of passion, such as the fear of some superior evil, or the hope and desire of some mighty good, it will decline and evade89 them: what stimulum then can be sufficiently powerful to urge the habitually90 indolent minds of our Bengal governors to encounter the difficulties, the labour, and fatigue attending a due discharge of the duties of government; which, of all human undertakings91, is the most replete92 with these mental evils? Yet this government, which demands a stronger 31stimulum than any other government that ever yet existed, is in effect urged by no one motive93 or consideration to discharge the duties of its office; for, as it holds no interest in the lasting welfare of the people governed, neither its hopes nor its fears are at all interested in the good or evil consequences that may be caused by its own vigilance or neglect: being altogether superior to the resentment of the subject, and independent of the sovereign’s authority, it is not impelled94, by the fear of immediate danger, nor the apprehension of future punishment: and as to the prospect95 of glory, applause, or respect, which push the generous and ambitious mind to action, our governors aim to attain them, not by governing well, but by acquiring and bringing home a mighty fortune to their own country.
Men thus actuated, or rather unactuated, must, in the discharge of their sovereign office, be perfectly torpid96 and listless; the machine of political government stops in their hands, and stands stock still: their minds being incapable97 of application, they withdraw themselves as much as possible from attention, and leave the trouble 32of governing to others, still less qualified98 than themselves; these inferior agents being chosen, not for their abilities or virtue, but for their fitness to serve the private purpose of the governors, otherwise by chance; but they give themselves no trouble to inspect the conduct of these agents, who in general are unprincipled miscreants99; on the contrary, they promiscuously100 approve and support every action; so that, wherever the power of this government acts, it is only to oppress; and all beside is left to chance. However, the power of governing, or rather of oppressing, is not confined to the persons vested with the charge of government: the numerous servants whom this Company disperses101 over the face of the country, for the purpose of carrying on her trade, do each of them, in his own district, assume the authority of a despot; and communicates a like authority to all his servants and dependants102, who, it must be allowed, are far more unrelenting than their masters; and thus tyranny is extended into every corner; oppression becomes general; and the oppressed are excluded from the very prospect of redress103; for, on appeal to the 33superior, the plaintiff is ever remanded to the very oppressor, who punishes him for having dared to complain. And thus justice and protection are no where to be found; vice13 goes unpunished, and innocence104 unsupported; therefore every man becomes a villain105 in his own defence; and faith, confidence, truth, and honesty are banished106 the land. In short, it may with strict propriety be said by these wretched people, Terras astr?a reliquit; and tyranny and anarchy107 have here set up their throne.
And to this inaction or non-exertion of the powers of government we are to impute108 the ruin of those countries, rather than to the avarice or rapine of the persons deputed by the Company to execute that government. For the power of governing being vested in only a few, the extortion of these few might have been long supported by a rich commercial country, provided they had exerted themselves to restrain and prevent all others from plundering109 and oppressing. The avarice, profusion110 and bloody111 tyranny of even Nero, and Domitian, was felt by only a few of their subjects at Rome; every where else the empire flourished; because 34these imperial monopolizers of vice would suffer none in power to be wicked but themselves; they narrowly inspected the conduct of their governors and officers, and severely112 punished their injustice113 or oppression. But where the government doth not only plunder itself, but suffers every one under it to plunder, that country must in time be completely ruined.
Now Bengal hath been subjected to a government of this nature for these fifteen years past; for though we commonly date the commencement of the Company’s sovereignty from the assumption of the Dewanny, (as it is termed,) yet hath this Company (at least her deputies) possessed114 a really absolute authority in those countries ever since the battle of Plassey in 1757. That action rendered them masters of Bengal; and it was equally within their power to assume the sovereign government at that time, as afterwards in 1765; their own will was the only obstacle: but notwithstanding they bestowed115 it on a native Nabob, yet did they retain an absolute superiority over him, and he governed in a state of perfect subordination 35to their authority; for he well knew and experienced, that the duration of his office, and even of his existence, depended upon their will; consequently this dependent native government could but little restrain the conduct of the Company’s deputies, or protect the subject from their rapacity116; and when they, in 1765, set aside this native government, they only removed a screen which they themselves had set up, and till then preserved for their own purpose.
How far these countries may have advanced towards the period of final ruin, under the fifteen or sixteen years domination of such a government, we shall not pretend to determine, because the term ruin is variously understood. This much is certain, that the unbounded remittance117 of specie made, for some years, by the English Company, for sundry118 purposes as sovereign; and for a much greater number of years, and in much larger sums by the other European Companies, who received it from the servants of the English Company for bills on Europe, at a very low exchange, and employed it for every purpose in the other parts of India 36and China, hath compleatly drained Bengal of its wealth, and reduced it to a state of the most abject119 poverty. And the grievous oppression and rapine exercised by the Company’s servants, and their numerous dependants; together with the most cruel monopolies usurped120 by them over every species of merchandize, and even the necessaries of life, hath in a great measure suppressed commerce, and abolished trade. Whilst the insatiable avarice and unrestrained extortion of those employed in the collection of taxes and revenue having ruined the farmer, the lands lay uncultivated and waste; insomuch that, not to mention the immense decrease of revenue, that naturally most fertile of all countries, Bengal, hath suffered a more severe famine than perhaps was ever heard of; it being reckoned that a fifth part of the inhabitants have died of want, and numbers have fled from starving and oppression.
But it is not difficult to determine how near the interest of Britain in those countries hath approached to ruin: for Britain is to consider them as ruined to her purpose, so soon as they shall become incapable of supporting a commerce beneficial 37to her; and at same time of yielding her a consideration, in the nature of tribute, equivalent to the expence of subjects which she sends out annually121 to maintain her dominion there. And that they are nearly, if not totally, ruined to her, in both these respects, we begin already to feel, in spite of all the art or influence used to conceal122 the truth.
For, in the article of tribute, we find that, instead of receiving such a surplus of revenue as sufficed, at the commencement of the Dewanny, to not only pay for the specie part of the Company’s investment in Bengal itself, but to purchase her cargoes123, and defray all her charges in the other parts of India, and in China, the government of Bengal was, two years ago, reduced to the necessity of borrowing near a million sterling124 on bills, which have been transmitted and accepted by the Company: in like manner hath this government been obliged to borrow last year; though the bills have been prevented, by an arbitrary stroke of deceit, from appearing against them in Europe. These borrowed sums have all been expended125 in Bengal itself: and if we allow that the whole 38hath been employed to pay for the Company’s investment, (though by the by the specie part of the Company’s investment cannot, at least it ought not, if she exports the proper quantity of European commodities, exceed half a million,) it must even then be admitted, that the revenue of Bengal hath barely sufficed to defray the ordinary expence of government. And, if so, from whence is the tribute of Bengal, (whether we term it dedomagement, drawback, or encreased dividend126) to arise? not from the mighty cargoes imported; for they are purchased, not with surplus revenue, but with borrowed money, which must be repaid either in India or in Europe: and as to the profits on these cargoes, they will be more than eat up by the charges of freight, and a long reckoning of India interest at eight per cent. I am sensible, that this account is strangely perplexed127 and embarrassed by intricate calculations of stock in hand, annual importations, and future sales, &c. but when divested128 of all these studied intricacies it will stand simply thus—As is the clear surplus of revenue received in Bengal, so will be the amount of tribute 39received in Britain; the former will ever exactly balance the latter. But this surplus we find to have been, for the two past years, equal to nothing; and the amount of tribute received in Britain must amount to exactly as much; consequently the dedomagement, drawback, and increased dividend for the two last years is still in Nubibus; where the national part, consisting of the two first articles, is like to remain; unless it shall be paid out of the Company’s capital stock, as the encreased dividend hath been. But this revenue, which for the two years past hath barely sufficed to defray the expence of government, hath not been kept up even to that extent without the aid of violence: but violence itself must yield to necessity, and cannot extort57 that which doth not exist; moreover the Company had, in these two years, decreased her military expence, by disbanding some thousand sipahis, and otherwise diminishing the charge of her remaining force; and the attack made by Shaw Allum in conjunction with the Mharrattors will, this year, compel her to re-augment her military expence in every respect; whilst the predatory incursions of these 40Mharrhattors will prevent the collection of revenue; how then will she support the augmented129 charge of this year, with a revenue decreased by a variety of causes so much below the degree of last year? Another loan upon the strength of the capital is the only resource; but possibly borrowing may, for several reasons, have become impracticable by this time; and it is certain that troops will not, nay cannot, serve without pay—Here is a blessed prospect indeed.
But, leaving this to the proof of time, we perceive that, at any rate, we have lost the prospect of future tribute from Bengal, through the channel of the Company; we have not so much as the promise of dedomagement, drawback, or encreased dividend for this current year; and if we can trust to our own reason, preferably to bankrupt promises, we may give it up for good and all. Nay, there is mighty reason to apprehend130, that even the private fortunes will soon cease to exist; and then Britain will cease to receive the sum of 1,400,000 l. sterling, which for a number of years past hath been annually flowing in to her from India, in consequence of 41dominion. And if she could barely support her burden, when aided by this influx131, how will she, when deprived of it, answer the annual drain of specie made by her foreign creditors132?
With respect to the present state of our commerce with those countries, it is not enquired133, and therefore not known, whether the Company exports the stipulated134 sum of British commodities or not; and it is still less known, whether the small quantity she hath exported of late is disposed of; or whether it remains135 in her warehouses136 abroad, to swell137 up the account of her stock; thus much however reason tells us, that the inhabitants of Bengal, who cannot procure138 the necessaries of life, millions having died of want, can but little afford to purchase foreign fopperies or superfluities. Nevertheless we have seen large cargoes of Indian manufactures imported this very year; but we are not to suppose, that these cargoes are the produce of willing industry; they are procured139 by force and compulsion; the artisan being held to work under the discipline of task masters, who deprive him of his labour before it is completed, 42at a price that will not afford him the means of living. Of the many markets that for ages had taken off the manufactures of Bengal, Europe is now the only one remaining; and this one market cannot be supplied without the application of force. How long force might supply the place of willing industry, we shall not pretend to determine; but one year more will discover the united effects of want of artisans, want of money, and Mharrattor incursions.
And thus have we demonstrated the nature and condition of this Bengal government, together with the evils it hath caused to the country governed, not from a recital of disputed facts, but from principles universally understood and admitted. For every one, the least acquainted with the Company’s affairs, must know and will allow that the views, the interests, the powers and opportunities of her deputed government in Bengal are exactly such as we have described them; and upon this one undisputed datum140 we have built our whole demonstration141; the truth and justness of which every man is capable of trying and proving, by the touchstone of 43his own reason. For reason, without the aid of circumstantial proof, can judge whether the line of conduct which we have assigned to the government of Bengal, is fairly inferred and deduced from its evident and allowed principle of action: and common sense, unassisted by demonstration, will point out the effects that such conduct must operate on the interest of the country governed; and, if we farther advert142 to the length of time that this country hath been subjected to such operation, we shall nearly guess at its present state and condition.
And we doubt not, that what hath been said will enable every one, who makes use of his own reason and reflection, to form a proper judgment for himself on certain points of this East India business, which have been most grossly misrepresented. For he will thereby143 discover, that the object, for which the nation hath to apprehend at present, is not the “credit of the Company;” which, had she been restrained within her natural sphere, and her conduct properly inspected by government, could never have been injured; or, if it had, the breach144 could (in such case) have 44little more affected145 the general weal, than the failure of any large trading house; which, so long as the trade remained entire, would have been immediately replaced by another; but he will perceive, that the present bad state of the Company’s credit is only an effect, or consequence, of the ruinous situation of affairs in India; and, of course, that the object of national apprehension is the ruin or loss of that mighty and important branch of national interest, which hath been committed to the charge of the Company, in a manner so complete and implicit27, that the name, as well as the interest of the nation, nay the very name of the object itself, hath been sunk and lost in that of the Company: this Company, which is but the temporary farmer, having been, to all intents and purposes, substituted in the stead of not only the sovereign proprietor146, but even of the farm itself. And it will farther appear, that the danger which threatens this object is not to be averted147 by blindly supporting the credit of the Company: but, on the contrary, that the nation will, by affording this blind support, only furnish the means of 45completing that ruin, which is already so far advanced. To prevent this danger demands measures of a very different nature: and we shall proceed to point out these measures; which, had they been applied148 in time, would, we humbly149 conceive, have sufficed to prevent the ruin or loss of this important concern: and which, if matters are not past remedy, may yet serve to restore them.
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1 dominion | |
n.统治,管辖,支配权;领土,版图 | |
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2 industrious | |
adj.勤劳的,刻苦的,奋发的 | |
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3 presidency | |
n.总统(校长,总经理)的职位(任期) | |
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4 supreme | |
adj.极度的,最重要的;至高的,最高的 | |
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5 immediate | |
adj.立即的;直接的,最接近的;紧靠的 | |
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6 perfectly | |
adv.完美地,无可非议地,彻底地 | |
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7 nugatory | |
adj.琐碎的,无价值的 | |
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8 defer | |
vt.推迟,拖延;vi.(to)遵从,听从,服从 | |
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9 interfere | |
v.(in)干涉,干预;(with)妨碍,打扰 | |
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10 discretion | |
n.谨慎;随意处理 | |
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11 inflict | |
vt.(on)把…强加给,使遭受,使承担 | |
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12 obedience | |
n.服从,顺从 | |
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13 vice | |
n.坏事;恶习;[pl.]台钳,老虎钳;adj.副的 | |
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14 delinquents | |
n.(尤指青少年)有过失的人,违法的人( delinquent的名词复数 ) | |
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15 previously | |
adv.以前,先前(地) | |
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16 defiance | |
n.挑战,挑衅,蔑视,违抗 | |
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17 requisite | |
adj.需要的,必不可少的;n.必需品 | |
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18 dread | |
vt.担忧,忧虑;惧怕,不敢;n.担忧,畏惧 | |
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19 abstruse | |
adj.深奥的,难解的 | |
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20 apprehension | |
n.理解,领悟;逮捕,拘捕;忧虑 | |
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21 deter | |
vt.阻止,使不敢,吓住 | |
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22 prosecuting | |
检举、告发某人( prosecute的现在分词 ); 对某人提起公诉; 继续从事(某事物); 担任控方律师 | |
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23 lawsuit | |
n.诉讼,控诉 | |
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24 peculation | |
n.侵吞公款[公物] | |
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25 awe | |
n.敬畏,惊惧;vt.使敬畏,使惊惧 | |
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26 ass | |
n.驴;傻瓜,蠢笨的人 | |
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27 implicit | |
a.暗示的,含蓄的,不明晰的,绝对的 | |
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28 implicitly | |
adv. 含蓄地, 暗中地, 毫不保留地 | |
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29 jurisdiction | |
n.司法权,审判权,管辖权,控制权 | |
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30 unlimited | |
adj.无限的,不受控制的,无条件的 | |
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31 exterior | |
adj.外部的,外在的;表面的 | |
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32 propriety | |
n.正当行为;正当;适当 | |
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33 sufficiently | |
adv.足够地,充分地 | |
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34 mere | |
adj.纯粹的;仅仅,只不过 | |
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35 conditional | |
adj.条件的,带有条件的 | |
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36 derived | |
vi.起源;由来;衍生;导出v.得到( derive的过去式和过去分词 );(从…中)得到获得;源于;(从…中)提取 | |
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37 specially | |
adv.特定地;特殊地;明确地 | |
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38 transgress | |
vt.违反,逾越 | |
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39 nay | |
adv.不;n.反对票,投反对票者 | |
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40 transgressing | |
v.超越( transgress的现在分词 );越过;违反;违背 | |
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41 resentment | |
n.怨愤,忿恨 | |
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42 impelling | |
adj.迫使性的,强有力的v.推动、推进或敦促某人做某事( impel的现在分词 ) | |
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43 tyrant | |
n.暴君,专制的君主,残暴的人 | |
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44 acting | |
n.演戏,行为,假装;adj.代理的,临时的,演出用的 | |
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45 abstain | |
v.自制,戒绝,弃权,避免 | |
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46 recoil | |
vi.退却,退缩,畏缩 | |
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47 virtue | |
n.德行,美德;贞操;优点;功效,效力 | |
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48 vices | |
缺陷( vice的名词复数 ); 恶习; 不道德行为; 台钳 | |
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49 sordid | |
adj.肮脏的,不干净的,卑鄙的,暗淡的 | |
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50 avarice | |
n.贪婪;贪心 | |
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51 jealousy | |
n.妒忌,嫉妒,猜忌 | |
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52 lasting | |
adj.永久的,永恒的;vbl.持续,维持 | |
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53 expiration | |
n.终结,期满,呼气,呼出物 | |
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54 amass | |
vt.积累,积聚 | |
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55 amasses | |
v.积累,积聚( amass的第三人称单数 ) | |
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56 extorted | |
v.敲诈( extort的过去式和过去分词 );曲解 | |
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57 extort | |
v.勒索,敲诈,强要 | |
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58 pillage | |
v.抢劫;掠夺;n.抢劫,掠夺;掠夺物 | |
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59 plunder | |
vt.劫掠财物,掠夺;n.劫掠物,赃物;劫掠 | |
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60 exempted | |
使免除[豁免]( exempt的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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61 lodged | |
v.存放( lodge的过去式和过去分词 );暂住;埋入;(权利、权威等)归属 | |
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62 infinitely | |
adv.无限地,无穷地 | |
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63 undertaking | |
n.保证,许诺,事业 | |
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64 recital | |
n.朗诵,独奏会,独唱会 | |
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65 judgment | |
n.审判;判断力,识别力,看法,意见 | |
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66 stimulated | |
a.刺激的 | |
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67 precedent | |
n.先例,前例;惯例;adj.在前的,在先的 | |
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68 thoroughly | |
adv.完全地,彻底地,十足地 | |
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69 err | |
vi.犯错误,出差错 | |
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70 grievance | |
n.怨愤,气恼,委屈 | |
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71 havoc | |
n.大破坏,浩劫,大混乱,大杂乱 | |
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72 herd | |
n.兽群,牧群;vt.使集中,把…赶在一起 | |
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73 hogs | |
n.(尤指喂肥供食用的)猪( hog的名词复数 );(供食用的)阉公猪;彻底地做某事;自私的或贪婪的人 | |
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74 gorge | |
n.咽喉,胃,暴食,山峡;v.塞饱,狼吞虎咽地吃 | |
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75 voracious | |
adj.狼吞虎咽的,贪婪的 | |
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76 devour | |
v.吞没;贪婪地注视或谛听,贪读;使着迷 | |
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77 trampling | |
踩( trample的现在分词 ); 践踏; 无视; 侵犯 | |
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78 mighty | |
adj.强有力的;巨大的 | |
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79 entrusted | |
v.委托,托付( entrust的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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80 inclination | |
n.倾斜;点头;弯腰;斜坡;倾度;倾向;爱好 | |
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81 attain | |
vt.达到,获得,完成 | |
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82 scholastic | |
adj.学校的,学院的,学术上的 | |
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83 consonant | |
n.辅音;adj.[音]符合的 | |
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84 voluptuous | |
adj.肉欲的,骄奢淫逸的 | |
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85 juvenile | |
n.青少年,少年读物;adj.青少年的,幼稚的 | |
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86 averse | |
adj.厌恶的;反对的,不乐意的 | |
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87 confide | |
v.向某人吐露秘密 | |
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88 fatigue | |
n.疲劳,劳累 | |
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89 evade | |
vt.逃避,回避;避开,躲避 | |
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90 habitually | |
ad.习惯地,通常地 | |
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91 undertakings | |
企业( undertaking的名词复数 ); 保证; 殡仪业; 任务 | |
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92 replete | |
adj.饱满的,塞满的;n.贮蜜蚁 | |
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93 motive | |
n.动机,目的;adv.发动的,运动的 | |
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94 impelled | |
v.推动、推进或敦促某人做某事( impel的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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95 prospect | |
n.前景,前途;景色,视野 | |
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96 torpid | |
adj.麻痹的,麻木的,迟钝的 | |
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97 incapable | |
adj.无能力的,不能做某事的 | |
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98 qualified | |
adj.合格的,有资格的,胜任的,有限制的 | |
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99 miscreants | |
n.恶棍,歹徒( miscreant的名词复数 ) | |
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100 promiscuously | |
adv.杂乱地,混杂地 | |
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101 disperses | |
v.(使)分散( disperse的第三人称单数 );疏散;驱散;散布 | |
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102 dependants | |
受赡养者,受扶养的家属( dependant的名词复数 ) | |
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103 redress | |
n.赔偿,救济,矫正;v.纠正,匡正,革除 | |
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104 innocence | |
n.无罪;天真;无害 | |
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105 villain | |
n.反派演员,反面人物;恶棍;问题的起因 | |
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106 banished | |
v.放逐,驱逐( banish的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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107 anarchy | |
n.无政府状态;社会秩序混乱,无秩序 | |
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108 impute | |
v.归咎于 | |
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109 plundering | |
掠夺,抢劫( plunder的现在分词 ) | |
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110 profusion | |
n.挥霍;丰富 | |
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111 bloody | |
adj.非常的的;流血的;残忍的;adv.很;vt.血染 | |
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112 severely | |
adv.严格地;严厉地;非常恶劣地 | |
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113 injustice | |
n.非正义,不公正,不公平,侵犯(别人的)权利 | |
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114 possessed | |
adj.疯狂的;拥有的,占有的 | |
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115 bestowed | |
赠给,授予( bestow的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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116 rapacity | |
n.贪婪,贪心,劫掠的欲望 | |
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117 remittance | |
n.汇款,寄款,汇兑 | |
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118 sundry | |
adj.各式各样的,种种的 | |
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119 abject | |
adj.极可怜的,卑屈的 | |
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120 usurped | |
篡夺,霸占( usurp的过去式和过去分词 ); 盗用; 篡夺,篡权 | |
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121 annually | |
adv.一年一次,每年 | |
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122 conceal | |
v.隐藏,隐瞒,隐蔽 | |
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123 cargoes | |
n.(船或飞机装载的)货物( cargo的名词复数 );大量,重负 | |
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124 sterling | |
adj.英币的(纯粹的,货真价实的);n.英国货币(英镑) | |
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125 expended | |
v.花费( expend的过去式和过去分词 );使用(钱等)做某事;用光;耗尽 | |
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126 dividend | |
n.红利,股息;回报,效益 | |
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127 perplexed | |
adj.不知所措的 | |
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128 divested | |
v.剥夺( divest的过去式和过去分词 );脱去(衣服);2。从…取去…;1。(给某人)脱衣服 | |
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129 Augmented | |
adj.增音的 动词augment的过去式和过去分词形式 | |
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130 apprehend | |
vt.理解,领悟,逮捕,拘捕,忧虑 | |
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131 influx | |
n.流入,注入 | |
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132 creditors | |
n.债权人,债主( creditor的名词复数 ) | |
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133 enquired | |
打听( enquire的过去式和过去分词 ); 询问; 问问题; 查问 | |
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134 stipulated | |
vt.& vi.规定;约定adj.[法]合同规定的 | |
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135 remains | |
n.剩余物,残留物;遗体,遗迹 | |
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136 warehouses | |
仓库,货栈( warehouse的名词复数 ) | |
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137 swell | |
vi.膨胀,肿胀;增长,增强 | |
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138 procure | |
vt.获得,取得,促成;vi.拉皮条 | |
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139 procured | |
v.(努力)取得, (设法)获得( procure的过去式和过去分词 );拉皮条 | |
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140 datum | |
n.资料;数据;已知数 | |
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141 demonstration | |
n.表明,示范,论证,示威 | |
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142 advert | |
vi.注意,留意,言及;n.广告 | |
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143 thereby | |
adv.因此,从而 | |
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144 breach | |
n.违反,不履行;破裂;vt.冲破,攻破 | |
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145 affected | |
adj.不自然的,假装的 | |
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146 proprietor | |
n.所有人;业主;经营者 | |
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147 averted | |
防止,避免( avert的过去式和过去分词 ); 转移 | |
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148 applied | |
adj.应用的;v.应用,适用 | |
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149 humbly | |
adv. 恭顺地,谦卑地 | |
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