What, after all, is involved in the acceptance of such a conclusion? What is there to fear? To concede this, it is thought, would mean to relegate11 man to the position of a mere12 "automaton," freed from "accountability to God, responsibility to man, and the fears of conscience."
So far from ridding man of responsibility, the clear recognition by him of the true nature of his environment and antecedents, the laws by which they influence him, and his inherent capacity of resistance—in other words, the two processes observable in the world, action contrary to, and action along, the line of least resistance[15]—does, on the contrary, greatly increase his responsibility of action and his power to know himself.
Is not mind and matter subject to the same law? Do they not react to the same God? What matter, then, if we adopt the formula of Pampsychism and assert that "all individual things are animated14 albeit15 in divers16 degrees"? or endorse17 the conclusion of Professor James Ward18, who "finds no ground for separating organic life from psychical19 life"? and continues: "All life is experience. We cannot therefore assume that experience has no part in the [Pg 9]building up of the organism, and only begins when viable20 organism is already there."[16]
The belief that there can be no life without mind does not necessarily imply that there can be no mind without body. As John Stuart Mill pointed21 out, Determinism does not imply Materialism22, a man may be a spiritual being but yet subject to the law of causation. Neither does it deny the dynamic character of will, but allows that not only our conduct but our character is in part amenable23 to our will. The causality involved in human actions would, however, enable any one who knew perfectly24 our character and our circumstances to predict our actions.
Such considerations, however, although contributory, do not, of themselves, decide the question with which we are here concerned, namely, What is the real meaning and what the authority of "conscience," or of that mental act which takes place in our minds when we call certain conduct "right" and certain conduct "wrong"?
Apart from the question of the ultimate sanction of moral conduct, there have always been two explanations of the mental act variously known as "ethical judgment25," "moral faculty26," "moral sense" or conscience. On the one side there have been those who considered that moral judgment was an emotion, an intuition, or instinctive27 recognition of right or wrong, which implied no rational or intellectual process beyond[Pg 10] that which is involved in registering or perceiving the fact. And on the other side there have been those who treat moral approbation28 as essentially29 an act of judgment—the result of the reasoning and intellectual function of the mind.
The earliest exponents30 of a morality that in no way depended upon the work of Reason were the ancient Epicureans and Cyrenaics; since for them good was pleasure and evil was pain, the sources and tests of all ethical truth were necessarily, in consequence, the feelings and emotions.
In the eighteenth century there arose a school, associated with the names of the third Lord Shaftesbury and Francis Hutcheson, the Scotch31 philosopher, which became known as the "moral sense" school, widely different from the old hedonistic philosophers, since they were the first to assert the existence of a distinctively32 ethical, as opposed to a merely pleasurable, feeling.
The philosophers of the "moral sense" school attempted to prove that there existed a distinct moral "faculty" which differed from all other perceptions or ideas, in that it was a separate medium by which men could recognize ethical truth, which was rather a matter of the heart than of the head.
As a result of the attacks of the various rationalist schools this idea of a "moral faculty" has been for the most part abandoned by those who approach ethics from the Religious or Theistic standpoint, for they are far more concerned to establish the "Divine authority" and[Pg 11] sacrosanct34 character of conscience than influenced by psychological or metaphysical distinctions. For the most part such writers are content to assume that "conscience" is the knowledge of one's own soul with regard to questions of right and wrong, but insist on that element of Divine Guidance which alone, they think, can give it the necessary authority and sanctity.
The Rev35. G. H. Richardson[17] defines conscience as "the whole personality acting36 ethically37; or, more precisely38, conscience is the reaction, pleasurable or painful, of the whole personality in response to a human or Divine standard."
It is neither wholly emotional nor wholly rational, but "is sensitive to motives40 of which the pure reason would take no account; it is more akin41 to instinct than intelligence." Yet "without reason, conscience would be blind impulse, though it might feel the consciousness of obligation."[18]
Clearly, then, conscience can derive42 little validity from intelligence; the concession43 to the Rationalists does not amount to much; it might almost get on without reason altogether. It is the Divine authority of conscience which, for the Theistic writer, is the factor of prime importance.
"As we are bound to trust reason in the intellectual sphere, so we are bound to trust conscience in the moral sphere. To deny the authority of the one or the other is to distrust the Power[Pg 12] in whom physical and moral law have their source. The authority of conscience is thus paramount44 for the individual; it will be better for me to do what is objectively wrong, but what I conscientiously45 believe to be right, than do what is in fact right, but what my conscience disapproves46."[19]
Here the writer appears to abandon his Rationalistic friends altogether; the fanatic47 is given free rein48, his ravings are sacred.
Dr. H. Rashdall, who by many is considered representative of rationalistic ethics, insists on the "objectivity of moral judgment. Feelings or emotions possess no objectivity; and 'without objectivity,' in the words of Eduard von Hartmann, 'ethic4 has no meaning'."[20]
The all-important task for the Theistic writer is to establish the factor of Divine impulse. "Therefore we say that conscience is a fundamental form of man's personal consciousness of eternity49; that ineffaceable certainty that the relation of Duty, with Responsibility and Judgment, is not a relation which stands and falls with our relations to the world and to men, but in its essence is a relation to the holy and Almighty50 God.... Additional force seems to be given to this way of regarding the Authority of conscience if we consider that its activity is set in motion by an impulse from the Divine Personality."[21]
[Pg 13]
Bishop51 Butler refers to conscience as the "voice of God," and as "supreme52 among human faculties"; and this is endorsed53 by Richardson, who finds that Theism is essential to any doctrine54 of conscience, because the alternative is "destructive of its authority."
Let us now summarize the Theistic conscience, variously described in different passages, in the author's own words: "Its activity is set in motion by an impulse from the Divine Personality, and does not originate in the individual nor the world," yet it "reacts to public opinion," is "often unreasonable55 and inconsistent," is "subject to evolutionary56 growth" and is "not infallible," is "capable of infinite variety of interpretation" and "reacts to a human standard," which, however, "trails some clouds of glory from its Divine original"; and in conclusion, "If we regard conscience not as a phosphorescent gleam playing upon the surface of consciousness, but as a vital impulse, partly rational, partly instinctive, welling up from the depths of Personality, we shall not run the risk of denying its authority."[22] It would be well, however, not to underestimate the risk, although it undoubtedly57 caters58 for a great variety of tastes.
Allied59 to the Emotional school for the purpose of proving conscience are those Rationalists, of whom we have taken Dr. Rashdall as an example, who have for an object the establishment of the[Pg 14] "objective" validity of moral judgment. The real contention60 becomes clearer; the chief point at issue is the question of authority.
We see, then, that there are two points to be decided61: (1) the ultimate validity, with which is connected the question of the Divine Authority, of moral judgments62; and (2) the mode of recognition, with which is connected the cause or propellent which induces moral action.
Rashdall summarily dismisses the dual13 character of the problem in a phrase. "The question at issue between Rationalists and Emotionalists is not what impels63 me to do a virtuous64 act, but how I know it to be virtuous."[23] The connexion between motive39 and judgment is too closely related to be thus calmly ignored. It is agreed that the motive does not affect the intrinsic character or "rightness" of an action, but at the same time it most certainly does affect a man's estimation of his action; and this, in order to arrive at the value of moral judgments, is most obviously relevant.
For Dr. Rashdall the distinction between how I know my action to be right or virtuous, and how it is virtuous, does not exist. Both imply recognition or statement of indisputable fact; for him there can be no ultimate doubt as to the character of moral "good," which can in no way be a matter of opinion, for good is sui generis: it is good and nothing else; happiness may be good, honesty may be good, but good is good for[Pg 15] no other reason than because such an abstraction is supposed to exist as a transcendental fact. "Therefore good can be recognized just as any axiomatic65 truth can be recognized; as, for instance, the fact that 2 + 2 = 4, or two straight lines cannot enclose a space." How is it then that people even of the highest intelligence do not invariably agree about what is good or morally right?
There are no two opinions about whether 2 + 2 does, or does not, equal 4, yet there is no such general agreement about what is right. If asked why a thing is right or good most people would reply either by giving a reason to show that it is desirable or else by quoting the authority of some one else's ipse dixit (in which case it is inferred that the authority quoted had some reason for supposing it desirable). The reason that 2 + 2 = 4 is, on the other hand, that there can be no possible alternative. Yet is it true to say that there can be no possible alternative to what the consensus66 of opinion in any one country considers morally right? Some things that are considered immoral67 in England are considered moral in Japan, and vice10 versa.
Dr. Rashdall, however, conceives of but two alternatives in estimating moral values, the first of which he dismisses, because on this view "our moral judgments could possess no objective validity." He says: "... I examined the question whether our moral judgments are in ultimate analysis merely statements asserting the existence[Pg 16] of a particular kind of feeling in particular minds, or whether they are intellectual judgments of universal validity—judgments, of course, of a very peculiar68 and distinctive33 kind, but just as much intellectual and universal judgments about the nature of Reality as the judgments 2 + 2 = 4, or 'this is a good inference and that is a bad one'."[24]
It is difficult to know whether this arbitrary elimination69 of the subjective70 element from ethical judgments, and the attempt to translate moral values into terms of mathematical formul?, is intended to denote the infusion71 of a mystic factor into the "exact sciences," or an attempt to reduce metaphysics and morality to rule of thumb! The following thesis, however, which will be elaborated in the course of this discussion, is based on a synchronous72 realization73 of rational principles and psychological processes.
Thus, what an individual conceives to be morally right and good, when he is conscious of having acted so according to his own standard, may be either:
(1) Wholly irrational74, illogical, anti-social and undesirable75 (from every point of view except his own), even though arrived at solely76 by an intellectual and reasoning process; or
(2) An entirely77 instinctive, blindly impulsive78 or emotional action, afterwards endorsed by the intellect (i.e. subsequently rationalized); or
(3) The result of thoughtful deliberation, carefully and logically designed to bring about certain[Pg 17] preconceived "moral" ends such as social happiness, justice, fulfilment of duty; all of which are artificial and conventional standards, and good only because they are desirable, not because they are universally valid—irrespective of time, locality and circumstances; or
(4) Any combination of these three.
The foregoing applies as much to the aggregate79 moral consciousness of a community in different stages of civilization, or in varying states of emotional abnormality, as to the individual conscience.
It can also be shown that the "communal80 conscience" reacts upon the "individual conscience" in inverse81 ratio to the latter's emotional or intellectual capacity for resistance; and that the "communal conscience" (identified at a later stage of this inquiry82 with "Cosmic Suggestion") is the integral product of the numerical and dynamic strength of the convictions of the members of the community, and operates upon the "individual conscience," either consciously or subconsciously83, in the same way that "Suggestion," according to the law discovered by Liébeault and employed by the Nancy School, operates in hypnotic phenomena84.
It will then (if this view can be established) be shown that the factors of conscience are: (1) emotional, (2) intellectual, (3) internal (including hereditary85 and organic elements), and (4) external (environment—material and psychic); and that its validity, in ultimate analysis,[Pg 18] can but rest on codes, which may be not only Conventional and Artificial, but also Rational or Intellectual, Social and Utilitarian86; and in any case variable, in the same way that the soundest and most logical policies must, to a certain extent, be variable, or capable of adjustment as circumstances change; the only elements which should be constant and invariable in any policy (which is not a misnomer) being logic8 and truth. So it is with rules of conduct.
As regards the purely87 internal sanction of our actions and thoughts, that is to say, our relationship with Ultimate Reality, which is God or the Law of Existence, there is only one conception of the latter which seems to comprehend the infinite with the finite, and that is Force, because it is the continuity of Existence, or after the manner of Leibnitz: "Substance, the ultimate reality, can only be conceived as force." Any moral law which may be said to be fundamental in itself and independent of circumstances will be in relation to force. But such "laws" will also be independent of the moral imperatives89 and written codes, for they are independent of volition—of the will to obey them. Can a man be possessed90 of love, greatness, nobility, courage, honour, at a word of command? Therefore if it can be truly said that "love is the greatest thing in the world," it is because it is the most powerful force. Hate is disruptive, disintegrating91 and annihilating92; love is integrating and strengthening.
But there is yet one "good," one fundamental[Pg 19] imperative88 which needs no proof, and that is Truth—ultimate truth, because it is the statement of what Is; without which logic, or, indeed, intelligible93 language, would be impossible. But truth is not opinion, or assertion, or hope, or faith, or in the words of Huxley "those idols94 built up of books and traditions and fine-spun ecclesiastical cobwebs." Truth and all its derivatives—honesty, integrity, truthfulness95 and sincerity—have an intrinsic value of their own, for their negation96 implies the negation of the principles of Existence.
But men require more than this, they require a "moral code" or standard to give coherence97 to their relationships; this code, then, is that which is desired, or imposed, and this want is most efficiently98 supplied by the principle of "Utility."
点击
收听单词发音
收听单词发音 |
1
investigation
|
|
| n.调查，调查研究 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
2
interpretation
|
|
| n.解释，说明，描述；艺术处理 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
3
ethics
|
|
| n.伦理学；伦理观，道德标准 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
4
ethic
|
|
| n.道德标准，行为准则 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
5
discredit
|
|
| vt.使不可置信；n.丧失信义；不信，怀疑 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
6
demolish
|
|
| v.拆毁(建筑物等)，推翻(计划、制度等) | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
7
ethical
|
|
| adj.伦理的，道德的，合乎道德的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
8
logic
|
|
| n.逻辑(学)；逻辑性 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
9
functional
|
|
| adj.为实用而设计的，具备功能的，起作用的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
10
vice
|
|
| n.坏事；恶习；[pl.]台钳，老虎钳；adj.副的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
11
relegate
|
|
| v.使降级，流放，移交，委任 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
12
mere
|
|
| adj.纯粹的；仅仅，只不过 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
13
dual
|
|
| adj.双的；二重的，二元的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
14
animated
|
|
| adj.生气勃勃的，活跃的，愉快的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
15
albeit
|
|
| conj.即使；纵使；虽然 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
16
divers
|
|
| adj.不同的；种种的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
17
endorse
|
|
| vt.(支票、汇票等)背书，背署；批注；同意 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
18
ward
|
|
| n.守卫，监护，病房，行政区，由监护人或法院保护的人（尤指儿童）；vt.守护，躲开 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
19
psychical
|
|
| adj.有关特异功能现象的；有关特异功能官能的；灵魂的；心灵的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
20
viable
|
|
| adj.可行的，切实可行的，能活下去的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
21
pointed
|
|
| adj.尖的，直截了当的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
22
materialism
|
|
| n.［哲］唯物主义，唯物论；物质至上 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
23
amenable
|
|
| adj.经得起检验的；顺从的；对负有义务的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
24
perfectly
|
|
| adv.完美地，无可非议地，彻底地 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
25
judgment
|
|
| n.审判；判断力，识别力，看法，意见 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
26
faculty
|
|
| n.才能；学院，系；(学院或系的)全体教学人员 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
27
instinctive
|
|
| adj.(出于)本能的；直觉的；(出于)天性的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
28
approbation
|
|
| n.称赞；认可 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
29
essentially
|
|
| adv.本质上，实质上，基本上 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
30
exponents
|
|
| n.倡导者( exponent的名词复数 )；说明者；指数；能手 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
31
scotch
|
|
| n.伤口，刻痕；苏格兰威士忌酒；v.粉碎，消灭，阻止；adj.苏格兰(人)的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
32
distinctively
|
|
| adv.特殊地，区别地 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
33
distinctive
|
|
| adj.特别的，有特色的，与众不同的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
34
sacrosanct
|
|
| adj.神圣不可侵犯的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
35
rev
|
|
| v.发动机旋转，加快速度 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
36
acting
|
|
| n.演戏，行为，假装；adj.代理的，临时的，演出用的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
37
ethically
|
|
| adv.在伦理上，道德上 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
38
precisely
|
|
| adv.恰好，正好，精确地，细致地 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
39
motive
|
|
| n.动机，目的；adv.发动的，运动的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
40
motives
|
|
| n.动机，目的( motive的名词复数 ) | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
41
akin
|
|
| adj.同族的，类似的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
42
derive
|
|
| v.取得；导出；引申；来自；源自；出自 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
43
concession
|
|
| n.让步，妥协；特许(权) | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
44
paramount
|
|
| a.最重要的，最高权力的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
45
conscientiously
|
|
| adv.凭良心地；认真地，负责尽职地；老老实实 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
46
disapproves
|
|
| v.不赞成( disapprove的第三人称单数 ) | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
47
fanatic
|
|
| n.狂热者，入迷者；adj.狂热入迷的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
48
rein
|
|
| n.疆绳，统治，支配；vt.以僵绳控制，统治 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
49
eternity
|
|
| n.不朽，来世；永恒，无穷 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
50
almighty
|
|
| adj.全能的，万能的；很大的，很强的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
51
bishop
|
|
| n.主教，（国际象棋）象 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
52
supreme
|
|
| adj.极度的，最重要的；至高的，最高的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
53
endorsed
|
|
| vt.& vi.endorse的过去式或过去分词形式v.赞同( endorse的过去式和过去分词 )；在（尤指支票的）背面签字；在（文件的）背面写评论；在广告上说本人使用并赞同某产品 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
54
doctrine
|
|
| n.教义；主义；学说 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
55
unreasonable
|
|
| adj.不讲道理的，不合情理的，过度的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
56
evolutionary
|
|
| adj.进化的；演化的，演变的；[生]进化论的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
57
undoubtedly
|
|
| adv.确实地，无疑地 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
58
caters
|
|
| 提供饮食及服务( cater的第三人称单数 )； 满足需要，适合 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
59
allied
|
|
| adj.协约国的；同盟国的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
60
contention
|
|
| n.争论，争辩，论战；论点，主张 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
61
decided
|
|
| adj.决定了的，坚决的；明显的，明确的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
62
judgments
|
|
| 判断( judgment的名词复数 )； 鉴定； 评价； 审判 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
63
impels
|
|
| v.推动、推进或敦促某人做某事( impel的第三人称单数 ) | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
64
virtuous
|
|
| adj.有品德的，善良的，贞洁的，有效力的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
65
axiomatic
|
|
| adj.不需证明的，不言自明的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
66
consensus
|
|
| n.(意见等的)一致，一致同意，共识 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
67
immoral
|
|
| adj.不道德的，淫荡的，荒淫的，有伤风化的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
68
peculiar
|
|
| adj.古怪的，异常的；特殊的，特有的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
69
elimination
|
|
| n.排除，消除，消灭 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
70
subjective
|
|
| a.主观(上)的，个人的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
71
infusion
|
|
| n.灌输 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
72
synchronous
|
|
| adj.同步的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
73
realization
|
|
| n.实现；认识到，深刻了解 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
74
irrational
|
|
| adj.无理性的，失去理性的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
75
undesirable
|
|
| adj.不受欢迎的，不良的，不合意的，讨厌的；n.不受欢迎的人，不良分子 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
76
solely
|
|
| adv.仅仅，唯一地 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
77
entirely
|
|
| ad.全部地，完整地；完全地，彻底地 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
78
impulsive
|
|
| adj.冲动的，刺激的；有推动力的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
79
aggregate
|
|
| adj.总计的，集合的；n.总数；v.合计；集合 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
80
communal
|
|
| adj.公有的，公共的，公社的，公社制的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
81
inverse
|
|
| adj.相反的，倒转的，反转的；n.相反之物；v.倒转 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
82
inquiry
|
|
| n.打听，询问，调查，查问 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
83
subconsciously
|
|
| ad.下意识地，潜意识地 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
84
phenomena
|
|
| n.现象 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
85
hereditary
|
|
| adj.遗传的，遗传性的，可继承的，世袭的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
86
utilitarian
|
|
| adj.实用的，功利的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
87
purely
|
|
| adv.纯粹地，完全地 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
88
imperative
|
|
| n.命令，需要；规则；祈使语气；adj.强制的；紧急的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
89
imperatives
|
|
| n.必要的事( imperative的名词复数 )；祈使语气；必须履行的责任 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
90
possessed
|
|
| adj.疯狂的；拥有的，占有的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
91
disintegrating
|
|
| v.（使）破裂[分裂，粉碎]，（使）崩溃( disintegrate的现在分词 ) | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
92
annihilating
|
|
| v.（彻底）消灭( annihilate的现在分词 )；使无效；废止；彻底击溃 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
93
intelligible
|
|
| adj.可理解的，明白易懂的，清楚的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
94
idols
|
|
| 偶像( idol的名词复数 )； 受崇拜的人或物； 受到热爱和崇拜的人或物； 神像 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
95
truthfulness
|
|
| n. 符合实际 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
96
negation
|
|
| n.否定；否认 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
97
coherence
|
|
| n.紧凑；连贯；一致性 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
98
efficiently
|
|
| adv.高效率地，有能力地 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
| 欢迎访问英文小说网 |