Not only is this position not admitted by Utilitarians15, but John Stuart Mill long ago pointed16 out that such a hypothesis "is to mistake the very meaning of a standard of morals, and to confound the rule of action with the motive of it. It is the business of Ethics17 to tell us what are our duties, or by what test we may know them; but no system of ethics requires that the sole motive of all we do shall be a feeling of duty.... The great majority of good actions are intended, not for the benefit of the world, but for that of individuals, of which the good of the world is made up; and the thoughts of the most virtuous18 man need not on these occasions travel beyond the particular persons concerned, except so far as is necessary to assure himself that in benefiting them he is not violating the[Pg 22] rights—that is, the legitimate19 and authorized20 expectations—of any one else."[25]
This is sufficient refutation of such objections to Utilitarianism as the one brought forward by Richardson, and clearly founded on a misconception.
Mill, in what is still the best defence of this system, continues: "Utilitarians ... are ... of opinion that in the long run the best proof of a good character is good actions; and resolutely21 refuse to consider any mental disposition22 as good, of which the predominant tendency is to produce bad conduct."[26]
"The creed23 which accepts as the foundation of morals, Utility, or the Greatest Happiness Principle, holds that actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness, wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness."[27]
The Theistic writer says "the essence of morality is sacrifice."[28]
The utilitarian morality does recognize in human beings the power of sacrificing their own greatest good for the good of others. It only refuses to admit that sacrifice is itself a good. A sacrifice that does not increase, or tend to increase, the sum total of happiness, it considers as wasted.
As regards "conscience": the Utilitarian, when he attempts an analysis, realizes that "in that complex phenomenon as it actually exists,[Pg 23] the simple fact is in general all encrusted over with collateral24 associations derived26 from sympathy, from love, and still more from fear; from all forms of religious feeling; from recollections of childhood and of all our past life; from self-esteem27, desire of the esteem of others, and occasionally even self-abasement."[29]
For the priest "ethics cannot be built securely upon anything less than religious sanctions, and it is for the sake of conscience that ethics have a practical value."[30]
Can an honest and unbiased thinker doubt that the first is the truer statement?
Let us now return to a further statement of the position of Utilitarianism as dealt with by J. S. Mill. From Professor Sidgwick and those Utilitarians who attempt to claim for the atheistic28 moralist a conscience of mathematical accuracy we are unlikely to derive25 much assistance.
"According to the Greatest Happiness Principle, the ultimate end, with reference to, and for the sake of which, all other things are desirable (whether we are considering our own good or that of other people), is an existence exempt29 as far as possible from pain and as rich as possible in enjoyments30, both in point of quantity and quality; the test of quality, and the rule for measuring it against quantity, being the preference felt by those who, in their opportunities of experience, to which must be added their habits of [Pg 24]self-consciousness and self-observation, are best furnished with the means of comparison."[31]
This, according to Utilitarians, is also the standard of morality.
In conformance with this principle of moral obligation, we choose the greater before the lesser31 good. Between General Morality and the obligation of Duty, with which he associates justice, Mill draws what appears to be a somewhat unnecessarily hard line of distinction, insomuch as the difference may be seen to consist more of degree than of kind. Other ethical32 writers make the same distinction when they divide moral duties into the two classes of perfect and imperfect obligation, "the latter being those in which, though the act is obligatory33, the particular occasions of performing it are left to our choice, as in the case of charity or beneficence."
If, in assessing the "amount" of good, we take into consideration, besides the categories of quantity and quality, a third category of "proximity34," it would, I think, prove a useful qualification by enabling the Utilitarian Good to embrace all moral obligation, including legal Duty, which is considered by Mill apart from general morality. By "proximity" it is intended to imply that the nearer good is more binding35 than the further good, which may in some measure counteract36 the value of "quantity and quality" where these are involved, and when a decision between conflicting moral obligations has to be made.
[Pg 25]
Though this additional category of Good may not altogether abolish the distinction which Mill makes between general morality and justice or duty which may be obligatory by law, it appears to amplify37 and extend the scope of the principle of Utility.
"Duty," in the words of J. S. Mill, "is a thing which may be exacted from a person as one exacts a debt. Unless we think that it might be exacted from him we do not call it his duty."
From this it might be assumed that there could never be any doubt about what is a person's duty, since when any one owes another or the community a debt, he is clearly conscious of it, even to the amount. In the case of right conduct which implies Duty, this, however, is not always so clearly recognized, especially when Duty implies Allegiance or Responsibility.
In this connexion we may say that the good we do for our own country is a nearer good than the good we do for an alien country, therefore if doing the good involves a choice we should choose our own country; for the debt we owe to our own country is greater than the debt we owe to humanity at large. Equally the good we owe to our own family is nearer than, and therefore comes before, the good we owe to society. To this most people will accede38, and, in fact, the realization39 of this is at the base of all sense of Responsibility; thus every man, in whatsoever40 capacity he is acting41, whether as statesman, county councillor, soldier or head of a family,[Pg 26] should put the considerations of the body he represents or belongs to before all others; and finally he owes it to himself—or God[32]—to be true to himself, even before he can be true to another, in the sense that keeping faith with a friend will not excuse a man acting dishonestly or untruthfully towards himself. And this for the reason that Truth is independent of Utilitarian valuation, since Truth alone is an a priori and self-evident "good"; by its very meaning it is a statement of "what is," temporally as well as ultimately; as such it must be a statement of indisputable fact, not opinion or faith which rests on assertion. Since more things are capable of being proved untrue than ultimately true, it follows that as a criterion of conduct its value is chiefly negative. It can thus be shown that lying, deception42, breach43 of contract are wrong per se, for truth is the basic principle upon which all others depend, and the necessary postulate44 of the idea of God, whilst the value of our positive acts must for the most part depend upon some such standard as the Greatest Happiness or Utility principle.
As an illustration of the "nearer is the greater good" principle may be cited the line taken up by Disraeli when the controversy45 over the opium46 trade between India and China first came to the fore13. Disraeli firmly refused to ruin our export[Pg 27] trade in opium for any quixotic considerations involving the moral effect upon the Chinaman, whilst it in no way implied a breach of faith with him.
Less clear is the question of precedence when two primary obligations are conflicting; primary obligations are here intended to mean those obligatory duties which may rightly be exacted from a person by reason of his indebtedness to the corporate47 body to which he belongs, or which he represents, and which is entitled to a preference in the good he does.
For instance, it may sometimes be said that a man's duty to his country as a soldier conflicts with his duty to his family as its sole support; both are primary obligations; as long, then, as allegiance to one does not involve a betrayal of the other, which could only be if their interests were fundamentally opposed and directed against each other, both obligations must be equally acknowledged, and a via media discovered to satisfy the claims of both to an equal extent.
Should, however, this confliction of interests be so direct and antagonistic48 as necessarily to involve an overt49 repudiation50 of the claims of one or the other, as in the hypothetical case of a soldier being ordered to execute the members of his own family, his conduct, supposing him to be actuated by a desire to act solely51 in conformance with ethical considerations, would be determined52 by his judgment53 as to which course would promote the greater good or Utility, having regard to the[Pg 28] categories: quantity, quality and proximity; the "nearer" in this case undoubtedly54 being his family, though this fact alone would not necessarily outweigh55 the other values of quantity and quality. In certain Eastern countries it would possibly appeal to a man's sense of appropriateness to be the agent by which the crime or dishonour56 of his relative would be expiated57.
A man is often heard to claim that his moral duty towards himself, in other words "his conscience," absolves59 him from the fulfilment of another primary duty or obligation. As I have attempted to show, the only real or a priori duty which a man can prove he owes to himself, and therefore has a right to place before any other clear duty derived from the fact of his membership of any community or corporate body, is his obligation not to violate Truth, which is a statement of reality, not of opinion. Thus no other duty can rightly oblige a man to perjure60 himself.
If this maxim61 is accepted, it will be seen that a deadlock62 of this sort between a man's duty to his country as a citizen and his duty to himself or his "conscience," could rarely occur in a civilized63 or rational community. Against this a man might argue that he had solemnly vowed64 not to shed human blood, either as a soldier or otherwise, and that he is right to resist any attempt to conscript him for the army, since he would thereby65 be required to perjure himself. The answer is simple, for the man clearly violated his duty to his country in the first place by vowing66 he[Pg 29] would deprive his country of his services should they be required, a right which no country has ever forsworn and which is considered the natural return due for free citizenship67 and state protection; these conditions are presumed to be accepted with the benefits of citizenship and protection of person and property; his first violation68 of duty towards his country will therefore not absolve58 him of a second.
Neither can it be shown according to this principle that a man is entitled to take an oath of this nature, regardless of potential conflicting obligations, on the score that such an oath is merely in conformance with the postulates69 of Truth, since the question of the Rightness or Wrongness of shedding blood under all circumstances is not susceptible70 of ultimate proof, but must remain finally on the authority of an ipse dixit, or of Utility.
Thus far we have examined to some extent the purely71 ethical basis on which the idea of priority of duty, as evinced by conscience or reason, rests: the sanction of conscience which rests on religious authority is dealt with elsewhere.
To further illustrate72 the "nearer good" principle with which we have been dealing73, it may be profitable to refer to a passage from an account of the life of General Robert E. Lee, Commander-in-Chief of the Confederate troops during the American Civil War, a devoutly74 religious man, and a lifelong member of the Protestant Episcopal Church.[33]
[Pg 30]
"Colonel Lee was in command of the department of Texas in 1860, but was recalled to Washington early in 1861, when the 'irrepressible conflict' between the free and the slave states seemed imminent75. When Lee reached the capital in March 1861, seven states had passed ordinances76 of secession from the union, and had formed the Southern Confederacy. Virginia seceded77 from the union on April 17, and Colonel Lee, believing that his supreme78 political allegiance was due to his state rather than to the union, felt compelled to send his resignation to General Scott, which he did on April 20. The bitter struggle between his personal preferences and his high sense of duty is shown in the words of his wife written to a friend at the time: 'My husband has wept tears of blood over this terrible war; but he must as a man and a Virginian share the destiny of his state, which has solemnly pronounced for independence.'"
Lee's action in choosing the "nearer" duty to his own state in preference to the duty he owed to the union as a soldier and a citizen, even against his personal preferences and, as far as one can discern them, his religious opinions, affords a striking example of the principle I have been attempting to illustrate.
Whether his decision was arrived at spontaneously and impulsively79, or as the result of deliberation, is immaterial as affecting the "rightness" of his action. Equally immaterial is the possibility that he might have arrived at an[Pg 31] opposite conclusion whilst still employing the same principles, by judging that the categories of "quantity" and "quality" outweighed80 that of "proximity." Whenever clear duties are mutually annihilating81, which fortunately is very rarely the case, the problem will always have to be solved, if it is solved with scrupulous10 honesty, by a careful balance of values, whilst the result at best cannot be infallible.
What stands out, however, in this case, is the triumph of clearly recognized duty founded on "nearer" indebtedness, and so of responsibility, over lesser indebtedness, even though the latter was reinforced by personal predilection82 and religious sentiment.
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1
demolish
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| v.拆毁(建筑物等)，推翻(计划、制度等) | |
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utilitarian
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| adj.实用的，功利的 | |
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justify
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| vt.证明…正当(或有理)，为…辩护 | |
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motive
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| n.动机，目的；adv.发动的，运动的 | |
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distinguished
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| adj.卓越的，杰出的，著名的 | |
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motives
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| n.动机，目的( motive的名词复数 ) | |
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7
sentient
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| adj.有知觉的，知悉的；adv.有感觉能力地 | |
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deliberately
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| adv.审慎地；蓄意地；故意地 | |
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immoral
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| adj.不道德的，淫荡的，荒淫的，有伤风化的 | |
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scrupulous
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| adj.审慎的，小心翼翼的，完全的，纯粹的 | |
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aggression
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| n.进攻，侵略，侵犯，侵害 | |
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slain
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| 杀死，宰杀，杀戮( slay的过去分词 )； (slay的过去分词) | |
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fore
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| adv.在前面；adj.先前的；在前部的；n.前部 | |
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reprobation
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| n.斥责 | |
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utilitarians
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| 功利主义者，实用主义者( utilitarian的名词复数 ) | |
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pointed
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| adj.尖的，直截了当的 | |
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ethics
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| n.伦理学；伦理观，道德标准 | |
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virtuous
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| adj.有品德的，善良的，贞洁的，有效力的 | |
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legitimate
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| adj.合法的，合理的，合乎逻辑的；v.使合法 | |
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authorized
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| a.委任的，许可的 | |
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resolutely
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| adj.坚决地，果断地 | |
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disposition
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| n.性情，性格；意向，倾向；排列，部署 | |
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creed
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| n.信条；信念，纲领 | |
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collateral
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| adj.平行的；旁系的；n.担保品 | |
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derive
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| v.取得；导出；引申；来自；源自；出自 | |
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derived
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| vi.起源；由来；衍生；导出v.得到( derive的过去式和过去分词 )；（从…中）得到获得；源于；（从…中）提取 | |
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esteem
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| n.尊敬，尊重；vt.尊重，敬重；把…看作 | |
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atheistic
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| adj.无神论者的 | |
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exempt
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| adj.免除的；v.使免除；n.免税者，被免除义务者 | |
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enjoyments
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| 愉快( enjoyment的名词复数 )； 令人愉快的事物； 享有； 享受 | |
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lesser
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| adj.次要的，较小的；adv.较小地，较少地 | |
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ethical
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| adj.伦理的，道德的，合乎道德的 | |
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obligatory
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| adj.强制性的，义务的，必须的 | |
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proximity
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| n.接近，邻近 | |
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binding
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| 有约束力的，有效的，应遵守的 | |
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counteract
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| vt.对…起反作用，对抗，抵消 | |
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amplify
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| vt.放大，增强；详述，详加解说 | |
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accede
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| v.应允，同意 | |
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realization
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| n.实现；认识到，深刻了解 | |
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whatsoever
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| adv.（用于否定句中以加强语气）任何；pron.无论什么 | |
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41
acting
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| n.演戏，行为，假装；adj.代理的，临时的，演出用的 | |
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deception
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| n.欺骗，欺诈；骗局，诡计 | |
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43
breach
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| n.违反，不履行；破裂；vt.冲破，攻破 | |
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postulate
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| n.假定，基本条件；vt.要求，假定 | |
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controversy
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| n.争论，辩论，争吵 | |
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opium
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| n.鸦片；adj.鸦片的 | |
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corporate
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| adj.共同的，全体的；公司的，企业的 | |
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antagonistic
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| adj.敌对的 | |
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overt
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| adj.公开的，明显的，公然的 | |
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50
repudiation
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| n.拒绝；否认；断绝关系；抛弃 | |
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51
solely
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| adv.仅仅，唯一地 | |
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52
determined
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| adj.坚定的；有决心的 | |
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53
judgment
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| n.审判；判断力，识别力，看法，意见 | |
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54
undoubtedly
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| adv.确实地，无疑地 | |
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55
outweigh
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| vt.比...更重，...更重要 | |
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56
dishonour
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| n./vt.拒付（支票、汇票、票据等）；vt.凌辱，使丢脸；n.不名誉，耻辱，不光彩 | |
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57
expiated
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| v.为（所犯罪过）接受惩罚，赎（罪）( expiate的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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58
absolve
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| v.赦免，解除（责任等） | |
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59
absolves
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| 宣告…无罪，赦免…的罪行，宽恕…的罪行( absolve的第三人称单数 )； 不受责难，免除责任 [义务] ,开脱（罪责） | |
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60
perjure
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| v.作伪证；使发假誓 | |
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61
maxim
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| n.格言，箴言 | |
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deadlock
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| n.僵局，僵持 | |
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civilized
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| a.有教养的，文雅的 | |
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64
vowed
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| 起誓，发誓（vow的过去式与过去分词形式） | |
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thereby
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| adv.因此，从而 | |
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vowing
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| 起誓，发誓（vow的现在分词形式） | |
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citizenship
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| n.市民权，公民权，国民的义务(身份) | |
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68
violation
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| n.违反(行为)，违背(行为)，侵犯 | |
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postulates
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| v.假定，假设( postulate的第三人称单数 ) | |
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70
susceptible
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| adj.过敏的，敏感的；易动感情的，易受感动的 | |
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71
purely
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| adv.纯粹地，完全地 | |
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72
illustrate
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| v.举例说明，阐明；图解，加插图 | |
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73
dealing
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| n.经商方法，待人态度 | |
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devoutly
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| adv.虔诚地，虔敬地，衷心地 | |
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75
imminent
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| adj.即将发生的，临近的，逼近的 | |
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76
ordinances
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| n.条例，法令( ordinance的名词复数 ) | |
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seceded
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| v.脱离，退出( secede的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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supreme
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| adj.极度的，最重要的；至高的，最高的 | |
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impulsively
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| adv.冲动地 | |
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outweighed
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| v.在重量上超过( outweigh的过去式和过去分词 )；在重要性或价值方面超过 | |
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81
annihilating
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| v.（彻底）消灭( annihilate的现在分词 )；使无效；废止；彻底击溃 | |
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82
predilection
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| n.偏好 | |
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