This sense of incalculability, which has been aroused by the prodigious5 literary efflorescence of late years, reacts upon its cause; and the reaction tends by many different paths to express itself finally in the ventilation of problems that hinge about criticism. There is a general feeling that the growth of the young plant has been too luxuriant; a desire to have it vigorously pruned6 by a capable gardener, in order that its strength may be gathered together to produce a more perfect fruit. There is also a sense that if the lusus natur?, the writer of genius, were to appear, there ought to be a person or an organisation7 capable of recognising him, however unexpected his scent8 or the shape of his leaves. Both these tasks fall upon criticism. The younger generation looks round a little apprehensively9 to see if there is a gardener whom it can trust, and decides, perhaps a little prematurely10, that there is none.
There is reviewing but no criticism, says one icy voice that we have learned to respect. There are pontiffs and potential pontiffs, but no critics, says another disrespectful young man. Oh, for some more Scotch11 Reviewers to settle the hash of our English bards12, sighs a third. And the London Mercury, after whetting13 our appetite by announcing that it proposed to restore the standards of authoritative14 criticism, still leaves us a little in the dark as to what these standards are. Mr T.S. Eliot deals more kindly15, if more frigidly16, with us in the Monthly Chapbook. There are, he says, three kinds of criticism—the historical, the philosophic17, and the purely18 literary.
'Every form of genuine criticism is directed towards creation. The historical or philosophic critic of poetry is criticising poetry in order to create a history or a philosophy; the poetic19 critic is criticising poetry in order to create poetry.'
These separate and distinct kinds, he considers, are but rarely found to-day, even in a fragmentary form; where they do exist, they are almost invariably mingled21 in an inextricable confusion.
Whether we agree or not with the general condemnation22 of reviewing implicit23 in this survey of the situation, or with the division of criticism itself, we have every reason to be grateful to Mr Eliot for disentangling the problem for us. The question of criticism has become rather like Glaucus the sea-god, encrusted with shells and hung with weed till his lineaments are hardly discernible. We have at least clear sight of him now, and we are able to decide whether we will accept Mr Eliot's description of him. Let us see.
We have no difficulty in agreeing that historical criticism of literature is a kind apart. The historical critic approaches literature as the manifestation24 of an evolutionary25 process in which all the phases are of equal value. Essentially26, he has no concern with the greater or less literary excellence27 of the objects whose history he traces—their existence is alone sufficient for him; a bad book is as important as a good one, and much more important than a good one if it exercised, as bad books have a way of doing, a real influence on the course of literature. In practice, it is true, the historical critic generally fails of this ideal of unimpassioned objectivity. He either begins by making judgments28 of value for himself, or accepts those judgments which have been endorsed30 by tradition. He fastens upon a number of outstanding figures and more or less deliberately31 represents the process as from culmination32 to culmination; but in spite of this arbitrary foreshortening he is primarily concerned, in each one of the phases which he distinguishes, with that which is common to every member of the group of writers which it includes. The individuality, the quintessence, of a writer lies completely outside his view.
We may accept the isolation33 of the historical critic then, at least in theory, and conceive of him as a fragment of a social historian, as the author of a chapter in the history of the human spirit. But can we isolate34 the philosophic critic in the same way? And what exactly is a philosophic critic? Is he a critic with a philosophical35 scheme in which art and literature have their places, a critic who therefore approaches literature with a definite conception of it as one among many parallel manifestations36 of the human spirit, and with a system of values derived37 from his metaphysical scheme? Hegel and Croce are philosophical critics in this sense, and Aristotle is not, as far as we can judge from the Poetics, wherein he considers the literary work of Greece as an isolated39 phenomenon, and examines it in and for itself. But for the moment, and with the uneasy sense that we have not thoroughly40 laid the ghost of philosophic criticism, we will assume that we have isolated him, and pass to the consideration of the pure literary critic, if indeed we can find him.
What does he do? How shall we recognise him? Mr Eliot puts before us Coleridge and Aristotle and Dryden as literary critics par20 excellence arranged in an ascending41 scale of purity. The concatenation is curious, for these were men possessed42 of very different interests and faculties43 of mind; and it would occur to few to place Dryden, as a critic, at their head. The living centre of Aristotle's criticism is a conception of art as a means to a good life. As an activity, poetry 'is more philosophic than history,' a nearer approach to the universal truth in appearances; and as a more active influence, drama refines our spiritual being by a purgation of pity and terror. Indeed, it would not be an exaggeration to say that the very pith and marrow44 of Aristotle's literary criticism is a system of moral values derived from his contemplation of life. It was necessary that this relation should exist, because for Aristotle literature was, essentially, an imitation of life though we must remember to understand imitation according to our final sense of the theme which is the golden, persistent45 thread throughout the Poetics. The imitation of life in literature was for Aristotle, the creative revelation of the ideal actively at work in human life. The tragic46 hero failed because his composition was less than ideal; but he could only be a tragic hero if the ideal was implicit in him and he visibly approximated to it. It is this constant reference to the ideal which makes of 'imitation' a truly creative principle and the one which, properly understood, is the most permanently47 valid48 and pregnant of all; it is also one which has been constantly misunderstood. Its importance is, nevertheless, so central that adequate recognition of it might conceivably be taken as the distinguishing mark of all fruitful criticism.
To his sympathetic understanding of this principle Coleridge owed a great debt. It is true that his efforts to refine upon it were not only unsuccessful, but a trifle ludicrous; his effort to graft49 the vague transcendentalism of Germany on to the rigour and clarity of Aristotle was, from the outset, unfortunately conceived. But the root of the matter was there, and in Coleridge's fertile mind the Aristotelian theory of imitation flowered into a magnificent conception of the validity and process of the poetic imagination. And partly because the foundation was truly Aristotelian, partly because Coleridge had known what it was to be a great poet, the reference to life pervades50 the whole of what is permanently valuable in Coleridge's criticism. In him, too, there is a strict and mutually fertilising relation between the moral and the ?sthetic values. This is the firm ground beneath his feet when he—too seldom—proceeds to the free exercise of his exquisite51 ?sthetic discrimination.
In Dryden, however, there was no such organic interpenetration. Dryden, too, had a fine sensibility, though less exquisite, by far, than that of Coleridge; but his theoretical system was not merely alien to him—it was in itself false and mistaken. Corruptio optimi pessima. He took over from France the sterilised and lifeless Aristotelianism which has been the plague of criticism for centuries; he used it no worse than his French exemplars, but he used it very little better than they. It was in his hands, as in theirs, a dead mechanical framework of rules about the unities53. Dryden, we can see in his critical writing, was constantly chafed54 by it. He behaves like a fine horse with a bearing rein38: he is continually tossing his head after a minute or two of 'good manners and action,' and saying, 'Shakespeare was the best of them, anyhow'; 'Chaucer beats Ovid to a standstill.' It is a gesture with which all decent people sympathise and when it is made in language so supple55 as Dryden's prose it has a lasting56 charm. Dryden's heart was in the right place, and he was not afraid of showing it; but that does not make him a critic, much less a critic to be set as a superior in the company of Aristotle and Coleridge.
Our search for the pure literary critic is likely to be arduous57. We have seen that there is a sense in which Dryden is a purer literary critic than either Coleridge or Aristotle; but we have also seen that it is precisely58 by reason of the 'pureness' in him that he is to be relegated59 into a rank inferior to theirs. It looks as though we might have to pronounce that the true literary critic is the philosophic critic. Yet the pronouncement must not be prematurely made; for there is a real and vital difference between those for whom we have accepted the designation of philosophic critics, Hegel or Croce, and Aristotle or Coleridge. Yet three of these (and it might be wise to include Coleridge as a fourth) were professional philosophers. It is evidently not the philosophy as such that makes the difference.
The difference depends, we believe, upon the nature of the philosophy. The secret lies in Aristotle. The true literary critic must have a humanistic philosophy. His inquiries60 must be modulated61, subject to an intimate, organic governance, by an ideal of the good life. He is not the mere52 investigator62 of facts; existence is never for him synonymous with value, and it is of the utmost importance that he should never be deluded63 into believing that it is. He will not accept from Hegel the thesis that all the events of human history, all man's spiritual activities, are equally authentic64 manifestations of Spirit; he will not even recognise the existence of Spirit. He may accept from Croce the thesis that art is the expression of intuitions, but he will not be extravagantly65 grateful, because his duty as a critic is to distinguish between intuitions and to decide that one is more significant than another. A philosophy of art that lends him no aid in this and affords no indication why the expression of one intuition should be preferred to the expression of another is of little value to him. He will incline to say that Hegel and Croce are the scientists of art rather than its philosophers.
Here, then, is the opposition66: between the philosophy that borrows its values from science and the philosophy which shares its values with art. We may put it with more cogency67 and truth: the opposition lies between a philosophy without values and a philosophy based upon them. For values are human, anthropocentric. Shut them out once and you shut them out for ever. You do not get them back, as some believe, by declaring that such and such a thing is true. Nothing is precious because it is true save to a mind which has, consciously or unconsciously, decided68 that it is good to know the truth. And the making of that single decision is a most momentous69 judgment29 of value. If the scientist appeals to it, as indeed he invariably does, he too is at bottom, though he may deny it, a humanist. He would do better to confess it, and to confess that he too is in search of the good life. Then he might become aware that to search for the good life is in fact impossible, unless he has an ideal of it before his mind's eye.
An ideal of the good life, if it is to have the internal coherence70 and the organic force of a true ideal, must inevitably71 be ?sthetic. There is no other power than our ?sthetic intuition by which we can imagine or conceive it; we can express it only in ?sthetic terms. We say, for instance, the good life is that in which man has achieved a harmony of the diverse elements in his soul. For the good life, we know instinctively72, is one of our human absolutes. It is not good with reference to any end outside itself. A man does not live the good life because he is a good citizen; but he is a good citizen because he lives the good life. And here we touch the secret of the most magnificently human of all books that has ever been written—Plato's Republic. In the Republic the good life and the life of the good citizen are identified; but the citizenship73 is not of an earthly but of an ideal city, whose proportions, like the duties of its citizens, are determined4 by the ?sthetic intuition. Plato's philosophy is ?sthetic through and through, and because it is ?sthetic it is the most human, the most permanently pregnant of all philosophies. Much labour has been spent on the examination of the identity which Plato established between the good and the beautiful. It is labour lost, for that identity is axiomatic74, absolute, irreducible. The Greeks knew by instinct that it is so, and in their common speech the word for a gentleman was the kalos kagathos, the beautiful-good.
This is why we have to go back to the Greeks for the principles of art and criticism, and why only those critics who have returned to bathe themselves in the life-giving source have made enduring contributions to criticism. They alone are—let us not say philosophic critics but—critics indeed. Their approach to life and their approach to art are the same; to them, and to them alone, life and art are one. The interpenetration is complete; the standards by which life and art are judged the same. If we may use a metaphor75, in the Greek view art is the consciousness of life. Poetry is more philosophic and more highly serious than history, just as the mind of a man is more significant than his outward gestures. To make those gestures significant the art of the actor must be called into play. So to make the outward event of history significant the poet's art is needed. Therefore a criticism which is based on the Greek view is impelled76 to assign to art a place, the place of sovereignty in its scheme of values. That Plato himself did not do this was due to his having misunderstood the nature of that process of 'imitation' in which art consists; but only the superficial readers of Plato—and a good many readers deserve no better name—will conclude from the fact that he rejected art that his attitude was not fundamentally ?sthetic. Not only is the Republic itself one of the greatest 'imitations,' one of the most subtle and profound works of art ever created, but it would also be true to say that Plato cleared the way for a true conception of art. In reality he rejected not art, but false art; and it only remained for Aristotle to discern the nature of the relation between artistic77 'imitation' and the ideal for the Platonic78 system to be complete and four-square, a perpetual inspiration and an everlasting79 foundation for art and the criticism of art.
Art, then, is the revelation of the ideal in human life. As the ideal is active and organic so must art itself be. The ideal is never achieved, therefore the process of revealing it is creative in the truest sense of the word. More than that, only by virtue80 of the artist in him can man appreciate or imagine the ideal at all. To discern it is essentially the work of divination81 or intuition. The artist divines the end at which human life is aiming; he makes men who are his characters completely expressive82 of themselves, which no actual man ever has been. If he works on a smaller canvas he aims to make himself completely expressive of himself. That, also, is the aim of the greater artist who expresses himself through the medium of a world of characters of his own creation. He needs that machinery83, if a coarse and non-organic metaphor may be tolerated, for the explication of his own intuitions of the ideal, which are so various that the attempt to express them through the persona of himself would inevitably end in confusion. That is why the great poetic genius is never purely lyrical, and why the greatest lyrics84 are as often as not the work of poets who are only seldom lyrical.
Moreover, every act of intuition or divination of the ideal in act in the world of men must be set, implicitly85 or explicitly86, in relation to the absolute ideal. In subordinating its particular intuitions to the absolute ideal art is, therefore, merely asserting its own sovereign autonomy. True criticism is itself an organic part of the whole activity of art; it is the exercise of sovereignty by art upon itself, and not the imposition of an alien. To use our previous metaphor, as art is the consciousness of life, criticism is the consciousness of art. The essential activity of true criticism is the harmonious87 control of art by art. This is at the root of a confusion in the thought of Mr. Eliot, who, in his just anxiety to assert the full autonomy of art, pronounces that the true critic of poetry is the poet and has to smuggle88 the anomalous89 Aristotle in on the hardly convincing ground that 'he wrote well about everything,' and has, moreover, to elevate Dryden to a purple which he is quite unfitted to wear. No, what distinguishes the true critic of poetry is a truly ?sthetic philosophy. In the present state of society it is extremely probable that only the poet or the artist will possess this, for art and poetry were never more profoundly divorced from the ordinary life of society than they are at the present day. But the poet who would be a critic has to make his ?sthetic philosophy conscious to himself; to him as a poet it may be unconscious. This necessary change from unconsciousness to consciousness is by no means easy, and we should do well to insist upon its difficulty, for quite as much nonsense is talked about poetry by poets and by artists about art as by the profane90 about either. Moreover, it is important to remember that in proportion as society approaches the ideal—there is no continual progress towards the ideal; at present society is as far removed from it as it has ever been—the chance of the philosopher, of the scientist even, becoming a true critic of art grows greater. When the ?sthetic basis of all humane91 activity is familiarly recognised, the values of the philosopher, the scientist, and the artist become consciously the same, and therefore interchangeable.
Still, the ideal society is sufficiently92 remote for us to disregard it, and we shall say that the principle of art for art's sake contains an element of truth when it is opposed to those who would inflict93 upon art the values of science, of metaphysics, or of a morality of mere convention. We shall also say that the principle of art for art's sake needs to be understood and interpreted very differently. Its implications are tremendous. Art is autonomous94, and to be pursued for its own sake, precisely because it comprehends the whole of human life; because it has reference to a more perfectly95 human morality than other activity of man; because, in so far as it is truly art, it is indicative of a more comprehensive and unchallengeable harmony in the spirit of man. It does not demand impossibilities, that man should be at one with the universe or in tune96 with the infinite; but it does envisage97 the highest of all attainable98 ideals, that man should be at one with himself, obedient to his own most musical law.
Thus art reveals to us the principle of its own governance. The function of criticism is to apply it. Obviously it can be applied99 only by him who has achieved, if not the actual ?sthetic ideal in life, at least a vision and a sense of it. He alone will know that the principle he has to elucidate100 and apply is living, organic. It is indeed the very principle of artistic creation itself. Therefore he will approach what claims to be a work of art first as a thing in itself, and seek with it the most intimate and immediate101 contact in order that he may decide whether it too is organic and living. He will be untiring in his effort to refine his power of discrimination by the frequentation of the finest work of the past, so that he may be sure of himself when he decides, as he must, whether the object before him is the expression of an ?sthetic intuition at all. At the best he is likely to find that it is mixed and various; that fragments of ?sthetic vision jostle with unsubordinated intellectual judgments.
But, in regarding the work of art as a thing in itself, he will never forget the hierarchy102 of comprehension, that the active ideal of art is indeed to see life steadily103 and see it whole, and that only he has a claim to the title of a great artist whose work manifests an incessant104 growth from a merely personal immediacy to a coherent and all-comprehending attitude to life. The great artist's work is in all its parts a revelation of the ideal as a principle of activity in human life. As the apprehension105 of the ideal is more or less perfect, the artist's comprehension will be greater or less. The critic has not merely the right, but the duty, to judge between Homer and Shakespeare, between Dante and Milton, between Cezanne and Michelangelo, Beethoven and Mozart. If the foundations of his criticism are truly ?sthetic, he is compelled to believe and to show that among would-be artists some are true artists and some are not, and that among true artists some are greater than others. That what has generally passed under the name of ?sthetic criticism assumes as an axiom that every true work of art is unique and incomparable is merely the paradox106 which betrays the unworthiness of such criticism to bear the name it has arrogated107 to itself. The function of true criticism is to establish a definite hierarchy among the great artists of the past, as well as to test the production of the present; by the combination of these activities it asserts the organic unity108 of all art. It cannot honestly be said that our present criticism is adequate to either task.
[APRIL, 1920.
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actively
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| adv.积极地，勤奋地 | |
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volatile
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| adj.反复无常的，挥发性的，稍纵即逝的，脾气火爆的；n.挥发性物质 | |
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rejections
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| 拒绝( rejection的名词复数 )； 摒弃； 剔除物； 排斥 | |
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determined
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| adj.坚定的；有决心的 | |
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prodigious
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| adj.惊人的，奇妙的；异常的；巨大的；庞大的 | |
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pruned
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| v.修剪（树木等）( prune的过去式和过去分词 )；精简某事物，除去某事物多余的部分 | |
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organisation
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| n.组织，安排，团体，有机休 | |
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scent
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| n.气味，香味，香水，线索，嗅觉；v.嗅，发觉 | |
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apprehensively
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| adv.担心地 | |
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prematurely
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| adv.过早地，贸然地 | |
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scotch
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| n.伤口，刻痕；苏格兰威士忌酒；v.粉碎，消灭，阻止；adj.苏格兰(人)的 | |
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bards
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| n.诗人( bard的名词复数 ) | |
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whetting
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| v.（在石头上）磨（刀、斧等）( whet的现在分词 )；引起，刺激（食欲、欲望、兴趣等） | |
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authoritative
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| adj.有权威的，可相信的；命令式的；官方的 | |
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kindly
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frigidly
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| adv.寒冷地；冷漠地；冷淡地；呆板地 | |
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philosophic
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| adj.哲学的，贤明的 | |
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purely
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| adv.纯粹地，完全地 | |
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poetic
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| adj.富有诗意的，有诗人气质的，善于抒情的 | |
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par
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| n.标准，票面价值，平均数量；adj.票面的，平常的，标准的 | |
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mingled
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| 混合，混入( mingle的过去式和过去分词 )； 混进，与…交往[联系] | |
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condemnation
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| n.谴责; 定罪 | |
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implicit
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| a.暗示的，含蓄的，不明晰的，绝对的 | |
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manifestation
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| n.表现形式；表明；现象 | |
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evolutionary
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| adj.进化的；演化的，演变的；[生]进化论的 | |
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essentially
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| adv.本质上，实质上，基本上 | |
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excellence
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| n.优秀，杰出，(pl.)优点，美德 | |
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judgments
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| 判断( judgment的名词复数 )； 鉴定； 评价； 审判 | |
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judgment
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| n.审判；判断力，识别力，看法，意见 | |
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endorsed
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| vt.& vi.endorse的过去式或过去分词形式v.赞同( endorse的过去式和过去分词 )；在（尤指支票的）背面签字；在（文件的）背面写评论；在广告上说本人使用并赞同某产品 | |
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deliberately
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| adv.审慎地；蓄意地；故意地 | |
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culmination
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| n.顶点；最高潮 | |
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isolation
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| n.隔离，孤立，分解，分离 | |
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isolate
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| vt.使孤立，隔离 | |
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philosophical
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| adj.哲学家的，哲学上的，达观的 | |
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manifestations
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| n.表示，显示（manifestation的复数形式） | |
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derived
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| vi.起源；由来；衍生；导出v.得到( derive的过去式和过去分词 )；（从…中）得到获得；源于；（从…中）提取 | |
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rein
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| n.疆绳，统治，支配；vt.以僵绳控制，统治 | |
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isolated
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| adj.与世隔绝的 | |
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thoroughly
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| adv.完全地，彻底地，十足地 | |
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ascending
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| adj.上升的，向上的 | |
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possessed
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| adj.疯狂的；拥有的，占有的 | |
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faculties
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| n.能力( faculty的名词复数 )；全体教职员；技巧；院 | |
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marrow
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| n.骨髓；精华；活力 | |
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persistent
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| adj.坚持不懈的，执意的；持续的 | |
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tragic
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| adj.悲剧的，悲剧性的，悲惨的 | |
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permanently
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| adv.永恒地，永久地，固定不变地 | |
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valid
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| adj.有确实根据的；有效的；正当的，合法的 | |
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graft
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| n.移植，嫁接，艰苦工作，贪污；v.移植，嫁接 | |
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pervades
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| v.遍及，弥漫( pervade的第三人称单数 ) | |
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exquisite
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| adj.精美的；敏锐的；剧烈的，感觉强烈的 | |
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mere
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| adj.纯粹的；仅仅，只不过 | |
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unities
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| n.统一体( unity的名词复数 )；（艺术等） 完整；（文学、戏剧） （情节、时间和地点的）统一性；团结一致 | |
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54
chafed
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| v.擦热（尤指皮肤）( chafe的过去式 )；擦痛；发怒；惹怒 | |
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supple
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| adj.柔软的，易弯的，逢迎的，顺从的，灵活的；vt.使柔软，使柔顺，使顺从；vi.变柔软，变柔顺 | |
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lasting
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| adj.永久的，永恒的；vbl.持续，维持 | |
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arduous
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| adj.艰苦的，费力的，陡峭的 | |
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precisely
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| adv.恰好，正好，精确地，细致地 | |
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relegated
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| v.使降级( relegate的过去式和过去分词 )；使降职；转移；把…归类 | |
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inquiries
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| n.调查( inquiry的名词复数 )；疑问；探究；打听 | |
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modulated
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| 已调整[制]的，被调的 | |
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investigator
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| n.研究者，调查者，审查者 | |
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deluded
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| v.欺骗，哄骗( delude的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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authentic
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| a.真的，真正的；可靠的，可信的，有根据的 | |
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extravagantly
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| adv.挥霍无度地 | |
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opposition
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| n.反对，敌对 | |
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cogency
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| n.说服力；adj.有说服力的 | |
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decided
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| adj.决定了的，坚决的；明显的，明确的 | |
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momentous
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| adj.重要的，重大的 | |
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coherence
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| n.紧凑；连贯；一致性 | |
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inevitably
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| adv.不可避免地；必然发生地 | |
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instinctively
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| adv.本能地 | |
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citizenship
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| n.市民权，公民权，国民的义务(身份) | |
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axiomatic
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| adj.不需证明的，不言自明的 | |
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metaphor
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| n.隐喻，暗喻 | |
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impelled
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| v.推动、推进或敦促某人做某事( impel的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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artistic
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| adj.艺术(家)的，美术(家)的；善于艺术创作的 | |
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platonic
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| adj.精神的；柏拉图（哲学）的 | |
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everlasting
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| adj.永恒的，持久的，无止境的 | |
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virtue
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| n.德行，美德；贞操；优点；功效，效力 | |
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divination
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| n.占卜，预测 | |
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expressive
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| adj.表现的，表达…的，富于表情的 | |
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machinery
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| n.(总称)机械，机器；机构 | |
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lyrics
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| n.歌词 | |
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implicitly
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| adv. 含蓄地, 暗中地, 毫不保留地 | |
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explicitly
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| ad.明确地，显然地 | |
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harmonious
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| adj.和睦的，调和的，和谐的，协调的 | |
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smuggle
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| vt.私运；vi.走私 | |
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anomalous
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| adj.反常的；不规则的 | |
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profane
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| adj.亵神的，亵渎的；vt.亵渎，玷污 | |
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humane
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| adj.人道的，富有同情心的 | |
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sufficiently
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| adv.足够地，充分地 | |
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inflict
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| vt.(on)把…强加给，使遭受，使承担 | |
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autonomous
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| adj.自治的；独立的 | |
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perfectly
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| adv.完美地，无可非议地，彻底地 | |
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tune
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| n.调子；和谐，协调；v.调音，调节，调整 | |
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envisage
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| v.想象，设想，展望，正视 | |
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98
attainable
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| a.可达到的，可获得的 | |
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99
applied
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| adj.应用的；v.应用，适用 | |
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100
elucidate
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| v.阐明，说明 | |
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101
immediate
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| adj.立即的；直接的，最接近的；紧靠的 | |
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102
hierarchy
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| n.等级制度；统治集团，领导层 | |
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103
steadily
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| adv.稳定地；不变地；持续地 | |
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104
incessant
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| adj.不停的，连续的 | |
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105
apprehension
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| n.理解，领悟；逮捕，拘捕；忧虑 | |
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paradox
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| n.似乎矛盾却正确的说法；自相矛盾的人(物) | |
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107
arrogated
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| v.冒称，妄取( arrogate的过去式和过去分词 )；没来由地把…归属（于） | |
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108
unity
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| n.团结，联合，统一；和睦，协调 | |
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