Salvador versus1 Honduras and Nicaragua—Attitude of the President—Proclamation to the people—Generals Rivas and Alfaro—Invasion of Salvador—Ignominious retreat of enemy—Conciliatory conduct of General Figueroa—Character of Salvadorean people—Treachery of Zelaya.
There is no question that but for the prompt and conciliatory action of General Figueroa the events which took place in the last months of 1907 might well have involved the whole of the States of Central America in a long, serious, and sanguinary conflict. As it was, sufficient provocation2 was given to Salvador, whose territory was invaded, and many of whose citizens were either injured or robbed. In this month, the invaders3 who came from Honduras were largely composed of Honduraneans, Nicaraguans, Salvadorean revolutionists, and American filibusters4, who actually seized the port of Acajutla, and taking forcible possession of engines and cars belonging to the Salvador Railway Company, reached as far as the city of Sonsonate. The invading forces were led by Generals Manuel Rivas and Prudencio Alfaro, the latter being General Santos Zelaya's candidate for the Presidency5 of Salvador.
It was at this time that General Figueroa issued a fervent6 and eloquent7 appeal to the loyalty8 of his troops and his countrymen. In exhorting9 them to deeds of valour, he declared that he himself would[62] lead his army in defence of the national honour even to death, and his previous military experience would certainly have enabled him to have carried them to success. General Figueroa's "Proclamation to the Salvadorean People" is worth quotation10 in these pages, and I therefore give it in full as follows:
"Compatriots: General J. Santos Zelaya, in violation11 of the faith imposed in international agreements, has broken his solemn obligations contracted through the intervention12 of the Governments of the United States and Mexico. At daybreak this morning he surprised the small military force at Acajutla, and has landed Nicaraguan forces with the object of conquest. Before this brutal13 offence which the Nicaraguan Government has committed against us, we should all, as one man, gather round the flag of our country and defend it, letting our blood flow rather than allow it to be stained by the adventurers who, in an evil hour, seek to defile14 it. The national honour, the deeds of our forefathers15, the future of our children, and the lofty legends of our people, cry to us to arise and punish the insolence16 of the Nicaraguan President, and to preserve, not only our military glory and our interests, which recent events in Honduras have shown to be in danger, but the respect that our heroic army has inspired whenever it has been called upon in defence of our country.
"Soldiers: Do not permit the consummation of this insolent17 attempt in the annals of an enlightened people which would fill us with shame and opprobrium18, rendering19 us unworthy to preserve intact the sacred treasure of our autonomy, the honour of our victorious21 banner and our sovereignty. Before permitting the arms of an audacious adventurer to violate the soil of our beloved country, whose safeguard is entrusted22 to the national army and to your undoubted patriotism23, prefer yes, a thousand times, death with honour on the battle-field, where I will accompany you even to death.
"I have full confidence in your loyalty and in your military honour, and I therefore place in your hands the sacred trust of the national defence.
"Free and heroic peoples never retreat before the enemy, for they carry in their hearts the conscience of doing their duties and confidence in the right, which assist all worthy20 and independent peoples to repel24 aggression25 against their autonomy.
"Salvadoreans: In this movement be assured that I shall save, untarnished, the honour of the country and the security of your homes, which are now threatened by the mercenary soldiery of the Nicaraguan ruler.
"Your chief and friend,
"F. Figueroa.
"San Salvador,
"June 11, 1907."
It is satisfactory to know that the Presidential call to arms, in addition to the strong personal influence which General Figueroa wielded26, shortly afterwards put an end to the trouble that had threatened at one time to assume the most serious aspects, and to have involved the whole of the five States in a fierce struggle. Now that the threatening cloud has been dispersed—it may be hoped for all time—it is possible to smile at some of the incidents which have been related in connection with the embroilment27. It is, for instance, related that the invasion of Salvadorean territory, the first step of which took place in the month of June, 1907, failed of achievement principally on account of a personal dispute which broke out between the two Revolutionary Generals, Rivas and Alfaro.
It is alleged28 that the former, on reaching the town of Sonsonate, after landing successfully at Acajutla, proceeded to the National Bank in that town, where he overawed the cashier (not a very brilliant achievement, since he was only a boy) and raised what is known as "a forced loan," departing heroically with the sum[64] of $20,000 in silver, and nobly handing over to the bewildered and trembling bank official a receipt for that amount signed by himself as the "General of the new Salvadorean Army." On learning what his brother-commander had done, Alfaro, it is said, strongly objected to raising—"stealing," he described it—money in this manner; and so emphatic30 was his language, and so indomitable his decision to have none of it, that General Rivas refused on his part any longer to act with him, and the two leaders parted there and then, Rivas proceeding31 on his way to the Capital at the head of his following, and Alfaro marching with his to Santa Ana.
Before leaving one another, it was arranged, however, that the Republic of Salvador should be divided in half, General Rivas to rule the Eastern zone, with headquarters at San Salvador, and General Alfaro to rule the Western zone, with headquarters at Sonsonate. To this proposition General Alfaro also strongly objected at first, but consented reluctantly later; and while the two future victors were quarrelling as to what they would do with the territory which was not yet theirs, a messenger arrived hot-haste from the Capital with the unpleasant tidings that General Figueroa was coming in person with a train-load of troops to Sonsonate.
Thereupon followed a hasty and most undignified retreat to Acajutla, and an eyewitness33 has left a humorous description of how the brave invaders, in their desire to get out as soon as possible, precipitated34 themselves into small boats, barges35, and lighters36, or any kind of thing that floated, making their way to the gunboat Momotombo, up the sides of which they scrambled37 helter-skelter, glad enough to be safely off[65] Salvadorean territory and once more on their way to the refuge of the Nicaraguan port of Corinto.
The gunboat was obliged, as all vessels39 are, to anchor a half-mile from the Acajutla pier40, men, arms, and ammunition41 having to be conveyed over that distance in any kind of boat of which they could command the use.
At an early period of the invasion it is certain that General Figueroa had the situation well in hand. He was always popular with the army, and he likewise possessed42 the complete confidence of the Salvadorean people, who felt that in his strong hands the safety of the Republic lay. Moreover, by his excellent system of organizing the Intelligence Department of his army, and the care with which he had selected his officers, General Figueroa was always in complete possession of the plans and actions of the opposing force; and even when these latter fatuously43 supposed that he knew nothing, and was doing nothing, to check their advance, General Figueroa was laying his plans with consummate44 ability, and, as we now know, he ultimately executed them with complete success.
Dr. Alfaro, who for the nonce had become a "General," was never an opponent worth much consideration; while General Rivas only displayed any marked ability when conspiring45 and organizing foreign troops, destined46 to be led to battle, when led at all, by others than himself. The only man who had any chance of making serious difficulty, and who might have fostered formidable trouble, was Barahona, of whose actions and intentions the President was always fully29 aware, and who at the psychological moment consigned47 him to the security of a prison. And there he kept him until the worst trouble was over.
The conciliatory measures which were adopted at the beginning by General Figueroa and his Government were adhered to throughout the upheaval48, and it is only right that impartial49 history should record the dignified32 and sane50 proceedings51 which characterized the attitude of the Republic of Salvador at this period. The views which General Figueroa entertained and acted upon throughout are clearly reflected in an official communication addressed to a well-known American, the then Consul-General for Salvador in the United States. General Figueroa said:
"Untiring enemies of the peace and repose52 of our people have once more endeavoured to create disturbances53; for some time past my Government has received notices of what was transpiring55, and of the progress of the conspiracy56, together with considerable data. This Government did not, however, act hastily, assuming, rather, an expectative attitude, but nevertheless following closely the trend of affairs, until the moment had arrived when active work was to be begun.
"This Government early received advices from various parts of the country, notifying it of suspicious movements on the part of the enemies of the Republic. It was also noted57 that many of these left the Capital two or three days before for other towns, and all of them were closely followed. The Government was prepared for all emergencies; barracks were ready, and the proper orders given to crush any movements on their part. Consequently, when numbers of these conspirators58 formed in groups around such towns as Sonsonate and Ahuachapán, many were captured. The Government is now in possession of the persons of most of the authors of the conspiracy, and the guilty ones are being proceeded against legally. Fortunately, the trouble has not interfered60 with the progress of the country, nor with the gathering61 of the coffee crop which is now in progress; while the Government has received assurances of sympathy and support from the great majority of law-abiding citizens throughout the country."
In this reference to the trifling62 effect occasioned to the coffee crop by the political disturbances, the President was a little premature63. The subsequent depression which was experienced in commercial circles generally was undoubtedly64 occasioned by these disturbances, although the consequence only proved transient.
All travellers, foreigners and natives alike, who happened to be in Central America at this time, were well aware of the provocative65 part which President Santos Zelaya of Nicaragua was playing; for many years he had been acting66 as the evil genius of this Republic, and his misgovernment and brutalities to his own people met with general condemnation67.
There can be no question that the revolution which was started in Salvador, but which was so promptly68 and effectually suppressed, was promoted by Zelaya, who, rightly or wrongly, imagined that at the psychological moment he would meet with support, not alone from Honduras, but from the United States, either directly or indirectly69.
There is sufficient evidence on record to prove that Dr. Prudencio Alfaro, who, since the death of General Regalado during the war with Guatemala in 1906, had attained70 some slight popularity in Salvador, was the instrument through whom General Zelaya hoped, and indeed endeavoured, to carry out his plans. The conquest of Salvador was only one of them, since, as I have mentioned in another part of this volume, it was the ambition of Santos Zelaya to reconstitute a Federation71 of the five Central American States, and then to elect himself first President.
It was with the financial and physical assistance of Zelaya that Dr. Alfaro engaged the Nicaraguan[68] gunboat to convey him and other conspirators from Corinto to Acajutla in order to spy out the land, and to industriously72 lay the seeds of revolution. It was nothing to Zelaya that he should allow one of the Government gunboats to be employed in making warfare73 against a friendly power, with which he had signed a treaty of peace only a very few weeks before, or to supply from the national treasury74 the funds for letting loose a horde75 of armed ruffians upon a neighbour's territory.
I have been shown documentary proofs of the arrangements upon which Zelaya had been employed for many months previous, and which provided for the invasion of Salvador at four different points. From time to time changes were made in the personnel of the Nicaraguan commanders, but the names upon the lists which were shown to me were not in all cases the same as those of the men who actually took part in the abortive76 invasion.
I remember, for instance, observing the name of General Salvador Toledo, who had previously77 been deputed to command the invading army which was to enter Salvador from Honduras, near the Guatemalan frontier; and also that of General Estrada, who had been nominated to strike at the enemy with the Northern forces at the proper time. This General Estrada had been in command of the Honduranean forces between Puerto Cortes and the Salvadorean line, and he it was who numbered among his followers78 all the scum of the population, mostly consisting of ex-prisoners and exiles, who were willing enough to fight against their own country's soldiers, side by side with Honduraneans.
Another name which was on the officers' list was[69] that of General Cierra, who was to have entered the Republic of Salvador from the south, with the intention of capturing the port of La Unión, and of meeting the forces of Generals Cristales and Presa. According to the calculations which were then made, it was believed that General Cierra had only 3,000 men with him.
General Figueroa at this time wisely declared the City of Salvador "in a state of siege," which is the equivalent of suspension of political guarantees, to enable summary action to be taken against political offenders79 or even suspects; a condition afterwards extended to the whole country; and his instructions to the Governors of the several Departments no doubt saved the Central Government from considerable embarrassment80 as the result of the rising. Those who led the insurrection had counted upon receiving support from the public, which, however, they did not realize, and the lack of this made the capture of the leaders by the Government troops a matter of comparative facility. Secondly81, much of the inconvenience which would have followed a general disturbance54 of the affairs of the country at that time, and which would have caused both the Government and the people losses upon coffee shipments, was spared them, but not altogether obviated82.
As we have seen, it was altogether a clumsy attack which had been planned, and had better local knowledge prevailed it would have been ascertained83 that the prestige of the existing Government stood too high, and the personal popularity of General Figueroa was too great, to have ever endowed this rising with any great chances of success.
In this connection I think I may well quote an[70] extract from an official statement which was made in El Diario de Salvador, one of the most powerful papers in the Republic, of which I attach the following translation:
"In our edition of yesterday we published the decree of the Supreme84 Executive power declaring the Republic to be in a state of siege. According to the terms of this decree, the Government has been obliged to take extreme measures, owing to the attempt of its enemies to create a revolutionary movement calculated to cause a radical85 change in this Government.
"Fortunately for the Administration, the plot was discovered in time, and repressive measures were at once adopted which rendered the movement impossible of consummation. But, if it is certain that the internal peace has not been disturbed, such is not the case with the credit of the country. Furthermore, the fact that the attempt was made at the time for harvesting coffee aggravated86 the situation somewhat for the moment, and threatened to interfere59 with the gathering of this important crop on which much of the prosperity of the country depends; but the action of the Chief Executive in issuing orders to the Governors of the several Departments has reduced this evil to a minimum.
"In his instructions to the Governors, the Minister of the Interior provided in part that, notwithstanding the state of siege, the greatest latitude87 must be given persons and workmen who were not actually under suspicion, but insisted on the strict guarding of public order. Men in the discharge of their duties, however, were allowed to pass toward the Capital of the country without the necessity of presenting passports. This referred particularly to merchants, managers of plantations88, and day labourers.
"As will be seen," continued the journal referred to, "the circular does not mention the municipal elections which are soon to take place throughout the interior, but the President of the Republic has authorized89 us to make known his desires that these elections be held with perfect freedom, and be unhampered by the decree of the Executive."
quarters
Colonel's Quarters, School of Sergeants90.
Officers
Officers' Club Room, School of Sergeants.
The extract which I am quoting continues as follows:
"Whatever reasons the enemies of the Government may set forth91 in justification92 of their conduct, it cannot be doubted that the country has resisted the movement grandly, and has caused the failure of another attempt, which adds one more to the number which have aided to discredit93 the country abroad, and characterized our land as one of convulsive nations, incapable94 of making reasonable use of their Governments, such as we now enjoy. We must not lose sight of the fact that the eyes of Europe are upon us, thanks to the important r?le which Salvador is destined to play in uniting the civilizations of the East with the West."
It cannot be too emphatically pointed95 out that the Salvadoreans are not naturally a rebellious96 or warlike people, and, except when compelled to take up arms in their own defence or in favour of a righteous cause, they ask nothing better than to be permitted to devote themselves to the congenial and profitable occupation of cultivating the bounteous97 land which is theirs by inheritance. In the troubles which afflicted98 the country in the years 1907-08, the whole cause was the incitement99 which was offered to them by their turbulent and troublesome neighbours the Nicaraguans and the Honduraneans. As I have shown very conclusively100, it was the long-established policy of Santos Zelaya to foster an outbreak in Salvador which should broaden into a revolution, in the course of which Salvadorean troops would be compelled innocently to commit some overt101 act which would give Honduras or Nicaragua a cause for the initiation102 of a movement against the Republic. This, it was hoped, would ultimately result in the election to the Presidency of Salvador of Dr. Prudencio Alfaro, who was always a creature of Santos Zelaya, and who for[72] many months was his guest at Managua, where he formed all his plans, for the execution of which President Zelaya was ready to pay. As we have seen, the agitators103 did not wait for the casus belli on the part of Salvador, but most unwarrantably invaded that country and committed certain outrages104, only, however, to have to execute a most humiliating retreat before any beneficial results could possibly have accrued105 to them. Had it come to an actual encounter or series of encounters between the allied106 forces of Honduras and Nicaragua on the one hand and the Salvadoreans on the other, there can be no question that the latter would in the long-run have emerged victorious; out of a population of 1,100,000, the Salvadoreans can claim a fighting force of at least 100,000. The Salvadoreans are the best and most plucky107 fighters in South or Central America, as has been proved upon several occasions, displaying great intelligence on the battle-field and in the conduct of their campaigns. At the memorable108 battle of Jutiapa, fought between the Salvadorean troops and the Guatemalans in the previous year (1906), and in spite of the fact that the latter numbered over 40,000 as against little more than half that force arrayed on the side of Salvador, the former gave an extremely good account of themselves, and showed that the excellent military training which they had received had not been thrown away.
The invasion of Salvadorean territory in the month of June, 1907, by the Nicaraguans was a direct and unprovoked violation of the Treaty of Peace and Amity109 of Amapala, only signed on the previous April 23, and ratified110 on May 8, by which the Governments of the two countries agreed to submit their[73] grievances111 to the Presidents of the United States and Mexico for arbitration112. The news was first received through the telegram sent by President Figueroa, dated June 11, 1907, and addressed to Dr. Manuel Delgado, the Salvadorean Minister at Washington. In this despatch113, General Figueroa says:
"This morning the revolutionists bombarded and captured the port of Acajutla. The forces were commanded by General Manuel Rivas, and came from Corinto in the warship114 Momotombo, armed by the President of Nicaragua. It is in this manner that President Zelaya complies with the terms of the Treaty of Amapala, which was the result of the intervention of the American Government."
The gunboat mentioned was one of six warships115 which Nicaragua at that date possessed, and which composed the whole of the Nicaraguan "Navy." The vessel38 was capable of transporting 1,000 troops, and the facility with which these landed and seized the port of Acajutla is explained by the fact that the Salvadoreans were entirely116 unsuspicious and unprepared for such an outrageous117 act upon the part of the treacherous118 Zelaya, with whom they had every reason to consider themselves at peace. The civilized119 world has denounced the Nicaraguans' act of aggression, and unhesitatingly expressed the opinion that President Zelaya had committed a grave violation of international ethics120 in opening hostilities121 against Salvador without having made a preliminary declaration of war or giving any reasons for such an action.
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versus
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| prep.以…为对手，对；与…相比之下 | |
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provocation
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| n.激怒，刺激，挑拨，挑衅的事物，激怒的原因 | |
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invaders
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filibusters
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| n.掠夺兵( filibuster的名词复数 )；暴兵；（用冗长的发言）阻挠议事的议员；会议妨碍行为v.阻碍或延宕国会或其他立法机构通过提案( filibuster的第三人称单数 )；掠夺 | |
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presidency
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fervent
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| adj.热的，热烈的，热情的 | |
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eloquent
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| adj.雄辩的，口才流利的；明白显示出的 | |
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loyalty
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| n.忠诚，忠心 | |
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exhorting
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| v.劝告，劝说( exhort的现在分词 ) | |
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quotation
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| n.引文，引语，语录；报价，牌价，行情 | |
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violation
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| n.违反(行为)，违背(行为)，侵犯 | |
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intervention
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| n.介入，干涉，干预 | |
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brutal
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| adj.残忍的，野蛮的，不讲理的 | |
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defile
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| v.弄污，弄脏；n.(山间)小道 | |
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forefathers
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| n.祖先，先人；祖先，祖宗( forefather的名词复数 )；列祖列宗；前人 | |
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insolence
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| n.傲慢；无礼；厚颜；傲慢的态度 | |
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insolent
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| adj.傲慢的，无理的 | |
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opprobrium
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| n.耻辱，责难 | |
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rendering
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worthy
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| adj.(of)值得的，配得上的；有价值的 | |
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victorious
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| adj.胜利的，得胜的 | |
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entrusted
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| v.委托，托付( entrust的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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patriotism
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| n.爱国精神，爱国心，爱国主义 | |
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repel
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aggression
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| n.进攻，侵略，侵犯，侵害 | |
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wielded
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| 手持着使用（武器、工具等）( wield的过去式和过去分词 )； 具有； 运用（权力）； 施加（影响） | |
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embroilment
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alleged
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fully
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| adv.完全地，全部地，彻底地；充分地 | |
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emphatic
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| adj.强调的，着重的；无可置疑的，明显的 | |
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proceeding
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dignified
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| a.可敬的，高贵的 | |
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eyewitness
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precipitated
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| v.（突如其来地）使发生( precipitate的过去式和过去分词 )；促成；猛然摔下；使沉淀 | |
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barges
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lighters
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scrambled
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| v.快速爬行( scramble的过去式和过去分词 )；攀登；争夺；（军事飞机）紧急起飞 | |
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vessel
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| n.船舶；容器，器皿；管，导管，血管 | |
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vessels
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| n.血管( vessel的名词复数 )；船；容器；（具有特殊品质或接受特殊品质的）人 | |
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pier
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| n.码头；桥墩，桥柱；[建]窗间壁，支柱 | |
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ammunition
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| n.军火，弹药 | |
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possessed
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| adj.疯狂的；拥有的，占有的 | |
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fatuously
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| adv.愚昧地，昏庸地，蠢地 | |
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consummate
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| adj.完美的；v.成婚；使完美 [反]baffle | |
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conspiring
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| 密谋( conspire的现在分词 )； 搞阴谋； （事件等）巧合； 共同导致 | |
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destined
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| adj.命中注定的；(for)以…为目的地的 | |
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consigned
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| v.把…置于（令人不快的境地）( consign的过去式和过去分词 )；把…托付给；把…托人代售；丟弃 | |
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upheaval
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| n.胀起，(地壳)的隆起；剧变，动乱 | |
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impartial
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| adj.(in,to)公正的，无偏见的 | |
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sane
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| adj.心智健全的，神志清醒的，明智的，稳健的 | |
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proceedings
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| n.进程，过程，议程；诉讼(程序)；公报 | |
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52
repose
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| v.(使)休息；n.安息 | |
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53
disturbances
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| n.骚乱( disturbance的名词复数 )；打扰；困扰；障碍 | |
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54
disturbance
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| n.动乱，骚动；打扰，干扰；(身心)失调 | |
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55
transpiring
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| （事实，秘密等）被人知道( transpire的现在分词 )； 泄露； 显露； 发生 | |
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56
conspiracy
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| n.阴谋，密谋，共谋 | |
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noted
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| adj.著名的，知名的 | |
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conspirators
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| n.共谋者，阴谋家( conspirator的名词复数 ) | |
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interfere
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| v.(in)干涉，干预；(with)妨碍，打扰 | |
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interfered
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| v.干预( interfere的过去式和过去分词 )；调停；妨碍；干涉 | |
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61
gathering
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| n.集会，聚会，聚集 | |
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trifling
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| adj.微不足道的；没什么价值的 | |
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premature
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| adj.比预期时间早的；不成熟的，仓促的 | |
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undoubtedly
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| adv.确实地，无疑地 | |
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provocative
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| adj.挑衅的，煽动的，刺激的，挑逗的 | |
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acting
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| n.演戏，行为，假装；adj.代理的，临时的，演出用的 | |
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condemnation
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| n.谴责; 定罪 | |
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promptly
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| adv.及时地，敏捷地 | |
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indirectly
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| adv.间接地，不直接了当地 | |
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attained
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| （通常经过努力）实现( attain的过去式和过去分词 )； 达到； 获得； 达到（某年龄、水平、状况） | |
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federation
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| n.同盟，联邦，联合，联盟，联合会 | |
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industriously
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warfare
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| n.战争(状态)；斗争；冲突 | |
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treasury
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| n.宝库；国库，金库；文库 | |
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horde
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| n.群众，一大群 | |
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abortive
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| adj.不成功的，发育不全的 | |
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previously
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| adv.以前，先前（地） | |
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followers
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| 追随者( follower的名词复数 )； 用户； 契据的附面； 从动件 | |
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offenders
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| n.冒犯者( offender的名词复数 )；犯规者；罪犯；妨害…的人（或事物） | |
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embarrassment
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| n.尴尬；使人为难的人(事物)；障碍；窘迫 | |
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secondly
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| adv.第二，其次 | |
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obviated
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| v.避免，消除（贫困、不方便等）( obviate的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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ascertained
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| v.弄清，确定，查明( ascertain的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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supreme
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| adj.极度的，最重要的；至高的，最高的 | |
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radical
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| n.激进份子，原子团，根号；adj.根本的，激进的，彻底的 | |
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aggravated
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| 使恶化( aggravate的过去式和过去分词 )； 使更严重； 激怒； 使恼火 | |
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latitude
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| n.纬度，行动或言论的自由(范围)，(pl.)地区 | |
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plantations
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| n.种植园，大农场( plantation的名词复数 ) | |
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authorized
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| a.委任的，许可的 | |
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sergeants
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| 警官( sergeant的名词复数 )； （美国警察）警佐； （英国警察）巡佐； 陆军（或空军）中士 | |
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forth
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| adv.向前；向外，往外 | |
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justification
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| n.正当的理由；辩解的理由 | |
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discredit
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| vt.使不可置信；n.丧失信义；不信，怀疑 | |
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incapable
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| adj.无能力的，不能做某事的 | |
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pointed
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| adj.尖的，直截了当的 | |
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rebellious
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| adj.造反的，反抗的，难控制的 | |
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bounteous
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| adj.丰富的 | |
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afflicted
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| 使受痛苦，折磨( afflict的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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incitement
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| 激励； 刺激； 煽动； 激励物 | |
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conclusively
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| adv.令人信服地，确凿地 | |
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overt
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| adj.公开的，明显的，公然的 | |
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102
initiation
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| n.开始 | |
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103
agitators
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| n.（尤指政治变革的）鼓动者( agitator的名词复数 )；煽动者；搅拌器；搅拌机 | |
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104
outrages
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| 引起…的义愤，激怒( outrage的第三人称单数 ) | |
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accrued
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| adj.权责已发生的v.增加( accrue的过去式和过去分词 )；（通过自然增长）产生；获得；（使钱款、债务）积累 | |
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106
allied
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| adj.协约国的；同盟国的 | |
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plucky
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| adj.勇敢的 | |
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108
memorable
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| adj.值得回忆的，难忘的，特别的，显著的 | |
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109
amity
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| n.友好关系 | |
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ratified
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| v.批准，签认（合约等）( ratify的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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111
grievances
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| n.委屈( grievance的名词复数 )；苦衷；不满；牢骚 | |
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arbitration
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| n.调停，仲裁 | |
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113
despatch
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| n./v.(dispatch)派遣；发送；n.急件；新闻报道 | |
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114
warship
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| n.军舰，战舰 | |
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115
warships
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| 军舰，战舰( warship的名词复数 )； 舰只 | |
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116
entirely
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| ad.全部地，完整地；完全地，彻底地 | |
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117
outrageous
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| adj.无理的，令人不能容忍的 | |
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118
treacherous
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| adj.不可靠的，有暗藏的危险的；adj.背叛的，背信弃义的 | |
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119
civilized
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| a.有教养的，文雅的 | |
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120
ethics
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| n.伦理学；伦理观，道德标准 | |
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121
hostilities
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| n.战争；敌意(hostility的复数)；敌对状态；战事 | |
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