And as these Councils have been in certain quarters greatly praised as being not only good in themselves now but as containing the germs of great possibilities, it is necessary to consider them carefully.
Councils were first instituted in India in 1861, were enlarged in 1892, and again much enlarged in 1909; thus they are no new thing, and their value is already fairly obvious. Moreover, since the enlargements of the Act of 1909 some time has elapsed, so that I am not here criticising institutions which have not yet had a chance of showing what they can do.
There are Executive Councils for the Government of India and for the Provincial2 Governments of Bombay and Madras, and there are Legislative3 Councils for the Government of India and for each Province.
The whole of the law for the constitution of these Councils is contained in the Indian Councils Acts of 1861, 1892, and 1909, and the Rules for the nomination4 or election of the members are contained in Blue Book Number Cd 6714, published in 1913. I give these references in order that anyone who cares to go into the subject in greater detail than I can in this chapter will be able to find all his material readily. He will be able to see how other Councils than those I intend to deal with here are constituted; also in what way and by what constituencies elected members are chosen. There is a great deal that might well be said on each of these Councils.
But the only Councils I propose to deal with here are those of the Government of India and of the Province of Burma. I would have liked to include the Council of Madras but that I think the subject can be fairly understood without this.
The Executive Council of the Government of India consists of the Governor-General and nine members. These form the Cabinet of India, and, subject to the control of the Secretary of State, it has supreme5 power. It includes the Commander-in-Chief and members for Finance, Public Works, Home affairs and so on.
The only alteration6 made in this Council is by declaring that one of the members must be an Indian. So far that member has been the Law Member, and it is somewhat difficult to see how any other post could be filled by an Indian. You can find Indian lawyers, many, perhaps too many of them, but where are you to find Indians with that necessary experience that would fit them to be Finance or Home Members or Commander-in-Chief, for instance?
The appointment of this Indian gentleman to be Law Member has not been followed by any striking results. Law in India is petrified7, and until the great reform takes place petrified it must remain. It does not seem to matter very much who is head of it. When reform comes it will not be an Indian who could undertake it.
The Legislative Council is formed of the Executive Council and Additional Members. Before 1909, Additional Members were few, they were nominated and there was always a good Government majority. Since 1909 it has been constituted as follows:
Nominated Members
28 officials
5 non-officials.
Of these five non-officials one is to represent the Indian Commercial community, one the Mohammedans of the Punjab, and one the landowners in the Punjab. The other two nominated members may be anyone apparently8.
Then there are twenty-seven elected members; two each to represent the four large Provincial Councils; one each for the five smaller Provinces, one each to represent the landowners of six Provinces; five representatives of Mohammedans in these five Provinces; one member each to the Chambers10 of Commerce of Bengal and Bombay; and one extra Mohammedan member. Thus in this assembly there are represented in a way nine Provinces as wholes, the landowning class of some Provinces, one religion and the trade of two cities.
To make it clearer to the reader who has not been to India, let me put it in this way. India is as big as Europe without Russia, and has three hundred million inhabitants, more than Europe. Suppose Europe were conquered and administered by Martians, and they were to establish a Council. If they did it on similar principles to this Legislative Council of the Government of India it would consist of:
Two members each for Germany, France, Great Britain, and Italy, one member each for five smaller nations, one representative each for the landowners in Great Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Austria, and Spain, five representatives of Protestants as Protestants, and one each for the Chambers of Commerce of London and Paris.
What would the reader think of this as a Council to make laws for all Europe? What would he say? I think he would say many things. He would also ask some questions. He would ask:
Firstly, how can two members represent great countries—like England for instance? Or one represent another great area and people like Spain? Is it conceivably possible that one or at best two individuals could have the necessary knowledge or impartiality12 to do this?
His second question would be: How can one man represent landowners spread over a great territory with different forms of tenure13, different crops, different climates, different nationalities?
His third would be: Two cities are represented; where are the others?
His fourth would be: At best, all these members can but represent, in even ever so faint a way, their own class who elects them. Say at a liberal estimate that they represent more or less imperfectly half a million people; what about the two hundred and ninety-nine and a half million who are left out? Who are to protect tenants14 from landlords, the innumerable unrepresented religions from that one which is represented, the voiceless cities from the two which have voices? In fact, who is to protect Europe from these few privileged classes?
That would be analogous15 to what is happening in India. These questions are being asked.
The answer to the first question is quite simple. The two members do not represent Madras, nor does the one member represent Burma. They represent the non-officials of the Local Council, and that is all; that is to say, ten or fifteen individuals of much their own class and standing16. It is not likely that they have any knowledge of the country they are to represent, except the chief town. It is quite certain that they have never even travelled over half their country, nor speak more than one or two of the various tongues.
They have no knowledge of the administration anywhere, nor any administrative17 ability. If a question vital to their Province arose they would not know what to do; and if they did know they would not dare to do it if it involved any responsibility, because they have no backing in the country supposed to be theirs. They are totally unknown, even by name, to nine hundred and ninety-nine out of every thousand inhabitants. In fact, even this is an over-estimate. They are not only without knowledge of the immense majority of "their" people, but are antagonistic18 in race and religion to many of them, so that it is only the English Government that keeps the peace.
The answer to the second question is much the same as to the first. Fancy one member representing the Nair landholders of Malabar, the Poligars, the Tamils, the Telugu landholders, and many others. It is absurd.
There is no answer to the third question.
The answer to the fourth is that whatever help and representation and defence the bulk of India can obtain must be obtained from the English official members. They alone are quite impartial11; they may be comparatively ignorant, but their ignorance is light compared to that of the native members, for it includes a knowledge of administration obtained by experience, which none of the latter have. It is we alone who have raised the people economically, and have done it often enough against the influence of class.
Therefore the Council of the Government of India is so constituted that whereas perhaps half a million people are represented directly or indirectly19 by class and religion, the two hundred and ninety-nine and a half million have no representation at all and must depend on the English officials.
This is no new discovery of mine. Here is what Lord Curzon said in the debate in the House of Lords on this new Act: "I wonder how these changes will in the last resort affect the great mass of the people of India—the people who have no vote and have scarcely a voice. Remember that to these people, who form the bulk of the population of India, representative government and electoral institutions are nothing whatever. I have a misgiving20 that this class will not fare much better under these changes than they do now. At any rate, I see no place for them in these enlarged Councils which are to be created, and I am under the strong opinion that as government in India becomes more and more Parliamentary—as will be the inevitable21 result—so it will become less paternal22 and less beneficial to the poorer classes of the population." It was seen that these Councils were merely by way of handing over the India we have made to a tiny section of privileged classes whom we were to keep in power and support with our bayonets. It was seen and disregarded. Why?
So much for its constitution. Every principle that experience shows must go to the making of a successful Assembly has been scorned. The representation, even such as it is, is by class, by race, and by religion. No assembly where such a method of representation has been adopted has ever been known. Wherever, even in a small degree, such differences have existed it has paralysed all action. Take, for instance, the French National Assembly before the Revolution. Imagine a House of Commons with members for landowners, for the merchants of London and Glasgow, and special members for the Catholic Irish in England and Scotland. Even that would be far less extraordinary than the Council of India.
This Council has no executive powers, but it can ask questions: it can discuss the Budget though it cannot make alterations23; it can make laws affecting all India. But all it does is subject to veto by the Government of India—and naturally so. How could you delegate real power to a Council which, the English officials apart, has no representative value of any kind and no administrative experience? The power behind the Government is the power of England—the Army, the Navy, and the wealth of England. It is administered by British officials, and even the native army is officered by English officers. Is this great English organism to be used for enforcing laws passed by such a Council as that I have described? To be at its mercy, to be its servant? Does it enter into the possibility of things?
The Council, the officials apart, is in reality at its very best advisory24 only. It cannot be more. It has no power behind it and could be given no responsibility. Yet without the fear of responsibility what advice is ever well given? Irresponsible advisers25! Of what value have they ever been in the world's history?
"But"—I have been told and have read often enough—"the Council works well, it is a success, it has gratified the educated Indian. Why criticise26 it, then?" To that I reply, "In what has its success consisted—what has it done?" And to that I never get any answer except that it is a success because it has done nothing. The speakers were afraid, apparently, it might try to do something—to express, for instance, some of the desires and needs of the people, a few of which I have tried to explain in this book; to suggest some new policy to Government, to show how the great and increasing unrest might be guided into safe channels; and it has been a success because it has done none of these things and was capable of doing none of them. It has been as an influence nil27. All it has done has been empty criticism. A writer trying to praise it says: "The debates in the Imperial Council are already not unworthy of older and more famous assemblies." If the comparison is with the House of Commons it is not inapt. For many years now debates there have been merely a pretence28. The conclusions are already fixed29 and the speakers know it. They speak to pass time, to satisfy the electors that they are really doing something to justify30 their existence, and they try to show off—or to score off someone else. Their speeches have no value. They make no difference to the result. And the debates in the India Council are no different. It perhaps gives the members the illusion of power and authority to be able to badger31 Government and make long speeches, but it can effect nothing. The debates are make-believe. How should they be anything else? The men are not to blame, but the institution.
"But"—again say its advocates—"this is but a beginning. The Council is but in embryo32. Wait till it comes to greater maturity33."
To what greater maturity can it come? Is there in this Council any true idea that can expand and grow? There is no idea at all. Is it ever contemplated34 to make it really representative? How many members would it take to represent three hundred millions of people? On the British basis, not a liberal one, it would require an assembly of over four thousand five hundred members. Is that possible?
Is any election possible among the masses of the people?
Is it ever possible that real executive or legislative power should be given to an assembly when it is the English Government and the English people who in the last resort would have to carry out those orders and bear the brunt of their failure?
Think over the facts carefully. Could you make a central Parliament to govern all Europe? No. For a hundred reasons the idea is impossible. It is equally impossible in India. It is even more impossible in India than it would be in Europe.
Finally it is said that this Council has satisfied the educated class in India.
Has it?
And if it had could there be a greater criterion of its worthlessness than such satisfaction?
Let us now turn to the Burma Provincial Council. There is no Executive Council, all executive power lies with the Lieut.-Governor. The Legislative Council consists of seventeen members.
One member is elected by the Chamber9 of Commerce, and the other sixteen are nominated. Of these sixteen, six may be officials; two experts may be official or non-official; the rest must be non-official; of these, four must be Burmese, one must be Chinese, and one must be Indian.
The Council has power to enact35 local legislation for Burma only. That is to say it can pass special or local laws. It cannot, of course, interfere36 with or vary the Imperial legislation, such as the Indian Penal37 Codes. Its powers are small and are limited. It is, as will be seen, representative of nothing. Except the officials, none of the members have any administrative knowledge; none are known to the people at large even by name. That they approved or passed any Act modifying, say, the Burmese law of inheritance, would be no justification38 for it before the people. They represent neither people nor ideas. They have effected nothing and can effect nothing because they have no force behind them. What have any of them ever done that the people should repose39 confidence in them?
For the rest the same criticisms apply as to the Indian Council. The Lieut.-Governor has all the executive power and he has the power of veto over all legislation. Naturally he must have this power. If not, he might be forced into using British power and authority and means for enforcing Acts that he disapproved40 of and were passed by men who represented at best not one thousandth part of the country.
Yet, as long as he has this power of veto, the Council, like the Indian Council, becomes simply an advisory Council with no responsibility. And, again, of what value is advice that is not steadied by the sense of responsibility?
And with all this talk of self-government, of an Imperial Indian Parliament and local parliaments, of election and representation, there is in no village in the Indian Empire any self-government at all, even in the smallest matters. The villages are one and all under the rule of a Government official, and every vestige41 of self-government has been destroyed. India may have representatives in the India Council and a voice, even if an impotent voice, in Imperial matters, but it may have no representation in its Village Council, and no voice in the smallest village concern.
The whole base on which any self-government could rest has been destroyed. And instead of building up from below a system of self-government that would proceed from the people and be so founded as to stand any shocks, it is sought to begin self-government from the top, by suspending in the air Councils that rest on nothing, that mean nothing, that have as much solidity and reality as kites would have.
This, too, must have been foreseen, because it is obvious. Why, then, was it done?
Was there ever in any history a reductio ad absurdum like these Councils of Despair?
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1
allaying
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| v.减轻，缓和( allay的现在分词 ) | |
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provincial
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| adj.省的，地方的；n．外省人，乡下人 | |
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legislative
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| n.立法机构，立法权；adj.立法的，有立法权的 | |
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nomination
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| n.提名，任命，提名权 | |
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supreme
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| adj.极度的，最重要的；至高的，最高的 | |
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alteration
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| n.变更，改变；蚀变 | |
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petrified
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| adj.惊呆的；目瞪口呆的v.使吓呆，使惊呆；变僵硬；使石化(petrify的过去式和过去分词) | |
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apparently
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| adv.显然地；表面上，似乎 | |
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chamber
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| n.房间，寝室；会议厅；议院；会所 | |
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chambers
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| n.房间( chamber的名词复数 )；（议会的）议院；卧室；会议厅 | |
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impartial
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| adj.(in,to)公正的，无偏见的 | |
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impartiality
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| n. 公平, 无私, 不偏 | |
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tenure
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| n.终身职位；任期；(土地)保有权，保有期 | |
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tenants
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| n.房客( tenant的名词复数 )；佃户；占用者；占有者 | |
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analogous
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| adj.相似的；类似的 | |
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standing
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| n.持续，地位；adj.永久的，不动的，直立的，不流动的 | |
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administrative
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| adj.行政的，管理的 | |
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antagonistic
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| adj.敌对的 | |
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indirectly
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| adv.间接地，不直接了当地 | |
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misgiving
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| n.疑虑，担忧，害怕 | |
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inevitable
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| adj.不可避免的，必然发生的 | |
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paternal
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| adj.父亲的，像父亲的，父系的，父方的 | |
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alterations
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| n.改动( alteration的名词复数 )；更改；变化；改变 | |
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advisory
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| adj.劝告的，忠告的，顾问的，提供咨询 | |
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advisers
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| 顾问，劝告者( adviser的名词复数 )； （指导大学新生学科问题等的）指导教授 | |
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criticise
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| v.批评，评论；非难 | |
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nil
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| n.无，全无，零 | |
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pretence
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| n.假装，作假；借口，口实；虚伪；虚饰 | |
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fixed
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| adj.固定的，不变的，准备好的；(计算机)固定的 | |
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justify
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| vt.证明…正当(或有理)，为…辩护 | |
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badger
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| v.一再烦扰，一再要求，纠缠 | |
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embryo
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| n.胚胎，萌芽的事物 | |
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maturity
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| n.成熟；完成；(支票、债券等)到期 | |
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contemplated
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| adj. 预期的 动词contemplate的过去分词形式 | |
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enact
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| vt.制定(法律)；上演，扮演 | |
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interfere
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| v.(in)干涉，干预；(with)妨碍，打扰 | |
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penal
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| adj.刑罚的；刑法上的 | |
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justification
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| n.正当的理由；辩解的理由 | |
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repose
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| v.(使)休息；n.安息 | |
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disapproved
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| v.不赞成( disapprove的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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vestige
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| n.痕迹，遗迹，残余 | |
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