C?sar begins the last book of his last Commentary by telling us that this was the year in which he, C?sar, was by the law permitted to name a consul1. He names Publius Servilius to act in conjunction with himself. The meaning of this is, that, as C?sar had been created Dictator, Pompey having taken with him into Illyria the consuls2 of the previous year, C?sar was now the only magistrate3 under whose authority a consul could be elected. No doubt he did choose the man, but the election was supposed to have been made in accordance with the forms of the Republic. He remained at Rome as Dictator for eleven days, during which he made various laws, of which the chief object was to lessen4 the insecurity caused by the disruption of the ordinary course of things; and then he went down to Brindisi on the track of Pompey. He had twelve legions with him, but was but badly off for ships in which to transport them; and he owns that the health of the men is bad, an autumn in the south of Italy having been very severe{147} on men accustomed to the healthy climate of Gaul and the north of Spain. Pompey, he tells us, had had a whole year to prepare his army,—a whole year, without warfare5, and had collected men and ships and money, and all that support which assent6 gives, from Asia and the Cyclades, from Corcyra, Athens, Bithynia, Cilicia, Ph?nicia, Egypt, and the free states of Achaia. He had with him nine Roman legions, and is expecting two more with his father-in-law Scipio out of Syria. He has three thousand archers7 from Crete, from Sparta, and from Pontus; he has twelve hundred slingers, and he has seven thousand cavalry8 from Galatia, Cappadocia, and Thrace. A valorous prince from Macedonia had brought him two hundred men, all mounted. Five hundred of Galatian and German cavalry, who had been left to overawe Ptolemy in Egypt, are brought to Pompey by the filial care of young Cn?us. He too had armed eight hundred of their own family retainers, and had brought them armed. Antiochus of Commagena sends him two hundred mounted archers,—mercenaries, however, not sent without promise of high payment. Dardani,—men from the land of old Troy, Bessi, from the banks of the Hebrus, Thessalians and Macedonians, have all been crowded together under Pompey’s standard. We feel that C?sar’s mouth waters as he recounts them. But we feel also that he is preparing for the triumphant9 record in which he is about to tell us that all these swarms10 did he scatter11 to the winds of heaven with the handful of Roman legionaries which he at last succeeded in landing on the shores of Illyria.{148}
Pompey has also collected from all parts “frumenti vim12 maximam”—“a great power of corn indeed,” as an Irishman would say, translating the words literally13. And he has covered the seas with his ships, so as to hinder C?sar from coming out of Italy. He has eight vice-admirals to command his various fleets,—all of whom C?sar names; and over them all, as admiral-in-chief, is Bibulus, who was joint14-consul with C?sar before C?sar went to Gaul, and who was so harassed15 during his consulship16 by the C?sareans that he shut himself up in his house, and allowed C?sar to rule as sole consul. Now he is about to take his revenge; but the vengeance17 of such a one as Bibulus cannot reach C?sar.
C?sar having led his legions to Brindisi, makes them a speech which almost beats in impudence18 anything that he ever said or did. He tells them that as they have now nearly finished all his work for him;—they have only got to lay low the Republic with Pompey the Great, and all the forces of the Republic—to which, however, have to be added King Ptolemy in Egypt, King Pharnaces in Asia, and King Juba in Numidia;—they had better leave behind them at Brindisi all their little property, the spoils of former wars, so that they may pack the tighter in the boats in which he means to send them across to Illyria,—if only they can escape the mercies of ex-Consul Admiral Bibulus. There is no suggestion that at any future time they will recover their property. For their future hopes they are to trust entirely19 to C?sar’s generosity20. With one shout they declare their readiness to obey him. He takes over{149} seven legions, escaping the dangers of those “rocks of evil fame,” the Acroceraunia of which Horace tells us,—and escaping Bibulus also, who seems to have shut himself up in his ship as he did before in his house during the consulship. C?sar seems to have made the passage with the conviction that had he fallen into the hands of Bibulus everything would have been lost. And with ordinary precaution and diligence on the part of Bibulus such would have been the result. Yet he makes the attempt,—trusting to the Fortune of C?sar,—and he succeeds. He lands at a place which he calls Pal21?ste on the coast of Epirus, considerably22 to the south of Dyrrachium, in Illyria. At Dyrrachium Pompey had landed the year before, and there is now stored that wealth of provision of which C?sar has spoken. But Bibulus at last determines to be active, and he does manage to fall upon the empty vessels25 which C?sar sends back to fetch the remainder of his army. “Having come upon thirty of them, he falls upon them with all the wrath27 occasioned by his own want of circumspection28 and grief, and burns them. And in the same fire he kills the sailors and the masters of the vessels,—hoping to deter24 others,” C?sar tells us, “by the severity of the punishment.” After that we are not sorry to hear that he potters about on the seas very busy, but still incapable29, and that he dies, as it seems, of a broken heart. He does indeed catch one ship afterwards,—not laden30 with soldiers, but coming on a private venture, with children, servants, and suchlike, dependants31 and followers32 of C?sar’s camp. All these, including the children, Bibulus slaughters34, down to{150} the smallest child. We have, however, to remember that the story is told by C?sar, and that C?sar did not love Bibulus.
Marc Antony has been left at Brindisi in command of the legions which C?sar could not bring across at his first trip for want of sufficient ship-room, and is pressed very much by C?sar to make the passage. There are attempts at treaties made, but as we read the account we feel that C?sar is only obtaining the delay which is necessary to him till he shall have been joined by Antony. We are told how by this time the camps of C?sar and Pompey have been brought so near together that they are separated only by the river Apsus,—for C?sar had moved northwards towards Pompey’s stronghold. And the soldiers talked together across the stream; “nor, the while, was any weapon thrown,—by compact between those who talked.” Then C?sar sends Vatinius, as his ambassador, down to the river to talk of peace; and Vatinius demands with a loud voice “whether it should not be allowed to citizens to send legates to citizens, to treat of peace;—a thing that has been allowed even to deserters from the wilds of the Pyrenees and to robbers,—especially with so excellent an object as that of hindering citizens from fighting with citizens.” This seems so reasonable, that a day is named, and Labienus,—who has deserted37 from C?sar and become Pompeian,—comes to treat on one side of the river, and Vatinius on the other. But,—so C?sar tells the story himself,—the C?sarean soldiers throw their weapons at their old general. They probably cannot endure the voice or sight of one whom they regard{151} as a renegade. Labienus escapes under the protection of those who are with him,—but he is full of wrath against C?sar. “After this,” says he, “let us cease to speak of treaties, for there can be no peace for us till C?sar’s head has been brought to us.” But the colloquies38 over the little stream no doubt answered C?sar’s purpose.
C?sar is very anxious to get his legions over from Italy, and even scolds Antony for not bringing them. There is a story,—which he does not tell himself,—that he put himself into a small boat, intending to cross over to Brindisi in a storm, to hurry matters, and that he encouraged the awe-struck master of the boat by reminding him that he would carry “C?sar and his fortunes.” The story goes on to say that the sailors attempted the trip, but were driven back by the tempest.
At last there springs up a south-west wind, and Antony ventures with his flotilla,—although the war-ships of Pompey still hold the sea, and guard the Illyrian coast. But C?sar’s general is successful, and the second half of the C?sarean army is carried northward35 by favouring breezes towards the shore in the very sight of Pompey and his soldiers at Dyrrachium. Two ships, however, lag behind and fall into the hands of one Otacilius, an officer belonging to Pompey. The two ships, one full of recruits and the other of veterans, agree to surrender, Otacilius having sworn that he will not hurt the men. “Here you may see,” says C?sar, “how much safety to men there is in presence of mind.” The recruits do as they have undertaken, and give themselves{152} up;—whereupon Otacilius, altogether disregarding his oath, like a true Roman, kills every man of them. But the veterans, disregarding their word also, and knowing no doubt to a fraction the worth of the word of Otacilius, run their ship ashore39 in the night, and, with much fighting, get safe to Antony. C?sar implies that the recruits even would have known better had they not been sea-sick; but that even bilge-water and bad weather combined had failed to touch the ancient courage of the veteran legionaries. They were still good men—“item conflictati et tempestatis et sentin? vitiis.”
We are then told how Metellus Scipio, coming out of Syria with his legions into Macedonia, almost succeeds in robbing the temple of Diana of Ephesus on his way. He gets together a body of senators, who are to give evidence that he counts the money fairly as he takes it out of the temple. But letters come from Pompey just as he is in the act, and he does not dare to delay his journey even to complete so pleasant a transaction. He comes to meet Pompey and to share his command at the great battle that must soon be fought. We hear, too, how C?sar sends his lieutenants41 into Thessaly and ?tolia and Macedonia, to try what friends he has there, to take cities, and to get food. He is now in a land which has seemed specially36 to belong to Pompey; but even here they have heard of C?sar, and the Greeks are simply anxious to be friends with the strongest Roman of the day. They have to judge which will win, and to adhere to him. For the poor Greeks there is much difficulty in forming a judgment42.{153} Presently we shall see the way in which C?sar gives a lesson on that subject to the citizens of Gomphi. In the mean time he joins his own forces to those lately brought by Antony out of Italy, and resolves that he will force Pompey to a fight.
We may divide the remainder of this last book of the second Commentary into two episodes,—the first being the story of what occurred within the lines at Petra, and the second the account of the crowning battle of Pharsalia. In the first Pompey was the victor,—but the victory, great as it was, has won from the world very little notice. In the second, as all the world knows, C?sar was triumphant and henceforward dominant43. And yet the affair at Petra should have made a Pharsalia unnecessary, and indeed impossible. Two reasons have conspired44 to make Pompey’s complete success at Petra unimportant in the world’s esteem45. This Commentary was written not by Pompey but by C?sar; and then, unfortunately for Pompey, Pharsalia was allowed to follow Petra.
It is not very easy to unravel46 C?sar’s story of the doings of the two armies at Petra. Nor, were this ever so easy, would our limits or the purport47 of this little volume allow us to attempt to give that narrative48 in full to our readers. C?sar had managed to join the legions which he had himself brought from Italy with those which had crossed afterwards with Antony, and was now anxious for a battle. His men, though fewer in number than they who followed Pompey, were fit for fighting, and knew all the work of soldiering. Pompey’s men were for the most part beginners;—but{154} they were learning, and every week added to their experience was a week in Pompey’s favour. With hope of forcing a battle, C?sar managed to get his army between Dyrrachium, in which were kept all Pompey’s stores and wealth of war, and the army of his opponent, so that Pompey, as regarded any approach by land, was shut off from Dyrrachium. But the sea was open to him. His fleet was everywhere on the coast, while C?sar had not a ship that could dare to show its bow upon the waters.
There was a steep rocky promontory49 some few miles north of Dyrrachium, from whence there was easy access to the sea, called Petra, or the rock. At this point Pompey could touch the sea, but between Petra and Dyrrachium C?sar held the country. Here, on this rock, taking in for the use of his army a certain somewhat wide amount of pasturage at the foot of the rock, Pompey placed his army, and made intrenchments all round from sea to sea, fortifying50 himself, as all Roman generals knew how to do, with a bank and ditch and twenty-four turrets52 and earthworks that would make the place absolutely impregnable. The length of his lines was fifteen Roman miles,—more than thirteen English miles,—so that within his works he might have as much space as possible to give him grass for his horses. So placed, he had all the world at his back to feed him. Not only could he get at that wealth of stores which he had amassed53 at Dyrrachium, and which were safe from C?sar, but the coasts of Greece, and Asia, and Egypt were open to his ships. Two things only were wanting to him,—sufficient grass{155} for his horses, and water. But all things were wanting to C?sar,—except grass and water. The Illyrian country at his back was one so unproductive, being rough and mountainous, that the inhabitants themselves were in ordinary times fed upon imported corn. And Pompey, foreseeing something of what might happen, had taken care to empty the storehouses and to leave the towns behind him destitute54 and impoverished55.
Nevertheless C?sar, having got the body of his enemy, as it were, imprisoned56 at Petra, was determined57 to keep his prisoner fast. So round and in front of Pompey’s lines he also made other lines, from sea to sea. He began by erecting58 turrets and placing small detachments on the little hills outside Pompey’s lines, so as to prevent his enemy from getting the grass. Then he joined these towers by lines, and in this way surrounded the other lines,—thinking that so Pompey would not be able to send out his horsemen for forage60; and again, that the horses inside at Petra might gradually be starved; and again “that the reputation,”—“auctoritatem,”—“which in the estimation of foreign nations belonged chiefly to Pompey in this war, would be lessened61 when the story should have been told over the world that Pompey had been besieged63 by C?sar, and did not dare to fight.”
We are, perhaps, too much disposed to think,—reading our history somewhat cursorily,—that C?sar at this time was everybody, and that Pompey was hardly worthy64 to be his foe65. Such passages in the Commentary as that above translated,—they are not many, but a few suffice,—show that this idea is erroneous. Up{156} to this period in their joint courses Pompey had been the greater man; C?sar had done very much, but Pompey had done more—and now he had on his side almost all that was wealthy and respectable in Rome. He led the Conservative party, and was still confident that he had only to bide66 his time, and that C?sar must fall before him. C?sar and the C?sareans were to him as the spirits of the Revolution were in France to Louis XVI., to Charles X., and to Louis-Philippe, before they had made their powers credible67 and formidable; as the Reform Bill and Catholic Emancipation68 were to such men as George IV. and Lord Eldon, while yet they could be opposed and postponed69. It was impossible to Pompey that the sweepings70 of Rome, even with C?sar and C?sar’s army to help them, should at last prevail over himself and over the Roman Senate. “He was said at that time,” we are again translating C?sar’s words, “to have declared with boasts among his own people, that he would not himself deny that as a general he should be considered to be worthless if C?sar’s legions should now extricate71 themselves from the position in which they had rashly entangled72 themselves without very great loss”—“maximo detrimento”—loss that should amount wellnigh to destruction. And he was all but right in what he said.
There was a great deal of fighting for the plots of grass and different bits of vantage-ground,—fighting which must have taken place almost entirely between the two lines. But C?sar suffered under this disadvantage, that his works, being much the longest,{157} required the greatest number of men to erect59 them and prolong them and keep them in order; whereas Pompey, who in this respect had the least to do, having the inner line, was provided with much the greater number of men to do it. C?sar’s men, being veterans, had always the advantage in the actual fighting; but in the mean time Pompey’s untried soldiers were obtaining that experience which was so much needed by them. Nevertheless Pompey suffered very much. They could not get water on the rock, and when he attempted to sink wells, C?sar so perverted73 the water-courses that the wells gave no water. C?sar tells us that he even dammed up the streams, making little lakes to hold it, so that it should not trickle74 down in its underground courses to the comfort of his enemies; but we should have thought that any reservoirs so made must soon have overflown75 themselves, and have been useless for the intended purpose. In the mean time C?sar’s men had no bread but what was made of a certain wild cabbage,—“chara,”—which grew there, which they kneaded up with milk, and lived upon it cheerfully, though it was not very palatable76. To show the Pompeians the sort of fare with which real veterans could be content to break their fasts, they threw loaves of this composition across the lines; for they were close together, and could talk to each other, and the Pompeians did not hesitate to twit their enemies with their want of provisions. But the C?sareans had plenty of water,—and plenty of meat; and they assure C?sar that they would rather eat the bark off the trees than allow the Pompeians to escape them.{158}
But there was always this for C?sar to fear,—that Pompey should land a detachment behind his lines and attack him at the back. To hinder this C?sar made another intrenchment, with ditch and bank, running at right angles from the shore, and was intending to join this to his main work by a transverse line of fortifications running along that short portion of the coast which lay between his first lines and the second, when there came upon him the disaster which nearly destroyed him. While he was digging his trenches77 and building his turrets the fighting was so frequent that, as C?sar tells us, on one day there were six battles. Pompey lost two thousand legionaries, while C?sar lost no more than twenty; but every C?sarean engaged in a certain turret51 was wounded, and four officers lost their eyes. C?sar estimates that thirty thousand arrows were thrown upon the men defending this tower, and tells us of one Sc?va, an officer, who had two hundred and thirty holes made by these arrows in his own shield.[12] We can only surmise{159} that it must have been a very big shield, and that there must have been much trouble in counting the holes. C?sar, however, was so much pleased that he gave Sc?va a large sum of money,—something over ￡500, and, allowing him to skip over six intermediate ranks, made him at once first centurion78—or Primipilus of the legion. We remember no other record of such quick promotion—in prose. There is, indeed, the well-known case of a common sailor who did a gallant79 action and was made first-lieutenant40 on the spot; but that is told in verse, and the common sailor was a lady.
Two perfidious80 Gauls to whom C?sar had been very kind, but whom he had been obliged to check on account of certain gross peculations of which they had been guilty, though, as he tells us, he had not time to punish them, went over to Pompey, and told Pompey all the secrets of C?sar’s ditches, and forts, and mounds,—finished and unfinished. Before that, C?sar assures us, not a single man of his had gone over to the enemy, though many of the enemy had come to him. But those perfidious Gauls did a world of mischief81. Pompey, hearing how far C?sar was from having his works along the sea-shore finished, got together a huge fleet of boats, and succeeded at night in throwing a large body of his men ashore between C?sar’s two lines, thus dividing C?sar’s forces, and coming upon them in their weakest{160} point. C?sar admits that there was a panic in his lines, and that the slaughter33 of his men was very great. It seems that the very size of his own works produced the ruin which befel them, for the different parts of them were divided one from another, so that the men in one position could not succour those in another. The affair ended in the total rout82 of the C?sarean army. C?sar actually fled, and had Pompey followed him we must suppose that then there would have been an end of C?sar. He acknowledges that in the two battles fought on that day he lost 960 legionaries, 32 officers, and 32 standards.
And then C?sar tells us a story of Labienus, who had been his most trusted lieutenant in the Gallic wars, but who had now gone over to Pompey, not choosing to fight against the Republic. Labienus demanded of Pompey the C?sarean captives, and caused them all to be slaughtered83, asking them with scorn whether veterans such as they were accustomed to run away. C?sar is very angry with Labienus; but Labienus might have defended himself by saying that the slaughter of prisoners of war was a custom he had learned in Gaul. As for those words of scorn, C?sar could hardly have heard them with his own ears, and we can understand that he should take delight in saying a hard thing of Labienus.
Pompey was at once proclaimed Imperator. And Pompey used the name, though the victory had, alas84! been gained over his fellow-countrymen. “So great was the effect of all this on the spirits and confidence of the Pompeians, that they thought no more of the carrying on of the war, but only of the victory{161} they had gained.” And then C?sar throws scorn upon the Pompeians, making his own apology in the same words. “They did not care to remember that the small number of our soldiers was the cause of their triumph, or that the unevenness85 of the ground and narrowness of the defiles86 had aught to do with it; or the occupation of our lines, and the panic of our men between their double fortifications; or our army cut into two parts, so that one part could not help the other. Nor did they add to this the fact that our men, pressed as they were, could not engage themselves in a fair conflict, and that they indeed suffered more from their own numbers, and from the narrowness of the ravines, than from the enemy. Nor were the ordinary chances of war brought to mind,—how small matters, such as some unfounded suspicion, a sudden panic, a remembered superstition87, may create great misfortune; nor how often the fault of a general, or the mistake of an officer, may bring injury upon an army. But they spread abroad the report of the victory of that day throughout all the world, sending forth88 letters and tales as though they had conquered solely89 by their own valour, nor was it possible that there should after this be a reverse of their circumstances.” Such was the affair of Petra, by which the relative position in the world-history of C?sar and Pompey was very nearly made the reverse of what it is.
C?sar now acknowledges that he is driven to change the whole plan of his campaign. He addresses a speech to his men, and explains to them that this defeat, like that at Gergovia, may lead to their future{162} success. The victory at Alesia had sprung from the defeat of Gergovia, because the Gauls had been induced to fight; and from the reverses endured within the lines of Petra might come the same fortune;—for surely now the army of Pompey would not fear a battle. Some few officers he punishes and degrades. His own words respecting his army after their defeat are very touching90. “So great a grief had come from this disaster upon the whole army, and so strong a desire of repairing its disgrace, that no one now desired the place of tribune or centurion in his legion; and all, by way of self-imposed punishment, subjected themselves to increased toil91; and every man burned with a desire to fight. Some from the higher ranks were so stirred by C?sar’s speech, that they thought that they should stand their ground where they were, and fight where they stood.” But C?sar was too good a general for that. He moves on towards the south-east, and in retreating gets the better of Pompey, who follows him with only half a heart. After a short while Pompey gives up the pursuit. His father-in-law, Scipio, has brought a great army from the east, and is in Thessaly. As we read this we cannot fail to remember how short a time since it was that C?sar himself was Pompey’s father-in-law, and that Pompey was C?sar’s friend because, with too uxorious92 a love, he clung to Julia, his young wife. Pompey now goes eastward93 to unite his army to that of Scipio; and C?sar, making his way also into Thessaly by a more southern route, joins certain forces under his lieutenant Calvinus, who had been watching Scipio,{163} and who barely escaped falling into Pompey’s hands before he could reach C?sar. But wherever Fortune or Chance could interfere94, the Gods were always kind to C?sar.
Then C?sar tells us of his treatment of two towns in Thessaly, Gomphi and Metropolis95. Unluckily for the poor Gomphians, C?sar reaches Gomphi first. Now the fame of Pompey’s victory at Petra had been spread abroad; and the Gomphians, who,—to give them their due,—would have been just as willing to favour C?sar as Pompey, and who only wanted to be on the winning side that they might hold their little own in safety, believed that things were going badly with C?sar. They therefore shut their gates against C?sar, and sent off messengers to Pompey. They can hold their town against C?sar for a little while, but Pompey must come quickly to their aid. Pompey comes by no means quick enough, and the Gomphians’ capacity to hold their own is very short-lived. At about three o’clock in the afternoon C?sar begins to besiege62 the town, and before sunset he has taken it, and given it to be sacked by his soldiers. The men of Metropolis were also going to shut their gates, but luckily they hear just in time what had happened at Gomphi,—and open them instead. Whereupon C?sar showers protection upon Metropolis; and all the other towns of Thessaly, hearing what had been done, learn what C?sar’s favour means.
Pompey, having joined his army to that of Scipio, shares all his honours with his father-in-law. When we hear this we know that Pompey’s position was not{164} comfortable, and that he was under constraint96. He was a man who would share his honour with no one unless driven to do so. And indeed his command at present was not a pleasant one. It was much for a Roman commander to have with him the Roman Senate,—but the senators so placed would be apt to be less obedient than trained soldiers. They even accuse him of keeping them in Thessaly because he likes to lord it over such followers. But they were, nevertheless, all certain that C?sar was about to be destroyed; and, even in Pompey’s camp, they quarrel over the rewards of victory which they think that they will enjoy at Rome when their oligarchy97 shall have been re-established by Pompey’s arms.
Before the great day arrives Labienus again appears on the scene; and C?sar puts into his mouth a speech which he of course intends us to compare with the result of the coming battle. “Do not think, O Pompey, that this is the army which conquered Gaul and Germany,”—where Labienus himself was second in command under C?sar. “I was present at all those battles, and speak of a thing which I know. A very small part of that army remains98. Many have perished,—as a matter of course in so many battles. The autumn pestilence99 killed many in Italy. Many have gone home. Many have been left on the other shore. Have you not heard from our own friends who remained behind sick, that these cohorts of C?sar’s were made up at Brindisi?”—made up but the other day, Labienus implies. “This army, indeed, has been renewed from levies100 in the two Gauls; but all that it{165} had of strength perished in those two battles at Dyrrachium;”—in the contests, that is, within the lines of Petra. Upon this Labienus swears that he will not sleep under canvas again until he sleeps as victor over C?sar; and Pompey swears the same, and everybody swears. Then they all go away full of the coming victory. We daresay there was a great deal of false confidence; but as for the words which C?sar puts into the mouth of Labienus, we know well how much cause C?sar had to dislike Labienus, and we doubt whether they were ever spoken.
At length the battle-field is chosen,—near the town of Pharsalus, on the banks of the river Enipeus in Thessaly. The battle has acquired world-wide fame as that of Pharsalia, which we have been taught to regard as the name of the plain on which it was fought. Neither of these names occur in the Commentary, nor does that of the river; and the actual spot on which the great contest took place seems to be a matter of doubt even now. The ground is Turkish soil,—near to the mountains which separate modern Greece from Turkey, and is not well adapted for the researches of historical travellers. C?sar had been keeping his men on the march close to Pompey, till Pompey found that he could no longer abstain101 from fighting. Then came Labienus with his vaunts, and his oath,—and at length the day and the field were chosen. C?sar at any rate was ready. At this time C?sar was fifty-two years old, and Pompey was five years his elder.
C?sar tells us that Pompey had 110 cohorts, or eleven legions. Had the legions been full, Pompey’s army{166} would have contained 66,000 legionaries; but C?sar states their number at 45,000, or something over two-thirds of the full number. He does not forget to tell us once again that among these eleven were the two legions which he had given up in obedience102 to the demand of the Senate. Pompey himself, with these two very legions, placed himself on the left away from the river; and there also were all his auxiliaries103,—not counted with the legionaries,—slingers, archers, and cavalry. Scipio commanded in the centre with the legions he had brought out of Syria. So C?sar tells us. “We learn from other sources that Lentulus commanded Pompey’s right wing, lying on the river—and Domitius, whom we remember as trying to hold Marseilles against young Brutus and Trebonius, the left. C?sar had 80 cohorts, or eight legions, which should have numbered 48,000 men had his legions been full;—but, as he tells us, he led but 22,000 legionaries, so that his ranks were deficient104 by more than a half. As was his custom, he had his tenth legion to the right, away from the river. The ninth, terribly thinned by what had befallen it within the lines at Petra, joined to the eleventh, lay next the river, forming part of C?sar’s left wing. Antony commanded the left wing, Domitius Calvinus, whom C?sar sometimes calls by one name and sometimes by the other, the centre,—and Sulla the right. C?sar placed himself to the right, with his tenth legion, opposite to Pompey. As far as we can learn, there was but little in the nature of the ground to aid either of them;—and so the fight began.
There is not much complication, and perhaps no{167} great interest, in the account of the actual battle as it is given by C?sar. C?sar makes a speech to his army, which was, as we have already learned, and as he tells us now, the accustomed thing to do. No falser speech was ever made by man, if he spoke23 the words which he himself reports. He first of all reminds them how they themselves are witnesses that he has done his best to insure peace;—and then he calls to their memory certain mock treaties as to peace, in which, when seeking delay, he had pretended to engage himself and his enemy. He had never wasted, he told them, the blood of his soldiers, nor did he desire to deprive the Republic of either army—“alterutro exercitu”—of Pompey’s army or of his own. They were both Roman, and far be it from him to destroy aught belonging to the Republic. We must acknowledge that C?sar was always chary105 of Roman life and Roman blood. He would spare it when it could be spared; but he could spill it like water when the spilling of it was necessary to his end. He was very politic106; but as for tenderness,—neither he nor any Roman knew what it was.
Then there is a story of one Crastinus, who declares that whether dead or alive he will please C?sar. He throws the first weapon against the enemy and does please C?sar. But he has to please by his death, for he is killed in his effort.
Pompey orders that his first rank shall not leave its order to advance, but shall receive the shock of C?sar’s attack. C?sar points out to us that he is wrong in this, because the very excitement of a first attack gives increased energy and strength to the men. C?sar’s{168} legionaries are told to attack, and they rush over the space intervening between the first ranks to do so. But they are so well trained that they pause and catch their breath before they throw their weapons. Then they throw their piles and draw their swords, and the ranks of the two armies are close pitted against each other.
But Pompey had thought that he could win the battle, almost without calling on his legionaries for any exertion107, by the simple strategic movement of his numerous cavalry and auxiliaries. He outnumbered C?sar altogether, but in these arms he could overwhelm him with a cloud of horsemen and of archers. But C?sar also had known of these clouds. He fought now as always with a triple rank of legionaries,—but behind his third rank,—or rather somewhat to their right shoulder,—he had drawn108 up a choice body of men picked from his third line,—a fourth line as it were,—whose business it was to stand against Pompey’s clouds when the attempt should be made by these clouds upon their right flank. C?sar’s small body of cavalry did give way before the Pompeian clouds, and the horsemen and the archers and the slingers swept round upon C?sar’s flank. But they swept round upon destruction. C?sar gave the word to that fourth line of picked men. “Illi—they,” says C?sar, “ran forward with the greatest rapidity, and with their standards in advance attacked the cavalry of Pompey with such violence that none of them could stand their ground;—so that all not only were forced from the ground, but being at once driven in panic, they sought the shelter of the highest mountains near them. And{169} when they were thus removed, all the archers and the slingers, desolate109 and unarmed, without any one to take care of them, were killed in heaps.” Such is C?sar’s account of Pompey’s great attack of cavalry which was to win the battle without giving trouble to the legions.
C?sar acknowledges that Pompey’s legionaries drew their swords bravely and began their share of the fighting well. Then at once he tells us of the failure on the part of the cavalry and of the slaughter of the poor auxiliary110 slingers, and in the very next sentence gives us to understand that the battle was won. Though Pompey’s legions were so much more numerous than those of C?sar, we are told that C?sar’s third line attacked the Pompeian legionaries when they were “defessi”—worn out. The few cohorts of picked men who in such marvellous manner had dispersed111 Pompey’s clouds, following on their success, turned the flank of Pompey’s legions and carried the day. That it was all as C?sar says there can be little doubt. That he won the battle there can, we presume, be no doubt. Pompey at once flew to his camp and endeavoured to defend it. But such defence was impossible, and Pompey was driven to seek succour in flight. He found a horse and a few companions, and did not stop till he was on the sea-shore. Then he got on board a provision-vessel26, and was heard to complain that he had been betrayed by those very men from whose hands he had expected victory.
We are told with much picturesque112 effect how C?sar’s men, hungry, accustomed to endurance, patient in all their want, found Pompey’s camp prepared for{170} victory, and decked in luxurious113 preparation for the senatorial victors. Couches were strewn, and plate was put out, and tables prepared, and the tents of these happy ones were adorned114 with fresh ivy115. The senatorial happy ones have but a bad time of it, either perishing in their flight, or escaping into the desert solitudes116 of the mountains. C?sar follows up his conquest, and on the day after the battle compels the great body of the fugitives117 to surrender at discretion118. He surrounds them on the top of a hill and shuts them out from water, and they do surrender at discretion. With stretched-out hands, prone119 upon the earth, these late conquerors120, the cream of the Roman power, who had so lately sworn to conquer ere they slept, weeping beg for mercy. C?sar, having said a few words to them of his clemency122, gave them their lives. He recommends them to the care of his own men, and desires that they may neither be slaughtered nor robbed.
C?sar says he lost only 200 soldiers in that battle—and among them 30 officers, all brave men. That gallant Crastinus was among the 30. Of Pompey’s army 15,000 had been killed, and 24,000 had surrendered! 180 standards and 9 eagles were taken and brought to C?sar. The numbers seem to us to be almost incredible, whether we look at those given to us in regard to the conqueror121 or the conquered. C?sar’s account, however, of that day’s work has hitherto been taken as authoritative123, and it is too late now to question it. After this fashion was the battle of Pharsalia won, and the so-called Roman Republic brought to an end.
But C?sar by no means thought that his work was{171} done;—nor indeed was it nearly done. It was now clearly his first duty to pursue Pompey,—whom, should he escape, the outside provinces and distant allies of the Republic would soon supply with another army. “C?sar thought that Pompey was to be pursued to the neglecting of all other things.” In the mean time Pompey, who seems to have been panic-struck by his misfortune, fled with a few friends down the ?gean Sea, picked his young wife up at an island as he went, and made his way to Egypt. The story of his murder by those who had the young King of Egypt in their keeping is well known and need not detain us. C?sar tells it very shortly. Pompey sends to young Ptolemy for succour and assistance, trusting to past friendship between himself and the young king’s father. Ptolemy is in the hands of eunuchs, adventurers, and cut-throat soldiers, and has no voice of his own in the matter. But these ruffians think it well to have Pompey out of the way, and therefore they murder him. Achillas, a royal satrap, and Septimius, a Roman soldier, go out to Pompey’s vessel, as messengers from the king, and induce him to come down into their boat. Then, in the very sight of his wife, he is slaughtered, and his head is carried away as proof of the deed. Such was the end of Pompey, for whom no fortune had seemed to be too great, till C?sar came upon the scene. We are told by the Roman poet, Lucan, who took the battle of Pharsalia as his difficult theme, that C?sar could bear no superior, and Pompey no equal. The poet probably wished to make the latter the more magnanimous by the comparison. To us, as we examine the character of the two generals, C?sar seems{172} at least as jealous of power as his son-in-law, and certainly was the more successful of the two in extruding124 all others from a share in the power which he coveted125. Pompey in the triumvirate admitted his junior to more, as he must have felt it, than equal power: C?sar in the triumvirate simply made a stepping-stone of the great man who was his elder. Pompey at Thessaly was forced to divide at least the name of his power with Scipio, his last father-in-law: but C?sar never gave a shred126 of his mantle127 to be worn by another soldier.
In speaking, however, of the character of Pompey, and in comparing it with that of his greater rival, it may probably be said of him that in all his contests, both military and political, he was governed by a love of old Rome, and of the Republic as the greatest national institution which the world had ever known, and by a feeling which we call patriotism128, and of which C?sar was,—perhaps, we may say, too great to be capable. Pompey desired to lead, but to lead the beloved Republic. C?sar, caring nothing for the things of old, with no reverence129 for the past, utterly130 destitute of that tenderness for our former footsteps which makes so many of us cling with passionate131 fondness to convicted errors, desired to create out of the dust of the Republic,—which fate and his genius allowed him to recast as he would,—something which should be better and truer than the Republic.
The last seven chapters of the third book of this Commentary form a commencement of the record of the Alexandrine war,—which, beyond those seven chapters, C?sar himself did not write. That he{173} should have written any Commentary amidst the necessary toils132 of war, and the perhaps more pressing emergencies of his political condition, is one of the greatest marvels133 of human power. He tells us now, that having delayed but a few days in Asia, he followed Pompey first to Cyprus and then to Egypt, taking with him as his entire army three thousand two hundred men. “The rest, worn out with wounds, and battles, and toil, and the greatness of the journey, could not follow him.” But he directed that legions should be made up for him from the remnants of Pompey’s broken army, and, with a godlike trust in the obedience of absent vassals134, he went on to Egypt. He tells us that he was kept in Alexandria by Etesian winds. But we know also that Cleopatra came to him at Alexandria, requiring his services in her contest for the crown of Egypt; and knowing at what price she bought them, we doubt the persistent135 malignity136 of the Etesian winds, Had Cleopatra been a swarthy Nubian, as some have portrayed137 her, C?sar, we think, would have left Alexandria though the Etesian winds had blown in his very teeth. All winds filled C?sar’s sails. C?sar gets possession of Cleopatra’s brother Ptolemy, who, in accordance with their father’s will, was to have reigned138 in conjunction with his sister, and the Alexandrians rise against him in great force. He slays139 Photinus, the servant of King Ptolemy, has his own ambassador slain140, and burns the royal fleet of Egypt,—burning with it, unfortunately, the greater part of the royal library. “These things were the beginning of the Alexandrine war.” These are the last words of C?sar’s last Commentary.
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1
consul
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| n.领事；执政官 | |
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consuls
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| 领事( consul的名词复数 )； （古罗马共和国时期）执政官 （古罗马共和国及其军队的最高首长，同时共有两位，每年选举一次） | |
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magistrate
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| n.地方行政官，地方法官，治安官 | |
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lessen
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| vt.减少，减轻；缩小 | |
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warfare
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| n.战争(状态)；斗争；冲突 | |
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assent
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| v.批准，认可；n.批准，认可 | |
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archers
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| n.弓箭手，射箭运动员( archer的名词复数 ) | |
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cavalry
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| n.骑兵；轻装甲部队 | |
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triumphant
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| adj.胜利的，成功的；狂欢的，喜悦的 | |
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swarms
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| 蜂群，一大群( swarm的名词复数 ) | |
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scatter
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| vt.撒，驱散，散开；散布/播；vi.分散，消散 | |
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vim
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| n.精力，活力 | |
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literally
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| adv.照字面意义，逐字地；确实 | |
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joint
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| adj.联合的，共同的；n.关节，接合处；v.连接，贴合 | |
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harassed
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| adj. 疲倦的，厌烦的 动词harass的过去式和过去分词 | |
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consulship
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| 领事的职位或任期 | |
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vengeance
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| n.报复，报仇，复仇 | |
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impudence
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| n.厚颜无耻；冒失；无礼 | |
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19
entirely
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| ad.全部地，完整地；完全地，彻底地 | |
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generosity
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| n.大度，慷慨，慷慨的行为 | |
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pal
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| n.朋友，伙伴，同志；vi.结为友 | |
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considerably
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| adv.极大地；相当大地；在很大程度上 | |
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spoke
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| n.（车轮的）辐条；轮辐；破坏某人的计划；阻挠某人的行动 v.讲，谈（speak的过去式）；说；演说；从某种观点来说 | |
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deter
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| vt.阻止，使不敢，吓住 | |
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vessels
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| n.血管( vessel的名词复数 )；船；容器；（具有特殊品质或接受特殊品质的）人 | |
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vessel
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| n.船舶；容器，器皿；管，导管，血管 | |
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wrath
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| n.愤怒，愤慨，暴怒 | |
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circumspection
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| n.细心，慎重 | |
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incapable
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| adj.无能力的，不能做某事的 | |
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laden
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| adj.装满了的；充满了的；负了重担的；苦恼的 | |
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dependants
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| 受赡养者，受扶养的家属( dependant的名词复数 ) | |
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followers
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| 追随者( follower的名词复数 )； 用户； 契据的附面； 从动件 | |
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slaughter
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| n.屠杀，屠宰；vt.屠杀，宰杀 | |
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slaughters
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| v.屠杀，杀戮，屠宰( slaughter的第三人称单数 ) | |
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northward
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| adv.向北；n.北方的地区 | |
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specially
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| adv.特定地；特殊地；明确地 | |
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deserted
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| adj.荒芜的，荒废的，无人的，被遗弃的 | |
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colloquies
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| n.谈话，对话( colloquy的名词复数 ) | |
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ashore
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| adv.在(向)岸上，上岸 | |
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lieutenant
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| n.陆军中尉，海军上尉；代理官员，副职官员 | |
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lieutenants
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| n.陆军中尉( lieutenant的名词复数 )；副职官员；空军；仅低于…官阶的官员 | |
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42
judgment
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| n.审判；判断力，识别力，看法，意见 | |
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43
dominant
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| adj.支配的，统治的；占优势的；显性的；n.主因，要素，主要的人(或物)；显性基因 | |
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44
conspired
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| 密谋( conspire的过去式和过去分词 )； 搞阴谋； （事件等）巧合； 共同导致 | |
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45
esteem
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| n.尊敬，尊重；vt.尊重，敬重；把…看作 | |
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46
unravel
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| v.弄清楚（秘密）；拆开，解开，松开 | |
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47
purport
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| n.意义，要旨，大要；v.意味著，做为...要旨，要领是... | |
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48
narrative
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| n.叙述，故事；adj.叙事的，故事体的 | |
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49
promontory
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| n.海角；岬 | |
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50
fortifying
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| 筑防御工事于( fortify的现在分词 )； 筑堡于； 增强； 强化（食品） | |
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51
turret
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| n.塔楼，角塔 | |
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turrets
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| （六角）转台( turret的名词复数 )； （战舰和坦克等上的）转动炮塔； （摄影机等上的）镜头转台； （旧时攻城用的）塔车 | |
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53
amassed
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| v.积累，积聚( amass的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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54
destitute
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| adj.缺乏的；穷困的 | |
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impoverished
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| adj.穷困的，无力的，用尽了的v.使（某人）贫穷( impoverish的过去式和过去分词 )；使（某物）贫瘠或恶化 | |
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56
imprisoned
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| 下狱，监禁( imprison的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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determined
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| adj.坚定的；有决心的 | |
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58
erecting
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| v.使直立，竖起( erect的现在分词 )；建立 | |
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erect
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| n./v.树立，建立，使竖立；adj.直立的，垂直的 | |
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60
forage
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| n.(牛马的)饲料，粮草；v.搜寻，翻寻 | |
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61
lessened
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| 减少的，减弱的 | |
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62
besiege
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| vt.包围，围攻，拥在...周围 | |
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besieged
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| 包围，围困，围攻( besiege的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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64
worthy
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| adj.(of)值得的，配得上的；有价值的 | |
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foe
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| n.敌人，仇敌 | |
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bide
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| v.忍耐；等候；住 | |
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credible
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| adj.可信任的，可靠的 | |
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emancipation
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| n.（从束缚、支配下）解放 | |
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postponed
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| vt.& vi.延期，缓办，（使）延迟vt.把…放在次要地位；[语]把…放在后面（或句尾）vi.（疟疾等）延缓发作（或复发） | |
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sweepings
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| n.笼统的( sweeping的名词复数 )；（在投票等中的）大胜；影响广泛的；包罗万象的 | |
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extricate
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| v.拯救，救出；解脱 | |
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entangled
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| adj.卷入的；陷入的；被缠住的；缠在一起的v.使某人（某物/自己）缠绕，纠缠于（某物中），使某人（自己）陷入（困难或复杂的环境中）( entangle的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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perverted
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| adj.不正当的v.滥用( pervert的过去式和过去分词 )；腐蚀；败坏；使堕落 | |
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74
trickle
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| vi.淌，滴，流出，慢慢移动，逐渐消散 | |
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75
overflown
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| v.溢出，淹没( overflow的过去分词 )；充满；挤满了人；扩展出界，过度延伸 | |
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76
palatable
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| adj.可口的，美味的；惬意的 | |
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77
trenches
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| 深沟，地沟( trench的名词复数 )； 战壕 | |
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centurion
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| n.古罗马的百人队长 | |
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gallant
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| adj.英勇的，豪侠的；(向女人)献殷勤的 | |
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perfidious
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| adj.不忠的，背信弃义的 | |
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81
mischief
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| n.损害，伤害，危害；恶作剧，捣蛋，胡闹 | |
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82
rout
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| n.溃退，溃败；v.击溃，打垮 | |
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83
slaughtered
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| v.屠杀，杀戮，屠宰( slaughter的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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84
alas
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| int.唉(表示悲伤、忧愁、恐惧等) | |
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85
unevenness
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| n. 不平坦，不平衡，不匀性 | |
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86
defiles
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| v.玷污( defile的第三人称单数 )；污染；弄脏；纵列行进 | |
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87
superstition
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| n.迷信，迷信行为 | |
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88
forth
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| adv.向前；向外，往外 | |
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89
solely
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| adv.仅仅，唯一地 | |
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90
touching
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| adj.动人的，使人感伤的 | |
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91
toil
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| vi.辛劳工作，艰难地行动；n.苦工，难事 | |
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92
uxorious
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| adj.宠爱妻子的 | |
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93
eastward
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| adv.向东；adj.向东的；n.东方，东部 | |
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94
interfere
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| v.(in)干涉，干预；(with)妨碍，打扰 | |
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95
metropolis
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| n.首府；大城市 | |
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96
constraint
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| n.(on)约束，限制；限制(或约束)性的事物 | |
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97
oligarchy
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| n.寡头政治 | |
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98
remains
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| n.剩余物，残留物；遗体，遗迹 | |
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99
pestilence
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| n.瘟疫 | |
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100
levies
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| （部队）征兵( levy的名词复数 )； 募捐； 被征募的军队 | |
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101
abstain
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| v.自制，戒绝，弃权，避免 | |
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102
obedience
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| n.服从，顺从 | |
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103
auxiliaries
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| n.助动词 ( auxiliary的名词复数 )；辅助工，辅助人员 | |
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104
deficient
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| adj.不足的，不充份的，有缺陷的 | |
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105
chary
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| adj.谨慎的，细心的 | |
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106
politic
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| adj.有智虑的；精明的；v.从政 | |
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107
exertion
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| n.尽力，努力 | |
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108
drawn
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| v.拖，拉，拔出；adj.憔悴的，紧张的 | |
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desolate
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| adj.荒凉的，荒芜的；孤独的，凄凉的；v.使荒芜，使孤寂 | |
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110
auxiliary
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| adj.辅助的，备用的 | |
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111
dispersed
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| adj. 被驱散的, 被分散的, 散布的 | |
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112
picturesque
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| adj.美丽如画的，（语言）生动的，绘声绘色的 | |
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113
luxurious
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| adj.精美而昂贵的；豪华的 | |
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114
adorned
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| [计]被修饰的 | |
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115
ivy
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| n.常青藤，常春藤 | |
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116
solitudes
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| n.独居( solitude的名词复数 )；孤独；荒僻的地方；人迹罕至的地方 | |
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117
fugitives
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| n.亡命者，逃命者( fugitive的名词复数 ) | |
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118
discretion
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| n.谨慎；随意处理 | |
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119
prone
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| adj.(to)易于…的，很可能…的；俯卧的 | |
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120
conquerors
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| 征服者，占领者( conqueror的名词复数 ) | |
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121
conqueror
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| n.征服者，胜利者 | |
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122
clemency
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| n.温和，仁慈，宽厚 | |
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123
authoritative
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| adj.有权威的，可相信的；命令式的；官方的 | |
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124
extruding
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| v.挤压出( extrude的现在分词 )；挤压成；突出；伸出 | |
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125
coveted
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| adj.令人垂涎的；垂涎的，梦寐以求的v.贪求，觊觎(covet的过去分词)；垂涎；贪图 | |
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126
shred
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| v.撕成碎片，变成碎片；n.碎布条，细片，些少 | |
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127
mantle
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| n.斗篷，覆罩之物，罩子；v.罩住，覆盖，脸红 | |
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128
patriotism
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| n.爱国精神，爱国心，爱国主义 | |
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129
reverence
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| n.敬畏，尊敬，尊严；Reverence:对某些基督教神职人员的尊称；v.尊敬，敬畏，崇敬 | |
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130
utterly
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| adv.完全地，绝对地 | |
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131
passionate
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| adj.热情的，热烈的，激昂的，易动情的，易怒的，性情暴躁的 | |
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132
toils
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| 网 | |
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133
marvels
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| n.奇迹( marvel的名词复数 )；令人惊奇的事物（或事例）；不平凡的成果；成就v.惊奇，对…感到惊奇( marvel的第三人称单数 ) | |
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134
vassals
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| n.奴仆( vassal的名词复数 )；（封建时代）诸侯；从属者；下属 | |
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135
persistent
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| adj.坚持不懈的，执意的；持续的 | |
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136
malignity
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| n.极度的恶意，恶毒；（病的）恶性 | |
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137
portrayed
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| v.画像( portray的过去式和过去分词 )；描述；描绘；描画 | |
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138
reigned
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| vi.当政，统治（reign的过去式形式） | |
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139
slays
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| 杀死，宰杀，杀戮( slay的第三人称单数 ) | |
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140
slain
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| 杀死，宰杀，杀戮( slay的过去分词 )； (slay的过去分词) | |
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