This conclusion is thoroughly11 justified12, but not altogether in the way that one is inclined to assume. For one reason, the cavalry is now supplied with an excellent firearm, which its mobility13 enables it to employ against the most sensitive parts of an enemy's line of battle. For another, the composition of modern armies offers, as I have frequently said, many new possibilities of success. Newly raised levies14, such as[Pg 26] will often have to take their place in the great armies of the day, cannot possess the same steadiness as standing15 permanent troops. They are, according to experience, very sensitive to moral impressions, and will often enough, when shaken in battle, offer a tempting16 and suitable object of attack to the cavalry. At the same time, the fact remains17 that, by reason of its relative numerical weakness, cavalry can no longer retain its former importance in the battle, and that the manner of its intervention18 in the fight must often be of a very different nature from what it has been in the past.
On the other hand, the duty of cavalry in the sphere of reconnaissance has increased in importance. For all strategical movements the main body of the modern army demands considerably more time and, generally also, comprehensive preparatory measures. If, therefore, intelligence as to the disposition19 of the enemy is to be of use in operations, it follows that it must be procured20 at the earliest possible moment. Whoever gets the earliest and best information possesses nowadays a far greater advantage than formerly21, when, with the small armies of the day, movements and combinations of force could often be successfully carried out in the immediate23 presence of the enemy's army. These are indeed still possible in occasional cases and where sufficient depth of formation is maintained, and it is this circumstance that has made early and full intelligence, combined with successful screening of one's own movements, one of the most important factors of success.
There are people who, in fancy, already see cavalry replaced in this r?le by an air fleet. Such prophets cannot, however, be treated seriously. The air cruisers will not be designed for all the possibilities of war. In[Pg 27] the period of concentration and in fortress24 warfare25 they would doubtless be able, even in their present condition, to render excellent service. Whether they can be adapted for use in a war of movement remains to be seen; but, even if they can in time be of more service for war than at present appears to be the case, their capabilities26 in this direction will always be limited. They can only observe at night under favourable27 conditions—such things, for example, as large detrainments of troops or bivouacs with fires burning. They are under all circumstances dependent upon the weather. By day the air fleet of the enemy will seek battle with them in order to hinder their reconnaissance. Hostile artillery will be particularly dangerous to them, and will be able, thanks to the developments in modern ordnance28, to wage successful war against them. All detachments cannot possibly be supplied with airships, owing to the great cost and enormous apparatus29 entailed30, and their usefulness will therefore only be realised with the larger formations. Finally, one or the other of the air fleets will be driven from the field, or rather from the air, and that side which meets with defeat will be deprived of all means of reconnoitring unless it can rely on its cavalry. So in the most modern war the cavalry remains the principal means of reconnaissance. Its activity may indeed be supplemented by airships, but will never be replaced by them.[Pg 28][1]
These circumstances, however, necessitate31 a new r?le for cavalry. It must drive the hostile cavalry from the field, a cavalry which will do all in its power to secure its own army against intrusion. It will find this cavalry reinforced not only by horse artillery and machine-guns, but also by cyclist battalions32, mounted and other infantry, and will therefore have to be prepared, in order to properly carry out its service of exploration, to fight against detachments of all arms. But the same thing will also happen when it seeks to veil the movements of its own army, or to undertake some enterprise against the enemy's communications, or to defend its own against similar hostile raids. Our cavalry thus finds itself face to face with totally new duties of a most real kind, towards the carrying out of which it has no previous experience to help it.
In the wars of Frederick the Great and of Napoleon, as well as in the German war of Unification, there is a total absence of analogy from which to draw conclusions that can be practically applied33. The wars in South Africa and Manchuria, on the other hand, reveal conditions which have very little in common with those of a European war such as the German cavalry will have to fight. Nowhere can the few experiences of cavalry action gained in these wars be immediately applied, and there are but few bases[Pg 29] for the formation of judgment34 as to what is practical and possible under modern conditions. The same may be said to hold good of the Russo-Turkish war. The most interesting and instructive campaigns for the service of modern cavalry appear to be those of the American War of Secession, which are, however, almost unknown in Germany, where there is a lack of opportunities to study them.[2]
There is, therefore, for our cavalry a want of any sort of tradition for that r?le which it will be expected to carry out in the next war, and this want will be the more felt as it will in the future be expected to deal with a number of technical methods of communication which are, as a whole, still almost unknown, and as to the actual war value of which no judgment can yet be formed. Up to now, also, cavalry training as carried out since the war of 1870-71 has been unable to create a sound foundation for preparation for war. Left far behind in the march of military progress, in tactics as well as reconnaissance, it has been led so far from the right way that it would have been unable to stand the test of serious war. Nor have we yet fully22 extricated35 ourselves from these trammels of the past.
For the moment, therefore, our cavalry finds itself in a state of transition. The demands which modern war will make upon it have not yet penetrated36 into its flesh and blood, that is to say, their extent and range have not yet been clearly grasped by the arm, nor have we yet by any means succeeded in breaking loose from the fetters37 of the past. Views based on antiquated[Pg 30] assumptions are often apt to survive and to influence training as well as leading.
This is particularly the case as regards reconnaissance. In tactics, too, the cut-and-dried methods of bygone days are clearly not yet forgotten, while for enterprises against the enemy's communications there is a want both of practical training and theoretical instruction.
This state of affairs must be regarded as a great evil, as at the outbreak of a war there will no longer be time to collect experiences. From the very first day onward38 the greatest demands will be made upon the cavalry, not only as regards intentions, but performances. On the achievements of the cavalry in the early days of the war will depend to a considerable extent the success of the first great decisive encounter.
We must therefore be prepared to meet these great demands when war breaks out. Only a clear recognition of the necessities and the possibilities of man?uvre and training can secure us this preparation. There remains, then, nothing for us—with no practical war experience to go on—but to create the groundwork of our methods of training from theoretical and speculative39 reflection. With all the means of intellect and foresight40, we must endeavour to discern the probable course of the war of the future and regulate the methods of training accordingly.
Peace exercises based upon such clearly defined principles must serve as a further guide to what is possible and practical. They cannot, it is true, afford realistic results, as they lack the effect of weapons, the hostile country, the thousand causes of friction41, and the moral factors of serious war. They can, however, be regarded as practical guides in many direc[Pg 31]tions and will help us to evolve methods unattainable by pure theory: for instance, in increasing the capabilities of the troops, improving the practical arrangements for communication, the transmission service, the patrol system, and the like. Only these peace experiences must not be overrated, but subjected to continual criticism by the light of what would be practical in war.
It thus remains our chief duty to get a clear and just idea of the r?le that cavalry will play in a future war, in order to clear the mind fully on this point, and so be able further to build upon the foundations of sound reasoning.
The new Cavalry Drill Regulations,[3] in which I had the honour and pleasure of collaborating42, have undertaken the creation of these fundamental principles of the independent r?le of cavalry. Their teachings, however, have as yet by no means penetrated into the ranks. The new Drill Regulations have endeavoured to give new rules for the tactical employment of cavalry, which have not yet sufficiently43 established their value, even on the man?uvre-ground. As yet the troops are only endeavouring to get accustomed to them.
It is also obvious that practical drill instructions, at least for tactics, can only give general principles, and cannot be too definite, lest they should thereby44 tend to limit the independence of leaders in the thousand varied45 happenings of war.
It is quite another matter for him who is not called on to make regulations, but whose task is rather to[Pg 32] clear the understanding, to stimulate46 independent thought, and to encourage the troops themselves to form correct judgments47. Thus will be moulded the efficiency which will enable the soldier to act in the presence of the enemy according to the Regulations, with full freedom of thought, not after the letter, but the spirit, and even perhaps, in many cases, the intention of them.
From this point of view I have set forth my views and reflections. It seems to me, above all things, important to discuss those points which will be new to cavalry in a future war, and in so doing to touch on many matters of training which long years of experience have convinced me are practical. May I by these hints contribute towards the formation of fresh traditions for the training of the arm that will march with modern conditions, that will break away for good from all half-measures and obsolete48 views, and thereby clear the way towards a proper conduct of the cavalry in war, and to the winning of fresh and imperishable laurels49!
Where I have occasion to touch on views formerly expressed and set forth in my various writings, I find no reason to retract50 any of them. In certain directions they have naturally developed further, and have become more progressive under the impress of the whole of modern development and the latest experiences of war. On the whole, however, I adhere to my opinions, and only seek to supplement and develop them in order to suit them still better to the practical needs of the arm. I hope they may act as a stimulus51 and serve as a guide to many a comrade in difficulties.
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1
wrought
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| v.引起；以…原料制作；运转；adj.制造的 | |
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transformation
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| n.变化；改造；转变 | |
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forth
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| adv.向前；向外，往外 | |
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infantry
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| n.[总称]步兵(部队) | |
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sparser
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| adj.稀疏的，稀少的( sparse的比较级 ) | |
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artillery
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| n.(军)火炮，大炮；炮兵(部队) | |
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cavalry
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| n.骑兵；轻装甲部队 | |
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conspicuous
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| adj.明眼的，惹人注目的；炫耀的，摆阔气的 | |
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concealed
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| a.隐藏的，隐蔽的 | |
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considerably
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| adv.极大地；相当大地；在很大程度上 | |
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thoroughly
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| adv.完全地，彻底地，十足地 | |
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justified
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| a.正当的，有理的 | |
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mobility
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| n.可动性，变动性，情感不定 | |
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levies
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| （部队）征兵( levy的名词复数 )； 募捐； 被征募的军队 | |
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standing
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| n.持续，地位；adj.永久的，不动的，直立的，不流动的 | |
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tempting
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| a.诱人的, 吸引人的 | |
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remains
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| n.剩余物，残留物；遗体，遗迹 | |
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intervention
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| n.介入，干涉，干预 | |
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disposition
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| n.性情，性格；意向，倾向；排列，部署 | |
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procured
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| v.（努力）取得， （设法）获得( procure的过去式和过去分词 )；拉皮条 | |
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formerly
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| adv.从前，以前 | |
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fully
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| adv.完全地，全部地，彻底地；充分地 | |
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immediate
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| adj.立即的；直接的，最接近的；紧靠的 | |
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fortress
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| n.堡垒，防御工事 | |
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warfare
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| n.战争(状态)；斗争；冲突 | |
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capabilities
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| n.能力( capability的名词复数 )；可能；容量；[复数]潜在能力 | |
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favourable
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| adj.赞成的，称赞的，有利的，良好的，顺利的 | |
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ordnance
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| n.大炮，军械 | |
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apparatus
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| n.装置，器械；器具，设备 | |
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entailed
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| 使…成为必要( entail的过去式和过去分词 )； 需要； 限定继承； 使必需 | |
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necessitate
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| v.使成为必要，需要 | |
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battalions
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| n.（陆军的）一营（大约有一千兵士）( battalion的名词复数 )；协同作战的部队；军队；（组织在一起工作的）队伍 | |
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applied
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| adj.应用的；v.应用，适用 | |
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judgment
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| n.审判；判断力，识别力，看法，意见 | |
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extricated
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| v.使摆脱困难，脱身( extricate的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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penetrated
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| adj. 击穿的，鞭辟入里的 动词penetrate的过去式和过去分词形式 | |
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fetters
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| n.脚镣( fetter的名词复数 )；束缚v.给…上脚镣，束缚( fetter的第三人称单数 ) | |
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onward
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| adj.向前的，前进的；adv.向前，前进，在先 | |
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speculative
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| adj.思索性的，暝想性的，推理的 | |
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foresight
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| n.先见之明，深谋远虑 | |
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friction
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| n.摩擦，摩擦力 | |
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42
collaborating
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| 合作( collaborate的现在分词 )； 勾结叛国 | |
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sufficiently
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| adv.足够地，充分地 | |
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thereby
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| adv.因此，从而 | |
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varied
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| adj.多样的，多变化的 | |
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stimulate
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| vt.刺激，使兴奋；激励，使…振奋 | |
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judgments
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| 判断( judgment的名词复数 )； 鉴定； 评价； 审判 | |
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48
obsolete
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| adj.已废弃的，过时的 | |
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49
laurels
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| n.桂冠，荣誉 | |
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50
retract
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| vt.缩回，撤回收回，取消 | |
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51
stimulus
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| n.刺激，刺激物，促进因素，引起兴奋的事物 | |
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