It has been proposed, even for the cavalry, to di[Pg 105]vide tactical principles according to the idea of the prearranged battle and the battle of encounter. I do not, however, think that this grouping will meet the case. In a great battle the fighting is always of a prearranged nature; in the fight of the independent cavalry it is possible to distinguish between an encounter and an arranged affair. On the other hand, the conditions of prearranged action in a battle and in an independent conflict of the cavalry are quite different, and cannot be examined from a single point of view.
The grouping, then, proposed by me is still that which best corresponds to the actual circumstances. In this grouping, in the first case, the cavalry appears as the chief arm, whose spirit and character set the tone of the whole nature of the fight; in the second, it is merely an auxiliary5, and must conform to the law of the other arms in great matters and small.
But the fight is deeply influenced, even in the first case, by the co-operation of these other arms, and I believe that only in exceptional cases will a purely6 cavalry combat take place, at all events on a large scale. Where squadrons, regiments7, and perhaps even brigades unassisted by the other arms, come into collision with each other, the charge may still often suffice for a decision. But where it is an affair of larger masses it will never be possible to dispense8 with the co-operation of firearms, and in most cases a combination of cavalry combat, of dismounted fighting and artillery9 action, will ensue.
We must not conceal10 from ourselves the fact that in a future war it will by no means be always a matter of choice whether we will fight mounted or dismounted. Rather, by himself, seizing the rifle, will the opponent be able to compel us to adopt dismounted action. On[Pg 106] our man?uvre-grounds the charge on horseback is always the order of the day, even against artillery or machine-guns. The umpires continually allow such attacks to succeed, and the troops ride on as if nothing had happened. Equally fearless of consequences do they expose themselves to rifle-fire. But there are no bullets.
In real war it is different. Even then many a charge will naturally be successful, but victory will mean such sacrifices that the troops will often become too weak to carry out their further tactical and strategical duties. Such losses will not be incurred11 without necessity, and troops will give way, where possible, or themselves adopt dismounted action. The last will often indeed be necessary, as space and time will frequently be wanting for a turning movement, and even if such a movement were undertaken it would often lead to a fresh obligation to fight on foot in another place. This was repeatedly proved by the events of the campaign of 1870-71. Again and again was it necessary to detail infantry12 to the cavalry divisions in order to brush aside by offensive action resistance that hindered the advance of the cavalry, and which could not be broken down even by the horse artillery which accompanied it.
That the English in the South African war were finally repeatedly successful in forcing the mounted Boers back by turning movements without actual attacks proves nothing for European conditions. The explanation lies in the clumsiness of the Boers, who were hampered13 for rapid movement by their wagons14 and possessed15 no offensive strength of any kind, at least during the decisive portion of the campaign. Otherwise they could easily have anticipated the efforts of the English at a turning movement by the[Pg 107] shortest line, or would have been able by taking the offensive to punish the dispersion that the turning movement entailed16. We must not fall into any misconception of the fact that turning movements always contain an element of danger and can often bring about very unfavourable situations. They lay bare our own communications or lead to dangerous dispersion of force. It is necessary too, not only to see behind the enemy, but also to defeat him, in order to gain a free hand for reconnaissance. To this end we will have to attack, and often on foot, as we may be quite sure that our possible opponent will use the rifle.
Circumstances have distinctly altered since 1870-71. If we had at that time no real cavalry opponent to face, we may yet be certain next time of having to deal with a numerous and determined17 cavalry who will quite conceivably endeavour to meet us in shock action with the arme blanche. There will always be dashing soldierly natures everywhere who will make a bid for success by risking all. Whether the hostile cavalry, once beaten, will return to the attack, is more than doubtful. I do not think so.
It lies deeply embedded18 in human nature that he who feels himself the weaker will act on the defensive19. Both opponents will often endeavour to exploit the advantages of the defensive. It frequently happens during man?uvres that the cavalry endeavours to seize some commanding position, and so force the enemy to attack it under the fire of artillery posted there. The other side, however, may make corresponding endeavours. An indecisive artillery duel20 is the usual result of such efforts. But if such action is frequent in peace, how much more frequent will it be under the pressure of responsibility which war brings[Pg 108] with it, especially where one side is tactically the weaker?
It requires an enormous moral strength, personal influence over troops, and firmness of character to be able to maintain the offensive spirit, even after an unfavourable conflict, and continually to invoke21 the ultimate decision anew. In general, it may be relied upon that defence will be carried out according to tactical defensive principles, and that with the firearm. There can be no doubt upon that point to those who have studied human nature by the light of military history.
Our probable opponents, too, will certainly often advance dismounted. At all events they are endeavouring to strengthen cavalry divisions by cyclist battalions22 and infantry, and perhaps by mounted infantry, and thereby23 already show a remarkable24 inclination25 to conduct the fight, even of cavalry, with the firearm, and only to use their horses as a means of mobility26, as was the custom of the Boers in Africa.
The r?le of cavalry in the fight will then apparently27 consist of a combination of the various methods of fighting. In explanation of this view I would cite a well-known example.
The task of the German army cavalry in the battle of Mars la Tour was to relieve the left flank of the German army by a determined attack against the right of the French, and thus to bring the apprehended28 advance of the enemy to a standstill. It did not accomplish this task, but was satisfied with trying conclusions with the French cavalry; but did not either win a decisive victory over the latter nor reap the necessary tactical benefit from the action. It certainly maintained its superiority over the enemy, but it made no attempt to interfere29 decisively in the[Pg 109] course of the battle itself. This honour was left to the 1st Dragoons of the Guard.
But if we assume for a moment that this cavalry, after driving the French from the field, had made an attempt to operate further against the right flank of the French army, Cissey's Division, how would matters have stood?
The French infantry had occupied the Gréyère Farm as a support to their right flank. The Chasseurs d'Afrique, on the other hand, who initiated30 the cavalry fight, retired31 after they had been beaten by the 13th Dragoons in a northerly direction, and occupied with dismounted fire the southern edge of a small wood near Ville sur Yron, which the French call Bois de la Grange and the German official history Bois de Gréyère. It is bordered on the south by the plateau of Ville sur Yron. The dismounted Chasseurs here formed an échelon behind the right flank of the French infantry.
How should the German cavalry have acted under such circumstances in order to gain contact with the right flank of the French infantry so protected? The strongly occupied Gréyère Farm commanded the crossing of the Fond de la Cuve, which stretches in a northerly direction from Mars la Tour towards Chateau32 Moncel, while to the north the wood occupied by the Chasseurs limited freedom of movement. What else remained but a determined attack of both objectives and their capture, and that on foot? Artillery alone would not have sufficed against the Gréyère Farm, for this point would have had to be strongly occupied with riflemen, and nowadays also with machine guns, before the crossing of the Fond de la Cuve which the farm commanded, and which[Pg 110] divided our cavalry from the French infantry, could be accomplished33.
We can thus see that even in the action of cavalry in battle the combination of the several methods of fighting can scarcely, if ever, be avoided. In flank and rear, also, the opponent will endeavour to secure himself by occupying points of support as soon as he becomes aware of our intention to operate in these directions. Our cavalry must thus be continually prepared to pave the way by dismounted action for the mounted combat.
Our new Regulations mention quite incidentally (390)[12] that cavalry will often have to combine mounted and dismounted action, that "on occasions" also, in combination with shock action, dismounted cavalry must be ready to hold supporting points to cover deployment34 or to co-operate in the engagement (438).[13]
I do not think that this passing mention of the importance of combination of the two methods of fighting of the cavalry sufficiently35 emphasises the matter. After due reflection over all the circumstances appertaining to the question, I am, on the other hand, firmly convinced that the mutual36 relationship between the[Pg 111] fight on foot and on horseback will give the modern cavalry combat its peculiar37 character. This relationship will always have to be reckoned with, and all tactical considerations must be guided by it.
In my opinion all the principles of cavalry tactics should spring from this co-operation of the several methods of fighting and not from its attitude towards the various arms considered separately. The modern battle suffers no division of the action of one arm, or of one manner of fighting from another. As every kind of country has to be utilised for the fight, so also must the most varied38 kind of action of the arms be taken into account. It must, of course, be clearly established how these can best be applied39 against the various adversaries—cavalry, artillery, or infantry. Such reflections, however, can refer only to tactical formations. On the other hand, as soon as it becomes a question of tactical leading, such combination of all arms must, from the first, be taken into account as war may demand.
Military history affords us vivid examples of such co-operation of the arms in a cavalry fight, not, indeed, in a European theatre of war, but in the Civil War in America. They are woven, above all, round the heroic figure of General "Jeb" Stuart, and if weapons and other circumstances of the time and place were different from those obtaining in Europe to-day, the principle of action has still remained the same.
"Soon after the outbreak of the war Stuart distinguished40 himself as a cavalry leader, and his strategical work in blindfolding41 the enemy and in enlightening his own army has never been surpassed. As a cavalry tactician42 he is not only the first, but hitherto the only, leader of the arm who understood how to combine the effects of fire and shock, how to[Pg 112] render effective service in fighting on foot without losing the power to strike on horseback when opportunity offered."[14]
We must, I think, be resolute45 in freeing ourselves from all old-fashioned conceptions of those knightly46 cavalry combats which have in reality become obsolete47 owing to the necessities of modern war. We do not in this need to break with our ancient and honoured traditions, for the spirit of tradition consists not in the retention48 of antiquated49 forms, but in acting in that spirit which in the past led to such glorious success. But this spirit points to the road of progress and bids us not allow ourselves to be urged by events, but, hurrying before them, to gain a start in development and therewith a decisive advantage over our enemies. To maintain in the troops, under modern conditions, the spirit of discipline and independence, and of the greatest effort and self-sacrifice, that is the old Prussian tradition, and not the adherence50 to dead forms, which in our history has been bloodily51 enough avenged52.
This principle has been embraced in all the other spheres of military development; it is only the cavalry that has remained behind the times.
In order to be able to deal with the functions of the mounted arm in accordance with the old Prussian principles, we must try to get a clear and unprejudiced conception of the spirit of the modern cavalry combat. We must look forward and pierce the veil of the future uninfluenced by the ghosts of the past. The probable events and conditions of the modern battle must be our guiding star, and when we have realised how the spirit of cavalry may be adapted to them, how[Pg 113] the results of modern technical improvements in arms influence and strengthen the action of the cavalry masses, then alone can we lay down principles for the conduct and tactics of cavalry in the fight.
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1
cavalry
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| n.骑兵；轻装甲部队 | |
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acting
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| n.演戏，行为，假装；adj.代理的，临时的，演出用的 | |
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detailed
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| adj.详细的，详尽的，极注意细节的，完全的 | |
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intervention
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| n.介入，干涉，干预 | |
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auxiliary
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| adj.辅助的，备用的 | |
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purely
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| adv.纯粹地，完全地 | |
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regiments
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| （军队的）团( regiment的名词复数 )； 大量的人或物 | |
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dispense
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| vt.分配，分发；配(药)，发(药)；实施 | |
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artillery
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| n.(军)火炮，大炮；炮兵(部队) | |
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conceal
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| v.隐藏，隐瞒，隐蔽 | |
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incurred
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| [医]招致的，遭受的； incur的过去式 | |
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infantry
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| n.[总称]步兵(部队) | |
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hampered
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| 妨碍，束缚，限制( hamper的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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wagons
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| n.四轮的运货马车( wagon的名词复数 )；铁路货车；小手推车 | |
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possessed
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| adj.疯狂的；拥有的，占有的 | |
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entailed
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| 使…成为必要( entail的过去式和过去分词 )； 需要； 限定继承； 使必需 | |
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determined
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| adj.坚定的；有决心的 | |
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embedded
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| a.扎牢的 | |
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defensive
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| adj.防御的；防卫的；防守的 | |
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20
duel
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| n./v.决斗；(双方的)斗争 | |
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invoke
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| v.求助于(神、法律)；恳求，乞求 | |
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battalions
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| n.（陆军的）一营（大约有一千兵士）( battalion的名词复数 )；协同作战的部队；军队；（组织在一起工作的）队伍 | |
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thereby
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| adv.因此，从而 | |
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remarkable
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| adj.显著的，异常的，非凡的，值得注意的 | |
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inclination
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| n.倾斜；点头；弯腰；斜坡；倾度；倾向；爱好 | |
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mobility
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| n.可动性，变动性，情感不定 | |
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apparently
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| adv.显然地；表面上，似乎 | |
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apprehended
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| 逮捕，拘押( apprehend的过去式和过去分词 )； 理解 | |
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interfere
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| v.(in)干涉，干预；(with)妨碍，打扰 | |
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30
initiated
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| n. 创始人 adj. 新加入的 vt. 开始，创始，启蒙，介绍加入 | |
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31
retired
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| adj.隐退的，退休的，退役的 | |
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32
chateau
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| n.城堡，别墅 | |
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33
accomplished
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| adj.有才艺的；有造诣的；达到了的 | |
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34
deployment
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| n. 部署,展开 | |
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35
sufficiently
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| adv.足够地，充分地 | |
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mutual
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| adj.相互的，彼此的；共同的，共有的 | |
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peculiar
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| adj.古怪的，异常的；特殊的，特有的 | |
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varied
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| adj.多样的，多变化的 | |
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applied
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| adj.应用的；v.应用，适用 | |
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40
distinguished
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| adj.卓越的，杰出的，著名的 | |
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41
blindfolding
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| v.（尤指用布）挡住（某人）的视线( blindfold的现在分词 )；蒙住（某人）的眼睛；使不理解；蒙骗 | |
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42
tactician
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| n. 战术家, 策士 | |
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43
worthy
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| adj.(of)值得的，配得上的；有价值的 | |
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44
emulation
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| n.竞争；仿效 | |
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45
resolute
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| adj.坚决的，果敢的 | |
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46
knightly
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| adj. 骑士般的 adv. 骑士般地 | |
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47
obsolete
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| adj.已废弃的，过时的 | |
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48
retention
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| n.保留，保持，保持力，记忆力 | |
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49
antiquated
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| adj.陈旧的，过时的 | |
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50
adherence
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| n.信奉，依附，坚持，固着 | |
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51
bloodily
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| adv.出血地；血淋淋地；残忍地；野蛮地 | |
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52
avenged
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| v.为…复仇，报…之仇( avenge的过去式和过去分词 )；为…报复 | |
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