Whether one agrees with this estimation of the value of such enterprises naturally depends upon the view taken of the co-operation of cavalry in the battle and the general conception of the conditions of modern war. It appears to me that the importance of such undertakings has increased in the same measure as the value of cavalry on the main battlefield has diminished.
The great size of modern armies renders it, generally speaking, impossible for them to live on the country. A modern army marching once through the richest country will nowadays almost completely exhaust its resources, and yet the supplies carried will scarcely suffice to feed the columns during a protracted4 movement. Armies are far more dependent than formerly5 on the supplies from the rear—more, indeed, than in the time of Frederick the Great. In those days, if the bread-wagons6 ran short, it was possible to fill up from the country. The armies were never so great that this became impossible. The cavalry, indeed, devoted7 most of its time to foraging8, and the soldier frequently bought his supplies, all except his bread, on the spot.
Nowadays the circumstances are quite changed. It is out of the question for the horses of the modern army to find the necessary forage9 in the country itself. That the men of the great armies of the present day can supply themselves when rations10 run out remains11 to be proved. On paper it is indeed often possible, taking into consideration the supplies available in peace; but these calculations cannot hold good for a real theatre of war where concentration has claimed all available resources.
[Pg 99]
Of the straits to which a great army may be reduced when supplies really give out, the campaign of 1812 in Russia is a good example. There, even during the advance to Moscow, Napoleon's army practically dissolved owing to lack of supplies. Only some 90,000 men of the mighty12 host arrived in Moscow; only these perished during the retreat. How fearfully the Napoleonic armies suffered and melted away owing to want of supplies gives cause for reflection. In the armies of millions of the present day such conditions become still more perilous13. Matters appertaining to ammunition14 are of equal importance. The modern army carries enormous masses of artillery15 with it. All the guns are designed for a vast expenditure16 of ammunition, and the rafale from covered positions and against covered positions will indeed make this necessary. Modern infantry17, too, is armed in a manner that will entail18 a prodigious19 expenditure of cartridges20. The replacement21 of this expended22 ammunition is of vital importance. Railways will have to be laid in rear of the armies to cope with these demands. Long trains of wagons and automobiles23 will move to and fro behind them. On every high-road and in every railway-station magazines will appear, and all operations must come to a standstill and miscarry as soon as this great organisation24 ceases from any cause to carry out its functions.
I hold, therefore, that such circumstances render a disturbance25 of the rear communications of an army an important matter. It will often do the opponent more damage, and contribute more to a favourable26 decision of arms than the intervention27 of a few cavalry divisions in the decisive battle itself.
The one does not, of course, exclude the possibility of the other. General Stuart, in the campaign of[Pg 100] Gettysburg, rode all round the hostile army, broke up its communications, drew hostile troops away from the decisive point, and was yet in his place on the wing of the army on the day of battle. What this man performed with cavalry and the inestimable damage he inflicted28 on his opponent are worth studying. The fortune of war, which lay in might and in the nature of things, he could not turn. Nor could he bring the advance of an army to a standstill, because at that period and under those circumstances it was possible for the army of the North to live, at least for a time, upon the country. If we regard his achievement by the light of modern conditions, we shall certainly not fall into the error of underestimating the value of such enterprises. If we compare it with the performances of cavalry upon the battlefield in the latest war, we will be able to obtain a true impression of the degree of importance of modern cavalry action.
I am inclined to think that such enterprises will be of altogether extraordinary significance in a future war; least so, perhaps, during the earlier battles resulting from the concentration, when it will be difficult to get round the flanks of the enemy, but more so during the subsequent course of operations. We have only to imagine what the decisive consequences must have been if General von Werder, and, later, General von Manteuffel, had been in a position to continually interrupt the rear communications of the army of Bourbaki. In all probability the latter must have capitulated long before it reached the Swiss frontier, always granting that it was successful in getting so far as the battlefield of the Lisaine. The whole crisis of this campaign, which was very nearly ending in the defeat of the Germans, would thus possibly have been avoided.
[Pg 101]
There are plenty of examples of this. To indicate only one from the history of the latest war, I would call to mind the undertaking1 of the Russians against the rear communications of the Japanese army.
If this undertaking had been actually directed against the only railway at the disposal of the Japanese army, if it had been carried through by throwing into the scale the whole fighting strength of a really mobile and efficient cavalry, and if it had thereby29 succeeded in interrupting the supplies of the Japanese army for a period, the whole course of the campaign might have been changed. Victory in this tremendous conflict hung continually in the balance, and it needed but little more weight on either side to turn the scale of the fortunes of war.
The importance of such raids in modern war should not therefore, in my opinion, be underestimated. They are capable rather of exercising enormous influence on the course of events.
Rules, however, cannot be laid down for their conduct. The Regulations indicate, shortly, that attention must be paid to the transport of sufficient ammunition and supplies, and here, indeed, move in the right direction. It is absolutely indispensable that a cavalry mass destined30 to carry out such an enterprise should be independent of what it may find in the country and be perfectly31 free of movement.
The supply and ammunition columns, however, which accompany it, must also be so mobile that they are able to follow the troops closely, even at a rapid pace, as otherwise they will run the danger of falling into the hands of the enemy. The whole force designed for the enterprise must be able to advance rapidly as a concrete whole, and should not be allowed to take up too much room. Resources found upon[Pg 102] the enemy's lines of communication and magazines captured must be used for the sustenance32 of the troops as far as possible. It will then be able to reserve the supplies carried for critical times or for a further turning movement. Any of the enemy's supplies which are not used must be ruthlessly laid waste. His railways and magazines, particularly any important engineering structures, must be thoroughly33 destroyed, the necessary explosives being carried in sufficient quantities.
In contrast to Stuart's raids, however, one must count on meeting not inconsiderable bodies of the enemy's communication troops, which will probably be capable of rapid reinforcement. This entails34 corresponding preventive measures.
Hostile cavalry sent to secure the safety of the communications will generally have to be attacked in a determined35 manner. It may sometimes, however, be more advantageous36 to avoid it by rapid marching. For the rest, the factor of surprise is of decisive importance. Should the enemy early become aware of the approach, he will generally be in a position to bring up fresh forces, often by rail, and thereby imperil the success of the whole undertaking. Under such circumstances a covered approach, perhaps by night, careful screening, and the interruption of the enemy's telegraph-lines and transmission service are matters to which special attention must be paid. It is also a matter of consideration in the attack on communications and railways to destroy them at a sufficient distance above and below the objective by means of detachments deflected37 for that purpose, so that the enemy may be prevented from bringing up reinforcements. If the direction of the attack is fixed38 upon and assured, and if approach and deployment39 have[Pg 103] been successfully effected unobserved, the attack must from the first be carried through with sufficient firepower and energy to allow the enemy no time for reflection.
It is therefore absolutely necessary that troops engaged in a raid should be of sufficient fighting strength to be able rapidly to break down any resistance. The scanty40 strength of a division of six regiments41 is much too small for such an undertaking in modern war. Stronger divisions must be formed for the purpose, and strengthened when necessary by cyclist battalions42. An enterprise of this kind also requires thorough preparation, especially by an extensive system of espionage43 which will amplify44 the results of the cavalry reconnaissance. Before such a raid is undertaken all possible information must be to hand as to the conditions in the rear of the hostile army. Mobile light bridging equipment should accompany the expedition, with the necessary complement45 of mounted engineers. During the advance the cavalry should be surrounded by a screen of patrols, not too far distant from it, so that the enemy will not too early become aware of the expedition, and yet at the same time far enough to guard against surprise. After a successful surprise the force should withdraw with the same speed in order to escape from the enemy's counter-measures. Finally, the chief safety of such enterprises lies in their daring.
The leader of such a raid should be minutely instructed as to the advance and intended operations of his own army, so that he may be able to calculate when and where the decisive collision between the opposing armies will take place. He must regulate his own movements accordingly. As long as the two armies are still distant from each other he can strike[Pg 104] the enemy's communications far to the rear, destroying railways and magazines. The nearer, however, the opponent approaches to his own army, the more closely must he endeavour to hang on the rear of the hostile troops and to interrupt the supply of the immediate46 necessities, that is to say, to destroy the supply and ammunition columns of the army corps47, and to capture the provision and baggage wagons of the troops. If circumstances demand, he must be able to appear upon the battlefield itself on the day of battle.
Keen perception and foresight48, rapid decision, and relentless49 energy are indispensable qualities to the leader of such a raid. The ability to mystify and mislead the enemy will greatly facilitate the carrying out of the enterprise. A considerable measure of cavalry ability is, at the same time, necessary to ensure proper horse management. A combination of all these qualities goes to form the great cavalry leader, before whom, even in modern war, lie great prospects50 of distinction, if he but understands how to break loose from the routine and pedantry51 of the day.
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1
undertaking
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| n.保证，许诺，事业 | |
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undertakings
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| 企业( undertaking的名词复数 )； 保证； 殡仪业； 任务 | |
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cavalry
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| n.骑兵；轻装甲部队 | |
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protracted
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| adj.拖延的；延长的v.拖延“protract”的过去式和过去分词 | |
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formerly
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| adv.从前，以前 | |
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wagons
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| n.四轮的运货马车( wagon的名词复数 )；铁路货车；小手推车 | |
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devoted
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| adj.忠诚的，忠实的，热心的，献身于...的 | |
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foraging
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| v.搜寻（食物），尤指动物觅（食）( forage的现在分词 )；（尤指用手）搜寻（东西） | |
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forage
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| n.(牛马的)饲料，粮草；v.搜寻，翻寻 | |
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rations
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| 定量( ration的名词复数 )； 配给量； 正常量； 合理的量 | |
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remains
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| n.剩余物，残留物；遗体，遗迹 | |
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mighty
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| adj.强有力的；巨大的 | |
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perilous
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| adj.危险的，冒险的 | |
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ammunition
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| n.军火，弹药 | |
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artillery
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| n.(军)火炮，大炮；炮兵(部队) | |
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expenditure
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| n.(时间、劳力、金钱等)支出；使用，消耗 | |
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infantry
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| n.[总称]步兵(部队) | |
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entail
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| vt.使承担，使成为必要，需要 | |
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prodigious
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| adj.惊人的，奇妙的；异常的；巨大的；庞大的 | |
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cartridges
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| 子弹( cartridge的名词复数 )； （打印机的）墨盒； 录音带盒； （唱机的）唱头 | |
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replacement
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| n.取代，替换，交换；替代品，代用品 | |
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expended
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| v.花费( expend的过去式和过去分词 )；使用（钱等）做某事；用光；耗尽 | |
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automobiles
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| n.汽车( automobile的名词复数 ) | |
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organisation
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| n.组织，安排，团体，有机休 | |
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disturbance
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| n.动乱，骚动；打扰，干扰；(身心)失调 | |
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favourable
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| adj.赞成的，称赞的，有利的，良好的，顺利的 | |
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intervention
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| n.介入，干涉，干预 | |
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inflicted
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| 把…强加给，使承受，遭受( inflict的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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thereby
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| adv.因此，从而 | |
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destined
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| adj.命中注定的；(for)以…为目的地的 | |
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perfectly
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| adv.完美地，无可非议地，彻底地 | |
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32
sustenance
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| n.食物，粮食；生活资料；生计 | |
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thoroughly
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| adv.完全地，彻底地，十足地 | |
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entails
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| 使…成为必要( entail的第三人称单数 )； 需要； 限定继承； 使必需 | |
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determined
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| adj.坚定的；有决心的 | |
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advantageous
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| adj.有利的；有帮助的 | |
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deflected
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| 偏离的 | |
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fixed
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| adj.固定的，不变的，准备好的；(计算机)固定的 | |
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deployment
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| n. 部署,展开 | |
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40
scanty
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| adj.缺乏的，仅有的，节省的，狭小的，不够的 | |
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regiments
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| （军队的）团( regiment的名词复数 )； 大量的人或物 | |
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battalions
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| n.（陆军的）一营（大约有一千兵士）( battalion的名词复数 )；协同作战的部队；军队；（组织在一起工作的）队伍 | |
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43
espionage
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| n.间谍行为，谍报活动 | |
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44
amplify
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| vt.放大，增强；详述，详加解说 | |
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45
complement
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| n.补足物，船上的定员；补语；vt.补充，补足 | |
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46
immediate
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| adj.立即的；直接的，最接近的；紧靠的 | |
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47
corps
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| n.(通信等兵种的)部队；(同类作的)一组 | |
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48
foresight
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| n.先见之明，深谋远虑 | |
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49
relentless
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| adj.残酷的，不留情的，无怜悯心的 | |
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50
prospects
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| n.希望，前途(恒为复数) | |
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51
pedantry
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| n.迂腐，卖弄学问 | |
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