In the mounted combat against cavalry1, every effort must be directed towards falling upon the enemy at full gallop2 in a serried3 mass, and thus to overthrow4 him. It is not sufficient to succeed in coming to blows with the enemy. His tactical formation must be destroyed, and he must be rendered incapable5 either of evolution or battle. And this must be done without losing cohesion6 or power of command. The material damage done to the enemy is a matter for the mounted pursuit, which need only be carried out by part of the troops, or, in default of this, by shrapnel.
For the conduct of the purely7 cavalry fight we should, in my opinion, rely upon men like Frederick the Great, Seydlitz, and the prominent Napoleonic cavalry leaders. In the relations of cavalry to cavalry, nothing has altered since their day, and the experiences of these men are, in their lessons, just as applicable to-day as at the time in which they lived. And what do they teach us?
It is the serried formation of the attack that is,[Pg 120] above all else, to be aimed at. Frederick the Great certainly changed his formation from the three-rank to the two-rank line. This was owing to his desire to render the troops more mobile, and in some way to compensate8 for the numerical superiority of his opponent. The longer his experience of war, however, the more did the king insist upon close formation in the attack, and to the end that the attack should lead not to a mêlée, but to the breaking up of the enemy by the impact of the solid mass. Napoleon, whose cavalry was not so proficient9 in the saddle, sought to obtain this result by greater depth, while in the infrequent cavalry fights of the present day it has become thoroughly10 apparent that cohesion in the shock is the deciding factor. At Mars la Tour the French Hussar Brigade of Montaigu was overthrown11 by the closely formed 13th Dragoons, after having made an easy prey12 of the 10th Hussars, while the other attacks only led to long and indecisive mêlées. Frederick the Great, in order to attain13 the greatest possible cohesion, finally abolished all intervals15 between the tactical units and required the knee-to-knee riding. As, however, he was perfectly16 well aware that, in spite of all regulations, the ranks must open out while crossing country, he would never allow the enemy's cavalry to be attacked without a second line following the first, not in échelon, but directly in rear of it, a measure which repeatedly proved itself necessary, if not decisive. Napoleon's cavalry leaders held that a still greater depth was necessary owing to the looser riding of the French squadrons. As far as I know, there is no example of their attacking in large masses without depth of formation. Peace experience teaches us, that riding across country must loosen cohesion, while the modern firearm obliges us to take refuge in broken coun[Pg 121]try, where the closest touch cannot always be kept, and to this end riding stirrup to stirrup has been introduced. Is it, however, ordained17 that we should attack in this formation and neglect the decisive factor of the charge in favour of mobility18, a proceeding19 which is almost always seen in charges at man?uvres?
The disadvantages of such methods are certainly not apparent in peace, as the troops do not come into real collision, and rapidity and ability to deploy20 receive therefore more attention than cohesion in the attack. At inspections21 on the drill-ground such cohesion is certainly demanded, but at man?uvres it is generally conspicuous22 by its absence. In war I am firmly convinced that such habits will be heavily punished.
I think, therefore, that we must return to the principles of Frederick the Great, which up to now have been neglected. In approach and deployment23 we must indeed ride stirrup to stirrup, and under certain circumstances in even looser formation. But for the charge against cavalry we need a closer formation, knee to knee as of old, which can be effected on the move by word of command, as in France, where the order "Serrez les rangs!" is still in use. Besides this, we require always a second line in the Frederician sense, to assist, when necessary, in maintaining cohesion, and to be ready to meet the vicissitudes24 of the attack. This is a matter of experience which allows of no misinterpretation.
Another point comes under consideration. Commanders always seem to be particularly desirous of retaining close formation throughout the attack, and of preventing the whole of the troops becoming involved in a mêlée or pursuit. This originates from the necessity of having to reckon with the enemy's reserves, which may appear suddenly on the field at[Pg 122] the decisive moment to extricate25 their beaten comrades. We must always be in a position to meet them, and the rapid rally from the mêlée is therefore to-day diligently26 practised, in the hope that the troops may quickly be got in hand ready to be led against a fresh foe27.
It is indeed astounding28 that we should give way to such self-deception. Such rallies can only appear possible if we disregard all the moral forces which the fight sets loose. Whoever has had experience of a single charge in war knows what excitement possesses the men and what time and trouble are required to tactically concentrate troops that have once been launched to the attack, and render them capable of evolution. In peace this is delightfully29 easy after a little practice; in war it is an absolute impossibility.
We must therefore be perfectly clear in our minds that only those troops which have not been engaged in the mêlée, those parts of the first and second lines which have remained formed during the charge, and the reserve which has been held in rear, will be available to meet any hostile forces which may suddenly appear.
Up to now our Regulations have followed the teachings of military history in so far as they provided for supporting squadrons behind the front line in the attack against cavalry. The new Regulations, however, not only retain the "stirrup feeling,"[18] even in the attack against cavalry, but have also greatly limited the employment of supporting squadrons, and rendered it exceptional. The Regulations practically ignore the use of the second line in the attack against cavalry. To preserve cohesion in the attack in spite[Pg 123] of this, the men in the rear rank are to advance into the front rank in order to fill the larger gaps which may there occur (106).[19] This will lead under certain circumstances to a loose, almost single-line attack against cavalry. These measures give ground for some concern. They can scarcely lead to any other end than to render steady riding to the charge impossible, to create disorder31, and to deprive the already thin line of its force of impact.
It appears to me to be very questionable32 whether such directions could be carried out at all in practice. They will most certainly not attain the object which the Regulations apparently33 expect, that is to say, of securing cohesion in the attack, and thereby34 a victory for one thin attacking line. The necessity for a second line under such circumstances appears all the more obvious. The Regulations in this respect direct (200)[Pg 124][20] that, "if the situation demands it, even single squadrons can follow in column formation," also as an exception. This indicates a distinct divergence35 from the proven results of all experience, and cannot, in my opinion, be even theoretically justified36.
Such dispositions37 cannot therefore be regarded as justifiable39. I consider it to be my unavoidable duty to express myself clearly upon this point. They in no wise alter the fact that to attack the enemy successfully our cavalry must, where its comparative strength in any way allows, be fundamentally formed in two lines, and be launched to the charge in the closest attack formation, knee to knee. For it was thus that the Prussian squadrons gained their laurels40 in all the splendid victories of the Frederician and Napoleonic wars.
At Mars la Tour, also, the success of the cavalry fight was decided41 by the 16th Dragoons, who threw themselves into the mêlée from the rear, acting42 as a second line entirely43 in accordance with the Frederician spirit. The 10th Hussars also attacked as a second line; and it was the cohesion of the 13th Dragoons, as we have already seen, that allowed them on two occasions rapidly to secure a victory.
If the conditions of the fight of cavalry against cavalry to-day have remained practically unaltered as compared to those of the past, it is a very different matter where the attack is against troops armed with modern firearms, essentially44 infantry45 and artillery46.
In the old days, where infantry fought in serried masses, standing47 up, and were only able to cover a short distance to their front with a comparatively slow fire, the cavalry were able, even as against their own arm, to ride them down with shock action in close formation. They were therefore justified in attacking[Pg 125] infantry in the same formation and with the same cohesion as they attacked cavalry. This has now changed. Nowadays, when infantry can cover the ground to a distance of 1,500 or even 2,000 yards with a hot and rapid fire, and offer in their wide extension no sort of objective for shock action, an attack on unshaken, steadily48 firing infantry, which has any sort of adequate field of fire, is quite out of the question. Only infantry whose morale49 has been shaken, or which can be surprised at quite close range, can still be charged with a prospect50 of success. It is, then, no question of attack in cohesion, but a matter of crossing as rapidly as possible the zone swept by the enemy's fire in some formation which will allow a portion at least of the cavalry to escape its full effect.
These conditions may be fulfilled by the formation in lines. The first line must receive the fire, and will thereby provide cover to some extent to the lines behind and the possibility of reaching the enemy without suffering too severely51. It will usually be no advantage to form the first line in two ranks, as such a disposition38 would but increase losses and the disorder caused by them. It will be better, generally, that the leading line or lines should consist of one rank at quite loose interval14. This is principally on account of the ground, as the horses, in order to rapidly cover the necessary distance, must have room to gallop freely, and to avoid such obstacles as may lie in front of them or may be caused by losses in the leading line.
It is obvious, in my opinion, that such attacks cannot be ridden home according to the same principles that govern the attack against cavalry. It is an arbitrary assumption that a line of cavalry 1,500 or 2,000 yards wide can cross country stirrup to stirrup at the[Pg 126] regulation pace of the charge,[21] as the Regulations demand. Not only must the leading line ride at quite loose interval, but the main attack must also have a looser formation than is here demanded. It is therefore indicated that such extension should be laid down in the Regulations. For it can in no case be avoided, but is the outcome of the force of circumstances. In the formation in lines, however, there is always room to open out, and troops or squadrons may be used in single rank.
The same principles that govern the attack against infantry hold good for that against artillery. Here also it is a matter of crossing the zone of fire at a rapid pace in widely extended order, or drawing the fire of the artillery by the advance of the leading line, and of compelling it to repeatedly alter its elevation52. To this end it may perhaps at first be advisable to expose only weak portions of the charging first line to the fire of the guns, in order to disturb it, and to pave the way for the success of the main attack. This will have to ride in line, or perhaps better still in squadron column, in order to make full use of the unexposed portions of the ground. Thus in this case, also, the leading lines in single rank extended and loose riding in the changing formations of the main attacking line are advocated.
The new Regulations arrive partially53 at the conclusions inevitable54 from these reflections. The attack in several lines, and the formation of a first line in single rank for the attack against fire action have been[Pg 127] adopted by them (113 and 174).[22] In one point only according to my view, they do not take sufficient account of the demands of reality, and this is in the matter of extension. As before, the attack in close formation against infantry which the Regulations advocate, will be carried out and practised according to the same principles as against cavalry. As before, infantry[Pg 128] firing lying extended under cover, as also artillery, are to be charged in the same method as cavalry advancing in close formation.
I think we have proved that the attendant conditions of the two cases differ widely. If the Regulations had but taken them into consideration, the difference between the two methods of attack would have thereby been made more intelligible55 to all officers from the first than could be done by general instructions of this nature.
The cavalry has now a demand made upon it by Regulation which, although it can be met on the drill-ground, will be impossible of fulfilment in war. It will therefore be necessary to discard in war what we have taken such pains to learn, a thing which frequently happens in man?uvres, and even on the exercise-ground.
In the formation for attack and the deployment, the Regulations follow the logical sequence of their point of view that, in the attack upon cavalry, no second line is necessary, and in this matter adhere to the directions laid down in the old Regulations. From my point of[Pg 129] view, this does not seem to correspond at all with the necessities of the fight.
In my "Reflections on the New Cavalry Drill Regulations" I laid down "that it should always be possible for cavalry to change from the man?uvre column straightway into attack formation with flank protection, without first forming line, as hitherto has been deemed necessary." In opposition56 to the Regulations I still hold fast to this principle.
We have seen that the formation in lines is the necessary one for all charges, and that an attack in one line will only be possible in exceptional cases where weakness forbids the formation of several lines, or where the surprised and demoralised condition of the enemy appears to render a second line superfluous57.
The logical conclusions resulting from these reflections are that all column formations employed in the approach march must keep in view first and foremost the rapid adoption58 of the attack formation, and that deployment must in principle lead to the formation in lines for attack. The complete deployment in line of any units from the regiment59 upwards60 can only be necessary in exceptional cases. It can be formed from the attack formation or direct from column when specially61 ordered.
Taking into consideration the rapidity with which approach, deployment, and attack will often follow each other, I would even advocate that a trumpet-call, "Form for attack!" should be laid down in the Regulations. The strength of the various lines will generally have to be ordered according as the objective consists of cavalry or troops using fire action. It will not always be possible to find time for detailed62 arrangements, particularly during the rapid vicissitudes of a cavalry combat. The trumpet-call would then justify[Pg 130] itself, and the lines would be formed by the independent action of squadron leaders, according to the formation the troops were in and the expected breadth of frontage of the enemy. It should be laid down as a guide that of four squadrons one at least should form a second line, and that an unprotected flank should, when possible, be covered by a squadron in échelon. The squadrons nearest the enemy would form a first line, and the remainder would act according to circumstances, and either follow the first line, échelon themselves in rear of it, or, when necessary, prolong it. For the deployment into one line a special call could be used.
For the conduct of the fight on foot the same principles hold good as for the infantry. The duties and conditions of the fight are similar, and demand similar general tactical directions. The arrangements for the led horses, however, render the introduction and the conduct of the fight considerably63 more difficult. There is also a certain difference according as the opponent is infantry or cavalry.
For, in the first case, there is generally no danger of a further turning movement, or of threats against the led horses from the flank or rear. In the greater number of cases when arranging for the position and safety of the led horses, only small hostile patrols need be expected. An action may therefore generally be conducted with more boldness under these circumstances than when opposed to cavalry which might seriously threaten the led horses by a mounted reserve.
These circumstances must be taken into consideration when dealing64 with the principles for the conduct of the led horses.
In defence, the measures required are comparatively simple. The conformation of the ground usually[Pg 131] chosen with a view to the peculiarities65 of defensive66 action will often allow of the led horses being kept close to the firing-line, where it will also be possible to mount out of the enemy's range and to withdraw from his fire under cover of the ground. The led horses should only be left to the rear if the position is to be maintained until the enemy comes to close quarters, and then should be, if possible, behind some fresh position, where it seems likely that resistance may be renewed. In defence, the led horses will generally be left quite immobile,[23] though this method should not be considered imperative67. For even in defence the led horses must be sometimes kept mobile; for instance, when it is necessary to rapidly occupy on foot some locality in the neighbourhood of which there is no suitable position for the led horses. In such a case they will have to be sent behind cover, which can only be done if they are mobile. The horses will only be kept in the immediate68 neighbourhood when it is intended merely to bring off a fire surprise, and not when carrying out an attack or making an obstinate69 resistance (471-473).[Pg 132][24]
For the attack the conditions are different. The troops must then be often completely separated from their horses. It is therefore all the more necessary that the latter should be secured against all hostile attack. If, for instance, hostile cavalry threatens, they must have a special escort. The possibility of a reverse must be taken into consideration when selecting the position for led horses, and the retiring troops must be able not only to mount, but to withdraw under cover.
It is of especial importance that the troops should regain70 their mobility after an attack has been carried out. When the led horses can be moved, this is an easy matter. Where, however, they are immobile, as will generally be the case where full force has to be put into the fight, there will be considerable loss of time unless it be possible for the led horses to be brought up, part at a time, by any mounted reserve that may have been left in the rear. In spite of this disadvantage, the desire to render the led horses mobile should not be allowed to lead to the undertaking71 of a dismounted action with insufficient72 numbers.
This desire to regain the horses as rapidly as possible is frequently to be observed at man?uvres, and not only leads to dismounting and leaving the led horses mobile, but is sometimes allowed to exercise too much influence on the question of where the horses are to be left. In war this consideration should never influence the conduct of the fight, nor lead to the undertaking of a dismounted fight in a half-hearted manner, or precipitately73, and thus paralysing the energy of the attack. It should never induce a commander to keep his horses too close to the battlefield and thereby exposed to danger, in order that he may more quickly re[Pg 133]gain them. If dismounted action has been determined74 on, the main condition is that the attack should be successfully carried out, and all other matters must be subordinated to this end.
The precepts75 of the new Regulations do not, to be sure, harmonise with this view. According to them, even when led horses are not required to be mobile, only three-quarters of the men dismount, and each man will hold four horses (366).[25] The number of rifles will be greatly diminished by these measures (by about a quarter); and it is not quite clear, at least to me, what corresponding advantage is to be gained. The measure is, however, so far-reaching that it merits special criticism—the more so as the Regulations themselves lay stress upon the rapid energetic conduct of the fight, and at the same time make such action more difficult by weakening the numbers in the firing-line.
Will the horses thus retain a certain degree of mobility? This would be a mischievous76 delusion77. Even if such measures allow of short distances being covered[Pg 134] at a walk on the level drill-ground, such a thing is out of the question in the field and in the proximity78 of a fight. How will one man lead four horses, and at the same time carry four lances? A practical impossibility.
The Regulations also give no clear directions as to how the lances are to be carried during these evolutions. On the other hand, the number of men formerly79 detailed fully30 sufficed for holding the horses when it was not required to move them. There seems therefore to be some other reason for this measure.
I have asked myself the question as to whether the fact that more men are to be left with the horses than formerly will perhaps make it possible to defend the led horses by dismounted patrols. The directions contained in the Regulations (368)[26] that hostile patrols must be kept at a distance by single sentries80 posted by the commander of the led horses indicates that such was perhaps the intention. But it appears to me that even this object cannot be obtained in such a way. The sentries, if they are to defend the led horses from long-range fire in open country, must be pushed forward in considerable numbers, and very far, almost at rifle range. With single sentries close at hand, no proper protection is afforded, nor can posts be sent out 1,000 yards without giving them a strength which the force cannot afford. If, however, the protection of the led horses in difficult country is to be provided for, a[Pg 135] few sentries will most assuredly not suffice to prevent hostile patrols approaching unobserved.
In order to properly protect the led horses they must either be so disposed that they are actually covered from the view and fire of the enemy, or else secured by an escort strong enough to prevent hostile action against them. There is no third course.
Taking these things into consideration I cannot regard the limitation of the number of rifles in the firing-line imposed by the Regulations as justifiable. It seems to me that here a sacrifice is made with no corresponding advantage resulting.
This anxiety seems also to have influenced, to a certain degree, the text of the Regulations. In paragraph 367[27] the attempt is made to compensate in some measure for the danger created by the weakening of the firing-line. That is to say, the squadron leader is allowed in either method of dismounting (with half or three-quarters of the men) to reinforce the firing-line, if the situation demands, by diminishing the number of horse-holders. But it seems to me that this arrangement is not quite practicable, and does not sufficiently81 take into account the difficulties that will continually result therefrom in the conduct of a real fight.
First of all, it must be regarded as extremely hazardous82 to leave such measures altogether in the hands of squadron leaders. Only consider, for example, the case of a brigade commander who dismounts half his men in order to keep his led horses mobile, and during the attack makes the discovery that the horses cannot[Pg 136] follow because the squadron leaders have reinforced the firing-line from the horse-holders! Throughout the Regulations there are no sort of directions for limiting the initiative of the squadron leader in such matters in the case of the larger bodies of troops.
But if this is to be disregarded, what becomes of the whole measure? Is it to be determined when dismounting that the number of horse-holders is to be diminished, or are these men only to be brought up in the course of the fight? Against the first method there is naturally nothing to urge. But the second, also, is quite allowable according to the letter of the Regulations. It will, however, result in grave disadvantages.
If in defence the led horses are close to the firing-line, such procedure is certainly possible, but only, it seems to me, in this one case. If fighting a defensive action where the horses must be left far to the rear, or indeed in an attack, how and when are these reinforcements to be brought up? It is generally in the middle of a fight that the discovery is made that the troops are insufficient. How is the order then to be sent to the squadron leader that the few men who can still be spared from the led horses are now to advance? How will these men be led to the front, perhaps 1,000 or 1,500 yards, or still farther? How long will the squadron wait for their arrival? And in the end will it not only be a matter of comparatively few men for each squadron which will dribble83 gradually into the fight? These cannot be regarded as reserves, but, at best, weak supports far in rear, which can only be employed in the fight with difficulty and loss of time, if at all.
I think, therefore, that what the Regulations prescribe in this matter is not suitable for real war, and that it would be better from the commencement to employ all the men that are considered necessary, and[Pg 137] rather to dismount as before, and leave the led horses quite immobile, than afterwards to allow single men to dribble into the fight. As reserves, formed detachments must be directed against the decisive points, and not a few troops brought up to reinforce the whole length of the line at the discretion84 of the squadron leader.
点击
收听单词发音
收听单词发音 |
1
cavalry
|
|
| n.骑兵；轻装甲部队 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
2
gallop
|
|
| v./n.(马或骑马等)飞奔；飞速发展 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
3
serried
|
|
| adj.拥挤的；密集的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
4
overthrow
|
|
| v.推翻，打倒，颠覆；n.推翻，瓦解，颠覆 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
5
incapable
|
|
| adj.无能力的，不能做某事的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
6
cohesion
|
|
| n.团结，凝结力 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
7
purely
|
|
| adv.纯粹地，完全地 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
8
compensate
|
|
| vt.补偿，赔偿；酬报 vi.弥补；补偿；抵消 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
9
proficient
|
|
| adj.熟练的，精通的；n.能手，专家 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
10
thoroughly
|
|
| adv.完全地，彻底地，十足地 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
11
overthrown
|
|
| adj. 打翻的，推倒的，倾覆的 动词overthrow的过去分词 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
12
prey
|
|
| n.被掠食者，牺牲者，掠食；v.捕食，掠夺，折磨 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
13
attain
|
|
| vt.达到，获得，完成 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
14
interval
|
|
| n.间隔，间距；幕间休息，中场休息 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
15
intervals
|
|
| n.[军事]间隔( interval的名词复数 )；间隔时间；[数学]区间；（戏剧、电影或音乐会的）幕间休息 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
16
perfectly
|
|
| adv.完美地，无可非议地，彻底地 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
17
ordained
|
|
| v.任命（某人）为牧师( ordain的过去式和过去分词 )；授予（某人）圣职；（上帝、法律等）命令；判定 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
18
mobility
|
|
| n.可动性，变动性，情感不定 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
19
proceeding
|
|
| n.行动，进行，(pl.)会议录，学报 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
20
deploy
|
|
| v.（军）散开成战斗队形，布置，展开 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
21
inspections
|
|
| n.检查( inspection的名词复数 )；检验；视察；检阅 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
22
conspicuous
|
|
| adj.明眼的，惹人注目的；炫耀的，摆阔气的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
23
deployment
|
|
| n. 部署,展开 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
24
vicissitudes
|
|
| n.变迁，世事变化；变迁兴衰( vicissitude的名词复数 )；盛衰兴废 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
25
extricate
|
|
| v.拯救，救出；解脱 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
26
diligently
|
|
| ad.industriously;carefully | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
27
foe
|
|
| n.敌人，仇敌 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
28
astounding
|
|
| adj.使人震惊的vt.使震惊，使大吃一惊astound的现在分词) | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
29
delightfully
|
|
| 大喜，欣然 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
30
fully
|
|
| adv.完全地，全部地，彻底地；充分地 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
31
disorder
|
|
| n.紊乱，混乱；骚动，骚乱；疾病，失调 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
32
questionable
|
|
| adj.可疑的，有问题的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
33
apparently
|
|
| adv.显然地；表面上，似乎 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
34
thereby
|
|
| adv.因此，从而 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
35
divergence
|
|
| n.分歧，岔开 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
36
justified
|
|
| a.正当的，有理的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
37
dispositions
|
|
| 安排( disposition的名词复数 )； 倾向； （财产、金钱的）处置； 气质 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
38
disposition
|
|
| n.性情，性格；意向，倾向；排列，部署 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
39
justifiable
|
|
| adj.有理由的，无可非议的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
40
laurels
|
|
| n.桂冠，荣誉 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
41
decided
|
|
| adj.决定了的，坚决的；明显的，明确的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
42
acting
|
|
| n.演戏，行为，假装；adj.代理的，临时的，演出用的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
43
entirely
|
|
| ad.全部地，完整地；完全地，彻底地 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
44
essentially
|
|
| adv.本质上，实质上，基本上 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
45
infantry
|
|
| n.[总称]步兵(部队) | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
46
artillery
|
|
| n.(军)火炮，大炮；炮兵(部队) | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
47
standing
|
|
| n.持续，地位；adj.永久的，不动的，直立的，不流动的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
48
steadily
|
|
| adv.稳定地；不变地；持续地 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
49
morale
|
|
| n.道德准则，士气，斗志 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
50
prospect
|
|
| n.前景，前途；景色，视野 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
51
severely
|
|
| adv.严格地；严厉地；非常恶劣地 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
52
elevation
|
|
| n.高度；海拔；高地；上升；提高 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
53
partially
|
|
| adv.部分地，从某些方面讲 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
54
inevitable
|
|
| adj.不可避免的，必然发生的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
55
intelligible
|
|
| adj.可理解的，明白易懂的，清楚的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
56
opposition
|
|
| n.反对，敌对 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
57
superfluous
|
|
| adj.过多的，过剩的，多余的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
58
adoption
|
|
| n.采用，采纳，通过；收养 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
59
regiment
|
|
| n.团，多数，管理；v.组织，编成团，统制 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
60
upwards
|
|
| adv.向上，在更高处...以上 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
61
specially
|
|
| adv.特定地；特殊地；明确地 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
62
detailed
|
|
| adj.详细的，详尽的，极注意细节的，完全的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
63
considerably
|
|
| adv.极大地；相当大地；在很大程度上 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
64
dealing
|
|
| n.经商方法，待人态度 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
65
peculiarities
|
|
| n. 特质, 特性, 怪癖, 古怪 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
66
defensive
|
|
| adj.防御的；防卫的；防守的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
67
imperative
|
|
| n.命令，需要；规则；祈使语气；adj.强制的；紧急的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
68
immediate
|
|
| adj.立即的；直接的，最接近的；紧靠的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
69
obstinate
|
|
| adj.顽固的，倔强的，不易屈服的，较难治愈的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
70
regain
|
|
| vt.重新获得，收复，恢复 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
71
undertaking
|
|
| n.保证，许诺，事业 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
72
insufficient
|
|
| adj.(for，of)不足的，不够的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
73
precipitately
|
|
| adv.猛进地 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
74
determined
|
|
| adj.坚定的；有决心的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
75
precepts
|
|
| n.规诫，戒律，箴言( precept的名词复数 ) | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
76
mischievous
|
|
| adj.调皮的，恶作剧的，有害的，伤人的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
77
delusion
|
|
| n.谬见，欺骗，幻觉，迷惑 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
78
proximity
|
|
| n.接近，邻近 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
79
formerly
|
|
| adv.从前，以前 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
80
sentries
|
|
| 哨兵，步兵( sentry的名词复数 ) | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
81
sufficiently
|
|
| adv.足够地，充分地 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
82
hazardous
|
|
| adj.(有)危险的，冒险的；碰运气的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
83
dribble
|
|
| v.点滴留下，流口水；n.口水 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
84
discretion
|
|
| n.谨慎；随意处理 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
| 欢迎访问英文小说网 |