It is naturally impossible to give tactical guides and directions for all these various cases; each problem, rather, will demand its own solution. At the same time certain typical phenomena9 continually repeat themselves in all such combats, for which general principles and rules for guidance may be profitably set forth10.
The fight will be either offensive or defensive11. In the offensive it will either be a matter, if the enemy is also pressing forward, of the battle of encounter, or else the attack against localities or positions. In fighting against partisans, also, it will more frequently be a case, as it was in France, of a struggle for localities. In the defence, on the other hand, localities, positions, or defiles13 will have to be defended. Beyond these groups no real fight can be considered with the excep[Pg 138]tion of surprises, which merit separate consideration.
It is therefore, in my opinion, advisable to develop the tactical principles according to some corresponding grouping of the material. Only thus can clear and reasoned conclusions be arrived at. For if we take all the various principles evolved from different tactical situations and jumble14 them illogically together, or discuss them from points of view which are not closely based on the probable happenings of reality, we run a danger of confusing the judgment15 instead of clearing it.
1. The Battle of Encounter
When lesser16 bodies of cavalry, unaccompanied by the other arms, meet during a mutual17 advance, it is essentially18 a matter of endeavouring to deploy19 more quickly than the adversary20, of surprising him if possible while still deploying21, and of seizing the advantages of the terrain22. It is by good screening of the approach, superior reconnaissance, a quick eye for the possibilities of the ground, and rapid decision that here, as before, superiority can be maintained.
It may happen in exceptional cases, under modern conditions, that the larger bodies of cavalry, accompanied by a proportion of other arms, are unable at the moment of collision to employ them—e.g. in close country. There may then be a purely23 cavalry fight on a large scale, and action must of course be taken according to the tactical principles involved. Early deployment24, maintenance of exterior25 lines, rapid decision, are, as regards the leading, the important factors of success.
It is quite another matter where co-operation of the other arms can be seriously counted on. It is then chiefly the artillery26 which will set its stamp upon the[Pg 139] development of the fight, and it will no longer be possible to act according to purely cavalry tactical principles. A brigade or division, in column of route, or even in several formed columns, if exposed to the enemy's artillery fire, will suffer such material and moral loss that such formations, unless compelled by circumstances, are particularly to be avoided. Whoever is obliged to effect the deployment of his force under the enemy's guns casts from him one of the most important elements of success.
It will therefore be necessary, when advancing against the enemy, to adopt the approach formation, and to seek cover as soon as it is calculated that the hostile artillery are within effective range. In order rightly to calculate this moment the enemy's probable advance must of course be taken into consideration, and, as this may vary greatly according to the pace adopted, it is advisable in this respect not to be too optimistic, but to be deployed27 rather too early than too late.
Taking into consideration the range of modern artillery, the deployment should commence, therefore, in open country, at latest when some 6,500 yards from the enemy.[28] As this distance will diminish very quickly when the opponents are both rapidly advancing, it will certainly be advisable, if the knowledge of the situation in any way allows, to take up the required breadth of front still earlier.
I would here lay down that a too rapid advance of our own troops, unless rendered necessary by the situa[Pg 140]tion, is in no way advantageous28. It is not generally a question of striking the enemy as far to the front as possible, but of striking surely, and of having sufficient strength in hand to annihilate29 him in the pursuit.
A steady and well-thought-out advance should therefore be undertaken; for a precipitate30 forward movement distresses31 the horses quite unnecessarily, renders an appreciation32 of the situation more difficult, and generally allows of no well-considered action. There is also another reason for avoiding a too rapid advance. This is the fact that in such a case the most important reports generally come in when the force is already in the immediate33 proximity34 of the enemy. This disadvantage increases with the rapidity of the advance, as a rapidly moving force will follow more closely on the heels of its reconnoitring patrols. To ride slowly forward and to give the patrols time to send back reports will generally lead to better information as to the situation, and will allow of a better and quicker decision being made. The enormous advantage may then be gained of being deployed earlier than the enemy, and of gaining exterior lines[29] from the beginning.
In spite of this, most cavalry leaders, especially at man?uvres, regard their task as a matter of rapidly covering a certain distance, and see in this the essence of the cavalry spirit. This is, however, by no means so. Coolness, reflection, economy of force in approach and deployment, but that lightning-like decision and action at the proper moment, which can only result[Pg 141] from a clear appreciation of the situation, alone make the great cavalry leader. It is just because such opposite qualities must be united in the soul of one man that such leaders are so rare and so difficult to recognise in time of peace.
When a collision with the enemy is in any way in prospect36, the commander must in principle remain, during the advance, with the foremost detachments of the advanced guard, in order that reports may reach him as early as possible. When in close proximity to the enemy he will often be obliged to advance with a sufficient escort from point to point, in order that he may be able to study the ground from good points of view, and, where possible, himself observe the movements and dispositions38 of the enemy. He will thus be in a position to make his preliminary arrangements rapidly and effectively, to spare his troops unnecessary marching, and to counteract39 any unsuitable dispositions made by his subordinates. He must not, however, conceal40 from himself that even the most effective measures of reconnaissance may fail, and that he may be faced by the necessity of coming to a decision without full knowledge as to the enemy.
In such cases, when it can be estimated that deploying distance from the enemy has been arrived at, further reconnaissance should not be waited for to assist decision; but the initiative must, under all circumstances, be maintained. The leader, then, must act according to his own judgment, and impose the law upon his opponent, and yet be ready, by careful dispositions, to meet unforeseen events.
It may happen that the opponent is unexpectedly met with, and has gained an advantage in deployment. In such a case a forward deployment generally leads to the dribbling41 up of the force, hampered42, as it will be,[Pg 142] by the proximity of the enemy. The deployment should therefore be made either on the existing line of front or to the rear, according to the distance from the enemy, and should be covered, where necessary, by the dismounted action of the advanced guard and by artillery fire. Only thus can the lost freedom of action be regained43, as superior breadth of deployment is the first and perhaps the most important step towards the maintenance of the initiative.
We must not, however, assume that this deployment—in a cavalry division, for instance—requires that the various brigades shall draw away from each other at regulation intervals45, and that the division will, in this formation, advance towards the enemy. This will generally be impossible; first, because it is usually advisable to seek the cover of the ground in order to be secure from possible hostile fire surprise, even when the enemy's artillery is not yet located; secondly46, because the regulation frontage of deployment of a cavalry division is much too narrow to allow it to gain exterior lines, or to affect a concentric attack. The deployment must rather be carried out according to the demands of the situation at the moment, without regard to regulation intervals. The division commander will first of all detail a reserve for himself. To this he will then give the orders necessary for its conduct as well as to the advanced guard, the various groups of the main body, and the artillery and machine-guns. The direction of march of the various subdivisions will thus be determined47 according to the ground and the intentions of the commander, and it will also usually be necessary, in order to keep the troops well in hand, to order the advance by stages, and to regulate the pace.
If the advance has been carried out in separate[Pg 143] columns, the action of the smaller columns must be regulated before the deployment of the main column. A certain loss of time will here generally be found inevitable48. The necessary preparations must therefore be made early enough to ensure that, if the junction49 of a detachment with the main body is intended, it will be possible to carry it out before contact with the enemy is made. It is a matter for especially careful and well-considered action if one of the lesser columns is to intervene from a flank direction in a fight which is already raging, an operation which may be of the most decisive importance, but difficult to effect in the rapid course of cavalry action. If, however, it is desired to reap the benefits of such action, an endeavour must be made to gain time by dismounted action for the arrival of the column which is to strike the decisive blow. Such measures will always be risky50, but may lead to glorious results.
The orders for the concentration and for the deployment form the framework on which the whole fight develops. They are therefore of the highest importance. Faults committed here can seldom be rectified51 later, and yet such orders will generally have to be issued before touch with the enemy is gained, except by patrols, and at a moment when the main features at most of the enemy's situation are known. Particular attention must, as we have seen, be paid to his artillery. No one will deny that herein lies the possibility of misapprehension and failure, and that many a leader will shrink from the necessity of such a decision. He, however, who, in spite of the uncertainty52 of the situation, succeeds in making up his mind betimes has an obvious advantage. For it is just in such a battle of encounter that success will fall to him who knows how to avail himself with rapidity and determination of the[Pg 144] favourable53 moment, who quickly possesses himself of important points and localities, and who anticipates the enemy, as advocated above, in broadening the front, and thereby54 in deployment.
Under such circumstances the dispositions made for the advanced guard will be of the greatest importance. Its conduct has often a deciding influence on the issue of the whole fight.
If it be carelessly handled, this circumstance may mean the loss of the initiative, and the commander may find himself compelled to turn his attention to the situation forced upon him by the advanced guard, and to conduct the fight otherwise than his own intentions and the general situation demand. On the other hand, a too careful employment of the advanced detachments is apt to entail55 loss of advantages which might be of decisive importance. The proper conduct of such an advanced guard demands, therefore, an unusually sure military instinct. Its commander must always be instructed in a detailed56 manner as to the intentions of the general, if he is expected to handle his detachment successfully according to them.
It will often be advisable for the advanced guard to occupy some point of support dismounted, in order that the deployment and the further tactical development may be undertaken under cover of it. In such circumstances there is no reason to shrink, when necessary, from bringing the advanced guard back to some suitable locality, if thereby full cover can be afforded for the rear detachments or for separated portions of the force that may be rejoining. It will often be found desirable also, in the critical moments of deployment, to strengthen the resisting power of the advanced guard by machine-guns. It may, however, on the other hand, be equally advantageous for the advanced de[Pg 145]tachments, on collision with the enemy, to charge him recklessly in order to reap full benefit from some favourable opportunity.
The handling of the artillery, particularly at the moment of deployment, is of especial importance. It may be a great advantage to bring it into action before the enemy's artillery, in order to profit by any carelessness of the hostile troops in deployment and approach, and to surprise their artillery when coming into position. The conduct of the advanced guard must therefore be influenced by the fact that a suitable position must be assured to the artillery. Its fire will often suffice to induce the enemy to show his strength or to evacuate57 localities which he has occupied.
As long as the strength of the enemy is unknown, and the possibilities of superior force have to be reckoned with, it would be a great error to stake the whole force as soon as contact has been gained. This is often done on training-grounds in quite a systematic58 way, because there is always a tacit understanding that the enemy is no stronger than one's own force. In war such action might lead to the gravest disasters.
If, therefore, complete uncertainty reigns59 as to the enemy's strength, it will be better at first to operate tentatively with a portion of the force until an opinion can be arrived at as to whether the decisive attack can be ventured on. Energetic contact with the enemy by fire action will generally soon clear up this point.
The view that a gradual and judicious60 employment of force is not in accordance with the principles of cavalry action (430)[30] can only be justified61 in the case of[Pg 146] the pure cavalry combat mounted. This, however, in my opinion, should only be determined upon if the enemy's strength is known, at all events to some degree. I do not share the view of the Regulations that, if uncertainty reigns as to the strength and intentions of the enemy, freedom of action can be preserved, even in the mounted combat against cavalry, by the use of formations in échelon (424).[31] This is only possible by a protracted62 action in which gradual reinforcements are used, and only in such a manner can the enemy be forced to disclose his strength and intentions. A protracted fight, however, can only be carried out by fire action. A mounted advance, whether made in échelon or otherwise, cannot alter the rapid nature of a cavalry fight, and will not allow of sufficient time being gained to form a proper appreciation of the enemy. échelon formations lead at best to eccentric attacks and thereby to unfavorable tactical situations.
If the situation is to be cleared up by fighting, fire action must be employed, and as soon as this occurs, whether on the part of the enemy or oneself, a gradual employment of force is not only no disadvantage, but is demanded by the circumstances. For at first the fight must be carried out from depth; the Napoleonic "Je m'engage et puis je vois"[32] holds good; one's own main force will only be engaged when the strength and[Pg 147] intentions of the enemy become in some measure known. It will, however, be advisable in all cases to keep a strong reserve in hand until prepared to advance to a well-considered and planned attack.
The passage of defiles, also, is scarcely likely to be undertaken in serious war in the manner so often seen at man?uvres. Here the chief matter for consideration is generally to keep one side as far from the defile12 as possible, in order that the passage of the other may be possible. Such tender solicitude63 is scarcely to be expected of a real enemy, and it will, I opine, scarcely occur to anybody in war to attempt a defile without preparation, and to advance on the farther side against an enemy whose strength, as is generally the case in war, is unknown, thereby running the danger of being thrown back on the defile and of suffering enormous loss. Such a danger, to which the whole force is exposed, would certainly only be incurred64 when the gravest necessity compelled. What the Regulations say in this respect (434)[33] has, to my mind, but a limited practical significance.
Such directions would only be followed if the enemy were known to be still far distant and approaching, where there is time and space sufficient, and where the force is considered to be at least a match for the enemy. Even then, preparations should be made for a possible retirement66. In all other cases, however, a defile on the[Pg 148] far side of which the enemy is supposed to be will only be crossed when the ground for deployment on the far side is at least commanded with fire in such a way that the enemy will not be able, in case a retirement becomes necessary, to pursue right into the defile.
It will therefore generally be advisable to throw forward a few squadrons at a rapid pace across the defile in order to occupy with dismounted action strong points on the far side, from which the foreground can be covered. This will secure the passage of the main body and arrest any possible pursuit. It will often be advantageous to provide such squadrons with machine-guns. Artillery can most suitably come into action on the near side of the defile, so that it may be able to cover the country on the far side with its fire.
Even if a defile occupied by the enemy has been captured by fire action it is advisable, before the main body crosses it, to secure a few strong points in the foreground, in order to secure the passage against counter-attack by the enemy's reserve.
Such necessary care in the preliminaries of an action, however, must in nowise lead commanders to allow themselves to be forced to adopt a defensive attitude or to abstain67 from decisive attack. That is not the intention. Such measures are only taken to clear up the situation, which cannot generally be done in war without fighting, and to diminish the risks of any further action which may ensue. If the enemy has so far shown himself that an appreciation can to some extent be arrived at as to its strength, if he has brought artillery into position, if perhaps he has attacked our advanced guard, or by the action of the latter has been forced to throw more men into the fight, if, in short, it can be determined that an attack has prospect of success, then the decisive offensive must be undertaken[Pg 149] with all the force hitherto kept back. Detachments, also, which have been dismounted can then, according to circumstances, be withdrawn68 from the fire fight and otherwise used. The attack, especially when mounted, will usually be delivered with greatest advantage from the flank, and must, as a rule, reach well out in order to escape as far as possible the artillery and machine-gun fire of the enemy. Whether it be undertaken mounted or dismounted will depend upon the attitude of the enemy and the attendant circumstances. In either case it will be advisable to husband a reserve as long as possible to meet the vicissitudes70 of the fight, or to be used for a bold stroke, when it is seen where a decision may be arrived at.
If dismounted action must be undertaken, the principles which govern the infantry71 attack hold good. The fire of the artillery and, where possible, the machine-guns must naturally be utilised for the support of the attacking troops. The dispositions for the action should, however, never depend upon the possibility of finding a good artillery position. The artillery must suit itself to the circumstances, and come into action wherever it can best co-operate in carrying out the commander's intentions. It can often be profitably employed in the protection of an exposed flank. It will be of advantage to shelter it behind some obstacle in order to save the necessity of finding a detachment for its security. Machine-guns may sometimes be advantageously used for the protection of the artillery. It is at the same time advisable that a specially35 detailed cavalry escort should be dismounted for this object.
A concentration of the batteries facilitates fire command and measures for protection. A dispersion by groups allows a better effect against the hostile artillery and usually affords a more extensive field of fire.[Pg 150] Machine-guns, which must generally look for positions as far to the front as possible, or, if they are protected, to a flank, will usually be best concentrated in a single fire position. They may, however, be disposed by sections when occasion demands. This principle holds good also for the artillery. Hard-and-fast rules must be avoided if the many and varied72 demands of a cavalry fight are to be met. The line of fire, however, of artillery and machine-guns should never be allowed to limit the movements of our own cavalry.
In consequence of the peculiar73 nature of the cavalry fight it will often be desirable to keep the limbers with the guns. It may also be an advantage not to bring the first-line transport and a portion of the wagons74 on to the field itself. For similar reasons the light ammunition75 columns will at the commencement probably march with the baggage. Thus too it will often be necessary for the machine-gun detachments to keep their teams near the guns, or to shoot from the carriage and to leave the ammunition wagons in a safe place. All these measures contain, however, the danger that ammunition may not be at hand when wanted, or that these indispensable supplies may fall into the hands of hostile raiding parties. The failure of ammunition may, especially in the case of a protracted dismounted action, be of decisive importance. Such will be especially the case where the ground favours the use of the rifle, or where the hostile cavalry is strengthened by cyclists or mounted infantry and shows an eagerness (natural under such circumstances) to take advantage of such methods of fighting.
The cavalry leader will, under these conditions, only undertake what must be an obstinate76 combat when he cannot in any way avoid it, or at least is not compelled to attack frontally. He will rather endeavour, if the[Pg 151] general situation allows, to separate the hostile cavalry from the less mobile infantry by repeated turning movements and then to attack it when isolated77. If the hostile cavalry and horse artillery can be driven from the field, the infantry detachments will form an easy prey78 for the artillery or can be surrounded. Under such circumstances, always with due regard to the general situation, the road on which the advance is being made may for a time be abandoned and the turning movement carried out with the whole force, if such a proceeding79 affords a favourable prospect of tactical success. Such a movement threatens the enemy's communications in the same way as it exposes our own. Victory, however, will secure the latter again, and will be the more decisive the farther the enemy can be driven from his natural line of retreat.
Should the cavalry meet a superior force of all arms, such as might be pushed forward by the enemy's army, to support the offensive of his own cavalry, or to serve as a pivot80 of man?uvre for them, a decisive battle must on no account be undertaken with it.
When the Regulations (519)[34] demand that endeavours must be made to force back such detachments or to break through them, I think that the tactical value of the arm is over-estimated. I cannot conceive any real case in which cavalry can break through hostile detachments of all arms. In my opinion the cavalry will generally have to be content to make such detach[Pg 152]ments deploy, by means of artillery fire, and especially by fire action from a flank, and thereby to lose time, to deflect81 them from their line of march, and, by threatening their rear and communications, prevent them from carrying out their intentions. Bold measures are in such cases the best, and will preserve to the cavalry the possibility of continuing the distant reconnaissance in rear of the hostile detachment.
As to the leading, in all such battles of encounter the commander's place, as has already been indicated, is at the head of the advanced guard. As soon, however, as contact has been gained he must, on the contrary, remain far enough behind the fighting-line to be able to watch his own troops and the enemy, and to be easily found. He should not be wandering about the battlefield, seeing everything and arranging everything himself. Only where it appears necessary to him to make a moral impression should he place himself at the head of an attacking force. He might, especially, lead his last reserve into battle, and by his personal example endeavour to inspire the troops to an impetuous attack. Such cases, however, will be very exceptional. It will always be most important that the supreme82 commander retains control over the whole of his troops, and can receive messages and at decisive moments issue orders and instructions to the force.
In the greater number of cases the commander will personally neither reconnoitre the ground whither he is sending a detachment nor yet the enemy which it shall engage. He will scarcely ever be able to give to single small units or even to the directing brigade, if indeed he has detailed one, the direction of attack. It will often be impossible for changes in orders to reach troops once set in motion in time to be of use, especially in a purely cavalry fight.
[Pg 153]
When the Regulations, in spite of this, declare it to be indispensable that the leader himself must be able to see if he takes the offensive against cavalry (403),[35] this is, under modern conditions and large formations, in most cases quite impracticable, even in man?uvres. As a rule the commander will only be able to indicate the task, and it must be left to the subordinate leaders to carry it out to the best of their ability, according to the situation as they find it on the spot. The situation during the rapidly changing phases of the cavalry fight will often be quite different from what was expected when the tasks were allotted83.
On the other hand, before the commencement of the engagement, all subordinate leaders must be informed as to the situation and the general idea of the fight, also as to what duties each one of the larger formations is to carry out; so that all may be in a position to act according to the views and intentions of the commander if circumstances should be found different from what was expected. It will in most cases be desirable to issue the order for deployment in such a way that at least every brigade commander is informed of the general situation, and then to give supplementary85 orders for the fight which will be issued to all units. Whether in a battle of encounter it will be always possible to detail a directing brigade I very much doubt. One brigade will often fight on foot, the other mounted, while the change from the advanced-guard r?le to deployment for battle[Pg 154] will generally render a handling of the division according to rule practically impossible. The idea that, with an independent army cavalry in the battle of encounter, one division can in some measure be handled as on the drill-ground, and can be put into the fight in proper cohesion86, must be dismissed. That is an error that has grown upon the exercise-ground, and which the conditions of modern warfare87 will not admit.
The more, however, that the method of leading is compelled by the pressure of modern development to change from tactical routine and adopt a more or less strategic form, the more unconditionally88 is it demanded of subordinate leaders that they be, even when independent, continually conscious of the guiding tactical principles, and endeavour to act in accordance with them.
The necessary consideration for the effect of the enemy's fire should never lead to fainthearted dispositions or paralyse the idea of decisive offensive action. If the result of the fight appears doubtful, the most decisive measures must be taken with rapidity and determination, and the last reserve thrown into the fight, regardless of consequences, in order to wrest90 victory from the enemy. For daring is in itself a mighty91 factor of success, and one which exercises enormous influence on the fickle92 Goddess of Fortune. The calculated boldness of all, and the greatest initiative within reasonable limits of subordinate leaders, must give to the fight of the cavalry mass its peculiar character.
It appears to me that this principle cannot be too greatly emphasised when considering the cavalry tactics of the present day.
If the fight takes a favourable course, the commander will make timely preparations for an effective pursuit, get control of any reserves still intact, and take[Pg 155] measures for the concentration of strong bodies of his troops, so as to be prepared for further tactical action. Artillery and machine-guns advance rapidly—when necessary, on their own initiative—in order to come to effective range as soon as possible. Should the fight take an unfavourable turn, the commander will first make dispositions for these arms, unless they are to remain in position and sacrifice themselves to facilitate retirement. They will generally be sent to the rear in good time to a previously94 selected position. Only then will measures be taken to extricate95 the troops involved with the enemy, to concentrate them in a safe place, and to make fresh dispositions. Should the enemy pursue with but weak detachments, the offensive should be renewed.
2. Attack of Localities
The attack of an enemy who takes up a defensive attitude can obviously only be carried out dismounted. It must be a matter, therefore, for careful consideration whether such an operation shall be undertaken or not. Considerable numerical superiority is necessary to ensure success. A reserve will be needed, which can be used dismounted, to give the final decision at the decisive point, or to meet unexpected events. Besides this, it will be necessary in most cases to make a detachment which shall provide for the security of the led horses, for reconnaissance, and for operating against the enemy's flank and rear. It is the task of such a detachment to seek out and overthrow96 the enemy's mounted reserve, that it may then be able to co-operate in the main attack. The expression "Mounted reserve," used in the Regulations to designate this detachment, hardly corresponds with the r?le[Pg 156] of these troops, which will be offensive from the commencement.
Here also I find myself in disagreement with the idea of the Regulations that the dismounted reserve can be frequently detailed from the troops which have remained mounted (460).[36] The mounted reserve must, as we have seen, operate offensively. The Regulations themselves allot84 this task to it by laying down that it shall undertake operations against the enemy's flank, his led horses, and his reserves (464).[37] It is, however, not compatible with these duties that the mounted reserve shall at the same time find a dismounted reserve, which can only enter the fight from the rear, and until then must remain behind the fighting-line. Different troops must be detailed from the first for both these duties, otherwise neither of them will be properly carried out.
Should the cavalry commander not have at his disposal sufficient force to meet all these demands, he will generally be better advised to abstain from the attack, and to endeavour to carry out his mission in some other[Pg 157] manner. An unsuccessful enterprise not only entails97 unnecessary loss, but tends to lower the moral value of the troops. It is only when conscious of great moral and tactical superiority, or when there is a prospect of surprising the enemy, that an attack should be dared without the necessary numerical preponderance.
The more difficult and serious such an undertaking8 is, the greater efforts must be made to gain at least a favourable base for attack, as regards not only the direction of the attack but also any special advantages of the ground. The mobility98 of the troops renders rapid changes of direction possible, such as are unknown to the infantry. Unlike the case of the infantry, therefore, the line of advance and of attack need not coincide. If thorough reconnaissance of the enemy's position, and the ground in front of it, is made in good time, it will often be possible to change the base of attack even at the last moment and to appear suddenly from an unexpected direction.
Therefore, even in the approach, the deployment, and the advance to effective range, the ground should be carefully utilised in order that cover from view and fire may be secured as long as possible. It is also important to clear the country where the approach and deployment will take place of the enemy's patrols, and to do everything possible to prevent his reconnaissance.
Artillery and machine-guns must come into action in such a way that they will be able to combine with the firing-line in concentrating an overwhelming fire against the decisive points of attack. The guns will generally be able to come into action under cover, and to fire indirect against the enemy in position. They will only engage the enemy's artillery if the latter shows itself in open or half-covered positions with the[Pg 158] object of turning its fire on the advancing attack. Otherwise the fire of the artillery will be directed against the enemy's firing-line or any mounted detachments that are visible. It is of importance that a sufficient quantity of ammunition should be brought up, and that it should not be wasted by random99 fire against invisible targets.
The orders for the fight must be issued with great care and clearness, for, once the battle is begun, it will not generally be possible to make changes of disposition37. The difficulty, also, of changing the front of the fighting-line increases in proportion to the size of the units employed. It is therefore of the highest importance not only to determine the front of attack before the commencement of a fight, but also to give a clear order allotting100 a definite task to each unit, which should, when possible, be made known to all the troops. Only if this is achieved will they be able to act independently according to the spirit of the orders.
When all preparatory dispositions have been made, the attack should, if possible, be commenced simultaneously101, unless circumstances demand that some detachments take up the fire fight before the others are ready to co-operate. From the moment that the attack is commenced, but one thought should inspire the troops: "Forward against the enemy, cost what it may." Pressing continually to the front, each must endeavour to surpass his neighbour. Should further advance be impossible without reinforcements, the ground won must be maintained at all costs, even against hostile counter-attack.
The strength of the first deployment of the firing-line must depend on circumstances. In any case the whole breadth of that part of the enemy's front must be simultaneously engaged which is able to direct its[Pg 159] fire against the attack, as otherwise the latter will be exposed to flanking or cross-fire.
If the ground allows of a covered approach to within effective range, a sufficiently102 thick firing-line should be established at once. On the other hand, where cover is scarce, it will sometimes be advisable, when sufficient time can be spared, to deploy at first only a loose, irregular firing-line, which will offer a difficult target to the enemy, or to remain at first under cover and gradually to strengthen the firing-line in the same way until it attains103 the strength necessary to commence the attack. In the further advance, supports must follow all the firing-lines, to make good losses, keep up the ammunition supply, and to put new moral strength into the fighting-line.
Open country in such cases demands increased depth in order to minimise loss, while close country requires that depth should be diminished, and it will be found advisable to act accordingly. Close formation can and must be maintained as long as the terrain and the hostile fire admit. It will of course be impossible to expose such formations within range of the enemy's fire. The advance will then consist of rushes, with pauses for breath, of distribution into small units, and the adoption104 of extended order. The nearer the decision of the fight, the closer must the supports follow, ready to co-operate.
In difficult country the order and cohesion of units must not be lost. It is especially important for the supports as well as the firing-line to make use of any available cover, so that units may be re-formed, ammunition supply regulated, and that the officers may regain44 their influence over the troops. This latter moral element deserves especial consideration.
When feeling its way forward the firing-line should[Pg 160] avoid regular formation, and its rushes should not be made in too small bodies, as such a proceeding is apt to mask the fire of neighbouring detachments. It will likewise generally happen that some portions of the line are able to advance under cover of the ground more rapidly than others. These must then ask themselves the question whether their isolated advance might not lead to a reverse which would imperil the success of the attack. On the other hand, the unceasing pressing forward of all the various detachments is conditional89 to success. If localities exist in the foreground which might serve as supporting points for the further development of the attack, it should be considered whether they should not be occupied as rapidly as possible, and, where necessary, secured against counter-attack by being placed in a state of hasty defence. The advance of neighbouring detachments may then be facilitated from such points by energetic fire action. Such points at the same time secure the possession of the ground won and, under certain circumstances, protect those portions of the artillery and the machine-gun detachments which may accompany the attack, according as circumstances dictate105. In any case such a measure (the co-operation of artillery and machine-guns) brings moral support to the attacking-line, and may at times prevent a defeat.
As soon as the firing-line has arrived within assaulting distance its fire must be increased to the utmost. All detachments in rear press forward regardless of loss as soon as they become aware that the first line is preparing for the assault. At the trumpet-call "Rapid advance"[38] the whole hurl106 themselves with the greatest determination and with loud cheers upon the enemy. Any reserves which may be still to the rear strain[Pg 161] every nerve to reach the advanced firing-line. The assault should, if possible, be simultaneous. But the effort to secure this should never lead to detachments waiting for each other. Where a possibility is offered to single portions of the force to penetrate107 into the enemy's position they must advance independently, and all other detachments must conform.
It is important that the assault should not be begun too early, but that the firing-line should work its way forward to the closest range before rising for the final charge. The Infantry Drill Regulations lay down 150 paces as a guide for this distance in peace. That is a great deal too much. I do not think that the firing-line, especially in deep ground or uphill, can "rush" forward in full marching order 150 paces after having already carried out a lengthy108 attack. These instructions of the Infantry Drill should certainly be modified. Cavalry, however, should not fall into this error. A premature109 assault may imperil the success of the attack, because physical force may fail, and the enemy's fire is given a chance of regaining110 its full strength. The fire weapon should rather be used up to the last moment. The assault should take place only from the closest possible distance, and this will ensure success. For the rest, I may draw attention to the instructions laid down in the Cavalry Drill for the dispositions for the attack and for its conduct. On these points it coincides with my view, and it would be superfluous111 here to repeat what lies therein. If I have gone into the question of the conduct of the attack rather more closely, it is to emphasise93 certain points that are not prominent enough in the compressed instructions of the Regulations, and which do not generally receive sufficient consideration.
[Pg 162]
As to surprise fire action, also, the Regulations contain all the essentials (471-473).[39]
I may, however, touch here upon another matter which is connected with dismounted action, i.e. the question of armament. It has often been proposed, and from influential112 quarters, to replace the cavalry sword by some kind of a bayonet. If, it is said, with a certain appearance of justification113, cavalry are to assault hostile positions on foot, they must have some arme blanche for the hand-to-hand fight, and this can only be a bayonet. The war in Manchuria, where such mêlées repeatedly took place, is cited as a proof of the necessity of such an armament. I cannot ally myself with such proposals. As to the repeated hand-to-hand fights in the Russo-Japanese war, these took place principally because the Russians found it impossible to evacuate their entrenchments in time, and that they took such full advantage of cover that they were in some measure surprised by the attacker. These examples can certainly not be adapted therefore to the dismounted action of our cavalry. With them it will[Pg 163] never be a question of prepared positions—which cavalry will, as a rule, neither attack nor defend—but of actions resulting from a battle of encounter. In such cases, however, as the experience of military history teaches us, a hand-to-hand fight is quite exceptional. Even the struggle for localities is fought out almost entirely114 with the firearm. If the defence should consist of dismounted cavalry and cyclists, it cannot as a rule be assumed that such troops will allow the attack to come to close quarters. They will more generally, as soon as the decision of the fire fight has become clear, endeavour to reach their horses or cycles and to escape the fire of the pursuit. As a matter of fact, therefore, dismounted cavalry would really only use the bayonet on foot in quite exceptional cases, and it would only be justifiable115 to introduce it if there were no attendant disadvantages. Such, however, is not the case. I would regard the abolition116 of the present sword as a great danger, calculated to seriously injure the morale117 of the cavalry.
Our lance is an excellent weapon for the charge, but for single combat only in cases where the men have freedom of movement. In the close turmoil118 of the fight it is very difficult to handle with success; besides which, it easily becomes unserviceable on striking an object too heavily. Should it pierce a body at the full speed of a horse's gallop119 it will generally bend on being drawn69 out (if indeed the rider in his haste extricates120 it at all), and then becomes unserviceable. In such a case the man needs his sword. A short bayonet can never replace this, and a compromise between a bayonet and a sword would be of but little service. If the sword is taken away from the cavalry soldier he will be rendered in many cases weaponless. There can be no doubt of this. And the consciousness of this drawback would very[Pg 164] soon be felt by the troops and would damp their eagerness for the fight.
The case, then, is this. When confronted by a hostile cavalry of any activity, the mounted combat, the mêlée, at least for smaller detachments and patrols, will be of almost daily occurrence; while, as we have seen, the hand-to-hand fight on foot must be most exceptional. To injure the efficiency of the troops for their daily r?le for the sake of such isolated occurrences I hold to be a great mistake, and therefore hope that the arm will be spared this fate.
3. Defence
As regards the principles of the defence, I may draw attention to the instructions laid down in the new Cavalry Regulations, which coincide with my views in all essentials. There are, however, still a few points to be raised which seem to me of importance.
First and foremost, I think that it follows, from the above arguments, that, in the case of cavalry operating independently, engagements may often take place which, with a generally offensive intention, must be conducted at times in a defensive spirit and with only part of the troops—that is to say, where it is not the intention to act on the defensive with the whole force, but to use the defence only as a means of resuming the general offensive later at the most advantageous time. It will be possible, especially in the battle of encounter, to defend favourable positions or localities with the advanced troops, either to gain time for the arrival of the main body, or else to oblige the enemy to weaken his reserves, against which the offensive is intended. This combination of attack and defence will frequently occur, I am convinced, even in the battle of encounter.
[Pg 165]
In such cases the defence must endeavour to deceive the opponent and to provoke the attack. Efforts will be made, while putting but few men into the fight, to give the impression of strength in the firing-line, and yet so to dispose the troops that attack will not appear impossible, if carried out in sufficient force. Groups of men on a broad front, a liberal expenditure121 of ammunition, and sometimes the holding back of artillery and machine-guns, are the means whereby the enemy may be thus misled.
But, even if the defensive on a large scale is adopted because the force is considered too weak to take the offensive in the open, the guiding principle will still be, as I have already indicated, to obtain a decision in the defensive fight by an offensive counter-stroke, in so far as the force and the circumstances of the ground in any way permit. This is a fundamental principle of the spirit of cavalry.
The force destined122 for the counter-attack should accordingly be detailed from the first. Efforts must be made, by using favourable country for the defensive front and thus being able to occupy it weakly, to spare every available man for the counter-attack, and to compensate123 for the weakness of the force in position by ample ammunition, well-arranged cross-fire, and similar measures. The troops designed to play the offensive r?le must first be placed in reserve, withdrawn, as far as possible, from view and fire of the enemy. As soon as the situation is cleared up, they will be placed in échelon behind that flank from which the counter-stroke will take place. Whether this will be a mounted or dismounted attack depends on the character of the ground and similar circumstances. In any case a base for attack outside the limits of the enemy's fire must be reached, and, where possible, by surprise.
[Pg 166]
It is therefore of the highest importance that the enemy shall be prevented from gaining observation as to the conduct of the reserve, in order that its presence may eventually come as a surprise to him. Hostile patrols must be attacked with remorseless energy wherever seen, and, if possible, put out of action. Those look-out points, on the other hand, from which observation can be made of the enemy must be occupied early in the fight.
The cavalry will, as a rule, only undertake a completely passive defence, where the object of the fight is to hold the crossing over some obstacle, to defend isolated localities, or to gain time. In such a case the question is one of the obstinate defence of a definite object, sometimes perhaps, also, of a retirement from one point to another. Such an operation, however, is always difficult to carry out on account of the led horses, and should only be attempted in very favorable country. It demands that the fight shall be broken off—always a difficult matter, and, to cavalry encumbered124 by their led horses, one of considerable danger. The horses certainly render it possible, by making a proper use of the ground, to withdraw more rapidly than could infantry in the same case. On the other hand, however, they tie the dismounted troops down to a definite direction of retreat, and remounting, when pressed by the enemy, is always a critical matter.
4. Breaking off the Fight, Retreat, and Pursuit
When it becomes apparent during the course of a fight that success cannot ensue, the commander must decide in good time whether he will carry the engagement through or break it off. To choose the right moment for the latter operation is generally extraordi[Pg 167]narily difficult, even when it has been planned from the commencement. To make the necessary dispositions, also, demands great tactical skill. To continue the fight with determination, perhaps till nightfall, will often cost no greater sacrifice than the breaking off of the engagement and the attendant retreat.
Generally speaking, such engagements will only be those which are fought out on foot. The more open the country, the closer the enemy, and the greater the number of troops which have already been thrown into the fighting-line, so much the more difficult will it usually be to break off the fight. The circumstance also as to whether the led horses are mobile or immobile, and their position, will naturally influence the decision. On the other hand, it is easier to extricate the force after some success has been gained; whether it be that a hostile attack has been repulsed125, or that our own troops have made a successful counter-stroke. History teaches us that at such moments there is generally a lull126, during which the opponent is obliged to bring up fresh troops or to make fresh tactical dispositions.
Even under such favourable conditions, however, it will generally be impossible to break loose from the enemy without suffering heavy loss.
In defence, if the ground is especially favourable, it will certainly be possible at times to extricate a force without considerable loss. If it can rapidly withdraw from the firing-line and retire covered from pursuing fire, the whole force may under certain circumstances simultaneously evacuate a position, that is to say, if the enemy is still so far distant that he is unable to employ pursuing fire until the defender127 has reached a place of safety. How seldom, however, will such be the case! Small detachments will generally have to be sacrificed[Pg 168] to secure the retreat of the main body. This means that various especially strong supporting points in the position will be occupied, and the force will withdraw under cover of them.
Military history offers us repeated examples where the attacker makes desperate endeavours to overpower such points, and in so doing forgets to pursue the withdrawing masses of the defender's troops. This, for example, was the part played at the battle of Weissenburg by Geisberg Castle and Schafbusch, and the chateau128 with its enclosed park at the battle of Coulmiers. Under cover of these points, against which all the efforts of the French were concentrated, the defenders129 were able in both cases to withdraw so slightly molested130 that even touch with them was completely lost.
The defence of such supporting points, which must be conducted with the utmost obstinacy131, frequently ends in capture, but the end gained is worth the sacrifice. If the endeavour is made to withdraw the whole line of defence simultaneously under circumstances where it is possible for the attacker to bring to bear an effective pursuing fire from the captured position, loss will generally be much greater than that which would be deliberately132 incurred in arresting the pursuit.
The conditions are similar in attack. At man?uvres certainly we see the attacker when repulsed turn about, and, in a continuous retreat, lay himself open to a pursuing fire, which would mean absolute destruction. I do not think such a man?uvre possible in reality. As the advance has been by stages, so must be the retreat. But, whereas in the advance it was a matter of pressing forward on a wide connected front, in order to hold the whole of the enemy's position under fire, and not of massing together where cover could be[Pg 169] obtained, the exact contrary is the case in retreat, and the troops must seek any cover that will shelter them from the fire of the pursuit. Various strong points in the attack which have already been taken and occupied must be obstinately133 held during the retirement, and from them a heavy fire poured into the pursuit to bring it to a standstill. Care should be taken, even during an advance, to keep such places well supplied with ammunition, which can either be taken forward to the captured position or be at the disposal of the retiring troops.
I do not think that it will be possible in any other manner to break off an attack which has penetrated134 to within effective range of the enemy, or to carry out a compulsory135 retreat without disastrous136 loss.
The troops must fall back, obstinately contesting the ground and continually recommencing fire from any favourable position. The commander must make careful preparations, even when advancing, that a possible retreat shall not lead to disaster, but will be able to find prepared points of support. All detachments, however, that are outside the effective range of the enemy's fire, and still capable of man?uvre, especially artillery and machine-guns, must from commanding positions bring fire to bear on those troops which are harassing137 the retreat, regardless of the losses they may themselves incur65. In such a moment everything must be subordinated to delivering the retreating masses from that destruction which the fire of the pursuit portends138. Any advance of pursuing cavalry, also, must be met by heavy fire from such detachments, regardless of the expenditure of ammunition.
A retreat, then, requires particularly intelligent handling. The various detachments must be provided with instructions that are clear and definite. The com[Pg 170]mander must have his troops well in hand, must arrange for the occupation of any positions, decide which detachments shall cover the retreat, dispose of the artillery and machine-guns, determine the line of retreat of the various units, with due regard to the situation of their led horses, and arrange for the occupation of the rallying position. He should himself only leave the field when the force has got clear of the enemy. He must then, however, straightway attend to the rearrangement of the tactical dispositions, and take the other necessary measures. Any reserve still in hand must be used to check the pursuit where possible by a vigorous offensive. It is just in such situations that a determined counter-attack, even by a weak force, makes the greatest impression on the enemy.
As to the further conduct of the retreat after a successful extrication139, definite instructions are naturally impossible. Everything depends on the circumstances of the moment. The possibilities of resuming the offensive must be borne in mind, even during a retirement. To this end it is frequently advisable to fall back partially140 towards a flank. Gneisenau, after the defeat at Ligny, directed the retreat on Wavre, in order to be able to take up the offensive again on the following day, and thus supplied us with a brilliant example well worthy141 of imitation even where the forces engaged are but small.
If it is a matter of mounted combat, the breaking off of the actual fight is quite impossible. Troops once engaged must carry the fight through. Even when retreating from the mêlée, fighting cavalry has no kind of means of extricating142 itself. It is then entirely dependent on the enemy, and can only retire at the most rapid speed. Reserves alone are able to bring the immediate pursuit to a standstill by intervening in[Pg 171] the running fight. Generally, however, this will only end when the horses of the victor are quite exhausted143, or when the latter feels the necessity of getting his troops in hand and forming again for fresh duties. The further conduct of the vanquished144 troops must depend on the condition of the horses and the general situation. It is of importance to withdraw beyond the reach of the enemy as soon as possible in order that full freedom of action may be regained.
If the fire of the hostile artillery is to be feared, it is advisable to retire extended without regard to tactical formations, and making the best possible use of the ground. The troops will then only rally again beyond the range of the enemy's fire. The same naturally holds good for the retreat from a dismounted action after the men have remounted.
The commander will be well advised to inform his senior subordinates, if not all the troops, before the fight begins where the troops are to concentrate again in case of a reverse. The necessity for such dispositions generally passes unnoticed in peace, because pursuit is never thoroughly145 carried out, and the beaten troops are not so completely broken up as has repeatedly happened in war in the past and will happen again. We should not deceive ourselves in this matter, as otherwise there is a danger of completely losing control over the troops. Whoever expects to be able to rally a beaten cavalry division after a mounted fight by blowing the divisional call lays himself open to bitter disappointment. If the enemy is pursuing with energy, this will only be possible in the very rarest cases.
Before the commencement of the fight, arrangements must also be made for the rear communication, as there will otherwise be a danger of losing transport, and thereby ability to operate. Far to the rear or close at[Pg 172] hand are the two only possible positions for it. In the first case an escort whose strength will be dictated146 by the circumstances will always be necessary.
It should also be remembered that wagons should be able to turn round where they are halted. If single teams are unable to turn about on their own ground, it will be better to park the whole of the transport in such a way that it can easily be moved in any direction. It is then also easier to protect it against attack. If there is no fear of attack, the various columns may turn off the road with intervals corresponding to their length. It appears to me to be of especial importance to lay stress on these circumstances because in peace exercises there is no transport, and commanders consequently get accustomed to paying little attention to it.
As regards the pursuit, it is necessary to differentiate147 between a tactical and a strategical pursuit. The latter must crown the success of the former.
In mounted action, the beaten opponent must be kept at the point of the sword as long as the strength of the horses hold out. Detachments not immediately pursuing must be concentrated, and must seek to regain their ability for man?uvre as soon as possible.
After a dismounted action on the defensive, the pursuit will first be taken up by rifle fire. Any mounted reserve there may be should be launched to the charge against the retiring enemy as soon as the pursuing fire begins to cease to be effective. A victorious148 attack, on the other hand, must make every endeavour to gain the position vacated by the enemy, and to occupy ground from whence an effective pursuing fire is possible. The bringing up of the led horses will be of special importance in this case. If they are immobile, a portion of the men must be sent to the rear to bring them up, while the remainder hold the captured position. Any[Pg 173] mounted reserves there may be can often be employed to bring up at least a portion of the led horses. Generally speaking, however, all troops not already engaged must, as we have already shown, take up the strategic pursuit as early as possible. This will supplement and complete the results of the tactical pursuit.
Never to let the enemy rest, even when the tactical pursuit has ceased, to prevent him regaining his cohesion, to capture prisoners, horses, and trophies149, and, above all, to increase to the utmost the moral effects of his defeat, is the task before us. The immediate pursuit must therefore be combined, wherever possible, with a parallel pursuit commenced in good time. The latter must nip in the bud every attempt on the part of the retiring enemy to take up rearguard positions, by turning such positions and pressing forward with reckless energy against the actual lines of retreat. It must also endeavour to anticipate the enemy in the occupation of any defiles necessary to his retreat. At such times there must be no thought of sparing horseflesh. Even in this pursuit, however, the commander must give a definite object and a rallying point for the detachments following. He will otherwise, by reason of rapidity of the movements in progress, risk losing control of at least part of his troops, and of allowing them to go farther than the strategical situation demands or admits. For the rest, I may draw attention to the new Cavalry Drill Regulations, the compressed instructions of which contain much that is essential and coincide generally with my views.
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1
cavalry
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| n.骑兵；轻装甲部队 | |
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entrusted
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| v.委托，托付( entrust的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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dispersing
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| adj. 分散的 动词disperse的现在分词形式 | |
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gatherings
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| 聚集( gathering的名词复数 )； 收集； 采集； 搜集 | |
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partisans
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| 游击队员( partisan的名词复数 )； 党人； 党羽； 帮伙 | |
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levying
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| 征（兵）( levy的现在分词 )； 索取； 发动（战争）； 征税 | |
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undertakings
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| 企业( undertaking的名词复数 )； 保证； 殡仪业； 任务 | |
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undertaking
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| n.保证，许诺，事业 | |
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phenomena
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| n.现象 | |
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forth
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| adv.向前；向外，往外 | |
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defensive
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| adj.防御的；防卫的；防守的 | |
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defile
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| v.弄污，弄脏；n.(山间)小道 | |
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defiles
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| v.玷污( defile的第三人称单数 )；污染；弄脏；纵列行进 | |
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jumble
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| vt.使混乱，混杂；n.混乱；杂乱的一堆 | |
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judgment
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| n.审判；判断力，识别力，看法，意见 | |
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lesser
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| adj.次要的，较小的；adv.较小地，较少地 | |
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mutual
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| adj.相互的，彼此的；共同的，共有的 | |
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essentially
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| adv.本质上，实质上，基本上 | |
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deploy
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| v.（军）散开成战斗队形，布置，展开 | |
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adversary
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| adj.敌手，对手 | |
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deploying
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| （尤指军事行动）使展开( deploy的现在分词 )； 施展； 部署； 有效地利用 | |
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terrain
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| n.地面，地形，地图 | |
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purely
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| adv.纯粹地，完全地 | |
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deployment
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| n. 部署,展开 | |
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exterior
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| adj.外部的，外在的；表面的 | |
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artillery
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| n.(军)火炮，大炮；炮兵(部队) | |
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deployed
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| （尤指军事行动）使展开( deploy的过去式和过去分词 )； 施展； 部署； 有效地利用 | |
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advantageous
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| adj.有利的；有帮助的 | |
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annihilate
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| v.使无效；毁灭；取消 | |
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precipitate
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| adj.突如其来的；vt.使突然发生；n.沉淀物 | |
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distresses
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| n.悲痛( distress的名词复数 )；痛苦；贫困；危险 | |
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appreciation
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| n.评价；欣赏；感谢；领会，理解；价格上涨 | |
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immediate
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| adj.立即的；直接的，最接近的；紧靠的 | |
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proximity
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| n.接近，邻近 | |
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specially
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| adv.特定地；特殊地；明确地 | |
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prospect
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| n.前景，前途；景色，视野 | |
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disposition
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| n.性情，性格；意向，倾向；排列，部署 | |
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dispositions
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| 安排( disposition的名词复数 )； 倾向； （财产、金钱的）处置； 气质 | |
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counteract
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| vt.对…起反作用，对抗，抵消 | |
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conceal
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| v.隐藏，隐瞒，隐蔽 | |
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dribbling
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| n.（燃料或油从系统内）漏泄v.流口水( dribble的现在分词 )；（使液体）滴下或作细流；运球，带球 | |
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hampered
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| 妨碍，束缚，限制( hamper的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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regained
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| 复得( regain的过去式和过去分词 )； 赢回； 重回； 复至某地 | |
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regain
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| vt.重新获得，收复，恢复 | |
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intervals
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| n.[军事]间隔( interval的名词复数 )；间隔时间；[数学]区间；（戏剧、电影或音乐会的）幕间休息 | |
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secondly
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| adv.第二，其次 | |
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determined
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| adj.坚定的；有决心的 | |
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inevitable
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| adj.不可避免的，必然发生的 | |
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49
junction
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| n.连接，接合；交叉点，接合处，枢纽站 | |
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50
risky
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| adj.有风险的，冒险的 | |
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51
rectified
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| [医]矫正的，调整的 | |
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52
uncertainty
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| n.易变，靠不住，不确知，不确定的事物 | |
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53
favourable
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| adj.赞成的，称赞的，有利的，良好的，顺利的 | |
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54
thereby
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| adv.因此，从而 | |
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55
entail
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| vt.使承担，使成为必要，需要 | |
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56
detailed
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| adj.详细的，详尽的，极注意细节的，完全的 | |
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57
evacuate
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| v.遣送；搬空；抽出；排泄；大(小)便 | |
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58
systematic
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| adj.有系统的，有计划的，有方法的 | |
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59
reigns
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| n.君主的统治( reign的名词复数 )；君主统治时期；任期；当政期 | |
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60
judicious
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| adj.明智的，明断的，能作出明智决定的 | |
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61
justified
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| a.正当的，有理的 | |
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62
protracted
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| adj.拖延的；延长的v.拖延“protract”的过去式和过去分词 | |
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63
solicitude
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| n.焦虑 | |
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64
incurred
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| [医]招致的，遭受的； incur的过去式 | |
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65
incur
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| vt.招致，蒙受，遭遇 | |
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66
retirement
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| n.退休，退职 | |
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67
abstain
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| v.自制，戒绝，弃权，避免 | |
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68
withdrawn
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| vt.收回；使退出；vi.撤退，退出 | |
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69
drawn
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| v.拖，拉，拔出；adj.憔悴的，紧张的 | |
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70
vicissitudes
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| n.变迁，世事变化；变迁兴衰( vicissitude的名词复数 )；盛衰兴废 | |
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71
infantry
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| n.[总称]步兵(部队) | |
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72
varied
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| adj.多样的，多变化的 | |
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73
peculiar
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| adj.古怪的，异常的；特殊的，特有的 | |
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74
wagons
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| n.四轮的运货马车( wagon的名词复数 )；铁路货车；小手推车 | |
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75
ammunition
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| n.军火，弹药 | |
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76
obstinate
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| adj.顽固的，倔强的，不易屈服的，较难治愈的 | |
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77
isolated
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| adj.与世隔绝的 | |
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78
prey
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| n.被掠食者，牺牲者，掠食；v.捕食，掠夺，折磨 | |
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79
proceeding
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| n.行动，进行，(pl.)会议录，学报 | |
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80
pivot
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| v.在枢轴上转动；装枢轴，枢轴；adj.枢轴的 | |
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81
deflect
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| v.(使)偏斜，(使)偏离，(使)转向 | |
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82
supreme
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| adj.极度的，最重要的；至高的，最高的 | |
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83
allotted
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| 分配，拨给，摊派( allot的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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84
allot
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| v.分配；拨给；n.部分；小块菜地 | |
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85
supplementary
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| adj.补充的，附加的 | |
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86
cohesion
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| n.团结，凝结力 | |
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87
warfare
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| n.战争(状态)；斗争；冲突 | |
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88
unconditionally
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| adv.无条件地 | |
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89
conditional
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| adj.条件的，带有条件的 | |
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90
wrest
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| n.扭，拧，猛夺；v.夺取，猛扭，歪曲 | |
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91
mighty
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| adj.强有力的；巨大的 | |
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92
fickle
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| adj.(爱情或友谊上)易变的，不坚定的 | |
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93
emphasise
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| vt.加强...的语气，强调，着重 | |
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94
previously
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| adv.以前，先前（地） | |
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95
extricate
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| v.拯救，救出；解脱 | |
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96
overthrow
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| v.推翻，打倒，颠覆；n.推翻，瓦解，颠覆 | |
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97
entails
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| 使…成为必要( entail的第三人称单数 )； 需要； 限定继承； 使必需 | |
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98
mobility
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| n.可动性，变动性，情感不定 | |
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99
random
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| adj.随机的；任意的；n.偶然的(或随便的)行动 | |
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100
allotting
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| 分配，拨给，摊派( allot的现在分词 ) | |
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101
simultaneously
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| adv.同时发生地，同时进行地 | |
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102
sufficiently
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| adv.足够地，充分地 | |
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103
attains
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| （通常经过努力）实现( attain的第三人称单数 )； 达到； 获得； 达到（某年龄、水平、状况） | |
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104
adoption
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| n.采用，采纳，通过；收养 | |
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105
dictate
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| v.口授；(使)听写；指令，指示，命令 | |
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106
hurl
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| vt.猛投，力掷，声叫骂 | |
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107
penetrate
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| v.透(渗)入；刺入，刺穿；洞察，了解 | |
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108
lengthy
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| adj.漫长的，冗长的 | |
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109
premature
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| adj.比预期时间早的；不成熟的，仓促的 | |
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110
regaining
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| 复得( regain的现在分词 )； 赢回； 重回； 复至某地 | |
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111
superfluous
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| adj.过多的，过剩的，多余的 | |
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112
influential
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| adj.有影响的，有权势的 | |
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113
justification
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| n.正当的理由；辩解的理由 | |
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114
entirely
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| ad.全部地，完整地；完全地，彻底地 | |
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115
justifiable
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| adj.有理由的，无可非议的 | |
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116
abolition
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| n.废除，取消 | |
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117
morale
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| n.道德准则，士气，斗志 | |
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118
turmoil
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| n.骚乱，混乱，动乱 | |
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119
gallop
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| v./n.(马或骑马等)飞奔；飞速发展 | |
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120
extricates
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| v.使摆脱困难，脱身( extricate的第三人称单数 ) | |
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121
expenditure
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| n.(时间、劳力、金钱等)支出；使用，消耗 | |
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122
destined
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| adj.命中注定的；(for)以…为目的地的 | |
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123
compensate
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| vt.补偿，赔偿；酬报 vi.弥补；补偿；抵消 | |
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124
encumbered
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| v.妨碍，阻碍，拖累( encumber的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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125
repulsed
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| v.击退( repulse的过去式和过去分词 )；驳斥；拒绝 | |
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126
lull
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| v.使安静，使入睡，缓和，哄骗；n.暂停，间歇 | |
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127
defender
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| n.保卫者，拥护者，辩护人 | |
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128
chateau
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| n.城堡，别墅 | |
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129
defenders
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| n.防御者( defender的名词复数 )；守卫者；保护者；辩护者 | |
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130
molested
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| v.骚扰( molest的过去式和过去分词 )；干扰；调戏；猥亵 | |
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131
obstinacy
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| n.顽固；（病痛等）难治 | |
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132
deliberately
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| adv.审慎地；蓄意地；故意地 | |
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133
obstinately
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| ad.固执地，顽固地 | |
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134
penetrated
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| adj. 击穿的，鞭辟入里的 动词penetrate的过去式和过去分词形式 | |
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135
compulsory
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| n.强制的，必修的；规定的，义务的 | |
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136
disastrous
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| adj.灾难性的，造成灾害的；极坏的，很糟的 | |
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137
harassing
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| v.侵扰，骚扰( harass的现在分词 )；不断攻击（敌人） | |
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138
portends
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| v.预示( portend的第三人称单数 )；预兆；给…以警告；预告 | |
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139
extrication
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| n.解脱；救出，解脱 | |
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140
partially
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| adv.部分地，从某些方面讲 | |
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141
worthy
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| adj.(of)值得的，配得上的；有价值的 | |
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142
extricating
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| v.使摆脱困难，脱身( extricate的现在分词 ) | |
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143
exhausted
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| adj.极其疲惫的，精疲力尽的 | |
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144
vanquished
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| v.征服( vanquish的过去式和过去分词 )；战胜；克服；抑制 | |
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145
thoroughly
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| adv.完全地，彻底地，十足地 | |
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146
dictated
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| v.大声讲或读( dictate的过去式和过去分词 )；口授；支配；摆布 | |
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147
differentiate
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| vi.(between)区分；vt.区别；使不同 | |
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148
victorious
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| adj.胜利的，得胜的 | |
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149
trophies
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| n.（为竞赛获胜者颁发的）奖品( trophy的名词复数 )；奖杯；（尤指狩猎或战争中获得的）纪念品；（用于比赛或赛跑名称）奖 | |
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