If, therefore, the strength and intentions of the enemy are not fully3 known, it will be better, as we have seen, to guard against engaging the whole force in such an uncertain enterprise. Efforts should rather be made, as I have endeavoured to show, to clear up the situation by a careful feeling of the enemy and a gradual engagement of force. Once possessed4 of this knowledge of the situation, it will be possible either to seek a decision or to break off the fight in time to avoid the risk of incurring5 too considerable a loss.
Quite different is the case in the main battle. Here the objective is contained in the battle itself. It is the destruction of the enemy that is sought. It is not expected that each single detachment engaged should be victorious6, but that the net result of the battle should be a victory. The task of the various detachments is only to engage and to destroy so much of the enemy's force as lies within their power. This naturally holds good for the cavalry. It is not now demanded that each single action of the cavalry should of itself be successful, but that the general engagement of the cavalry should have the greatest possible effect. A considerable result may often be obtained by the at[Pg 175]tacking cavalry drawing the enemy's fire upon itself for a time, and thus affording the infantry7 the possibility of gaining ground to the front, or of re-forming and receiving reinforcements.
To break off the main battle is generally quite out of the question. The very fact that the battle has been begun betokens8 the intention of carrying it through to a final decision, even where the enemy has shown himself to be in superior force. The various troops which advance to the conflict need not therefore reflect whether they have any special prospect9 of success, but must strive for this success with all their power. This means for the cavalry, in by far the greater number of cases, always at least where a charge is in prospect, the simultaneous engaging of its whole fighting strength, naturally in that tactical formation which the conditions of weapons demand. If in its independent operations cavalry must be dealt with as a strategical body, and thus employed in the fight, it is in the main battle a purely10 tactical body, which must be engaged en masse, and not in detail. This contrast appears, at least to me, to be an obvious one. There is another that is equally clear.
In independent operations it is the duty of the cavalry, before all else, to defeat the enemy's cavalry. Victory over the latter creates the possibility of carrying out its proper task, that of reconnoitring and screening, without being involved in further fighting on a large scale. In the main battle, however, it would be taking quite a false view of its duty if it were to restrict itself to driving the hostile cavalry from the field. Victory over the latter has indeed a certain value, as it paralyses its further action, but it will, in most cases, be comparatively useless for the main issue of the battle unless further consequences result from[Pg 176] it. A victory over the hostile cavalry only receives its particular importance when by it the possibility is gained of intervening in the decisive encounter of the other arms, and of acting11 unhindered when, in the course of events, it becomes a matter either of pursuit or of covering a retreat.
Finally, in independent operations, even small detachments can aim at great results, and a division of force will frequently be indicated. In the great battle, however, any considerable effect can only be attained by the action of the mass. The reason for this lies in the size of modern armies.
It will be advisable to concentrate the mass of the cavalry at what are considered the decisive points, in order to be able to engage it simultaneously12. Any frittering away of force upon the field of battle will strike the troops with impotence. We have only to remember the battle of Coulmiers, where the richest prospects13 of success confronted a cavalry which achieved nothing, because it did not act in concert. Where great tactical units have to be concentrated which are not under a single command, it will be advisable that the laws of seniority be set aside, and the command given to that leader from whom the best performances are to be expected, even though he be not the senior. In the cavalry, more than in any other arm, success depends upon the leader. Nothing is more rare than a good cavalry leader, and it would therefore be a great mistake to ignore such a one, and thus perhaps to sacrifice the fortunes of the day to the Moloch of Seniority. We should rather act like Frederick the Great at Rossbach, when he placed Seydlitz at the head of his cavalry, and we must expect from Prussians to-day the same generosity14 as Frederick's generals showed in willingly serving under their junior.
[Pg 177]
The best of leaders, however, will only be capable of great performances if he is fully acquainted with the intentions of the Head Quarters and the idea of the battle. He must therefore be not only closely informed before the fight, but must remain throughout its progress in continual communication with the Head Quarters, and must be made aware of all dispositions16 and at the same time must share its observations and be in touch with its intentions. The German cavalry would certainly have been able to fight a more successful and connected action at Mars la Tour, as at Coulmiers, if it had been better informed as to the general situation, and had thus been in a position to appreciate for itself what was necessary and what was possible.
If, however, understanding between the commander-in-chief and the leader of the cavalry is established, and if full confidence in the judgment17 and energy of the latter exists, he must be allowed that necessary freedom and independence which alone ensure successful action. On the other hand, he should never wait for orders to intervene, but must himself turn any favourable18 moments of the fight to account by rapid and energetic independent action. Even if he is definitely placed at the disposal of the commander, he should not shrink at critical moments from acting on his own responsibility, informing, of course, his superior officer of his actions. As an example of the relations between the supreme19 command and the cavalry leader I would draw attention to the conduct of King Frederick and General von Seydlitz in the battle of Zorndorf. The King felt the necessity of restoring the wavering fortunes of the day by launching the cavalry to the attack, but Seydlitz independently chose the moment for the charge; and success justified20 them both. When, however, in the battle of Kunersdorf, the General was compelled to[Pg 178] order the charge against his better judgment, the consequences were a heavy defeat for the cavalry.
1. The Army Cavalry on the Flank of the Battle
I have already repeatedly indicated that the most favourable position for the army cavalry is to a flank and in advance of a flank of its own army, and, where possible, of that flank on which, in the battle of offence, the decision will be sought, or, when in defence, the main hostile attack may be expected.[40] The new Cavalry Regulations adopt this point of view. It is therefore superfluous21 to comment further on the advantages of such a position. Unless the cavalry is going to resign all claim to offensive action, this position will compel it to seek battle. This may also happen when the cavalry masses of both sides endeavour to take up such a position, and thereby22 naturally come into collision, so that a sort of battle of encounter results, but one, however, that will bear quite a different character from the battle of encounter in strategic operations.
There will already be a difference, in the fact that the strategic approach and the tactical disposition15 in advance guard, main body, and reserve, will be wanting. In the consciousness, moreover, that, whatever the relative strength may be, the decisive battle has, under any circumstances, to be sought, it must be prepared for systematically23. The cavalry will therefore have to adopt a wider front, or even deploy24 while farther from the enemy, having to its front only the necessary bodies for reconnaissance and security. The reconnaissance must be of a double nature. Timely measures must first be taken to ascertain25 whether, on the probable lines of approach and communication of[Pg 179] the enemy, further hostile forces, ammunition26 columns, or supply trains are hurrying to the battlefield. Where the squadrons already pushed forward have received the necessary further instructions, this reconnaissance will often develop from the corresponding strategic measures. It will, however, frequently be necessary to send forward new organs of reconnaissance, even up to the strength of squadrons, as is discussed in the chapter on "Close Reconnaissance and Reconnaissance for the Fight." Besides this far-reaching exploration, immediate27 tactical reconnaissance for the fight must also be arranged; this will, in general, be directed against such hostile troops as may be within tactical reach, and must at the same time comprise reconnaissance of the ground. This service must be carried out by contact patrols and it is obviously impossible to separate the two duties.
The reconnoitring organs suffice in such a case for safety to the front. To the flank, however, local flanking patrols must be pushed out during the advance. It may at the same time be advisable, for the protection of the main body, and as points of support for the reconnaissance, to occupy defiles28 and other important places to the flank or front by dismounted detachments up to the strength of a squadron or more.
Screened by these various measures, the cavalry mass now advances fully deployed29 for the fight. It must be écheloned so far from the flank of the army that it cannot come under the fire of its own infantry, and that it can, if in any way possible, turn the outer flank of the hostile cavalry. The latter may then easily become hampered30 in movement by its own troops, and will have to deploy eccentrically, a disadvantage under any circumstances. Connection with our own army must, naturally, not be lost, so that in case of an unfavourable[Pg 180] issue of the fight the cavalry may not be completely severed31 from it. The tactical dispositions, which should always be of an elastic32 nature, must obviate33 this.
That depth must be maintained in so far as it allows the necessary frontage, is easily understood. In deploying34 concentrically the various groups do not by any means need to be in touch, as during the advance they will gradually approach each other. They can, or rather must, be disposed at wide intervals35, and it is better that these should be too great than that the necessary depth should suffer. A reserve must always be detailed36 and at the disposal of the commander, in order that he may retain his influence over the decision and be ready to meet the vicissitudes37 of the conflict.
Artillery38 and machine-guns will generally be able to remain effectively in action longest on the inner flank, and in this position can also form a connecting-link between the cavalry and the flank of the army. Special circumstances, however, may, of course, lead to their employment elsewhere. Their employment on the extreme outer flank, however, so often seen in peace, is to be guarded against. From such a position they can indeed often bring an effective flanking fire to bear, but are, on the other hand, in great danger, especially when opposed to a numerically superior enemy. Should the outcome of the fight be unfavourable, they will generally not only themselves be lost, but may often contribute to the difficulties of the beaten squadrons. Machine-gun detachments must be pushed forward recklessly to within effective range of the enemy, and should not shrink from the danger of occasional capture.
Should the hostile cavalry be driven from the field, it must be pursued with sufficient force to prevent its rallying and re-forming, and to complete its material[Pg 181] and moral defeat. Should it seek shelter behind occupied points of support, farms, woods, and the like, these must be attacked immediately by employing the greatest possible fire power. It is a matter of absolute necessity to gain possession of such points, as they may otherwise stand in the way of further action.
All portions of the cavalry not required for the pursuit should endeavour quickly to regain39 their tactical cohesion40, that they may be ready for further effort. If localities are at hand by the occupation of which the ground won can be secured, they must at once be garrisoned41 by dismounted men. Artillery and machine-guns will, in so far as they are not detailed for the pursuit, or as they return from it, be brought into position with a like object in view. Every effort must be made to utilise to the full the advantages which the different methods of action of which the arm is capable confer, and thereby to minimise the chances of defeat. To reckon with the charge alone is, even on the field of battle, out of date, and calculated to limit the effect of cavalry action.
If a position of readiness has at first to be taken up, as will generally be the case until it is known in what direction further developments will take place, it must be as secure as possible from the view and fire of the enemy, but must be one from which immediate action can be taken. A disposition in groups of units will generally be the most suitable formation. What else is to be done the circumstances of the various cases must decide; the indispensable condition is that the cavalry should never be present and inactive throughout the course of the battle. It must in all cases prevent the enemy's patrols from making observations as to the disposition of our own army, while, on the other hand, its own reconnaissance should never cease.
[Pg 182]
We should, however, be quite wrong to regard such action as sufficient; rather must our whole attention be devoted42 to participating in the decisive battle, if in any way possible. With this view the cavalry must be careful to ensure its own advance to that portion of the ground where the decisive battle will probably take place, so that the charge will not meet with unexpected resistance and obstacles when the moment comes to ride it home. When this crisis of the battle approaches, the cavalry must be ready to intervene, whether it be to complete the defeat of the enemy and to facilitate the victory of its own infantry, or to support the latter in difficult situations.
Deployment43 in masses and depth, if possible in several lines, is indispensable for such attacks. The outer flank must be secured by reserves against the action of freshly arriving hostile cavalry and the covering troops of the enemy's artillery. Only when reconnaissance has clearly shown that there are no more such hostile troops at hand can the reserves be dispensed44 with.
The attack will best take place from the flank, and will then generally find a double objective in the hostile artillery and any infantry that may be farther to the front; but both should be dealt with simultaneously. There may also be a possibility and a necessity of attacking from the rear. Circumstances must decide this. In any case, there should be no question of a gradual engagement of a force, but the charge of the whole mass must, even when disposed in lines, be carried out in a simultaneous and preconcerted manner.
The moment chosen for the attack is also of great importance. As the crisis approaches, endeavours must be made to get as close to the enemy as possible, in order to shorten the distance that will have to be[Pg 183] covered in the charge. In so doing, the protection of the ground must be used as long as possible for cover, at least from view, without adhering to stereotyped45 tactical formations.
However important and desirable it may be to contribute to the great decision by a glorious cavalry charge, it should be borne in mind that the possibility of this will only occur in very rare cases. The more cultivated and agricultural the country in which the war takes place, the rarer will be these opportunities, as the circumstances of the ground offer so many opportunities for local defence.
If we consider the battles of the Franco-Prussian, the Russo-Turkish, and the Manchurian wars, we must soon admit that great cavalry charges were practicable only in very isolated46 cases. The peculiarities47 of the ground rendered them impossible; nor can this alter in the future. If it is to the interests of the defence to seek open country with a good field of fire, the attacker, on the other hand, will endeavour to choose ground for the attack which will give him cover from fire and view. On the whole, the possible European theatres of war are but little suitable for charges, owing to the extent to which they have been cultivated. We must not be deceived in this matter by the experience of our peace man?uvres. For then suitable ground has to be sought for the operation of the three arms, and considerations of compensation make it necessary to choose country as free from cultivation48 as possible.
War, however, knows no such considerations, and we must not blind ourselves to the fact that the opportunity for great decisive charges will but seldom occur. The greatest imaginable error, therefore, which the cavalry could possibly commit would be to adopt a waiting attitude and renounce49 all other kind of action,[Pg 184] in order that the possibility of a great charge might not slip by unutilised. Besides the decisive attack, there is another wide field of activity indicated by the conditions of modern war, where cavalry can operate without being compelled to renounce co-operation in the decisive battle when circumstances will allow.
This sphere of activity lies in rear of the hostile army. Here columns of supply of every kind are streaming forward to the fighting-line. Here are massed the hostile reserves, already waiting for the decisive moment. Here stands the heavy artillery of the enemy in action, often without an escort. And it is here that opportunities for decisive action must be sought.
If cavalry can succeed, especially in battles of several days' duration, in interrupting the hostile supplies from the rear, in surprising the enemy's reserves with fire, causing him heavy loss and compelling him to deploy against it, or if any advancing portions of the enemy's army can be brought to a halt and prevented from reaching the battlefield at the right time, greater results will probably be obtained than by a doubtful charge. This is quite apart from the great moral impression which such action must produce on leaders and troops when the alarm suddenly re-echoes from the rear, and the shrapnel of the cavalry carries confusion and consternation50 amongst the reserves and supports of the fighting-line. The enemy's artillery, also, firing from covered positions, and otherwise so difficult to reach, may then fall a prey51 to a bold cavalry, and will offer opportunities for a success of far-reaching importance.
Such action must, of course, be conducted with a due co-operation between mounted and dismounted action.
[Pg 185]
Against intact hostile reserves the firearm will be principally used, and endeavour must be made to surprise them in the formation of assembly or on the march. Against columns of wagons52, also, it will be well to commence with fire action, by shooting down the horses of the leading teams, and so bringing the columns to a halt. They must then, however, be actually taken possession of and taken away or destroyed, in so far as this cannot be done by artillery fire.
The cavalry must therefore endeavour to be ever active, and to co-operate unceasingly by damaging the enemy and shaking his morale53. Great results can, however, only be obtained if antiquated54 views, handed down from time immemorial, are discarded, and the demands of modern war and the capabilities55 of modern cavalry are recognised. It is not a question as to whether we cavalry men are to fight mounted or dismounted; but that we must be prepared and determined56 to take part in the decision, and to employ the whole of our great strength and mobility57 to this end.
2. The Army Cavalry as a Reserve behind the Front
The same principles hold good for those portions of the army cavalry which find themselves behind the fighting-line, and not on the exposed flank. Such a position is generally, indeed, undesirable58, but may be the outcome of circumstances.
The task before the cavalry is here naturally quite a different one from when on the flank of the army. The necessity, or even the possibility, will in this case scarcely ever occur of having to deal with hostile cavalry, and of opening thereby a way for intervention59 in the decisive battle. It is much more likely in this[Pg 186] case to happen that the cavalry will have to adopt a waiting attitude, and see whether its engagement as a mounted arm will be necessary. During this period of waiting, the cavalry must remain beyond the range of hostile fire, but as near the fighting-line as intelligent use of the ground will permit. Its position should never be chosen so far to the rear that it cannot arrive on the spot at the right time for the attack; for the moments which offer a favourable prospect for a charge are often fleeting—they depend upon the tactical situation and the moral condition of the opponent. These conditions may, however, quickly change if, for instance, reinforcements should arrive on the field.
Thus, at Mars la Tour, when the 6th Cavalry Division advanced in order to attack the obviously shaken and retiring 2nd Corps60 of the French, it struck, according to the account of the German General Staff, not this corps, but the intact Guard Grenadier Division of Picard, which had already advanced in support, and the charge was frustrated61.[41]
To be prepared to meet such conditions, it will generally be advisable not only to remain as close behind the fighting-line as possible, but to prepare for a rapid deployment to the front, so that a disposition in groups, with the necessary deploying intervals, may be adopted behind that part of the fighting-line where the ground is especially adapted to a charge of large masses. If it can be seen that the crisis of the fight is approaching, and that the intervention of the cavalry may be necessary, the latter should advance still closer to the fighting-line, making, of course, full use of the[Pg 187] ground for cover, but no longer taking heed62 of small losses.
The cavalry will advance to the charge in order either to complete the defeat of an already wavering enemy, and to capture his artillery, or to relieve its own infantry, exhausted63 in the fight or suffering from want of ammunition, when other reserves have been used up, or have not yet arrived on the spot. The attack will probably always have to be conducted against an extended front. Flanking and surprise attacks will rarely be possible under such circumstances. It will scarcely ever be practicable to carry out separate attacks against the hostile infantry and artillery, as in the case of a flank attack. The charge will rather, in by far the greater number of cases, first strike the hostile line of infantry, and must endeavour to ride through this and then to fall upon the enemy's artillery.
The formation for attack must be chosen to correspond with this point of view. A considerable extension will be necessary for the first line, so that, although the wings of the attacking-line may be exposed to flanking fire, the main portion of the front of attack will only have to reckon with frontal fire, and the enemy will not be in a position to direct a concentric fire against it. The great range of modern weapons demands a very considerable extension for this purpose if success is to be ensured. Suitable ground, also, must be chosen for this deployment. It will often allow, if rightly used, of one or other flank finding cover. A previous close study of the ground over which the attack is to be made is therefore imperative64 for the cavalry leader, even though it may entail65 personal exposure to the enemy's fire.
Necessary, however, as this extension is, a formation in depth in two or three lines is also imperative if de[Pg 188]cisive results are to be gained—this is, as I have already pointed66 out, the formation especially necessary against firearms. To lay down the distances which must be taken up between the lines according as infantry or artillery is the objective, as is done in the Regulations, will naturally be impossible in most cases, as both arms will have to be reckoned with simultaneously. A mean distance of about 250 paces would generally meet the case.
It is obvious that not only the preliminary deployment, but the formation for attack must take place beyond the effective range of the enemy's fire, for, once inside this zone, flank movements can no longer be carried out, and nothing else can be done but to gallop67 straight to the front. As, however, our own infantry will have to be ridden through in the charge, it is impossible in such a case to attack in close order. The first lines should therefore be of loose single-rank formation, with wide intervals from man to man. This is also to be recommended on the ground that it will allow a greater breadth of front for the same strength. Behind the leading lines squadrons can then follow in column of troops, which can easily ride through their own infantry, and adapt themselves to the ground, utilizing68 for their advance the less exposed portions of the terrain69. In such dispositions there can naturally be no talk of regular distances, and the circumstances of the case must decide.
If sufficient force is available, reserves must follow behind the centre and in échelon behind the flanks. Their duty will be to to turn against hostile cavalry and other troops which may take the advancing mass in flank or may threaten a charge.
The batteries and machine-guns belonging to the cavalry will usually remain at the disposal of the cav[Pg 189]alry commander, even during the great battle. If a charge is launched it will sometimes be advantageous70 to use them for flank protection, for which purpose they may be temporarily held back. Such cases, however, will be rare. The commander will therefore have to consider whether it is not more advisable to let them take part in the general engagement, even when the cavalry is not yet called upon to intervene. For it must be clearly understood that in this case, as in the other, where the cavalry is on the flank of the army, there will seldom be an opportunity for the charge, for reasons already given.
As, however, the cavalry in the former case should not remain inactive even if there is no opportunity for the charge during the decisive battle, the same holds good where the cavalry is placed behind the front of the army.
Having a less extensive field of action than in the case of the cavalry on the flank, it is all the more necessary, if there is no chance of a charge, for it to act in the manner of a reserve. The cavalry must not shrink, when necessity demands, from employing its whole force in the fire fight, disregarding for this purpose its purely cavalry r?le, which may, perhaps, be resumed later. The first essential is that victory shall be won. To this end all available forces must co-operate. We will find a good example to follow in the battle of Fredericksburg and the manner in which Stuart threw the whole of his cavalry into the fight. The employment of cavalry in the War of Secession in North America, the study of which I have urgently recommended, can here again serve us as a guide to follow.
[Pg 190]
3. Pursuit and Retreat
In critical study of military history there is continual cause for complaint that after a victorious battle no effective pursuit, with a few brilliant exceptions, has ever taken place. These complaints are justified. It must, however, be conceded that a failure of the pursuit may be traced in most instances to the force of circumstances.
As the day of battle draws to a close and the decision has taken place, the victorious attacker has generally accomplished71 a long march to the battlefield and carried out an exceedingly exhausting attack. The troops have perhaps all been employed in the battle, down to the last reserve. Ammunition, food, and water are often lacking. It is therefore quite natural that the mere72 physical energy required for a pursuit is wanting. If, on the other hand, the defender73 is successful, it is generally against a superior enemy, or one that is thought to be superior. With the greatest expenditure74 of moral and physical force he has held his own. In the evening of the day of battle, when the attacks cease, he is still perhaps scarcely conscious of his victory, and still imagines that the enemy is endeavouring to turn his flank. He awaits renewed onslaughts, and will be fearful of imperilling his success by leaving the positions which he has maintained with such difficulty, in order, on his side, to take up the offensive. It is therefore but natural that a pursuit should at first remain in abeyance75. If, however, it is not carried out at once, the favourable opportunity is generally lost forever.
The beaten defender, on the other hand, has often still a surplus of fresh troops. On the day of battle he will generally have had no exhausting marches to[Pg 191] undertake. The battle has not imposed nearly such heavy physical demands upon him as upon the attacker. He has also been able to supply himself during the fight much better than the latter. To these factors of advantage must be added the instinct of self-preservation of the individual, which continually induces afresh the desire to escape from the grasp of the enemy. What can be more natural for the beaten defender after a lost battle than to march long distances, and thus successfully to evade76 pursuit, unless it be immediately undertaken? General von Goeben gave orders on the evening of the battle of St. Quentin that all troops must march five miles[42] the next day. But the French had already covered a similar distance during the night, and were no longer within reach.
The beaten attacker also may, after the battle, no longer have at his disposal sufficient physical force to carry out a further immediate march, but, as before the fight he was in superior force, or considered himself to be so, it will not be necessary for him to withdraw from the enemy as quickly as a beaten defender. The reason for this lies in the difficulty which exists for the latter of taking up the pursuit. The attacker can then utilise the time after the battle to secure himself in the terrain and to re-form his units. He falls back on his reserves of supply and ammunition. Unless he has suffered a destructive defeat, the pursuer will generally find him the next morning again in a condition to offer some resistance.
The factors of weakness, therefore, which allow but seldom of an effective pursuit have their origin in the nature of circumstances, and are exceedingly difficult to cope with.
Energy and activity sufficient to this end are only to[Pg 192] be found in moments of the greatest moral excitement, under the influence of overpowering personalities77, or under special conditions, such, for example, as resulted after the battle of Waterloo. In the future, however, we shall generally have to reckon that these factors of weakness will prevail and the pursuit fail unless it is prepared with conscious intention in good time, and initiated78 with energy.
Here will certainly be required careful leading, good tactical judgment, and rapid decision.
Before all things, it is essential that any reserves still available should be sent forward in the directions important for pursuit as soon as it is judged that the battle is won, and that their supply should be arranged for before the pursuit begins.
I may cite the battle of Woerth as an example. The 4th Cavalry Division stood at the disposal of the commander. Observation troops were sufficient in the direction of Hagenau and Zabern. This cavalry mass was, however, only brought up late in the evening, and arrived on the field too late to take up the immediate pursuit, although it had long been realised that a pursuit would become necessary.
The infantry pursuit failed for different reasons. At the end of the day, when success inclined to the Germans, a fresh Württemberg brigade arrived upon the battlefield. Hot fighting still raged about Fr?schweiler, in which the whole of the Vth and XIth Corps were involved. The Crown Prince, with a right appreciation79 of the situation, sent forward this brigade in a parallel pursuit against the right wing of the French in the direction of Reichshofen, where it could have denied the exit at Zabern to the French. This brigade, however, allowed itself to be deflected80 from its objective, and involved in the fighting round Fr?sch[Pg 193]weiler, the capture of which was no longer of any real importance from the point of view of the Head Quarters.
If the affair is practically decided81, as was the case at Woerth, the reserves still in hand should no longer allow themselves to be drawn82 towards the various foci of the battle, but must be sent forward by the Commander-in-Chief with boldness and determination in the now more decisive directions of the pursuit.
The same reasons and principles hold good for the pursuit by the cavalry.
The cavalry commander must continually keep his finger on the pulse of the battle, and not watch only that portion of the great drama which is being played under his own eyes.
Should the scales of victory incline in favour of his own army, if he considers that the intervention of his cavalry will no longer be necessary to complete the victory, he will often be well advised to renounce his share in the decisive battle, at least by a charge which would entail heavy loss, and to husband all his force for the pursuit, and to prepare and make dispositions for it. This consideration is of especial importance for that portion of the army cavalry which is concentrated on the flank, as to it must chiefly fall the task of pursuit.
Great attention should be paid, even during the battle, to nursing the horses. They should be fed, not from the small reserve of forage83 carried on the saddle, but from wagons, which can be easily sent to the flank of the army, emptied, and used later for the transport of the wounded. It is of great importance that these measures should be taken in good time. The forage carried will be needed during the pursuit, for supplies for the horses cannot be reckoned upon[Pg 194] in country where armies have been on the move. It will even be advisable to take forage wagons with the pursuing force itself. When the maintenance of physical strength has thus been cared for, the next step is to push patrols and squadrons rapidly forward to reconnoitre the outer lines of retreat of the enemy. While these have been ascertained84, the march in pursuit must be undertaken without hesitation85, and continued even during the night. While daylight in any way allows, attempts will naturally be made to attack the withdrawing enemy in flank, and to carry disorder86 into his columns. As soon, however, as darkness falls and puts an end to the fighting, the march should be continued on parallel lines throughout the whole night, if possible in constant touch with the enemy, in order that he may again be attacked at dawn the next morning, or that his retreat may be barred at defiles or other favourable places. The trophies87 of pursuit will rarely fall into the hands of him who shrinks from spending the night after the battle marching, or neglects to prepare in every way for such an operation.
Direct frontal pursuit by the cavalry will generally yield but meagre results against the masses of the modern army and the firearm of the present day. Only when completely demoralised troops are retreating in the open, and cannot be reached by fire, will a charge be feasible. Generally, however, the frontal cavalry pursuit will be soon brought to a standstill by the hostile occupation of localities, woods and the like. Frontal pursuit is essentially88 a matter for the infantry, who must press the retreating enemy to the utmost. On the other hand, it is of course the duty of the cavalry to maintain touch with the enemy under all circumstances. With this object in view it must continue the frontal pursuit, sometimes even without seek[Pg 195]ing to draw on a fight, by day and night. When the strength of the infantry fails, it is the imperative duty of the cavalry to continue to harass89 the foe90. In conjunction with the artillery it should be able to inflict91 considerable losses on the opponent. In the face of modern conditions, however, too great results must not be expected from such action.
When the army cavalry undertakes a frontal pursuit, it will be advisable to divide it by brigades, to which must be allotted92 the various roads along which the enemy is retreating. To each column must be assigned artillery, to enable it to be continually at grips with the enemy. Cases may also occur where, if the enemy's lines of retreat are not too close together, it will be possible to penetrate93 between them, and thus strike all the terrors of a parallel pursuit to the very heart of his army. The results that might thus be gained will justify94 great risks.
As to the covering of a retreat, I may draw attention to paragraph 518[43] of the new Regulations. All the essentials are here set forth95 in compressed form. Under such circumstances the cavalry must never renounce the offensive, as the maintenance of morale when things are going badly is imperative. Continual efforts must be made to confront the enemy, and to attack him whenever possible with the cold steel. Defensive96 fire tactics, however, will of course be em[Pg 196]ployed whenever circumstances demand such action. Thus, when it becomes no longer possible to show a front to the pursuing cavalry in the open, measures must be taken to block the routes upon which his parallel pursuit is operating by barricading97 roads and occupying important points and defiles, especially during the night, and thus to secure the retreat of the army. Detachments to which these duties are confided98 must be despatched from the battlefield in good time, so that they may be able, if possible, to arrange their defensive measures by daylight. The more obstinately99 they hold well-chosen points, even at the risk of being cut off and captured, the better will they have done their duty.
4. The R?le of the Divisional Cavalry
The numerical weakness of the divisional cavalry, and the variety of duties that fall to its lot, considerably100 limit the development of its fighting power. It will scarcely ever be able to seek battle with the enemy's cavalry in an offensive sense, nor in defence will it possess the requisite101 numbers for an effective counter-stroke. It is therefore all the more important that such isolated favourable opportunities for the charge as some fortunate chance may place in its way should not be allowed to slip by. Every tactical success raises the self-confidence of the troops, and operates towards the attainment102 of moral superiority over the enemy, even though he may be numerically the stronger force.
In the battle of all arms, as soon as fighting contact has been established with the enemy, and the close and combat reconnaissance is thus probably at an end, the divisional cavalry must endeavour to gain touch with the army cavalry, in order to strengthen the latter for[Pg 197] the battle. In so doing, it must not of course lose all connection with its own infantry division. When this cannot be done, and when no other chance of mounted action offers, the divisional cavalry must seize the rifle and act as an immediate support for the infantry. Opportunities for such action will occur more especially in defence, as was proved by the cavalry of General Stuart.
After the battle it is the duty of the divisional cavalry to advance in frontal pursuit, even though no great results are to be expected from such action. During a retreat after the battle it will be continually in action as the rearmost detachment, and must endeavour to arrest the pursuit by occupying favourable positions with fire action. Frequent opportunities for a charge on a small scale may here occur.
Should the infantry division to which the cavalry belongs be operating independently without army cavalry, the divisional cavalry must act in accordance with the principles laid down for the army cavalry, as far as they apply and in so far as its strength and other circumstances will allow. Parallel pursuit may be possible under such conditions.
In retreat, every effort within the power of the cavalry must be made to protect the flanks of the retiring division, and to arrest the pursuer by sudden bursts of fire on every possible occasion.
There is for the divisional cavalry no such wide field of possibilities as is open to the army cavalry: it will be less often mentioned in despatches. The tasks which fall to its share, however, are certainly immeasurably more arduous103 and call for greater sacrifices. It will often be confronted by the most important and dangerous duties, for the fulfilment of which its means are quite inadequate104. Such duties can only be carried out[Pg 198] if the troops are capable of the greatest efforts and determined to do great deeds, without the impulse that the prospect of distinction promotes.
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1
cavalry
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| n.骑兵；轻装甲部队 | |
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attained
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| （通常经过努力）实现( attain的过去式和过去分词 )； 达到； 获得； 达到（某年龄、水平、状况） | |
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fully
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| adv.完全地，全部地，彻底地；充分地 | |
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possessed
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| adj.疯狂的；拥有的，占有的 | |
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incurring
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| 遭受，招致，引起( incur的现在分词 ) | |
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victorious
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| adj.胜利的，得胜的 | |
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infantry
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| n.[总称]步兵(部队) | |
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betokens
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| v.预示，表示( betoken的第三人称单数 ) | |
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prospect
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| n.前景，前途；景色，视野 | |
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purely
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| adv.纯粹地，完全地 | |
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acting
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| n.演戏，行为，假装；adj.代理的，临时的，演出用的 | |
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simultaneously
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| adv.同时发生地，同时进行地 | |
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prospects
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| n.希望，前途(恒为复数) | |
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generosity
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| n.大度，慷慨，慷慨的行为 | |
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disposition
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| n.性情，性格；意向，倾向；排列，部署 | |
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dispositions
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| 安排( disposition的名词复数 )； 倾向； （财产、金钱的）处置； 气质 | |
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judgment
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| n.审判；判断力，识别力，看法，意见 | |
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favourable
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| adj.赞成的，称赞的，有利的，良好的，顺利的 | |
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supreme
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| adj.极度的，最重要的；至高的，最高的 | |
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justified
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| a.正当的，有理的 | |
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superfluous
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| adj.过多的，过剩的，多余的 | |
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thereby
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| adv.因此，从而 | |
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systematically
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| adv.有系统地 | |
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deploy
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| v.（军）散开成战斗队形，布置，展开 | |
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ascertain
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| vt.发现，确定，查明，弄清 | |
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ammunition
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| n.军火，弹药 | |
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immediate
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| adj.立即的；直接的，最接近的；紧靠的 | |
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defiles
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| v.玷污( defile的第三人称单数 )；污染；弄脏；纵列行进 | |
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deployed
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| （尤指军事行动）使展开( deploy的过去式和过去分词 )； 施展； 部署； 有效地利用 | |
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hampered
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| 妨碍，束缚，限制( hamper的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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severed
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| v.切断，断绝( sever的过去式和过去分词 )；断，裂 | |
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elastic
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| n.橡皮圈，松紧带；adj.有弹性的；灵活的 | |
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obviate
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| v.除去，排除，避免，预防 | |
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deploying
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| （尤指军事行动）使展开( deploy的现在分词 )； 施展； 部署； 有效地利用 | |
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intervals
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| n.[军事]间隔( interval的名词复数 )；间隔时间；[数学]区间；（戏剧、电影或音乐会的）幕间休息 | |
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detailed
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| adj.详细的，详尽的，极注意细节的，完全的 | |
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vicissitudes
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| n.变迁，世事变化；变迁兴衰( vicissitude的名词复数 )；盛衰兴废 | |
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artillery
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| n.(军)火炮，大炮；炮兵(部队) | |
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regain
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| vt.重新获得，收复，恢复 | |
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cohesion
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| n.团结，凝结力 | |
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garrisoned
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| 卫戍部队守备( garrison的过去式和过去分词 )； 派部队驻防 | |
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devoted
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| adj.忠诚的，忠实的，热心的，献身于...的 | |
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deployment
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| n. 部署,展开 | |
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44
dispensed
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| v.分配( dispense的过去式和过去分词 )；施与；配（药） | |
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stereotyped
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| adj.(指形象、思想、人物等)模式化的 | |
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isolated
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| adj.与世隔绝的 | |
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peculiarities
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| n. 特质, 特性, 怪癖, 古怪 | |
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cultivation
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| n.耕作，培养，栽培（法），养成 | |
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renounce
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| v.放弃；拒绝承认，宣布与…断绝关系 | |
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consternation
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| n.大为吃惊，惊骇 | |
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prey
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| n.被掠食者，牺牲者，掠食；v.捕食，掠夺，折磨 | |
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wagons
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| n.四轮的运货马车( wagon的名词复数 )；铁路货车；小手推车 | |
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morale
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| n.道德准则，士气，斗志 | |
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antiquated
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| adj.陈旧的，过时的 | |
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capabilities
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| n.能力( capability的名词复数 )；可能；容量；[复数]潜在能力 | |
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determined
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| adj.坚定的；有决心的 | |
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mobility
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| n.可动性，变动性，情感不定 | |
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undesirable
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| adj.不受欢迎的，不良的，不合意的，讨厌的；n.不受欢迎的人，不良分子 | |
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intervention
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| n.介入，干涉，干预 | |
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corps
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| n.(通信等兵种的)部队；(同类作的)一组 | |
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frustrated
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| adj.挫败的，失意的，泄气的v.使不成功( frustrate的过去式和过去分词 )；挫败；使受挫折；令人沮丧 | |
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heed
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| v.注意，留意；n.注意，留心 | |
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exhausted
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| adj.极其疲惫的，精疲力尽的 | |
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imperative
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| n.命令，需要；规则；祈使语气；adj.强制的；紧急的 | |
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entail
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| vt.使承担，使成为必要，需要 | |
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pointed
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| adj.尖的，直截了当的 | |
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gallop
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| v./n.(马或骑马等)飞奔；飞速发展 | |
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utilizing
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| v.利用，使用( utilize的现在分词 ) | |
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terrain
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| n.地面，地形，地图 | |
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advantageous
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| adj.有利的；有帮助的 | |
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accomplished
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| adj.有才艺的；有造诣的；达到了的 | |
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mere
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| adj.纯粹的；仅仅，只不过 | |
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defender
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| n.保卫者，拥护者，辩护人 | |
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expenditure
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| n.(时间、劳力、金钱等)支出；使用，消耗 | |
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abeyance
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| n.搁置，缓办，中止，产权未定 | |
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evade
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| vt.逃避，回避；避开，躲避 | |
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personalities
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| n. 诽谤，（对某人容貌、性格等所进行的）人身攻击； 人身攻击；人格, 个性, 名人( personality的名词复数 ) | |
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initiated
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| n. 创始人 adj. 新加入的 vt. 开始，创始，启蒙，介绍加入 | |
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appreciation
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| n.评价；欣赏；感谢；领会，理解；价格上涨 | |
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deflected
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| 偏离的 | |
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decided
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| adj.决定了的，坚决的；明显的，明确的 | |
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drawn
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| v.拖，拉，拔出；adj.憔悴的，紧张的 | |
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forage
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| n.(牛马的)饲料，粮草；v.搜寻，翻寻 | |
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ascertained
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| v.弄清，确定，查明( ascertain的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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hesitation
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| n.犹豫，踌躇 | |
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disorder
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| n.紊乱，混乱；骚动，骚乱；疾病，失调 | |
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trophies
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| n.（为竞赛获胜者颁发的）奖品( trophy的名词复数 )；奖杯；（尤指狩猎或战争中获得的）纪念品；（用于比赛或赛跑名称）奖 | |
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essentially
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| adv.本质上，实质上，基本上 | |
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harass
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| vt.使烦恼，折磨，骚扰 | |
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foe
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| n.敌人，仇敌 | |
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inflict
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| vt.(on)把…强加给，使遭受，使承担 | |
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allotted
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| 分配，拨给，摊派( allot的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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penetrate
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| v.透(渗)入；刺入，刺穿；洞察，了解 | |
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justify
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| vt.证明…正当(或有理)，为…辩护 | |
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forth
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| adv.向前；向外，往外 | |
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defensive
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| adj.防御的；防卫的；防守的 | |
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barricading
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| 设路障于，以障碍物阻塞( barricade的现在分词 )； 设路障[防御工事]保卫或固守 | |
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confided
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| v.吐露（秘密，心事等）( confide的过去式和过去分词 )；（向某人）吐露（隐私、秘密等） | |
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obstinately
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| ad.固执地，顽固地 | |
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considerably
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| adv.极大地；相当大地；在很大程度上 | |
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requisite
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| adj.需要的，必不可少的；n.必需品 | |
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attainment
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| n.达到，到达；［常pl.］成就，造诣 | |
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arduous
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| adj.艰苦的，费力的，陡峭的 | |
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inadequate
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| adj.(for,to)不充足的，不适当的 | |
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