Frederick the Great arranged his cavalry in two lines, and within these lines the tactical units were on the same line of front. Detachments destined4 to turn the enemy's flank were attached in column to the outer flank of the leading line. As far as I know, a mention of échelon can only be found in one place. In a sketch5 that accompanies one of the Regulations of July 25, 1744, a squadron of the second line is shown thrown forward at half the distance between the lines and écheloned on the first line, with the obvious intention of securing the outer flank of the first line against local turning movements. Out of this one squadron the whole of our échelon system has grown. Here is the only justification6 for claiming that the échelon of the second line is of Frederician origin.
[Pg 199]
Nor, as far as I know, in the tactics of the Napoleonic cavalry is there any trace of échelon in the modern sense. We would do well to seek, in this period of experience in great cavalry battles instruction for the conduct of cavalry against cavalry, and not to sacrifice its lessons for imaginary advantages.
According to all appearances, our modern échelon is but the offspring of peace requirements. The troops were required to be mobile and capable of man?uvre, and a division was required to perform the same stereotyped7 evolutions as a regiment8 or a brigade. In the division the échelon of brigades met this requirement admirably, favouring as it did the change to line, a man?uvre which, on its part, was well suited to the necessities of drill in a limited area, and was regarded as the pièce de résistance of all cavalry divisional man?uvres. Many a time have I assisted at these tactical orgies!
We must not neglect the warning that, even in man?uvres, as soon as there is any kind of approach to service conditions, such necessity for change of front never—literally never—occurs. Besides this, the échelon formation has shown itself to be quite unpractical where any real tactical deployment10 is required off the drill-ground. The question, then, of the circumstances for which it is particularly designed does not appear as yet to have been definitely asked or answered. We have been content with general representations that it increased the power of man?uvre, and thus added to our beloved stereotyped formations.
For years I have striven to clear up these views and to establish their true worth. As long ago as 1903, in my book "Cavalry in Future Wars," I wrote as follows: " ... It is obvious that the formations for approach and attack prescribed by the (old) Regula[Pg 200]tions are as unpromising of success as they well can be. While affording a possibility of quickly presenting the same formation in any direction, a feat11 of no possible advantage for war, they seriously impede12 any deployment to the front. If it is required to launch the first line against the enemy's flank because this is its shortest line, one at least of the following brigades will be masked, and will be hampered13 in its movements. If, again, it is desired to utilise one of the rear brigades for a flank movement or any similar purpose, the first line has to be checked until the others reach the required position, or else they will certainly arrive too late to co-operate. Furthermore, the formations advocated render it more difficult to derive14 full benefit from the configuration15 of the ground."
These deductions16 have remained, up to now, uncontested. In spite of this, however, the new Regulations uphold the point of view of the old as regards échelon formation in every way, and even vest it with increased importance by confiding17 to the échelon the duties of the real second line, i.e. of the supporting squadrons of the old Regulations. In the regiment, as in the brigade, depth is to consist in échelon formation, and only exceptionally is a real second line to be formed. The échelons are not only to protect the flank of their own units, and turn against any portions of the enemy's line that may break through, but are also to turn the enemy's flanks (170 and 200).[45] In the division, also,[Pg 201] during the advance to attack cavalry, échelon formation will, "as a rule," be ordered. The transition formation thus remains18 with us not only in name, but in fact, only with the difference that brigades provide for their own depth and flank protection, thus, in fact, being again in themselves écheloned (223, 424, 425).[Pg 202][46] Only when a closer knowledge of the enemy is attained19 may the brigades come into the same alignment20 from the commencement, and assume the requisite21 frontage (426).[47]
In close connection with this modified transition formation, the "change to lines" has also been retained in fact, though no longer designated as such. That is to say, the possibility of a change of front "to the complete flank," i.e. at right angles to the direction of march, is still contemplated22 (220),[48] and to this end a fresh formation of the division will generally be required, as well as a fresh directing brigade, which takes up the new line of march, and to which the remainder conform in the desired manner. It is apparently23 a matter of indifference24 whether the brigades are called lines or brigades. It is, and remains, a purely25 drill evolution of the division in close formation, a complete change of front to a flank, and is therefore something that would certainly not occur in[Pg 203] war if any reasonable sort of information were to hand. If it did occur, it would presuppose the entire failure of reconnaissance and the corresponding incapacity of the leader.
My cavalry instinct forbids me to share the tactical principles that these views entail26, and I will therefore again endeavour to make clear that conception of the matter which I hold to be correct.
First, as regards the demands of the Regulations that échelon is to replace depth. In my opinion, the conditions of reality have not in this matter been taken into account. To be able to meet a hostile squadron that has broken through the line, the écheloned squadron, if still in column, must wheel into line, or if, as is probable, already in line, must wheel, and then charge behind the front of its own attacking-line. I consider this, of itself, to be impracticable in the excitement of the fight, a man?uvre that can only be carried out on the drill-ground. We have only to consult any one who has had experience of a cavalry attack to learn how difficult it is to perform such evolutions immediately before the charge.
Then, again, what is our conception of such a hostile squadron breaking through? It may be expected to be accompanied by a simultaneous rearward movement of a corresponding portion of our own line, so that no clear objective for attack from the flank would be likely to offer itself. Such retirements28 of single portions of the line can only be met and counteracted29 by throwing in fresh forces from the rear; such has always been the experience in cavalry fights, as far as the teachings of history show.
But there are other matters for consideration. How can the squadron, écheloned, for instance, on the outer[Pg 204] flank of a brigade, intervene when this so-called rupture30 of the line takes place on the inner flank? In the dust and excitement of a cavalry fight, will such a rupture, especially in undulating country, be even noticed? What if there is a simultaneous threatening of the other flank, which the échelon is obliged to meet? What if the échelon has advanced in an enveloping31 movement? Who is then to deal with the rupture of the line?
To go on trying to prove that the duties devolving on depth and échelon cannot be met by one and the same detachment, is like carrying coals to Newcastle. The formation of a second line in the fight against cavalry, regarded as exceptional by the Regulations, should be made an invariable rule, from which departure is allowed only in exceptional cases, while safety for the flanks must be arranged for independently of this.
Here again we come into collision with paragraph 170 of the Regulations, which lays down that an offensive flank attack may be undertaken from a rearward échelon; as if such a man?uvre could possibly be carried out! Detachments which are to turn the enemy's flank must, during the approach, advance into alignment with their own line separated from its flank by the necessary interval32, or else must be écheloned forwards from the commencement.
Forward échelon will generally be found to correspond with the offensive spirit of cavalry better than the more defensive33 rearward échelon. It is usually more practical and protects the flank better, while at the same time threatening the enemy's flank and laying down the law to him. Forward échelon is a very useful tactical cavalry formation, and deserves[Pg 205] more attention than the Regulations bestow34 upon it.[49]
On its offensive importance I need scarcely enlarge. Troops in forward échelon are already in a position which can only be reached after an exhausting gallop35 by those in rearward échelon, the position prescribed by the Regulations. They will be in a position to frustrate36 any offensive intentions of the hostile reserves, and will obtain quicker and surer information as to the enemy than will ever be possible at such a time by patrols alone. That they may at times come in contact with hostile troops in rearward échelon is obvious. If the flank of these cannot be turned, they must be dealt with frontally. Local dispositions37 and a vanguard must provide security against the action of hostile reserves.
Even in a defensive sense the forward échelon will often be more useful than the rearward. The latter formation surrenders the initiative to the enemy, and confines itself to parrying attacks, always a disadvantage in a cavalry fight. Forward échelon, on the contrary, seeks to forestall38 the enemy in the offence. As to how it may often be better adapted to warding39 off hostile attacks than the rearward échelon I will give an example.
A body of cavalry, in the approach formation, is advancing against the enemy, with blind ground on a flank, which would allow of the enemy's covered approach, and which perhaps it has been impossible to reconnoitre. Attack or fire surprise is feared from this quarter. How will the cavalry protect itself? The modern tactician40 would in most cases reply: "By an échelon to the rear." I do not think this would be[Pg 206] suitable. How is such a formation to give safety from fire surprise, and to locate the enemy's advance and arrest it until the main body can take counter-measures? The forward échelon can here alone avail. It comes to close quarters with the enemy, attacks him before he can reach the flank of the main body, and thus gains time for defensive measures or retirement27.
It is quite obvious that the cases for employment of the forward échelon do not allow of being formulated41. I think, however, that we should make much more use of this formation than is at present the fashion. Properly applied42, such methods will ensure to us considerable superiority over our opponents.
If we turn from this narrower tactical point of view to the formations on a large scale where échelon is to be found—namely, the divisions—here too the examination leads to no more favourable43 conclusions. I ask myself, when and under what circumstances will such a formation be advisable?
During the approach to the battle of encounter it is, as I have endeavoured to prove, quite superfluous44, and may even operate to our disadvantage. In this case, when total uncertainty45 reigns46 as to whether the combat will be carried out mounted or dismounted, or both, there can be no question of any stereotyped tactical formation, either of units as a whole or of smaller bodies within them. Here, as we have seen, the battle will generally develop gradually, and the fighting-line be fed from depth, until the necessary information as to the enemy has been gained and the decisive attack can be embarked47 upon. Under such circumstances the brigades advance according to the tasks allotted48 them, and make their dispositions as circumstances dictate49. The depth that will be necessary can obviously not be laid down, and can be attained by échelon neither in[Pg 207] the division nor in its subdivisions. If the division should advance under such circumstances in close formation écheloned within itself, the unnecessary danger would be run of offering an ideal target to the enemy's artillery50 (which must always be taken into consideration), and at the same time of hampering51 movement where circumstances demand the greatest freedom in all directions.
If, on the other hand, the enemy's dispositions are known before a collision occurs, the Regulations themselves (426, see p. 172) allow that échelon formation is superfluous, and that the advance may be made in the deployed52 formation desired, brigades being on the same frontage, if the country and the character of the adversary53 offer the probability of a charge.
And will it be different in the battle of all arms? In that case, if the army cavalry advances from the wing of the army with the intention of attacking the enemy's flank, what need will it have of échelon formations? It is known that an attack must be made under any circumstances. Further information as to the comparative strength of the enemy cannot and must not be waited for. All available forces will be engaged in order to wrest54 a victory, and must from the beginning be so disposed that the enemy will be compelled as far as possible to conform to our movements, and that we may prepare the most favourable deployment for attack in the manner discussed above. Must we, then, advance with the division in close formation, écheloned within itself, in order to afford the greatest possible target for the enemy's artillery? Are we to choose the pusillanimous55 formation of the defensive échelon, that we may perhaps be obliged to approach and to deploy9 under the enemy's eyes, incapable56 in this unwieldy formation of turning the ground to account?[Pg 208] I cannot think that this is practical and believe that modern artillery fire of itself suffices to make the écheloned division an impossibility and to banish57 it for ever from the battlefield.
It must be added that should the unexpected appearance of the enemy on a flank make it necessary, rearward échelon is much easier to assume from a formation of brigades on the same front than is the line or attack formation from rearward échelon. It is only necessary for that part of the line which is to be écheloned to halt or decrease the pace, and the échelon is soon formed. To push forward units from depth while on the move means, on the other hand, a considerable and indeed unnecessary expenditure58 of force.
点击收听单词发音
1 cavalry | |
n.骑兵;轻装甲部队 | |
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2 contradictory | |
adj.反驳的,反对的,抗辩的;n.正反对,矛盾对立 | |
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3 astounding | |
adj.使人震惊的vt.使震惊,使大吃一惊astound的现在分词) | |
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4 destined | |
adj.命中注定的;(for)以…为目的地的 | |
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5 sketch | |
n.草图;梗概;素描;v.素描;概述 | |
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6 justification | |
n.正当的理由;辩解的理由 | |
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7 stereotyped | |
adj.(指形象、思想、人物等)模式化的 | |
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8 regiment | |
n.团,多数,管理;v.组织,编成团,统制 | |
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9 deploy | |
v.(军)散开成战斗队形,布置,展开 | |
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10 deployment | |
n. 部署,展开 | |
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11 feat | |
n.功绩;武艺,技艺;adj.灵巧的,漂亮的,合适的 | |
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12 impede | |
v.妨碍,阻碍,阻止 | |
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13 hampered | |
妨碍,束缚,限制( hamper的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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14 derive | |
v.取得;导出;引申;来自;源自;出自 | |
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15 configuration | |
n.结构,布局,形态,(计算机)配置 | |
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16 deductions | |
扣除( deduction的名词复数 ); 结论; 扣除的量; 推演 | |
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17 confiding | |
adj.相信人的,易于相信的v.吐露(秘密,心事等)( confide的现在分词 );(向某人)吐露(隐私、秘密等) | |
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18 remains | |
n.剩余物,残留物;遗体,遗迹 | |
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19 attained | |
(通常经过努力)实现( attain的过去式和过去分词 ); 达到; 获得; 达到(某年龄、水平、状况) | |
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20 alignment | |
n.队列;结盟,联合 | |
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21 requisite | |
adj.需要的,必不可少的;n.必需品 | |
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22 contemplated | |
adj. 预期的 动词contemplate的过去分词形式 | |
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23 apparently | |
adv.显然地;表面上,似乎 | |
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24 indifference | |
n.不感兴趣,不关心,冷淡,不在乎 | |
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25 purely | |
adv.纯粹地,完全地 | |
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26 entail | |
vt.使承担,使成为必要,需要 | |
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27 retirement | |
n.退休,退职 | |
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28 retirements | |
退休( retirement的名词复数 ); 退职; 退役; 退休的实例 | |
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29 counteracted | |
对抗,抵消( counteract的过去式 ) | |
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30 rupture | |
n.破裂;(关系的)决裂;v.(使)破裂 | |
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31 enveloping | |
v.包围,笼罩,包住( envelop的现在分词 ) | |
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32 interval | |
n.间隔,间距;幕间休息,中场休息 | |
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33 defensive | |
adj.防御的;防卫的;防守的 | |
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34 bestow | |
v.把…赠与,把…授予;花费 | |
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35 gallop | |
v./n.(马或骑马等)飞奔;飞速发展 | |
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36 frustrate | |
v.使失望;使沮丧;使厌烦 | |
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37 dispositions | |
安排( disposition的名词复数 ); 倾向; (财产、金钱的)处置; 气质 | |
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38 forestall | |
vt.抢在…之前采取行动;预先阻止 | |
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39 warding | |
监护,守护(ward的现在分词形式) | |
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40 tactician | |
n. 战术家, 策士 | |
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41 formulated | |
v.构想出( formulate的过去式和过去分词 );规划;确切地阐述;用公式表示 | |
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42 applied | |
adj.应用的;v.应用,适用 | |
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43 favourable | |
adj.赞成的,称赞的,有利的,良好的,顺利的 | |
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44 superfluous | |
adj.过多的,过剩的,多余的 | |
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45 uncertainty | |
n.易变,靠不住,不确知,不确定的事物 | |
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46 reigns | |
n.君主的统治( reign的名词复数 );君主统治时期;任期;当政期 | |
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47 embarked | |
乘船( embark的过去式和过去分词 ); 装载; 从事 | |
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48 allotted | |
分配,拨给,摊派( allot的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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49 dictate | |
v.口授;(使)听写;指令,指示,命令 | |
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50 artillery | |
n.(军)火炮,大炮;炮兵(部队) | |
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51 hampering | |
妨碍,束缚,限制( hamper的现在分词 ) | |
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52 deployed | |
(尤指军事行动)使展开( deploy的过去式和过去分词 ); 施展; 部署; 有效地利用 | |
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53 adversary | |
adj.敌手,对手 | |
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54 wrest | |
n.扭,拧,猛夺;v.夺取,猛扭,歪曲 | |
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55 pusillanimous | |
adj.懦弱的,胆怯的 | |
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56 incapable | |
adj.无能力的,不能做某事的 | |
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57 banish | |
vt.放逐,驱逐;消除,排除 | |
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58 expenditure | |
n.(时间、劳力、金钱等)支出;使用,消耗 | |
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