Our new Regulations lay down that, if the cavalry2, after its preliminary deployment3, has to cross an extensive fire-zone, the subordinate leaders are to choose such formations for their units as will minimise the effect of the hostile fire, and that, for this purpose, the configuration4 of the ground must be turned to the best advantage, even though it should involve temporary departure from prescribed intervals5.
I do not consider these instructions, which, in contradiction to the general principles of the Regulations, give free play to the initiative of all subordinate leaders, are sufficiently6 definite. They appear to try to avoid giving a distinct designation to this manner of[Pg 209] advance. Before the publication of the Regulations it was known as "extended formation." As such I have characterised it in my brochure, "Reflections on the New Cavalry Regulations," published in 1908, and it is to be regretted that this title was not maintained in the Regulations, and with it also the real essence of the whole formation. This would, I think, have made the matter clearer. I hold it to be of great importance that the adoption7 of such formations should be ordered by higher authority, as otherwise there must be a danger of the troops getting out of hand.
In adopting these extensions it is not only a question of ground actually under artillery fire, but also of areas during the crossing of which fire may be expected, to which, of course, the troops should not be exposed. Whether such is the case or not, the cavalry commander, who is observing and receiving intelligence as the troops hurry forward, is alone in a position to judge, and not each subordinate leader. For this reason alone, unity8 of action is absolutely necessary. So is it also from another point of view. I need scarcely enlarge on the picture of what would occur if each subordinate commander, each squadron leader, according to his individual judgment9, were to suddenly regulate the pace and formation of his own volition10, while it would be a matter of difficulty to maintain proper control of the troops if it were left to the squadron leaders to regain11 alignment12 in their own time.
It is therefore imperative13, to my mind, that such extensions should not be left to the discretion14 of the squadron leader, but ordered by superior authority. Instructions as to pace should be given at the same time, and the area indicated where troops are to regain the formation ordered and decrease the pace. These[Pg 210] are points that have escaped the notice of the Regulations. Orders must also be given as to whether several lines will eventually be formed. These will then generally have to follow each other at shrapnel distance. Only the choice of formation and line of advance must be left to the subordinate leaders, as they alone are in a position to judge of the local effect of the hostile fire.
If such dispositions15 are to be made, all commanders, down to squadron leaders, must be instructed in time, so that they may have already adopted the necessary formation on reaching the dangerous zone. They must at the same time be informed, in so far as can be ascertained16, from which direction artillery fire—for this alone can be in question—is to be expected.
Should the artillery fire come from the front, column of route will often be a suitable formation. It affords but a small frontage of target, and facilitates use of the ground. If the artillery fire is expected from a flank, the adoption of a single-rank line will often commend itself. In any case, in the larger formations, distances and intervals must be adjusted so that one and the same burst of shrapnel will not strike two squadrons at once.
As the Regulations do not touch on these points, I do not see how a proper understanding of them can be awakened17 and cultivated in the troops, imperative though this may be.
As a rule it will be by no means sufficient to adopt formations for minimising the effect of artillery fire only in special cases where such fire is to be expected. The great range of modern guns, and their capabilities18 of indirect fire induced by improved means of observation, and the possibility of bringing fire to bear on large unseen targets with the aid of the map, make it[Pg 211] absolutely necessary, when entering within possible effective range of artillery, to adopt formations which will offer no favourable19 mark. If this tends on the one hand, as already remarked, to a premature20 deployment, it forces us, on the other, to adopt formations which can cross country easily and afford no easy target for the artillery.
I have already shown in a former work[50] how well the double column[51] answers this purpose, and in what a comprehensive manner the principle of independent squadron columns allows of elaboration, to procure21 for the cavalry the greatest imaginable freedom of movement.
The Regulations do not agree with these views. They hold fast to the principle that deployment must always be in line, and not in a succession of lines, and that before this deployment the squadron columns hitherto employed will generally be replaced by some other formation.
The above remain the chief formations for movement and deployment of the cavalry. The employment of the "regimental mass and brigade mass"[52] has been limited, but the Regulations give us nothing in their place. Nor, on the other hand, is the flexibility22 of the double column particularly emphasised; its use, indeed, is in a certain sense limited. I see such limitation in the fact that the trumpet-call "Double column!" has been abolished. As, on the other hand, the call "Form regimental mass!" has been retained, it does not ap[Pg 212]pear as if the use of double column is to be further developed, or allowed to replace the regimental and brigade mass on the field of battle.
It is further laid down that the regimental mass is to be used when beyond the range of the enemy's fire, the brigade mass when concealed23 by the ground, even on the battlefield. A deployment is even allowed for from the brigade in mass towards the flank, and that by a wheel of the head of the columns. This presupposes that such a column can be used in a flank movement, which I regard as an impossibility. A deployment from regimental mass to squadron columns is also provided for. In view of the great effective range of the modern gun, I cannot think that movements in such close formation right up to the moment of deployment can go unpunished upon a modern battlefield.
All these instructions contained in the Regulations, and many others that take effect in the same sense, cannot be regarded as practical. They lead us to fear that the regimental and brigade masses, in spite of all modern conditions, will retain more or less their old importance. They will serve as a pretext24 for many a hidebound drill enthusiast25, of which, alas26! there are still many among us. Upon the battlefields of the future, however, we will no longer dare to appear in such formations, but only widely deployed27 and in thin columns, in such dispositions indeed as will allow of a rapid adoption of the attack formation, such as we have discussed in detail above. I can only hope that these views will, in the not too far distant future, come to be more generally recognised and will find their way into the Regulations.
Finally, I would once again draw attention to the[Pg 213] idea of the "vanguard."[53] It receives but a passing mention in the Regulations, and no explanation of what is thereby28 meant. My opinion is that it is indispensable to all flank movements, and must continually be used, especially in the offensive. It should therefore be provided for by regulation in all deployments, and the troops should be fully29 conversant30 with its use.
For the rest, the present Regulations, in spite of all actual progress made, can only be designated as provisional, and give rise to the hope that it will be found possible to re-edit them soon, above all as regards the stereotyped31 parts, so that, fully prepared and up to date, we may go forth32 with confidence to meet the events of any future war.
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1 artillery | |
n.(军)火炮,大炮;炮兵(部队) | |
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2 cavalry | |
n.骑兵;轻装甲部队 | |
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3 deployment | |
n. 部署,展开 | |
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4 configuration | |
n.结构,布局,形态,(计算机)配置 | |
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5 intervals | |
n.[军事]间隔( interval的名词复数 );间隔时间;[数学]区间;(戏剧、电影或音乐会的)幕间休息 | |
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6 sufficiently | |
adv.足够地,充分地 | |
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7 adoption | |
n.采用,采纳,通过;收养 | |
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8 unity | |
n.团结,联合,统一;和睦,协调 | |
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9 judgment | |
n.审判;判断力,识别力,看法,意见 | |
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10 volition | |
n.意志;决意 | |
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11 regain | |
vt.重新获得,收复,恢复 | |
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12 alignment | |
n.队列;结盟,联合 | |
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13 imperative | |
n.命令,需要;规则;祈使语气;adj.强制的;紧急的 | |
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14 discretion | |
n.谨慎;随意处理 | |
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15 dispositions | |
安排( disposition的名词复数 ); 倾向; (财产、金钱的)处置; 气质 | |
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16 ascertained | |
v.弄清,确定,查明( ascertain的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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17 awakened | |
v.(使)醒( awaken的过去式和过去分词 );(使)觉醒;弄醒;(使)意识到 | |
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18 capabilities | |
n.能力( capability的名词复数 );可能;容量;[复数]潜在能力 | |
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19 favourable | |
adj.赞成的,称赞的,有利的,良好的,顺利的 | |
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20 premature | |
adj.比预期时间早的;不成熟的,仓促的 | |
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21 procure | |
vt.获得,取得,促成;vi.拉皮条 | |
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22 flexibility | |
n.柔韧性,弹性,(光的)折射性,灵活性 | |
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23 concealed | |
a.隐藏的,隐蔽的 | |
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24 pretext | |
n.借口,托词 | |
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25 enthusiast | |
n.热心人,热衷者 | |
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26 alas | |
int.唉(表示悲伤、忧愁、恐惧等) | |
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27 deployed | |
(尤指军事行动)使展开( deploy的过去式和过去分词 ); 施展; 部署; 有效地利用 | |
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28 thereby | |
adv.因此,从而 | |
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29 fully | |
adv.完全地,全部地,彻底地;充分地 | |
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30 conversant | |
adj.亲近的,有交情的,熟悉的 | |
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31 stereotyped | |
adj.(指形象、思想、人物等)模式化的 | |
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32 forth | |
adv.向前;向外,往外 | |
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