When a squadron, acting1 independently in reconnaissance, as advanced guard, flank guard, or divisional cavalry2, finds itself obliged to attack, it will, as a rule, employ its whole force simultaneously3, whether it charges in line, knee to knee, or uses a troop in single rank as first line. If a troop has been thrown forward as advanced guard, it must quickly clear the front, and endeavour to join the squadron, so as to strengthen it before the collision, and not to become prematurely4 involved in a disadvantageous fight.
The squadron is generally too weak to carry out an offensive fight on foot. There is also no means of[Pg 214] guarding the led horses but by patrols. If they should become isolated6 during the attack, there will be a danger of losing them, especially in hostile country. A squadron must therefore only determine on a dismounted attack when such action is absolutely unavoidable. For dispersing7 hostile patrols or armed inhabitants, about a troop dismounted will generally suffice, where there is no opportunity of surprising them in the charge, or of enveloping9 them. A defensive10 fight on foot must not be undertaken by a single squadron unless absolutely necessary, or which the led horses can be disposed in a safe place in the immediate11 neighbourhood, where the flanks cannot be turned, or where the arrival of reinforcements can be relied upon.
A squadron attacking knee to knee is stronger than a numerically superior enemy who charges in looser formation and is not armed with the lance.
The regiment12 of four or five squadrons is numerically too weak a body to be able of itself to carry out the larger strategical missions. It will therefore operate in more or less close co-operation with other troops, and will seldom be called upon to fight independently. It may, however, find itself for a time obliged to rely upon its own fighting strength, whether acting as divisional cavalry, as advanced guard, or as a detachment from a larger force of cavalry.
If a fight is in immediate prospect13, column of troops must first be formed from column of route, and a broader front, which will allow of a rapid assumption of the attack formation, must then be adopted according to the ground.
In the charge against cavalry the regiment should only on rare occasions deploy14 all its squadrons into line, but must, whenever practicable, detail one squad[Pg 215]ron to follow in second line, and another in forward échelon, to protect the more exposed flank and to turn that of the enemy.
It will also be possible for the regiment to operate dismounted against weaker hostile detachments. If relative strength allows, at least a squadron should be detached to guard the led horses and to carry out reconnaissance duties. In the defence on foot, with ample ammunition15 and every available rifle in the firing-line, the regiment represents a formidable fighting force, even when obliged to detach one, or even two squadrons, for reconnaissance and for the protection of the flanks and the led horses.
In the fight of smaller bodies of all arms, a regiment will frequently be able to intervene in a most effective manner by a timely charge, from which considerable results may often be expected, especially during pursuit of a retreating and shaken enemy. In such cases the formation of lines for attack will frequently be superfluous16, and a broad enveloping formation may be adopted.
The brigade of two regiments17 is numerically too weak of itself to carry out strategical missions, and to be able to engage in the independent actions they demand. The heavy drains on its strength which such missions generally entail18 will usually weaken the fighting power so much that the brigade will no longer be in a condition to engage an opponent of any strength who may have to be dealt with by mounted or dismounted action, or the two in combination.
At the same time, circumstances may lead to a brigade being forced to carry out an independent r?le. It will then have to reconnoitre with great care, so that it may only embark19 on a decisive encounter with a full knowledge of the situation. Otherwise, in view[Pg 216] of its small offensive power, it will run a great risk of suffering defeat, especially when dismounted.
In the defence on foot, on the other hand, a brigade may be regarded as an important factor of strength, capable of successfully resisting an enemy of considerable superiority, as long as its flanks are protected and the led horses do not require too large an escort.
On approaching the enemy, the brigade must form column of troops from column of route in good time and the regiments must be deployed20 on the frontage and in the formations demanded by the situation. In such cases a reserve must always be detailed21. The allotment of different r?les in the fight to the various regiments or groups will form the framework for the tactical deployment22. In all attacks the brigade or its component23 parts must always adopt the formation in lines. Where there is blind ground to a flank, a forward échelon must be formed which will co-operate concentrically in the charge. In the attack on foot, too, it will often be advantageous5 to échelon detachments forward under due protection, in order to envelop8 the enemy's position.
In the combat of detachments of all arms, and especially in pursuit, considerable performances must be expected of a brigade. A timely charge or the employment of its fire power in an effective direction may bring about a decision.
The division of six regiments, under circumstances where its full strength can be employed in the charge, represents, even against troops using the rifle, a very considerable fighting power, which can, if judiciously24 handled and launched at the right moment, have a decisive effect, even in a battle of armies.
In independent missions it must be remembered that a complete regiment of four squadrons with 15 files[Pg 217] per troop will represent 400 rifles at most. In war, however, this figure will never be reached. Wastage on the march and the provision of the necessary detachments and patrols, weaken squadrons very considerably25. We must further remember that in every great battle a mounted reserve will always have to be detailed, while, in addition to this, detachments such as reconnoitring squadrons, escorts to transport, reporting centres, and signal stations, will generally fail to rejoin in time for the battle. Thus the division will seldom actually be able to reckon on more than 1,000 to 1,500 rifles in the firing-line.
Even counting on the co-operation of artillery26 and machine-guns, which the enemy will also have at his disposal, this represents no great offensive strength. It is therefore necessary to be quite clear in our minds that only weak detachments can be attacked with prospect of success.
A cavalry division is greatly handicapped by these circumstances in carrying out the r?le which may be assigned to it in the course of operations. The resistance of a body of equal strength where circumstances demand a dismounted attack can thus never be overcome.
Mounted, however, it is quite another matter. A well-trained German cavalry division, handled according to sound tactical principles and schooled to charge in close formation, may attack even a stronger enemy regardless of consequences.
Should the task at issue demand a larger force, several divisions must be united in a cavalry corps27. In the battle of all arms such a corps, either by the charge or by employment of its fire power, may aim at decisive results. For the conduct of independent strategic missions fire power is an important factor. As in this[Pg 218] case the number of men detached, etc., will be divided between the divisions, a strength of 3,500 rifles can at times be reached in a corps of two divisions.
For the division, as for the corps, the framework of the tactical deployment depends upon the commander's tactical plan, as too does the allotment of duties in the fight to the various units, divisions, brigades, and regiments, or to the tactical groups, advanced guard, main body, reserve, etc., and any attempt at retaining the command in one hand is obviously out of the question. Stress has already been laid on the necessity for early deployment, and once this is effected, the various subdivisions of the force must take their own independent measures for carrying out the r?les that devolve upon them.
On the other hand, neither in the fight of the independent cavalry nor in the great battle should a unit be allowed to become isolated in the combat. The necessary combination must always be preserved. United action, however, is only possible if subordinate leaders never lose sight of the general purpose of the fight, and continually bear in mind the necessary interchangeable relations of the various tactical methods.
In war it will seldom be possible either to undertake or to carry out the very best course of action, but will generally be unnecessary, for we may certainly count on numerous errors and vacillations on the part of the enemy, especially in the case of cavalry warfare28.
It is of far greater importance that any plan once undertaken should be energetically carried through to a conclusion.
Success in war is first and foremost a matter of character and will. The indomitable will to conquer carries with it a considerable guarantee of success.
The determination to win, cost what it may, is therefore the first and greatest quality required of a cavalry leader—and the offensive is the weapon with which he can best enforce his will.
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1
acting
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| n.演戏，行为，假装；adj.代理的，临时的，演出用的 | |
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2
cavalry
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| n.骑兵；轻装甲部队 | |
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3
simultaneously
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| adv.同时发生地，同时进行地 | |
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4
prematurely
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| adv.过早地，贸然地 | |
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advantageous
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| adj.有利的；有帮助的 | |
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6
isolated
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| adj.与世隔绝的 | |
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7
dispersing
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| adj. 分散的 动词disperse的现在分词形式 | |
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8
envelop
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| vt.包，封，遮盖；包围 | |
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9
enveloping
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| v.包围，笼罩，包住( envelop的现在分词 ) | |
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10
defensive
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| adj.防御的；防卫的；防守的 | |
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11
immediate
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| adj.立即的；直接的，最接近的；紧靠的 | |
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12
regiment
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| n.团，多数，管理；v.组织，编成团，统制 | |
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prospect
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| n.前景，前途；景色，视野 | |
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14
deploy
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| v.（军）散开成战斗队形，布置，展开 | |
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15
ammunition
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| n.军火，弹药 | |
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16
superfluous
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| adj.过多的，过剩的，多余的 | |
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17
regiments
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| （军队的）团( regiment的名词复数 )； 大量的人或物 | |
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18
entail
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| vt.使承担，使成为必要，需要 | |
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19
embark
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| vi.乘船，着手，从事，上飞机 | |
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20
deployed
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| （尤指军事行动）使展开( deploy的过去式和过去分词 )； 施展； 部署； 有效地利用 | |
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21
detailed
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| adj.详细的，详尽的，极注意细节的，完全的 | |
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22
deployment
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| n. 部署,展开 | |
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23
component
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| n.组成部分，成分，元件；adj.组成的，合成的 | |
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24
judiciously
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| adv.明断地，明智而审慎地 | |
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25
considerably
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| adv.极大地；相当大地；在很大程度上 | |
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26
artillery
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| n.(军)火炮，大炮；炮兵(部队) | |
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27
corps
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| n.(通信等兵种的)部队；(同类作的)一组 | |
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warfare
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| n.战争(状态)；斗争；冲突 | |
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