The want of an amount power in the government adequate to preserve order and allow of progress in the people is incident rather to a wild and rude state of society generally than to any particular form of political union. When the people are too much attached to savage6 independence to be tolerant of the amount of power to which it is for their good that they should be subject, the state of society (as already observed) is not yet ripe for representative government. When the time for that government has arrived, sufficient power for all needful purposes is sure to reside in the sovereign assembly; and if enough of it is not intrusted to the executive, this can only arise from a jealous feeling on the part of the assembly toward the administration, never likely to exist but where the constitutional power of the assembly to turn them out of office has not yet sufficiently established itself. Wherever that constitutional right is admitted in principle and fully8 operative in practice, there is no fear that the assembly will not be willing to trust its own ministers with any amount of power really desirable; the danger is, on the contrary, lest they should grant it too ungrudgingly, and too indefinite in extent, since the power of the minister is the power of the body who make and who keep him so. It is, however, very likely, and is one of the dangers of a controlling assembly, that it may be lavish9 of powers, but afterwards interfere10 with their exercise; may give power by wholesale11, and take it back in detail, by multiplied single acts of interference in the business of administration. The evils arising from this assumption of the actual function of governing, in lieu of that of criticising and checking those who govern, have been sufficiently dwelt upon in the preceding chapter. No safeguard can in the nature of things be provided against this improper12 meddling13, except a strong and general conviction of its injurious character.
The other negative defect which may reside in a government, that of not bringing into sufficient exercise the individual faculties14, moral, intellectual, and active, of the people, has been exhibited generally in setting forth15 the distinctive16 mischiefs17 of despotism. As between one form of popular government and another, the advantage in this respect lies with that which most widely diffuses18 the exercise of public functions; on the one hand, by excluding fewest from the suffrage19; on the other, by opening to all classes of private citizens, so far as is consistent with other equally important objects, the widest participation20 in the details of judicial21 and administrative22 business; as by jury-trial, admission to municipal offices, and, above all, by the utmost possible publicity23 and liberty of discussion, whereby not merely a few individuals in succession, but the whole public, are made, to a certain extent, participants in the government, and sharers in the instruction and mental exercise derived25 from it. The further illustration of these benefits, as well as of the limitations under which they must be aimed at, will be better deferred26 until we come to speak of the details of administration.
The positive evils and dangers of the representative, as of every other form of government, may be reduced to two heads: first, general ignorance and incapacity, or, to speak more moderately, insufficient27 mental qualifications, in the controlling body; secondly28, the danger of its being under the influence of interests not identical with the general welfare of the community.
The former of these evils, deficiency in high mental qualifications, is one to which it is generally supposed that popular government is liable in a greater degree than any other. The energy of a monarch29, the steadiness and prudence30 of an aristocracy, are thought to contrast most favorably with the vacillation31 and shortsightedness of even the most qualified32 democracy. These propositions, however, are not by any means so well founded as they at first sight appear.
Compared with simple monarchy33, representative government is in these respects at no disadvantage. Except in a rude age, hereditary34 monarchy, when it is really such, and not aristocracy in disguise, far surpasses democracy in all the forms of incapacity supposed to be characteristic of the last. I say, except in a rude age, because in a really rude state of society there is a considerable guaranty for the intellectual and active capacities of the sovereign. His personal will is constantly encountering obstacles from the willfulness of his subjects, and of powerful individuals among their number. The circumstances of society do not afford him much temptation to mere24 luxurious35 self-indulgence; mental and bodily activity, especially political and military, are his principal excitements; and among turbulent chiefs and lawless followers37 he has little authority, and is seldom long secure even of his throne, unless he possesses a considerable amount of personal daring, dexterity38, and energy. The reason why the average of talent is so high among the Henries and Edwards of our history may be read in the tragical39 fate of the second Edward and the second Richard, and the civil wars and disturbances40 of the reigns41 of John and his incapable42 successor. The troubled period of the Reformation also produced several eminent43 hereditary monarchs—Elizabeth, Henri Quatre, Gustavus Adolphus; but they were mostly bred up in adversity, succeeded to the throne by the unexpected failure of nearer heirs, or had to contend with great difficulties in the commencement of their reign7. Since European life assumed a settled aspect, any thing above mediocrity in an hereditary king has become extremely rare, while the general average has been even below mediocrity, both in talent and in vigor44 of character. A monarchy constitutionally absolute now only maintains itself in existence (except temporarily in the hands of some active-minded usurper) through the mental qualifications of a permanent bureaucracy. The Russian and Austrian governments, and even the French government in its normal condition, are oligarchies45 of officials, of whom the head of the state does little more than select the chiefs. I am speaking of the regular course of their administration; for the will of the master of course determines many of their particular acts.
The governments which have been remarkable46 in history for sustained mental ability and vigor in the conduct of affairs have generally been aristocracies. But they have been, without any exception, aristocracies of public functionaries47. The ruling bodies have been so narrow, that each member, or at least each influential48 member of the body, was able to make, and did make, public business an active profession, and the principal occupation of his life. The only aristocracies which have manifested high governing capacities, and acted on steady maxims49 of policy through many generations, are those of Rome and Venice. But, at Venice, though the privileged order was numerous, the actual management of affairs was rigidly51 concentrated in a small oligarchy52 within the oligarchy, whose whole lives were devoted53 to the study and conduct of the affairs of the state. The Roman government partook more of the character of an open aristocracy like our own. But the really governing body, the Senate, was in exclusively composed of persons who had exercised public functions, and had either already filled, or were looking forward to fill the highest offices of the state, at the peril54 of a severe responsibility in case of incapacity and failure. When once members of the Senate, their lives were pledged to the conduct of public affairs; they were not permitted even to leave Italy except in the discharge of some public trust; and unless turned out of the Senate by the censors55 for character or conduct deemed disgraceful, they retained their powers and responsibilities to the end of life. In an aristocracy thus constituted, every member felt his personal importance entirely56 bound up with the dignity and estimation of the commonwealth57 which he administered, and with the part he was able to play in its councils. This dignity and estimation were quite different things from the prosperity or happiness of the general body of the citizens, and were often wholly incompatible58 with it. But they were closely linked with the external success and aggrandisement of the state; and it was, consequently, in the pursuit of that object almost exclusively, that either the Roman or the Venetian aristocracies manifested the systematically59 wise collective policy and the great individual capacities for government for which history has deservedly given them credit.
It thus appears that the only governments, not representative, in which high political skill and ability have been other than exceptional, whether under monarchical60 or aristocratic forms, have been essentially61 bureaucracies. The work of government has been in the hands of governors by profession, which is the essence and meaning of bureaucracy. Whether the work is done by them because they have been trained to it, or they are trained to it because it is to be done by them, makes a great difference in many respects, but none at all as to the essential character of the rule. Aristocracies, on the other hand, like that of England, in which the class who possessed62 the power derived it merely from their social position, without being specially36 trained or devoting themselves exclusively to it (and in which, therefore, the power was not exercised directly, but through representative institutions oligarchically63 constituted), have been, in respect to intellectual endowments, much on a par5 with democracies; that is, they have manifested such qualities in any considerable degree only during the temporary ascendancy64 which great and popular talents, united with a distinguished65 position, have given to some one man. Themistocles and Pericles, Washington and Jefferson, were not more completely exceptions in their several democracies, and were assuredly much more splendid exceptions, than the Chathams and Peels of the representative aristocracy of Great Britain, or even the Sullys and Colberts of the aristocratic monarchy of France. A great minister, in the aristocratic governments of modern Europe, is almost as rare a phenomenon as a great king.
The comparison, therefore, as to the intellectual attributes of a government has to be made between a representative democracy and a bureaucracy; all other governments may be left out of the account. And here it must be acknowledged that a bureaucratic66 government has, in some important respects, greatly the advantage. It accumulates experience, acquires well-tried and well-considered traditional maxims, and makes provision for appropriate practical knowledge in those who have the actual conduct of affairs. But it is not equally favorable to individual energy of mind. The disease which afflicts67 bureaucratic governments, and which they usually die of, is routine. They perish by the immutability68 of their maxims, and, still more, by the universal law that whatever becomes a routine loses its vital principle, and, having no longer a mind acting69 within it, goes on revolving70 mechanically, though the work it is intended to do remains71 undone72. A bureaucracy always tends to become a pedantocracy. When the bureaucracy is the real government, the spirit of the corps73 (as with the Jesuits) bears down the individuality of its more distinguished members. In the profession of government, as in other professions, the sole idea of the majority is to do what they have been taught; and it requires a popular government to enable the conceptions of the man of original genius among them to prevail over the obstructive spirit of trained mediocrity. Only in a popular government (setting apart the accident of a highly intelligent despot) could Sir Rowland Hill have been victorious74 over the Post-office. A popular government installed him in the Post-office, and made the body, in spite of itself, obey the impulse given by the man who united special knowledge with individual vigor and originality75. That the Roman aristocracy escaped this characteristic disease of a bureaucracy was evidently owing to its popular element. All special offices, both those which gave a seat in the Senate and those which were sought by senators, were conferred by popular election. The Russian government is a characteristic exemplification of both the good and bad side of bureaucracy: its fixed76 maxims, directed with Roman perseverance77 to the same unflinchingly-pursued ends from age to age; the remarkable skill with which those ends are generally pursued; the frightful78 internal corruption79, and the permanent organized hostility80 to improvements from without, which even the autocratic power of a vigorous-minded emperor is seldom or never sufficient to overcome; the patient obstructiveness of the body being in the long run more than a match for the fitful energy of one man. The Chinese government, a bureaucracy of Mandarins, is, as far as known to us, another apparent example of the same qualities and defects.
In all human affairs, conflicting influences are required to keep one another alive and efficient even for their own proper uses; and the exclusive pursuit of one good object, apart from some other which should accompany it, ends not in excess of one and defect of the other, but in the decay and loss even of that which has been exclusively cared for. Government by trained officials can not do for a country the things which can be done by a free government, but it might be supposed capable of doing some things which free government of itself can not do. We find, however, that an outside element of freedom is necessary to enable it to do effectually or permanently81 even its own business. And so, also, freedom can not produce its best effects, and often breaks down altogether, unless means can be found of combining it with trained and skilled administration. There could not be a moment's hesitation82 between representative government, among a people in any degree ripe for it, and the most perfect imaginable bureaucracy. But it is, at the same time, one of the most important ends of political institutions, to attain83 as many of the qualities of the one as are consistent with the other; to secure, as far as they can be made compatible, the great advantage of the conduct of affairs by skilled persons, bred to it as an intellectual profession, along with that of a general control vested in, and seriously exercised by, bodies representative of the entire people. Much would be done towards this end by recognizing the line of separation, discussed in the preceding chapter, between the work of government properly so called, which can only be well performed after special cultivation84, and that of selecting, watching, and, when needful, controlling the governors, which in this case, as in all others, properly devolves, not on those who do the work, but on those for whose benefit it ought to be done. No progress at all can be made towards obtaining a skilled democracy, unless the democracy are willing that the work which requires skill should be done by those who possess it. A democracy has enough to do in providing itself with an amount of mental competency sufficient for its own proper work, that of superintendence and check.
How to obtain and secure this amount is one of the questions to taken into consideration in judging of the proper constitution of a representative body. In proportion as its composition fails to secure this amount, the assembly will encroach, by special acts, on the province of the executive; it will expel a good, or elevate and uphold a bad ministry85; it will connive86 at, or overlook in them, abuses of trust, will be deluded87 by their false pretenses88, or will withhold89 support from those who endeavour to fulfill their trust conscientiously90; it will countenance92 or impose a selfish, a capricious and impulsive93, a short-sighted, ignorant, and prejudiced general policy, foreign and domestic; it will abrogate94 good laws, or enact95 bad ones; let in new evils, or cling with perverse96 obstinacy97 to old; it will even, perhaps, under misleading impulses, momentary98 or permanent, emanating99 from itself or from its constituents100, tolerate or connive at proceedings101 which set law aside altogether, in cases where equal justice would not be agreeable to popular feeling. Such are among the dangers of representative government, arising from a constitution of the representation which does not secure an adequate amount of intelligence and knowledge in the representative assembly.
We next proceed to the evils arising from the prevalence of modes of action in the representative body, dictated103 by sinister104 interests (to employ the useful phrase introduced by Bentham), that is, interests conflicting more or less with the general good of the community.
It is universally admitted that, of the evils incident to monarchical and aristocratic governments, a large proportion arise from this cause. The interest of the monarch, or the interest of the aristocracy, either collective or that of its individual members, is promoted, or they themselves think that it will be promoted, by conduct opposed to that which the general interest of the community requires. The interest, for example, of the government is to tax heavily; that of the community is to be as little taxed as the necessary expenses of good government permit. The interest of the king and of the governing aristocracy is to possess and exercise unlimited105 power over the people; to enforce, on their part, complete conformity106 to the will and preferences of the rulers. The interest of the people is to have as little control exercised over them in any respect as is consistent with attaining107 the legitimate108 ends of government. The interest, or apparent and supposed interest of the king or aristocracy, is to permit no censure109 of themselves, at least in any form which they may consider either to threaten their power or seriously to interfere with their free agency. The interest of the people is that there should be full liberty of censure on every public officer, and on every public act or measure. The interest of a ruling class, whether in an aristocracy or an aristocratic monarchy, is to assume to themselves an endless variety of unjust privileges, sometimes benefiting their pockets at the expense of the people, sometimes merely tending to exalt110 them above others, or, what is the same thing in different words, to degrade others below themselves. If the people are disaffected111, which under such a government they are very likely to be, it is the interest of the king or aristocracy to keep them at a low level of intelligence and education, foment112 dissensions among them, and even prevent them from being too well off, lest they should "wax fat, and kick," agreeably to the maxim50 of Cardinal113 Richelieu in his celebrated114 "Testament115 Politique." All these things are for the interest of a king or aristocracy, in a purely116 selfish point of view, unless a sufficiently strong counter-interest is created by the fear of provoking resistance. All these evils have been, and many of them still are, produced by the sinister interests of kings and aristocracies, where their power is sufficient to raise them above the opinion of the rest of the community; nor is it rational to expect, as a consequence of such a position, any other conduct.
These things are superabundantly evident in the case of a monarchy or an aristocracy; but it is sometimes rather gratuitously117 assumed that the same kind of injurious influences do not operate in a democracy. Looking at democracy in the way in which it is commonly conceived, as the rule of the numerical majority, it is surely possible that the ruling power may be under the dominion118 of sectional or class interests, pointing to conduct different from that which would be dictated by impartial119 regard for the interest of all. Suppose the majority to be whites, the minority negroes, or vice120 versa: is it likely that the majority would allow equal justice to the minority? Suppose the majority Catholics, the minority Protestants, or the reverse; will there not be the same danger? Or let the majority be English, the minority Irish, or the contrary: is there not a great probability of similar evil? In all countries there is a majority of poor, a minority who, in contradistinction, may be called rich. Between these two classes, on many questions, there is complete opposition121 of apparent interest. We will suppose the majority sufficiently intelligent to be aware that it is not for their advantage to weaken the security of property, and that it would be weakened by any act of arbitrary spoliation. But is there not a considerable danger lest they should throw upon the possessors of what is called realized property, and upon the larger incomes, an unfair share, or even the whole, of the burden of taxation122, and having done so, add to the amount without scruple123, expending124 the proceeds in modes supposed to conduce to the profit and advantage of the laboring126 class? Suppose, again, a minority of skilled laborers127, a majority of unskilled: the experience of many Trade unions, unless they are greatly calumniated128, justifies129 the apprehension130 that equality of earnings131 might be imposed as an obligation, and that piecework, and all practices which enable superior industry or abilities to gain a superior reward, might be put down. Legislative132 attempts to raise wages, limitation of competition in the labor125 market, taxes or restrictions133 on machinery134, and on improvements of all kinds tending to dispense135 with any of the existing labor—even, perhaps, protection of the home producer against foreign industry—are very natural (I do not venture to say whether probable) results of a feeling of class interest in a governing majority of manual laborers.
It will be said that none of these things are for the real interest of the most numerous class: to which I answer, that if the conduct of human beings was determined136 by no other interested considerations than those which constitute their "real" interest, neither monarchy nor oligarchy would be such bad governments as they are; for assuredly very strong arguments may be, and often have been, adduced to show that either a king or a governing senate are in much the most enviable position when ruling justly and vigilantly137 over an active, wealthy, enlightened, and high-minded people. But a king only now and then, and an oligarchy in no known instance, have taken this exalted138 view of their self-interest; and why should we expect a loftier mode of thinking from the laboring classes? It is not what their interest is, but what they suppose it to be, that is the important consideration with respect to their conduct; and it is quite conclusive139 against any theory of government that it assumes the numerical majority to do habitually140 what is never done, nor expected to be done, save in very exceptional cases, by any other depositaries of power—namely, to direct their conduct by their real ultimate interest, in opposition to their immediate142 and apparent interest. No one, surely, can doubt that many of the pernicious measures above enumerated143, and many others as bad, would be for the immediate interest of the general body of unskilled laborers. It is quite possible that they would be for the selfish interest of the whole existing generation of the class. The relaxation144 of industry and activity, and diminished encouragement to saving which would be their ultimate consequence, might perhaps be little felt by the class of unskilled laborers in the space of a single lifetime. Some of the most fatal changes in human affairs have been, as to their more manifest immediate effects, beneficial. The establishment of the despotism of the C?sars was a great benefit to the entire generation in which it took place. It put a stop to civil war, abated145 a vast amount of malversation and tyranny by pr?tors and proconsuls; it fostered many of the graces of life, and intellectual cultivation in all departments not political; it produced monuments of literary genius dazzling to the imaginations of shallow readers of history, who do not reflect that the men to whom the despotism of Augustus (as well as of Lorenzo de' Medici and of Louis XIV.) owes its brilliancy were all formed in the generation preceding. The accumulated riches, and the mental energy and activity produced by centuries of freedom, remained for the benefit of the first generation of slaves. Yet this was the commencement of a régime by whose gradual operation all the civilization which had been gained insensibly faded away, until the empire, which had conquered and embraced the world in its grasp so completely lost even its military efficiency that invaders146 whom three or four legions had always sufficed to coerce147 were able to overrun and occupy nearly the whole of its vast territory. The fresh impulse given by Christianity came but just in time to save arts and letters from perishing, and the human race from sinking back into perhaps endless night.
When we talk of the interest of a body of men, or even of an individual man, as a principle determining their actions, the question what would be considered their interest by an unprejudiced observer is one of the least important parts of the whole matter. As Coleridge observes, the man makes the motive148, not the motive the man. What it is the man's interest to do or refrain from depends less on any outward circumstances than upon what sort of man he is. If you wish to know what is practically a man's interest, you must know the cast of his habitual141 feelings and thoughts. Every body has two kinds of interests—interests which he cares for and interests which he does not care for. Every body has selfish and unselfish interests, and a selfish man has cultivated the habit of caring for the former and not caring for the latter. Every one has present and distant interests, and the improvident149 man is he who cares for the present interests and does not care for the distant. It matters little that on any correct calculation the latter may be the more considerable, if the habits of his mind lead him to fix his thoughts and wishes solely150 on the former. It would be vain to attempt to persuade a man who beats his wife and ill-treats his children that he would be happier if he lived in love and kindness with them. He would be happier if he were the kind of person who could so live; but he is not, and it is probably too late for him to become that kind of person. Being what he is, the gratification of his love of domineering and the indulgence of his ferocious151 temper are to his perceptions a greater good to himself than he would be capable of deriving152 from the pleasure and affection of those dependent on him. He has no pleasure in their pleasure, and does not care for their affection. His neighbor, who does, is probably a happier man than he; but could he be persuaded of this, the persuasion153 would, most likely, only still further exasperate154 his malignity155 or his irritability156. On the average, a person who cares for other people, for his country, or for mankind, is a happier man than one who does not; but of what use is it to preach this doctrine157 to a man who cares for nothing but his own ease or his own pocket? He can not care for other people if he would. It is like preaching to the worm who crawls on the ground how much better it would be for him if he were an eagle.
Now it is a universally observed fact that the two evil dispositions159 in question, the disposition158 to prefer a man's selfish interests to those which he shares with other people, and his immediate and direct interests to those which are indirect and remote, are characteristics most especially called forth and fostered by the possession of power. The moment a man, or a class of men, find themselves with power in their hands, the man's individual interest, or the class's separate interest, acquires an entirely new degree of importance in their eyes. Finding themselves worshipped by others, they become worshippers of themselves, and think themselves entitled to be counted at a hundred times the value of other people, while the facility they acquire of doing as they like without regard to consequences insensibly weakens the habits which make men look forward even to such consequences as affect themselves. This is the meaning of the universal tradition, grounded on universal experience, of men's being corrupted160 by power. Every one knows how absurd it would be to infer from what a man is or does when in a private station, that he will be and do exactly the like when a despot on a throne; where the bad parts of his human nature, instead of being restrained and kept in subordination by every circumstance of his life and by every person surrounding him, are courted by all persons, and ministered to by all circumstances. It would be quite as absurd to entertain a similar expectation in regard to a class of men; the Demos, or any other. Let them be ever so modest and amenable161 to reason while there is a power over them stronger than they, we ought to expect a total change in this respect when they themselves become the strongest power.
Governments must be made for human beings as they are, or as they are capable of speedily becoming; and in any state of cultivation which mankind, or any class among them, have yet attained162, or are likely soon to attain, the interests by which they will be led, when they are thinking only of self-interest, will be almost exclusively those which are obvious at first sight, and which operate on their present condition. It is only a disinterested163 regard for others, and especially for what comes after them, for the idea of posterity164, of their country, or of mankind, whether grounded on sympathy or on a conscientious91 feeling, which ever directs the minds and purposes of classes or bodies of men towards distant or unobvious interests; and it can not be maintained that any form of government would be rational which required as a condition that these exalted principles of action should be the guiding and master motives165 in the conduct of average human beings. A certain amount of conscience and of disinterested public spirit may fairly be calculated on in the citizens of any community ripe for representative government. But it would be ridiculous to expect such a degree of it, combined with such intellectual discernment, as would be proof against any plausible166 fallacy tending to make that which was for their class interest appear the dictate102 of justice and of the general good. We all know what specious167 fallacies may be urged in defense168 of every act of injustice169 yet proposed for the imaginary benefit of the mass. We know how many, not otherwise fools or bad men, have thought it justifiable170 to repudiate171 the national debt. We know how many, not destitute172 of ability and of considerable popular influence, think it fair to throw the whole burden of taxation upon savings173, under the name of realized property, allowing those whose progenitors174 and themselves have always spent all they received, to remain, as a reward for such exemplary conduct, wholly untaxed. We know what powerful arguments, the more dangerous because there is a portion of truth in them, may be brought against all inheritance, against the power of bequest175, against every advantage which one person seems to have over another. We know how easily the uselessness of almost every branch of knowledge may be proved to the complete satisfaction of those who do not possess it. How many, not altogether stupid men, think the scientific study of languages useless, think ancient literature useless, all erudition useless, logic176 and metaphysics useless, poetry and the fine arts idle and frivolous177, political economy purely mischievous178? Even history has been pronounced useless and mischievous by able men. Nothing but that acquaintance with external nature, empirically acquired, which serves directly for the production of objects necessary to existence or agreeable to the senses, would get its utility recognized if people had the least encouragement to disbelieve it. Is it reasonable to think that even much more cultivated minds than those of the numerical majority can be expected to be, will have so delicate a conscience, and so just an appreciation179 of what is against their own apparent interest, that they will reject these and the innumerable other fallacies which will press in upon them from all quarters as soon as they come into power, to induce them to follow their own selfish inclinations180 and short-sighted notions of their own good, in opposition to justice, at the expense of all other classes and of posterity?
One of the greatest dangers, therefore, of democracy, as of all other forms of government, lies in the sinister interest of the holders181 of power: it is the danger of class legislation, of government intended for (whether really effecting it or not) the immediate benefit of the dominant182 class, to the lasting183 detriment184 of the whole. And one of the most important questions demanding consideration in determining the best constitution of a representative government is how to provide efficacious securities against this evil.
If we consider as a class, politically speaking, any number of persons who have the same sinister interest—that is, whose direct and apparent interest points towards the same description of bad measures—the desirable object would be that no class, and no combination of classes likely to combine, shall be able to exercise a preponderant influence in the government. A modern community, not divided within itself by strong antipathies185 of race, language, or nationality, may be considered as in the main divisible into two sections, which, in spite of partial variations, correspond on the whole with two divergent directions of apparent interest. Let us call them (in brief general terms) laborers on the one hand, employers of labor on the other; including, however, along with employers of labor not only retired186 capitalists and the possessors of inherited wealth, but all that highly paid description of laborers (such as the professions) whose education and way of life assimilate them with the rich, and whose prospect187 and ambition it is to raise themselves into that class. With the laborers, on the other hand, may be ranked those smaller employers of labor who by interests, habits, and educational impressions are assimilated in wishes, tastes, and objects to the laboring classes, comprehending a large proportion of petty tradesmen. In a state of society thus composed, if the representative system could be made ideally perfect, and if it were possible to maintain it in that state, its organization must be such that these two classes, manual laborers and their affinities188 on one side, employers of labor and their affinities on the other, should be, in the arrangement of the representative system, equally balanced, each influencing about an equal number of votes in Parliament; since, assuming that the majority of each class, in any difference between them, would be mainly governed by their class interests, there would be a minority of each in whom that consideration would be subordinate to reason, justice, and the good of the whole; and this minority of either, joining with the whole of the other, would turn the scale against any demands of their own majority which were not such as ought to prevail. The reason why, in any tolerable constituted society, justice and the general interest mostly in the end carry their point, is that the separate and selfish interests of mankind are almost always divided; some are interested in what is wrong, but some, also, have their private interest on the side of what is right; and those who are governed by higher considerations, though too few and weak to prevail alone, usually, after sufficient discussion and agitation189, become strong enough to turn the balance in favor of the body of private interests which is on the same side with them. The representative system ought to be so constituted as to maintain this state of things; it ought not to allow any of the various sectional interests to be so powerful as to be capable of prevailing190 against truth and justice, and the other sectional interests combined. There ought always to be such a balance preserved among personal interests as may render any one of them dependent for its successes on carrying with it at least a large proportion of those who act on higher motives, and more comprehensive and distant views.
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defective
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| adj.有毛病的，有问题的，有瑕疵的 | |
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fulfill
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| vt.履行，实现，完成；满足，使满意 | |
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sufficiently
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| adv.足够地，充分地 | |
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inquiry
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| n.打听，询问，调查，查问 | |
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par
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| n.标准，票面价值，平均数量；adj.票面的，平常的，标准的 | |
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savage
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| adj.野蛮的；凶恶的，残暴的；n.未开化的人 | |
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reign
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| n.统治时期，统治，支配，盛行；v.占优势 | |
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fully
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| adv.完全地，全部地，彻底地；充分地 | |
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lavish
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| adj.无节制的；浪费的；vt.慷慨地给予，挥霍 | |
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interfere
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| v.(in)干涉，干预；(with)妨碍，打扰 | |
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wholesale
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| n.批发；adv.以批发方式；vt.批发，成批出售 | |
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improper
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| adj.不适当的，不合适的，不正确的，不合礼仪的 | |
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meddling
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| v.干涉，干预（他人事务）( meddle的现在分词 ) | |
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faculties
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| n.能力( faculty的名词复数 )；全体教职员；技巧；院 | |
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15
forth
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| adv.向前；向外，往外 | |
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16
distinctive
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| adj.特别的，有特色的，与众不同的 | |
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17
mischiefs
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| 损害( mischief的名词复数 )； 危害； 胡闹； 调皮捣蛋的人 | |
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18
diffuses
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| （使光）模糊，漫射，漫散( diffuse的第三人称单数 )； （使）扩散； （使）弥漫； （使）传播 | |
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19
suffrage
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| n.投票，选举权，参政权 | |
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20
participation
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| n.参与，参加，分享 | |
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21
judicial
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| adj.司法的，法庭的，审判的，明断的，公正的 | |
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22
administrative
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| adj.行政的，管理的 | |
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23
publicity
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| n.众所周知，闻名；宣传，广告 | |
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24
mere
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| adj.纯粹的；仅仅，只不过 | |
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25
derived
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| vi.起源；由来；衍生；导出v.得到( derive的过去式和过去分词 )；（从…中）得到获得；源于；（从…中）提取 | |
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26
deferred
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| adj.延期的，缓召的v.拖延，延缓，推迟( defer的过去式和过去分词 )；服从某人的意愿，遵从 | |
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27
insufficient
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| adj.(for，of)不足的，不够的 | |
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28
secondly
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| adv.第二，其次 | |
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29
monarch
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| n.帝王，君主，最高统治者 | |
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30
prudence
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| n.谨慎，精明，节俭 | |
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31
vacillation
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| n.动摇；忧柔寡断 | |
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32
qualified
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| adj.合格的，有资格的，胜任的，有限制的 | |
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33
monarchy
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| n.君主，最高统治者；君主政体，君主国 | |
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34
hereditary
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| adj.遗传的，遗传性的，可继承的，世袭的 | |
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35
luxurious
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| adj.精美而昂贵的；豪华的 | |
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36
specially
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| adv.特定地；特殊地；明确地 | |
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37
followers
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| 追随者( follower的名词复数 )； 用户； 契据的附面； 从动件 | |
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38
dexterity
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| n.(手的)灵巧，灵活 | |
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39
tragical
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| adj. 悲剧的, 悲剧性的 | |
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40
disturbances
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| n.骚乱( disturbance的名词复数 )；打扰；困扰；障碍 | |
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41
reigns
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| n.君主的统治( reign的名词复数 )；君主统治时期；任期；当政期 | |
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42
incapable
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| adj.无能力的，不能做某事的 | |
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43
eminent
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| adj.显赫的，杰出的，有名的，优良的 | |
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44
vigor
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| n.活力，精力，元气 | |
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45
oligarchies
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| n.寡头统治的政府( oligarchy的名词复数 )；寡头政治的执政集团；寡头统治的国家 | |
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46
remarkable
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| adj.显著的，异常的，非凡的，值得注意的 | |
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47
functionaries
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| n.公职人员，官员( functionary的名词复数 ) | |
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48
influential
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| adj.有影响的，有权势的 | |
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49
maxims
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| n.格言，座右铭( maxim的名词复数 ) | |
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50
maxim
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| n.格言，箴言 | |
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51
rigidly
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| adv.刻板地，僵化地 | |
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52
oligarchy
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| n.寡头政治 | |
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53
devoted
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| adj.忠诚的，忠实的，热心的，献身于...的 | |
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54
peril
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| n.(严重的)危险；危险的事物 | |
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55
censors
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| 删剪（书籍、电影等中被认为犯忌、违反道德或政治上危险的内容）( censor的第三人称单数 ) | |
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56
entirely
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| ad.全部地，完整地；完全地，彻底地 | |
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57
commonwealth
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| n.共和国，联邦，共同体 | |
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58
incompatible
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| adj.不相容的，不协调的，不相配的 | |
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59
systematically
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| adv.有系统地 | |
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60
monarchical
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| adj. 国王的，帝王的，君主的，拥护君主制的 =monarchic | |
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61
essentially
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| adv.本质上，实质上，基本上 | |
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62
possessed
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| adj.疯狂的；拥有的，占有的 | |
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63
oligarchically
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| adj.寡头政治的，主张寡头政治的 | |
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64
ascendancy
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| n.统治权，支配力量 | |
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65
distinguished
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| adj.卓越的，杰出的，著名的 | |
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66
bureaucratic
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| adj.官僚的，繁文缛节的 | |
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67
afflicts
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| 使受痛苦，折磨( afflict的名词复数 ) | |
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68
immutability
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| n.不变(性) | |
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69
acting
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| n.演戏，行为，假装；adj.代理的，临时的，演出用的 | |
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70
revolving
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| adj.旋转的，轮转式的；循环的v.（使）旋转( revolve的现在分词 )；细想 | |
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71
remains
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| n.剩余物，残留物；遗体，遗迹 | |
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72
undone
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| a.未做完的，未完成的 | |
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73
corps
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| n.(通信等兵种的)部队；(同类作的)一组 | |
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74
victorious
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| adj.胜利的，得胜的 | |
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75
originality
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| n.创造力，独创性；新颖 | |
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76
fixed
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| adj.固定的，不变的，准备好的；(计算机)固定的 | |
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77
perseverance
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| n.坚持不懈，不屈不挠 | |
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78
frightful
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| adj.可怕的；讨厌的 | |
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79
corruption
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| n.腐败，堕落，贪污 | |
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80
hostility
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| n.敌对，敌意；抵制［pl.］交战，战争 | |
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81
permanently
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| adv.永恒地，永久地，固定不变地 | |
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82
hesitation
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| n.犹豫，踌躇 | |
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83
attain
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| vt.达到，获得，完成 | |
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84
cultivation
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| n.耕作，培养，栽培（法），养成 | |
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85
ministry
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| n.(政府的)部；牧师 | |
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86
connive
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| v.纵容；密谋 | |
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87
deluded
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| v.欺骗，哄骗( delude的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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88
pretenses
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| n.借口（pretense的复数形式） | |
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89
withhold
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| v.拒绝，不给；使停止，阻挡 | |
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90
conscientiously
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| adv.凭良心地；认真地，负责尽职地；老老实实 | |
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91
conscientious
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| adj.审慎正直的，认真的，本着良心的 | |
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92
countenance
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| n.脸色，面容；面部表情；vt.支持，赞同 | |
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93
impulsive
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| adj.冲动的，刺激的；有推动力的 | |
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94
abrogate
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| v.废止，废除 | |
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95
enact
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| vt.制定(法律)；上演，扮演 | |
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96
perverse
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| adj.刚愎的；坚持错误的，行为反常的 | |
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97
obstinacy
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| n.顽固；（病痛等）难治 | |
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98
momentary
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| adj.片刻的，瞬息的；短暂的 | |
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99
emanating
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| v.从…处传出，传出( emanate的现在分词 )；产生，表现，显示 | |
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100
constituents
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| n.选民( constituent的名词复数 )；成分；构成部分；要素 | |
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101
proceedings
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| n.进程，过程，议程；诉讼(程序)；公报 | |
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102
dictate
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| v.口授；(使)听写；指令，指示，命令 | |
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103
dictated
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| v.大声讲或读( dictate的过去式和过去分词 )；口授；支配；摆布 | |
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104
sinister
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| adj.不吉利的，凶恶的，左边的 | |
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105
unlimited
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| adj.无限的，不受控制的，无条件的 | |
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106
conformity
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| n.一致，遵从，顺从 | |
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107
attaining
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| （通常经过努力）实现( attain的现在分词 )； 达到； 获得； 达到（某年龄、水平、状况） | |
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108
legitimate
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| adj.合法的，合理的，合乎逻辑的；v.使合法 | |
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109
censure
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| v./n.责备；非难；责难 | |
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110
exalt
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| v.赞扬，歌颂，晋升，提升 | |
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111
disaffected
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| adj.（政治上）不满的，叛离的 | |
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112
foment
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| v.煽动，助长 | |
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113
cardinal
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| n.(天主教的)红衣主教；adj.首要的，基本的 | |
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114
celebrated
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| adj.有名的，声誉卓著的 | |
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115
testament
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| n.遗嘱；证明 | |
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116
purely
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| adv.纯粹地，完全地 | |
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117
gratuitously
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| 平白 | |
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118
dominion
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| n.统治，管辖，支配权；领土，版图 | |
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119
impartial
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| adj.(in,to)公正的，无偏见的 | |
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120
vice
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| n.坏事；恶习；[pl.]台钳，老虎钳；adj.副的 | |
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121
opposition
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| n.反对，敌对 | |
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122
taxation
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| n.征税，税收，税金 | |
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123
scruple
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| n./v.顾忌，迟疑 | |
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124
expending
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| v.花费( expend的现在分词 )；使用（钱等）做某事；用光；耗尽 | |
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125
labor
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| n.劳动，努力，工作，劳工；分娩；vi.劳动，努力，苦干；vt.详细分析；麻烦 | |
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126
laboring
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| n.劳动，操劳v.努力争取(for)( labor的现在分词 )；苦干；详细分析；（指引擎）缓慢而困难地运转 | |
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127
laborers
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| n.体力劳动者，工人( laborer的名词复数 )；（熟练工人的）辅助工 | |
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128
calumniated
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| v.诽谤，中伤( calumniate的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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129
justifies
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| 证明…有理( justify的第三人称单数 )； 为…辩护； 对…作出解释； 为…辩解（或辩护） | |
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130
apprehension
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| n.理解，领悟；逮捕，拘捕；忧虑 | |
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131
earnings
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| n.工资收人；利润，利益，所得 | |
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132
legislative
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| n.立法机构，立法权；adj.立法的，有立法权的 | |
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133
restrictions
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|
| 约束( restriction的名词复数 )； 管制； 制约因素； 带限制性的条件（或规则） | |
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134
machinery
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| n.(总称)机械，机器；机构 | |
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135
dispense
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| vt.分配，分发；配(药)，发(药)；实施 | |
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136
determined
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| adj.坚定的；有决心的 | |
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137
vigilantly
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| adv.警觉地，警惕地 | |
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138
exalted
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| adj.(地位等)高的，崇高的；尊贵的，高尚的 | |
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139
conclusive
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| adj.最后的，结论的；确凿的，消除怀疑的 | |
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140
habitually
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| ad.习惯地，通常地 | |
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141
habitual
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| adj.习惯性的；通常的，惯常的 | |
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142
immediate
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| adj.立即的；直接的，最接近的；紧靠的 | |
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143
enumerated
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| v.列举，枚举，数( enumerate的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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relaxation
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| n.松弛，放松；休息；消遣；娱乐 | |
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abated
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| 减少( abate的过去式和过去分词 )； 减去； 降价； 撤消（诉讼） | |
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146
invaders
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| 入侵者，侵略者，侵入物( invader的名词复数 ) | |
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coerce
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| v.强迫，压制 | |
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148
motive
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| n.动机，目的；adv.发动的，运动的 | |
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149
improvident
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| adj.不顾将来的，不节俭的，无远见的 | |
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150
solely
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| adv.仅仅，唯一地 | |
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151
ferocious
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| adj.凶猛的，残暴的，极度的，十分强烈的 | |
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152
deriving
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| v.得到( derive的现在分词 )；（从…中）得到获得；源于；（从…中）提取 | |
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153
persuasion
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| n.劝说；说服；持有某种信仰的宗派 | |
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154
exasperate
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| v.激怒，使（疾病）加剧，使恶化 | |
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155
malignity
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| n.极度的恶意，恶毒；（病的）恶性 | |
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156
irritability
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| n.易怒 | |
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157
doctrine
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| n.教义；主义；学说 | |
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158
disposition
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| n.性情，性格；意向，倾向；排列，部署 | |
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dispositions
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| 安排( disposition的名词复数 )； 倾向； （财产、金钱的）处置； 气质 | |
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corrupted
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| （使）败坏( corrupt的过去式和过去分词 )； （使）腐化； 引起（计算机文件等的）错误； 破坏 | |
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161
amenable
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| adj.经得起检验的；顺从的；对负有义务的 | |
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attained
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| （通常经过努力）实现( attain的过去式和过去分词 )； 达到； 获得； 达到（某年龄、水平、状况） | |
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disinterested
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| adj.不关心的，不感兴趣的 | |
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164
posterity
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| n.后裔，子孙，后代 | |
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motives
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| n.动机，目的( motive的名词复数 ) | |
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166
plausible
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| adj.似真实的，似乎有理的，似乎可信的 | |
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specious
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| adj.似是而非的；adv.似是而非地 | |
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168
defense
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| n.防御，保卫；[pl.]防务工事；辩护，答辩 | |
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injustice
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| n.非正义，不公正，不公平，侵犯（别人的）权利 | |
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170
justifiable
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| adj.有理由的，无可非议的 | |
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171
repudiate
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| v.拒绝，拒付，拒绝履行 | |
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172
destitute
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| adj.缺乏的；穷困的 | |
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173
savings
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| n.存款，储蓄 | |
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174
progenitors
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| n.祖先( progenitor的名词复数 )；先驱；前辈；原本 | |
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175
bequest
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| n.遗赠；遗产，遗物 | |
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176
logic
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| n.逻辑(学)；逻辑性 | |
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177
frivolous
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| adj.轻薄的；轻率的 | |
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178
mischievous
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| adj.调皮的，恶作剧的，有害的，伤人的 | |
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179
appreciation
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| n.评价；欣赏；感谢；领会，理解；价格上涨 | |
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inclinations
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| 倾向( inclination的名词复数 )； 倾斜； 爱好； 斜坡 | |
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181
holders
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| 支持物( holder的名词复数 )； 持有者； （支票等）持有人； 支托（或握持）…之物 | |
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182
dominant
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| adj.支配的，统治的；占优势的；显性的；n.主因，要素，主要的人(或物)；显性基因 | |
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183
lasting
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| adj.永久的，永恒的；vbl.持续，维持 | |
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184
detriment
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| n.损害；损害物，造成损害的根源 | |
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185
antipathies
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| 反感( antipathy的名词复数 )； 引起反感的事物； 憎恶的对象； （在本性、倾向等方面的）不相容 | |
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186
retired
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| adj.隐退的，退休的，退役的 | |
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187
prospect
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| n.前景，前途；景色，视野 | |
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188
affinities
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| n.密切关系( affinity的名词复数 )；亲近；（生性）喜爱；类同 | |
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189
agitation
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| n.搅动；搅拌；鼓动，煽动 | |
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190
prevailing
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| adj.盛行的；占优势的；主要的 | |
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