To render a federation2 advisable several conditions are necessary. The first is that there should be a sufficient amount of mutual3 sympathy among the populations. The federation binds4 them always to fight on the same side; and if they have such feelings toward one another, or such diversity of feeling toward their neighbors that they would generally prefer to fight on opposite sides, the federal tie is neither likely to be of long duration, nor to be well observed while it subsists5. The sympathies available for the purpose are those of race, language, religion, and, above all, of political institutions, as conducing most to a feeling of identity of political interest. When a few free states, separately insufficient6 for their own defense7, are hemmed8 in on all sides by military or feudal9 monarchs10, who hate and despise freedom even in a neighbor, those states have no chance for preserving liberty and its blessings11 but by a federal union. The common interest arising from this cause has in Switzerland, for several centuries, been found adequate to maintain efficiently12 the federal bond, in spite not only of difference of religion when religion was the grand source of irreconcilable13 political enmity throughout Europe, but also in spite of great weakness in the constitution of the federation itself. In America, where all the conditions for the maintenance of union existed at the highest point, with the sole drawback of difference of institutions in the single but most important article of slavery, this one difference goes so far in alienating14 from each other's sympathies the two divisions of the union as to be now actually effecting the disruption of a tie of so much value to them both.
A second condition of the stability of a federal government is that the separate states be not so powerful as to be able to rely for protection against foreign encroachment15 on their individual strength. If they are, they will be apt to think that they do not gain, by union with others, the equivalent of what they sacrifice in their own liberty of action; and consequently, whenever the policy of the confederation, in things reserved to its cognizance, is different from that which any one of its members would separately pursue, the internal and sectional breach16 will, through absence of sufficient anxiety to preserve the union, be in danger of going so far as to dissolve it.
A third condition, not less important than the two others, is that there be not a very marked inequality of strength among the several contracting states. They can not, indeed, be exactly equal in resources; in all federations18 there will be a gradation of power among the members; some will be more populous19, rich, and civilized20 than others. There is a wide difference in wealth and population between New York and Rhode Island; between Berne, and Zug or Glaris. The essential is, that there should not be any one state so much more powerful than the rest as to be capable of vying21 in strength with many of them combined. If there be such a one, and only one, it will insist on being master of the joint22 deliberations; if there be two, they will be irresistible23 when they agree; and whenever they differ, every thing will be decided24 by a struggle for ascendancy25 between the rivals. This cause is alone enough to reduce the German Bund to almost a nullity, independently of its wretched internal constitution. It effects none of the real purposes of a confederation. It has never bestowed26 on Germany a uniform system of customs, nor so much as a uniform coinage, and has served only to give Austria and Prussia a legal right of pouring in their troops to assist the local sovereigns in keeping their subjects obedient to despotism, while, in regard to external concerns, the Bund would make all Germany a dependency of Prussia if there were no Austria, and of Austria if there were no Prussia; and, in the mean time, each petty prince has little choice but to be a partisan27 of one or the other, or to intrigue28 with foreign governments against both.
There are two different modes of organizing a federal union. The federal authorities may represent the governments solely29, and their acts may be obligatory30 only on the governments as such, or they may have the power of enacting31 laws and issuing orders which are binding32 directly on individual citizens. The former is the plan of the German so-called Confederation, and of the Swiss Constitution previous to 1847. It was tried in America for a few years immediately following the War of Independence. The other principle is that of the existing Constitution of the United States, and has been adopted within the last dozen years by the Swiss Confederacy. The Federal Congress of the American union is a substantive33 part of the government of every individual state. Within the limits of its attributions, it makes laws which are obeyed by every citizen individually, executes them through its own officers, and enforces them by its own tribunals. This is the only principle which has been found, or which is ever likely to produce an effective federal government. A union between the governments only is a mere34 alliance, and subject to all the contingencies35 which render alliances precarious36. If the acts of the President and of Congress were binding solely on the governments of New York, Virginia, or Pennsylvania, and could only be carried into effect through orders issued by those governments to officers appointed by them, under responsibility to their own courts of justice, no mandates37 of the federal government which were disagreeable to a local majority would ever be executed. Requisitions issued to a government have no other sanction or means of enforcement than war, and a federal army would have to be always in readiness to enforce the decrees of the federation against any recalcitrant38 state, subject to the probability that other states, sympathizing with the recusant, and perhaps sharing its sentiments on the particular point in dispute, would withhold39 their contingents40, if not send them to fight in the ranks of the disobedient State. Such a federation is more likely to be a cause than a preventive of internal wars; and if such was not its effect in Switzerland until the events of the years immediately preceding 1847, it was only because the federal government felt its weakness so strongly that it hardly ever attempted to exercise any real authority. In America, the experiment of a federation on this principle broke down in the first few years of its existence, happily while the men of enlarged knowledge and acquired ascendancy who founded the independence of the Republic were still alive to guide it through the difficult transition. The "Federalist," a collection of papers by three of these eminent41 men, written in explanation and defense of the new federal Constitution while still awaiting the national acceptance, is even now the most instructive treatise42 we possess on federal government. In Germany, the more imperfect kind of federation, as all know, has not even answered the purpose of maintaining an alliance. It has never, in any European war, prevented single members of the confederation from allying themselves with foreign powers against the rest. Yet this is the only federation which seems possible among monarchical43 states. A king, who holds his power by inheritance, not by delegation44, and who can not be deprived of it, nor made responsible to any one for its use, is not likely to renounce45 having a separate army, or to brook46 the exercise of sovereign authority over his own subjects, not through him, but directly by another power. To enable two or more countries under kingly government to be joined together in an effectual confederation, it seems necessary that they should all be under the same king. England and Scotland were a federation of this description during the interval47 of about a century between the union of the crowns and that of the Parliaments. Even this was effective, not through federal institutions, for none existed, but because the regal power in both Constitutions was so nearly absolute as to enable the foreign policy of both to be shaped according to a single will.
Under the more perfect mode of federation, where every citizen of each particular state owes obedience48 to two governments, that of his own state and that of the federation, it is evidently necessary not only that the constitutional limits of the authority of each should be precisely49 and clearly defined, but that the power to decide between them in any case of dispute should not reside in either of the governments, or in any functionary50 subject to it, but in an umpire independent of both. There must be a Supreme51 Court of Justice, and a system of subordinate courts in every state of the union, before whom such questions shall be carried, and whose judgment52 on them, in the last stage of appeal, shall be final. Every state of the union, and the federal government itself, as well as every functionary of each, must be liable to be sued in those courts for exceeding their powers, or for non-performance of their federal duties, and must in general be obliged to employ those courts as the instrument for enforcing their federal rights. This involves the remarkable53 consequence, actually realized in the United States, that a court of justice, the highest federal tribunal, is supreme over the various governments, both state and federal, having the right to declare that any law made, or act done by them, exceeds the powers assigned to them by the federal Constitution, and, in consequence, has no legal validity. It was natural to feel strong doubts, before trial had been made, how such a provision would work; whether the tribunal would have the courage to exercise its constitutional power; if it did, whether it would exercise it wisely, and whether the governments would consent to submit peaceably to its decision. The discussions on the American Constitution, before its final adoption54, give evidence that these natural apprehensions55 were strongly felt; but they are now entirely56 quieted, since, during the two generations and more which have subsequently elapsed, nothing has occurred to verify them, though there have at times been disputes of considerable acrimony, and which became the badges of parties, respecting the limits of the authority of the federal and state governments. The eminently57 beneficial working of so singular a provision is probably, as M. de Tocqueville remarks, in a great measure attributable to the peculiarity58 inherent in a court of justice acting17 as such—namely, that it does not declare the law eo nomine and in the abstract, but waits until a case between man and man is brought before it judicially60, involving the point in dispute; from which arises the happy effect that its declarations are not made in a very early stage of the controversy61; that much popular discussion usually precedes them; that the Court decides after hearing the point fully62 argued on both sides by lawyers of reputation; decides only as much of the question at a time as is required by the case before it, and its decision, instead of being volunteered for political purposes, is drawn63 from it by the duty which it can not refuse to fulfil, of dispensing64 justice impartially65 between adverse66 litigants67. Even these grounds of confidence would not have sufficed to produce the respectful submission68 with which all authorities have yielded to the decisions of the Supreme Court on the interpretation69 of the Constitution, were it not that complete reliance has been felt, not only on the intellectual pre-eminence of the judges composing that exalted70 tribunal, but on their entire superiority over either private or sectional partialities. This reliance has been in the main justified71; but there is nothing which more vitally imports the American people than to guard with the most watchful72 solicitude73 against every thing which has the remotest tendency to produce deterioration74 in the quality of this great national institution. The confidence on which depends the stability of federal institutions has been for the first time impaired75 by the judgment declaring slavery to be of common right, and consequently lawful76 in the Territories while not yet constituted as states, even against the will of a majority of their inhabitants. The main pillar of the American Constitution is scarcely strong enough to bear many more such shocks.
The tribunals which act as umpires between the federal and the state governments naturally also decide all disputes between two states, or between a citizen of one state and the government of another. The usual remedies between nations, war and diplomacy77, being precluded78 by the federal union, it is necessary that a judicial59 remedy should supply their place. The Supreme Court of the federation dispenses79 international law, and is the first great example of what is now one of the most prominent wants of civilized society, a real international tribunal.
The powers of a federal government naturally extend not only to peace and war, and all questions which arise between the country and foreign governments, but to making any other arrangements which are, in the opinion of the states, necessary to their enjoyment80 of the full benefits of union. For example, it is a great advantage to them that their mutual commerce should be free, without the impediment of frontier duties and custom-houses. But this internal freedom can not exist if each state has the power of fixing the duties on interchange of commodities between itself and foreign countries, since every foreign product let in by one state would be let into all the rest; and hence all custom duties and trade regulations in the United States are made or repealed81 by the federal government exclusively. Again, it is a great convenience to the states to have but one coinage, and but one system of weights and measures, which can only be insured if the regulation of these matters is intrusted to the federal government. The certainty and celerity of post-office communication is impeded82, and its expense increased, if a letter has to pass through half a dozen sets of public offices, subject to different supreme authorities: it is convenient, therefore, that all post-offices should be under the federal government; but on such questions the feelings of different communities are liable to be different. One of the American states, under the guidance of a man who has displayed powers as a speculative83 political thinker superior to any who has appeared in American politics since the authors of the "Federalist," [10] claimed a veto for each state on the custom laws of the federal Congress; and that statesman, in a posthumous84 work of great ability, which has been printed and widely circulated by the Legislature of South Carolina, vindicated85 this pretension86 on the general principle of limiting the tyranny of the majority, and protecting minorities by admitting them to a substantial participation88 in political power. One of the most disputed topics in American politics during the early part of this century was whether the power of the federal government ought to extend, and whether by the Constitution it did extend, to making roads and canals at the cost of the union. It is only in transactions with foreign powers that the authority of the federal government is of necessity complete. On every other subject the question depends on how closely the people in general wish to draw the federal tie; what portion of their local freedom of action they are willing to surrender, in order to enjoy more fully the benefit of being one nation.
Respecting the fitting constitution of a federal government within itself, much need not be said. It of course consists of a legislative89 branch and an executive, and the constitution of each is amenable90 to the same principles as that of representative governments generally. As regards the mode of adapting these general principles to a federal government, the provision of the American Constitution seems exceedingly judicious91, that Congress should consist of two houses, and that while one of them is constituted according to population, each state being entitled to representatives in the ratio of the number of its inhabitants, the other should represent not the citizens, but the state governments, and every state, whether large or small, should be represented in it by the same number of members. This provision precludes92 any undue93 power from being exercised by the more powerful states over the rest, and guarantees the reserved rights of the state governments by making it impossible, as far as the mode of representation can prevent, that any measure should pass Congress unless approved not only by a majority of the citizens, but by a majority of the states. I have before adverted94 to the further incidental advantage obtained of raising the standard of qualifications in one of the houses. Being nominated by select bodies, the Legislatures of the various states, whose choice, for reasons already indicated, is more likely to fall on eminent men than any popular election—who have not only the power of electing such, but a strong motive95 to do so, because the influence of their state in the general deliberations must be materially affected96 by the personal weight and abilities of its representatives—the Senate of the United States, thus chosen, has always contained nearly all the political men of established and high reputation in the union; while the Lower House of Congress has, in the opinion of competent observers, been generally as remarkable for the absence of conspicuous97 personal merit, as the Upper House for its presence.
When the conditions exist for the formation of efficient and durable98 federal unions, the multiplication99 of them is always a benefit to the world. It has the same salutary effect as any other extension of the practice of co-operation, through which the weak, by uniting, can meet on equal terms with the strong. By diminishing the number of those petty states which are not equal to their own defense, it weakens the temptations to an aggressive policy, whether working directly by arms, or through the prestige of superior power. It of course puts an end to war and diplomatic quarrels, and usually also to restrictions100 on commerce, between the states composing the union; while, in reference to neighboring nations, the increased military strength conferred by it is of a kind to be almost exclusively available for defensive101, scarcely at all for aggressive purposes. A federal government has not a sufficiently102 concentrated authority to conduct with much efficiency any war but one of self-defense, in which it can rely on the voluntary co-operation of every citizen; nor is there any thing very flattering to national vanity or ambition in acquiring, by a successful war, not subjects, nor even fellow-citizens, but only new, and perhaps troublesome independent members of the confederation. The warlike proceedings103 of the Americans in Mexico was purely104 exceptional, having been carried on principally by volunteers, under the influence of the migratory105 propensity106 which prompts individual Americans to possess themselves of unoccupied land, and stimulated107, if by any public motive, not by that of national aggrandizement108, but by the purely sectional purpose of extending slavery. There are few signs in the proceedings of Americans, nationally or individually, that the desire of territorial109 acquisition for their country as such has any considerable power over them. Their hankering after Cuba is, in the same manner, merely sectional, and the Northern States, those opposed to slavery, have never in any way favored it.
The question may present itself (as in Italy at its present uprising) whether a country which is determined110 to be united should form a complete or a merely federal union. The point is sometimes necessarily decided by the mere territorial magnitude of the united whole. There is a limit to the extent of country which can advantageously be governed, or even whose government can be conveniently superintended from a single centre. There are vast countries so governed; but they, or at least their distant provinces, are in general deplorably ill administered, and it is only when the inhabitants are almost savages112 that they could not manage their affairs better separately. This obstacle does not exist in the case of Italy, the size of which does not come up to that of several very efficiently governed single states in past and present times. The question then is, whether the different parts of the nation require to be governed in a way so essentially113 different that it is not probable the same Legislature, and the same ministry114 or administrative115 body, will give satisfaction to them all. Unless this be the case, which is a question of fact, it is better for them to be completely united. That a totally different system of laws and very different administrative institutions may exist in two portions of a country without being any obstacle to legislative unity116, is proved by the case of England and Scotland. Perhaps, however, this undisturbed coexistence of two legal systems under one united Legislature, making different laws for the two sections of the country in adaptation to the previous differences, might not be so well preserved, or the same confidence might not be felt in its preservation117, in a country whose legislators are more possessed118 (as is apt to be the case on the Continent) with the mania119 for uniformity. A people having that unbounded toleration which is characteristic of this country for every description of anomaly, so long as those whose interests it concerns do not feel aggrieved120 by it, afforded an exceptionally advantageous111 field for trying this difficult experiment. In most countries, if it was an object to retain different systems of law, it might probably be necessary to retain distinct legislatures as guardians121 of them, which is perfectly122 compatible with a national Parliament and king, or a national Parliament without a king, supreme over the external relations of all the members of the body.
Whenever it is not deemed necessary to maintain permanently123, in the different provinces, different systems of jurisprudence, and fundamental institutions grounded on different principles, it is always practicable to reconcile minor87 diversities with the maintenance of unity of government. All that is needful is to give a sufficiently large sphere of action to the local authorities. Under one and the same central government there may be local governors, and provincial124 assemblies for local purposes. It may happen, for instance, that the people of different provinces may have preferences in favor of different modes of taxation125. If the general Legislature could not be depended on for being guided by the members for each province in modifying the general system of taxation to suit that province, the Constitution might provide that as many of the expenses of the government as could by any possibility be made local should be defrayed by local rates imposed by the provincial assemblies, and that those which must of necessity be general, such as the support of an army and navy, should, in the estimates for the year, be apportioned126 among the different provinces according to some general estimate of their resources, the amount assigned to each being levied127 by the local assembly on the principles most acceptable to the locality, and paid en bloc128 into the national treasury129. A practice approaching to this existed even in the old French monarchy130, so far as regarded the pays d'états, each of which, having consented or been required to furnish a fixed131 sum, was left to assess it upon the inhabitants by its own officers, thus escaping the grinding despotism of the royal intendants and subdélégués; and this privilege is always mentioned as one of the advantages which mainly contributed to render them, as some of them were, the most flourishing provinces of France.
Identity of central government is compatible with many different degrees of centralisation, not only administrative, but even legislative. A people may have the desire and the capacity for a closer union than one merely federal, while yet their local peculiarities132 and antecedents render considerable diversities desirable in the details of their government. But if there is a real desire on all hands to make the experiment successful, there needs seldom be any difficulty in not only preserving these diversities, but giving them the guaranty of a constitutional provision against any attempt at assimilation except by the voluntary act of those who would be affected by the change.
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1
aggression
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| n.进攻，侵略，侵犯，侵害 | |
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federation
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| n.同盟，联邦，联合，联盟，联合会 | |
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mutual
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| adj.相互的，彼此的；共同的，共有的 | |
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binds
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| v.约束( bind的第三人称单数 )；装订；捆绑；（用长布条）缠绕 | |
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subsists
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| v.（靠很少的钱或食物）维持生活，生存下去( subsist的第三人称单数 ) | |
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insufficient
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| adj.(for，of)不足的，不够的 | |
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defense
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| n.防御，保卫；[pl.]防务工事；辩护，答辩 | |
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hemmed
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| 缝…的褶边( hem的过去式和过去分词 )； 包围 | |
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feudal
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| adj.封建的，封地的，领地的 | |
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monarchs
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| 君主，帝王( monarch的名词复数 ) | |
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blessings
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| n.（上帝的）祝福( blessing的名词复数 )；好事；福分；因祸得福 | |
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efficiently
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| adv.高效率地，有能力地 | |
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irreconcilable
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| adj.（指人）难和解的，势不两立的 | |
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alienating
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| v.使疏远( alienate的现在分词 )；使不友好；转让；让渡（财产等） | |
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encroachment
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| n.侵入，蚕食 | |
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breach
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| n.违反，不履行；破裂；vt.冲破，攻破 | |
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acting
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| n.演戏，行为，假装；adj.代理的，临时的，演出用的 | |
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federations
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| n.联邦( federation的名词复数 )；同盟；联盟；联合会 | |
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populous
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| adj.人口稠密的，人口众多的 | |
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civilized
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| a.有教养的，文雅的 | |
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vying
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| adj.竞争的；比赛的 | |
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joint
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| adj.联合的，共同的；n.关节，接合处；v.连接，贴合 | |
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irresistible
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| adj.非常诱人的，无法拒绝的，无法抗拒的 | |
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decided
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| adj.决定了的，坚决的；明显的，明确的 | |
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ascendancy
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| n.统治权，支配力量 | |
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bestowed
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| 赠给，授予( bestow的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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partisan
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| adj.党派性的；游击队的；n.游击队员；党徒 | |
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intrigue
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| vt.激起兴趣，迷住；vi.耍阴谋；n.阴谋，密谋 | |
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solely
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| adv.仅仅，唯一地 | |
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obligatory
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| adj.强制性的，义务的，必须的 | |
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enacting
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| 制定（法律），通过（法案）( enact的现在分词 ) | |
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binding
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| 有约束力的，有效的，应遵守的 | |
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substantive
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| adj.表示实在的；本质的、实质性的；独立的；n.实词，实名词；独立存在的实体 | |
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mere
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| adj.纯粹的；仅仅，只不过 | |
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contingencies
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| n.偶然发生的事故，意外事故( contingency的名词复数 )；以备万一 | |
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precarious
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| adj.不安定的，靠不住的；根据不足的 | |
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mandates
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| 托管（mandate的第三人称单数形式） | |
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recalcitrant
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| adj.倔强的 | |
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withhold
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| v.拒绝，不给；使停止，阻挡 | |
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contingents
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| （志趣相投、尤指来自同一地方的）一组与会者( contingent的名词复数 )； 代表团； （军队的）分遣队； 小分队 | |
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eminent
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| adj.显赫的，杰出的，有名的，优良的 | |
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treatise
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| n.专著；(专题)论文 | |
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monarchical
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| adj. 国王的，帝王的，君主的，拥护君主制的 =monarchic | |
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delegation
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| n.代表团；派遣 | |
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renounce
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| v.放弃；拒绝承认，宣布与…断绝关系 | |
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brook
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| n.小河，溪；v.忍受，容让 | |
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interval
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| n.间隔，间距；幕间休息，中场休息 | |
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obedience
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| n.服从，顺从 | |
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precisely
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| adv.恰好，正好，精确地，细致地 | |
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functionary
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| n.官员；公职人员 | |
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supreme
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| adj.极度的，最重要的；至高的，最高的 | |
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52
judgment
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| n.审判；判断力，识别力，看法，意见 | |
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remarkable
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| adj.显著的，异常的，非凡的，值得注意的 | |
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54
adoption
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| n.采用，采纳，通过；收养 | |
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55
apprehensions
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| 疑惧 | |
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56
entirely
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| ad.全部地，完整地；完全地，彻底地 | |
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eminently
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| adv.突出地；显著地；不寻常地 | |
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peculiarity
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| n.独特性，特色；特殊的东西；怪癖 | |
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judicial
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| adj.司法的，法庭的，审判的，明断的，公正的 | |
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judicially
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| 依法判决地，公平地 | |
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61
controversy
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| n.争论，辩论，争吵 | |
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fully
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| adv.完全地，全部地，彻底地；充分地 | |
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drawn
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| v.拖，拉，拔出；adj.憔悴的，紧张的 | |
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dispensing
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| v.分配( dispense的现在分词 )；施与；配（药） | |
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impartially
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| adv.公平地，无私地 | |
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adverse
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| adj.不利的；有害的；敌对的，不友好的 | |
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litigants
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| n.诉讼当事人( litigant的名词复数 ) | |
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68
submission
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| n.服从，投降；温顺，谦虚；提出 | |
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interpretation
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| n.解释，说明，描述；艺术处理 | |
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exalted
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| adj.(地位等)高的，崇高的；尊贵的，高尚的 | |
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justified
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| a.正当的，有理的 | |
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72
watchful
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| adj.注意的，警惕的 | |
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73
solicitude
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| n.焦虑 | |
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deterioration
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| n.退化；恶化；变坏 | |
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impaired
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| adj.受损的；出毛病的；有（身体或智力）缺陷的v.损害，削弱( impair的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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lawful
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| adj.法律许可的，守法的，合法的 | |
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diplomacy
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| n.外交；外交手腕，交际手腕 | |
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precluded
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| v.阻止( preclude的过去式和过去分词 )；排除；妨碍；使…行不通 | |
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dispenses
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| v.分配，分与；分配( dispense的第三人称单数 )；施与；配（药） | |
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enjoyment
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| n.乐趣；享有；享用 | |
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repealed
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| 撤销，废除( repeal的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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impeded
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| 阻碍，妨碍，阻止( impede的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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speculative
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| adj.思索性的，暝想性的，推理的 | |
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posthumous
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| adj.遗腹的；父亡后出生的；死后的，身后的 | |
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vindicated
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| v.澄清（某人/某事物）受到的责难或嫌疑( vindicate的过去式和过去分词 )；表明或证明（所争辩的事物）属实、正当、有效等；维护 | |
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pretension
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| n.要求；自命，自称；自负 | |
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minor
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| adj.较小(少)的，较次要的；n.辅修学科；vi.辅修 | |
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participation
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| n.参与，参加，分享 | |
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legislative
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| n.立法机构，立法权；adj.立法的，有立法权的 | |
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amenable
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| adj.经得起检验的；顺从的；对负有义务的 | |
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judicious
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| adj.明智的，明断的，能作出明智决定的 | |
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precludes
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| v.阻止( preclude的第三人称单数 )；排除；妨碍；使…行不通 | |
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undue
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| adj.过分的；不适当的；未到期的 | |
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adverted
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| 引起注意（advert的过去式与过去分词形式） | |
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motive
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| n.动机，目的；adv.发动的，运动的 | |
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affected
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| adj.不自然的，假装的 | |
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conspicuous
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| adj.明眼的，惹人注目的；炫耀的，摆阔气的 | |
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durable
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| adj.持久的，耐久的 | |
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multiplication
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| n.增加，增多，倍增；增殖，繁殖；乘法 | |
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restrictions
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| 约束( restriction的名词复数 )； 管制； 制约因素； 带限制性的条件（或规则） | |
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defensive
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| adj.防御的；防卫的；防守的 | |
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sufficiently
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| adv.足够地，充分地 | |
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proceedings
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| n.进程，过程，议程；诉讼(程序)；公报 | |
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purely
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| adv.纯粹地，完全地 | |
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migratory
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| n.候鸟，迁移 | |
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propensity
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| n.倾向；习性 | |
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stimulated
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| a.刺激的 | |
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108
aggrandizement
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| n.增大，强化，扩大 | |
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territorial
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| adj.领土的，领地的 | |
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determined
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| adj.坚定的；有决心的 | |
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111
advantageous
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| adj.有利的；有帮助的 | |
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112
savages
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| 未开化的人，野蛮人( savage的名词复数 ) | |
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113
essentially
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| adv.本质上，实质上，基本上 | |
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114
ministry
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| n.(政府的)部；牧师 | |
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115
administrative
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| adj.行政的，管理的 | |
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116
unity
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| n.团结，联合，统一；和睦，协调 | |
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117
preservation
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| n.保护，维护，保存，保留，保持 | |
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118
possessed
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| adj.疯狂的；拥有的，占有的 | |
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mania
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| n.疯狂；躁狂症，狂热，癖好 | |
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aggrieved
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| adj.愤愤不平的，受委屈的；悲痛的；（在合法权利方面）受侵害的v.令委屈，令苦恼，侵害( aggrieve的过去式)；令委屈，令苦恼，侵害( aggrieve的过去式和过去分词) | |
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121
guardians
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| 监护人( guardian的名词复数 )； 保护者，维护者 | |
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122
perfectly
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| adv.完美地，无可非议地，彻底地 | |
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permanently
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| adv.永恒地，永久地，固定不变地 | |
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124
provincial
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| adj.省的，地方的；n．外省人，乡下人 | |
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125
taxation
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| n.征税，税收，税金 | |
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126
apportioned
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| vt.分摊，分配（apportion的过去式与过去分词形式） | |
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127
levied
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| 征（兵）( levy的过去式和过去分词 )； 索取； 发动（战争）； 征税 | |
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128
bloc
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| n.集团；联盟 | |
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129
treasury
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| n.宝库；国库，金库；文库 | |
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130
monarchy
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| n.君主，最高统治者；君主政体，君主国 | |
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131
fixed
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| adj.固定的，不变的，准备好的；(计算机)固定的 | |
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peculiarities
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| n. 特质, 特性, 怪癖, 古怪 | |
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