It is unnecessary to discuss the case of small posts, like Gibraltar, Aden, or Heligoland, which are held only as naval2 or military positions. The military or naval object is in this case paramount4, and the inhabitants can not, consistently with it, be admitted to the government of the place, though they ought to be allowed all liberties and privileges compatible with that restriction5, including the free management of municipal affairs, and, as a compensation for being locally sacrificed to the convenience of the governing state, should be admitted to equal rights with its native subjects in all other parts of the empire.
Outlying territories of some size and population, which are held as dependencies, that is, which are subject, more or less, to acts of sovereign power on the part of the paramount country, without being equally represented (if represented at all) in its Legislature, may be divided into two classes. Some are composed of people of similar civilization to the ruling country, capable of, and ripe for, representative government, such as the British possessions in America and Australia. Others, like India, are still at a great distance from that state.
In the case of dependencies of the former class, this country has at length realized, in rare completeness, the true principle of government. England has always felt under a certain degree of obligation to bestow6 on such of her outlying populations as were of her own blood and language, and on some who were not, representative institutions formed in imitation of her own; but, until the present generation, she has been on the same bad level with other countries as to the amount of self-government which she allowed them to exercise through the representative institutions that she conceded to them. She claimed to be the supreme7 arbiter8 even of their purely9 internal concerns, according to her own, not their ideas of how those concerns could be best regulated. This practice was a natural corollary from the vicious theory of colonial policy—once common to all Europe, and not yet completely relinquished11 by any other people—which regarded colonies as valuable by affording markets for our commodities that could be kept entirely12 to ourselves; a privilege we valued so highly that we thought it worth purchasing by allowing to the colonies the same monopoly of our market for their own productions which we claimed for our commodities in theirs. This notable plan for enriching them and ourselves by making each pay enormous sums to the other, dropping the greatest part by the way, has been for some time abandoned. But the bad habit of meddling13 in the internal government of the colonies did not at once die out when we relinquished the idea of making any profit by it. We continued to torment14 them, not for any benefit to ourselves, but for that of a section or faction15 among the colonists16; and this persistence17 in domineering cost us a Canadian rebellion before we had the happy thought of giving it up. England was like an ill brought-up elder brother, who persists in tyrannizing over the younger ones from mere18 habit, till one of them, by a spirited resistance, though with unequal strength, gives him notice to desist. We were wise enough not to require a second warning. A new era in the colonial policy of nations began with Lord Durham's Report; the imperishable memorial of that nobleman's courage, patriotism19, and enlightened liberality, and of the intellect and practical sagacity of its joint20 authors, Mr. Wakefield and the lamented21 Charles Buller. [11]
It is now a fixed22 principle of the policy of Great Britain, professed23 in theory and faithfully adhered to in practice, that her colonies of European race, equally with the parent country, possess the fullest measure of internal self-government. They have been allowed to make their own free representative constitutions by altering in any manner they thought fit the already very popular constitutions which we had given them. Each is governed by its own Legislature and executive, constituted on highly democratic principles. The veto of the crown and of Parliament, though nominally24 reserved, is only exercised (and that very rarely) on questions which concern the empire, and not solely25 the particular colony. How liberal a construction has been given to the distinction between imperial and colonial questions is shown by the fact that the whole of the unappropriated lands in the regions behind our American and Australian colonies have been given up to the uncontrolled disposal of the colonial communities, though they might, without injustice26, have been kept in the hands of the imperial government, to be administered for the greatest advantage of future emigrants27 from all parts of the empire. Every colony has thus as full power over its own affairs as it could have if it were a member of even the loosest federation28, and much fuller than would belong to it under the Constitution of the United States, being free even to tax at its pleasure the commodities imported from the mother country. Their union with Great Britain is the slightest kind of federal union; but not a strictly29 equal federation, the mother country retaining to itself the powers of a federal government, though reduced in practice to their very narrowest limits. This inequality is, of course, as far as it goes, a disadvantage to the dependencies, which have no voice in foreign policy, but are bound by the decisions of the superior country. They are compelled to join England in war without being in any way consulted previous to engaging in it.
Those (now happily not a few) who think that justice is as binding30 on communities as it is on individuals, and that men are not warranted in doing to other countries, for the supposed benefit of their own country, what they would not be justified31 in doing to other men for their own benefit, feel even this limited amount of constitutional subordination on the part of the colonies to be a violation32 of principle, and have often occupied themselves in looking out for means by which it may be avoided. With this view it has been proposed by some that the colonies should return representatives to the British Legislature, and by others that the powers of our own, as well as of their Parliaments, should be confined to internal policy, and that there should be another representative body for foreign and imperial concerns, in which last the dependencies of Great Britain should be represented in the same manner, and with the same completeness as Great Britain itself. On this system there would be a perfectly33 equal federation between the mother country and her colonies, then no longer dependencies.
The feelings of equity34 and conceptions of public morality from which these suggestions emanate35 are worthy36 of all praise, but the suggestions themselves are so inconsistent with rational principles of government that it is doubtful if they have been seriously accepted as a possibility by any reasonable thinker. Countries separated by half the globe do not present the natural conditions for being under one government, or even members of one federation. If they had sufficiently37 the same interests, they have not, and never can have, a sufficient habit of taking council together. They are not part of the same public; they do not discuss and deliberate in the same arena38, but apart, and have only a most imperfect knowledge of what passes in the minds of one another. They neither know each other's objects, nor have confidence in each other's principles of conduct. Let any Englishman ask himself how he should like his destinies to depend on an assembly of which one third was British American, and another third South African and Australian. Yet to this it must come if there were any thing like fair or equal representation; and would not every one feel that the representatives of Canada and Australia, even in matters of an imperial character, could not know or feel any sufficient concern for the interests, opinions, or wishes of English, Irish, and Scotch39? Even for strictly federative purposes the conditions do not exist which we have seen to be essential to a federation. England is sufficient for her own protection without the colonies, and would be in a much stronger, as well as more dignified40 position, if separated from them, than when reduced to be a single member of an American, African, and Australian confederation. Over and above the commerce which she might equally enjoy after separation, England derives41 little advantage, except in prestige, from her dependencies, and the little she does derive42 is quite outweighed43 by the expense they cost her, and the dissemination45 they necessitate46 of her naval and military force, which, in case of war, or any real apprehension47 of it, requires to be double or treble what would be needed for the defense48 of this country alone.
But, though Great Britain could do perfectly well without her colonies, and though, on every principle of morality and justice, she ought to consent to their separation, should the time come when, after full trial of the best form of union, they deliberately49 desire to be dissevered, there are strong reasons for maintaining the present slight bond of connection so long as not disagreeable to the feelings of either party. It is a step, as far as it goes, towards universal peace and general friendly co-operation among nations. It renders war impossible among a large number of otherwise independent communities, and, moreover, hinders any of them from being absorbed into a foreign state, and becoming a source of additional aggressive strength to some rival power, either more despotic or closer at hand, which might not always be so unambitious or so pacific as Great Britain. It at least keeps the markets of the different countries open to one another, and prevents that mutual50 exclusion51 by hostile tariffs52 which none of the great communities of mankind except England have yet outgrown53. And in the case of the British possessions it has the advantage, especially valuable at the present time, of adding to the moral influence and weight in the councils of the world of the power which, of all in existence, best understands liberty—and, whatever may have been its errors in the past, has attained55 to more of conscience and moral principle in its dealings with foreigners than any other great nation seems either to conceive as possible or recognize as desirable. Since, then, the union can only continue, while it does continue, on the footing of an unequal federation, it is important to consider by what means this small amount of inequality can be prevented from being either onerous56 or humiliating to the communities occupying the less exalted57 position.
The only inferiority necessarily inherent in the case is that the mother country decides, both for the colonies and for herself, on questions of peace and war. They gain, in return, the obligation on the mother country to repel58 aggressions directed against them; but, except when the minor59 community is so weak that the protection of a stronger power is indispensable to it, reciprocity of obligation is not a full equivalent for non-admission to a voice in the deliberations. It is essential, therefore, that in all wars, save those which, like the Caffre or New Zealand wars, are incurred60 for the sake of the particular colony, the colonists should not (without their own voluntary request) be called on to contribute any thing to the expense except what may be required for the specific local defense of their ports, shores, and frontiers against invasion. Moreover, as the mother country claims the privilege, at her sole discretion61, of taking measures or pursuing a policy which may expose them to attack, it is just that she should undertake a considerable portion of the cost of their military defense even in time of peace; the whole of it, so far as it depends upon a standing62 army.
But there is a means, still more effectual than these, by which, and in general by which alone, a full equivalent can be given to a smaller community for sinking its individuality, as a substantive63 power among nations, in the greater individuality of a wide and powerful empire. This one indispensable, and, at the same time, sufficient expedient64, which meets at once the demands of justice and the growing exigencies65 of policy, is to open the service of government in all its departments, and in every part of the empire, on perfectly equal terms, to the inhabitants of the colonies. Why does no one ever hear a breath of disloyalty from the Islands in the British Channel? By race, religion, and geographical66 position they belong less to England than to France; but, while they enjoy, like Canada and New South Wales, complete control over their internal affairs and their taxation67, every office or dignity in the gift of the crown is freely open to the native of Guernsey or Jersey68. Generals, admirals, peers of the United Kingdom are made, and there is nothing which hinders prime ministers to be made from those insignificant69 islands. The same system was commenced in reference to the colonies generally by an enlightened colonial secretary, too early lost, Sir William Molesworth, when he appointed Mr. Hinckes, a leading Canadian politician, to a West Indian government. It is a very shallow view of the springs of political action in a community which thinks such things unimportant because the number of those in a position actually to profit by the concession70 might not be very considerable. That limited number would be composed precisely71 of those who have most moral power over the rest; and men are not so destitute72 of the sense of collective degradation73 as not to feel the withholding74 of an advantage from even one person, because of a circumstance which they all have in common with him, an affront75 to all. If we prevent the leading men of a community from standing forth76 to the world as its chiefs and representatives in the general councils of mankind, we owe it both to their legitimate77 ambition and to the just pride of the community to give them in return an equal chance of occupying the same prominent position in a nation of greater power and importance. Were the whole service of the British crown opened to the natives of the Ionian Islands, we should hear no more of the desire for union with Greece. Such a union is not desirable for the people, to whom it would be a step backward in civilization; but it is no wonder if Corfu, which has given a minister of European reputation to the Russian Empire, and a president to Greece itself before the arrival of the Bavarians, should feel it a grievance78 that its people are not admissable to the highest posts in some government or other.
Thus far of the dependencies whose population is in a sufficiently advanced state to be fitted for representative government; but there are others which have not attained that state, and which, if held at all, must be governed by the dominant79 country, or by persons delegated for that purpose by it. This mode of government is as legitimate as any other, if it is the one which in the existing state of civilization of the subject people most facilitates their transition to a higher stage of improvement. There are, as we have already seen, conditions of society in which a vigorous despotism is in itself the best mode of government for training the people in what is specifically wanting to render them capable of a higher civilization. There are others, in which the mere fact of despotism has indeed no beneficial effect, the lessons which it teaches having already been only too completely learned, but in which, there being no spring of spontaneous improvement in the people themselves, their almost only hope of making any steps in advance depends on the chances of a good despot. Under a native despotism, a good despot is a rare and transitory accident; but when the dominion80 they are under is that of a more civilized81 people, that people ought to be able to supply it constantly. The ruling country ought to be able to do for its subjects all that could be done by a succession of absolute monarchs82, guaranteed by irresistible83 force against the precariousness84 of tenure85 attendant on barbarous despotisms, and qualified86 by their genius to anticipate all that experience has taught to the more advanced nation. Such is the ideal rule of a free people over a barbarous or semi-barbarous one. We need not expect to see that ideal realized; but, unless some approach to it is, the rulers are guilty of a dereliction of the highest moral trust which can devolve upon a nation; and if they do not even aim at it, they are selfish usurpers, on a par3 in criminality with any of those whose ambition and rapacity87 have sported from age to age with the destiny of masses of mankind.
As it is already a common, and is rapidly tending to become the universal condition of the more backward populations to be either held in direct subjection by the more advanced, or to be under their complete political ascendancy89, there are in this age of the world few more important problems than how to organize this rule, so as to make it a good instead of an evil to the subject people, providing them with the best attainable90 present government, and with the conditions most favorable to future permanent improvement. But the mode of fitting the government for this purpose is by no means so well understood as the conditions of good government in a people capable of governing themselves. We may even say that it is not understood at all.
The thing appears perfectly easy to superficial observers. If India (for example) is not fit to govern itself, all that seems to them required is that there should be a minister to govern it, and that this minister, like all other British ministers, should be responsible to the British Parliament. Unfortunately this, though the simplest mode of attempting to govern a dependency, is about the worst, and betrays in its advocates a total want of comprehension of the conditions of good government. To govern a country under responsibility to the people of that country, and to govern one country under responsibility to the people of another, are two very different things. What makes the excellence91 of the first is, that freedom is preferable to despotism: but the last is despotism. The only choice the case admits is a choice of despotisms, and it is not certain that the despotism of twenty millions is necessarily better than that of a few or of one; but it is quite certain that the despotism of those who neither hear, nor see, nor know any thing about their subjects, has many chances of being worse than that of those who do. It is not usually thought that the immediate92 agents of authority govern better because they govern in the name of an absent master, and of one who has a thousand more pressing interests to attend to. The master may hold them to a strict responsibility, enforced by heavy penalties, but it is very questionable93 if those penalties will often fall in the right place.
It is always under great difficulties, and very imperfectly, that a country can be governed by foreigners, even when there is no extreme disparity in habits and ideas between the rulers and the ruled. Foreigners do not feel with the people. They can not judge, by the light in which a thing appears to their own minds, or the manner in which it affects their feelings, how it will affect the feelings or appear to the minds of the subject population. What a native of the country, of average practical ability, knows as it were by instinct, they have to learn slowly, and, after all, imperfectly, by study and experience. The laws, the customs, the social relations for which they have to legislate94, instead of being familiar to them from childhood, are all strange to them. For most of their detailed95 knowledge they must depend on the information of natives, and it is difficult for them to know whom to trust. They are feared, suspected, probably disliked by the population; seldom sought by them except for interested purposes; and they are prone96 to think that the servilely submissive are the trustworthy. Their danger is of despising the natives; that of the natives is, of disbelieving that any thing the strangers do can be intended for their good. These are but a part of the difficulties that any rulers have to struggle with, who honestly attempt to govern well a country in which they are foreigners. To overcome these difficulties in any degree will always be a work of much labor97, requiring a very superior degree of capacity in the chief administrators98, and a high average among the subordinates; and the best organization of such a government is that which will best insure the labor, develop the capacity, and place the highest specimens99 of it in the situations of greatest trust. Responsibility to an authority which has gone through none of the labor, acquired none of the capacity, and for the most part is not even aware that either, in any peculiar100 degree, is required, can not be regarded as a very effectual expedient for accomplishing these ends.
The government of a people by itself has a meaning and a reality, but such a thing as government of one people by another does not and can not exist. One people may keep another as a warren or preserve for its own use, a place to make money in, a human-cattle farm to be worked for the profit of its own inhabitants; but if the good of the governed is the proper business of a government, it is utterly101 impossible that a people should directly attend to it. The utmost they can do is to give some of their best men a commission to look after it, to whom the opinion of their own country can neither be much of a guide in the performance of their duty, nor a competent judge of the mode in which it has been performed. Let any one consider how the English themselves would be governed if they knew and cared no more about their own affairs than they know and care about the affairs of the Hindoos. Even this comparison gives no adequate idea of the state of the case; for a people thus indifferent to politics altogether would probably be simply acquiescent102, and let the government alone; whereas in the case of India, a politically active people like the English, amid habitual103 acquiescence104, are every now and then interfering105, and almost always in the wrong place. The real causes which determine the prosperity or wretchedness, the improvement or deterioration106 of the Hindoos, are too far off to be within their ken107. They have not the knowledge necessary for suspecting the existence of those causes, much less for judging of their operation. The most essential interests of the country may be well administered without obtaining any of their approbation108, or mismanaged to almost any excess without attracting their notice. The purposes for which they are principally tempted109 to interfere110, and control the proceedings111 of their delegates, are of two kinds. One is to force English ideas down the throats of the natives; for instance, by measures of proselytism, or acts intentionally112 or unintentionally offensive to the religious feelings of the people. This misdirection of opinion in the ruling country is instructively exemplified (the more so, because nothing is meant but justice and fairness, and as much impartiality113 as can be expected from persons really convinced) by the demand now so general in England for having the Bible taught, at the option of pupils or of their parents, in the government schools. From the European point of view nothing can wear a fairer aspect, or seem less open to objection on the score of religious freedom. To Asiatic eyes it is quite another thing. No Asiatic people ever believes that a government puts its paid officers and official machinery115 into motion unless it is bent116 upon an object; and when bent on an object, no Asiatic believes that any government, except a feeble and contemptible117 one, pursues it by halves. If government schools and schoolmasters taught Christianity, whatever pledges might be given of teaching it only to those who spontaneously sought it, no amount of evidence would ever persuade the parents that improper119 means were not used to make their children Christians120, or, at all events, outcasts from Hindooism. If they could, in the end, be convinced of the contrary, it would only be by the entire failure of the schools, so conducted, to make any converts. If the teaching had the smallest effect in promoting its object, it would compromise not only the utility and even existence of the government education, but perhaps the safety of the government itself. An English Protestant would not be easily induced, by disclaimers of proselytism, to place his children in a Roman Catholic seminary; Irish Catholics will not send their children to schools in which they can be made Protestants; and we expect that Hindoos, who believe that the privileges of Hindooism can be forfeited121 by a merely physical act, will expose theirs to the danger of being made Christians!
Such is one of the modes in which the opinion of the dominant country tends to act more injuriously than beneficially on the conduct of its deputed governors. In other respects, its interference is likely to be oftenest exercised where it will be most pertinaciously122 demanded, and that is, on behalf of some interest of the English settlers. English settlers have friends at home, have organs, have access to the public; they have a common language, and common ideas with their countrymen; any complaint by an Englishman is more sympathetically heard, even if no unjust preference is intentionally accorded to it. Now if there be a fact to which all experience testifies, it is that, when a country holds another in subjection, the individuals of the ruling people who resort to the foreign country to make their fortunes are of all others those who most need to be held under powerful restraint. They are always one of the chief difficulties of the government. Armed with the prestige and filled with the scornful overbearingness of the conquering nation, they have the feelings inspired by absolute power without its sense of responsibility. Among a people like that of India, the utmost efforts of the public authorities are not enough for the effectual protection of the weak against the strong; and of all the strong, the European settlers are the strongest. Wherever the demoralizing effect of the situation is not in a most remarkable123 degree corrected by the personal character of the individual, they think the people of the country mere dirt under their feet: it seems to them monstrous124 that any rights of the natives should stand in the way of their smallest pretensions125; the simplest act of protection to the inhabitants against any act of power on their part which they may consider useful to their commercial objects they denounce, and sincerely regard as an injury. So natural is this state of feeling in a situation like theirs, that, even under the discouragement which it has hitherto met with from the ruling authorities, it is impossible that more or less of the spirit should not perpetually break out. The government, itself free from this spirit, is never able sufficiently to keep it down in the young and raw even of its own civil and military officers, over whom it has so much more control than over the independent residents. As it is with the English in India, so, according to trustworthy testimony126, it is with the French in Algiers; so with the Americans in the countries conquered from Mexico; so it seems to be with the Europeans in China, and already even in Japan: there is no necessity to recall how it was with the Spaniards in South America. In all these cases, the government to which these private adventurers are subject is better than they, and does the most it can to protect the natives against them. Even the Spanish government did this, sincerely and earnestly, though ineffectually, as is known to every reader of Mr. Helps' instructive history. Had the Spanish government been directly accountable to Spanish opinion, we may question if it would have made the attempt, for the Spaniards, doubtless, would have taken part with their Christian118 friends and relations rather than with pagans. The settlers, not the natives, have the ear of the public at home; it is they whose representations are likely to pass for truth, because they alone have both the means and the motive127 to press them perseveringly128 upon the inattentive and uninterested public mind. The distrustful criticism with which Englishmen, more than any other people, are in the habit of scanning the conduct of their country towards foreigners, they usually reserve for the proceedings of the public authorities. In all questions between a government and an individual, the presumption129 in every Englishman's mind is that the government is in the wrong. And when the resident English bring the batteries of English political action to bear upon any of the bulwarks130 erected131 to protect the natives against their encroachments, the executive, with their real but faint velleities of something better, generally find it safer to their Parliamentary interest, and, at any rate, less troublesome, to give up the disputed position than to defend it.
What makes matters worse is that, when the public mind is invoked132 (as, to its credit, the English mind is extremely open to be) in the name of justice and philanthropy in behalf of the subject community or race, there is the same probability of its missing the mark; for in the subject community also there are oppressors and oppressed—powerful individuals or classes, and slaves prostrate133 before them; and it is the former, not the latter, who have the means of access to the English public. A tyrant134 or sensualist who has been deprived of the power he had abused, and, instead of punishment, is supported in as great wealth and splendor135 as he ever enjoyed; a knot of privileged landholders, who demand that the state should relinquish10 to them its reserved right to a rent from their lands, or who resent as a wrong any attempt to protect the masses from their extortion—these have no difficulty in procuring136 interested or sentimental137 advocacy in the British Parliament and press. The silent myriads138 obtain none.
The preceding observations exemplify the operation of a principle—which might be called an obvious one, were it not that scarcely anybody seems to be aware of it—that, while responsibility to the governed is the greatest of all securities for good government, responsibility to somebody else not only has no such tendency, but is as likely to produce evil as good. The responsibility of the British rulers of India to the British nation is chiefly useful because, when any acts of the government are called in question, it insures publicity139 and discussion; the utility of which does not require that the public at large should comprehend the point at issue, provided there are any individuals among them who do; for a merely moral responsibility not being responsibility to the collective people, but to every separate person among them who forms a judgment140, opinions may be weighed as well as counted, and the approbation or disapprobation of one person well versed141 in the subject may outweigh44 that of thousands who know nothing about it at all. It is doubtless a useful restraint upon the immediate rulers that they can be put upon their defense, and that one or two of the jury will form an opinion worth having about their conduct, though that of the remainder will probably be several degrees worse than none. Such as it is, this is the amount of benefit to India from the control exercised over the Indian government by the British Parliament and people.
It is not by attempting to rule directly a country like India, but by giving it good rulers, that the English people can do their duty to that country; and they can scarcely give it a worse one than an English cabinet minister, who is thinking of English, not Indian politics; who does not remains142 long enough in office to acquire an intelligent interest in so complicated a subject; upon whom the factitious public opinion got up in Parliament, consisting of two or three fluent speakers, acts with as much force as if it were genuine; while he is under none of the influences of training and position which would lead or qualify him to form an honest opinion of his own. A free country which attempts to govern a distant dependency, inhabited by a dissimilar people, by means of a branch of its own executive, will almost inevitably143 fail. The only mode which has any chance of tolerable success is to govern through a delegated body of a comparatively permanent character, allowing only a right of inspection144 and a negative voice to the changeable administration of the state. Such a body did exist in the case of India; and I fear that both India and England will pay a severe penalty for the shortsighted policy by which this intermediate instrument of government was done away with.
It is of no avail to say that such a delegated body can not have all the requisites145 of good government; above all, can not have that complete and over-operative identity of interest with the governed which it is so difficult to obtain even where the people to be ruled are in some degree qualified to look after their own affairs. Real good government is not compatible with the conditions of the case. There is but a choice of imperfections. The problem is, so to construct the governing body that, under the difficulties of the position, it shall have as much interest as possible in good government, and as little in bad. Now these conditions are best found in an intermediate body. A delegated administration has always this advantage over a direct one, that it has, at all events, no duty to perform except to the governed. It has no interests to consider except theirs. Its own power of deriving146 profit from misgovernment may be reduced—in the latest Constitution of the East India Company it was reduced—to a singularly small amount; and it can be kept entirely clear of bias147 from the individual or class interests of any one else. When the home government and Parliament are swayed by such partial influences in the exercise of the power reserved to them in the last resort, the intermediate body is the certain advocate and champion of the dependency before the imperial tribunal. The intermediate body, moreover, is, in the natural course of things, chiefly composed of persons who have acquired professional knowledge of this part of their country's concerns; who have been trained to it in the place itself, and have made its administration the main occupation of their lives. Furnished with these qualifications, and not being liable to lose their office from the accidents of home politics, they identify their character and consideration with their special trust, and have a much more permanent interest in the success of their administration, and in the prosperity of the country which they administer, than a member of a cabinet under a representative constitution can possibly have in the good government of any country except the one which he serves. So far as the choice of those who carry on the management on the spot devolves upon this body, their appointment is kept out of the vortex of party and Parliamentary jobbing, and freed from the influence of those motives148 to the abuse of patronage149 for the reward of adherents150, or to buy off those who would otherwise be opponents, which are always stronger with statesmen of average honesty than a conscientious151 sense of the duty of appointing the fittest man. To put this one class of appointments as far as possible out of harm's way is of more consequence than the worst which can happen to all other offices in the state; for, in every other department, if the officer is unqualified, the general opinion of the community directs him in a certain degree what to do; but in the position of the administrators of a dependency where the people are not fit to have the control in their own hands, the character of the government entirely depends on the qualifications, moral and intellectual, of the individual functionaries152.
It can not be too often repeated that, in a country like India, every thing depends on the personal qualities and capacities of the agents of government. This truth is the cardinal153 principle of Indian administration. The day when it comes to be thought that the appointment of persons to situations of trust from motives of convenience, already so criminal in England, can be practiced with impunity154 in India, will be the beginning of the decline and fall of our empire there. Even with a sincere intention of preferring the best candidate, it will not do to rely on chance for supplying fit persons. The system must be calculated to form them. It has done this hitherto; and because it has done so, our rule in India has lasted, and been one of constant, if not very rapid improvement in prosperity and good administration. As much bitterness is now manifested against this system, and as much eagerness displayed to overthrow155 it, as if educating and training the officers of government for their work were a thing utterly unreasonable156 and indefensible, an unjustifiable interference with the rights of ignorance and inexperience. There is a tacit conspiracy157 between those who would like to job in first-rate Indian offices for their connections here, and those who, being already in India, claim to be promoted from the indigo158 factory or the attorney's office to administer justice or fix the payments due to government from millions of people. The "monopoly" of the civil service, so much inveighed159 against, is like the monopoly of judicial160 offices by the bar; and its abolition161 would be like opening the bench in Westminster Hall to the first comer whose friends certify162 that he has now and then looked into Blackstone. Were the course ever adopted of sending men from this country, or encouraging them in going out, to get themselves put into high appointments without having learned their business by passing through the lower ones, the most important offices would be thrown to Scotch cousins and adventurers, connected by no professional feeling with the country or the work, held to no previous knowledge, and eager only to make money rapidly and return home. The safety of the country is, that those by whom it is administered be sent out in youth, as candidates only, to begin at the bottom of the ladder, and ascend88 higher or not, as, after a proper interval163, they are proved qualified. The defect of the East India Company's system was that, though the best men were carefully sought out for the most important posts, yet, if an officer remained in the service, promotion164, though it might be delayed, came at last in some shape or other, to the least as well as to the most competent. Even the inferior in qualifications among such a corps165 of functionaries consisted, it must be remembered, of men who had been brought up to their duties, and had fulfilled them for many years, at lowest without disgrace, under the eye and authority of a superior. But, though this diminished the evil, it was nevertheless considerable. A man who never becomes fit for more than an assistant's duty should remain an assistant all his life, and his juniors should be promoted over him. With this exception, I am not aware of any real defect in the old system of Indian appointments. It had already received the greatest other improvement it was susceptible166 of, the choice of the original candidates by competitive examination, which, besides the advantage of recruiting from a higher grade of industry and capacity, has the recommendation that under it, unless by accident, there are no personal ties between the candidates for offices and those who have a voice in conferring them.
It is in no way unjust that public officers thus selected and trained should be exclusively eligible167 to offices which require specially54 Indian knowledge and experience. If any door to the higher appointments, without passing through the lower, be opened even for occasional use, there will be such incessant168 knocking at it by persons of influence that it will be impossible ever to keep it closed. The only excepted appointment should be the highest one of all. The Viceroy of British India should be a person selected from all Englishmen for his great general capacity for government. If he have this, he will be able to distinguish in others, and turn to his own use, that special knowledge and judgment in local affairs which he has not himself had the opportunity of acquiring. There are good reasons why the viceroy should not be a member of the regular service. All services have, more or less, their class prejudices, from which the supreme ruler ought to be exempt169. Neither are men, however able and experienced, who have passed their lives in Asia, so likely to possess the most advanced European ideas in general statesmanship, which the chief ruler should carry out with him, and blend with the results of Indian experience. Again, being of a different class, and especially if chosen by a different authority, he will seldom have any personal partialities to warp170 his appointments to office. This great security for honest bestowal171 of patronage existed in rare perfection under the mixed government of the crown and the East India Company. The supreme dispensers of office—the governor general and governors—were appointed, in fact though not formally, by the crown, that is, by the general government, not by the intermediate body, and a great officer of the crown probably had not a single personal or political connection in the local service, while the delegated body, most of whom had themselves served in the country, had, and were likely to have, such connections. This guaranty for impartiality would be much impaired172 if the civil servants of government, even though sent out in boyhood as mere candidates for employment, should come to be furnished, in any considerable proportion, by the class of society which supplies viceroys and governors. Even the initiatory173 competitive examination would then be an insufficient174 security. It would exclude mere ignorance and incapacity; it would compel youths of family to start in the race with the same amount of instruction and ability as other people; the stupidest son could not be put into the Indian service, as he can be into the Church; but there would be nothing to prevent undue175 preference afterwards. No longer, all equally unknown and unheard of by the arbiter of their lot, a portion of the service would be personally, and a still greater number politically, in close relation with him. Members of certain families, and of the higher classes and influential176 connections generally, would rise more rapidly than their competitors, and be often kept in situations for which they were unfit, or placed in those for which others were fitter. The same influences would be brought into play which affect promotions177 in the army; and those alone, if such miracles of simplicity178 there be, who believe that these are impartial114, would expect impartiality in those of India. This evil is, I fear, irremediable by any general measures which can be taken under the present system. No such will afford a degree of security comparable to that which once flowed spontaneously from the so-called double government.
What is accounted so great an advantage in the case of the English system of government at home has been its misfortune in India—that it grew up of itself, not from preconceived design, but by successive expedients179, and by the adaptation of machinery originally created for a different purpose. As the country on which its maintenance depended was not the one out of whose necessities it grew, its practical benefits did not come home to the mind of that country, and it would have required theoretic recommendations to render it acceptable. Unfortunately, these were exactly what it seemed to be destitute of; and undoubtedly180 the common theories of government did not furnish it with such, framed as those theories have been for states of circumstances differing in all the most important features from the case concerned. But in government as in other departments of human agency, almost all principles which have been durable181 were first suggested by observation of some particular case, in which the general laws of nature acted in some new or previously182 unnoticed combination of circumstances. The institutions of Great Britain, and those of the United States, have the distinction of suggesting most of the theories of government which, through good and evil fortune, are now, in the course of generations, reawakening political life in the nations of Europe. It has been the destiny of the government of the East India Company to suggest the true theory of the government of a semi-barbarous dependency by a civilized country, and after having done this, to perish. It would be a singular fortune if, at the end of two or three more generations, this speculative183 result should be the only remaining fruit of our ascendancy in India; if posterity184 should say of us that, having stumbled accidentally upon better arrangements than our wisdom would ever have devised, the first use we made of our awakened185 reason was to destroy them, and allow the good which had been in course of being realized to fall through and be lost from ignorance of the principles on which it depended. D? meliora; but if a fate so disgraceful to England and to civilization can be averted186, it must be through far wider political conceptions than merely English or European practice can supply, and through a much more profound study of Indian experience and of the conditions of Indian government than either English politicians, or those who supply the English public with opinions, have hitherto shown any willingness to undertake.
The End
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1
colonization
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| 殖民地的开拓，殖民，殖民地化； 移殖 | |
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naval
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| adj.海军的，军舰的，船的 | |
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par
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| n.标准，票面价值，平均数量；adj.票面的，平常的，标准的 | |
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paramount
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| a.最重要的，最高权力的 | |
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restriction
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| n.限制，约束 | |
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bestow
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| v.把…赠与，把…授予；花费 | |
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supreme
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| adj.极度的，最重要的；至高的，最高的 | |
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arbiter
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| n.仲裁人，公断人 | |
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purely
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| adv.纯粹地，完全地 | |
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relinquish
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| v.放弃，撤回，让与，放手 | |
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relinquished
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| 交出，让给( relinquish的过去式和过去分词 )； 放弃 | |
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entirely
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| ad.全部地，完整地；完全地，彻底地 | |
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meddling
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| v.干涉，干预（他人事务）( meddle的现在分词 ) | |
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torment
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| n.折磨；令人痛苦的东西(人)；vt.折磨；纠缠 | |
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faction
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| n.宗派，小集团；派别；派系斗争 | |
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colonists
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| n.殖民地开拓者，移民，殖民地居民( colonist的名词复数 ) | |
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persistence
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| n.坚持，持续，存留 | |
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mere
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| adj.纯粹的；仅仅，只不过 | |
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patriotism
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| n.爱国精神，爱国心，爱国主义 | |
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joint
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| adj.联合的，共同的；n.关节，接合处；v.连接，贴合 | |
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lamented
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| adj.被哀悼的，令人遗憾的v.（为…）哀悼，痛哭，悲伤( lament的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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22
fixed
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| adj.固定的，不变的，准备好的；(计算机)固定的 | |
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professed
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| 公开声称的，伪称的，已立誓信教的 | |
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nominally
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| 在名义上，表面地； 应名儿 | |
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solely
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| adv.仅仅，唯一地 | |
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injustice
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| n.非正义，不公正，不公平，侵犯（别人的）权利 | |
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emigrants
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| n.（从本国移往他国的）移民( emigrant的名词复数 ) | |
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federation
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| n.同盟，联邦，联合，联盟，联合会 | |
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strictly
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| adv.严厉地，严格地；严密地 | |
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binding
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| 有约束力的，有效的，应遵守的 | |
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justified
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| a.正当的，有理的 | |
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violation
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| n.违反(行为)，违背(行为)，侵犯 | |
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perfectly
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| adv.完美地，无可非议地，彻底地 | |
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equity
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| n.公正，公平，（无固定利息的）股票 | |
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emanate
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| v.发自，来自，出自 | |
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worthy
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| adj.(of)值得的，配得上的；有价值的 | |
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sufficiently
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| adv.足够地，充分地 | |
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arena
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| n.竞技场，运动场所；竞争场所，舞台 | |
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scotch
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| n.伤口，刻痕；苏格兰威士忌酒；v.粉碎，消灭，阻止；adj.苏格兰(人)的 | |
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dignified
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| a.可敬的，高贵的 | |
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41
derives
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| v.得到( derive的第三人称单数 )；（从…中）得到获得；源于；（从…中）提取 | |
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42
derive
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| v.取得；导出；引申；来自；源自；出自 | |
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outweighed
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| v.在重量上超过( outweigh的过去式和过去分词 )；在重要性或价值方面超过 | |
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outweigh
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| vt.比...更重，...更重要 | |
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dissemination
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| 传播,宣传,传染(病毒) | |
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necessitate
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| v.使成为必要，需要 | |
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apprehension
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| n.理解，领悟；逮捕，拘捕；忧虑 | |
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defense
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| n.防御，保卫；[pl.]防务工事；辩护，答辩 | |
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49
deliberately
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| adv.审慎地；蓄意地；故意地 | |
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50
mutual
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| adj.相互的，彼此的；共同的，共有的 | |
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51
exclusion
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| n.拒绝，排除，排斥，远足，远途旅行 | |
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52
tariffs
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| 关税制度； 关税( tariff的名词复数 )； 关税表； （旅馆或饭店等的）收费表； 量刑标准 | |
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53
outgrown
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| 长[发展] 得超过（某物）的范围( outgrow的过去分词 )； 长[发展]得不能再要（某物）； 长得比…快； 生长速度超过 | |
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54
specially
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| adv.特定地；特殊地；明确地 | |
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55
attained
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| （通常经过努力）实现( attain的过去式和过去分词 )； 达到； 获得； 达到（某年龄、水平、状况） | |
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56
onerous
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| adj.繁重的 | |
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57
exalted
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| adj.(地位等)高的，崇高的；尊贵的，高尚的 | |
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58
repel
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| v.击退，抵制，拒绝，排斥 | |
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59
minor
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| adj.较小(少)的，较次要的；n.辅修学科；vi.辅修 | |
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60
incurred
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| [医]招致的，遭受的； incur的过去式 | |
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discretion
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| n.谨慎；随意处理 | |
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62
standing
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| n.持续，地位；adj.永久的，不动的，直立的，不流动的 | |
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substantive
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| adj.表示实在的；本质的、实质性的；独立的；n.实词，实名词；独立存在的实体 | |
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64
expedient
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| adj.有用的，有利的；n.紧急的办法，权宜之计 | |
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exigencies
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| n.急切需要 | |
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66
geographical
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| adj.地理的；地区(性)的 | |
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67
taxation
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| n.征税，税收，税金 | |
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68
jersey
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| n.运动衫 | |
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insignificant
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| adj.无关紧要的，可忽略的，无意义的 | |
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70
concession
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| n.让步，妥协；特许(权) | |
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71
precisely
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| adv.恰好，正好，精确地，细致地 | |
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72
destitute
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| adj.缺乏的；穷困的 | |
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73
degradation
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| n.降级；低落；退化；陵削；降解；衰变 | |
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74
withholding
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| 扣缴税款 | |
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affront
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| n./v.侮辱，触怒 | |
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forth
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| adv.向前；向外，往外 | |
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legitimate
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| adj.合法的，合理的，合乎逻辑的；v.使合法 | |
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grievance
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| n.怨愤，气恼，委屈 | |
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dominant
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| adj.支配的，统治的；占优势的；显性的；n.主因，要素，主要的人(或物)；显性基因 | |
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dominion
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| n.统治，管辖，支配权；领土，版图 | |
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civilized
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| a.有教养的，文雅的 | |
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82
monarchs
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| 君主，帝王( monarch的名词复数 ) | |
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83
irresistible
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| adj.非常诱人的，无法拒绝的，无法抗拒的 | |
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84
precariousness
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85
tenure
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| n.终身职位；任期；(土地)保有权，保有期 | |
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86
qualified
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| adj.合格的，有资格的，胜任的，有限制的 | |
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87
rapacity
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| n.贪婪，贪心，劫掠的欲望 | |
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88
ascend
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| vi.渐渐上升，升高；vt.攀登，登上 | |
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ascendancy
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| n.统治权，支配力量 | |
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attainable
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| a.可达到的，可获得的 | |
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91
excellence
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| n.优秀，杰出，(pl.)优点，美德 | |
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92
immediate
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| adj.立即的；直接的，最接近的；紧靠的 | |
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93
questionable
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| adj.可疑的，有问题的 | |
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94
legislate
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| vt.制定法律；n.法规，律例；立法 | |
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95
detailed
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| adj.详细的，详尽的，极注意细节的，完全的 | |
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96
prone
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| adj.(to)易于…的，很可能…的；俯卧的 | |
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97
labor
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| n.劳动，努力，工作，劳工；分娩；vi.劳动，努力，苦干；vt.详细分析；麻烦 | |
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98
administrators
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| n.管理者( administrator的名词复数 )；有管理（或行政）才能的人；（由遗嘱检验法庭指定的）遗产管理人；奉派暂管主教教区的牧师 | |
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99
specimens
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| n.样品( specimen的名词复数 )；范例；（化验的）抽样；某种类型的人 | |
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100
peculiar
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| adj.古怪的，异常的；特殊的，特有的 | |
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101
utterly
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| adv.完全地，绝对地 | |
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102
acquiescent
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| adj.默许的，默认的 | |
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103
habitual
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| adj.习惯性的；通常的，惯常的 | |
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104
acquiescence
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| n.默许；顺从 | |
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105
interfering
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| adj. 妨碍的 动词interfere的现在分词 | |
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106
deterioration
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| n.退化；恶化；变坏 | |
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107
ken
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| n.视野，知识领域 | |
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108
approbation
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| n.称赞；认可 | |
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109
tempted
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| v.怂恿（某人）干不正当的事；冒…的险（tempt的过去分词） | |
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110
interfere
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| v.(in)干涉，干预；(with)妨碍，打扰 | |
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111
proceedings
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| n.进程，过程，议程；诉讼(程序)；公报 | |
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112
intentionally
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| ad.故意地，有意地 | |
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113
impartiality
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| n. 公平, 无私, 不偏 | |
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114
impartial
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| adj.(in,to)公正的，无偏见的 | |
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115
machinery
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| n.(总称)机械，机器；机构 | |
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116
bent
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| n.爱好，癖好；adj.弯的；决心的，一心的 | |
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117
contemptible
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| adj.可鄙的，可轻视的，卑劣的 | |
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118
Christian
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| adj.基督教徒的；n.基督教徒 | |
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119
improper
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| adj.不适当的，不合适的，不正确的，不合礼仪的 | |
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120
Christians
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| n.基督教徒( Christian的名词复数 ) | |
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121
forfeited
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| （因违反协议、犯规、受罚等）丧失，失去( forfeit的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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122
pertinaciously
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| adv.坚持地；固执地；坚决地；执拗地 | |
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123
remarkable
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| adj.显著的，异常的，非凡的，值得注意的 | |
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124
monstrous
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| adj.巨大的；恐怖的；可耻的，丢脸的 | |
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125
pretensions
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| 自称( pretension的名词复数 )； 自命不凡； 要求； 权力 | |
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126
testimony
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| n.证词；见证，证明 | |
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127
motive
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| n.动机，目的；adv.发动的，运动的 | |
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128
perseveringly
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| 坚定地 | |
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129
presumption
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| n.推测，可能性，冒昧，放肆，[法律]推定 | |
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130
bulwarks
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| n.堡垒( bulwark的名词复数 )；保障；支柱；舷墙 | |
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131
ERECTED
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| adj. 直立的，竖立的，笔直的 vt. 使 ... 直立，建立 | |
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132
invoked
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| v.援引( invoke的过去式和过去分词 )；行使（权利等）；祈求救助；恳求 | |
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133
prostrate
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| v.拜倒，平卧，衰竭；adj.拜倒的，平卧的，衰竭的 | |
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134
tyrant
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| n.暴君，专制的君主，残暴的人 | |
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135
splendor
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| n.光彩；壮丽，华丽；显赫，辉煌 | |
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136
procuring
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| v.（努力）取得， （设法）获得( procure的现在分词 )；拉皮条 | |
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137
sentimental
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| adj.多愁善感的，感伤的 | |
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138
myriads
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| n.无数，极大数量( myriad的名词复数 ) | |
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139
publicity
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| n.众所周知，闻名；宣传，广告 | |
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140
judgment
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| n.审判；判断力，识别力，看法，意见 | |
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141
versed
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| adj. 精通，熟练 | |
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142
remains
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| n.剩余物，残留物；遗体，遗迹 | |
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143
inevitably
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| adv.不可避免地；必然发生地 | |
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144
inspection
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| n.检查，审查，检阅 | |
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145
requisites
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| n.必要的事物( requisite的名词复数 ) | |
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146
deriving
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| v.得到( derive的现在分词 )；（从…中）得到获得；源于；（从…中）提取 | |
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147
bias
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| n.偏见，偏心，偏袒；vt.使有偏见 | |
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148
motives
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| n.动机，目的( motive的名词复数 ) | |
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149
patronage
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| n.赞助，支援，援助；光顾，捧场 | |
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150
adherents
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| n.支持者，拥护者( adherent的名词复数 )；党羽；徒子徒孙 | |
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151
conscientious
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| adj.审慎正直的，认真的，本着良心的 | |
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152
functionaries
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| n.公职人员，官员( functionary的名词复数 ) | |
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153
cardinal
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| n.(天主教的)红衣主教；adj.首要的，基本的 | |
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154
impunity
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| n.(惩罚、损失、伤害等的)免除 | |
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155
overthrow
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| v.推翻，打倒，颠覆；n.推翻，瓦解，颠覆 | |
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156
unreasonable
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| adj.不讲道理的，不合情理的，过度的 | |
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157
conspiracy
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| n.阴谋，密谋，共谋 | |
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158
indigo
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| n.靛青，靛蓝 | |
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159
inveighed
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| v.猛烈抨击，痛骂，谩骂( inveigh的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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160
judicial
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| adj.司法的，法庭的，审判的，明断的，公正的 | |
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161
abolition
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| n.废除，取消 | |
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162
certify
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| vt.证明，证实；发证书(或执照)给 | |
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163
interval
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| n.间隔，间距；幕间休息，中场休息 | |
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164
promotion
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| n.提升，晋级；促销，宣传 | |
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165
corps
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| n.(通信等兵种的)部队；(同类作的)一组 | |
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166
susceptible
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| adj.过敏的，敏感的；易动感情的，易受感动的 | |
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167
eligible
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| adj.有条件被选中的；(尤指婚姻等)合适(意)的 | |
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168
incessant
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| adj.不停的，连续的 | |
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169
exempt
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| adj.免除的；v.使免除；n.免税者，被免除义务者 | |
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170
warp
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| vt.弄歪，使翘曲，使不正常，歪曲，使有偏见 | |
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171
bestowal
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| 赠与，给与； 贮存 | |
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172
impaired
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| adj.受损的；出毛病的；有（身体或智力）缺陷的v.损害，削弱( impair的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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173
initiatory
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| adj.开始的；创始的；入会的；入社的 | |
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174
insufficient
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| adj.(for，of)不足的，不够的 | |
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175
undue
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| adj.过分的；不适当的；未到期的 | |
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176
influential
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| adj.有影响的，有权势的 | |
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177
promotions
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| 促进( promotion的名词复数 )； 提升； 推广； 宣传 | |
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178
simplicity
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| n.简单，简易；朴素；直率，单纯 | |
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179
expedients
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| n.应急有效的，权宜之计的( expedient的名词复数 ) | |
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180
undoubtedly
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| adv.确实地，无疑地 | |
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181
durable
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| adj.持久的，耐久的 | |
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182
previously
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| adv.以前，先前（地） | |
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183
speculative
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| adj.思索性的，暝想性的，推理的 | |
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184
posterity
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| n.后裔，子孙，后代 | |
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185
awakened
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| v.（使）醒( awaken的过去式和过去分词 )；（使）觉醒；弄醒；（使）意识到 | |
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186
averted
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| 防止，避免( avert的过去式和过去分词 )； 转移 | |
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