The time, therefore, seems to have come, when every philosophic thinker not only ought to form, but may usefully express, a judgment13 respecting this intellectual movement; endeavouring to understand what it is, whether it is essentially14 a wholesome15 movement, and if so, what is to be accepted and what rejected of the direction given to it by its most important movers. There cannot be a more appropriate mode of discussing these points than in the form of a critical examination of the philosophy of Auguste Comte; for which the appearance of a new edition of his fundamental treatise, with a preface by the most eminent, in every point of view, of his professed17 disciples, M. Littré, affords a good opportunity. The name of M. Comte is more identified than any other with this mode of thought. He is the first who has attempted its complete systematization, and the scientific extension of it to all objects of human knowledge. And in doing this he has displayed a quantity and quality of mental power, and achieved an amount of success, which have not only won but retained the high admiration19 of thinkers as radically21 and strenuously22 opposed as it is possible to be, to nearly the whole of his later tendencies, and to many of his earlier opinions. It would have been a mistake had such thinkers busied themselves in the first instance with drawing attention to what they regarded as errors in his great work. Until it had taken the place in the world of thought which belonged to it, the important matter was not to criticise23 it, but to help in making it known. To have put those who neither knew nor were capable of appreciating the greatness of the book, in possession of its vulnerable points, would have indefinitely retarded24 its progress to a just estimation, and was not needful for guarding against any serious inconvenience. While a writer has few readers, and no influence except on independent thinkers, the only thing worth considering in him is what he can teach us: if there be anything in which he is less wise than we are already, it may be left unnoticed until the time comes when his errors can do harm. But the high place which M. Comte has now assumed among European thinkers, and the increasing influence of his principal work, while they make it a more hopeful task than before to impress and enforce the strong points of his philosophy, have rendered it, for the first time, not inopportune to discuss his mistakes. Whatever errors he may have fallen into are now in a position to be injurious, while the free exposure of them can no longer be so.
We propose, then, to pass in review the main principles of M. Comte's philosophy; commencing with the great treatise by which, in this country, he is chiefly known, and postponing26 consideration of the writings of the last ten years of his life, except for the occasional illustration of detached points.
When we extend our examination to these later productions, we shall have, in the main, to reverse our judgment. Instead of recognizing, as in the Cours de Philosophic Positive, an essentially sound view of philosophy, with a few capital errors, it is in their general character that we deem the subsequent speculations28 false and misleading, while in the midst of this wrong general tendency, we find a crowd of valuable thoughts, and suggestions of thought, in detail. For the present we put out of the question this signal anomaly in M. Comte's intellectual career. We shall consider only the principal gift which he has left to the world, his clear, full, and comprehensive exposition, and in part creation, of what he terms the Positive Philosophy: endeavouring to sever30 what in our estimation is true, from the much less which is erroneous, in that philosophy as he conceived it, and distinguishing, as we proceed, the part which is specially31 his, from that which belongs to the philosophy of the age, and is the common inheritance of thinkers. This last discrimination has been partially32 made in a late pamphlet, by Mr Herbert Spencer, in vindication33 of his own independence of thought: but this does not diminish the utility of doing it, with a less limited purpose, here; especially as Mr Spencer rejects nearly all which properly belongs to M. Comte, and in his abridged35 mode of statement does scanty37 justice to what he rejects. The separation is not difficult, even on the direct evidence given by M. Comte himself, who, far from claiming any originality38 not really belonging to him, was eager to connect his own most original thoughts with every germ of anything similar which he observed in previous thinkers.
The fundamental doctrine39 of a true philosophy, according to M. Comte, and the character by which he defines Positive Philosophy, is the following:—We have no knowledge of anything but Phaenomena; and our knowledge of phaenomena is relative, not absolute. We know not the essence, nor the real mode of production, of any fact, but only its relations to other facts in the way of succession or of similitude. These relations are constant; that is, always the same in the same circumstances. The constant resemblances which link phaenomena together, and the constant sequences which unite them as antecedent and consequent, are termed their laws. The laws of phaenomena are all we know respecting them. Their essential nature, and their ultimate causes, either efficient or final, are unknown and inscrutable to us.
M. Comte claims no originality for this conception of human knowledge. He avows41 that it has been virtually acted on from the earliest period by all who have made any real contribution to science, and became distinctly present to the minds of speculative men from the time of Bacon, Descartes, and Galileo, whom he regards as collectively the founders42 of the Positive Philosophy. As he says, the knowledge which mankind, even in the earliest ages, chiefly pursued, being that which they most needed, was foreknowledge: "savoir, pour prevoir." When they sought for the cause, it was mainly in order to control the effect or if it was uncontrollable, to foreknow and adapt their conduct to it. Now, all foresight43 of phaenomena, and power over them, depend on knowledge of their sequences, and not upon any notion we may have formed respecting their origin or inmost nature. We foresee a fact or event by means of facts which are signs of it, because experience has shown them to be its antecedents. We bring about any fact, other than our own muscular contractions44, by means of some fact which experience has shown to be followed by it. All foresight, therefore, and all intelligent action, have only been possible in proportion as men have successfully attempted to ascertain45 the successions of phaenomena. Neither foreknowledge, nor the knowledge which is practical power, can be acquired by any other means.
The conviction, however, that knowledge of the successions and co-existences of phaenomena is the sole knowledge accessible to us, could not be arrived at in a very early stage of the progress of thought. Men have not even now left off hoping for other knowledge, nor believing that they have attained46 it; and that, when attained, it is, in some undefinable manner, greatly more precious than mere47 knowledge of sequences and co-existences. The true doctrine was not seen in its full clearness even by Bacon, though it is the result to which all his speculations tend: still less by Descartes. It was, however, correctly apprehended48 by Newton.[1]
But it was probably first conceived in its entire generality by Hume, who carries it a step further than Comte, maintaining not merely that the only causes of phaenomena which can be known to us are other phaenomena, their invariable antecedents, but that there is no other kind of causes: cause, as he interprets it, means the invariable antecedent. This is the only part of Hume's doctrine which was contested by his great adversary50, Kant; who, maintaining as strenuously as Comte that we know nothing of Things in themselves, of Noumena, of real Substances and real Causes, yet peremptorily51 asserted their existence. But neither does Comte question this: on the contrary, all his language implies it. Among the direct successors of Hume, the writer who has best stated and defended Comte's fundamental doctrine is Dr Thomas Brown. The doctrine and spirit of Brown's philosophy are entirely52 Positivist, and no better introduction to Positivism than the early part of his Lectures has yet been produced. Of living thinkers we do not speak; but the same great truth formed the groundwork of all the speculative philosophy of Bentham, and pre-eminently of James Mill: and Sir William Hamilton's famous doctrine of the Relativity of human knowledge has guided many to it, though we cannot credit Sir William Hamilton himself with having understood the principle, or been willing to assent54 to it if he had.
The foundation of M. Comte's philosophy is thus in no way peculiar55 to him, but the general property of the age, however far as yet from being universally accepted even by thoughtful minds.
The philosophy called Positive is not a recent invention of M. Comte, but a simple adherence56 to the traditions of all the great scientific minds whose discoveries have made the human race what it is. M. Comte has never presented it in any other light. But he has made the doctrine his own by his manner of treating it. To know rightly what a thing is, we require to know, with equal distinctness, what it is not. To enter into the real character of any mode of thought, we must understand what other modes of thought compete with it. M. Comte has taken care that we should do so. The modes of philosophizing which, according to him, dispute ascendancy57 with the Positive, are two in number, both of them anterior58 to it in date; the Theological, and the Metaphysical.
We use the words Theological, Metaphysical, and Positive, because they are chosen by M. Comte as a vehicle for M. Comte's ideas. Any philosopher whose thoughts another person undertakes to set forth60, has a right to require that it should be done by means of his own nomenclature. They are not, however, the terms we should ourselves choose. In all languages, but especially in English, they excite ideas other than those intended. The words Positive and Positivism, in the meaning assigned to them, are ill fitted to take, root in English soil; while Metaphysical suggests, and suggested even to M. Comte, much that in no way deserves to be included in his denunciation. The term Theological is less wide of the mark, though the use of it as a term of condemnation62 implies, as we shall see, a greater reach of negation63 than need be included in the Positive creed64. Instead of the Theological we should prefer to speak of the Personal, or Volitional65 explanation of nature; instead of Metaphysical, the Abstractional or Ontological: and the meaning of Positive would be less ambiguously expressed in the objective aspect by Phaenomenal, in the subjective67 by Experiential. But M. Comte's opinions are best stated in his own phraseology; several of them, indeed, can scarcely be presented in some of their bearings without it.
The Theological, which is the original and spontaneous form of thought, regards the facts of the universe as governed not by invariable laws of sequence, but by single and direct volitions of beings, real or imaginary, possessed68 of life and intelligence. In the infantile state of reason and experience, individual objects are looked upon as animated69. The next step is the conception of invisible beings, each of whom superintends and governs an entire class of objects or events. The last merges71 this multitude of divinities in a single God, who made the whole universe in the beginning, and guides and carries on its phaenomena by his continued action, or, as others think, only modifies them from time to time by special interferences.
The mode of thought which M. Comte terms Metaphysical, accounts for phaenomena by ascribing them, not to volitions either sublunary or celestial73, but to realized abstractions. In this stage it is no longer a god that causes and directs each of the various agencies of nature: it is a power, or a force, or an occult quality, considered as real existences, inherent in but distinct from the concrete bodies in which they reside, and which they in a manner animate70. Instead of Dryads presiding over trees, producing and regulating their phaenomena, every plant or animal has now a Vegetative Soul, the θρεπτ?κη ψυχ? of Aristotle. At a later period the Vegetative Soul has become a Plastic Force, and still later, a Vital Principle. Objects now do all that they do because it is their Essence to do so, or by reason of an inherent Virtue74. Phaenomena are accounted for by supposed tendencies and propensities75 of the abstraction Nature; which, though regarded as impersonal76, is figured as acting77 on a sort of motives78, and in a manner more or less analogous80 to that of conscious beings. Aristotle affirms a tendency of nature towards the best, which helps him to a theory of many natural phaenomena. The rise of water in a pump is attributed to Nature's horror of a vacuum. The fall of heavy bodies, and the ascent81 of flame and smoke, are construed82 as attempts of each to get to its natural place. Many important consequences are deduced from the doctrine that Nature has no breaks (non habet saltum). In medicine the curative force (vis medicatrix) of Nature furnishes the explanation of the reparative processes which modern physiologists83 refer each to its own particular agencies and laws.
Examples are not necessary to prove to those who are acquainted with the past phases of human thought, how great a place both the theological and the metaphysical interpretations84 of phaenomena have historically occupied, as well in the speculations of thinkers as in the familiar conceptions of the multitude. Many had perceived before M. Comte that neither of these modes of explanation was final: the warfare86 against both of them could scarcely be carried on more vigorously than it already was, early in the seventeenth century, by Hobbes. Nor is it unknown to any one who has followed the history of the various physical sciences, that the positive explanation of facts has substituted itself, step by step, for the theological and metaphysical, as the progress of inquiry87 brought to light an increasing number of the invariable laws of phaenomena. In these respects M. Comte has not originated anything, but has taken his place in a fight long since engaged, and on the side already in the main victorious88. The generalization89 which belongs to himself, and in which he had not, to the best of our knowledge, been at all anticipated, is, that every distinct class of human conceptions passes through all these stages, beginning with the theological, and proceeding90 through the metaphysical to the positive: the metaphysical being a mere state of transition, but an indispensable one, from the theological mode of thought to the positive, which is destined91 finally to prevail, by the universal recognition that all phaemomena without exception are governed by invariable laws, with which no volitions, either natural or supernatural, interfere72. This general theorem is completed by the addition, that the theological mode of thought has three stages, Fetichism, Polytheism, and Monotheism: the successive transitions being prepared, and indeed caused, by the gradual uprising of the two rival modes of thought, the metaphysical and the positive, and in their turn preparing the way for the ascendancy of these; first and temporarily of the metaphysical, finally of the positive.
This generalization is the most fundamental of the doctrines92 which originated with M. Comte; and the survey of history, which occupies the two largest volumes of the six composing his work, is a continuous exemplification and verification of the law. How well it accords with the facts, and how vast a number of the greater historical phaenomena it explains, is known only to those who have studied its exposition, where alone it can be found—in these most striking and instructive volumes. As this theory is the key to M. Comte's other generalizations93, all of which arc more or less dependent on it; as it forms the backbone94, if we may so speak, of his philosophy, and, unless it be true, he has accomplished95 little; we cannot better employ part of our space than in clearing it from misconception, and giving the explanations necessary to remove the obstacles which prevent many competent persons from assenting96 to it.
It is proper to begin by relieving the doctrine from a religious prejudice. The doctrine condemns97 all theological explanations, and replaces them, or thinks them destined to be replaced, by theories which take no account of anything but an ascertained98 order of phaenomena. It is inferred that if this change were completely accomplished, mankind would cease to refer the constitution of Nature to an intelligent will or to believe at all in a Creator and supreme99 Governor of the world. This supposition is the more natural, as M. Comte was avowedly100 of that opinion. He indeed disclaimed101, with some acrimony, dogmatic atheism102, and even says (in a later work, but the earliest contains nothing at variance103 with it) that the hypothesis of design has much greater verisimilitude than that of a blind mechanism104. But conjecture105, founded on analogy, did not seem to him a basis to rest a theory on, in a mature state of human intelligence. He deemed all real knowledge of a commencement inaccessible106 to us, and the inquiry into it an overpassing of the essential limits of our mental faculties107. To this point, however, those who accept his theory of the progressive stages of opinion are not obliged to follow him. The Positive mode of thought is not necessarily a denial of the supernatural; it merely throws back that question to the origin of all things. If the universe had a beginning, its beginning, by the very conditions of the case, was supernatural; the laws of nature cannot account for their own origin. The Positive philosopher is free to form his opinion on the subject, according to the weight he attaches to the analogies which are called marks of design, and to the general traditions of the human race. The value of these evidences is indeed a question for Positive philosophy, but it is not one upon which Positive philosophers must necessarily be agreed. It is one of M. Comte's mistakes that he never allows of open questions. Positive Philosophy maintains that within the existing order of the universe, or rather of the part of it known to us, the direct determining cause of every phaenomenon is not supernatural but natural. It is compatible with this to believe, that the universe was created, and even that it is continuously governed, by an Intelligence, provided we admit that the intelligent Governor adheres to fixed108 laws, which are only modified or counteracted109 by other laws of the same dispensation, and are never either capriciously or providentially departed from. Whoever regards all events as parts of a constant order, each one being the invariable consequent of some antecedent condition, or combination of conditions, accepts fully4 the Positive mode of thought: whether he acknowledges or not an universal antecedent on which the whole system of nature was originally consequent, and whether that universal antecedent is conceived as an Intelligence or not.
There is a corresponding misconception to be corrected respecting the Metaphysical mode of thought. In repudiating110 metaphysics, M. Comte did not interdict111 himself from analysing or criticising any of the abstract conceptions of the mind. He was not ignorant (though he sometimes seemed to forget) that such analysis and criticism are a necessary part of the scientific process, and accompany the scientific mind in all its operations. What he condemned112 was the habit of conceiving these mental abstractions as real entities113, which could exert power, produce phaenomena, and the enunciation61 of which could be regarded as a theory or explanation of facts. Men of the present day with difficulty believe that so absurd a notion was ever really entertained, so repugnant is it to the mental habits formed by long and assiduous cultivation114 of the positive sciences. But those sciences, however widely cultivated, have never formed the basis of intellectual education in any society. It is with philosophy as with religion: men marvel115 at the absurdity116 of other people's tenets, while exactly parallel absurdities117 remain in their own, and the same man is unaffectedly astonished that words can be mistaken for things, who is treating other words as if they were things every time he opens his mouth to discuss. No one, unless entirely ignorant of the history of thought, will deny that the mistaking of abstractions for realities pervaded119 speculation27 all through antiquity120 and the middle ages. The mistake was generalized and systematized in the famous Ideas of Plato. The Aristotelians carried it on. Essences, quiddities, virtues121 residing in things, were accepted as a bona fide explanation of phaenomena. Not only abstract qualities, but the concrete names of genera and species, were mistaken for objective existences. It was believed that there were General Substances corresponding to all the familiar classes of concrete things: a substance Man, a substance Tree, a substance Animal, which, and not the individual objects so called, were directly denoted by those names. The real existence of Universal Substances was the question at issue in the famous controversy122 of the later middle ages between Nominalism and Realism, which is one of the turning points in the history of thought, being its first struggle to emancipate124 itself from the dominion125 of verbal abstractions. The Realists were the stronger party, but though the Nominalists for a time succumbed126, the doctrine they rebelled against fell, after a short interval127, with the rest of the scholastic128 philosophy. But while universal substances and substantial forms, being the grossest kind of realized abstractions, were the soonest discarded, Essences, Virtues, and Occult Qualities long survived them, and were first completely extruded129 from real existence by the Cartesians. In Descartes' conception of science, all physical phaenomena were to be explained by matter and motion, that is, not by abstractions but by invariable physical laws: though his own explanations were many of them hypothetical, and turned out to be erroneous. Long after him, however, fictitious130 entities (as they are happily termed by Bentham) continued to be imagined as means of accounting131 for the more mysterious phaenomena; above all in physiology132, where, under great varieties of phrase, mysterious forces and principles were the explanation, or substitute for explanation, of the phaenomena of organized beings. To modern philosophers these fictions are merely the abstract names of the classes of phaenomena which correspond to them; and it is one of the puzzles of philosophy, how mankind, after inventing a set of mere names to keep together certain combinations of ideas or images, could have so far forgotten their own act as to invest these creations of their will with objective reality, and mistake the name of a phaenomenon for its efficient cause. What was a mystery from the purely133 dogmatic point of view, is cleared up by the historical. These abstract words are indeed now mere names of phaenomena, but were not so in their origin. To us they denote only the phaenomena, because we have ceased to believe in what else they once designated; and the employment of them in explanation is to us evidently, as M. Comte says, the na?f reproduction of the phaenomenon as the reason for itself: but it was not so in the beginning. The metaphysical point of view was not a perversion134 of the positive, but a transformation135 of the theological. The human mind, in framing a class of objects, did not set out from the notion of a name, but from that of a divinity. The realization136 of abstractions was not the embodiment of a word, but the gradual disembodiment of a Fetish.
The primitive137 tendency or instinct of mankind is to assimilate all the agencies which they perceive in Nature, to the only one of which they are directly conscious, their own voluntary activity. Every object which seems to originate power, that is, to act without being first visibly acted upon, to communicate motion without having first received it, they suppose to possess life, consciousness, will. This first rude conception of nature can scarcely, however, have been at any time extended to all phaenomena. The simplest observation, without which the preservation138 of life would have been impossible, must have pointed139 out many uniformities in nature, many objects which, under given circumstances, acted exactly like one another: and whenever this was observed, men's natural and untutored faculties led them to form the similar objects into a class, and to think of them together: of which it was a natural consequence to refer effects, which were exactly alike, to a single will, rather than to a number of wills precisely140 accordant. But this single will could not be the will of the objects themselves, since they were many: it must be the will of an invisible being, apart from the objects, and ruling them from an unknown distance. This is Polytheism. We are not aware that in any tribe of savages142 or negroes who have been observed, Fetichism has been found totally unmixed with Polytheism, and it is probable that the two coexisted from the earliest period at which the human mind was capable of forming objects into classes. Fetichism proper gradually becomes limited to objects possessing a marked individuality. A particular mountain or river is worshipped bodily (as it is even now by the Hindoos and the South Sea Islanders) as a divinity in itself, not the mere residence of one, long after invisible gods have been imagined as rulers of all the great classes of phaenomena, even intellectual and moral, as war, love, wisdom, beauty, &c. The worship of the earth (Tellus or Pales) and of the various heavenly bodies, was prolonged into the heart of Polytheism. Every scholar knows, though littérateurs and men of the world do not, that in the full vigour143 of the Greek religion, the Sun and Moon, not a god and goddess thereof, were sacrificed to as deities144—older deities than Zeus and his descendants, belonging to the earlier dynasty of the Titans (which was the mythical145 version of the fact that their worship was older), and these deities had a distinct set of fables146 or legends connected with them. The father of Pha?thon and the lover of Endymion were not Apollo and Diana, whose identification with the Sungod and the Moongoddess was a late invention. Astrolatry, which, as M. Comte observes, is the last form of Fetichism, survived the other forms, partly because its objects, being inaccessible, were not so soon discovered to be in themselves inanimate, and partly because of the persistent147 spontaneousness of their apparent motions.
As far as Fetichism reached, and as long as it lasted, there was no abstraction, or classification of objects, and no room consequently for the metaphysical mode of thought. But as soon as the voluntary agent, whose will governed the phaenomenon, ceased to be the physical object itself, and was removed to an invisible position, from which he or she superintended an entire class of natural agencies, it began to seem impossible that this being should exert his powerful activity from a distance, unless through the medium of something present on the spot. Through the same Natural Prejudice which made Newton unable to conceive the possibility of his own law of gravitation without a subtle ether filling up the intervening space, and through which the attraction could be communicated—from this same natural infirmity of the human mind, it seemed indispensable that the god, at a distance from the object, must act through something residing in it, which was the immediate148 agent, the god having imparted to the intermediate something the power whereby it influenced and directed the object. When mankind felt a need for naming these imaginary entities, they called them the nature of the object, or its essence, or virtues residing in it, or by many other different names. These metaphysical conceptions were regarded as intensely real, and at first as mere instruments in the hands of the appropriate deities. But the habit being acquired of ascribing not only substantive149 existence, but real and efficacious agency, to the abstract entities, the consequence was that when belief in the deities declined and faded away, the entities were left standing150, and a semblance40 of explanation of phaenomena, equal to what existed before, was furnished by the entities alone, without referring them to any volitions. When things had reached this point, the metaphysical mode of thought, had completely substituted itself for the theological.
Thus did the different successive states of the human intellect, even at an early stage of its progress, overlap151 one another, the Fetichistic, the Polytheistic, and the Metaphysical modes of thought coexisting even in the same minds, while the belief in invariable laws, which constitutes the Positive mode of thought, was slowly winning its way beneath them all, as observation and experience disclosed in one class of phaenomena after another the laws to which they are really subject. It was this growth of positive knowledge which principally determined152 the next transition in the theological conception of the universe, from Polytheism to Monotheism.
It cannot be doubted that this transition took place very tardily153. The conception of a unity18 in Nature, which would admit of attributing it to a single will, is far from being natural to man, and only finds admittance after a long period of discipline and preparation, the obvious appearances all pointing to the idea of a government by many conflicting principles. We know how high a degree both of material civilization and of moral and intellectual development preceded the conversion154 of the leading populations of the world to the belief in one God. The superficial observations by which Christian155 travellers have persuaded themselves that they found their own Monotheistic belief in some tribes of savages, have always been contradicted by more accurate knowledge: those who have read, for instance, Mr Kohl's Kitchigami, know what to think of the Great Spirit of the American Indians, who belongs to a well-defined system of Polytheism, interspersed156 with large remains157 of an original Fetichism. We have no wish to dispute the matter with those who believe that Monotheism was the primitive religion, transmitted to our race from its first parents in uninterrupted tradition. By their own acknowledgment, the tradition was lost by all the nations of the world except a small and peculiar people, in whom it was miraculously159 kept alive, but who were themselves continually lapsing160 from it, and in all the earlier parts of their history did not hold it at all in its full meaning, but admitted the real existence of other gods, though believing their own to be the most powerful, and to be the Creator of the world. A greater proof of the unnaturalness161 of Monotheism to the human mind before a certain period in its development, could not well be required. The highest form of Monotheism, Christianity, has persisted to the present time in giving partial satisfaction to the mental dispositions162 that lead to Polytheism, by admitting into its theology the thoroughly163 polytheistic conception of a devil. When Monotheism, after many centuries, made its way to the Greeks and Romans from the small corner of the world where it existed, we know how the notion of daemons facilitated its reception, by making it unnecessary for Christians164 to deny the existence of the gods previously165 believed in, it being sufficient to place them under the absolute power of the new God, as the gods of Olympus were already under that of Zeus, and as the local deities of all the subjugated166 nations had been subordinated by conquest to the divine patrons of the Roman State.
In whatever mode, natural or supernatural, we choose to account for the early Monotheism of the Hebrews, there can be no question that its reception by the Gentiles was only rendered possible by the slow preparation which the human mind had undergone from the philosophers. In the age of the Caesars nearly the whole educated and cultivated class had outgrown167 the polytheistic creed, and though individually liable to returns of the superstition168 of their childhood, were predisposed (such of them as did not reject all religion whatever) to the acknowledgment of one Supreme Providence169. It is vain to object that Christianity did not find the majority of its early proselytes among the educated class: since, except in Palestine, its teachers and propagators were mainly of that class—many of them, like St Paul, well versed170 in the mental culture of their time; and they had evidently found no intellectual obstacle to the new doctrine in their own minds. We must not be deceived by the recrudescence, at a much later date, of a metaphysical Paganism in the Alexandrian and other philosophical171 schools, provoked not by attachment172 to Polytheism, but by distaste for the political and social ascendancy of the Christian teachers. The fact was, that Monotheism had become congenial to the cultivated mind: and a belief which has gained the cultivated minds of any society, unless put down by force, is certain, sooner or later, to reach the multitude. Indeed the multitude itself had been prepared for it, as already hinted, by the more and more complete subordination of all other deities to the supremacy173 of Zeus; from which the step to a single Deity174, surrounded by a host of angels, and keeping in recalcitrant175 subjection an army of devils, was by no means difficult.
By what means, then, had the cultivated minds of the Roman Empire been educated for Monotheism? By the growth of a practical feeling of the invariability of natural laws. Monotheism had a natural adaptation to this belief, while Polytheism naturally and necessarily conflicted with it. As men could not easily, and in fact never did, suppose that beings so powerful had their power absolutely restricted, each to its special department, the will of any divinity might always be frustrated176 by another: and unless all their wills were in complete harmony (which would itself be the most difficult to credit of all cases of invariability, and would require beyond anything else the ascendancy of a Supreme Deity) it was impossible that the course of any of the phaenomena under their government could be invariable. But if, on the contrary, all the phaenomena of the universe were under the exclusive and uncontrollable influence of a single will, it was an admissible supposition that this will might be always consistent with itself, and might choose to conduct each class of its operations in an invariable manner. In proportion, therefore, as the invariable laws of phaenomena revealed themselves to observers, the theory which ascribed them all to one will began to grow plausible177; but must still have appeared improbable until it had come to seem likely that invariability was the common rule of all nature. The Greeks and Romans at the Christian era had reached a point of advancement178 at which this supposition had become probable. The admirable height to which geometry had already been carried, had familiarized the educated mind with the conception of laws absolutely invariable. The logical analysis of the intellectual processes by Aristotle had shown a similar uniformity of law in the realm of mind. In the concrete external world, the most imposing179 phaenomena, those of the heavenly bodies, which by their power over the imagination had done most to keep up the whole system of ideas connected with supernatural agency, had been ascertained to take place in so regular an order as to admit of being predicted with a precision which to the notions of those days must have appeared perfect. And though an equal degree of regularity180 had not been discerned in natural phaenomena generally, even the most empirical observation had ascertained so many cases of an uniformity almost complete, that inquiring minds were eagerly on the look-out for further indications pointing in the same direction; and vied with one another in the formation of theories which, though hypothetical and essentially premature181, it was hoped would turn out to be correct representations of invariable laws governing large classes of phaenomena. When this hope and expectation became general, they were already a great encroachment182 on the original domain183 of the theological principle. Instead of the old conception, of events regulated from day to day by the unforeseen and changeable volitions of a legion of deities, it seemed more and more probable that all the phaenomena of the universe took place according to rules which must have been planned from the beginning; by which conception the function of the gods seemed to be limited to forming the plans, and setting the machinery184 in motion: their subsequent office appeared to be reduced to a sinecure185, or if they continued to reign186, it was in the manner of constitutional kings, bound by the laws to which they had previously given their assent. Accordingly, the pretension187 of philosophers to explain physical phaenomena by physical causes, or to predict their occurrence, was, up to a very late period of Polytheism, regarded as a sacrilegious insult to the gods. Anaxagoras was banished188 for it, Aristotle had to fly for his life, and the mere unfounded suspicion of it contributed greatly to the condemnation of Socrates. We are too well acquainted with this form of the religious sentiment even now, to have any difficulty in comprehending what must have been its violence then. It was inevitable189 that philosophers should be anxious to get rid of at least these gods, and so escape from the particular fables which stood immediately in their way; accepting a notion of divine government which harmonized better with the lessons they learnt from the study of nature, and a God concerning whom no mythos, as far as they knew, had yet been invented.
Again, when the idea became prevalent that the constitution of every part of Nature had been planned from the beginning, and continued to take place as it had been planned, this was itself a striking feature of resemblance extending through all Nature, and affording a presumption190 that the whole was the work, not of many, but of the same hand. It must have appeared vastly more probable that there should be one indefinitely foreseeing Intelligence and immovable Will, than hundreds and thousands of such. The philosophers had not at that time the arguments which might have been grounded on universal laws not yet suspected, such as the law of gravitation and the laws of heat; but there was a multitude, obvious even to them, of analogies and homologies in natural phaenomena, which suggested unity of plan; and a still greater number were raised up by their active fancy, aided by their premature scientific theories, all of which aimed at interpreting some phaenomenon by the analogy of others supposed to be better known; assuming, indeed, a much greater similarity among the various processes of Nature, than ampler experience has since shown to exist. The theological mode of thought thus advanced from Polytheism to Monotheism through the direct influence of the Positive mode of thought, not yet aspiring191 to complete speculative ascendancy. But, inasmuch as the belief in the invariability of natural laws was still imperfect even in highly cultivated minds, and in the merest infancy192 in the uncultivated, it gave rise to the belief in one God, but not in an immovable one. For many centuries the God believed in was flexible by entreaty193, was incessantly194 ordering the affairs of mankind by direct volitions, and continually reversing the course of nature by miraculous158 interpositions; and this is believed still, wherever the invariability of law has established itself in men's convictions as a general, but not as an universal truth.
In the change from Polytheism to Monotheism, the Metaphysical mode of thought contributed its part, affording great aid to the up-hill struggle which the Positive spirit had to maintain against the prevailing195 form, of the Theological. M. Comte, indeed, has considerably196 exaggerated the share of the Metaphysical spirit in this mental revolution, since by a lax use of terms he credits the Metaphysical mode of thought with all that is due to dialectics and negative criticism—to the exposure of inconsistencies and absurdities in the received religions. But this operation is quite independent of the Metaphysical mode of thought, and was no otherwise connected with it than in being very generally carried on by the same minds (Plato is a brilliant example), since the most eminent efficiency in it does not necessarily depend on the possession of positive scientific knowledge. But the Metaphysical spirit, strictly197 so called, did contribute largely to the advent198 of Monotheism. The conception of impersonal entities, interposed between the governing deity and the phaenomena, and forming the machinery through which these are immediately produced, is not repugnant, as the theory of direct supernatural volitions is, to the belief in invariable laws. The entities not being, like the gods, framed after the exemplar of men—being neither, like them, invested with human passions, nor supposed, like them, to have power beyond the phaenomena which are the special department of each, there was no fear of offending them by the attempt to foresee and define their action, or by the supposition that it took place according to fixed laws. The popular tribunal which condemned Anaxagoras had evidently not risen to the metaphysical point of view. Hippocrates, who was concerned only with a select and instructed class, could say with impunity199, speaking of what were called the god-inflicted diseases, that to his mind they were neither more nor less god-inflicted than all others. The doctrine of abstract entities was a kind of instinctive200 conciliation201 between the observed uniformity of the facts of nature, and their dependence34 on arbitrary volition66; since it was easier to conceive a single volition as setting a machinery to work, which afterwards went on of itself, than to suppose an inflexible202 constancy in so capricious and changeable a thing as volition must then have appeared. But though the régime of abstractions was in strictness compatible with Polytheism, it demanded Monotheism as the condition of its free development. The received Polytheism being only the first remove from Fetichism, its gods were too closely mixed up in the daily details of phaenomena, and the habit of propitiating203 them and ascertaining204 their will before any important action of life was too inveterate205, to admit, without the strongest shock to the received system, the notion that they did not habitually207 rule by special interpositions, but left phaenomena in all ordinary cases to the operation of the essences or peculiar natures which they had first implanted in them. Any modification208 of Polytheism which would have made it fully compatible with the Metaphysical conception of the world, would have been more difficult to effect than the transition to Monotheism, as Monotheism was at first conceived.
We have given, in our own way, and at some length, this important portion of M. Comte's view of the evolution of human thought, as a sample of the manner in which his theory corresponds with and interprets historical facts, and also to obviate209 some objections to it, grounded on an imperfect comprehension, or rather on a mere first glance. Some, for example, think the doctrine of the three successive stages of speculation and belief, inconsistent with the fact that they all three existed contemporaneously; much as if the natural succession of the hunting, the nomad210, and the agricultural state could be refuted by the fact that there are still hunters and nomads211. That the three states were contemporaneous, that they all began before authentic212 history, and still coexist, is M. Comte's express statement: as well as that the advent of the two later modes of thought was the very cause which disorganized and is gradually destroying the primitive one. The Theological mode of explaining phaenomena was once universal, with the exception, doubtless, of the familiar facts which, being even then seen to be controllable by human will, belonged already to the positive mode of thought. The first and easiest generalizations of common observation, anterior to the first traces of the scientific spirit, determined the birth of the Metaphysical mode of thought; and every further advance in the observation of nature, gradually bringing to light its invariable laws, determined a further development of the Metaphysical spirit at the expense of the Theological, this being the only medium through which the conclusions of the Positive mode of thought and the premises213 of the Theological could be temporarily made compatible. At a later period, when the real character of the positive laws of nature had come to be in a certain degree understood, and the theological idea had assumed, in scientific minds, its final character, that of a God governing by general laws, the positive spirit, having now no longer need of the fictitious medium of imaginary entities, set itself to the easy task of demolishing214 the instrument by which it had risen. But though it destroyed the actual belief in the objective reality of these abstractions, that belief has left behind it vicious tendencies of the human mind, which are still far enough from being extinguished, and which we shall presently have occasion to characterize.
The next point on which we have to touch is one of greater importance than it seems. If all human speculation had to pass through the three stages, we may presume that its different branches, having always been very unequally advanced, could not pass from one stage to another at the same time. There must have been a certain order of succession in which the different sciences would enter, first into the metaphysical, and afterwards into the purely positive stage; and this order M. Comte proceeds to investigate. The result is his remarkable215 conception of a scale of subordination of the sciences, being the order of the logical dependence of those which follow on those which precede. It is not at first obvious how a mere classification of the sciences can be not merely a help to their study, but itself an important part of a body of doctrine; the classification, however, is a very important part of M. Comte's philosophy.
He first distinguishes between the abstract and the concrete sciences. The abstract sciences have to do with the laws which govern the elementary facts of Nature; laws on which all phaenomena actually realized must of course depend, but which would have been equally compatible with many other combinations than those which actually come to pass. The concrete sciences, on the contrary, concern themselves only with the particular combinations of phaenomena which are found in existence. For example; the minerals which compose our planet, or are found in it, have been produced and are held together by the laws of mechanical aggregation216 and by those of chemical union. It is the business of the abstract sciences, Physics and Chemistry, to ascertain these laws: to discover how and under what conditions bodies may become aggregated218, and what are the possible modes and results of chemical combination. The great majority of these aggregations219 and combinations take place, so far as we are aware, only in our laboratories; with these the concrete science, Mineralogy, has nothing to do. Its business is with those aggregates220, and those chemical compounds, which form themselves, or have at some period been formed, in the natural world. Again, Physiology, the abstract science, investigates, by such means as are available to it, the general laws of organization and life. Those laws determine what living beings are possible, and maintain the existence and determine the phaenomena of those which actually exist: but they would be equally capable of maintaining in existence plants and animals very different from these. The concrete sciences, Zoology221 and Botany, confine themselves to species which really exist, or can be shown to have really existed: and do not concern themselves with the mode in which even these would comport222 themselves under all circumstances, but only under those which really take place. They set forth the actual mode of existence of plants and animals, the phaenomena which they in fact present: but they set forth all of these, and take into simultaneous consideration the whole real existence of each species, however various the ultimate laws on which it depends, and to whatever number of different abstract sciences these laws may belong. The existence of a date tree, or of a lion, is a joint223 result of many natural laws, physical, chemical, biological, and even astronomical224. Abstract science deals with these laws separately, but considers each of them in all its aspects, all its possibilities of operation: concrete science considers them only in combination, and so far as they exist and manifest themselves in the animals or plants of which we have experience. The distinctive225 attributes of the two are summed up by M. Comte in the expression, that concrete science relates to Beings, or Objects, abstract science to Events.[2]
The concrete sciences are inevitably226 later in their development than the abstract sciences on which they depend. Not that they begin later to be studied; on the contrary, they are the earliest cultivated, since in our abstract investigations228 we necessarily set out from spontaneous facts. But though we may make empirical generalizations, we can form no scientific theory of concrete phaenomena until the laws which govern and explain them are first known; and those laws are the subject of the abstract sciences. In consequence, there is not one of the concrete studies (unless we count astronomy among them) which has received, up to the present time, its final scientific constitution, or can be accounted a science, except in a very loose sense, but only materials for science: partly from insufficiency of facts, but more, because the abstract sciences, except those at the very beginning of the scale, have not attained the degree of perfection necessary to render real concrete sciences possible.
Postponing, therefore, the concrete sciences, as not yet formed, but only tending towards formation, the abstract sciences remain to be classed. These, as marked out by M. Comte, are six in number; and the principle which he proposes for their classification is admirably in accordance with the conditions of our study of Nature. It might have happened that the different classes of phaenomena had depended on laws altogether distinct; that in changing from one to another subject of scientific study, the student left behind all the laws he previously knew, and passed under the dominion of a totally new set of uniformities. The sciences would then have been wholly independent of one another; each would have rested entirely on its own inductions230, and if deductive at all, would have drawn231 its deductions233 from premises exclusively furnished by itself. The fact, however, is otherwise. The relation which really subsists234 between different kinds of phaenomena, enables the sciences to be arranged in such an order, that in travelling through them we do not pass out of the sphere of any laws, but merely take up additional ones at each step. In this order M. Comte proposes to arrange them. He classes the sciences in an ascending235 series, according to the degree of complexity236 of their phaenomena; so that each science depends on the truths of all those which precede it, with the addition of peculiar truths of its own.
Thus, the truths of number are true of all things, and depend only on their own laws; the science, therefore, of Number, consisting of Arithmetic and Algebra237, may be studied without reference to any other science. The truths of Geometry presuppose the laws of Number, and a more special class of laws peculiar to extended bodies, but require no others: Geometry, therefore, can be studied independently of all sciences except that of Number.
Rational Mechanics presupposes, and depends on, the laws of number and those of extension, and along with them another set of laws, those of Equilibrium238 and Motion. The truths of Algebra and Geometry nowise depend on these last, and would have been true if these had happened to be the reverse of what we find them: but the phaenomena of equilibrium and motion cannot be understood, nor even stated, without assuming the laws of number and extension, such as they actually are. The phaenomena of Astronomy depend on these three classes of laws, and on the law of gravitation besides; which last has no influence on the truths of number, geometry, or mechanics. Physics (badly named in common English parlance239 Natural Philosophy) presupposes the three mathematical sciences, and also astronomy; since all terrestrial phaenomena are affected118 by influences derived240 from the motions of the earth and of the heavenly bodies. Chemical phaenomena depend (besides their own laws) on all the preceding, those of physics among the rest, especially on the laws of heat and electricity; physiological242 phaenomena, on the laws of physics and chemistry, and their own laws in addition. The phaenomena of human society obey laws of their own, but do not depend solely243 upon these: they depend upon all the laws of organic and animal life, together with those of inorganic244 nature, these last influencing society not only through their influence on life, but by determining the physical conditions under which society has to be carried on. "Chacun de ces degré's successifs exige des inductions qui lui sont propres; mais elles ne peuvent jamais devenir systématiques que sous l'impulsion déductive resultée de tous les ordres moins compliqués."[3]
Thus arranged by M. Comte in a series, of which each term represents an advance in speciality beyond the term preceding it, and (what necessarily accompanies increased speciality) an increase of complexity—a set of phaenomena determined by a more numerous combination of laws; the sciences stand in the following order: 1st, Mathematics; its three branches following one another on the same principle, Number, Geometry, Mechanics. 2nd, Astronomy. 3rd, Physics. 4th, Chemistry. 5th, Biology. 6th, Sociology, or the Social Science, the phaemomena, of which depend on, and cannot be understood without, the principal truths of all the other sciences. The subject matter and contents of these various sciences are obvious of themselves, with the exception of Physics, which is a group of sciences rather than a single science, and is again divided by M. Comte into five departments: Barology, or the science of weight; Thermology, or that of heat; Acoustics245, Optics, and Electrology. These he attempts to arrange on the same principle of increasing speciality and complexity, but they hardly admit of such a scale, and M. Comte's mode of placing them varied246 at different periods. All the five being essentially independent of one another, he attached little importance to their order, except that barology ought to come first, as the connecting link with astronomy, and electrology last, as the transition to chemistry.
If the best classification is that which is grounded on the properties most important for our purposes, this classification will stand the test. By placing the sciences in the order of the complexity of their subject matter, it presents them in the order of their difficulty. Each science proposes to itself a more arduous247 inquiry than those which precede it in the series; it is therefore likely to be susceptible248, even finally, of a less degree of perfection, and will certainly arrive later at the degree attainable249 by it. In addition to this, each science, to establish its own truths, needs those of all the sciences anterior to it. The only means, for example, by which the physiological laws of life could have been ascertained, was by distinguishing, among the multifarious and complicated facts of life, the portion which physical and chemical laws cannot account for. Only by thus isolating250 the effects of the peculiar organic laws, did it become possible to discover what these are. It follows that the order in which the sciences succeed one another in the series, cannot but be, in the main, the historical order of their development; and is the only order in which they can rationally be studied. For this last there is an additional reason: since the more special and complete sciences require not only the truths of the simpler and more general ones, but still more their methods. The scientific intellect, both in the individual and in the race, must learn in the move elementary studies that art of investigation227 and those canons of proof which are to be put in practice in the more elevated. No intellect is properly qualified251 for the higher part of the scale, without due practice in the lower.
Mr Herbert Spencer, in his essay entitled "The Genesis of Science," and more recently in a pamphlet on "the Classification of the Sciences," has criticised and condemned M. Comte's classification, and proposed a more elaborate one of his own: and M. Littré, in his valuable biographical and philosophical work on M. Comte ("Auguste Comte et la Philosophie Positive"), has at some length criticised the criticism. Mr Spencer is one of the small number of persons who by the solidity and encyclopedical character of their knowledge, and their power of co-ordination and concatenation, may claim to be the peers of M. Comte, and entitled to a vote in the estimation of him. But after giving to his animadversions the respectful attention due to all that comes from Mr Spencer, we cannot find that he has made out any case. It is always easy to find fault with a classification. There are a hundred possible ways of arranging any set of objects, and something may almost always be said against the best, and in favour of the worst of them. But the merits of a classification depend on the purposes to which it is instrumental. We have shown the purposes for which M. Comte's classification is intended. Mr Spencer has not shown that it is ill adapted to those purposes: and we cannot perceive that his own answers any ends equally important. His chief objection is that if the more special sciences need the truths of the more general ones, the latter also need some of those of the former, and have at times been stopped in their progress by the imperfect state of sciences which follow long after them in M. Comte's scale; so that, the dependence being mutual252, there is a consensus253, but not an ascending scale or hierarchy254 of the sciences. That the earlier sciences derive241 help from the later is undoubtedly255 true; it is part of M. Comte's theory, and amply exemplified in the details of his work. When he affirms that one science historically precedes another, he does not mean that the perfection of the first precedes the humblest commencement of those which follow. Mr Spencer does not distinguish between the empirical stage of the cultivation of a branch of knowledge, and the scientific stage. The commencement of every study consists in gathering257 together unanalyzed facts, and treasuring up such spontaneous generalizations as present themselves to natural sagacity. In this stage any branch of inquiry can be carried on independently of every other; and it is one of M. Comte's own remarks that the most complex, in a scientific point of view, of all studies, the latest in his series, the study of man as a moral and social being, since from its absorbing interest it is cultivated more or less by every one, and pre-eminently by the great practical minds, acquired at an early period a greater stock of just though unscientific observations than the more elementary sciences. It is these empirical truths that the later and more special sciences lend to the earlier; or, at most, some extremely elementary scientific truth, which happening to be easily ascertainable258 by direct experiment, could be made available for carrying a previous science already founded, to a higher stage of development; a re-action of the later sciences on the earlier which M. Comte not only fully recognized, but attached great importance to systematizing.[4]
But though detached truths relating to the more complex order of phaenomena may be empirically observed, and a few of them even scientifically established, contemporaneously with an early stage of some of the sciences anterior in the scale, such detached truths, as M. Littré justly remarks, do not constitute a science. What is known of a subject, only becomes a science when it is made a connected body of truth; in which the relation between the general principles and the details is definitely made out, and each particular truth can be recognized as a case of the operation of wider laws. This point of progress, at which the study passes from the preliminary state of mere preparation, into a science, cannot be reached by the more complex studies until it has been attained by the simpler ones. A certain regularity of recurrence259 in the celestial appearances was ascertained empirically before much progress had been made in geometry; but astronomy could no more be a science until geometry was a highly advanced one, than the rule of three could have been practised before addition and subtraction260. The truths of the simpler sciences are a part of the laws to which the phaenomena of the more complex sciences conform: and are not only a necessary element in their explanation, but must be so well understood as to be traceable through complex combinations, before the special laws which co-exist and co-operate with them can be brought to light. This is all that M. Comte affirms, and enough for his purpose.[5] He no doubt occasionally indulges in more unqualified expressions than can be completely justified261, regarding the logical perfection of the construction of his series, and its exact correspondence with the historical evolution of the sciences; exaggerations confined to language, and which the details of his exposition often correct. But he is sufficiently262 near the truth, in both respects, for every practical purpose.[6] Minor263 inaccuracies must often be forgiven even to great thinkers. Mr Spencer, in the very-writings in which he criticises M. Comte, affords signal instances of them.[7]
Combining the doctrines, that every science is in a less advanced state as it occupies a higher place in the ascending scale, and that all the sciences pass through the three stages, theological, metaphysical, and positive, it follows that the more special a science is, the tardier264 is it in effecting each transition, so that a completely positive state of an earlier science has often coincided with the metaphysical state of the one next to it, and a purely theological state of those further on. This statement correctly represents the general course of the facts, though requiring allowances in the detail. Mathematics, for example, from the very beginning of its cultivation, can hardly at any time have been in the theological state, though exhibiting many traces of the metaphysical. No one, probably, ever believed that the will of a god kept parallel lines from meeting, or made two and two equal to four; or ever prayed to the gods to make the square of the hypothenuse equal to more or less than the sum of the squares of the sides. The most devout265 believers have recognized in propositions of this description a class of truths independent of the devine omnipotence266. Even among the truths which popular philosophy calls by the misleading name of Contingent267 the few which are at once exact and obvious were probably, from the very first, excepted from the theological explanation. M. Comte observes, after Adam Smith, that we are not told in any age or country of a god of Weight. It was otherwise with Astronomy: the heavenly bodies were believed not merely to be moved by gods, but to be gods themselves: and when this theory was exploded, there movements were explained by metaphysical conceptions; such as a tendency of Nature to perfection, in virtue of which these sublime268 bodies, being left to themselves, move in the most perfect orbit, the circle. Even Kepler was full of fancies of this description, which only terminated when Newton, by unveiling the real physical laws of the celestial motions, closed the metaphysical period of astronomical science. As M. Comte remarks, our power of foreseeing phaenomena, and our power of controlling them, are the two things which destroy the belief of their being governed by changeable wills. In the case of phaenomena which science has not yet taught us either to foresee or to control, the theological mode of thought has not ceased to operate: men still pray for rain, or for success in war, or to avert269 a shipwreck270 or a pestilence271, but not to put back the stars in their courses, to abridge36 the time necessary for a journey, or to arrest the tides. Such vestiges272 of the primitive mode of thought linger in the more intricate departments of sciences which have attained a high degree of positive development. The metaphysical mode of explanation, being less antagonistic273 than the theological to the idea of invariable laws, is still slower in being entirely discarded. M. Comte finds remains of it in the sciences which are the most completely positive, with the single exception of astronomy, mathematics itself not being, he thinks, altogether free from them: which is not wonderful, when we see at how very recent a date mathematicians275 have been able to give the really positive interpretation85 of their own symbols.[8] We have already however had occasion to notice M. Comte's propensity276 to use the term metaphysical in cases containing nothing that truly answers to his definition of the word. For instance, he considers chemistry as tainted277 with the metaphysical mode of thought by the notion of chemical affinity278. He thinks that the chemists who said that bodies combine because they have an affinity for each other, believed in a mysterious entity279 residing in bodies and inducing them to combine. On any other supposition, he thinks the statement could only mean that bodies combine because they combine. But it really meant more. It was the abstract expression of the doctrine, that bodies have an invariable tendency to combine with one thing in preference to another: that the tendencies of different substances to combine are fixed quantities, of which the greater always prevails over the less, so that if A detaches B from C in one case it will do so in every other; which was called having a greater attraction, or, more technically280, a greater affinity for it. This was not a metaphysical theory, but a positive generalization, which accounted for a great number of facts, and would have kept its place as a law of nature, had it not been disproved by the discovery of cases in which though A detached B from C in some circumstances, C detached it from A in others, showing the law of elective chemical combination to be a less simple one than had at first been supposed. In this case, therefore, M. Comte made a mistake: and he will be found to have made many similar ones. But in the science next after chemistry, biology, the empty mode of explanation by scholastic entities, such as a plastic force, a vital principle, and the like, has been kept up even to the present day. The German physiology of the school of Oken, notwithstanding his acknowledged genius, is almost as metaphysical as Hegel, and there is in France a quite recent revival281 of the Animism of Stahl. These metaphysical explanations, besides their inanity282, did serious harm, by directing the course of positive scientific inquiry into wrong channels. There was indeed nothing to prevent investigating the mode of action of the supposed plastic or vital force by observation and experiment; but the phrases gave currency and coherence283 to a false abstraction and generalization, setting inquirers to look out for one cause of complex phaenomena which undoubtedly depended on many.
According to M. Comte, chemistry entered into the positive stage with Lavoisier, in the latter half of the last century (in a subsequent treatise he places the date a generation earlier); and biology at the beginning of the present, when Bichat drew the fundamental distinction between nutritive or vegetative and properly animal life, and referred the properties of organs to the general laws of the component284 tissues. The most complex of all sciences, the Social, had not, he maintained, become positive at all, but was the subject of an ever-renewed and barren contest between the theological and the metaphysical modes of thought. To make this highest of the sciences positive, and thereby285 complete the positive character of all human speculations, was the principal aim of his labours, and he believed himself to have accomplished it in the last three volumes of his Treatise. But the term Positive is not, any more than Metaphysical, always used by M. Comte in the same meaning. There never can have been a period in any science when it was not in some degree positive, since it always professed to draw conclusions from experience and observation. M. Comte would have been the last to deny that previous to his own speculations, the world possessed a multitude of truths, of greater or less certainty, on social subjects, the evidence of which was obtained by inductive or deductive processes from observed sequences of phaenomena. Nor could it be denied that the best writers on subjects upon which so many men of the highest mental capacity had employed their powers, had accepted as thoroughly the positive point of view, and rejected the theological and metaphysical as decidedly, as M. Comte himself. Montesquieu; even Macchiavelli; Adam Smith and the political economists288 universally, both in France and in England; Bentham, and all thinkers initiated289 by him,—had a full conviction that social phaenomena conform to invariable laws, the discovery and illustration of which was their great object as speculative thinkers. All that can be said is, that those philosophers did not get so far as M. Comte in discovering the methods best adapted to bring these laws to light. It was not, therefore, reserved for M. Comte to make sociological inquiries290 positive. But what he really meant by making a science positive, is what we will call, with M. Littré, giving it its final scientific constitution; in other words, discovering or proving, and pursuing to their consequences, those of its truths which are fit to form the connecting links among the rest: truths which are to it what the law of gravitation is to astronomy, what the elementary properties of the tissues are to physiology, and we will add (though M. Comte did not) what the laws of association are to psychology291. This is an operation which, when accomplished, puts an end to the empirical period, and enables the science to be conceived as a co-ordinated and coherent body of doctrine. This is what had not yet been done for sociology; and the hope of effecting it was, from his early years, the prompter and incentive292 of all M. Comte's philosophic labours.
It was with a view to this that he undertook that wonderful systematization of the philosophy of all the antecedent sciences, from mathematics to physiology, which, if he had done nothing else, would have stamped him, in all minds competent to appreciate it, as one of the principal thinkers of the age. To make its nature intelligible293 to those who are not acquainted with it, we must explain what we mean by the philosophy of a science, as distinguished from the science itself. The proper meaning of philosophy we take to be, what the ancients understood by it—the scientific knowledge of Man, as an intellectual, moral, and social being. Since his intellectual faculties include his knowing faculty294, the science of Man includes everything that man can know, so far as regards his mode of knowing it: in other words, the whole doctrine of the conditions of human knowledge. The philosophy of a Science thus comes to mean the science itself, considered not as to its results, the truths which it ascertains295, but as to the processes by which the mind attains296 them, the marks by which it recognises them, and the co-ordinating and methodizing of them with a view to the greatest clearness of conception and the fullest and readiest availibility for use: in one word, the logic59 of the science. M. Comte has accomplished this for the first five of the fundamental sciences, with a success which can hardly be too much admired. We never reopen even the least admirable part of this survey, the volume on chemistry and biology (which was behind the actual state of those sciences when first written, and is far in the rear of them now), without a renewed sense of the great reach of its speculations, and a conviction that the way to a complete rationalizing of those sciences, still very imperfectly conceived by most who cultivate them, has been shown nowhere so successfully as there.
Yet, for a correct appreciation297 of this great philosophical achievement, we ought to take account of what has not been accomplished, as well as of what has. Some of the chief deficiencies and infirmities of M. Comte's system of thought will be found, as is usually the case, in close connexion with its greatest successes.
The philosophy of Science consists of two principal parts; the methods of investigation, and the requisites298 of proof. The one points out the roads by which the human intellect arrives at conclusions, the other the mode of testing their evidence. The former if complete would be an Organon of Discovery, the latter of Proof. It is to the first of these that M. Comte principally confines himself, and he treats it with a degree of perfection hitherto unrivalled. Nowhere is there anything comparable, in its kind, to his survey of the resources which the mind has at its disposal for investigating the laws of phaenomena; the circumstances which render each of the fundamental modes of exploration suitable or unsuitable to each class of phaenomena; the extensions and transformations300 which the process of investigation has to undergo in adapting itself to each new province of the field of study; and the especial gifts with which every one of the fundamental sciences enriches the method of positive inquiry, each science in its turn being the best fitted to bring to perfection one process or another. These, and many cognate301 subjects, such as the theory of Classification, and the proper use of scientific Hypotheses, M. Comte has treated with a completeness of insight which leaves little to be desired. Not less admirable is his survey of the most comprehensive truths that had been arrived at by each science, considered as to their relation to the general sum of human knowledge, and their logical value as aids to its further progress. But after all this, there remains a further and distinct question. We are taught the right way of searching for results, but when a result has been reached, how shall we know that it is true? How assure ourselves that the process has been performed correctly, and that our premises, whether consisting of generalities or of particular facts, really prove the conclusion we have grounded on them? On this question M. Comte throws no light. He supplies no test of proof. As regards deduction232, he neither recognises the syllogistic302 system of Aristotle and his successors (the insufficiency of which is as evident as its utility is real) nor proposes any other in lieu of it: and of induction229 he has no canons whatever. He does not seem to admit the possibility of any general criterion by which to decide whether a given inductive inference is correct or not. Yet he does not, with Dr Whewell, regard an inductive theory as proved if it accounts for the facts: on the contrary, he sets himself in the strongest opposition303 to those scientific hypotheses which, like the luminiferous ether, are not susceptible of direct proof, and are accepted on the sole evidence of their aptitude304 for explaining phenomena305. He maintains that no hypothesis is legitimate306 unless it is susceptible of verification, and that none ought to be accepted as true unless it can be shown not only that it accords with the facts, but that its falsehood would be inconsistent with them. He therefore needs a test of inductive proof; and in assigning none, he seems to give up as impracticable the main problem of Logic properly so called. At the beginning of his treatise he speaks of a doctrine of Method, apart from particular applications, as conceivable, but not needful: method, according to him, is learnt only by seeing it in operation, and the logic of a science can only usefully be taught through the science itself. Towards the end of the work, he assumes a more decidedly negative tone, and treats the very conception of studying Logic otherwise than in its applications as chimerical307. He got on, in his subsequent writings, to considering it as wrong. This indispensable part of Positive Philosophy he not only left to be supplied by others, but did all that depended on him to discourage them from attempting it.
This hiatus in M. Comte's system is not unconnected with a defect in his original conception of the subject matter of scientific investigation, which has been generally noticed, for it lies on the surface, and is more apt to be exaggerated than overlooked. It is often said of him that he rejects the study of causes. This is not, in the correct acceptation, true, for it is only questions of ultimate origin, and of Efficient as distinguished from what are called Physical causes, that he rejects. The causes that he regards as inaccessible are causes which are not themselves phaenomena. Like other people he admits the study of causes, in every sense in which one physical fact can be the cause of another. But he has an objection to the word cause; he will only consent to speak of Laws of Succession: and depriving himself of the use of a word which has a Positive meaning, he misses the meaning it expresses. He sees no difference between such generalizations as Kepler's laws, and such as the theory of gravitation. He fails to perceive the real distinction between the laws of succession and coexistence which thinkers of a different school call Laws of Phaenomena, and those of what they call the action of Causes: the former exemplified by the succession of day and night, the latter by the earth's rotation309 which causes it. The succession of day and night is as much an invariable sequence, as the alternate exposure of opposite sides of the earth to the sun. Yet day and night are not the causes of one another; why? Because their sequence, though invariable in our experience, is not unconditionally310 so: those facts only succeed each other, provided that the presence and absence of the sun succeed each other, and if this alternation were to cease, we might have either day or night unfollowed by one another. There are thus two kinds of uniformities of succession, the one unconditional311, the other conditional312 on the first: laws of causation, and other successions dependent on those laws. All ultimate laws are laws of causation, and the only universal law beyond the pale of mathematics is the law of universal causation, namely, that every phaenomenon has a phaenomenal cause; has some phaenomenon other than itself, or some combination of phaenomena, on which it is invariably and unconditionally consequent. It is on the universality of this law that the possibility rests of establishing a canon of Induction. A general proposition inductively obtained is only then proved to be true, when the instances on which it rests are such that if they have been correctly observed, the falsity of the generalization would be inconsistent with the constancy of causation; with the universality of the fact that the phaenomena of nature take place according to invariable laws of succession.[9] It is probable, therefore, that M. Comte's determined abstinence from the word and the idea of Cause, had much to do with his inability to conceive an Inductive Logic, by diverting his attention from the only basis upon which it could be founded.
We are afraid it must also be said, though shown only by slight indications in his fundamental work, and coming out in full evidence only in his later writings—that M. Comte, at bottom, was not so solicitous313 about completeness of proof as becomes a positive philosopher, and that the unimpeachable314 objectivity, as he would have called it, of a conception—its exact correspondence to the realities of outward fact—was not, with him, an indispensable condition of adopting it, if it was subjectively315 useful, by affording facilities to the mind for grouping phaenomena. This appears very curiously316 in his chapters on the philosophy of Chemistry. He recommends, as a judicious317 use of "the degree of liberty left to our intelligence by the end and purpose of positive science," that we should accept as a convenient generalization the doctrine that all chemical composition is between two elements only; that every substance which our analysis decomposes318, let us say into four elements, has for its immediate constituents319 two hypothetical substances, each compounded of two simpler ones. There would have been nothing to object to in this as a scientific hypothesis, assumed tentatively as a means of suggesting experiments by which its truth may be tested. With this for its destination, the conception, would have been legitimate and philosophical; the more so, as, if confirmed, it would have afforded an explanation of the fact that some substances which analysis shows to be composed of the same elementary substances in the same proportions, differ in their general properties, as for instance, sugar and gum.[10] And if, besides affording a reason for difference between things which differ, the hypothesis had afforded a reason for agreement between things which agree; if the intermediate link by which the quaternary compound was resolved into two binary320 ones, could have been so chosen as to bring each of them within the analogies of some known class of binary compounds (which it is easy to suppose possible, and which in some particular instances actually happens);[11] the universality of binary composition would have been a successful example of an hypothesis in anticipation321 of a positive theory, to give a direction to inquiry which might end in its being either proved or abandoned. But M. Comte evidently thought that even though it should never be proved—however many cases of chemical composition might always remain in which the theory was still as hypothetical as at first—so long as it was not actually disproved (which it is scarcely in the nature of the case that it should ever be) it would deserve to be retained, for its mere convenience in bringing a large body of phaenomena under a general conception. In a résumé of the general principles of the positive method at the end of the work, he claims, in express terms, an unlimited322 license323 of adopting "without any vain scruple324" hypothetical conceptions of this sort; "in order to satisfy, within proper limits, our just mental inclinations325, which always turn, with an instinctive predilection326, towards simplicity327, continuity, and generality of conceptions, while always respecting the reality of external laws in so far as accessible to us" (vi. 639). "The most philosophic point of view leads us to conceive the study of natural laws as destined to represent the external world so as to give as much satisfaction to the essential inclinations of our intelligence, as is consistent with the degree of exactitude commanded by the aggregate217 of our practical wants" (vi. 642). Among these "essential inclinations" he includes not only our "instinctive predilection for order and harmony," which makes us relish329 any conception, even fictitious, that helps to reduce phaenomena to system; but even our feelings of taste, "les convenances purement esthétiques," which, he says, have a legitimate part in the employment of the "genre330 de liberté" resté facultatif pour notre intelligence." After the due satisfaction of our "most eminent mental inclinations," there will still remain "a considerable margin331 of indeterminateness, which should be made use of to give a direct gratification to our besoin of ideality, by embellishing332 our scientific thoughts, without injury to their essential reality" (vi. 647). In consistency333 with all this, M. Comte warns thinkers against too severe a scrutiny334 of the exact truth of scientific laws, and stamps with "severe reprobation335" those who break down "by too minute an investigation" generalizations already made, without being able to substitute others (vi. 639): as in the case of Lavoisier's general theory of chemistry, which would have made that science more satisfactory than at present to "the instinctive inclinations of our intelligence" if it had turned out true, but unhappily it did not. These mental dispositions in M. Comte account for his not having found or sought a logical criterion of proof; but they are scarcely consistent with his inveterate hostility336 to the hypothesis of the luminiferous ether, which certainly gratifies our "predilection for order and harmony," not to say our "besoin d'idéalite", in no ordinary degree. This notion of the "destination" of the study of natural laws is to our minds a complete dereliction of the essential principles which form the Positive conception of science; and contained the germ of the perversion of his own philosophy which marked his later years. It might be interesting, but scarcely worth while, to attempt to penetrate337 to the just thought which misled M. Comte, for there is almost always a grain of truth in the errors of an original and powerful mind. There is another grave aberration338 in M. Comte's view of the method of positive science, which though not more unphilosophical than the last mentioned, is of greater practical importance. He rejects totally, as an invalid339 process, psychological observation properly so called, or in other words, internal consciousness, at least as regards our intellectual operations. He gives no place in his series of the science of Psychology, and always speaks of it with contempt. The study of mental phaenomena, or, as he expresses it, of moral and intellectual functions, has a place in his scheme, under the head of Biology, but only as a branch of physiology. Our knowledge of the human mind must, he thinks, be acquired by observing other people. How we are to observe other people's mental operations, or how interpret the signs of them without having learnt what the signs mean by knowledge of ourselves, he does not state. But it is clear to him that we can learn very little about the feelings, and nothing at all about the intellect, by self-observation. Our intelligence can observe all other things, but not itself: we cannot observe ourselves observing, or observe ourselves reasoning: and if we could, attention to this reflex operation would annihilate340 its object, by stopping the process observed.
There is little need for an elaborate refutation of a fallacy respecting which the only wonder is that it should impose on any one. Two answers may be given to it. In the first place, M. Comte might be referred to experience, and to the writings of his countryman M. Cardaillac and our own Sir William Hamilton, for proof that the mind can not only be conscious of, but attend to, more than one, and even a considerable number, of impressions at once.[12] It is true that attention is weakened by being divided; and this forms a special difficulty in psychological observation, as psychologists (Sir William Hamilton in particular) have fully recognised; but a difficulty is not an impossibility. Secondly341, it might have occurred to M. Comte that a fact may be studied through the medium of memory, not at the very moment of our perceiving it, but the moment after: and this is really the mode in which our best knowledge of our intellectual acts is generally acquired. We reflect on what we have been doing, when the act is past, but when its impression in the memory is still fresh. Unless in one of these ways, we could not have acquired the knowledge, which nobody denies us to have, of what passes in our minds. M. Comte would scarcely have affirmed that we are not aware of our own intellectual operations. We know of our observings and our reasonings, either at the very time, or by memory the moment after; in either case, by direct knowledge, and not (like things done by us in a state of somnambulism) merely by their results. This simple fact destroys the whole of M. Comte's argument. Whatever we are directly aware of, we can directly observe.
And what Organon for the study of "the moral and intellectual functions" does M. Comte offer, in lieu of the direct mental observation which he repudiates342? We are almost ashamed to say, that it is Phrenology! Not, indeed, he says, as a science formed, but as one still to be created; for he rejects almost all the special organs imagined by phrenologists, and accepts only their general division of the brain into the three regions of the propensities, the sentiments, and the intellect,[13] and the subdivision of the latter region between the organs of meditation343 and those of observation. Yet this mere first outline of an apportionment of the mental functions among different organs, he regards as extricating344 the mental study of man from the metaphysical stage, and elevating it to the positive. The condition of mental science would be sad indeed if this were its best chance of being positive; for the later course of physiological observation and speculation has not tended to confirm, but to discredit345, the phrenological hypothesis. And even if that hypothesis were true, psychological observation would still be necessary; for how is it possible to ascertain the correspondence between two things, by observation of only one of them? To establish a relation between mental functions and cerebral346 conformations, requires not only a parallel system of observations applied347 to each, but (as M. Comte himself, with some inconsistency, acknowledges) an analysis of the mental faculties, "des diverses facultés élémentaires," (iii. 573), conducted without any reference to the physical conditions, since the proof of the theory would lie in the correspondence between the division of the brain into organs and that of the mind into faculties, each shown by separate evidence. To accomplish this analysis requires direct psychological study carried to a high pitch of perfection; it being necessary, among other things, to investigate the degree in which mental character is created by circumstances, since no one supposes that cerebral conformation does all, and circumstances nothing. The phrenological study of Mind thus supposes as its necessary preparation the whole of the Association psychology. Without, then, rejecting any aid which study of the brain and nerves can afford to psychology (and it has afforded, and will yet afford, much), we may affirm that M. Comte has done nothing for the constitution of the positive method of mental science. He refused to profit by the very valuable commencements made by his predecessors348, especially by Hartley, Brown, and James Mill (if indeed any of those philosophers were known to him), and left the psychological branch of the positive method, as well as psychology itself, to be put in their true position as a part of Positive Philosophy by successors who duly placed themselves at the twofold point of view of physiology and psychology, Mr Bain and Mr Herbert Spencer. This great mistake is not a mere hiatus in M. Comte's system, but the parent of serious errors in his attempt to create a Social Science. He is indeed very skilful349 in estimating the effect of circumstances in moulding the general character of the human race; were he not, his historical theory could be of little worth: but in appreciating the influence which circumstances exercise, through psychological laws, in producing diversities of character, collective or individual, he is sadly at fault.
After this summary view of M. Comte's conception of Positive Philosophy, it remains to give some account of his more special and equally ambitious attempt to create the Science of Sociology, or, as he expresses it, to elevate the study of social phaenomena to the positive state.
He regarded all who profess16 any political opinions as hitherto divided between the adherents351 of the theological and those of the metaphysical mode of thought: the former deducing all their doctrines from divine ordinances352, the latter from abstractions. This assertion, however, cannot be intended in the same sense as when the terms are applied to the sciences of inorganic nature; for it is impossible that acts evidently proceeding from the human will could be ascribed to the agency (at least immediate) of either divinities or abstractions. No one ever regarded himself or his fellow-man as a mere piece of machinery worked by a god, or as the abode353 of an entity which was the true author of what the man himself appeared to do. True, it was believed that the gods, or God, could move or change human wills, as well as control their consequences, and prayers were offered to them accordingly, rather as able to overrule the spontaneous course of things, than as at each instant carrying it on. On the whole, however, the theological and metaphysical conceptions, in their application to sociology, had reference not to the production of phaenomena, but to the rule of duty, and conduct in life. It is this which was based, either on a divine will, or on abstract mental conceptions, which, by an illusion of the rational faculty, were invested with objective validity. On the one hand, the established rules of morality were everywhere referred to a divine origin. In the majority of countries the entire civil and criminal law was looked upon as revealed from above; and it is to the petty military communities which escaped this delusion354, that man is indebted for being now a progressive being. The fundamental institutions of the state were almost everywhere believed to have been divinely established, and to be still, in a greater or less degree, of divine authority. The divine right of certain lines of kings to rule, and even to rule absolutely, was but lately the creed of the dominant355 party in most countries of Europe; while the divine right of popes and bishops356 to dictate357 men's beliefs (and not respecting the invisible world alone) is still striving, though under considerable difficulties, to rule mankind. When these opinions began to be out of date, a rival theory presented itself to take their place. There were, in truth, many such theories, and to some of them the term metaphysical, in M. Comte's sense, cannot justly be applied. All theories in which the ultimate standard of institutions and rules of action was the happiness of mankind, and observation and experience the guides (and some such there have been in all periods of free speculation), are entitled to the name Positive, whatever, in other respects, their imperfections may be. But these were a small minority. M. Comte was right in affirming that the prevailing schools of moral and political speculation, when not theological, have been metaphysical. They affirmed that moral rules, and even political institutions, were not means to an end, the general good, but corollaries evolved from the conception of Natural Rights. This was especially the case in all the countries in which the ideas of publicists were the offspring of the Roman Law. The legislators of opinion on these subjects, when not theologians, were lawyers: and the Continental358 lawyers followed the Roman jurists, who followed the Greek metaphysicians, in acknowledging as the ultimate source of right and wrong in morals, and consequently in institutions, the imaginary law of the imaginary being Nature. The first systematizers of morals in Christian Europe, on any other than a purely theological basis, the writers on International Law, reasoned wholly from these premises, and transmitted them to a long line of successors. This mode of thought reached its culmination359 in Rousseau, in whose hands it became as powerful an instrument for destroying the past, as it was impotent for directing the future. The complete victory which this philosophy gained, in speculation, over the old doctrines, was temporarily followed by an equally complete practical triumph, the French Revolution: when, having had, for the first time, a full opportunity of developing its tendencies, and showing what it could not do, it failed so conspicuously360 as to determine a partial reaction to the doctrines of feudalism and Catholicism. Between these and the political metaphysics (meta-politics as Coleridge called it) of the Revolution, society has since oscillated; raising up in the process a hybrid362 intermediate party, termed Conservative, or the party of Order, which has no doctrines of its own, but attempts to hold the scales even between the two others, borrowing alternately the arguments of each, to use as weapons against whichever of the two seems at the moment most likely to prevail.
Such, reduced to a very condensed form, is M. Comte's version of the state of European opinion on politics and society. An Englishman's criticism would be, that it describes well enough the general division of political opinion in France and the countries which follow her lead, but not in England, or the communities of English origin: in all of which, divine right died out with the Jacobites, and the law of nature and natural rights have never been favourites even with the extreme popular party, who preferred to rest their claims on the historical traditions of their own country, and on maxims363 drawn from its law books, and since they outgrew364 this standard, almost always base them on general expediency365. In England, the preference of one form of government to another seldom turns on anything but the practical consequences which it produces, or which are expected from it. M. Comte can point to little of the nature of metaphysics in English politics, except "la métaphysique constitutionnelle," a name he chooses to give to the conventional fiction by which the occupant of the throne is supposed to be the source from whence all power emanates366, while nothing can be further from the belief or intention of anybody than that such should really be the case. Apart from this, which is a matter of forms and words, and has no connexion with any belief except belief in the proprieties367, the severest criticism can find nothing either worse or better, in the modes of thinking either of our conservative or of our liberal party, than a particularly shallow and flimsy kind of positivism. The working classes indeed, or some portion of them, perhaps still rest their claim to universal suffrage368 on abstract right, in addition to more substantial reasons, and thus far and no farther does metaphysics prevail in the region of English politics. But politics is not the entire art of social existence: ethics369 is a still deeper and more vital part of it: and in that, as much in England as elsewhere, the current opinions are still divided between the theological mode of thought and the metaphysical. What is the whole doctrine of Intuitive Morality, which reigns370 supreme wherever the idolatry of Scripture371 texts has abated372 and the influence of Bentham's philosophy has not reached, but the metaphysical state of ethical373 science? What else, indeed, is the whole a priori philosophy, in morals, jurisprudence, psychology, logic, even physical science, for it does not always keep its hands off that, the oldest domain of observation and experiment? It has the universal diagnostic of the metaphysical mode of thought, in the Comtean sense of the word; that of erecting375 a mere creation of the mind into a test or norma of external truth, and presenting the abstract expression of the beliefs already entertained, as the reason and evidence which justifies376 them. Of those who still adhere to the old opinions we need not speak; but when one of the most vigorous as well as boldest thinkers that English speculation has yet produced, full of the true scientific spirit, Mr Herbert Spencer, places in the front of his philosophy the doctrine that the ultimate test of the truth of a proposition is the inconceivableness of its negative; when, following in the steps of Mr Spencer, an able expounder377 of positive philosophy like Mr Lewes, in his meritorious378 and by no means superficial work on Aristotle, after laying, very justly, the blame of almost every error of the ancient thinkers on their neglecting to verify their opinions, announces that there are two kinds of verification, the Real and the Ideal, the ideal test of truth being that its negative is unthinkable, and by the application of that test judges that gravitation must be universal even in the stellar regions, because in the absence of proof to the contrary, "the idea of matter without gravity is unthinkable;"—when those from whom it was least to be expected thus set up acquired necessities of thought in the minds of one or two generations as evidence of real necessities in the universe, we must admit that the metaphysical mode of thought still rules the higher philosophy, even in the department of inorganic nature, and far more in all that relates to man as a moral, intellectual, and social being.
But, while M. Comte is so far in the right, we often, as already intimated, find him using the name metaphysical to denote certain practical conclusions, instead of a particular kind of theoretical premises. Whatever goes by the different names of the revolutionary, the radical20, the democratic, the liberal, the free-thinking, the sceptical, or the negative and critical school or party in religion, politics, or philosophy, all passes with him under the designation of metaphysical, and whatever he has to say about it forms part of his description of the metaphysical school of social science. He passes in review, one after another, what he deems the leading doctrines of the revolutionary school of politics, and dismisses them all as mere instruments of attack upon the old social system, with no permanent validity as social truth.
He assigns only this humble256 rank to the first of all the articles of the liberal creed, "the absolute right of free examination, or the dogma of unlimited liberty of conscience." As far as this doctrine only means that opinions, and their expression, should be exempt379 from legal restraint, either in the form of prevention or of penalty, M. Comte is a firm adherent350 of it: but the moral right of every human being, however ill-prepared by the necessary instruction and discipline, to erect374 himself into a judge of the most intricate as well as the most important questions that can occupy the human intellect, he resolutely381 denies. "There is no liberty of conscience," he said in an early work, "in astronomy, in physics, in chemistry, even in physiology, in the sense that every one would think it absurd not to accept in confidence the principles established in those sciences by the competent persons. If it is otherwise in politics, the reason is merely because, the old doctrines having gone by and the new ones not being yet formed, there are not properly, during the interval, any established opinions." When first mankind outgrew the old doctrines, an appeal from doctors and teachers to the outside public was inevitable and indispensable, since without the toleration and encouragement of discussion and criticism from all quarters, it would have been impossible for any new doctrines to grow up. But in itself, the practice of carrying the questions which more than all others require special knowledge and preparation, before the incompetent382 tribunal of common opinion, is, he contends, radically irrational383, and will and ought to cease when once mankind have again made up their minds to a system of doctrine. The prolongation of this provisional state, producing an ever-increasing divergence384 of opinions, is already, according to him, extremely dangerous, since it is only when there is a tolerable unanimity385 respecting the rule of life, that a real moral control can be established over the self-interest and passions of individuals. Besides which, when every man is encouraged to believe himself a competent judge of the most difficult social questions, he cannot be prevented from thinking himself competent also to the most important public duties, and the baneful386 competition for power and official functions spreads constantly downwards387 to a lower and lower grade of intelligence. In M. Comte's opinion, the peculiarly complicated nature of sociological studies, and the great amount of previous knowledge and intellectual discipline requisite299 for them, together with the serious consequences that may be produced by even, temporary errors on such subjects, render it necessary in the case of ethics and politics, still more than of mathematics and physics, that whatever legal liberty may exist of questioning and discussing, the opinions of mankind should really be formed for them by an exceedingly small number of minds of the highest class, trained to the task by the most thorough and laborious388 mental preparation: and that the questioning of their conclusions by any one, not of an equivalent grade of intellect and instruction, should be accounted equally presumptuous389, and more blamable, than the attempts occasionally made by sciolists to refute the Newtonian astronomy. All this is, in a sense, true: but we confess our sympathy with those who feel towards it like the man in the story, who being asked whether he admitted that six and five make eleven, refused to give an answer until he knew what use was to be made of it. The doctrine is one of a class of truths which, unless completed by other truths, are so liable to perversion, that we may fairly decline to take notice of them except in connexion with some definite application. In justice to M. Comte it should be said that he does not wish this intellectual dominion to be exercised over an ignorant people. Par29 from him is the thought of promoting the allegiance of the mass to scientific authority by withholding390 from them scientific knowledge. He holds it the duty of society to bestow391 on every one who grows up to manhood or womanhood as complete a course of instruction in every department of science, from mathematics to sociology, as can possibly be made general: and his ideas of what is possible in that respect are carried to a length to which few are prepared to follow him. There is something startling, though, when closely looked into, not Utopian or chimerical, in the amount of positive knowledge of the most varied kind which he believes may, by good methods of teaching, be made the common inheritance of all persons with ordinary faculties who are born into the world: not the mere knowledge of results, to which, except for the practical arts, he attaches only secondary value, but knowledge also of the mode in which those results were attained, and the evidence on which they rest, so far as it can be known and understood by those who do not devote their lives to its study.
We have stated thus fully M. Comte's opinion on the most fundamental doctrine of liberalism, because it is the clue to much of his general conception of politics. If his object had only been to exemplify by that doctrine the purely negative character of the principal liberal and revolutionary schools of thought, he need not have gone so far: it would have been enough to say, that the mere liberty to hold and express any creed, cannot itself be that creed. Every one is free to believe and publish that two and two make ten, but the important thing is to know that they make four. M. Comte has no difficulty in making out an equally strong case against the other principal tenets of what he calls the revolutionary school; since all that they generally amount to is, that something ought not to be: which cannot possibly be the whole truth, and which M. Comte, in general, will not admit to be even part of it. Take for instance the doctrine which denies to governments any initiative in social progress, restricting them to the function of preserving order, or in other words keeping the peace: an opinion which, so far as grounded on so-called rights of the individual, he justly regards as purely metaphysical; but does not recognise that it is also widely held as an inference from the laws of human nature and human affairs, and therefore, whether true or false, as a Positive doctrine. Believing with M. Comte that there are no absolute truths in the political art, nor indeed in any art whatever, we agree with him that the laisser faire doctrine, stated without large qualifications, is both unpractical and unscientific; but it does not follow that those who assert it are not, nineteen times out of twenty, practically nearer the truth than those who deny it. The doctrine of Equality meets no better fate at M. Comte's hands. He regards it as the erection into an absolute dogma of a mere protest against the inequalities which came down from the middle ages, and answer no legitimate end in modern society. He observes, that mankind in a normal state, having to act together, are necessarily, in practice, organized and classed with some reference to their unequal aptitudes392, natural or acquired, which demand that some should be under the direction of others: scrupulous393 regard being at the same time had to the fulfilment towards all, of "the claims rightfully inherent in the dignity of a human being; the aggregate of which, still very insufficiently395 appreciated, will constitute more and more the principle of universal morality as applied to daily use... a grand moral obligation, which has never been directly denied since the abolition396 of slavery" (iv. 51). There is not a word to be said against these doctrines: but the practical question is one which M. Comte never even entertains—viz., when, after being properly educated, people are left to find their places for themselves, do they not spontaneously class themselves in a manner much more conformable to their unequal or dissimilar aptitudes, than governments or social institutions are likely to do it for them? The Sovereignty of the People, again,—that metaphysical axiom which in France and the rest of the Continent has so long been the theoretic basis of radical and democratic politics,—he regards as of a purely negative character, signifying the right of the people to rid themselves by insurrection of a social order that has become oppressive; but, when erected397 into a positive principle of government, which condemns indefinitely all superiors to "an arbitrary dependence upon the multitude of their inferiors," he considers it as a sort of "transportation to peoples of the divine right so much reproached to kings" (iv. 55, 56). On the doctrine as a metaphysical dogma or an absolute principle, this criticism is just; but there is also a Positive doctrine, without any pretension to being absolute, which claims the direct participation398 of the governed in their own government, not as a natural right, but as a means to important ends, under the conditions and with the limitations which those ends impose. The general result of M. Comte's criticism on the revolutionary philosophy, is that he deems it not only incapable399 of aiding the necessary reorganization of society, but a serious impediment thereto, by setting up, on all the great interests of mankind, the mere negation of authority, direction, or organization, as the most perfect state, and the solution of all problems: the extreme point of this aberration being reached by Rousseau and his followers400, when they extolled401 the savage141 state, as an ideal from which civilization was only a degeneracy, more or less marked and complete.
The state of sociological speculation being such as has been described—divided between a feudal361 and theological school, now effete402, and a democratic and metaphysical one, of no value except for the destruction of the former; the problem, how to render the social science positive, must naturally have presented itself, more or less distinctly, to superior minds. M. Comte examines and criticises, for the most part justly, some of the principal efforts which have been made by individual thinkers for this purpose. But the weak side of his philosophy comes out prominently in his strictures on the only systematic403 attempt yet made by any body of thinkers, to constitute a science, not indeed of social phenomena generally, but of one great class or division of them. We mean, of course, political economy, which (with a reservation in favour of the speculations of Adam Smith as valuable preparatory studies for science) he deems unscientific, unpositive, and a mere branch of metaphysics, that comprehensive category of condemnation in which he places all attempts at positive science which are not in his opinion directed by a right scientific method. Any one acquainted with the writings of political economists need only read his few pages of animadversions on them (iv. 193 to 205), to learn how extremely superficial M. Comte can sometimes be. He affirms that they have added nothing really new to the original aper?us of Adam Smith; when every one who has read them knows that they have added so much as to have changed the whole aspect of the science, besides rectifying404 and clearing up in the most essential points the aper?us themselves. He lays an almost puerile405 stress, for the purpose of disparagement406, on the discussions about the meaning of words which are found in the best books on political economy, as if such discussions were not an indispensable accompaniment of the progress of thought, and abundant in the history of every physical science. On the whole question he has but one remark of any value, and that he misapplies; namely, that the study of the conditions of national wealth as a detached subject is unphilosophical, because, all the different aspects of social phaenomena acting and reacting on one another, they cannot be rightly understood apart: which by no means proves that the material and industrial phaenomena of society are not, even by themselves, susceptible of useful generalizations, but only that these generalizations must necessarily be relative to a given form of civilization and a given stage of social advancement. This, we apprehend49, is what no political economist287 would deny. None of them pretend that the laws of wages, profits, values, prices, and the like, set down in their treatises407, would be strictly true, or many of them true at all, in the savage state (for example), or in a community composed of masters and slaves. But they do think, with good reason, that whoever understands the political economy of a country with the complicated and manifold civilization of the nations of Europe, can deduce without difficulty the political economy of any other state of society, with the particular circumstances of which he is equally well acquainted.[14] We do not pretend that political economy has never been prosecuted408 or taught in a contracted spirit. As often as a study is cultivated by narrow minds, they will draw from it narrow conclusions. If a political economist is deficient409 in general knowledge, he will exaggerate the importance and universality of the limited class of truths which he knows. All kinds of scientific men are liable to this imputation410, and M. Comte is never weary of urging it against them; reproaching them with their narrowness of mind, the petty scale of their thoughts, their incapacity for large views, and the stupidity of those they occasionally attempt beyond the bounds of their own subjects. Political economists do not deserve these reproaches more than other classes of positive inquirers, but less than most. The principal error of narrowness with which they are frequently chargeable, is that of regarding, not any economical doctrine, but their present experience of mankind, as of universal validity; mistaking temporary or local phases of human character for human nature itself; having no faith in the wonderful pliability411 of the human mind; deeming it impossible, in spite of the strongest evidence, that the earth can produce human beings of a different type from that which is familiar to them in their own age, or even, perhaps, in their own country. The only security against this narrowness is a liberal mental cultivation, and all it proves is that a person is not likely to be a good political economist who is nothing else.
Thus far, we have had to do with M. Comte, as a sociologist412, only in his critical capacity. We have now to deal with him as a constructor—the author of a sociological system. The first question is that of the Method proper to the study. His view of this is highly instructive.
The Method proper to the Science of Society must be, in substance, the same as in all other sciences; the interrogation and interpretation of experience, by the twofold process of Induction and Deduction. But its mode of practising these operations has features of peculiarity413. In general, Induction furnishes to science the laws of the elementary facts, from which, when known, those of the complex combinations are thought out deductively: specific observation of complex phaenomena yields no general laws, or only empirical ones; its scientific function is to verify the laws obtained by deduction. This mode of philosophizing is not adequate to the exigencies414 of sociological investigation. In social phaemomena the elementary facts are feelings and actions, and the laws of these are the laws of human nature, social facts being the results of human acts and situations. Since, then, the phaenomena of man in society result from his nature as an individual being, it might be thought that the proper mode of constructing a positive Social Science must be by deducing it from the general laws of human nature, using the facts of history merely for verification. Such, accordingly, has been the conception of social science by many of those who have endeavoured to render it positive, particularly by the school of Bentham. M. Comte considers this as an error. We may, he says, draw from the universal laws of human nature some conclusions (though even these, we think, rather precarious) concerning the very earliest stages of human progress, of which there are either no, or very imperfect, historical records. But as society proceeds in its development, its phaenomena are determined, more and more, not by the simple tendencies of universal human nature, but by the accumulated influence of past generations over the present. The human beings themselves, on the laws of whose nature the facts of history depend, are not abstract or universal but historical human beings, already shaped, and made what they are, by human society. This being the case, no powers of deduction could enable any one, starting from the mere conception of the Being Man, placed in a world such as the earth may have been before the commencement of human agency, to predict and calculate the phaenomena of his development such as they have in fact proved. If the facts of history, empirically considered, had not given rise to any generalizations, a deductive study of history could never have reached higher than more or less plausible conjecture. By good fortune (for the case might easily have been otherwise) the history of our species, looked at as a comprehensive whole, does exhibit a determinate course, a certain order of development: though history alone cannot prove this to be a necessary law, as distinguished from a temporary accident. Here, therefore, begins the office of Biology (or, as we should say, of Psychology) in the social science. The universal laws of human nature are part of the data of sociology, but in using them we must reverse the method of the deductive physical sciences: for while, in these, specific experience commonly serves to verify laws arrived at by deduction, in sociology it is specific experience which suggests the laws, and deduction which verifies them. If a sociological theory, collected from historical evidence, contradicts the established general laws of human nature; if (to use M. Comte's instances) it implies, in the mass of mankind, any very decided286 natural bent53, either in a good or in a bad direction; if it supposes that the reason, in average human beings, predominates over the desires, or the disinterested415 desires over the personal; we may know that history has been misinterpreted, and that the theory is false. On the other hand, if laws of social phaenomena, empirically generalized from history, can when once suggested be affiliated416 to the known laws of human nature; if the direction actually taken by the developments and changes of human society, can be seen to be such as the properties of man and of his dwelling-place made antecedently probable, the empirical generalizations are raised into positive laws, and Sociology becomes a science.
Much has been said and written for centuries past, by the practical or empirical school of politicians, in condemnation of theories founded on principles of human nature, without an historical basis; and the theorists, in their turn, have successfully retaliated417 on the practicalists. But we know not any thinker who, before M. Comte, had penetrated418 to the philosophy of the matter, and placed the necessity of historical studies as the foundation of sociological speculation on the true footing. From this time any political thinker who fancies himself able to dispense419 with a connected view of the great facts of history, as a chain of causes and effects, must be regarded as below the level of the age; while the vulgar mode of using history, by looking in it for parallel cases, as if any cases were parallel, or as if a single instance, or even many instances not compared and analysed, could reveal a law, will be more than ever, and irrevocably, discredited420.
The inversion421 of the ordinary relation between Deduction and Induction is not the only point in which, according to M. Comte, the Method proper to Sociology differs from that of the sciences of inorganic nature. The common order of science proceeds from the details to the whole. The method of Sociology should proceed from the whole to the details. There is no universal principle for the order of study, but that of proceeding from the known to the unknown; finding our way to the facts at whatever point is most open to our observation. In the phaenomena of the social state, the collective phaenomenon is more accessible to us than the parts of which it is composed. This is already, in a great degree, true of the mere animal body. It is essential to the idea of an organism, and it is even more true of the social organism than of the individual. The state of every part of the social whole at any time, is intimately connected with the contemporaneous state of all the others. Religious belief, philosophy, science, the fine arts, the industrial arts, commerce, navigation, government, all are in close mutual dependence on one another, insomuch that when any considerable change takes place in one, we may know that a parallel change in all the others has preceded or will follow it. The progress of society from one general state to another is not an aggregate of partial changes, but the product of a single impulse, acting through all the partial agencies, and can therefore be most easily traced by studying them together. Could it even be detected in them separately, its true nature could not be understood except by examining them in the ensemble422. In constructing, therefore, a theory of society, all the different aspects of the social organization must be taken into consideration at once.
Our space is not consistent with inquiring into all the limitations of this doctrine. It requires many of which M. Comte's theory takes no account. There is one, in particular, dependent on a scientific artifice423 familiar to students of science, especially of the applications of mathematics to the study of nature. When an effect depends on several variable conditions, some of which change less, or more slowly, than others, we are often able to determine, either by reasoning or by experiment, what would be the law of variation of the effect if its changes depended only on some of the conditions, the remainder being supposed constant. The law so found will be sufficiently near the truth for all times and places in which the latter set of conditions do not vary greatly, and will be a basis to set out from when it becomes necessary to allow for the variations of those conditions also. Most of the conclusions of social science applicable to practical use are of this description. M. Comte's system makes no room for them. We have seen how he deals with the part of them which are the most scientific in character, the generalizations of political economy.
There is one more point in the general philosophy of sociology requiring notice. Social phaenomena, like all others, present two aspects, the statical, and the dynamical; the phaenomena of equilibrium, and those of motion. The statical aspect is that of the laws of social existence, considered abstractedly from progress, and confined to what is common to the progressive and the stationary424 state. The dynamical aspect is that of social progress. The statics of society is the study of the conditions of existence and permanence of the social state. The dynamics425 studies the laws of its evolution. The first is the theory of the consensus, or interdependence of social phaenomena. The second is the theory of their filiation.
The first division M. Comte, in his great work, treats in a much more summary manner than the second; and it forms, to our thinking, the weakest part of the treatise. He can hardly have seemed even to himself to have originated, in the statics of society, anything new,[15] unless his revival of the Catholic idea of a Spiritual Power may be so considered. The remainder, with the exception of detached thoughts, in which even his feeblest productions are always rich, is trite426, while in our judgment far from being always true.
He begins by a statement of the general properties of human nature which make social existence possible. Man has a spontaneous propensity to the society of his fellow-beings, and seeks it instinctively427, for its own sake, and not out of regard to the advantages it procures428 for him, which, in many conditions of humanity, must appear to him very problematical. Man has also a certain, though moderate, amount of natural benevolence429. On the other hand, these social propensities are by nature weaker than his selfish ones; and the social state, being mainly kept in existence through the former, involves an habitual206 antagonism430 between the two. Further, our wants of all kinds, from the purely organic upwards431, can only be satisfied by means of labour, nor does bodily labour suffice, without the guidance of intelligence. But labour, especially when prolonged and monotonous432, is naturally hateful, and mental labour the most irksome of all; and hence a second antagonism, which must exist in all societies whatever. The character of the society is principally determined by the degree in which the better incentive, in each of these cases, makes head against the worse. In both the points, human nature is capable of great amelioration. The social instincts may approximate much nearer to the strength of the personal ones, though never entirely coming up to it; the aversion to labour in general, and to intellectual labour in particular, may be much weakened, and the predominance of the inclinations over the reason greatly diminished, though never completely destroyed. The spirit of improvement results from the increasing strength of the social instincts, combined with the growth of an intellectual activity, which guiding the personal propensities, inspires each individual with a deliberate desire to improve his condition. The personal instincts left to their own guidance, and the indolence and apathy433 natural to mankind, are the sources which mainly feed the spirit of Conservation. The struggle between the two spirits is an universal incident of the social state.
The next of the universal elements in human society is family life; which M. Comte regards as originally the sole, and always the principal, source of the social feelings, and the only school open to mankind in general, in which unselfishness can be learnt, and the feelings and conduct demanded by social relations be made habitual. M. Comte takes this opportunity of declaring his opinions on the proper constitution of the family, and in particular of the marriage institution. They are of the most orthodox and conservative sort. M. Comte adheres not only to the popular Christian, but to the Catholic view of marriage in its utmost strictness, and rebukes434 Protestant nations for having tampered435 with the indissolubility of the engagement, by permitting divorce. He admits that the marriage institution has been, in various respects, beneficially modified with the advance of society, and that we may not yet have reached the last of these modifications436; but strenuously maintains that such changes cannot possibly affect what he regards as the essential principles of the institution—the irrevocability of the engagement, and the complete subordination of the wife to the husband, and of women generally to men; which are precisely the great vulnerable points of the existing constitution of society on this important subject. It is unpleasant to have to say it of a philosopher, but the incidents of his life which have been made public by his biographers afford an explanation of one of these two opinions: he had quarrelled with his wife.[16] At a later period, under the influence of circumstances equally personal, his opinions and feelings respecting women were very much modified, without becoming more rational: in his final scheme of society, instead of being treated as grown children, they were exalted437 into goddesses: honours, privileges, and immunities438, were lavished439 on them, only not simple justice. On the other question, the irrevocability of marriage, M. Comte must receive credit for impartiality440, since the opposite doctrine would have better suited his personal convenience: but we can give him no other credit, for his argument is not only futile442 but refutes itself. He says that with liberty of divorce, life would be spent in a constant succession of experiments and failures; and in the same breath congratulates himself on the fact, that modern manners and sentiments have in the main prevented the baneful effects which the toleration of divorce in Protestant countries might have been expected to produce. He did not perceive that if modern habits and feelings have successfully resisted what he deems the tendency of a less rigorous marriage law, it must be because modern habits and feelings are inconsistent with the perpetual series of new trials which he dreaded443. If there are tendencies in human nature which seek change and variety, there are others which demand fixity, in matters which touch the daily sources of happiness; and one who had studied history as much as M. Comte, ought to have known that ever since the nomad mode of life was exchanged for the agricultural, the latter tendencies have been always gaining ground on the former. All experience testifies that regularity in domestic relations is almost in direct proportion to industrial civilization. Idle life, and military life with its long intervals444 of idleness, are the conditions to which, either sexual profligacy445, or prolonged vagaries446 of imagination on that subject, are congenial. Busy men have no time for them, and have too much other occupation for their thoughts: they require that home should be a place of rest, not of incessantly renewed excitement and disturbance447. In the condition, therefore, into which modern society has passed, there is no probability that marriages would often be contracted without a sincere desire on both sides that they should be permanent. That this has been the case hitherto in countries where divorce was permitted, we have on M. Comte's own showing: and everything leads us to believe that the power, if granted elsewhere, would in general be used only for its legitimate purpose—for enabling those who, by a blameless or excusable mistake, have lost their first throw for domestic happiness, to free themselves (with due regard for all interests concerned) from the burthensome yoke448, and try, under more favourable449 auspices450, another chance. Any further discussion of these great social questions would evidently be incompatible451 with the nature and limits of the present paper.
Lastly, a phaenomenon universal in all societies, and constantly assuming a wider extension as they advance in their progress, is the co-operation of mankind one with another, by the division of employments and interchange of commodities and services; a communion which extends to nations as well as individuals. The economic importance of this spontaneous organization of mankind as joint workers with and for one another, has often been illustrated452. Its moral effects, in connecting them by their interests, and as a more remote consequence, by their sympathies, are equally salutary. But there are some things to be said on the other side. The increasing specialisation of all employments; the division of mankind into innumerable small fractions, each engrossed453 by an extremely minute fragment of the business of society, is not without inconveniences, as well moral as intellectual, which, if they could not be remedied, would be a serious abatement454 from the benefits of advanced civilization. The interests of the whole—the bearings of things on the ends of the social union—are less and less present to the minds of men who have so contracted a sphere of activity. The insignificant455 detail which forms their whole occupation—the infinitely456 minute wheel they help to turn in the machinery of society—does not arouse or gratify any feeling of public spirit, or unity with their fellow-men. Their work is a mere tribute to physical necessity, not the glad performance of a social office. This lowering effect of the extreme division of labour tells most of all on those who are set up as the lights and teachers of the rest. A man's mind is as fatally narrowed, and his feelings towards the great ends of humanity as miserably457 stunted458, by giving all his thoughts to the classification of a few insects or the resolution of a few equations, as to sharpening the points or putting on the heads of pins. The "dispersive459 speciality" of the present race of scientific men, who, unlike their predecessors, have a positive aversion to enlarged views, and seldom either know or care for any of the interests of mankind beyond the narrow limits of their pursuit, is dwelt on by M. Comte as one of the great and growing evils of the time, and the one which most retards460 moral and intellectual regeneration. To contend against it is one of the main purposes towards which he thinks the forces of society should be directed. The obvious remedy is a large and liberal general education, preparatory to all special pursuits: and this is M. Comte's opinion: but the education of youth is not in his estimation enough: he requires an agency set apart for obtruding461 upon all classes of persons through the whole of life, the paramount462 claims of the general interest, and the comprehensive ideas that demonstrate the mode in which human actions promote or impair463 it. In other words, he demands a moral and intellectual authority, charged with the duty of guiding men's opinions and enlightening and warning their consciences; a Spiritual Power, whose judgments464 on all matters of high moment should deserve, and receive, the same universal respect and deference465 which is paid to the united judgment of astronomers466 in matters astronomical. The very idea of such an authority implies that an unanimity has been attained, at least in essentials, among moral and political thinkers, corresponding or approaching to that which already exists in the other sciences. There cannot be this unanimity, until the true methods of positive science have been applied to all subjects, as completely as they have been applied to the study of physical science: to this, however, there is no real obstacle; and when once it is accomplished, the same degree of accordance will naturally follow. The undisputed authority which astronomers possess in astronomy, will be possessed on the great social questions by Positive Philosophers; to whom will belong the spiritual government of society, subject to two conditions: that they be entirely independent, within their own sphere, of the temporal government, and that they be peremptorily excluded from all share in it, receiving instead the entire conduct of education.
This is the leading feature in M. Comte's conception of a regenerated467 society; and however much this ideal differs from that which is implied more or less confusedly in the negative philosophy of the last three centuries, we hold the amount of truth in the two to be about the same. M. Comte has got hold of half the truth, and the so-called liberal or revolutionary school possesses the other half; each sees what the other does not see, and seeing it exclusively, draws consequences from it which to the other appear mischievously468 absurd. It is, without doubt, the necessary condition of mankind to receive most of their opinions on the authority of those who have specially studied the matters to which they relate. The wisest can act on no other rule, on subjects with which they are not themselves thoroughly conversant469; and the mass of mankind have always done the like on all the great subjects of thought and conduct, acting with implicit328 confidence on opinions of which they did not know, and were often incapable of understanding, the grounds, but on which as long as their natural guides were unanimous they fully relied, growing uncertain and sceptical only when these became divided, and teachers who as far as they could judge were equally competent, professed contradictory470 opinions. Any doctrines which come recommended by the nearly universal verdict of instructed minds will no doubt continue to be, as they have hitherto been, accepted without misgiving471 by the rest. The difference is, that with the wide diffusion472 of scientific education among the whole people, demanded by M. Comte, their faith, however implicit, would not be that of ignorance: it would not be the blind submission473 of dunces to men of knowledge, but the intelligent deference of those who know much, to those who know still more. It is those who have some knowledge of astronomy, not those who have none at all, who best appreciate how prodigiously474 more Lagrange or Laplace knew than themselves. This is what can be said in favour of M. Comte. On the contrary side it is to be said, that in order that this salutary ascendancy over opinion should be exercised by the most eminent thinkers, it is not necessary that they should be associated and organized. The ascendancy will come of itself when the unanimity is attained, without which it is neither desirable nor possible. It is because astronomers agree in their teaching that astronomy is trusted, and not because there is an Academy of Sciences or a Royal Society issuing decrees or passing resolutions. A constituted moral authority can only be required when the object is not merely to promulgate475 and diffuse476 principles of conduct, but to direct the detail of their application; to declare and inculcate, not duties, but each person's duty, as was attempted by the spiritual authority of the middle ages. From this extreme application of his principle M. Comte does not shrink. A function of this sort, no doubt, may often be very usefully discharged by individual members of the speculative class; but if entrusted477 to any organized body, would involve nothing less than a spiritual despotism. This however is what M. Comte really contemplated478, though it would practically nullify that peremptory479 separation of the spiritual from the temporal power, which he justly deemed essential to a wholesome state of society. Those whom an irresistible480 public opinion invested with the right to dictate or control the acts of rulers, though without the means of backing their advice by force, would have all the real power of the temporal authorities, without their labours or their responsibilities. M. Comte would probably have answered that the temporal rulers, having the whole legal power in their hands, would certainly not pay to the spiritual authority more than a very limited obedience481: which amounts to saying that the ideal form of society which he sets up, is only fit to be an ideal because it cannot possibly be realized.
That education should be practically directed by the philosophic class, when there is a philosophic class who have made good their claim to the place in opinion hitherto filled by the clergy482, would be natural and indispensable. But that all education should be in the hands of a centralized authority, whether composed of clergy or of philosophers, and be consequently all framed on the same model, and directed to the perpetuation483 of the same type, is a state of things which instead of becoming more acceptable, will assuredly be more repugnant to mankind, with every step of their progress in the unfettered exercise of their highest faculties. We shall see, in the Second Part, the evils with which the conception of the new Spiritual Power is pregnant, coming out into full bloom in the more complete development which M. Comte gave to the idea in his later years.
After this unsatisfactory attempt to trace the outline of Social Statics, M. Comte passes to a topic on which he is much more at home—the subject of his most eminent speculations; Social Dynamics, or the laws of the evolution of human society.
Two questions meet us at the outset: Is there a natural evolution in human affairs? and is that evolution an improvement? M. Comte resolves them both in the affirmative by the same answer. The natural progress of society consists in the growth of our human attributes, comparatively to our animal and our purely organic ones: the progress of our humanity towards an ascendancy over our animality, ever more nearly approached though incapable of being completely realized. This is the character and tendency of human development, or of what is called civilization; and the obligation of seconding this movement—of working in the direction of it—is the nearest approach which M. Comte makes in this treatise to a general principle or standard of morality.
But as our more eminent, and peculiarly human, faculties are of various orders, moral, intellectual, and aesthetic484, the question presents itself, is there any one of these whose development is the predominant agency in the evolution of our species? According to M. Comte, the main agent in the progress of mankind is their intellectual development.
Not because the intellectual is the most powerful part of our nature, for, limited to its inherent strength, it is one of the weakest: but because it is the guiding part, and acts not with its own strength alone, but with the united force of all parts of our nature which it can draw after it. In a social state the feelings and propensities cannot act with their full power, in a determinate direction, unless the speculative intellect places itself at their head. The passions are, in the individual man, a more energetic power than a mere intellectual conviction; but the passions tend to divide, not to unite, mankind: it is only by a common belief that passions are brought to work together, and become a collective force instead of forces neutralizing485 one another. Our intelligence is first awakened486 by the stimulus487 of our animal wants and of our stronger and coarser desires; and these for a long time almost exclusively determine the direction in which our intelligence shall work: but once roused to activity, it assumes more and more the management of the operations of which stronger impulses are the prompters, and constrains488 them to follow its lead, not by its own strength, but because in the play of antagonistic forces, the path it points out is (in scientific phraseology) the direction of least resistance. Personal interests and feelings, in the social state, can only obtain the maximum of satisfaction by means of co-operation, and the necessary condition of co-operation is a common belief. All human society, consequently, is grounded on a system of fundamental opinions, which only the speculative faculty can provide, and which when provided, directs our other impulses in their mode of seeking their gratification. And hence the history of opinions, and of the speculative faculty, has always been the leading element in the history of mankind.
This doctrine has been combated by Mr Herbert Spencer, in the pamphlet already referred to; and we will quote, in his own words, the theory he propounds489 in opposition to it:—
"Ideas do not govern and overthrow490 the world; the world is governed or overthrown491 by feelings, to which ideas serve only as guides. The social mechanism does not rest finally upon opinions, but almost wholly upon character. Not intellectual anarchy492, but moral antagonism, is the cause of political crises. All social phaenomena are produced by the totality of human emotions and beliefs, of which the emotions are mainly predetermined, while the beliefs are mainly post-determined. Men's desires are chiefly inherited; but their beliefs are chiefly acquired, and depend on surrounding conditions; and the most important surrounding conditions depend on the social state which the prevalent desires have produced. The social state at any time existing, is the resultant of all the ambitions, self-interests, fears, reverences494, indignations, sympathies, &c., of ancestral citizens and existing citizens. The ideas current in this social state must, on the average, lie congruous with the feelings of citizens, and therefore, on the average, with the social state these feelings have produced. Ideas wholly foreign to this social state cannot be evolved, and if introduced from without, cannot get accepted—or, if accepted, die out when the temporary phase of feeling which caused their acceptance ends. Hence, though advanced ideas, when once established, act upon society and aid its further advance, yet the establishment of such ideas depends on the fitness of society for receiving them. Practically, the popular character and the social state determine what ideas shall be current; instead of the current ideas determining the social state and the character. The modification of men's moral natures, caused by the continuous discipline of social life, which adapts them more and more to social relations, is therefore the chief proximate cause of social progress."[17]
A great part of these statements would have been acknowledged as true by M. Comte, and belong as much to his theory as to Mr Spencer's. The re-action of all other mental and social elements upon the intellectual not only is fully recognized by him, but his philosophy of history makes great use of it, pointing out that the principal intellectual changes could not have taken place unless changes in other elements of society had preceded; but also showing that these were themselves consequences of prior intellectual changes. It will not be found, on a fair examination of what M. Comte has written, that he has overlooked any of the truth that there is in Mr Spencer's theory. He would not indeed have said (what Mr Spencer apparently495 wishes us to say) that the effects which can be historically traced, for example to religion, were not produced by the belief in God, but by reverence493 and fear of him. He would have said that the reverence and fear presuppose the belief: that a God must be believed in before he can be feared or reverenced496. The whole influence of the belief in a God upon society and civilization, depends on the powerful human sentiments which are ready to attach themselves to the belief; and yet the sentiments are only a social force at all, through the definite direction given to them by that or some other intellectual conviction; nor did the sentiments spontaneously throw up the belief in a God, since in themselves they were equally capable of gathering round some other object. Though it is true that men's passions and interests often dictate their opinions, or rather decide their choice among the two or three forms of opinion, which the existing condition of human intelligence renders possible, this disturbing cause is confined to morals, politics, and religion; and it is the intellectual movement in other regions than these, which is at the root of all the great changes in human affairs. It was not human emotions and passions which discovered the motion of the earth, or detected the evidence of its antiquity; which exploded Scholasticism, and inaugurated the exploration of nature; which invented printing, paper, and the mariner's compass. Yet the Reformation, the English and French revolutions, and still greater moral and social changes yet to come, are direct consequences of these and similar discoveries. Even alchemy and astrology were not believed because people thirsted for gold and were anxious to pry497 into the future, for these desires are as strong now as they were then: but because alchemy and astrology were conceptions natural to a particular stage in the growth of human knowledge, and consequently determined during that stage the particular means whereby the passions which always exist, sought their gratification. To say that men's intellectual beliefs do not determine their conduct, is like saying that the ship is moved by the steam and not by the steersman. The steam indeed is the motive79 power; the steersman, left to himself, could not advance the vessel498 a single inch; yet it is the steersman's will and the steersman's knowledge which decide in what direction it shall move and whither it shall go.
Examining next what is the natural order of intellectual progress among mankind, M. Comte observes, that as their general mode of conceiving the universe must give its character to all their conceptions of detail, the determining fact in their intellectual history must be the natural succession of theories of the universe; which, it has been seen, consists of three stages, the theological, the metaphysical, and the positive. The passage of mankind through these stages, including the successive modifications of the theological conception by the rising influence of the other two, is, to M. Comte's mind, the most decisive fact in the evolution of humanity. Simultaneously499, however, there has been going on throughout history a parallel movement in the purely temporal department of things, consisting of the gradual decline of the military mode of life (originally the chief occupation of all freemen) and its replacement500 by the industrial. M. Comte maintains that there is a necessary connexion and interdependence between this historical sequence and the other: and he easily shows that the progress of industry and that of positive science are correlative; man's power to modify the facts of nature evidently depending on the knowledge he has acquired of their laws. We do not think him equally successful in showing a natural connexion between the theological mode of thought and the military system of society: but since they both belong to the same age of the world—since each is, in itself, natural and inevitable, and they are together modified and together undermined by the same cause, the progress of science and industry, M. Comte is justified in considering them as linked together, and the movement by which mankind emerge from them as a single evolution.
These propositions having been laid down as the first principles of social dynamics, M. Comte proceeds to verify and apply them by a connected view of universal history. This survey nearly fills two large volumes, above a third of the work, in all of which there is scarcely a sentence that does not add an idea. We regard it as by far his greatest achievement, except his review of the sciences, and in some respects more striking even than that. We wish it were practicable in the compass of an essay like the present, to give even a faint conception of the extraordinary merits of this historical analysis. It must be read to be appreciated. Whoever disbelieves that the philosophy of history can be made a science, should suspend his judgment until he has read these volumes of M. Comte. We do not affirm that they would certainly change his opinion; but we would strongly advise him to give them a chance.
We shall not attempt the vain task of abridgment501, a few words are all we can give to the subject. M. Comte confines himself to the main stream of human progress, looking only at the races and nations that led the van, and regarding as the successors of a people not their actual descendants, but those who took up the thread of progress after them. His object is to characterize truly, though generally, the successive states of society through which the advanced guard of our species has passed, and the filiation of these states on one another—how each grew out of the preceding and was the parent of the following state. A more detailed502 explanation, taking into account minute differences and more special and local phaenomena, M. Comte does not aim at, though he does not avoid it when it falls in his path. Here, as in all his other speculations, we meet occasional misjudgments, and his historical correctness in minor matters is now and then at fault; but we may well wonder that it is not oftener so, considering the vastness of the field, and a passage in one of his prefaces in which he says of himself that he rapidly amassed503 the materials for his great enterprise (vi. 34). This expression in his mouth does not imply what it would in that of the majority of men, regard being had to his rare capacity of prolonged and concentrated mental labour: and it is wonderful that he so seldom gives cause to wish that his collection of materials had been less "rapid." But (as he himself remarks) in an inquiry of this sort the vulgarest facts are the most important. A movement common to all mankind—to all of them at least who do move—must depend on causes affecting them all; and these, from the scale on which they operate, cannot require abstruse504 research to bring them to light: they are not only seen, but best seen, in the most obvious, most universal, and most undisputed phaenomena. Accordingly M. Comte lays no claim to new views respecting the mere facts of history; he takes them as he finds them, builds almost exclusively on those concerning which there is no dispute, and only tries what positive results can be obtained by combining them. Among the vast mass of historical observations which he has grouped and co-ordinated, if we have found any errors they are in things which do not affect his main conclusions. The chain of causation by which he connects the spiritual and temporal life of each era with one another and with the entire series, will be found, we think, in all essentials, irrefragable. When local or temporary disturbing causes have to be taken into the account as modifying the general movement, criticism has more to say. But this will only become important when the attempt is made to write the history or delineate the character of some given society on M. Comte's principles.
Such doubtful statements, or misappreciations of states of society, as we have remarked, are confined to cases which stand more or less apart from the principal line of development of the progressive societies. For instance, he makes greatly too much of what, with many other Continental thinkers, he calls the Theocratic505 state. He regards this as a natural, and at one time almost an universal, stage of social progress, though admitting that it either never existed or speedily ceased in the two ancient nations to which mankind are chiefly indebted for being permanently506 progressive. We hold it doubtful if there ever existed what M. Comte means by a theocracy507. There was indeed no lack of societies in which, the civil and penal380 law being supposed to have been divinely revealed, the priests were its authorized508 interpreters. But this is the case even in Mussulman countries, the extreme opposite of theocracy. By a theocracy we understand to be meant, and we understand M. Comte to mean, a society founded on caste, and in which the speculative, necessarily identical with the priestly caste, has the temporal government in its hands or under its control. We believe that no such state of things ever existed in the societies commonly cited as theocratic. There is no reason to think that in any of them, the king, or chief of the government, was ever, unless by occasional usurpation509, a member of the priestly caste.[18] It was not so in Israel, even in the time of the Judges; Jephtha, for example, was a Gileadite, of the tribe of Manasseh, and a military captain, as all governors in such an age and country needed to be. Priestly rulers only present themselves in two anomalous510 cases, of which next to nothing is known: the Mikados of Japan and the Grand Lamas of Thibet: in neither of which instances was the general constitution of society one of caste, and in the latter of them the priestly sovereignty is as nominal123 as it has become in the former. India is the typical specimen511 of the institution of caste—the only case in which we are certain that it ever really existed, for its existence anywhere else is a matter of more or less probable inference in the remote past. But in India, where the importance of the sacerdotal order was greater than in any other recorded state of society, the king not only was not a priest, but, consistently with the religious law, could not be one: he belonged to a different caste. The Brahmins were invested with an exalted character of sanctity, and an enormous amount of civil privileges; the king was enjoined512 to have a council of Brahmin advisers513; but practically he took their advice or disregarded it exactly as he pleased. As is observed by the historian who first threw the light of reason on Hindoo society,[19] the king, though in dignity, to judge by the written code, he seemed vastly inferior to the Brahmins, had always the full power of a despotic monarch514: the reason being that he had the command of the army, and the control of the public revenue. There is no case known to authentic history in which either of these belonged to the sacerdotal caste. Even in the cases most favourable to them, the priesthood had no voice in temporal affairs, except the "consultative" voice which M. Comte's theory allows to every spiritual power. His collection of materials must have been unusually "rapid" in this instance, for he regards almost all the societies of antiquity, except the Greek and Roman, as theocratic, even Gaul under the Druids, and Persia under Darius; admitting, however, that in these two countries, when they emerge into the light of history, the theocracy had already been much broken down by military usurpation. By what evidence he could have proved that it ever existed, we confess ourselves unable to divine.
The only other imperfection worth noticing here, which we find in M. Comte's view of history, is that he has a very insufficient394 understanding of the peculiar phaenomena of English development; though he recognizes, and on the whole correctly estimates, its exceptional character in relation to the general European movement. His failure consists chiefly in want of appreciation of Protestantism; which, like almost all thinkers, even unbelievers, who have lived and thought exclusively in a Catholic atmosphere, he sees and knows only on its negative side, regarding the Reformation as a mere destructive movement, stopped short in too early a stage. He does not seem to be aware that Protestantism has any positive influences, other than the general ones of Christianity; and misses one of the most important facts connected with it, its remarkable efficacy, as contrasted with Catholicism, in cultivating the intelligence and conscience of the individual believer. Protestantism, when not merely professed but actually taken into the mind, makes a demand on the intelligence; the mind is expected to be active, not passive, in the reception of it. The feeling of a direct responsibility of the individual immediately to God, is almost wholly a creation of Protestantism. Even when Protestants were nearly as persecuting515 as Catholics (quite as much so they never were); even when they held as firmly as Catholics that salvation516 depended on having the true belief, they still maintained that the belief was not to be accepted from a priest, but to be sought and found by the believer, at his eternal peril517 if he failed; and that no one could answer to God for him, but that he had to answer for himself. The avoidance of fatal error thus became in a great measure a question of culture; and there was the strongest inducement to every believer, however humble, to seek culture and to profit by it. In those Protestant countries, accordingly, whose Churches were not, as the Church of England always was, principally political institutions—in Scotland, for instance, and the New England States—an amount of education was carried down to the poorest of the people, of which there is no other example; every peasant expounded518 the Bible to his family (many to their neighbours), and had a mind practised in meditation and discussion on all the points of his religious creed. The food may not have been the most nourishing, but we cannot be blind to the sharpening and strengthening exercise which such great topics gave to the understanding—the discipline in abstraction and reasoning which such mental occupation brought down to the humblest layman519, and one of the consequences of which was the privilege long enjoyed by Scotland of supplying the greater part of Europe with professors for its universities, and educated and skilled workmen for its practical arts.
This, however, notwithstanding its importance, is, in a comprehensive view of universal history, only a matter of detail. We find no fundamental errors in M. Comte's general conception of history. He is singularly exempt from most of the twists and exaggerations which we are used to find in almost all thinkers who meddle520 with speculations of this character. Scarcely any of them is so free (for example) from the opposite errors of ascribing too much or too little influence to accident, and to the qualities of individuals. The vulgar mistake of supposing that the course of history has no tendencies of its own, and that great events usually proceed from small causes, or that kings, or conquerors521, or the founders of philosophies and religions, can do with society what they please, no one has more completely avoided or more tellingly exposed. But he is equally free from the error of those who ascribe all to general causes, and imagine that neither casual circumstances, nor governments by their acts, nor individuals of genius by their thoughts, materially accelerate or retard25 human progress. This is the mistake which pervades522 the instructive writings of the thinker who in England and in our own times bore the nearest, though a very remote, resemblance to M. Comte—the lamented523 Mr Buckle524; who, had he not been unhappily cut off in an early stage of his labours, and before the complete maturity525 of his powers, would probably have thrown off an error, the more to be regretted as it gives a colour to the prejudice which regards the doctrine of the invariability of natural laws as identical with fatalism. Mr Buckle also fell into another mistake which M. Comte avoided, that of regarding the intellectual as the only progressive element in man, and the moral as too much the same at all times to affect even the annual average of crime. M. Comte shows, on the contrary, a most acute sense of the causes which elevate or lower the general level of moral excellence526; and deems intellectual progress in no other way so beneficial as by creating a standard to guide the moral sentiments of mankind, and a mode of bringing those sentiments effectively to bear on conduct.
M. Comte is equally free from the error of considering any practical rule or doctrine that can be laid down in politics as universal and absolute. All political truth he deems strictly relative, implying as its correlative a given state or situation of society. This conviction is now common to him with all thinkers who are on a level with the age, and comes so naturally to any intelligent reader of history, that the only wonder is how men could have been prevented from reaching it sooner. It marks one of the principal differences between the political philosophy of the present time and that of the past; but M. Comte adopted it when the opposite mode of thinking was still general, and there are few thinkers to whom the principle owes more in the way of comment and illustration.
Again, while he sets forth the historical succession of systems of belief and forms of political society, and places in the strongest light those imperfections in each which make it impossible that any of them should be final, this does not make him for a moment unjust to the men or the opinions of the past. He accords with generous recognition the gratitude527 due to all who, with whatever imperfections of doctrine or even of conduct, contributed materially to the work of human improvement. In all past modes of thought and forms of society he acknowledged a useful, in many a necessary, office, in carrying mankind through one stage of improvement into a higher. The theological spirit in its successive forms, the metaphysical in its principal varieties, are honoured by him for the services they rendered in bringing mankind out of pristine528 savagery529 into a state in which more advanced modes of belief became possible. His list of heroes and benefactors530 of mankind includes, not only every important name in the scientific movement, from Thales of Miletus to Fourier the mathematician274 and Blainville the biologist, and in the aesthetic from Homer to Manzoni, but the most illustrious names in the annals of the various religions and philosophies, and the really great politicians in all states of society.[20] Above all, he has the most profound admiration for the services rendered by Christianity, and by the Church of the middle ages. His estimate of the Catholic period is such as the majority of Englishmen (from whom we take the liberty to differ) would deem exaggerated, if not absurd. The great men of Christianity, from St Paul to St Francis of Assisi, receive his warmest homage531: nor does he forget the greatness even of those who lived and thought in the centuries in which the Catholic Church, having stopt short while the world had gone on, had become a hindrance532 to progress instead of a promoter of it; such men as Fénélon and St Vincent de Paul, Bossuet and Joseph de Maistre. A more comprehensive, and, in the primitive sense of the term, more catholic, sympathy and reverence towards real worth, and every kind of service to humanity, we have not met with in any thinker. Men who would have torn each other in pieces, who even tried to do so, if each usefully served in his own way the interests of mankind, are all hallowed to him.
Neither is his a cramped533 and contracted notion of human excellence, which cares only for certain forms of development. He not only personally appreciates, but rates high in moral value, the creations of poets and artists in all departments, deeming them, by their mixed appeal to the sentiments and the understanding, admirably fitted to educate the feelings of abstract thinkers, and enlarge the intellectual horizon of people of the world.[21] He regards the law of progress as applicable, in spite of appearances, to poetry and art as much as to science and politics. The common impression to the contrary he ascribes solely to the fact, that the perfection of aesthetic creation requires as its condition a consentaneousness in the feelings of mankind, which depends for its existence on a fixed and settled state of opinions: while the last five centuries have been a period not of settling, but of unsettling and decomposing534, the most general beliefs and sentiments of mankind. The numerous monuments of poetic535 and artistic536 genius which the modern mind has produced even under this great disadvantage, are (he maintains) sufficient proof what great productions it will be capable of, when one harmonious537 vein538 of sentiment shall once more thrill through the whole of society, as in the days of Homer, of Aeschylus, of Phidias, and even of Dante.
After so profound and comprehensive a view of the progress of human society in the past, of which the future can only be a prolongation, it is natural to ask, to what use does he put this survey as a basis of practical recommendations? Such recommendations he certainly makes, though, in the present Treatise, they are of a much less definite character than in his later writings. But we miss a necessary link; there is a break in the otherwise close concatenation of his speculations. We fail to see any scientific connexion between his theoretical explanation of the past progress of society, and his proposals for future improvement. The proposals are not, as we might expect, recommended as that towards which human society has been tending and working through the whole of history. It is thus that thinkers have usually proceeded, who formed theories for the future, grounded on historical analysis of the past. Tocqueville, for example, and others, finding, as they thought, through all history, a steady progress in the direction of social and political equality, argued that to smooth this transition, and make the best of what is certainly coming, is the proper employment of political foresight. We do not find M. Comte supporting his recommendations by a similar line of argument. They rest as completely, each on its separate reasons of supposed utility, as with philosophers who, like Bentham, theorize on politics without any historical basis at all. The only bridge of connexion which leads from his historical speculations to his practical conclusions, is the inference, that since the old powers of society, both in the region of thought and of action, are declining and destined to disappear, leaving only the two rising powers, positive thinkers on the one hand, leaders of industry on the other, the future necessarily belongs to these: spiritual power to the former, temporal to the latter. As a specimen of historical forecast this is very deficient; for are there not the masses as well as the leaders of industry? and is not theirs also a growing power? Be this as it may, M. Comte's conceptions of the mode in which these growing powers should be organized and used, are grounded on anything rather than on history. And we cannot but remark a singular anomaly in a thinker of M. Comte's calibre. After the ample evidence he has brought forward of the slow growth of the sciences, all of which except the mathematico-astronomical couple are still, as he justly thinks, in a very early stage, it yet appears as if, to his mind, the mere institution of a positive science of sociology were tantamount to its completion; as if all the diversities of opinion on the subject, which set mankind at variance, were solely owing to its having been studied in the theological or the metaphysical manner, and as if when the positive method which has raised up real sciences on other subjects of knowledge, is similarly employed on this, divergence would at once cease, and the entire body of positive social inquirers would exhibit as much agreement in their doctrines as those who cultivate any of the sciences of inorganic life. Happy would be the prospects539 of mankind if this were so. A time such as M. Comte reckoned upon may come; unless something stops the progress of human improvement, it is sure to come: but after an unknown duration of hard thought and violent controversy. The period of decomposition540, which has lasted, on his own computation, from the beginning of the fourteenth century to the present, is not yet terminated: the shell of the old edifice541 will remain standing until there is another ready to replace it; and the new synthesis is barely begun, nor is even the preparatory analysis completely finished. On other occasions M. Comte is very well aware that the Method of a science is not the science itself, and that when the difficulty of discovering the right processes has been overcome, there remains a still greater difficulty, that of applying them. This, which is true of all sciences, is truest of all in Sociology. The facts being more complicated, and depending on a greater concurrence542 of forces, than in any other science, the difficulty of treating them deductively is proportionally increased, while the wide difference between any one case and every other in some of the circumstances which affect the result, makes the pretence543 of direct induction usually no better than empiricism. It is therefore, out of all proportion, more uncertain than in any other science, whether two inquirers equally competent and equally disinterested will take the same view of the evidence, or arrive at the same conclusion. When to this intrinsic difficulty is added the infinitely greater extent to which personal or class interests and predilections544 interfere with impartial441 judgment, the hope of such accordance of opinion among sociological inquirers as would obtain, in mere deference to their authority, the universal assent which M. Comte's scheme of society requires, must be adjourned545 to an indefinite distance.
M. Comte's own theory is an apt illustration of these difficulties, since, though prepared for these speculations as no one had ever been prepared before, his views of social regeneration even in the rudimentary form in which they appear above-ground in this treatise (not to speak of the singular system into which he afterwards enlarged them) are such as perhaps no other person of equal knowledge and capacity would agree in. Were those views as true as they are questionable546, they could not take effect until the unanimity among positive thinkers, to which he looked forward, shall have been attained; since the mainspring of his system is a Spiritual Power composed of positive philosophers, which only the previous attainment547 of the unanimity in question could call into existence. A few words will sufficiently express the outline of his scheme. A corporation of philosophers, receiving a modest support from the state, surrounded by reverence, but peremptorily excluded not only from all political power or employment, but from all riches, and all occupations except their own, are to have the entire direction of education: together with, not only the right and duty of advising and reproving all persons respecting both their public and their private life, but also a control (whether authoritative548 or only moral is not defined) over the speculative class itself, to prevent them from wasting time and ingenuity549 on inquiries and speculations of no value to mankind (among which he includes many now in high estimation), and compel them to employ all their powers on the investigations which may be judged, at the time, to be the most urgently important to the general welfare. The temporal government which is to coexist with this spiritual authority, consists of an aristocracy of capitalists, whose dignity and authority are to be in the ratio of the degree of generality of their conceptions and operations—bankers at the summit, merchants next, then manufacturers, and agriculturists at the bottom of the scale. No representative system, or other popular organization, by way of counterpoise to this governing power, is ever contemplated. The checks relied upon for preventing its abuse, are the counsels and remonstrances550 of the Spiritual Power, and unlimited liberty of discussion and comment by all classes of inferiors. Of the mode in which either set of authorities should fulfil the office assigned to it, little is said in this treatise: but the general idea is, while regulating as little as possible by law, to make the pressure of opinion, directed by the Spiritual Power, so heavy on every individual, from the humblest to the most powerful, as to render legal obligation, in as many cases as possible, needless. Liberty and spontaneity on the part of individuals form no part of the scheme. M. Comte looks on them with as great jealousy551 as any scholastic pedagogue552, or ecclesiastical director of consciences. Every particular of conduct, public or private, is to be open to the public eye, and to be kept, by the power of opinion, in the course which the Spiritual corporation shall judge to be the most right.
This is not a sufficiently tempting308 picture to have much chance of making converts rapidly, and the objections to the scheme are too obvious to need stating. Indeed, it is only thoughtful persons to whom it will be credible553, that speculations leading to this result can deserve the attention necessary for understanding them. We propose in the next Essay to examine them as part of the elaborate and coherent system of doctrine, which M. Comte afterwards put together for the reconstruction554 of society. Meanwhile the reader will gather, from what has been said, that M. Comte has not, in our opinion, created Sociology. Except his analysis of history, to which there is much to be added, but which we do not think likely to be ever, in its general features, superseded555, he has done nothing in Sociology which does not require to be done over again, and better. Nevertheless, he has greatly advanced the study. Besides the great stores of thought, of various and often of eminent merit, with which he has enriched the subject, his conception of its method is so much truer and more profound than that of any one who preceded him, as to constitute an era in its cultivation. If it cannot be said of him that he has created a science, it may be said truly that he has, for the first time, made the creation possible. This is a great achievement, and, with the extraordinary merit of his historical analysis, and of his philosophy of the physical sciences, is enough to immortalize his name. But his renown556 with posterity557 would probably have been greater than it is now likely to be, if after showing the way in which the social science should be formed, he had not flattered himself that he had formed it, and that it was already sufficiently solid for attempting to build upon its foundation the entire fabric558 of the Political Art.
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1 eminent | |
adj.显赫的,杰出的,有名的,优良的 | |
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6 philosophic | |
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7 speculative | |
adj.思索性的,暝想性的,推理的 | |
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11 distinguished | |
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12 conspicuous | |
adj.明眼的,惹人注目的;炫耀的,摆阔气的 | |
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13 judgment | |
n.审判;判断力,识别力,看法,意见 | |
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14 essentially | |
adv.本质上,实质上,基本上 | |
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15 wholesome | |
adj.适合;卫生的;有益健康的;显示身心健康的 | |
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16 profess | |
v.声称,冒称,以...为业,正式接受入教,表明信仰 | |
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17 professed | |
公开声称的,伪称的,已立誓信教的 | |
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18 unity | |
n.团结,联合,统一;和睦,协调 | |
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19 admiration | |
n.钦佩,赞美,羡慕 | |
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20 radical | |
n.激进份子,原子团,根号;adj.根本的,激进的,彻底的 | |
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21 radically | |
ad.根本地,本质地 | |
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22 strenuously | |
adv.奋发地,费力地 | |
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23 criticise | |
v.批评,评论;非难 | |
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24 retarded | |
a.智力迟钝的,智力发育迟缓的 | |
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25 retard | |
n.阻止,延迟;vt.妨碍,延迟,使减速 | |
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26 postponing | |
v.延期,推迟( postpone的现在分词 ) | |
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27 speculation | |
n.思索,沉思;猜测;投机 | |
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28 speculations | |
n.投机买卖( speculation的名词复数 );思考;投机活动;推断 | |
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29 par | |
n.标准,票面价值,平均数量;adj.票面的,平常的,标准的 | |
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30 sever | |
v.切开,割开;断绝,中断 | |
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31 specially | |
adv.特定地;特殊地;明确地 | |
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32 partially | |
adv.部分地,从某些方面讲 | |
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33 vindication | |
n.洗冤,证实 | |
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34 dependence | |
n.依靠,依赖;信任,信赖;隶属 | |
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35 abridged | |
削减的,删节的 | |
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36 abridge | |
v.删减,删节,节略,缩短 | |
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37 scanty | |
adj.缺乏的,仅有的,节省的,狭小的,不够的 | |
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38 originality | |
n.创造力,独创性;新颖 | |
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39 doctrine | |
n.教义;主义;学说 | |
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40 semblance | |
n.外貌,外表 | |
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41 avows | |
v.公开声明,承认( avow的第三人称单数 ) | |
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42 founders | |
n.创始人( founder的名词复数 ) | |
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43 foresight | |
n.先见之明,深谋远虑 | |
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44 contractions | |
n.收缩( contraction的名词复数 );缩减;缩略词;(分娩时)子宫收缩 | |
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45 ascertain | |
vt.发现,确定,查明,弄清 | |
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46 attained | |
(通常经过努力)实现( attain的过去式和过去分词 ); 达到; 获得; 达到(某年龄、水平、状况) | |
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47 mere | |
adj.纯粹的;仅仅,只不过 | |
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48 apprehended | |
逮捕,拘押( apprehend的过去式和过去分词 ); 理解 | |
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49 apprehend | |
vt.理解,领悟,逮捕,拘捕,忧虑 | |
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50 adversary | |
adj.敌手,对手 | |
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51 peremptorily | |
adv.紧急地,不容分说地,专横地 | |
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52 entirely | |
ad.全部地,完整地;完全地,彻底地 | |
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53 bent | |
n.爱好,癖好;adj.弯的;决心的,一心的 | |
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54 assent | |
v.批准,认可;n.批准,认可 | |
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55 peculiar | |
adj.古怪的,异常的;特殊的,特有的 | |
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56 adherence | |
n.信奉,依附,坚持,固着 | |
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57 ascendancy | |
n.统治权,支配力量 | |
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58 anterior | |
adj.较早的;在前的 | |
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59 logic | |
n.逻辑(学);逻辑性 | |
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60 forth | |
adv.向前;向外,往外 | |
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61 enunciation | |
n.清晰的发音;表明,宣言;口齿 | |
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62 condemnation | |
n.谴责; 定罪 | |
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63 negation | |
n.否定;否认 | |
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64 creed | |
n.信条;信念,纲领 | |
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65 volitional | |
adj.意志的,凭意志的,有意志的 | |
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66 volition | |
n.意志;决意 | |
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67 subjective | |
a.主观(上)的,个人的 | |
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68 possessed | |
adj.疯狂的;拥有的,占有的 | |
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69 animated | |
adj.生气勃勃的,活跃的,愉快的 | |
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70 animate | |
v.赋于生命,鼓励;adj.有生命的,有生气的 | |
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71 merges | |
(使)混合( merge的第三人称单数 ); 相融; 融入; 渐渐消失在某物中 | |
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72 interfere | |
v.(in)干涉,干预;(with)妨碍,打扰 | |
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73 celestial | |
adj.天体的;天上的 | |
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74 virtue | |
n.德行,美德;贞操;优点;功效,效力 | |
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75 propensities | |
n.倾向,习性( propensity的名词复数 ) | |
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76 impersonal | |
adj.无个人感情的,与个人无关的,非人称的 | |
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77 acting | |
n.演戏,行为,假装;adj.代理的,临时的,演出用的 | |
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78 motives | |
n.动机,目的( motive的名词复数 ) | |
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79 motive | |
n.动机,目的;adv.发动的,运动的 | |
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80 analogous | |
adj.相似的;类似的 | |
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81 ascent | |
n.(声望或地位)提高;上升,升高;登高 | |
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82 construed | |
v.解释(陈述、行为等)( construe的过去式和过去分词 );翻译,作句法分析 | |
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83 physiologists | |
n.生理学者( physiologist的名词复数 );生理学( physiology的名词复数 );生理机能 | |
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84 interpretations | |
n.解释( interpretation的名词复数 );表演;演绎;理解 | |
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85 interpretation | |
n.解释,说明,描述;艺术处理 | |
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86 warfare | |
n.战争(状态);斗争;冲突 | |
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87 inquiry | |
n.打听,询问,调查,查问 | |
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88 victorious | |
adj.胜利的,得胜的 | |
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89 generalization | |
n.普遍性,一般性,概括 | |
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90 proceeding | |
n.行动,进行,(pl.)会议录,学报 | |
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91 destined | |
adj.命中注定的;(for)以…为目的地的 | |
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92 doctrines | |
n.教条( doctrine的名词复数 );教义;学说;(政府政策的)正式声明 | |
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93 generalizations | |
一般化( generalization的名词复数 ); 普通化; 归纳; 概论 | |
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94 backbone | |
n.脊骨,脊柱,骨干;刚毅,骨气 | |
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95 accomplished | |
adj.有才艺的;有造诣的;达到了的 | |
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96 assenting | |
同意,赞成( assent的现在分词 ) | |
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97 condemns | |
v.(通常因道义上的原因而)谴责( condemn的第三人称单数 );宣判;宣布…不能使用;迫使…陷于不幸的境地 | |
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98 ascertained | |
v.弄清,确定,查明( ascertain的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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99 supreme | |
adj.极度的,最重要的;至高的,最高的 | |
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100 avowedly | |
adv.公然地 | |
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101 disclaimed | |
v.否认( disclaim的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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102 atheism | |
n.无神论,不信神 | |
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103 variance | |
n.矛盾,不同 | |
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104 mechanism | |
n.机械装置;机构,结构 | |
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105 conjecture | |
n./v.推测,猜测 | |
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106 inaccessible | |
adj.达不到的,难接近的 | |
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107 faculties | |
n.能力( faculty的名词复数 );全体教职员;技巧;院 | |
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108 fixed | |
adj.固定的,不变的,准备好的;(计算机)固定的 | |
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109 counteracted | |
对抗,抵消( counteract的过去式 ) | |
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110 repudiating | |
v.(正式地)否认( repudiate的现在分词 );拒绝接受;拒绝与…往来;拒不履行(法律义务) | |
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111 interdict | |
v.限制;禁止;n.正式禁止;禁令 | |
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112 condemned | |
adj. 被责难的, 被宣告有罪的 动词condemn的过去式和过去分词 | |
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113 entities | |
实体对像; 实体,独立存在体,实际存在物( entity的名词复数 ) | |
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114 cultivation | |
n.耕作,培养,栽培(法),养成 | |
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115 marvel | |
vi.(at)惊叹vt.感到惊异;n.令人惊异的事 | |
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116 absurdity | |
n.荒谬,愚蠢;谬论 | |
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117 absurdities | |
n.极端无理性( absurdity的名词复数 );荒谬;谬论;荒谬的行为 | |
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118 affected | |
adj.不自然的,假装的 | |
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119 pervaded | |
v.遍及,弥漫( pervade的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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120 antiquity | |
n.古老;高龄;古物,古迹 | |
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121 virtues | |
美德( virtue的名词复数 ); 德行; 优点; 长处 | |
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122 controversy | |
n.争论,辩论,争吵 | |
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123 nominal | |
adj.名义上的;(金额、租金)微不足道的 | |
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124 emancipate | |
v.解放,解除 | |
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125 dominion | |
n.统治,管辖,支配权;领土,版图 | |
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126 succumbed | |
不再抵抗(诱惑、疾病、攻击等)( succumb的过去式和过去分词 ); 屈从; 被压垮; 死 | |
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127 interval | |
n.间隔,间距;幕间休息,中场休息 | |
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128 scholastic | |
adj.学校的,学院的,学术上的 | |
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129 extruded | |
v.挤压出( extrude的过去式和过去分词 );挤压成;突出;伸出 | |
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130 fictitious | |
adj.虚构的,假设的;空头的 | |
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131 accounting | |
n.会计,会计学,借贷对照表 | |
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132 physiology | |
n.生理学,生理机能 | |
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133 purely | |
adv.纯粹地,完全地 | |
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134 perversion | |
n.曲解;堕落;反常 | |
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135 transformation | |
n.变化;改造;转变 | |
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136 realization | |
n.实现;认识到,深刻了解 | |
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137 primitive | |
adj.原始的;简单的;n.原(始)人,原始事物 | |
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138 preservation | |
n.保护,维护,保存,保留,保持 | |
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139 pointed | |
adj.尖的,直截了当的 | |
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140 precisely | |
adv.恰好,正好,精确地,细致地 | |
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141 savage | |
adj.野蛮的;凶恶的,残暴的;n.未开化的人 | |
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142 savages | |
未开化的人,野蛮人( savage的名词复数 ) | |
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143 vigour | |
(=vigor)n.智力,体力,精力 | |
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144 deities | |
n.神,女神( deity的名词复数 );神祗;神灵;神明 | |
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145 mythical | |
adj.神话的;虚构的;想像的 | |
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146 fables | |
n.寓言( fable的名词复数 );神话,传说 | |
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147 persistent | |
adj.坚持不懈的,执意的;持续的 | |
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148 immediate | |
adj.立即的;直接的,最接近的;紧靠的 | |
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149 substantive | |
adj.表示实在的;本质的、实质性的;独立的;n.实词,实名词;独立存在的实体 | |
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150 standing | |
n.持续,地位;adj.永久的,不动的,直立的,不流动的 | |
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151 overlap | |
v.重叠,与…交叠;n.重叠 | |
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152 determined | |
adj.坚定的;有决心的 | |
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153 tardily | |
adv.缓慢 | |
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154 conversion | |
n.转化,转换,转变 | |
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155 Christian | |
adj.基督教徒的;n.基督教徒 | |
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156 interspersed | |
adj.[医]散开的;点缀的v.intersperse的过去式和过去分词 | |
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157 remains | |
n.剩余物,残留物;遗体,遗迹 | |
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158 miraculous | |
adj.像奇迹一样的,不可思议的 | |
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159 miraculously | |
ad.奇迹般地 | |
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160 lapsing | |
v.退步( lapse的现在分词 );陷入;倒退;丧失 | |
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161 unnaturalness | |
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162 dispositions | |
安排( disposition的名词复数 ); 倾向; (财产、金钱的)处置; 气质 | |
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163 thoroughly | |
adv.完全地,彻底地,十足地 | |
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164 Christians | |
n.基督教徒( Christian的名词复数 ) | |
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165 previously | |
adv.以前,先前(地) | |
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166 subjugated | |
v.征服,降伏( subjugate的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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167 outgrown | |
长[发展] 得超过(某物)的范围( outgrow的过去分词 ); 长[发展]得不能再要(某物); 长得比…快; 生长速度超过 | |
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168 superstition | |
n.迷信,迷信行为 | |
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169 providence | |
n.深谋远虑,天道,天意;远见;节约;上帝 | |
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170 versed | |
adj. 精通,熟练 | |
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171 philosophical | |
adj.哲学家的,哲学上的,达观的 | |
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172 attachment | |
n.附属物,附件;依恋;依附 | |
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173 supremacy | |
n.至上;至高权力 | |
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174 deity | |
n.神,神性;被奉若神明的人(或物) | |
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175 recalcitrant | |
adj.倔强的 | |
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176 frustrated | |
adj.挫败的,失意的,泄气的v.使不成功( frustrate的过去式和过去分词 );挫败;使受挫折;令人沮丧 | |
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177 plausible | |
adj.似真实的,似乎有理的,似乎可信的 | |
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178 advancement | |
n.前进,促进,提升 | |
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179 imposing | |
adj.使人难忘的,壮丽的,堂皇的,雄伟的 | |
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180 regularity | |
n.规律性,规则性;匀称,整齐 | |
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181 premature | |
adj.比预期时间早的;不成熟的,仓促的 | |
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182 encroachment | |
n.侵入,蚕食 | |
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183 domain | |
n.(活动等)领域,范围;领地,势力范围 | |
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184 machinery | |
n.(总称)机械,机器;机构 | |
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185 sinecure | |
n.闲差事,挂名职务 | |
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186 reign | |
n.统治时期,统治,支配,盛行;v.占优势 | |
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187 pretension | |
n.要求;自命,自称;自负 | |
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188 banished | |
v.放逐,驱逐( banish的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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189 inevitable | |
adj.不可避免的,必然发生的 | |
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190 presumption | |
n.推测,可能性,冒昧,放肆,[法律]推定 | |
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191 aspiring | |
adj.有志气的;有抱负的;高耸的v.渴望;追求 | |
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192 infancy | |
n.婴儿期;幼年期;初期 | |
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193 entreaty | |
n.恳求,哀求 | |
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194 incessantly | |
ad.不停地 | |
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195 prevailing | |
adj.盛行的;占优势的;主要的 | |
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196 considerably | |
adv.极大地;相当大地;在很大程度上 | |
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197 strictly | |
adv.严厉地,严格地;严密地 | |
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198 advent | |
n.(重要事件等的)到来,来临 | |
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199 impunity | |
n.(惩罚、损失、伤害等的)免除 | |
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200 instinctive | |
adj.(出于)本能的;直觉的;(出于)天性的 | |
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201 conciliation | |
n.调解,调停 | |
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202 inflexible | |
adj.不可改变的,不受影响的,不屈服的 | |
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203 propitiating | |
v.劝解,抚慰,使息怒( propitiate的现在分词 ) | |
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204 ascertaining | |
v.弄清,确定,查明( ascertain的现在分词 ) | |
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205 inveterate | |
adj.积习已深的,根深蒂固的 | |
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206 habitual | |
adj.习惯性的;通常的,惯常的 | |
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207 habitually | |
ad.习惯地,通常地 | |
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208 modification | |
n.修改,改进,缓和,减轻 | |
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209 obviate | |
v.除去,排除,避免,预防 | |
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210 nomad | |
n.游牧部落的人,流浪者,游牧民 | |
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211 nomads | |
n.游牧部落的一员( nomad的名词复数 );流浪者;游牧生活;流浪生活 | |
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212 authentic | |
a.真的,真正的;可靠的,可信的,有根据的 | |
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213 premises | |
n.建筑物,房屋 | |
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214 demolishing | |
v.摧毁( demolish的现在分词 );推翻;拆毁(尤指大建筑物);吃光 | |
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215 remarkable | |
adj.显著的,异常的,非凡的,值得注意的 | |
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216 aggregation | |
n.聚合,组合;凝聚 | |
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217 aggregate | |
adj.总计的,集合的;n.总数;v.合计;集合 | |
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218 aggregated | |
a.聚合的,合计的 | |
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219 aggregations | |
n.聚集( aggregation的名词复数 );集成;集结;聚集体 | |
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220 aggregates | |
数( aggregate的名词复数 ); 总计; 骨料; 集料(可成混凝土或修路等用的) | |
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221 zoology | |
n.动物学,生态 | |
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222 comport | |
vi.相称,适合 | |
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223 joint | |
adj.联合的,共同的;n.关节,接合处;v.连接,贴合 | |
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224 astronomical | |
adj.天文学的,(数字)极大的 | |
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225 distinctive | |
adj.特别的,有特色的,与众不同的 | |
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226 inevitably | |
adv.不可避免地;必然发生地 | |
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227 investigation | |
n.调查,调查研究 | |
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228 investigations | |
(正式的)调查( investigation的名词复数 ); 侦查; 科学研究; 学术研究 | |
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229 induction | |
n.感应,感应现象 | |
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230 inductions | |
归纳(法)( induction的名词复数 ); (电或磁的)感应; 就职; 吸入 | |
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231 drawn | |
v.拖,拉,拔出;adj.憔悴的,紧张的 | |
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232 deduction | |
n.减除,扣除,减除额;推论,推理,演绎 | |
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233 deductions | |
扣除( deduction的名词复数 ); 结论; 扣除的量; 推演 | |
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234 subsists | |
v.(靠很少的钱或食物)维持生活,生存下去( subsist的第三人称单数 ) | |
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235 ascending | |
adj.上升的,向上的 | |
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236 complexity | |
n.复杂(性),复杂的事物 | |
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237 algebra | |
n.代数学 | |
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238 equilibrium | |
n.平衡,均衡,相称,均势,平静 | |
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239 parlance | |
n.说法;语调 | |
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240 derived | |
vi.起源;由来;衍生;导出v.得到( derive的过去式和过去分词 );(从…中)得到获得;源于;(从…中)提取 | |
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241 derive | |
v.取得;导出;引申;来自;源自;出自 | |
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242 physiological | |
adj.生理学的,生理学上的 | |
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243 solely | |
adv.仅仅,唯一地 | |
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244 inorganic | |
adj.无生物的;无机的 | |
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245 acoustics | |
n.声学,(复)音响效果,音响装置 | |
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246 varied | |
adj.多样的,多变化的 | |
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247 arduous | |
adj.艰苦的,费力的,陡峭的 | |
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248 susceptible | |
adj.过敏的,敏感的;易动感情的,易受感动的 | |
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249 attainable | |
a.可达到的,可获得的 | |
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250 isolating | |
adj.孤立的,绝缘的v.使隔离( isolate的现在分词 );将…剔出(以便看清和单独处理);使(某物质、细胞等)分离;使离析 | |
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251 qualified | |
adj.合格的,有资格的,胜任的,有限制的 | |
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252 mutual | |
adj.相互的,彼此的;共同的,共有的 | |
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253 consensus | |
n.(意见等的)一致,一致同意,共识 | |
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254 hierarchy | |
n.等级制度;统治集团,领导层 | |
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255 undoubtedly | |
adv.确实地,无疑地 | |
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256 humble | |
adj.谦卑的,恭顺的;地位低下的;v.降低,贬低 | |
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257 gathering | |
n.集会,聚会,聚集 | |
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258 ascertainable | |
adj.可确定(探知),可发现的 | |
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259 recurrence | |
n.复发,反复,重现 | |
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260 subtraction | |
n.减法,减去 | |
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261 justified | |
a.正当的,有理的 | |
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262 sufficiently | |
adv.足够地,充分地 | |
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263 minor | |
adj.较小(少)的,较次要的;n.辅修学科;vi.辅修 | |
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264 tardier | |
adj.行动缓慢的( tardy的比较级 );缓缓移动的;晚的;迟的 | |
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265 devout | |
adj.虔诚的,虔敬的,衷心的 (n.devoutness) | |
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266 omnipotence | |
n.全能,万能,无限威力 | |
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267 contingent | |
adj.视条件而定的;n.一组,代表团,分遣队 | |
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268 sublime | |
adj.崇高的,伟大的;极度的,不顾后果的 | |
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269 avert | |
v.防止,避免;转移(目光、注意力等) | |
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270 shipwreck | |
n.船舶失事,海难 | |
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271 pestilence | |
n.瘟疫 | |
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272 vestiges | |
残余部分( vestige的名词复数 ); 遗迹; 痕迹; 毫不 | |
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273 antagonistic | |
adj.敌对的 | |
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274 mathematician | |
n.数学家 | |
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275 mathematicians | |
数学家( mathematician的名词复数 ) | |
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276 propensity | |
n.倾向;习性 | |
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277 tainted | |
adj.腐坏的;污染的;沾污的;感染的v.使变质( taint的过去式和过去分词 );使污染;败坏;被污染,腐坏,败坏 | |
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278 affinity | |
n.亲和力,密切关系 | |
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279 entity | |
n.实体,独立存在体,实际存在物 | |
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280 technically | |
adv.专门地,技术上地 | |
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281 revival | |
n.复兴,复苏,(精力、活力等的)重振 | |
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282 inanity | |
n.无意义,无聊 | |
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283 coherence | |
n.紧凑;连贯;一致性 | |
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284 component | |
n.组成部分,成分,元件;adj.组成的,合成的 | |
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285 thereby | |
adv.因此,从而 | |
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286 decided | |
adj.决定了的,坚决的;明显的,明确的 | |
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287 economist | |
n.经济学家,经济专家,节俭的人 | |
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288 economists | |
n.经济学家,经济专家( economist的名词复数 ) | |
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289 initiated | |
n. 创始人 adj. 新加入的 vt. 开始,创始,启蒙,介绍加入 | |
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290 inquiries | |
n.调查( inquiry的名词复数 );疑问;探究;打听 | |
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291 psychology | |
n.心理,心理学,心理状态 | |
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292 incentive | |
n.刺激;动力;鼓励;诱因;动机 | |
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293 intelligible | |
adj.可理解的,明白易懂的,清楚的 | |
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294 faculty | |
n.才能;学院,系;(学院或系的)全体教学人员 | |
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295 ascertains | |
v.弄清,确定,查明( ascertain的第三人称单数 ) | |
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296 attains | |
(通常经过努力)实现( attain的第三人称单数 ); 达到; 获得; 达到(某年龄、水平、状况) | |
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297 appreciation | |
n.评价;欣赏;感谢;领会,理解;价格上涨 | |
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298 requisites | |
n.必要的事物( requisite的名词复数 ) | |
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299 requisite | |
adj.需要的,必不可少的;n.必需品 | |
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300 transformations | |
n.变化( transformation的名词复数 );转换;转换;变换 | |
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301 cognate | |
adj.同类的,同源的,同族的;n.同家族的人,同源词 | |
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302 syllogistic | |
adj.三段论法的,演绎的,演绎性的 | |
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303 opposition | |
n.反对,敌对 | |
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304 aptitude | |
n.(学习方面的)才能,资质,天资 | |
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305 phenomena | |
n.现象 | |
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306 legitimate | |
adj.合法的,合理的,合乎逻辑的;v.使合法 | |
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307 chimerical | |
adj.荒诞不经的,梦幻的 | |
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308 tempting | |
a.诱人的, 吸引人的 | |
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309 rotation | |
n.旋转;循环,轮流 | |
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310 unconditionally | |
adv.无条件地 | |
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311 unconditional | |
adj.无条件的,无限制的,绝对的 | |
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312 conditional | |
adj.条件的,带有条件的 | |
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313 solicitous | |
adj.热切的,挂念的 | |
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314 unimpeachable | |
adj.无可指责的;adv.无可怀疑地 | |
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315 subjectively | |
主观地; 臆 | |
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316 curiously | |
adv.有求知欲地;好问地;奇特地 | |
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317 judicious | |
adj.明智的,明断的,能作出明智决定的 | |
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318 decomposes | |
腐烂( decompose的第三人称单数 ); (使)分解; 分解(某物质、光线等) | |
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319 constituents | |
n.选民( constituent的名词复数 );成分;构成部分;要素 | |
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320 binary | |
adj.二,双;二进制的;n.双(体);联星 | |
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321 anticipation | |
n.预期,预料,期望 | |
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322 unlimited | |
adj.无限的,不受控制的,无条件的 | |
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323 license | |
n.执照,许可证,特许;v.许可,特许 | |
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324 scruple | |
n./v.顾忌,迟疑 | |
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325 inclinations | |
倾向( inclination的名词复数 ); 倾斜; 爱好; 斜坡 | |
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326 predilection | |
n.偏好 | |
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327 simplicity | |
n.简单,简易;朴素;直率,单纯 | |
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328 implicit | |
a.暗示的,含蓄的,不明晰的,绝对的 | |
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329 relish | |
n.滋味,享受,爱好,调味品;vt.加调味料,享受,品味;vi.有滋味 | |
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330 genre | |
n.(文学、艺术等的)类型,体裁,风格 | |
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331 margin | |
n.页边空白;差额;余地,余裕;边,边缘 | |
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332 embellishing | |
v.美化( embellish的现在分词 );装饰;修饰;润色 | |
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333 consistency | |
n.一贯性,前后一致,稳定性;(液体的)浓度 | |
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334 scrutiny | |
n.详细检查,仔细观察 | |
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335 reprobation | |
n.斥责 | |
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336 hostility | |
n.敌对,敌意;抵制[pl.]交战,战争 | |
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337 penetrate | |
v.透(渗)入;刺入,刺穿;洞察,了解 | |
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338 aberration | |
n.离开正路,脱离常规,色差 | |
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339 invalid | |
n.病人,伤残人;adj.有病的,伤残的;无效的 | |
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340 annihilate | |
v.使无效;毁灭;取消 | |
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341 secondly | |
adv.第二,其次 | |
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342 repudiates | |
v.(正式地)否认( repudiate的第三人称单数 );拒绝接受;拒绝与…往来;拒不履行(法律义务) | |
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343 meditation | |
n.熟虑,(尤指宗教的)默想,沉思,(pl.)冥想录 | |
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344 extricating | |
v.使摆脱困难,脱身( extricate的现在分词 ) | |
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345 discredit | |
vt.使不可置信;n.丧失信义;不信,怀疑 | |
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346 cerebral | |
adj.脑的,大脑的;有智力的,理智型的 | |
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347 applied | |
adj.应用的;v.应用,适用 | |
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348 predecessors | |
n.前任( predecessor的名词复数 );前辈;(被取代的)原有事物;前身 | |
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349 skilful | |
(=skillful)adj.灵巧的,熟练的 | |
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350 adherent | |
n.信徒,追随者,拥护者 | |
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351 adherents | |
n.支持者,拥护者( adherent的名词复数 );党羽;徒子徒孙 | |
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352 ordinances | |
n.条例,法令( ordinance的名词复数 ) | |
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353 abode | |
n.住处,住所 | |
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354 delusion | |
n.谬见,欺骗,幻觉,迷惑 | |
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355 dominant | |
adj.支配的,统治的;占优势的;显性的;n.主因,要素,主要的人(或物);显性基因 | |
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356 bishops | |
(基督教某些教派管辖大教区的)主教( bishop的名词复数 ); (国际象棋的)象 | |
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357 dictate | |
v.口授;(使)听写;指令,指示,命令 | |
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358 continental | |
adj.大陆的,大陆性的,欧洲大陆的 | |
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359 culmination | |
n.顶点;最高潮 | |
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360 conspicuously | |
ad.明显地,惹人注目地 | |
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361 feudal | |
adj.封建的,封地的,领地的 | |
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362 hybrid | |
n.(动,植)杂种,混合物 | |
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363 maxims | |
n.格言,座右铭( maxim的名词复数 ) | |
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364 outgrew | |
长[发展] 得超过(某物)的范围( outgrow的过去式 ); 长[发展]得不能再要(某物); 长得比…快; 生长速度超过 | |
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365 expediency | |
n.适宜;方便;合算;利己 | |
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366 emanates | |
v.从…处传出,传出( emanate的第三人称单数 );产生,表现,显示 | |
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367 proprieties | |
n.礼仪,礼节;礼貌( propriety的名词复数 );规矩;正当;合适 | |
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368 suffrage | |
n.投票,选举权,参政权 | |
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369 ethics | |
n.伦理学;伦理观,道德标准 | |
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370 reigns | |
n.君主的统治( reign的名词复数 );君主统治时期;任期;当政期 | |
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371 scripture | |
n.经文,圣书,手稿;Scripture:(常用复数)《圣经》,《圣经》中的一段 | |
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372 abated | |
减少( abate的过去式和过去分词 ); 减去; 降价; 撤消(诉讼) | |
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373 ethical | |
adj.伦理的,道德的,合乎道德的 | |
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374 erect | |
n./v.树立,建立,使竖立;adj.直立的,垂直的 | |
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375 erecting | |
v.使直立,竖起( erect的现在分词 );建立 | |
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376 justifies | |
证明…有理( justify的第三人称单数 ); 为…辩护; 对…作出解释; 为…辩解(或辩护) | |
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377 expounder | |
陈述者,说明者 | |
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378 meritorious | |
adj.值得赞赏的 | |
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379 exempt | |
adj.免除的;v.使免除;n.免税者,被免除义务者 | |
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380 penal | |
adj.刑罚的;刑法上的 | |
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381 resolutely | |
adj.坚决地,果断地 | |
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382 incompetent | |
adj.无能力的,不能胜任的 | |
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383 irrational | |
adj.无理性的,失去理性的 | |
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384 divergence | |
n.分歧,岔开 | |
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385 unanimity | |
n.全体一致,一致同意 | |
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386 baneful | |
adj.有害的 | |
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387 downwards | |
adj./adv.向下的(地),下行的(地) | |
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388 laborious | |
adj.吃力的,努力的,不流畅 | |
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389 presumptuous | |
adj.胆大妄为的,放肆的,冒昧的,冒失的 | |
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390 withholding | |
扣缴税款 | |
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391 bestow | |
v.把…赠与,把…授予;花费 | |
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392 aptitudes | |
(学习方面的)才能,资质,天资( aptitude的名词复数 ) | |
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393 scrupulous | |
adj.审慎的,小心翼翼的,完全的,纯粹的 | |
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394 insufficient | |
adj.(for,of)不足的,不够的 | |
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395 insufficiently | |
adv.不够地,不能胜任地 | |
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396 abolition | |
n.废除,取消 | |
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397 ERECTED | |
adj. 直立的,竖立的,笔直的 vt. 使 ... 直立,建立 | |
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398 participation | |
n.参与,参加,分享 | |
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399 incapable | |
adj.无能力的,不能做某事的 | |
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400 followers | |
追随者( follower的名词复数 ); 用户; 契据的附面; 从动件 | |
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401 extolled | |
v.赞颂,赞扬,赞美( extol的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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402 effete | |
adj.无生产力的,虚弱的 | |
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403 systematic | |
adj.有系统的,有计划的,有方法的 | |
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404 rectifying | |
改正,矫正( rectify的现在分词 ); 精馏; 蒸流; 整流 | |
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405 puerile | |
adj.幼稚的,儿童的 | |
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406 disparagement | |
n.轻视,轻蔑 | |
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407 treatises | |
n.专题著作,专题论文,专著( treatise的名词复数 ) | |
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408 prosecuted | |
a.被起诉的 | |
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409 deficient | |
adj.不足的,不充份的,有缺陷的 | |
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410 imputation | |
n.归罪,责难 | |
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411 pliability | |
n.柔韧性;可弯性 | |
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412 sociologist | |
n.研究社会学的人,社会学家 | |
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413 peculiarity | |
n.独特性,特色;特殊的东西;怪癖 | |
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414 exigencies | |
n.急切需要 | |
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415 disinterested | |
adj.不关心的,不感兴趣的 | |
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416 affiliated | |
adj. 附属的, 有关连的 | |
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417 retaliated | |
v.报复,反击( retaliate的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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418 penetrated | |
adj. 击穿的,鞭辟入里的 动词penetrate的过去式和过去分词形式 | |
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419 dispense | |
vt.分配,分发;配(药),发(药);实施 | |
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420 discredited | |
不足信的,不名誉的 | |
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421 inversion | |
n.反向,倒转,倒置 | |
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422 ensemble | |
n.合奏(唱)组;全套服装;整体,总效果 | |
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423 artifice | |
n.妙计,高明的手段;狡诈,诡计 | |
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424 stationary | |
adj.固定的,静止不动的 | |
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425 dynamics | |
n.力学,动力学,动力,原动力;动态 | |
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426 trite | |
adj.陈腐的 | |
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427 instinctively | |
adv.本能地 | |
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428 procures | |
v.(努力)取得, (设法)获得( procure的第三人称单数 );拉皮条 | |
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429 benevolence | |
n.慈悲,捐助 | |
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430 antagonism | |
n.对抗,敌对,对立 | |
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431 upwards | |
adv.向上,在更高处...以上 | |
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432 monotonous | |
adj.单调的,一成不变的,使人厌倦的 | |
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433 apathy | |
n.漠不关心,无动于衷;冷淡 | |
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434 rebukes | |
责难或指责( rebuke的第三人称单数 ) | |
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435 tampered | |
v.窜改( tamper的过去式 );篡改;(用不正当手段)影响;瞎摆弄 | |
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436 modifications | |
n.缓和( modification的名词复数 );限制;更改;改变 | |
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437 exalted | |
adj.(地位等)高的,崇高的;尊贵的,高尚的 | |
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438 immunities | |
免除,豁免( immunity的名词复数 ); 免疫力 | |
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439 lavished | |
v.过分给予,滥施( lavish的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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440 impartiality | |
n. 公平, 无私, 不偏 | |
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441 impartial | |
adj.(in,to)公正的,无偏见的 | |
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442 futile | |
adj.无效的,无用的,无希望的 | |
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443 dreaded | |
adj.令人畏惧的;害怕的v.害怕,恐惧,担心( dread的过去式和过去分词) | |
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444 intervals | |
n.[军事]间隔( interval的名词复数 );间隔时间;[数学]区间;(戏剧、电影或音乐会的)幕间休息 | |
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445 profligacy | |
n.放荡,不检点,肆意挥霍 | |
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446 vagaries | |
n.奇想( vagary的名词复数 );异想天开;异常行为;难以预测的情况 | |
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447 disturbance | |
n.动乱,骚动;打扰,干扰;(身心)失调 | |
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448 yoke | |
n.轭;支配;v.给...上轭,连接,使成配偶 | |
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449 favourable | |
adj.赞成的,称赞的,有利的,良好的,顺利的 | |
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450 auspices | |
n.资助,赞助 | |
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451 incompatible | |
adj.不相容的,不协调的,不相配的 | |
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452 illustrated | |
adj. 有插图的,列举的 动词illustrate的过去式和过去分词 | |
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453 engrossed | |
adj.全神贯注的 | |
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454 abatement | |
n.减(免)税,打折扣,冲销 | |
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455 insignificant | |
adj.无关紧要的,可忽略的,无意义的 | |
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456 infinitely | |
adv.无限地,无穷地 | |
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457 miserably | |
adv.痛苦地;悲惨地;糟糕地;极度地 | |
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458 stunted | |
adj.矮小的;发育迟缓的 | |
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459 Dispersive | |
adj. 分散的 | |
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460 retards | |
使减速( retard的第三人称单数 ); 妨碍; 阻止; 推迟 | |
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461 obtruding | |
v.强行向前,强行,强迫( obtrude的现在分词 ) | |
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462 paramount | |
a.最重要的,最高权力的 | |
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463 impair | |
v.损害,损伤;削弱,减少 | |
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464 judgments | |
判断( judgment的名词复数 ); 鉴定; 评价; 审判 | |
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465 deference | |
n.尊重,顺从;敬意 | |
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466 astronomers | |
n.天文学者,天文学家( astronomer的名词复数 ) | |
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467 regenerated | |
v.新生,再生( regenerate的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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468 mischievously | |
adv.有害地;淘气地 | |
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469 conversant | |
adj.亲近的,有交情的,熟悉的 | |
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470 contradictory | |
adj.反驳的,反对的,抗辩的;n.正反对,矛盾对立 | |
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471 misgiving | |
n.疑虑,担忧,害怕 | |
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472 diffusion | |
n.流布;普及;散漫 | |
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473 submission | |
n.服从,投降;温顺,谦虚;提出 | |
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474 prodigiously | |
adv.异常地,惊人地,巨大地 | |
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475 promulgate | |
v.宣布;传播;颁布(法令、新法律等) | |
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476 diffuse | |
v.扩散;传播;adj.冗长的;四散的,弥漫的 | |
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477 entrusted | |
v.委托,托付( entrust的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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478 contemplated | |
adj. 预期的 动词contemplate的过去分词形式 | |
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479 peremptory | |
adj.紧急的,专横的,断然的 | |
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480 irresistible | |
adj.非常诱人的,无法拒绝的,无法抗拒的 | |
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481 obedience | |
n.服从,顺从 | |
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482 clergy | |
n.[总称]牧师,神职人员 | |
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483 perpetuation | |
n.永存,不朽 | |
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484 aesthetic | |
adj.美学的,审美的,有美感 | |
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485 neutralizing | |
v.使失效( neutralize的现在分词 );抵消;中和;使(一个国家)中立化 | |
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486 awakened | |
v.(使)醒( awaken的过去式和过去分词 );(使)觉醒;弄醒;(使)意识到 | |
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487 stimulus | |
n.刺激,刺激物,促进因素,引起兴奋的事物 | |
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488 constrains | |
强迫( constrain的第三人称单数 ); 强使; 限制; 约束 | |
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489 propounds | |
v.提出(问题、计划等)供考虑[讨论],提议( propound的第三人称单数 ) | |
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490 overthrow | |
v.推翻,打倒,颠覆;n.推翻,瓦解,颠覆 | |
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491 overthrown | |
adj. 打翻的,推倒的,倾覆的 动词overthrow的过去分词 | |
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492 anarchy | |
n.无政府状态;社会秩序混乱,无秩序 | |
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493 reverence | |
n.敬畏,尊敬,尊严;Reverence:对某些基督教神职人员的尊称;v.尊敬,敬畏,崇敬 | |
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494 reverences | |
n.尊敬,崇敬( reverence的名词复数 );敬礼 | |
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495 apparently | |
adv.显然地;表面上,似乎 | |
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496 reverenced | |
v.尊敬,崇敬( reverence的过去式和过去分词 );敬礼 | |
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497 pry | |
vi.窥(刺)探,打听;vt.撬动(开,起) | |
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498 vessel | |
n.船舶;容器,器皿;管,导管,血管 | |
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499 simultaneously | |
adv.同时发生地,同时进行地 | |
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500 replacement | |
n.取代,替换,交换;替代品,代用品 | |
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501 abridgment | |
n.删节,节本 | |
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502 detailed | |
adj.详细的,详尽的,极注意细节的,完全的 | |
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503 amassed | |
v.积累,积聚( amass的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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504 abstruse | |
adj.深奥的,难解的 | |
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505 theocratic | |
adj.神权的,神权政治的 | |
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506 permanently | |
adv.永恒地,永久地,固定不变地 | |
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507 theocracy | |
n.神权政治;僧侣政治 | |
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508 authorized | |
a.委任的,许可的 | |
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509 usurpation | |
n.篡位;霸占 | |
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510 anomalous | |
adj.反常的;不规则的 | |
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511 specimen | |
n.样本,标本 | |
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512 enjoined | |
v.命令( enjoin的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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513 advisers | |
顾问,劝告者( adviser的名词复数 ); (指导大学新生学科问题等的)指导教授 | |
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514 monarch | |
n.帝王,君主,最高统治者 | |
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515 persecuting | |
(尤指宗教或政治信仰的)迫害(~sb. for sth.)( persecute的现在分词 ); 烦扰,困扰或骚扰某人 | |
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516 salvation | |
n.(尤指基督)救世,超度,拯救,解困 | |
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517 peril | |
n.(严重的)危险;危险的事物 | |
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518 expounded | |
论述,详细讲解( expound的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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519 layman | |
n.俗人,门外汉,凡人 | |
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520 meddle | |
v.干预,干涉,插手 | |
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521 conquerors | |
征服者,占领者( conqueror的名词复数 ) | |
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522 pervades | |
v.遍及,弥漫( pervade的第三人称单数 ) | |
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523 lamented | |
adj.被哀悼的,令人遗憾的v.(为…)哀悼,痛哭,悲伤( lament的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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524 buckle | |
n.扣子,带扣;v.把...扣住,由于压力而弯曲 | |
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525 maturity | |
n.成熟;完成;(支票、债券等)到期 | |
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526 excellence | |
n.优秀,杰出,(pl.)优点,美德 | |
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527 gratitude | |
adj.感激,感谢 | |
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528 pristine | |
adj.原来的,古时的,原始的,纯净的,无垢的 | |
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529 savagery | |
n.野性 | |
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530 benefactors | |
n.捐助者,施主( benefactor的名词复数 );恩人 | |
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531 homage | |
n.尊敬,敬意,崇敬 | |
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532 hindrance | |
n.妨碍,障碍 | |
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533 cramped | |
a.狭窄的 | |
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534 decomposing | |
腐烂( decompose的现在分词 ); (使)分解; 分解(某物质、光线等) | |
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535 poetic | |
adj.富有诗意的,有诗人气质的,善于抒情的 | |
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536 artistic | |
adj.艺术(家)的,美术(家)的;善于艺术创作的 | |
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537 harmonious | |
adj.和睦的,调和的,和谐的,协调的 | |
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538 vein | |
n.血管,静脉;叶脉,纹理;情绪;vt.使成脉络 | |
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539 prospects | |
n.希望,前途(恒为复数) | |
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540 decomposition | |
n. 分解, 腐烂, 崩溃 | |
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541 edifice | |
n.宏伟的建筑物(如宫殿,教室) | |
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542 concurrence | |
n.同意;并发 | |
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543 pretence | |
n.假装,作假;借口,口实;虚伪;虚饰 | |
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544 predilections | |
n.偏爱,偏好,嗜好( predilection的名词复数 ) | |
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545 adjourned | |
(使)休会, (使)休庭( adjourn的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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546 questionable | |
adj.可疑的,有问题的 | |
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547 attainment | |
n.达到,到达;[常pl.]成就,造诣 | |
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548 authoritative | |
adj.有权威的,可相信的;命令式的;官方的 | |
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549 ingenuity | |
n.别出心裁;善于发明创造 | |
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550 remonstrances | |
n.抱怨,抗议( remonstrance的名词复数 ) | |
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551 jealousy | |
n.妒忌,嫉妒,猜忌 | |
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552 pedagogue | |
n.教师 | |
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553 credible | |
adj.可信任的,可靠的 | |
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554 reconstruction | |
n.重建,再现,复原 | |
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555 superseded | |
[医]被代替的,废弃的 | |
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556 renown | |
n.声誉,名望 | |
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557 posterity | |
n.后裔,子孙,后代 | |
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558 fabric | |
n.织物,织品,布;构造,结构,组织 | |
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