It is true that similar confusion and uncertainty7, and in some cases similar discordance8, exist respecting the first principles of all the sciences, not excepting that which is deemed the most certain of them, mathematics; without much impairing9, generally indeed without impairing at all, the trustworthiness of the conclusions of those sciences. An apparent anomaly, the explanation of which is, that the detailed10 doctrines11 of a science are not usually deduced from, nor depend for their evidence upon, what are called its first principles. Were it not so, there would be no science more precarious13, or whose conclusions were more insufficiently14 made out, than algebra15; which derives16 none of its certainty from what are commonly taught to learners as its elements, since these, as laid down by some of its most eminent18 teachers, are as full of fictions as English law, and of mysteries as theology. The truths which are ultimately accepted as the first principles of a science, are really the last results of metaphysical analysis, practised on the elementary notions with which the science is conversant19; and their relation to the science is not that of foundations to an edifice20, but of roots to a tree, which may perform their office equally well though they be never dug down to and exposed to light. But though in science the particular truths precede the general theory, the contrary might be expected to be the case with a practical art, such as morals or legislation. All action is for the sake of some end, and rules of action, it seems natural to suppose, must take their whole character and colour from the end to which they are subservient21. When we engage in a pursuit, a clear and precise conception of what we are pursuing would seem to be the first thing we need, instead of the last we are to look forward to. A test of right and wrong must be the means, one would think, of ascertaining22 what is right or wrong, and not a consequence of having already ascertained23 it.
The difficulty is not avoided by having recourse to the popular theory of a natural faculty24, a sense or instinct, informing us of right and wrong. For—besides that the existence of such a moral instinct is itself one of the matters in dispute—those believers in it who have any pretensions25 to philosophy, have been obliged to abandon the idea that it discerns what is right or wrong in the particular case in hand, as our other senses discern the sight or sound actually present. Our moral faculty, according to all those of its interpreters who are entitled to the name of thinkers, supplies us only with the general principles of moral judgments26; it is a branch of our reason, not of our sensitive faculty; and must be looked to for the abstract doctrines of morality, not for perception of it in the concrete. The intuitive, no less than what may be termed the inductive, school of ethics27, insists on the necessity of general laws. They both agree that the morality of an individual action is not a question of direct perception, but of the application of a law to an individual case. They recognise also, to a great extent, the same moral laws; but differ as to their evidence, and the source from which they derive17 their authority. According to the one opinion, the principles of morals are evident à priori, requiring nothing to command assent28, except that the meaning of the terms be understood. According to the other doctrine12, right and wrong, as well as truth and falsehood, are questions of observation and experience. But both hold equally that morality must be deduced from principles; and the intuitive school affirm as strongly as the inductive, that there is a science of morals. Yet they seldom attempt to make out a list of the à priori principles which are to serve as the premises29 of the science; still more rarely do they make any effort to reduce those various principles to one first principle, or common ground of obligation. They either assume the ordinary precepts31 of morals as of à priori authority, or they lay down as the common groundwork of those maxims32, some generality much less obviously authoritative33 than the maxims themselves, and which has never succeeded in gaining popular acceptance. Yet to support their pretensions there ought either to be some one fundamental principle or law, at the root of all morality, or if there be several, there should be a determinate order of precedence among them; and the one principle, or the rule for deciding between the various principles when they conflict, ought to be self-evident.
To inquire how far the bad effects of this deficiency have been mitigated34 in practice, or to what extent the moral beliefs of mankind have been vitiated or made uncertain by the absence of any distinct recognition of an ultimate standard, would imply a complete survey and criticism of past and present ethical35 doctrine. It would, however, be easy to show that whatever steadiness or consistency36 these moral beliefs have attained37, has been mainly due to the tacit influence of a standard not recognised. Although the non-existence of an acknowledged first principle has made ethics not so much a guide as a consecration38 of men's actual sentiments, still, as men's sentiments, both of favour and of aversion, are greatly influenced by what they suppose to be the effects of things upon their happiness, the principle of utility, or as Bentham latterly called it, the greatest happiness principle, has had a large share in forming the moral doctrines even of those who most scornfully reject its authority. Nor is there any school of thought which refuses to admit that the influence of actions on happiness is a most material and even predominant consideration in many of the details of morals, however unwilling39 to acknowledge it as the fundamental principle of morality, and the source of moral obligation. I might go much further, and say that to all those à priori moralists who deem it necessary to argue at all, utilitarian6 arguments are indispensable. It is not my present purpose to criticise40 these thinkers; but I cannot help referring, for illustration, to a systematic41 treatise42 by one of the most illustrious of them, the Metaphysics of Ethics, by Kant. This remarkable43 man, whose system of thought will long remain one of the landmarks44 in the history of philosophical45 speculation, does, in the treatise in question, lay down an universal first principle as the origin and ground of moral obligation; it is this:—'So act, that the rule on which thou actest would admit of being adopted as a law by all rational beings.' But when he begins to deduce from this precept30 any of the actual duties of morality, he fails, almost grotesquely46, to show that there would be any contradiction, any logical (not to say physical) impossibility, in the adoption47 by all rational beings of the most outrageously48 immoral49 rules of conduct. All he shows is that the consequences of their universal adoption would be such as no one would choose to incur50.
On the present occasion, I shall, without further discussion of the other theories, attempt to contribute something towards the understanding and appreciation51 of the Utilitarian or Happiness theory, and towards such proof as it is susceptible52 of. It is evident that this cannot be proof in the ordinary and popular meaning of the term. Questions of ultimate ends are not amenable53 to direct proof. Whatever can be proved to be good, must be so by being shown to be a means to something admitted to be good without proof. The medical art is proved to be good, by its conducing to health; but how is it possible to prove that health is good? The art of music is good, for the reason, among others, that it produces pleasure; but what proof is it possible to give that pleasure is good? If, then, it is asserted that there is a comprehensive formula, including all things which are in themselves good, and that whatever else is good, is not so as an end, but as a mean, the formula may be accepted or rejected, but is not a subject of what is commonly understood by proof. We are not, however, to infer that its acceptance or rejection54 must depend on blind impulse, or arbitrary choice. There is a larger meaning of the word proof, in which this question is as amenable to it as any other of the disputed questions of philosophy. The subject is within the cognizance of the rational faculty; and neither does that faculty deal with it solely55 in the way of intuition. Considerations may be presented capable of determining the intellect either to give or withhold56 its assent to the doctrine; and this is equivalent to proof.
We shall examine presently of what nature are these considerations; in what manner they apply to the case, and what rational grounds, therefore, can be given for accepting or rejecting the utilitarian formula. But it is a preliminary condition of rational acceptance or rejection, that the formula should be correctly understood. I believe that the very imperfect notion ordinarily formed of its meaning, is the chief obstacle which impedes57 its reception; and that could it be cleared, even from only the grosser misconceptions, the question would be greatly simplified, and a large proportion of its difficulties removed. Before, therefore, I attempt to enter into the philosophical grounds which can be given for assenting58 to the utilitarian standard, I shall offer some illustrations of the doctrine itself; with the view of showing more clearly what it is, distinguishing it from what it is not, and disposing of such of the practical objections to it as either originate in, or are closely connected with, mistaken interpretations59 of its meaning. Having thus prepared the ground, I shall afterwards endeavour to throw such light as I can upon the question, considered as one of philosophical theory.
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1
speculation
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| n.思索，沉思；猜测；投机 | |
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controversy
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| n.争论，辩论，争吵 | |
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speculative
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| adj.思索性的，暝想性的，推理的 | |
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sects
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| n.宗派，教派( sect的名词复数 ) | |
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warfare
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| n.战争(状态)；斗争；冲突 | |
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utilitarian
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| adj.实用的，功利的 | |
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uncertainty
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| n.易变，靠不住，不确知，不确定的事物 | |
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discordance
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| n.不调和，不和，不一致性；不整合；假整合 | |
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impairing
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| v.损害，削弱( impair的现在分词 ) | |
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detailed
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| adj.详细的，详尽的，极注意细节的，完全的 | |
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doctrines
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| n.教条( doctrine的名词复数 )；教义；学说；（政府政策的）正式声明 | |
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doctrine
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| n.教义；主义；学说 | |
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precarious
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| adj.不安定的，靠不住的；根据不足的 | |
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insufficiently
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| adv.不够地，不能胜任地 | |
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algebra
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| n.代数学 | |
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derives
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| v.得到( derive的第三人称单数 )；（从…中）得到获得；源于；（从…中）提取 | |
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derive
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| v.取得；导出；引申；来自；源自；出自 | |
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eminent
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| adj.显赫的，杰出的，有名的，优良的 | |
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conversant
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| adj.亲近的，有交情的，熟悉的 | |
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edifice
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| n.宏伟的建筑物(如宫殿，教室) | |
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subservient
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| adj.卑屈的，阿谀的 | |
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ascertaining
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| v.弄清，确定，查明( ascertain的现在分词 ) | |
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ascertained
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| v.弄清，确定，查明( ascertain的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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faculty
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| n.才能；学院，系；(学院或系的)全体教学人员 | |
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pretensions
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| 自称( pretension的名词复数 )； 自命不凡； 要求； 权力 | |
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judgments
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| 判断( judgment的名词复数 )； 鉴定； 评价； 审判 | |
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ethics
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| n.伦理学；伦理观，道德标准 | |
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assent
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| v.批准，认可；n.批准，认可 | |
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premises
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| n.建筑物，房屋 | |
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precept
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| n.戒律；格言 | |
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precepts
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| n.规诫，戒律，箴言( precept的名词复数 ) | |
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maxims
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| n.格言，座右铭( maxim的名词复数 ) | |
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authoritative
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| adj.有权威的，可相信的；命令式的；官方的 | |
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mitigated
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| v.减轻，缓和( mitigate的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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ethical
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| adj.伦理的，道德的，合乎道德的 | |
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consistency
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| n.一贯性，前后一致，稳定性；(液体的)浓度 | |
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attained
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| （通常经过努力）实现( attain的过去式和过去分词 )； 达到； 获得； 达到（某年龄、水平、状况） | |
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consecration
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| n.供献，奉献，献祭仪式 | |
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unwilling
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| adj.不情愿的 | |
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criticise
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| v.批评，评论；非难 | |
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systematic
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| adj.有系统的，有计划的，有方法的 | |
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treatise
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| n.专著；(专题)论文 | |
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remarkable
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| adj.显著的，异常的，非凡的，值得注意的 | |
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landmarks
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| n.陆标( landmark的名词复数 )；目标；（标志重要阶段的）里程碑 ~ (in sth)；有历史意义的建筑物（或遗址） | |
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philosophical
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| adj.哲学家的，哲学上的，达观的 | |
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grotesquely
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| adv. 奇异地,荒诞地 | |
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adoption
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| n.采用，采纳，通过；收养 | |
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48
outrageously
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| 凶残地； 肆无忌惮地； 令人不能容忍地； 不寻常地 | |
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immoral
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| adj.不道德的，淫荡的，荒淫的，有伤风化的 | |
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incur
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| vt.招致，蒙受，遭遇 | |
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51
appreciation
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| n.评价；欣赏；感谢；领会，理解；价格上涨 | |
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susceptible
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| adj.过敏的，敏感的；易动感情的，易受感动的 | |
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amenable
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| adj.经得起检验的；顺从的；对负有义务的 | |
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54
rejection
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| n.拒绝，被拒，抛弃，被弃 | |
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solely
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| adv.仅仅，唯一地 | |
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withhold
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| v.拒绝，不给；使停止，阻挡 | |
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impedes
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| 阻碍，妨碍，阻止( impede的第三人称单数 ) | |
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assenting
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| 同意，赞成( assent的现在分词 ) | |
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interpretations
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| n.解释( interpretation的名词复数 )；表演；演绎；理解 | |
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