The right of directing a civil officer presupposes that of cashiering him if he does not obey orders, and of rewarding him by promotion18 if he fulfils his duties with propriety19. But an elected magistrate3 can neither be cashiered nor promoted. All elective functions are inalienable until their term is expired. In fact, the elected magistrate has nothing either to expect or to fear from his constituents20; and when all public offices are filled by ballot21 there can be no series of official dignities, because the double right of commanding and of enforcing obedience13 can never be vested in the same individual, and because the power of issuing an order can never be joined to that of inflicting22 a punishment or bestowing23 a reward.
The communities therefore in which the secondary functionaries of the government are elected are perforce obliged to make great use of judicial penalties as a means of administration. This is not evident at first sight; for those in power are apt to look upon the institution of elective functionaries as one concession24, and the subjection of the elected magistrate to the judges of the land as another. They are equally averse25 to both these innovations; and as they are more pressingly solicited26 to grant the former than the latter, they accede27 to the election of the magistrate, and leave him independent of the judicial power. Nevertheless, the second of these measures is the only thing that can possibly counterbalance the first; and it will be found that an elective authority which is not subject to judicial power will, sooner or later, either elude28 all control or be destroyed. The courts of justice are the only possible medium between the central power and the administrative29 bodies; they alone can compel the elected functionary to obey, without violating the rights of the elector. The extension of judicial power in the political world ought therefore to be in the exact ratio of the extension of elective offices: if these two institutions do not go hand in hand, the State must fall into anarchy30 or into subjection.
It has always been remarked that habits of legal business do not render men apt to the exercise of administrative authority. The Americans have borrowed from the English, their fathers, the idea of an institution which is unknown upon the continent of Europe: I allude31 to that of the Justices of the Peace. The Justice of the Peace is a sort of mezzo termine between the magistrate and the man of the world, between the civil officer and the judge. A justice of the peace is a well-informed citizen, though he is not necessarily versed32 in the knowledge of the laws. His office simply obliges him to execute the police regulations of society; a task in which good sense and integrity are of more avail than legal science. The justice introduces into the administration a certain taste for established forms and publicity33, which renders him a most unserviceable instrument of despotism; and, on the other hand, he is not blinded by those superstitions34 which render legal officers unfit members of a government. The Americans have adopted the system of the English justices of the peace, but they have deprived it of that aristocratic character which is discernible in the mother-country. The Governor of Massachusetts *p appoints a certain number of justices of the peace in every county, whose functions last seven years. *q He further designates three individuals from amongst the whole body of justices who form in each county what is called the Court of Sessions. The justices take a personal share in public business; they are sometimes entrusted with administrative functions in conjunction with elected officers, *r they sometimes constitute a tribunal, before which the magistrates summarily prosecute35 a refractory36 citizen, or the citizens inform against the abuses of the magistrate. But it is in the Court of Sessions that they exercise their most important functions. This court meets twice a year in the county town; in Massachusetts it is empowered to enforce the obedience of the greater number *s of public officers. *t It must be observed, that in the State of Massachusetts the Court of Sessions is at the same time an administrative body, properly so called, and a political tribunal. It has been asserted that the county is a purely37 administrative division. The Court of Sessions presides over that small number of affairs which, as they concern several townships, or all the townships of the county in common, cannot be entrusted to any one of them in particular. *u In all that concerns county business the duties of the Court of Sessions are purely administrative; and if in its investigations39 it occasionally borrows the forms of judicial procedure, it is only with a view to its own information, *v or as a guarantee to the community over which it presides. But when the administration of the township is brought before it, it always acts as a judicial body, and in some few cases as an official assembly.
p
[ We shall hereafter learn what a Governor is: I shall content myself with remarking in this place that he represents the executive power of the whole State.]
q
r
[ Thus, for example, a stranger arrives in a township from a country where a contagious41 disease prevails, and he falls ill. Two justices of the peace can, with the assent42 of the selectmen, order the sheriff of the county to remove and take care of him.—Act of June 22, 1797, vol. i. p. 540.
In general the justices interfere43 in all the important acts of the administration, and give them a semi-judicial character.] [Footnote s: I say the greater number, because certain administrative misdemeanors are brought before ordinary tribunals. If, for instance, a township refuses to make the necessary expenditure44 for its schools or to name a school-committee, it is liable to a heavy fine. But this penalty is pronounced by the Supreme45 Judicial Court or the Court of Common Pleas. See Act of March 10, 1827, Laws of Massachusetts, vol. iii. p. 190. Or when a township neglects to provide the necessary war-stores.—Act of February 21, 1822: Id., vol. ii. p. 570.]
t
[ In their individual capacity the justices of the peace take a part in the business of the counties and townships.] [Footnote u: These affairs may be brought under the following heads:—1. The erection of prisons and courts of justice. 2. The county budget, which is afterwards voted by the State. 3. The distribution of the taxes so voted. 4. Grants of certain patents. 5. The laying down and repairs of the country roads.]
v
[ Thus, when a road is under consideration, almost all difficulties are disposed of by the aid of the jury.]
The first difficulty is to procure46 the obedience of an authority as entirely47 independent of the general laws of the State as the township is. We have stated that assessors are annually48 named by the town-meetings to levy49 the taxes. If a township attempts to evade50 the payment of the taxes by neglecting to name its assessors, the Court of Sessions condemns51 it to a heavy penalty. *w The fine is levied52 on each of the inhabitants; and the sheriff of the county, who is the officer of justice, executes the mandate53. Thus it is that in the United States the authority of the Government is mysteriously concealed54 under the forms of a judicial sentence; and its influence is at the same time fortified55 by that irresistible56 power with which men have invested the formalities of law.
w
[ See Act of February 20, 1786, Laws of Massachusetts, vol. i. p. 217.]
These proceedings57 are easy to follow and to understand. The demands made upon a township are in general plain and accurately58 defined; they consist in a simple fact without any complication, or in a principle without its application in detail. *x But the difficulty increases when it is not the obedience of the township, but that of the town officers which is to be enforced. All the reprehensible59 actions of which a public functionary may be guilty are reducible to the following heads:
x
[ There is an indirect method of enforcing the obedience of a township. Suppose that the funds which the law demands for the maintenance of the roads have not been voted, the town surveyor is then authorized, ex officio, to levy the supplies. As he is personally responsible to private individuals for the state of the roads, and indictable before the Court of Sessions, he is sure to employ the extraordinary right which the law gives him against the township. Thus by threatening the officer the Court of Sessions exacts compliance from the town. See Act of March 5, 1787, Id., vol. i. p. 305.]
He may neglect to execute the law;
The last two violations63 of duty can alone come under the cognizance of a tribunal; a positive and appreciable64 fact is the indispensable foundation of an action at law. Thus, if the selectmen omit to fulfil the legal formalities usual at town elections, they may be condemned65 to pay a fine; *y but when the public officer performs his duty without ability, and when he obeys the letter of the law without zeal or energy, he is at least beyond the reach of judicial interference. The Court of Sessions, even when it is invested with its official powers, is in this case unable to compel him to a more satisfactory obedience. The fear of removal is the only check to these quasi-offences; and as the Court of Sessions does not originate the town authorities, it cannot remove functionaries whom it does not appoint. Moreover, a perpetual investigation38 would be necessary to convict the officer of negligence66 or lukewarmness; and the Court of Sessions sits but twice a year and then only judges such offences as are brought before its notice. The only security of that active and enlightened obedience which a court of justice cannot impose upon public officers lies in the possibility of their arbitrary removal. In France this security is sought for in powers exercised by the heads of the administration; in America it is sought for in the principle of election.
y
[ Laws of Massachusetts, vol. ii. p. 45.]
Thus, to recapitulate67 in a few words what I have been showing: If a public officer in New England commits a crime in the exercise of his functions, the ordinary courts of justice are always called upon to pass sentence upon him. If he commits a fault in his official capacity, a purely administrative tribunal is empowered to punish him; and, if the affair is important or urgent, the judge supplies the omission68 of the functionary. *z Lastly, if the same individual is guilty of one of those intangible offences of which human justice has no cognizance, he annually appears before a tribunal from which there is no appeal, which can at once reduce him to insignificance69 and deprive him of his charge. This system undoubtedly70 possesses great advantages, but its execution is attended with a practical difficulty which it is important to point out.
z
[ If, for instance, a township persists in refusing to name its assessors, the Court of Sessions nominates them; and the magistrates thus appointed are invested with the same authority as elected officers. See the Act quoted above, February 20, 1787.]
I have already observed that the administrative tribunal, which is called the Court of Sessions, has no right of inspection71 over the town officers. It can only interfere when the conduct of a magistrate is specially72 brought under its notice; and this is the delicate part of the system. The Americans of New England are unacquainted with the office of public prosecutor73 in the Court of Sessions, *a and it may readily be perceived that it could not have been established without difficulty. If an accusing magistrate had merely been appointed in the chief town of each county, and if he had been unassisted by agents in the townships, he would not have been better acquainted with what was going on in the county than the members of the Court of Sessions. But to appoint agents in each township would have been to centre in his person the most formidable of powers, that of a judicial administration. Moreover, laws are the children of habit, and nothing of the kind exists in the legislation of England. The Americans have therefore divided the offices of inspection and of prosecution74, as well as all the other functions of the administration. Grand jurors are bound by the law to apprise75 the court to which they belong of all the misdemeanors which may have been committed in their county. *b There are certain great offences which are officially prosecuted76 by the States; *c but more frequently the task of punishing delinquents77 devolves upon the fiscal78 officer, whose province it is to receive the fine: thus the treasurer79 of the township is charged with the prosecution of such administrative offences as fall under his notice. But a more special appeal is made by American legislation to the private interest of the citizen; *d and this great principle is constantly to be met with in studying the laws of the United States. American legislators are more apt to give men credit for intelligence than for honesty, and they rely not a little on personal cupidity80 for the execution of the laws. When an individual is really and sensibly injured by an administrative abuse, it is natural that his personal interest should induce him to prosecute. But if a legal formality be required, which, however advantageous81 to the community, is of small importance to individuals, plaintiffs may be less easily found; and thus, by a tacit agreement, the laws may fall into disuse. Reduced by their system to this extremity82, the Americans are obliged to encourage informers by bestowing on them a portion of the penalty in certain cases, *e and to insure the execution of the laws by the dangerous expedient83 of degrading the morals of the people. The only administrative authority above the county magistrates is, properly speaking, that of the Government.
a
[ I say the Court of Sessions, because in common courts there is a magistrate who exercises some of the functions of a public prosecutor.]
b
[ The grand-jurors are, for instance, bound to inform the court of the bad state of the roads.—Laws of Massachusetts, vol. i. p. 308.]
c
[ If, for instance, the treasurer of the county holds back his accounts.—Laws of Massachusetts, vol. i. p. 406.] [Footnote d: Thus, if a private individual breaks down or is wounded in consequence of the badness of a road, he can sue the township or the county for damages at the sessions.—Laws of Massachusetts, vol. i. p. 309.]
e
[ In cases of invasion or insurrection, if the town-officers neglect to furnish the necessary stores and ammunition84 for the militia85, the township may be condemned to a fine of from $200 to $500. It may readily be imagined that in such a case it might happen that no one cared to prosecute; hence the law adds that all the citizens may indict60 offences of this kind, and that half of the fine shall belong to the plaintiff. See Act of March 6, 1810, vol. ii. p. 236. The same clause is frequently to be met with in the law of Massachusetts. Not only are private individuals thus incited86 to prosecute the public officers, but the public officers are encouraged in the same manner to bring the disobedience of private individuals to justice. If a citizen refuses to perform the work which has been assigned to him upon a road, the road surveyor may prosecute him, and he receives half the penalty for himself. See the Laws above quoted, vol. i. p. 308.]
General Remarks On The Administration Of The United States Differences of the States of the union in their system of administration—Activity and perfection of the local authorities decrease towards the South—Power of the magistrate increases; that of the elector diminishes—Administration passes from the township to the county—States of New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania—Principles of administration applicable to the whole union—Election of public officers, and inalienability of their functions—Absence of gradation of ranks—Introduction of judicial resources into the administration.
I have already premised that, after having examined the constitution of the township and the county of New England in detail, I should take a general view of the remainder of the union. Townships and a local activity exist in every State; but in no part of the confederation is a township to be met with precisely87 similar to those of New England. The more we descend6 towards the South, the less active does the business of the township or parish become; the number of magistrates, of functions, and of rights decreases; the population exercises a less immediate88 influence on affairs; town meetings are less frequent, and the subjects of debate less numerous. The power of the elected magistrate is augmented89 and that of the elector diminished, whilst the public spirit of the local communities is less awakened90 and less influential91. *f These differences may be perceived to a certain extent in the State of New York; they are very sensible in Pennsylvania; but they become less striking as we advance to the northwest. The majority of the emigrants92 who settle in the northwestern States are natives of New England, and they carry the habits of their mother country with them into that which they adopt. A township in Ohio is by no means dissimilar from a township in Massachusetts.
f
[ For details see the Revised Statutes93 of the State of New York, part i. chap. xi. vol. i. pp. 336-364, entitled, "Of the Powers, Duties, and Privileges of Towns."
See in the Digest of the Laws of Pennsylvania, the words Assessors, Collector, Constables94, Overseer of the Poor, Supervisors95 of Highways; and in the Acts of a general nature of the State of Ohio, the Act of February 25, 1834, relating to townships, p. 412; besides the peculiar96 dispositions97 relating to divers98 town-officers, such as Township's Clerk, Trustees, Overseers of the Poor, Fence Viewers, Appraisers of Property, Township's Treasurer, Constables, Supervisors of Highways.]
We have seen that in Massachusetts the mainspring of public administration lies in the township. It forms the common centre of the interests and affections of the citizens. But this ceases to be the case as we descend to States in which knowledge is less generally diffused99, and where the township consequently offers fewer guarantees of a wise and active administration. As we leave New England, therefore, we find that the importance of the town is gradually transferred to the county, which becomes the centre of administration, and the intermediate power between the Government and the citizen. In Massachusetts the business of the county is conducted by the Court of Sessions, which is composed of a quorum100 named by the Governor and his council; but the county has no representative assembly, and its expenditure is voted by the national legislature. In the great State of New York, on the contrary, and in those of Ohio and Pennsylvania, the inhabitants of each county choose a certain number of representatives, who constitute the assembly of the county. *g The county assembly has the right of taxing the inhabitants to a certain extent; and in this respect it enjoys the privileges of a real legislative body: at the same time it exercises an executive power in the county, frequently directs the administration of the townships, and restricts their authority within much narrower bounds than in Massachusetts.
g
[ See the Revised Statutes of the State of New York, part i. chap. xi. vol. i. p. 340. Id. chap. xii. p. 366; also in the Acts of the State of Ohio, an act relating to county commissioners101, February 25, 1824, p. 263. See the Digest of the Laws of Pennsylvania, at the words County-rates and Levies102, p. 170. In the State of New York each township elects a representative, who has a share in the administration of the county as well as in that of the township.]
Such are the principal differences which the systems of county and town administration present in the Federal States. Were it my intention to examine the provisions of American law minutely, I should have to point out still further differences in the executive details of the several communities. But what I have already said may suffice to show the general principles on which the administration of the United States rests. These principles are differently applied103; their consequences are more or less numerous in various localities; but they are always substantially the same. The laws differ, and their outward features change, but their character does not vary. If the township and the county are not everywhere constituted in the same manner, it is at least true that in the United States the county and the township are always based upon the same principle, namely, that everyone is the best judge of what concerns himself alone, and the most proper person to supply his private wants. The township and the county are therefore bound to take care of their special interests: the State governs, but it does not interfere with their administration. Exceptions to this rule may be met with, but not a contrary principle.
The first consequence of this doctrine104 has been to cause all the magistrates to be chosen either by or at least from amongst the citizens. As the officers are everywhere elected or appointed for a certain period, it has been impossible to establish the rules of a dependent series of authorities; there are almost as many independent functionaries as there are functions, and the executive power is disseminated105 in a multitude of hands. Hence arose the indispensable necessity of introducing the control of the courts of justice over the administration, and the system of pecuniary106 penalties, by which the secondary bodies and their representatives are constrained107 to obey the laws. This system obtains from one end of the union to the other. The power of punishing the misconduct of public officers, or of performing the part of the executive in urgent cases, has not, however, been bestowed108 on the same judges in all the States. The Anglo-Americans derived109 the institution of justices of the peace from a common source; but although it exists in all the States, it is not always turned to the same use. The justices of the peace everywhere participate in the administration of the townships and the counties, *h either as public officers or as the judges of public misdemeanors, but in most of the States the more important classes of public offences come under the cognizance of the ordinary tribunals.
h
[ In some of the Southern States the county courts are charged with all the details of the administration. See the Statutes of the State of Tennessee, arts. Judiciary, Taxes, etc.]
The election of public officers, or the inalienability of their functions, the absence of a gradation of powers, and the introduction of a judicial control over the secondary branches of the administration, are the universal characteristics of the American system from Maine to the Floridas. In some States (and that of New York has advanced most in this direction) traces of a centralized administration begin to be discernible. In the State of New York the officers of the central government exercise, in certain cases, a sort of inspection or control over the secondary bodies. *i
i
[ For instance, the direction of public instruction centres in the hands of the Government. The legislature names the members of the University, who are denominated Regents; the Governor and Lieutentant-Governor of the State are necessarily of the number.—Revised Statutes, vol. i. p. 455. The Regents of the University annually visit the colleges and academies, and make their report to the legislature. Their superintendence is not inefficient110, for several reasons: the colleges in order to become corporations stand in need of a charter, which is only granted on the recommendation of the Regents; every year funds are distributed by the State for the encouragement of learning, and the Regents are the distributors of this money. See chap. xv. "Instruction," Revised Statutes, vol. i. p. 455.
The school-commissioners are obliged to send an annual report to the Superintendent111 of the Republic.—Id. p. 488.
A similar report is annually made to the same person on the number and condition of the poor.—Id. p. 631.]
At other times they constitute a court of appeal for the decision of affairs. *j In the State of New York judicial penalties are less used than in other parts as a means of administration, and the right of prosecuting112 the offences of public officers is vested in fewer hands. *k The same tendency is faintly observable in some other States; *l but in general the prominent feature of the administration in the United States is its excessive local independence.
j
[ If any one conceives himself to be wronged by the school-commissioners (who are town-officers), he can appeal to the superintendent of the primary schools, whose decision is final.—Revised Statutes, vol. i. p. 487.
Provisions similar to those above cited are to be met with from time to time in the laws of the State of New York; but in general these attempts at centralization are weak and unproductive. The great authorities of the State have the right of watching and controlling the subordinate agents, without that of rewarding or punishing them. The same individual is never empowered to give an order and to punish disobedience; he has therefore the right of commanding, without the means of exacting113 compliance. In 1830 the Superintendent of Schools complained in his Annual Report addressed to the legislature that several school-commissioners had neglected, notwithstanding his application, to furnish him with the accounts which were due. He added that if this omission continued he should be obliged to prosecute them, as the law directs, before the proper tribunals.]
k
[ Thus the district-attorney is directed to recover all fines below the sum of fifty dollars, unless such a right has been specially awarded to another magistrate.—Revised Statutes, vol. i. p. 383.]
l
[ Several traces of centralization may be discovered in Massachusetts; for instance, the committees of the town-schools are directed to make an annual report to the Secretary of State. See Laws of Massachusetts, vol. i. p. 367.]
Of The State
I have described the townships and the administration; it now remains for me to speak of the State and the Government. This is ground I may pass over rapidly, without fear of being misunderstood; for all I have to say is to be found in written forms of the various constitutions, which are easily to be procured114. These constitutions rest upon a simple and rational theory; their forms have been adopted by all constitutional nations, and are become familiar to us. In this place, therefore, it is only necessary for me to give a short analysis; I shall endeavor afterwards to pass judgment115 upon what I now describe.
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1
compliance
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| n.顺从；服从；附和；屈从 | |
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magistrates
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| 地方法官，治安官( magistrate的名词复数 ) | |
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magistrate
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| n.地方行政官，地方法官，治安官 | |
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legislative
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| n.立法机构，立法权；adj.立法的，有立法权的 | |
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penetrates
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| v.穿过( penetrate的第三人称单数 )；刺入；了解；渗透 | |
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descend
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| vt./vi.传下来，下来，下降 | |
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descends
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| v.下来( descend的第三人称单数 )；下去；下降；下斜 | |
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enactment
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| n.演出，担任…角色；制订，通过 | |
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functionaries
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| n.公职人员，官员( functionary的名词复数 ) | |
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remains
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| n.剩余物，残留物；遗体，遗迹 | |
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entrusted
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| v.委托，托付( entrust的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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functionary
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| n.官员；公职人员 | |
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obedience
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| n.服从，顺从 | |
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authorized
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| a.委任的，许可的 | |
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inflict
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| vt.(on)把…强加给，使遭受，使承担 | |
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judicial
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| adj.司法的，法庭的，审判的，明断的，公正的 | |
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offender
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| n.冒犯者，违反者，犯罪者 | |
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promotion
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| n.提升，晋级；促销，宣传 | |
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propriety
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| n.正当行为；正当；适当 | |
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constituents
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| n.选民( constituent的名词复数 )；成分；构成部分；要素 | |
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ballot
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| n.（不记名）投票，投票总数，投票权；vi.投票 | |
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inflicting
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| 把…强加给，使承受，遭受( inflict的现在分词 ) | |
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bestowing
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| 砖窑中砖堆上层已烧透的砖 | |
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concession
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| n.让步，妥协；特许(权) | |
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averse
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| adj.厌恶的；反对的，不乐意的 | |
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solicited
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| v.恳求( solicit的过去式和过去分词 )；（指娼妇）拉客；索求；征求 | |
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accede
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| v.应允，同意 | |
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elude
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| v.躲避，困惑 | |
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administrative
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| adj.行政的，管理的 | |
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anarchy
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| n.无政府状态；社会秩序混乱，无秩序 | |
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allude
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| v.提及，暗指 | |
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versed
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| adj. 精通，熟练 | |
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publicity
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| n.众所周知，闻名；宣传，广告 | |
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superstitions
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| 迷信，迷信行为( superstition的名词复数 ) | |
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prosecute
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| vt.告发；进行；vi.告发，起诉，作检察官 | |
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refractory
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| adj.倔强的，难驾驭的 | |
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purely
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| adv.纯粹地，完全地 | |
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investigation
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| n.调查，调查研究 | |
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investigations
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| （正式的）调查( investigation的名词复数 )； 侦查； 科学研究； 学术研究 | |
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sect
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| n.派别，宗教，学派，派系 | |
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contagious
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| adj.传染性的，有感染力的 | |
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assent
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| v.批准，认可；n.批准，认可 | |
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interfere
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| v.(in)干涉，干预；(with)妨碍，打扰 | |
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expenditure
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| n.(时间、劳力、金钱等)支出；使用，消耗 | |
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supreme
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| adj.极度的，最重要的；至高的，最高的 | |
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46
procure
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| vt.获得，取得，促成；vi.拉皮条 | |
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entirely
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| ad.全部地，完整地；完全地，彻底地 | |
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annually
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| adv.一年一次，每年 | |
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levy
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| n.征收税或其他款项，征收额 | |
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evade
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| vt.逃避，回避；避开，躲避 | |
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condemns
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| v.（通常因道义上的原因而）谴责( condemn的第三人称单数 )；宣判；宣布…不能使用；迫使…陷于不幸的境地 | |
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52
levied
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| 征（兵）( levy的过去式和过去分词 )； 索取； 发动（战争）； 征税 | |
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53
mandate
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| n.托管地；命令，指示 | |
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concealed
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| a.隐藏的，隐蔽的 | |
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fortified
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| adj. 加强的 | |
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irresistible
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| adj.非常诱人的，无法拒绝的，无法抗拒的 | |
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proceedings
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| n.进程，过程，议程；诉讼(程序)；公报 | |
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accurately
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| adv.准确地，精确地 | |
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reprehensible
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| adj.该受责备的 | |
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indict
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| v.起诉，控告，指控 | |
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zeal
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| n.热心，热情，热忱 | |
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enjoins
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| v.命令( enjoin的第三人称单数 ) | |
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violations
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| 违反( violation的名词复数 )； 冒犯； 违反（行为、事例）； 强奸 | |
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appreciable
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| adj.明显的，可见的，可估量的，可觉察的 | |
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condemned
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| adj. 被责难的, 被宣告有罪的 动词condemn的过去式和过去分词 | |
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negligence
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| n.疏忽，玩忽，粗心大意 | |
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recapitulate
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| v.节述要旨，择要说明 | |
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omission
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| n.省略，删节；遗漏或省略的事物，冗长 | |
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insignificance
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| n.不重要；无价值；无意义 | |
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undoubtedly
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| adv.确实地，无疑地 | |
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inspection
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| n.检查，审查，检阅 | |
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specially
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| adv.特定地；特殊地；明确地 | |
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prosecutor
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| n.起诉人；检察官，公诉人 | |
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prosecution
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| n.起诉，告发，检举，执行，经营 | |
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apprise
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| vt.通知，告知 | |
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prosecuted
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| a.被起诉的 | |
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77
delinquents
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| n.（尤指青少年）有过失的人，违法的人( delinquent的名词复数 ) | |
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fiscal
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| adj.财政的，会计的，国库的，国库岁入的 | |
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treasurer
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| n.司库，财务主管 | |
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cupidity
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| n.贪心，贪财 | |
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advantageous
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| adj.有利的；有帮助的 | |
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extremity
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| n.末端，尽头；尽力；终极；极度 | |
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expedient
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| adj.有用的，有利的；n.紧急的办法，权宜之计 | |
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ammunition
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| n.军火，弹药 | |
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militia
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| n.民兵，民兵组织 | |
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incited
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| 刺激，激励，煽动( incite的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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precisely
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| adv.恰好，正好，精确地，细致地 | |
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immediate
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| adj.立即的；直接的，最接近的；紧靠的 | |
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Augmented
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| adj.增音的 动词augment的过去式和过去分词形式 | |
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awakened
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| v.（使）醒( awaken的过去式和过去分词 )；（使）觉醒；弄醒；（使）意识到 | |
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influential
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| adj.有影响的，有权势的 | |
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emigrants
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| n.（从本国移往他国的）移民( emigrant的名词复数 ) | |
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statutes
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| 成文法( statute的名词复数 )； 法令； 法规； 章程 | |
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constables
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| n.警察( constable的名词复数 ) | |
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supervisors
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| n.监督者，管理者( supervisor的名词复数 ) | |
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96
peculiar
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| adj.古怪的，异常的；特殊的，特有的 | |
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97
dispositions
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| 安排( disposition的名词复数 )； 倾向； （财产、金钱的）处置； 气质 | |
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divers
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| adj.不同的；种种的 | |
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99
diffused
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| 散布的，普及的，扩散的 | |
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100
quorum
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| n.法定人数 | |
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101
commissioners
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| n.专员( commissioner的名词复数 )；长官；委员；政府部门的长官 | |
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102
levies
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| （部队）征兵( levy的名词复数 )； 募捐； 被征募的军队 | |
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103
applied
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| adj.应用的；v.应用，适用 | |
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104
doctrine
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| n.教义；主义；学说 | |
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105
disseminated
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| 散布，传播( disseminate的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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106
pecuniary
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| adj.金钱的；金钱上的 | |
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107
constrained
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| adj.束缚的,节制的 | |
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108
bestowed
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| 赠给，授予( bestow的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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109
derived
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| vi.起源；由来；衍生；导出v.得到( derive的过去式和过去分词 )；（从…中）得到获得；源于；（从…中）提取 | |
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110
inefficient
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| adj.效率低的，无效的 | |
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111
superintendent
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| n.监督人，主管，总监；(英国)警务长 | |
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112
prosecuting
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| 检举、告发某人( prosecute的现在分词 )； 对某人提起公诉； 继续从事（某事物）； 担任控方律师 | |
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113
exacting
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| adj.苛求的，要求严格的 | |
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114
procured
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| v.（努力）取得， （设法）获得( procure的过去式和过去分词 )；拉皮条 | |
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115
judgment
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| n.审判；判断力，识别力，看法，意见 | |
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