Division of the Legislative Body into two Houses—Senate—House of Representatives—Different functions of these two Bodies.
The legislative power of the State is vested in two assemblies, the first of which generally bears the name of the Senate. The Senate is commonly a legislative body; but it sometimes becomes an executive and judicial2 one. It takes a part in the government in several ways, according to the constitution of the different States; *m but it is in the nomination3 of public functionaries4 that it most commonly assumes an executive power. It partakes of judicial power in the trial of certain political offences, and sometimes also in the decision of certain civil cases. *n The number of its members is always small. The other branch of the legislature, which is usually called the House of Representatives, has no share whatever in the administration, and only takes a part in the judicial power inasmuch as it impeaches6 public functionaries before the Senate. The members of the two Houses are nearly everywhere subject to the same conditions of election. They are chosen in the same manner, and by the same citizens. The only difference which exists between them is, that the term for which the Senate is chosen is in general longer than that of the House of Representatives. The latter seldom remain in office longer than a year; the former usually sit two or three years. By granting to the senators the privilege of being chosen for several years, and being renewed seriatim, the law takes care to preserve in the legislative body a nucleus7 of men already accustomed to public business, and capable of exercising a salutary influence upon the junior members.
[ As in the State of New York.]
The Americans, plainly, did not desire, by this separation of the legislative body into two branches, to make one house hereditary8 and the other elective; one aristocratic and the other democratic. It was not their object to create in the one a bulwark9 to power, whilst the other represented the interests and passions of the people. The only advantages which result from the present constitution of the United States are the division of the legislative power and the consequent check upon political assemblies; with the creation of a tribunal of appeal for the revision of the laws.
Time and experience, however, have convinced the Americans that if these are its only advantages, the division of the legislative power is still a principle of the greatest necessity. Pennsylvania was the only one of the United States which at first attempted to establish a single House of Assembly, and Franklin himself was so far carried away by the necessary consequences of the principle of the sovereignty of the people as to have concurred11 in the measure; but the Pennsylvanians were soon obliged to change the law, and to create two Houses. Thus the principle of the division of the legislative power was finally established, and its necessity may henceforward be regarded as a demonstrated truth. This theory, which was nearly unknown to the republics of antiquity—which was introduced into the world almost by accident, like so many other great truths—and misunderstood by several modern nations, is at length become an axiom in the political science of the present age.
[See Benjamin Franklin]
The Executive Power Of The State
Office of Governor in an American State—The place he occupies in relation to the Legislature—His rights and his duties—His dependence12 on the people.
The executive power of the State may with truth be said to be represented by the Governor, although he enjoys but a portion of its rights. The supreme13 magistrate14, under the title of Governor, is the official moderator and counsellor of the legislature. He is armed with a veto or suspensive power, which allows him to stop, or at least to retard15, its movements at pleasure. He lays the wants of the country before the legislative body, and points out the means which he thinks may be usefully employed in providing for them; he is the natural executor of its decrees in all the undertakings16 which interest the nation at large. *o In the absence of the legislature, the Governor is bound to take all necessary steps to guard the State against violent shocks and unforeseen dangers. The whole military power of the State is at the disposal of the Governor. He is the commander of the militia18, and head of the armed force. When the authority, which is by general consent awarded to the laws, is disregarded, the Governor puts himself at the head of the armed force of the State, to quell19 resistance, and to restore order. Lastly, the Governor takes no share in the administration of townships and counties, except it be indirectly20 in the nomination of Justices of the Peace, which nomination he has not the power to cancel. *p The Governor is an elected magistrate, and is generally chosen for one or two years only; so that he always continues to be strictly21 dependent upon the majority who returned him.
o
[ Practically speaking, it is not always the Governor who executes the plans of the Legislature; it often happens that the latter, in voting a measure, names special agents to superintend the execution of it.]
p
[ In some of the States the justices of the peace are not elected by the Governor.]
Political Effects Of The System Of Local Administration In The United States
Necessary distinction between the general centralization of Government and the centralization of the local administration—Local administration not centralized in the United States: great general centralization of the Government—Some bad consequences resulting to the United States from the local administration—Administrative22 advantages attending this order of things—The power which conducts the Government is less regular, less enlightened, less learned, but much greater than in Europe—Political advantages of this order of things—In the United States the interests of the country are everywhere kept in view—Support given to the Government by the community—Provincial23 institutions more necessary in proportion as the social condition becomes more democratic—Reason of this.
Centralization is become a word of general and daily use, without any precise meaning being attached to it. Nevertheless, there exist two distinct kinds of centralization, which it is necessary to discriminate24 with accuracy. Certain interests are common to all parts of a nation, such as the enactment25 of its general laws and the maintenance of its foreign relations. Other interests are peculiar26 to certain parts of the nation; such, for instance, as the business of different townships. When the power which directs the general interests is centred in one place, or vested in the same persons, it constitutes a central government. In like manner the power of directing partial or local interests, when brought together into one place, constitutes what may be termed a central administration.
Upon some points these two kinds of centralization coalesce27; but by classifying the objects which fall more particularly within the province of each of them, they may easily be distinguished28. It is evident that a central government acquires immense power when united to administrative centralization. Thus combined, it accustoms29 men to set their own will habitually30 and completely aside; to submit, not only for once, or upon one point, but in every respect, and at all times. Not only, therefore, does this union of power subdue31 them compulsorily32, but it affects them in the ordinary habits of life, and influences each individual, first separately and then collectively.
These two kinds of centralization mutually assist and attract each other; but they must not be supposed to be inseparable. It is impossible to imagine a more completely central government than that which existed in France under Louis XIV.; when the same individual was the author and the interpreter of the laws, and the representative of France at home and abroad, he was justified33 in asserting that the State was identified with his person. Nevertheless, the administration was much less centralized under Louis XIV. than it is at the present day.
In England the centralization of the government is carried to great perfection; the State has the compact vigor34 of a man, and by the sole act of its will it puts immense engines in motion, and wields35 or collects the efforts of its authority. Indeed, I cannot conceive that a nation can enjoy a secure or prosperous existence without a powerful centralization of government. But I am of opinion that a central administration enervates36 the nations in which it exists by incessantly37 diminishing their public spirit. If such an administration succeeds in condensing at a given moment, on a given point, all the disposable resources of a people, it impairs38 at least the renewal39 of those resources. It may ensure a victory in the hour of strife40, but it gradually relaxes the sinews of strength. It may contribute admirably to the transient greatness of a man, but it cannot ensure the durable41 prosperity of a nation.
If we pay proper attention, we shall find that whenever it is said that a State cannot act because it has no central point, it is the centralization of the government in which it is deficient42. It is frequently asserted, and we are prepared to assent43 to the proposition, that the German empire was never able to bring all its powers into action. But the reason was, that the State was never able to enforce obedience44 to its general laws, because the several members of that great body always claimed the right, or found the means, of refusing their co-operation to the representatives of the common authority, even in the affairs which concerned the mass of the people; in other words, because there was no centralization of government. The same remark is applicable to the Middle Ages; the cause of all the confusion of feudal45 society was that the control, not only of local but of general interests, was divided amongst a thousand hands, and broken up in a thousand different ways; the absence of a central government prevented the nations of Europe from advancing with energy in any straightforward46 course.
We have shown that in the United States no central administration and no dependent series of public functionaries exist. Local authority has been carried to lengths which no European nation could endure without great inconvenience, and which has even produced some disadvantageous consequences in America. But in the United States the centralization of the Government is complete; and it would be easy to prove that the national power is more compact than it has ever been in the old nations of Europe. Not only is there but one legislative body in each State; not only does there exist but one source of political authority; but district assemblies and county courts have not in general been multiplied, lest they should be tempted10 to exceed their administrative duties, and interfere47 with the Government. In America the legislature of each State is supreme; nothing can impede48 its authority; neither privileges, nor local immunities49, nor personal influence, nor even the empire of reason, since it represents that majority which claims to be the sole organ of reason. Its own determination is, therefore, the only limit to this action. In juxtaposition50 to it, and under its immediate51 control, is the representative of the executive power, whose duty it is to constrain52 the refractory53 to submit by superior force. The only symptom of weakness lies in certain details of the action of the Government. The American republics have no standing54 armies to intimidate55 a discontented minority; but as no minority has as yet been reduced to declare open war, the necessity of an army has not been felt. *q The State usually employs the officers of the township or the county to deal with the citizens. Thus, for instance, in New England, the assessor fixes the rate of taxes; the collector receives them; the town-treasurer transmits the amount to the public treasury56; and the disputes which may arise are brought before the ordinary courts of justice. This method of collecting taxes is slow as well as inconvenient57, and it would prove a perpetual hindrance58 to a Government whose pecuniary59 demands were large. It is desirable that, in whatever materially affects its existence, the Government should be served by officers of its own, appointed by itself, removable at pleasure, and accustomed to rapid methods of proceeding60. But it will always be easy for the central government, organized as it is in America, to introduce new and more efficacious modes of action, proportioned to its wants. [Footnote q: [The Civil War of 1860-65 cruelly belied61 this statement, and in the course of the struggle the North alone called two millions and a half of men to arms; but to the honor of the United States it must be added that, with the cessation of the contest, this army disappeared as rapidly as it had been raised.—Translator's Note.]]
The absence of a central government will not, then, as has often been asserted, prove the destruction of the republics of the New World; far from supposing that the American governments are not sufficiently62 centralized, I shall prove hereafter that they are too much so. The legislative bodies daily encroach upon the authority of the Government, and their tendency, like that of the French Convention, is to appropriate it entirely63 to themselves. Under these circumstances the social power is constantly changing hands, because it is subordinate to the power of the people, which is too apt to forget the maxims64 of wisdom and of foresight65 in the consciousness of its strength: hence arises its danger; and thus its vigor, and not its impotence, will probably be the cause of its ultimate destruction.
The system of local administration produces several different effects in America. The Americans seem to me to have outstepped the limits of sound policy in isolating66 the administration of the Government; for order, even in second-rate affairs, is a matter of national importance. *r As the State has no administrative functionaries of its own, stationed on different points of its territory, to whom it can give a common impulse, the consequence is that it rarely attempts to issue any general police regulations. The want of these regulations is severely67 felt, and is frequently observed by Europeans. The appearance of disorder68 which prevails on the surface leads him at first to imagine that society is in a state of anarchy69; nor does he perceive his mistake till he has gone deeper into the subject. Certain undertakings are of importance to the whole State; but they cannot be put in execution, because there is no national administration to direct them. Abandoned to the exertions70 of the towns or counties, under the care of elected or temporary agents, they lead to no result, or at least to no durable benefit.
r
[ The authority which represents the State ought not, I think, to waive71 the right of inspecting the local administration, even when it does not interfere more actively72. Suppose, for instance, that an agent of the Government was stationed at some appointed spot in the country, to prosecute73 the misdemeanors of the town and county officers, would not a more uniform order be the result, without in any way compromising the independence of the township? Nothing of the kind, however, exists in America: there is nothing above the county-courts, which have, as it were, only an incidental cognizance of the offences they are meant to repress.]
The partisans74 of centralization in Europe are wont75 to maintain that the Government directs the affairs of each locality better than the citizens could do it for themselves; this may be true when the central power is enlightened, and when the local districts are ignorant; when it is as alert as they are slow; when it is accustomed to act, and they to obey. Indeed, it is evident that this double tendency must augment76 with the increase of centralization, and that the readiness of the one and the incapacity of the others must become more and more prominent. But I deny that such is the case when the people is as enlightened, as awake to its interests, and as accustomed to reflect on them, as the Americans are. I am persuaded, on the contrary, that in this case the collective strength of the citizens will always conduce more efficaciously to the public welfare than the authority of the Government. It is difficult to point out with certainty the means of arousing a sleeping population, and of giving it passions and knowledge which it does not possess; it is, I am well aware, an arduous77 task to persuade men to busy themselves about their own affairs; and it would frequently be easier to interest them in the punctilios of court etiquette78 than in the repairs of their common dwelling79. But whenever a central administration affects to supersede80 the persons most interested, I am inclined to suppose that it is either misled or desirous to mislead. However enlightened and however skilful81 a central power may be, it cannot of itself embrace all the details of the existence of a great nation. Such vigilance exceeds the powers of man. And when it attempts to create and set in motion so many complicated springs, it must submit to a very imperfect result, or consume itself in bootless efforts.
Centralization succeeds more easily, indeed, in subjecting the external actions of men to a certain uniformity, which at least commands our regard, independently of the objects to which it is applied82, like those devotees who worship the statue and forget the deity83 it represents. Centralization imparts without difficulty an admirable regularity84 to the routine of business; provides for the details of the social police with sagacity; represses the smallest disorder and the most petty misdemeanors; maintains society in a status quo alike secure from improvement and decline; and perpetuates85 a drowsy86 precision in the conduct of affairs, which is hailed by the heads of the administration as a sign of perfect order and public tranquillity87: *s in short, it excels more in prevention than in action. Its force deserts it when society is to be disturbed or accelerated in its course; and if once the co-operation of private citizens is necessary to the furtherance of its measures, the secret of its impotence is disclosed. Even whilst it invokes88 their assistance, it is on the condition that they shall act exactly as much as the Government chooses, and exactly in the manner it appoints. They are to take charge of the details, without aspiring89 to guide the system; they are to work in a dark and subordinate sphere, and only to judge the acts in which they have themselves cooperated by their results. These, however, are not conditions on which the alliance of the human will is to be obtained; its carriage must be free and its actions responsible, or (such is the constitution of man) the citizen had rather remain a passive spectator than a dependent actor in schemes with which he is unacquainted.
s
[ China appears to me to present the most perfect instance of that species of well-being90 which a completely central administration may furnish to the nations among which it exists. Travellers assure us that the Chinese have peace without happiness, industry without improvement, stability without strength, and public order without public morality. The condition of society is always tolerable, never excellent. I am convinced that, when China is opened to European observation, it will be found to contain the most perfect model of a central administration which exists in the universe.]
It is undeniable that the want of those uniform regulations which control the conduct of every inhabitant of France is not unfrequently felt in the United States. Gross instances of social indifference91 and neglect are to be met with, and from time to time disgraceful blemishes92 are seen in complete contrast with the surrounding civilization. Useful undertakings which cannot succeed without perpetual attention and rigorous exactitude are very frequently abandoned in the end; for in America, as well as in other countries, the people is subject to sudden impulses and momentary93 exertions. The European who is accustomed to find a functionary94 always at hand to interfere with all he undertakes has some difficulty in accustoming95 himself to the complex mechanism96 of the administration of the townships. In general it may be affirmed that the lesser97 details of the police, which render life easy and comfortable, are neglected in America; but that the essential guarantees of man in society are as strong there as elsewhere. In America the power which conducts the Government is far less regular, less enlightened, and less learned, but an hundredfold more authoritative98 than in Europe. In no country in the world do the citizens make such exertions for the common weal; and I am acquainted with no people which has established schools as numerous and as efficacious, places of public worship better suited to the wants of the inhabitants, or roads kept in better repair. Uniformity or permanence of design, the minute arrangement of details, *t and the perfection of an ingenious administration, must not be sought for in the United States; but it will be easy to find, on the other hand, the symptoms of a power which, if it is somewhat barbarous, is at least robust99; and of an existence which is checkered100 with accidents indeed, but cheered at the same time by animation101 and effort.
t
[ A writer of talent, who, in the comparison which he has drawn102 between the finances of France and those of the United States, has proved that ingenuity103 cannot always supply the place of a knowledge of facts, very justly reproaches the Americans for the sort of confusion which exists in the accounts of the expenditure104 in the townships; and after giving the model of a departmental budget in France, he adds:—"We are indebted to centralization, that admirable invention of a great man, for the uniform order and method which prevail alike in all the municipal budgets, from the largest town to the humblest commune." Whatever may be my admiration105 of this result, when I see the communes of France, with their excellent system of accounts, plunged106 into the grossest ignorance of their true interests, and abandoned to so incorrigible107 an apathy108 that they seem to vegetate109 rather than to live; when, on the other hand, I observe the activity, the information, and the spirit of enterprise which keep society in perpetual labor110, in those American townships whose budgets are drawn up with small method and with still less uniformity, I am struck by the spectacle; for to my mind the end of a good government is to ensure the welfare of a people, and not to establish order and regularity in the midst of its misery111 and its distress112. I am therefore led to suppose that the prosperity of the American townships and the apparent confusion of their accounts, the distress of the French communes and the perfection of their budget, may be attributable to the same cause. At any rate I am suspicious of a benefit which is united to so many evils, and I am not averse113 to an evil which is compensated114 by so many benefits.]
Granting for an instant that the villages and counties of the United States would be more usefully governed by a remote authority which they had never seen than by functionaries taken from the midst of them—admitting, for the sake of argument, that the country would be more secure, and the resources of society better employed, if the whole administration centred in a single arm—still the political advantages which the Americans derive115 from their system would induce me to prefer it to the contrary plan. It profits me but little, after all, that a vigilant116 authority should protect the tranquillity of my pleasures and constantly avert117 all dangers from my path, without my care or my concern, if this same authority is the absolute mistress of my liberty and of my life, and if it so monopolizes118 all the energy of existence that when it languishes119 everything languishes around it, that when it sleeps everything must sleep, that when it dies the State itself must perish.
In certain countries of Europe the natives consider themselves as a kind of settlers, indifferent to the fate of the spot upon which they live. The greatest changes are effected without their concurrence120 and (unless chance may have apprised121 them of the event) without their knowledge; nay122 more, the citizen is unconcerned as to the condition of his village, the police of his street, the repairs of the church or of the parsonage; for he looks upon all these things as unconnected with himself, and as the property of a powerful stranger whom he calls the Government. He has only a life-interest in these possessions, and he entertains no notions of ownership or of improvement. This want of interest in his own affairs goes so far that, if his own safety or that of his children is endangered, instead of trying to avert the peril123, he will fold his arms, and wait till the nation comes to his assistance. This same individual, who has so completely sacrificed his own free will, has no natural propensity124 to obedience; he cowers125, it is true, before the pettiest officer; but he braves the law with the spirit of a conquered foe126 as soon as its superior force is removed: his oscillations between servitude and license127 are perpetual. When a nation has arrived at this state it must either change its customs and its laws or perish: the source of public virtue128 is dry, and, though it may contain subjects, the race of citizens is extinct. Such communities are a natural prey129 to foreign conquests, and if they do not disappear from the scene of life, it is because they are surrounded by other nations similar or inferior to themselves: it is because the instinctive130 feeling of their country's claims still exists in their hearts; and because an involuntary pride in the name it bears, or a vague reminiscence of its bygone fame, suffices to give them the impulse of self-preservation.
Nor can the prodigious131 exertions made by tribes in the defence of a country to which they did not belong be adduced in favor of such a system; for it will be found that in these cases their main incitement132 was religion. The permanence, the glory, or the prosperity of the nation were become parts of their faith, and in defending the country they inhabited they defended that Holy City of which they were all citizens. The Turkish tribes have never taken an active share in the conduct of the affairs of society, but they accomplished133 stupendous enterprises as long as the victories of the Sultan were the triumphs of the Mohammedan faith. In the present age they are in rapid decay, because their religion is departing, and despotism only remains134. Montesquieu, who attributed to absolute power an authority peculiar to itself, did it, as I conceive, an undeserved honor; for despotism, taken by itself, can produce no durable results. On close inspection135 we shall find that religion, and not fear, has ever been the cause of the long-lived prosperity of an absolute government. Whatever exertions may be made, no true power can be founded among men which does not depend upon the free union of their inclinations136; and patriotism137 and religion are the only two motives138 in the world which can permanently139 direct the whole of a body politic5 to one end.
Laws cannot succeed in rekindling140 the ardor141 of an extinguished faith, but men may be interested in the fate of their country by the laws. By this influence the vague impulse of patriotism, which never abandons the human heart, may be directed and revived; and if it be connected with the thoughts, the passions, and the daily habits of life, it may be consolidated142 into a durable and rational sentiment.
Let it not be said that the time for the experiment is already past; for the old age of nations is not like the old age of men, and every fresh generation is a new people ready for the care of the legislator.
It is not the administrative but the political effects of the local system that I most admire in America. In the United States the interests of the country are everywhere kept in view; they are an object of solicitude143 to the people of the whole union, and every citizen is as warmly attached to them as if they were his own. He takes pride in the glory of his nation; he boasts of its success, to which he conceives himself to have contributed, and he rejoices in the general prosperity by which he profits. The feeling he entertains towards the State is analogous144 to that which unites him to his family, and it is by a kind of egotism that he interests himself in the welfare of his country.
The European generally submits to a public officer because he represents a superior force; but to an American he represents a right. In America it may be said that no one renders obedience to man, but to justice and to law. If the opinion which the citizen entertains of himself is exaggerated, it is at least salutary; he unhesitatingly confides145 in his own powers, which appear to him to be all-sufficient. When a private individual meditates146 an undertaking17, however directly connected it may be with the welfare of society, he never thinks of soliciting147 the co-operation of the Government, but he publishes his plan, offers to execute it himself, courts the assistance of other individuals, and struggles manfully against all obstacles. Undoubtedly148 he is often less successful than the State might have been in his position; but in the end the sum of these private undertakings far exceeds all that the Government could have done.
As the administrative authority is within the reach of the citizens, whom it in some degree represents, it excites neither their jealousy149 nor their hatred150; as its resources are limited, every one feels that he must not rely solely151 on its assistance. Thus, when the administration thinks fit to interfere, it is not abandoned to itself as in Europe; the duties of the private citizens are not supposed to have lapsed152 because the State assists in their fulfilment, but every one is ready, on the contrary, to guide and to support it. This action of individual exertions, joined to that of the public authorities, frequently performs what the most energetic central administration would be unable to execute. It would be easy to adduce several facts in proof of what I advance, but I had rather give only one, with which I am more thoroughly153 acquainted. *u In America the means which the authorities have at their disposal for the discovery of crimes and the arrest of criminals are few. The State police does not exist, and passports are unknown. The criminal police of the United States cannot be compared to that of France; the magistrates154 and public prosecutors155 are not numerous, and the examinations of prisoners are rapid and oral. Nevertheless in no country does crime more rarely elude156 punishment. The reason is, that every one conceives himself to be interested in furnishing evidence of the act committed, and in stopping the delinquent157. During my stay in the United States I witnessed the spontaneous formation of committees for the pursuit and prosecution158 of a man who had committed a great crime in a certain county. In Europe a criminal is an unhappy being who is struggling for his life against the ministers of justice, whilst the population is merely a spectator of the conflict; in America he is looked upon as an enemy of the human race, and the whole of mankind is against him.
u
[ See Appendix, I.]
I believe that provincial institutions are useful to all nations, but nowhere do they appear to me to be more indispensable than amongst a democratic people. In an aristocracy order can always be maintained in the midst of liberty, and as the rulers have a great deal to lose order is to them a first-rate consideration. In like manner an aristocracy protects the people from the excesses of despotism, because it always possesses an organized power ready to resist a despot. But a democracy without provincial institutions has no security against these evils. How can a populace, unaccustomed to freedom in small concerns, learn to use it temperately159 in great affairs? What resistance can be offered to tyranny in a country where every private individual is impotent, and where the citizens are united by no common tie? Those who dread160 the license of the mob, and those who fear the rule of absolute power, ought alike to desire the progressive growth of provincial liberties.
On the other hand, I am convinced that democratic nations are most exposed to fall beneath the yoke161 of a central administration, for several reasons, amongst which is the following. The constant tendency of these nations is to concentrate all the strength of the Government in the hands of the only power which directly represents the people, because beyond the people nothing is to be perceived but a mass of equal individuals confounded together. But when the same power is already in possession of all the attributes of the Government, it can scarcely refrain from penetrating162 into the details of the administration, and an opportunity of doing so is sure to present itself in the end, as was the case in France. In the French Revolution there were two impulses in opposite directions, which must never be confounded—the one was favorable to liberty, the other to despotism. Under the ancient monarchy163 the King was the sole author of the laws, and below the power of the sovereign certain vestiges164 of provincial institutions, half destroyed, were still distinguishable. These provincial institutions were incoherent, ill compacted, and frequently absurd; in the hands of the aristocracy they had sometimes been converted into instruments of oppression. The Revolution declared itself the enemy of royalty165 and of provincial institutions at the same time; it confounded all that had preceded it—despotic power and the checks to its abuses—in indiscriminate hatred, and its tendency was at once to overthrow166 and to centralize. This double character of the French Revolution is a fact which has been adroitly167 handled by the friends of absolute power. Can they be accused of laboring168 in the cause of despotism when they are defending that central administration which was one of the great innovations of the Revolution? *v In this manner popularity may be conciliated with hostility169 to the rights of the people, and the secret slave of tyranny may be the professed170 admirer of freedom.
v
[ See Appendix K.]
I have visited the two nations in which the system of provincial liberty has been most perfectly171 established, and I have listened to the opinions of different parties in those countries. In America I met with men who secretly aspired172 to destroy the democratic institutions of the union; in England I found others who attacked the aristocracy openly, but I know of no one who does not regard provincial independence as a great benefit. In both countries I have heard a thousand different causes assigned for the evils of the State, but the local system was never mentioned amongst them. I have heard citizens attribute the power and prosperity of their country to a multitude of reasons, but they all placed the advantages of local institutions in the foremost rank. Am I to suppose that when men who are naturally so divided on religious opinions and on political theories agree on one point (and that one of which they have daily experience), they are all in error? The only nations which deny the utility of provincial liberties are those which have fewest of them; in other words, those who are unacquainted with the institution are the only persons who pass a censure173 upon it.
点击
收听单词发音
收听单词发音 |
1
legislative
|
|
| n.立法机构，立法权；adj.立法的，有立法权的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
2
judicial
|
|
| adj.司法的，法庭的，审判的，明断的，公正的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
3
nomination
|
|
| n.提名，任命，提名权 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
4
functionaries
|
|
| n.公职人员，官员( functionary的名词复数 ) | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
5
politic
|
|
| adj.有智虑的；精明的；v.从政 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
6
impeaches
|
|
| v.控告（某人）犯罪( impeach的第三人称单数 )；弹劾；对（某事物）怀疑；提出异议 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
7
nucleus
|
|
| n.核，核心，原子核 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
8
hereditary
|
|
| adj.遗传的，遗传性的，可继承的，世袭的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
9
bulwark
|
|
| n.堡垒，保障，防御 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
10
tempted
|
|
| v.怂恿（某人）干不正当的事；冒…的险（tempt的过去分词） | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
11
concurred
|
|
| 同意（concur的过去式与过去分词形式） | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
12
dependence
|
|
| n.依靠，依赖；信任，信赖；隶属 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
13
supreme
|
|
| adj.极度的，最重要的；至高的，最高的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
14
magistrate
|
|
| n.地方行政官，地方法官，治安官 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
15
retard
|
|
| n.阻止，延迟；vt.妨碍，延迟，使减速 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
16
undertakings
|
|
| 企业( undertaking的名词复数 )； 保证； 殡仪业； 任务 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
17
undertaking
|
|
| n.保证，许诺，事业 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
18
militia
|
|
| n.民兵，民兵组织 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
19
quell
|
|
| v.压制，平息，减轻 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
20
indirectly
|
|
| adv.间接地，不直接了当地 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
21
strictly
|
|
| adv.严厉地，严格地；严密地 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
22
administrative
|
|
| adj.行政的，管理的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
23
provincial
|
|
| adj.省的，地方的；n．外省人，乡下人 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
24
discriminate
|
|
| v.区别，辨别，区分；有区别地对待 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
25
enactment
|
|
| n.演出，担任…角色；制订，通过 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
26
peculiar
|
|
| adj.古怪的，异常的；特殊的，特有的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
27
coalesce
|
|
| v.联合，结合，合并 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
28
distinguished
|
|
| adj.卓越的，杰出的，著名的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
29
accustoms
|
|
| v.（使）习惯于( accustom的第三人称单数 ) | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
30
habitually
|
|
| ad.习惯地，通常地 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
31
subdue
|
|
| vt.制服，使顺从，征服；抑制，克制 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
32
compulsorily
|
|
| 强迫地，强制地 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
33
justified
|
|
| a.正当的，有理的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
34
vigor
|
|
| n.活力，精力，元气 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
35
wields
|
|
| 手持着使用（武器、工具等）( wield的第三人称单数 )； 具有； 运用（权力）； 施加（影响） | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
36
enervates
|
|
| v.使衰弱，使失去活力( enervate的第三人称单数 ) | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
37
incessantly
|
|
| ad.不停地 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
38
impairs
|
|
| v.损害，削弱( impair的第三人称单数 ) | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
39
renewal
|
|
| adj.(契约)延期，续订，更新，复活，重来 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
40
strife
|
|
| n.争吵，冲突，倾轧，竞争 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
41
durable
|
|
| adj.持久的，耐久的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
42
deficient
|
|
| adj.不足的，不充份的，有缺陷的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
43
assent
|
|
| v.批准，认可；n.批准，认可 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
44
obedience
|
|
| n.服从，顺从 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
45
feudal
|
|
| adj.封建的，封地的，领地的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
46
straightforward
|
|
| adj.正直的，坦率的；易懂的，简单的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
47
interfere
|
|
| v.(in)干涉，干预；(with)妨碍，打扰 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
48
impede
|
|
| v.妨碍，阻碍，阻止 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
49
immunities
|
|
| 免除，豁免( immunity的名词复数 )； 免疫力 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
50
juxtaposition
|
|
| n.毗邻，并置，并列 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
51
immediate
|
|
| adj.立即的；直接的，最接近的；紧靠的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
52
constrain
|
|
| vt.限制，约束；克制，抑制 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
53
refractory
|
|
| adj.倔强的，难驾驭的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
54
standing
|
|
| n.持续，地位；adj.永久的，不动的，直立的，不流动的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
55
intimidate
|
|
| vt.恐吓，威胁 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
56
treasury
|
|
| n.宝库；国库，金库；文库 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
57
inconvenient
|
|
| adj.不方便的，令人感到麻烦的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
58
hindrance
|
|
| n.妨碍，障碍 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
59
pecuniary
|
|
| adj.金钱的；金钱上的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
60
proceeding
|
|
| n.行动，进行，(pl.)会议录，学报 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
61
belied
|
|
| v.掩饰( belie的过去式和过去分词 )；证明（或显示）…为虚假；辜负；就…扯谎 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
62
sufficiently
|
|
| adv.足够地，充分地 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
63
entirely
|
|
| ad.全部地，完整地；完全地，彻底地 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
64
maxims
|
|
| n.格言，座右铭( maxim的名词复数 ) | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
65
foresight
|
|
| n.先见之明，深谋远虑 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
66
isolating
|
|
| adj.孤立的，绝缘的v.使隔离( isolate的现在分词 )；将…剔出（以便看清和单独处理）；使（某物质、细胞等）分离；使离析 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
67
severely
|
|
| adv.严格地；严厉地；非常恶劣地 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
68
disorder
|
|
| n.紊乱，混乱；骚动，骚乱；疾病，失调 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
69
anarchy
|
|
| n.无政府状态；社会秩序混乱，无秩序 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
70
exertions
|
|
| n.努力( exertion的名词复数 )；费力；（能力、权力等的）运用；行使 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
71
waive
|
|
| vt.放弃，不坚持(规定、要求、权力等) | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
72
actively
|
|
| adv.积极地，勤奋地 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
73
prosecute
|
|
| vt.告发；进行；vi.告发，起诉，作检察官 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
74
partisans
|
|
| 游击队员( partisan的名词复数 )； 党人； 党羽； 帮伙 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
75
wont
|
|
| adj.习惯于；v.习惯；n.习惯 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
76
augment
|
|
| vt.(使)增大，增加，增长，扩张 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
77
arduous
|
|
| adj.艰苦的，费力的，陡峭的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
78
etiquette
|
|
| n.礼仪，礼节；规矩 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
79
dwelling
|
|
| n.住宅，住所，寓所 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
80
supersede
|
|
| v.替代；充任 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
81
skilful
|
|
| (=skillful)adj.灵巧的，熟练的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
82
applied
|
|
| adj.应用的；v.应用，适用 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
83
deity
|
|
| n.神，神性；被奉若神明的人(或物) | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
84
regularity
|
|
| n.规律性，规则性；匀称，整齐 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
85
perpetuates
|
|
| n.使永存，使人记住不忘( perpetuate的名词复数 )；使永久化，使持久化，使持续 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
86
drowsy
|
|
| adj.昏昏欲睡的，令人发困的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
87
tranquillity
|
|
| n. 平静, 安静 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
88
invokes
|
|
| v.援引( invoke的第三人称单数 )；行使（权利等）；祈求救助；恳求 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
89
aspiring
|
|
| adj.有志气的；有抱负的；高耸的v.渴望；追求 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
90
well-being
|
|
| n.安康，安乐，幸福 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
91
indifference
|
|
| n.不感兴趣，不关心，冷淡，不在乎 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
92
blemishes
|
|
| n.（身体的）瘢点( blemish的名词复数 )；伤疤；瑕疵；污点 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
93
momentary
|
|
| adj.片刻的，瞬息的；短暂的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
94
functionary
|
|
| n.官员；公职人员 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
95
accustoming
|
|
| v.（使）习惯于( accustom的现在分词 ) | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
|
96
mechanism
|
|
| n.机械装置；机构，结构 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
97
lesser
|
|
| adj.次要的，较小的；adv.较小地，较少地 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
98
authoritative
|
|
| adj.有权威的，可相信的；命令式的；官方的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
99
robust
|
|
| adj.强壮的，强健的，粗野的，需要体力的，浓的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
100
checkered
|
|
| adj.有方格图案的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
101
animation
|
|
| n.活泼，兴奋，卡通片／动画片的制作 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
102
drawn
|
|
| v.拖，拉，拔出；adj.憔悴的，紧张的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
103
ingenuity
|
|
| n.别出心裁；善于发明创造 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
104
expenditure
|
|
| n.(时间、劳力、金钱等)支出；使用，消耗 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
105
admiration
|
|
| n.钦佩，赞美，羡慕 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
106
plunged
|
|
| v.颠簸( plunge的过去式和过去分词 )；暴跌；骤降；突降 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
107
incorrigible
|
|
| adj.难以纠正的，屡教不改的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
108
apathy
|
|
| n.漠不关心，无动于衷；冷淡 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
109
vegetate
|
|
| v.无所事事地过活 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
110
labor
|
|
| n.劳动，努力，工作，劳工；分娩；vi.劳动，努力，苦干；vt.详细分析；麻烦 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
111
misery
|
|
| n.痛苦，苦恼，苦难；悲惨的境遇，贫苦 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
112
distress
|
|
| n.苦恼，痛苦，不舒适；不幸；vt.使悲痛 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
113
averse
|
|
| adj.厌恶的；反对的，不乐意的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
114
compensated
|
|
| 补偿，报酬( compensate的过去式和过去分词 )； 给（某人）赔偿（或赔款） | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
115
derive
|
|
| v.取得；导出；引申；来自；源自；出自 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
116
vigilant
|
|
| adj.警觉的，警戒的，警惕的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
117
avert
|
|
| v.防止，避免；转移(目光、注意力等) | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
118
monopolizes
|
|
| n.垄断( monopolize的名词复数 )；独占；专卖；专营v.垄断( monopolize的第三人称单数 )；独占；专卖；专营 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
119
languishes
|
|
| 长期受苦( languish的第三人称单数 )； 受折磨； 变得（越来越）衰弱； 因渴望而变得憔悴或闷闷不乐 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
120
concurrence
|
|
| n.同意；并发 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
121
apprised
|
|
| v.告知，通知( apprise的过去式和过去分词 )；评价 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
122
nay
|
|
| adv.不；n.反对票，投反对票者 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
123
peril
|
|
| n.(严重的)危险；危险的事物 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
124
propensity
|
|
| n.倾向；习性 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
125
cowers
|
|
| v.畏缩，抖缩( cower的第三人称单数 ) | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
|
126
foe
|
|
| n.敌人，仇敌 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
127
license
|
|
| n.执照，许可证，特许；v.许可，特许 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
128
virtue
|
|
| n.德行，美德；贞操；优点；功效，效力 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
129
prey
|
|
| n.被掠食者，牺牲者，掠食；v.捕食，掠夺，折磨 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
130
instinctive
|
|
| adj.(出于)本能的；直觉的；(出于)天性的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
131
prodigious
|
|
| adj.惊人的，奇妙的；异常的；巨大的；庞大的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
132
incitement
|
|
| 激励； 刺激； 煽动； 激励物 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
133
accomplished
|
|
| adj.有才艺的；有造诣的；达到了的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
134
remains
|
|
| n.剩余物，残留物；遗体，遗迹 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
135
inspection
|
|
| n.检查，审查，检阅 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
136
inclinations
|
|
| 倾向( inclination的名词复数 )； 倾斜； 爱好； 斜坡 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
137
patriotism
|
|
| n.爱国精神，爱国心，爱国主义 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
138
motives
|
|
| n.动机，目的( motive的名词复数 ) | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
139
permanently
|
|
| adv.永恒地，永久地，固定不变地 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
140
rekindling
|
|
| v.使再燃( rekindle的现在分词 ) | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
141
ardor
|
|
| n.热情，狂热 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
142
consolidated
|
|
| a.联合的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
143
solicitude
|
|
| n.焦虑 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
144
analogous
|
|
| adj.相似的；类似的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
145
confides
|
|
| v.吐露（秘密，心事等）( confide的第三人称单数 )；（向某人）吐露（隐私、秘密等） | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
146
meditates
|
|
| 深思，沉思，冥想( meditate的第三人称单数 )； 内心策划，考虑 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
147
soliciting
|
|
| v.恳求( solicit的现在分词 )；（指娼妇）拉客；索求；征求 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
148
undoubtedly
|
|
| adv.确实地，无疑地 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
149
jealousy
|
|
| n.妒忌，嫉妒，猜忌 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
150
hatred
|
|
| n.憎恶，憎恨，仇恨 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
151
solely
|
|
| adv.仅仅，唯一地 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
152
lapsed
|
|
| adj.流失的，堕落的v.退步( lapse的过去式和过去分词 )；陷入；倒退；丧失 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
153
thoroughly
|
|
| adv.完全地，彻底地，十足地 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
154
magistrates
|
|
| 地方法官，治安官( magistrate的名词复数 ) | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
155
prosecutors
|
|
| 检举人( prosecutor的名词复数 )； 告发人； 起诉人； 公诉人 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
156
elude
|
|
| v.躲避，困惑 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
157
delinquent
|
|
| adj.犯法的，有过失的；n.违法者 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
158
prosecution
|
|
| n.起诉，告发，检举，执行，经营 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
159
temperately
|
|
| adv.节制地，适度地 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
160
dread
|
|
| vt.担忧，忧虑；惧怕，不敢；n.担忧，畏惧 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
161
yoke
|
|
| n.轭；支配；v.给...上轭，连接，使成配偶 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
162
penetrating
|
|
| adj.（声音）响亮的，尖锐的adj.（气味）刺激的adj.（思想）敏锐的，有洞察力的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
163
monarchy
|
|
| n.君主，最高统治者；君主政体，君主国 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
164
vestiges
|
|
| 残余部分( vestige的名词复数 )； 遗迹； 痕迹； 毫不 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
165
royalty
|
|
| n.皇家，皇族 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
166
overthrow
|
|
| v.推翻，打倒，颠覆；n.推翻，瓦解，颠覆 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
167
adroitly
|
|
| adv.熟练地，敏捷地 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
168
laboring
|
|
| n.劳动，操劳v.努力争取(for)( labor的现在分词 )；苦干；详细分析；（指引擎）缓慢而困难地运转 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
169
hostility
|
|
| n.敌对，敌意；抵制［pl.］交战，战争 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
170
professed
|
|
| 公开声称的，伪称的，已立誓信教的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
171
perfectly
|
|
| adv.完美地，无可非议地，彻底地 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
172
aspired
|
|
| v.渴望，追求( aspire的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
173
censure
|
|
| v./n.责备；非难；责难 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
| 欢迎访问英文小说网 |