The practice which obtains amongst the Americans of fixing the standard of their judgment14 in themselves alone, leads them to other habits of mind. As they perceive that they succeed in resolving without assistance all the little difficulties which their practical life presents, they readily conclude that everything in the world may be explained, and that nothing in it transcends15 the limits of the understanding. Thus they fall to denying what they cannot comprehend; which leaves them but little faith for whatever is extraordinary, and an almost insurmountable distaste for whatever is supernatural. As it is on their own testimony16 that they are accustomed to rely, they like to discern the object which engages their attention with extreme clearness; they therefore strip off as much as possible all that covers it, they rid themselves of whatever separates them from it, they remove whatever conceals17 it from sight, in order to view it more closely and in the broad light of day. This disposition18 of the mind soon leads them to contemn19 forms, which they regard as useless and inconvenient20 veils placed between them and the truth.
The Americans then have not required to extract their philosophical method from books; they have found it in themselves. The same thing may be remarked in what has taken place in Europe. This same method has only been established and made popular in Europe in proportion as the condition of society has become more equal, and men have grown more like each other. Let us consider for a moment the connection of the periods in which this change may be traced. In the sixteenth century the Reformers subjected some of the dogmas of the ancient faith to the scrutiny21 of private judgment; but they still withheld22 from it the judgment of all the rest. In the seventeenth century, Bacon in the natural sciences, and Descartes in the study of philosophy in the strict sense of the term, abolished recognized formulas, destroyed the empire of tradition, and overthrew23 the authority of the schools. The philosophers of the eighteenth century, generalizing at length the same principle, undertook to submit to the private judgment of each man all the objects of his belief.
Who does not perceive that Luther, Descartes, and Voltaire employed the same method, and that they differed only in the greater or less use which they professed24 should be made of it? Why did the Reformers confine themselves so closely within the circle of religious ideas? Why did Descartes, choosing only to apply his method to certain matters, though he had made it fit to be applied to all, declare that men might judge for themselves in matters philosophical but not in matters political? How happened it that in the eighteenth century those general applications were all at once drawn25 from this same method, which Descartes and his predecessors26 had either not perceived or had rejected? To what, lastly, is the fact to be attributed, that at this period the method we are speaking of suddenly emerged from the schools, to penetrate27 into society and become the common standard of intelligence; and that, after it had become popular among the French, it has been ostensibly adopted or secretly followed by all the nations of Europe?
The philosophical method here designated may have been engendered28 in the sixteenth century—it may have been more accurately29 defined and more extensively applied in the seventeenth; but neither in the one nor in the other could it be commonly adopted. Political laws, the condition of society, and the habits of mind which are derived30 from these causes, were as yet opposed to it. It was discovered at a time when men were beginning to equalize and assimilate their conditions. It could only be generally followed in ages when those conditions had at length become nearly equal, and men nearly alike.
The philosophical method of the eighteenth century is then not only French, but it is democratic; and this explains why it was so readily admitted throughout Europe, where it has contributed so powerfully to change the face of society. It is not because the French have changed their former opinions, and altered their former manners, that they have convulsed the world; but because they were the first to generalize and bring to light a philosophical method, by the assistance of which it became easy to attack all that was old, and to open a path to all that was new.
If it be asked why, at the present day, this same method is more rigorously followed and more frequently applied by the French than by the Americans, although the principle of equality be no less complete, and of more ancient date, amongst the latter people, the fact may be attributed to two circumstances, which it is essential to have clearly understood in the first instance. It must never be forgotten that religion gave birth to Anglo-American society. In the United States religion is therefore commingled31 with all the habits of the nation and all the feelings of patriotism32; whence it derives33 a peculiar34 force. To this powerful reason another of no less intensity35 may be added: in American religion has, as it were, laid down its own limits. Religious institutions have remained wholly distinct from political institutions, so that former laws have been easily changed whilst former belief has remained unshaken. Christianity has therefore retained a strong hold on the public mind in America; and, I would more particularly remark, that its sway is not only that of a philosophical doctrine37 which has been adopted upon inquiry38, but of a religion which is believed without discussion. In the United States Christian36 sects39 are infinitely40 diversified41 and perpetually modified; but Christianity itself is a fact so irresistibly42 established, that no one undertakes either to attack or to defend it. The Americans, having admitted the principal doctrines43 of the Christian religion without inquiry, are obliged to accept in like manner a great number of moral truths originating in it and connected with it. Hence the activity of individual analysis is restrained within narrow limits, and many of the most important of human opinions are removed from the range of its influence.
The second circumstance to which I have alluded44 is the following: the social condition and the constitution of the Americans are democratic, but they have not had a democratic revolution. They arrived upon the soil they occupy in nearly the condition in which we see them at the present day; and this is of very considerable importance.
There are no revolutions which do not shake existing belief, enervate45 authority, and throw doubts over commonly received ideas. The effect of all revolutions is therefore, more or less, to surrender men to their own guidance, and to open to the mind of every man a void and almost unlimited46 range of speculation47. When equality of conditions succeeds a protracted48 conflict between the different classes of which the elder society was composed, envy, hatred49, and uncharitableness, pride, and exaggerated self-confidence are apt to seize upon the human heart, and plant their sway there for a time. This, independently of equality itself, tends powerfully to divide men—to lead them to mistrust the judgment of others, and to seek the light of truth nowhere but in their own understandings. Everyone then attempts to be his own sufficient guide, and makes it his boast to form his own opinions on all subjects. Men are no longer bound together by ideas, but by interests; and it would seem as if human opinions were reduced to a sort of intellectual dust, scattered50 on every side, unable to collect, unable to cohere51.
Thus, that independence of mind which equality supposes to exist, is never so great, nor ever appears so excessive, as at the time when equality is beginning to establish itself, and in the course of that painful labor52 by which it is established. That sort of intellectual freedom which equality may give ought, therefore, to be very carefully distinguished53 from the anarchy54 which revolution brings. Each of these two things must be severally considered, in order not to conceive exaggerated hopes or fears of the future.
I believe that the men who will live under the new forms of society will make frequent use of their private judgment; but I am far from thinking that they will often abuse it. This is attributable to a cause of more general application to all democratic countries, and which, in the long run, must needs restrain in them the independence of individual speculation within fixed55, and sometimes narrow, limits. I shall proceed to point out this cause in the next chapter.
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1 civilized | |
a.有教养的,文雅的 | |
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2 philosophical | |
adj.哲学家的,哲学上的,达观的 | |
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3 evade | |
vt.逃避,回避;避开,躲避 | |
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4 bondage | |
n.奴役,束缚 | |
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5 maxims | |
n.格言,座右铭( maxim的名词复数 ) | |
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6 precepts | |
n.规诫,戒律,箴言( precept的名词复数 ) | |
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7 applied | |
adj.应用的;v.应用,适用 | |
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8 deters | |
v.阻止,制止( deter的第三人称单数 ) | |
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9 speculative | |
adj.思索性的,暝想性的,推理的 | |
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10 agitates | |
搅动( agitate的第三人称单数 ); 激怒; 使焦虑不安; (尤指为法律、社会状况的改变而)激烈争论 | |
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11 forefathers | |
n.祖先,先人;祖先,祖宗( forefather的名词复数 );列祖列宗;前人 | |
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12 derive | |
v.取得;导出;引申;来自;源自;出自 | |
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13 whatsoever | |
adv.(用于否定句中以加强语气)任何;pron.无论什么 | |
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14 judgment | |
n.审判;判断力,识别力,看法,意见 | |
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15 transcends | |
超出或超越(经验、信念、描写能力等)的范围( transcend的第三人称单数 ); 优于或胜过… | |
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16 testimony | |
n.证词;见证,证明 | |
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17 conceals | |
v.隐藏,隐瞒,遮住( conceal的第三人称单数 ) | |
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18 disposition | |
n.性情,性格;意向,倾向;排列,部署 | |
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19 contemn | |
v.蔑视 | |
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20 inconvenient | |
adj.不方便的,令人感到麻烦的 | |
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21 scrutiny | |
n.详细检查,仔细观察 | |
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22 withheld | |
withhold过去式及过去分词 | |
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23 overthrew | |
overthrow的过去式 | |
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24 professed | |
公开声称的,伪称的,已立誓信教的 | |
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25 drawn | |
v.拖,拉,拔出;adj.憔悴的,紧张的 | |
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26 predecessors | |
n.前任( predecessor的名词复数 );前辈;(被取代的)原有事物;前身 | |
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27 penetrate | |
v.透(渗)入;刺入,刺穿;洞察,了解 | |
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28 engendered | |
v.产生(某形势或状况),造成,引起( engender的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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29 accurately | |
adv.准确地,精确地 | |
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30 derived | |
vi.起源;由来;衍生;导出v.得到( derive的过去式和过去分词 );(从…中)得到获得;源于;(从…中)提取 | |
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31 commingled | |
v.混合,掺和,合并( commingle的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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32 patriotism | |
n.爱国精神,爱国心,爱国主义 | |
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33 derives | |
v.得到( derive的第三人称单数 );(从…中)得到获得;源于;(从…中)提取 | |
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34 peculiar | |
adj.古怪的,异常的;特殊的,特有的 | |
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35 intensity | |
n.强烈,剧烈;强度;烈度 | |
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36 Christian | |
adj.基督教徒的;n.基督教徒 | |
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37 doctrine | |
n.教义;主义;学说 | |
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38 inquiry | |
n.打听,询问,调查,查问 | |
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39 sects | |
n.宗派,教派( sect的名词复数 ) | |
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40 infinitely | |
adv.无限地,无穷地 | |
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41 diversified | |
adj.多样化的,多种经营的v.使多样化,多样化( diversify的过去式和过去分词 );进入新的商业领域 | |
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42 irresistibly | |
adv.无法抵抗地,不能自持地;极为诱惑人地 | |
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43 doctrines | |
n.教条( doctrine的名词复数 );教义;学说;(政府政策的)正式声明 | |
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44 alluded | |
提及,暗指( allude的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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45 enervate | |
v.使虚弱,使无力 | |
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46 unlimited | |
adj.无限的,不受控制的,无条件的 | |
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47 speculation | |
n.思索,沉思;猜测;投机 | |
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48 protracted | |
adj.拖延的;延长的v.拖延“protract”的过去式和过去分词 | |
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49 hatred | |
n.憎恶,憎恨,仇恨 | |
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50 scattered | |
adj.分散的,稀疏的;散步的;疏疏落落的 | |
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51 cohere | |
vt.附着,连贯,一致 | |
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52 labor | |
n.劳动,努力,工作,劳工;分娩;vi.劳动,努力,苦干;vt.详细分析;麻烦 | |
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53 distinguished | |
adj.卓越的,杰出的,著名的 | |
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54 anarchy | |
n.无政府状态;社会秩序混乱,无秩序 | |
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55 fixed | |
adj.固定的,不变的,准备好的;(计算机)固定的 | |
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