Despotism, which is of a very timorous1 nature, is never more secure of continuance than when it can keep men asunder2; and all is influence is commonly exerted for that purpose. No vice3 of the human heart is so acceptable to it as egotism: a despot easily forgives his subjects for not loving him, provided they do not love each other. He does not ask them to assist him in governing the State; it is enough that they do not aspire4 to govern it themselves. He stigmatizes5 as turbulent and unruly spirits those who would combine their exertions6 to promote the prosperity of the community, and, perverting7 the natural meaning of words, he applauds as good citizens those who have no sympathy for any but themselves. Thus the vices8 which despotism engenders9 are precisely10 those which equality fosters. These two things mutually and perniciously complete and assist each other. Equality places men side by side, unconnected by any common tie; despotism raises barriers to keep them asunder; the former predisposes them not to consider their fellow-creatures, the latter makes general indifference12 a sort of public virtue13.
Despotism then, which is at all times dangerous, is more particularly to be feared in democratic ages. It is easy to see that in those same ages men stand most in need of freedom. When the members of a community are forced to attend to public affairs, they are necessarily drawn14 from the circle of their own interests, and snatched at times from self-observation. As soon as a man begins to treat of public affairs in public, he begins to perceive that he is not so independent of his fellow-men as he had at first imagined, and that, in order to obtain their support, he must often lend them his co-operation.
When the public is supreme15, there is no man who does not feel the value of public goodwill16, or who does not endeavor to court it by drawing to himself the esteem17 and affection of those amongst whom he is to live. Many of the passions which congeal18 and keep asunder human hearts, are then obliged to retire and hide below the surface. Pride must be dissembled; disdain19 dares not break out; egotism fears its own self. Under a free government, as most public offices are elective, the men whose elevated minds or aspiring20 hopes are too closely circumscribed21 in private life, constantly feel that they cannot do without the population which surrounds them. Men learn at such times to think of their fellow-men from ambitious motives22; and they frequently find it, in a manner, their interest to forget themselves.
I may here be met by an objection derived23 from electioneering intrigues24, the meannesses of candidates, and the calumnies25 of their opponents. These are opportunities for animosity which occur the oftener the more frequent elections become. Such evils are doubtless great, but they are transient; whereas the benefits which attend them remain. The desire of being elected may lead some men for a time to violent hostility26; but this same desire leads all men in the long run mutually to support each other; and if it happens that an election accidentally severs28 two friends, the electoral system brings a multitude of citizens permanently29 together, who would always have remained unknown to each other. Freedom engenders private animosities, but despotism gives birth to general indifference.
The Americans have combated by free institutions the tendency of equality to keep men asunder, and they have subdued30 it. The legislators of America did not suppose that a general representation of the whole nation would suffice to ward31 off a disorder32 at once so natural to the frame of democratic society, and so fatal: they also thought that it would be well to infuse political life into each portion of the territory, in order to multiply to an infinite extent opportunities of acting33 in concert for all the members of the community, and to make them constantly feel their mutual11 dependence34 on each other. The plan was a wise one. The general affairs of a country only engage the attention of leading politicians, who assemble from time to time in the same places; and as they often lose sight of each other afterwards, no lasting35 ties are established between them. But if the object be to have the local affairs of a district conducted by the men who reside there, the same persons are always in contact, and they are, in a manner, forced to be acquainted, and to adapt themselves to one another.
It is difficult to draw a man out of his own circle to interest him in the destiny of the State, because he does not clearly understand what influence the destiny of the State can have upon his own lot. But if it be proposed to make a road cross the end of his estate, he will see at a glance that there is a connection between this small public affair and his greatest private affairs; and he will discover, without its being shown to him, the close tie which unites private to general interest. Thus, far more may be done by intrusting to the citizens the administration of minor36 affairs than by surrendering to them the control of important ones, towards interesting them in the public welfare, and convincing them that they constantly stand in need one of the other in order to provide for it. A brilliant achievement may win for you the favor of a people at one stroke; but to earn the love and respect of the population which surrounds you, a long succession of little services rendered and of obscure good deeds—a constant habit of kindness, and an established reputation for disinterestedness—will be required. Local freedom, then, which leads a great number of citizens to value the affection of their neighbors and of their kindred, perpetually brings men together, and forces them to help one another, in spite of the propensities37 which sever27 them.
In the United States the more opulent citizens take great care not to stand aloof38 from the people; on the contrary, they constantly keep on easy terms with the lower classes: they listen to them, they speak to them every day. They know that the rich in democracies always stand in need of the poor; and that in democratic ages you attach a poor man to you more by your manner than by benefits conferred. The magnitude of such benefits, which sets off the difference of conditions, causes a secret irritation39 to those who reap advantage from them; but the charm of simplicity40 of manners is almost irresistible41: their affability carries men away, and even their want of polish is not always displeasing42. This truth does not take root at once in the minds of the rich. They generally resist it as long as the democratic revolution lasts, and they do not acknowledge it immediately after that revolution is accomplished43. They are very ready to do good to the people, but they still choose to keep them at arm's length; they think that is sufficient, but they are mistaken. They might spend fortunes thus without warming the hearts of the population around them;—that population does not ask them for the sacrifice of their money, but of their pride.
It would seem as if every imagination in the United States were upon the stretch to invent means of increasing the wealth and satisfying the wants of the public. The best-informed inhabitants of each district constantly use their information to discover new truths which may augment44 the general prosperity; and if they have made any such discoveries, they eagerly surrender them to the mass of the people.
When the vices and weaknesses, frequently exhibited by those who govern in America, are closely examined, the prosperity of the people occasions—but improperly45 occasions—surprise. Elected magistrates46 do not make the American democracy flourish; it flourishes because the magistrates are elective.
It would be unjust to suppose that the patriotism47 and the zeal48 which every American displays for the welfare of his fellow-citizens are wholly insincere. Although private interest directs the greater part of human actions in the United States as well as elsewhere, it does not regulate them all. I must say that I have often seen Americans make great and real sacrifices to the public welfare; and I have remarked a hundred instances in which they hardly ever failed to lend faithful support to each other. The free institutions which the inhabitants of the United States possess, and the political rights of which they make so much use, remind every citizen, and in a thousand ways, that he lives in society. They every instant impress upon his mind the notion that it is the duty, as well as the interest of men, to make themselves useful to their fellow-creatures; and as he sees no particular ground of animosity to them, since he is never either their master or their slave, his heart readily leans to the side of kindness. Men attend to the interests of the public, first by necessity, afterwards by choice: what was intentional49 becomes an instinct; and by dint50 of working for the good of one's fellow citizens, the habit and the taste for serving them is at length acquired.
Many people in France consider equality of conditions as one evil, and political freedom as a second. When they are obliged to yield to the former, they strive at least to escape from the latter. But I contend that in order to combat the evils which equality may produce, there is only one effectual remedy—namely, political freedom.
点击收听单词发音
1 timorous | |
adj.胆怯的,胆小的 | |
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2 asunder | |
adj.分离的,化为碎片 | |
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3 vice | |
n.坏事;恶习;[pl.]台钳,老虎钳;adj.副的 | |
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4 aspire | |
vi.(to,after)渴望,追求,有志于 | |
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5 stigmatizes | |
v.使受耻辱,指责,污辱( stigmatize的第三人称单数 ) | |
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6 exertions | |
n.努力( exertion的名词复数 );费力;(能力、权力等的)运用;行使 | |
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7 perverting | |
v.滥用( pervert的现在分词 );腐蚀;败坏;使堕落 | |
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8 vices | |
缺陷( vice的名词复数 ); 恶习; 不道德行为; 台钳 | |
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9 engenders | |
v.产生(某形势或状况),造成,引起( engender的第三人称单数 ) | |
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10 precisely | |
adv.恰好,正好,精确地,细致地 | |
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11 mutual | |
adj.相互的,彼此的;共同的,共有的 | |
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12 indifference | |
n.不感兴趣,不关心,冷淡,不在乎 | |
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13 virtue | |
n.德行,美德;贞操;优点;功效,效力 | |
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14 drawn | |
v.拖,拉,拔出;adj.憔悴的,紧张的 | |
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15 supreme | |
adj.极度的,最重要的;至高的,最高的 | |
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16 goodwill | |
n.善意,亲善,信誉,声誉 | |
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17 esteem | |
n.尊敬,尊重;vt.尊重,敬重;把…看作 | |
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18 congeal | |
v.凝结,凝固 | |
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19 disdain | |
n.鄙视,轻视;v.轻视,鄙视,不屑 | |
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20 aspiring | |
adj.有志气的;有抱负的;高耸的v.渴望;追求 | |
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21 circumscribed | |
adj.[医]局限的:受限制或限于有限空间的v.在…周围划线( circumscribe的过去式和过去分词 );划定…范围;限制;限定 | |
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22 motives | |
n.动机,目的( motive的名词复数 ) | |
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23 derived | |
vi.起源;由来;衍生;导出v.得到( derive的过去式和过去分词 );(从…中)得到获得;源于;(从…中)提取 | |
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24 intrigues | |
n.密谋策划( intrigue的名词复数 );神秘气氛;引人入胜的复杂情节v.搞阴谋诡计( intrigue的第三人称单数 );激起…的好奇心 | |
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25 calumnies | |
n.诬蔑,诽谤,中伤(的话)( calumny的名词复数 ) | |
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26 hostility | |
n.敌对,敌意;抵制[pl.]交战,战争 | |
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27 sever | |
v.切开,割开;断绝,中断 | |
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28 severs | |
v.切断,断绝( sever的第三人称单数 );断,裂 | |
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29 permanently | |
adv.永恒地,永久地,固定不变地 | |
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30 subdued | |
adj. 屈服的,柔和的,减弱的 动词subdue的过去式和过去分词 | |
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31 ward | |
n.守卫,监护,病房,行政区,由监护人或法院保护的人(尤指儿童);vt.守护,躲开 | |
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32 disorder | |
n.紊乱,混乱;骚动,骚乱;疾病,失调 | |
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33 acting | |
n.演戏,行为,假装;adj.代理的,临时的,演出用的 | |
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34 dependence | |
n.依靠,依赖;信任,信赖;隶属 | |
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35 lasting | |
adj.永久的,永恒的;vbl.持续,维持 | |
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36 minor | |
adj.较小(少)的,较次要的;n.辅修学科;vi.辅修 | |
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37 propensities | |
n.倾向,习性( propensity的名词复数 ) | |
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38 aloof | |
adj.远离的;冷淡的,漠不关心的 | |
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39 irritation | |
n.激怒,恼怒,生气 | |
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40 simplicity | |
n.简单,简易;朴素;直率,单纯 | |
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41 irresistible | |
adj.非常诱人的,无法拒绝的,无法抗拒的 | |
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42 displeasing | |
不愉快的,令人发火的 | |
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43 accomplished | |
adj.有才艺的;有造诣的;达到了的 | |
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44 augment | |
vt.(使)增大,增加,增长,扩张 | |
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45 improperly | |
不正确地,不适当地 | |
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46 magistrates | |
地方法官,治安官( magistrate的名词复数 ) | |
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47 patriotism | |
n.爱国精神,爱国心,爱国主义 | |
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48 zeal | |
n.热心,热情,热忱 | |
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49 intentional | |
adj.故意的,有意(识)的 | |
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50 dint | |
n.由于,靠;凹坑 | |
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