If all democratic nations are instinctively2 led to the centralization of government, they tend to this result in an unequal manner. This depends on the particular circumstances which may promote or prevent the natural consequences of that state of society—circumstances which are exceedingly numerous; but I shall only advert3 to a few of them. Amongst men who have lived free long before they became equal, the tendencies derived4 from free institutions combat, to a certain extent, the propensities5 superinduced by the principle of equality; and although the central power may increase its privileges amongst such a people, the private members of such a community will never entirely6 forfeit7 their independence. But when the equality of conditions grows up amongst a people which has never known, or has long ceased to know, what freedom is (and such is the case upon the Continent of Europe), as the former habits of the nation are suddenly combined, by some sort of natural attraction, with the novel habits and principles engendered8 by the state of society, all powers seem spontaneously to rush to the centre. These powers accumulate there with astonishing rapidity, and the State instantly attains9 the utmost limits of its strength, whilst private persons allow themselves to sink as suddenly to the lowest degree of weakness.
The English who emigrated three hundred years ago to found a democratic commonwealth10 on the shores of the New World, had all learned to take a part in public affairs in their mother-country; they were conversant11 with trial by jury; they were accustomed to liberty of speech and of the press—to personal freedom, to the notion of rights and the practice of asserting them. They carried with them to America these free institutions and manly12 customs, and these institutions preserved them against the encroachments of the State. Thus amongst the Americans it is freedom which is old—equality is of comparatively modern date. The reverse is occurring in Europe, where equality, introduced by absolute power and under the rule of kings, was already infused into the habits of nations long before freedom had entered into their conceptions.
I have said that amongst democratic nations the notion of government naturally presents itself to the mind under the form of a sole and central power, and that the notion of intermediate powers is not familiar to them. This is peculiarly applicable to the democratic nations which have witnessed the triumph of the principle of equality by means of a violent revolution. As the classes which managed local affairs have been suddenly swept away by the storm, and as the confused mass which remains13 has as yet neither the organization nor the habits which fit it to assume the administration of these same affairs, the State alone seems capable of taking upon itself all the details of government, and centralization becomes, as it were, the unavoidable state of the country. Napoleon deserves neither praise nor censure14 for having centred in his own hands almost all the administrative15 power of France; for, after the abrupt16 disappearance17 of the nobility and the higher rank of the middle classes, these powers devolved on him of course: it would have been almost as difficult for him to reject as to assume them. But no necessity of this kind has ever been felt by the Americans, who, having passed through no revolution, and having governed themselves from the first, never had to call upon the State to act for a time as their guardian18. Thus the progress of centralization amongst a democratic people depends not only on the progress of equality, but on the manner in which this equality has been established.
At the commencement of a great democratic revolution, when hostilities19 have but just broken out between the different classes of society, the people endeavors to centralize the public administration in the hands of the government, in order to wrest20 the management of local affairs from the aristocracy. Towards the close of such a revolution, on the contrary, it is usually the conquered aristocracy that endeavors to make over the management of all affairs to the State, because such an aristocracy dreads21 the tyranny of a people which has become its equal, and not unfrequently its master. Thus it is not always the same class of the community which strives to increase the prerogative23 of the government; but as long as the democratic revolution lasts there is always one class in the nation, powerful in numbers or in wealth, which is induced, by peculiar passions or interests, to centralize the public administration, independently of that hatred24 of being governed by one's neighbor, which is a general and permanent feeling amongst democratic nations. It may be remarked, that at the present day the lower orders in England are striving with all their might to destroy local independence, and to transfer the administration from all points of the circumference25 to the centre; whereas the higher classes are endeavoring to retain this administration within its ancient boundaries. I venture to predict that a time will come when the very reverse will happen.
These observations explain why the supreme26 power is always stronger, and private individuals weaker, amongst a democratic people which has passed through a long and arduous27 struggle to reach a state of equality than amongst a democratic community in which the citizens have been equal from the first. The example of the Americans completely demonstrates the fact. The inhabitants of the United States were never divided by any privileges; they have never known the mutual28 relation of master and inferior, and as they neither dread22 nor hate each other, they have never known the necessity of calling in the supreme power to manage their affairs. The lot of the Americans is singular: they have derived from the aristocracy of England the notion of private rights and the taste for local freedom; and they have been able to retain both the one and the other, because they have had no aristocracy to combat.
If at all times education enables men to defend their independence, this is most especially true in democratic ages. When all men are alike, it is easy to found a sole and all-powerful government, by the aid of mere29 instinct. But men require much intelligence, knowledge, and art to organize and to maintain secondary powers under similar circumstances, and to create amidst the independence and individual weakness of the citizens such free associations as may be in a condition to struggle against tyranny without destroying public order.
Hence the concentration of power and the subjection of individuals will increase amongst democratic nations, not only in the same proportion as their equality, but in the same proportion as their ignorance. It is true, that in ages of imperfect civilization the government is frequently as wanting in the knowledge required to impose a despotism upon the people as the people are wanting in the knowledge required to shake it off; but the effect is not the same on both sides. However rude a democratic people may be, the central power which rules it is never completely devoid30 of cultivation31, because it readily draws to its own uses what little cultivation is to be found in the country, and, if necessary, may seek assistance elsewhere. Hence, amongst a nation which is ignorant as well as democratic, an amazing difference cannot fail speedily to arise between the intellectual capacity of the ruler and that of each of his subjects. This completes the easy concentration of all power in his hands: the administrative function of the State is perpetually extended, because the State alone is competent to administer the affairs of the country. Aristocratic nations, however unenlightened they may be, never afford the same spectacle, because in them instruction is nearly equally diffused32 between the monarch33 and the leading members of the community.
The pacha who now rules in Egypt found the population of that country composed of men exceedingly ignorant and equal, and he has borrowed the science and ability of Europe to govern that people. As the personal attainments34 of the sovereign are thus combined with the ignorance and democratic weakness of his subjects, the utmost centralization has been established without impediment, and the pacha has made the country his manufactory, and the inhabitants his workmen.
I think that extreme centralization of government ultimately enervates36 society, and thus after a length of time weakens the government itself; but I do not deny that a centralized social power may be able to execute great undertakings37 with facility in a given time and on a particular point. This is more especially true of war, in which success depends much more on the means of transferring all the resources of a nation to one single point, than on the extent of those resources. Hence it is chiefly in war that nations desire and frequently require to increase the powers of the central government. All men of military genius are fond of centralization, which increases their strength; and all men of centralizing genius are fond of war, which compels nations to combine all their powers in the hands of the government. Thus the democratic tendency which leads men unceasingly to multiply the privileges of the State, and to circumscribe38 the rights of private persons, is much more rapid and constant amongst those democratic nations which are exposed by their position to great and frequent wars, than amongst all others.
I have shown how the dread of disturbance39 and the love of well-being40 insensibly lead democratic nations to increase the functions of central government, as the only power which appears to be intrinsically sufficiently41 strong, enlightened, and secure, to protect them from anarchy42. I would now add, that all the particular circumstances which tend to make the state of a democratic community agitated43 and precarious44, enhance this general propensity45, and lead private persons more and more to sacrifice their rights to their tranquility. A people is therefore never so disposed to increase the functions of central government as at the close of a long and bloody46 revolution, which, after having wrested47 property from the hands of its former possessors, has shaken all belief, and filled the nation with fierce hatreds48, conflicting interests, and contending factions49. The love of public tranquillity50 becomes at such times an indiscriminating passion, and the members of the community are apt to conceive a most inordinate51 devotion to order.
I have already examined several of the incidents which may concur52 to promote the centralization of power, but the principal cause still remains to be noticed. The foremost of the incidental causes which may draw the management of all affairs into the hands of the ruler in democratic countries, is the origin of that ruler himself, and his own propensities. Men who live in the ages of equality are naturally fond of central power, and are willing to extend its privileges; but if it happens that this same power faithfully represents their own interests, and exactly copies their own inclinations53, the confidence they place in it knows no bounds, and they think that whatever they bestow54 upon it is bestowed55 upon themselves.
The attraction of administrative powers to the centre will always be less easy and less rapid under the reign35 of kings who are still in some way connected with the old aristocratic order, than under new princes, the children of their own achievements, whose birth, prejudices, propensities, and habits appear to bind56 them indissolubly to the cause of equality. I do not mean that princes of aristocratic origin who live in democratic ages do not attempt to centralize; I believe they apply themselves to that object as diligently57 as any others. For them, the sole advantages of equality lie in that direction; but their opportunities are less great, because the community, instead of volunteering compliance58 with their desires, frequently obeys them with reluctance59. In democratic communities the rule is that centralization must increase in proportion as the sovereign is less aristocratic. When an ancient race of kings stands at the head of an aristocracy, as the natural prejudices of the sovereign perfectly60 accord with the natural prejudices of the nobility, the vices61 inherent in aristocratic communities have a free course, and meet with no corrective. The reverse is the case when the scion62 of a feudal63 stock is placed at the head of a democratic people. The sovereign is constantly led, by his education, his habits, and his associations, to adopt sentiments suggested by the inequality of conditions, and the people tend as constantly, by their social condition, to those manners which are engendered by equality. At such times it often happens that the citizens seek to control the central power far less as a tyrannical than as an aristocratical power, and that they persist in the firm defence of their independence, not only because they would remain free, but especially because they are determined64 to remain equal. A revolution which overthrows65 an ancient regal family, in order to place men of more recent growth at the head of a democratic people, may temporarily weaken the central power; but however anarchical such a revolution may appear at first, we need not hesitate to predict that its final and certain consequence will be to extend and to secure the prerogatives66 of that power. The foremost or indeed the sole condition which is required in order to succeed in centralizing the supreme power in a democratic community, is to love equality, or to get men to believe you love it. Thus the science of despotism, which was once so complex, is simplified, and reduced as it were to a single principle.
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1
peculiar
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| adj.古怪的，异常的；特殊的，特有的 | |
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instinctively
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| adv.本能地 | |
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advert
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| vi.注意，留意，言及；n.广告 | |
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derived
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| vi.起源；由来；衍生；导出v.得到( derive的过去式和过去分词 )；（从…中）得到获得；源于；（从…中）提取 | |
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propensities
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| n.倾向，习性( propensity的名词复数 ) | |
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6
entirely
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| ad.全部地，完整地；完全地，彻底地 | |
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forfeit
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| vt.丧失；n.罚金，罚款，没收物 | |
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engendered
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| v.产生（某形势或状况），造成，引起( engender的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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9
attains
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| （通常经过努力）实现( attain的第三人称单数 )； 达到； 获得； 达到（某年龄、水平、状况） | |
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commonwealth
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| n.共和国，联邦，共同体 | |
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conversant
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| adj.亲近的，有交情的，熟悉的 | |
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12
manly
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| adj.有男子气概的；adv.男子般地，果断地 | |
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13
remains
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| n.剩余物，残留物；遗体，遗迹 | |
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14
censure
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| v./n.责备；非难；责难 | |
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15
administrative
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| adj.行政的，管理的 | |
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abrupt
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| adj.突然的，意外的；唐突的，鲁莽的 | |
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17
disappearance
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| n.消失，消散，失踪 | |
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18
guardian
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| n.监护人；守卫者，保护者 | |
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19
hostilities
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| n.战争；敌意(hostility的复数)；敌对状态；战事 | |
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wrest
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| n.扭，拧，猛夺；v.夺取，猛扭，歪曲 | |
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21
dreads
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| n.恐惧，畏惧( dread的名词复数 )；令人恐惧的事物v.害怕，恐惧，担心( dread的第三人称单数 ) | |
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22
dread
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| vt.担忧，忧虑；惧怕，不敢；n.担忧，畏惧 | |
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prerogative
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| n.特权 | |
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24
hatred
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| n.憎恶，憎恨，仇恨 | |
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25
circumference
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| n.圆周，周长，圆周线 | |
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supreme
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| adj.极度的，最重要的；至高的，最高的 | |
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arduous
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| adj.艰苦的，费力的，陡峭的 | |
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mutual
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| adj.相互的，彼此的；共同的，共有的 | |
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mere
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| adj.纯粹的；仅仅，只不过 | |
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devoid
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| adj.全无的，缺乏的 | |
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31
cultivation
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| n.耕作，培养，栽培（法），养成 | |
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32
diffused
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| 散布的，普及的，扩散的 | |
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monarch
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| n.帝王，君主，最高统治者 | |
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34
attainments
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| 成就，造诣； 获得( attainment的名词复数 )； 达到； 造诣； 成就 | |
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reign
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| n.统治时期，统治，支配，盛行；v.占优势 | |
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enervates
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| v.使衰弱，使失去活力( enervate的第三人称单数 ) | |
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undertakings
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| 企业( undertaking的名词复数 )； 保证； 殡仪业； 任务 | |
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circumscribe
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| v.在...周围划线，限制，约束 | |
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39
disturbance
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| n.动乱，骚动；打扰，干扰；(身心)失调 | |
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well-being
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| n.安康，安乐，幸福 | |
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41
sufficiently
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| adv.足够地，充分地 | |
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42
anarchy
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| n.无政府状态；社会秩序混乱，无秩序 | |
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43
agitated
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| adj.被鼓动的，不安的 | |
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44
precarious
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| adj.不安定的，靠不住的；根据不足的 | |
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45
propensity
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| n.倾向；习性 | |
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46
bloody
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| adj.非常的的；流血的；残忍的；adv.很；vt.血染 | |
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47
wrested
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| （用力）拧( wrest的过去式和过去分词 )； 费力取得； （从…）攫取； （ 从… ） 强行取去… | |
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48
hatreds
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| n.仇恨，憎恶( hatred的名词复数 )；厌恶的事 | |
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49
factions
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| 组织中的小派别，派系( faction的名词复数 ) | |
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50
tranquillity
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| n. 平静, 安静 | |
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51
inordinate
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| adj.无节制的；过度的 | |
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52
concur
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| v.同意，意见一致，互助，同时发生 | |
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53
inclinations
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| 倾向( inclination的名词复数 )； 倾斜； 爱好； 斜坡 | |
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54
bestow
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| v.把…赠与，把…授予；花费 | |
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55
bestowed
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| 赠给，授予( bestow的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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56
bind
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| vt.捆，包扎；装订；约束；使凝固；vi.变硬 | |
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57
diligently
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| ad.industriously;carefully | |
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58
compliance
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| n.顺从；服从；附和；屈从 | |
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59
reluctance
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| n.厌恶，讨厌，勉强，不情愿 | |
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60
perfectly
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| adv.完美地，无可非议地，彻底地 | |
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61
vices
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| 缺陷( vice的名词复数 )； 恶习； 不道德行为； 台钳 | |
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62
scion
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| n.嫩芽，子孙 | |
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63
feudal
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| adj.封建的，封地的，领地的 | |
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64
determined
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| adj.坚定的；有决心的 | |
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65
overthrows
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| n.推翻，终止，结束( overthrow的名词复数 )v.打倒，推翻( overthrow的第三人称单数 )；使终止 | |
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66
prerogatives
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| n.权利( prerogative的名词复数 )；特权；大主教法庭；总督委任组成的法庭 | |
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