If it be true that, in ages of equality, men readily adopt the notion of a great central power, it cannot be doubted on the other hand that their habits and sentiments predispose them to recognize such a power and to give it their support. This may be demonstrated in a few words, as the greater part of the reasons, to which the fact may be attributed, have been previously1 stated. *a As the men who inhabit democratic countries have no superiors, no inferiors, and no habitual2 or necessary partners in their undertakings3, they readily fall back upon themselves and consider themselves as beings apart. I had occasion to point this out at considerable length in treating of individualism. Hence such men can never, without an effort, tear themselves from their private affairs to engage in public business; their natural bias4 leads them to abandon the latter to the sole visible and permanent representative of the interests of the community, that is to say, to the State. Not only are they naturally wanting in a taste for public business, but they have frequently no time to attend to it. Private life is so busy in democratic periods, so excited, so full of wishes and of work, that hardly any energy or leisure remains5 to each individual for public life. I am the last man to contend that these propensities6 are unconquerable, since my chief object in writing this book has been to combat them. I only maintain that at the present day a secret power is fostering them in the human heart, and that if they are not checked they will wholly overgrow it.
a
[ See Appendix W.]
I have also had occasion to show how the increasing love of well-being7, and the fluctuating character of property, cause democratic nations to dread8 all violent disturbance9. The love of public tranquillity10 is frequently the only passion which these nations retain, and it becomes more active and powerful amongst them in proportion as all other passions droop11 and die. This naturally disposes the members of the community constantly to give or to surrender additional rights to the central power, which alone seems to be interested in defending them by the same means that it uses to defend itself. As in ages of equality no man is compelled to lend his assistance to his fellow-men, and none has any right to expect much support from them, everyone is at once independent and powerless. These two conditions, which must never be either separately considered or confounded together, inspire the citizen of a democratic country with very contrary propensities. His independence fills him with self-reliance and pride amongst his equals; his debility makes him feel from time to time the want of some outward assistance, which he cannot expect from any of them, because they are all impotent and unsympathizing. In this predicament he naturally turns his eyes to that imposing13 power which alone rises above the level of universal depression. Of that power his wants and especially his desires continually remind him, until he ultimately views it as the sole and necessary support of his own weakness. *b This may more completely explain what frequently takes place in democratic countries, where the very men who are so impatient of superiors patiently submit to a master, exhibiting at once their pride and their servility.
b
[ In democratic communities nothing but the central power has any stability in its position or any permanence in its undertakings. All the members of society are in ceaseless stir and transformation14. Now it is in the nature of all governments to seek constantly to enlarge their sphere of action; hence it is almost impossible that such a government should not ultimately succeed, because it acts with a fixed15 principle and a constant will, upon men, whose position, whose notions, and whose desires are in continual vacillation16. It frequently happens that the members of the community promote the influence of the central power without intending it. Democratic ages are periods of experiment, innovation, and adventure. At such times there are always a multitude of men engaged in difficult or novel undertakings, which they follow alone, without caring for their fellowmen. Such persons may be ready to admit, as a general principle, that the public authority ought not to interfere17 in private concerns; but, by an exception to that rule, each of them craves18 for its assistance in the particular concern on which he is engaged, and seeks to draw upon the influence of the government for his own benefit, though he would restrict it on all other occasions. If a large number of men apply this particular exception to a great variety of different purposes, the sphere of the central power extends insensibly in all directions, although each of them wishes it to be circumscribed19. Thus a democratic government increases its power simply by the fact of its permanence. Time is on its side; every incident befriends it; the passions of individuals unconsciously promote it; and it may be asserted, that the older a democratic community is, the more centralized will its government become.]
The hatred20 which men bear to privilege increases in proportion as privileges become more scarce and less considerable, so that democratic passions would seem to burn most fiercely at the very time when they have least fuel. I have already given the reason of this phenomenon. When all conditions are unequal, no inequality is so great as to offend the eye; whereas the slightest dissimilarity is odious21 in the midst of general uniformity: the more complete is this uniformity, the more insupportable does the sight of such a difference become. Hence it is natural that the love of equality should constantly increase together with equality itself, and that it should grow by what it feeds upon. This never-dying, ever-kindling hatred, which sets a democratic people against the smallest privileges, is peculiarly favorable to the gradual concentration of all political rights in the hands of the representative of the State alone. The sovereign, being necessarily and incontestably above all the citizens, excites not their envy, and each of them thinks that he strips his equals of the prerogative22 which he concedes to the crown. The man of a democratic age is extremely reluctant to obey his neighbor who is his equal; he refuses to acknowledge in such a person ability superior to his own; he mistrusts his justice, and is jealous of his power; he fears and he contemns23 him; and he loves continually to remind him of the common dependence12 in which both of them stand to the same master. Every central power which follows its natural tendencies courts and encourages the principle of equality; for equality singularly facilitates, extends, and secures the influence of a central power.
In like manner it may be said that every central government worships uniformity: uniformity relieves it from inquiry24 into an infinite number of small details which must be attended to if rules were to be adapted to men, instead of indiscriminately subjecting men to rules: thus the government likes what the citizens like, and naturally hates what they hate. These common sentiments, which, in democratic nations, constantly unite the sovereign and every member of the community in one and the same conviction, establish a secret and lasting25 sympathy between them. The faults of the government are pardoned for the sake of its tastes; public confidence is only reluctantly withdrawn26 in the midst even of its excesses and its errors, and it is restored at the first call. Democratic nations often hate those in whose hands the central power is vested; but they always love that power itself.
Thus, by two separate paths, I have reached the same conclusion. I have shown that the principle of equality suggests to men the notion of a sole, uniform, and strong government: I have now shown that the principle of equality imparts to them a taste for it. To governments of this kind the nations of our age are therefore tending. They are drawn27 thither28 by the natural inclination29 of mind and heart; and in order to reach that result, it is enough that they do not check themselves in their course. I am of opinion, that, in the democratic ages which are opening upon us, individual independence and local liberties will ever be the produce of artificial contrivance; that centralization will be the natural form of government.
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1
previously
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| adv.以前，先前（地） | |
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habitual
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| adj.习惯性的；通常的，惯常的 | |
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3
undertakings
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| 企业( undertaking的名词复数 )； 保证； 殡仪业； 任务 | |
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bias
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| n.偏见，偏心，偏袒；vt.使有偏见 | |
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remains
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| n.剩余物，残留物；遗体，遗迹 | |
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propensities
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| n.倾向，习性( propensity的名词复数 ) | |
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7
well-being
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| n.安康，安乐，幸福 | |
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8
dread
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| vt.担忧，忧虑；惧怕，不敢；n.担忧，畏惧 | |
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9
disturbance
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| n.动乱，骚动；打扰，干扰；(身心)失调 | |
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10
tranquillity
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| n. 平静, 安静 | |
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11
droop
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| v.低垂，下垂；凋萎，萎靡 | |
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dependence
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| n.依靠，依赖；信任，信赖；隶属 | |
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imposing
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| adj.使人难忘的，壮丽的，堂皇的，雄伟的 | |
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14
transformation
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| n.变化；改造；转变 | |
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fixed
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| adj.固定的，不变的，准备好的；(计算机)固定的 | |
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vacillation
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| n.动摇；忧柔寡断 | |
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interfere
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| v.(in)干涉，干预；(with)妨碍，打扰 | |
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18
craves
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| 渴望，热望( crave的第三人称单数 )； 恳求，请求 | |
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circumscribed
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| adj.[医]局限的：受限制或限于有限空间的v.在…周围划线( circumscribe的过去式和过去分词 )；划定…范围；限制；限定 | |
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hatred
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| n.憎恶，憎恨，仇恨 | |
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odious
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| adj.可憎的，讨厌的 | |
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prerogative
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| n.特权 | |
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contemns
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| v.侮辱，蔑视( contemn的第三人称单数 ) | |
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inquiry
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| n.打听，询问，调查，查问 | |
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lasting
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| adj.永久的，永恒的；vbl.持续，维持 | |
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withdrawn
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| vt.收回；使退出；vi.撤退，退出 | |
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drawn
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| v.拖，拉，拔出；adj.憔悴的，紧张的 | |
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28
thither
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| adv.向那里；adj.在那边的，对岸的 | |
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29
inclination
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| n.倾斜；点头；弯腰；斜坡；倾度；倾向；爱好 | |
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