This is but a new wording of the last Sophism1. The demand made is, that the foreign article should be taxed, in order to neutralize2 the effects of the tax, which weighs down national produce. It is still then but the question of equalizing the facilities of production. We have but to say that the tax is an artificial obstacle, which has exactly the same effect as a natural obstacle, i.e. the increasing of the price. If this increase is so great that there is more loss in producing the article in question than in attracting it from foreign parts by the production of an equivalent value, let it alone. Individual interest will soon learn to choose the lesser3 of two evils. I might refer the reader to the preceding demonstration4 for an answer to this Sophism; but it is one which recurs5 so often in the complaints and the petitions, I had almost said the demands, of the protectionist school, that it deserves a special discussion.
If the tax in question should be one of a special kind, directed against fixed6 articles of production, I agree that it is perfectly7 reasonable that foreign produce should be subjected to it. For instance, it would be absurd to free foreign salt from impost8 duty; not that in an economical point of view France would lose any thing by it; on the contrary, whatever may be said, principles are invariable, and France would gain by it, as she must always gain by avoiding an obstacle whether natural or artificial. But here the obstacle has been raised with a fiscal9 object. It is necessary that this end should be attained10; and if foreign salt were to be sold in our market free from duty, the treasury11 would not receive its revenue, and would be obliged to seek it from some thing else. There would be evident inconsistency in creating an obstacle with a given object, and then avoiding the attainment12 of that object. It would have been better at once to seek what was needed in the other impost without taxing French salt. Such are the circumstances under which I would allow upon any foreign article a duty, not protecting but fiscal.
But the supposition that a nation, because it is subjected to heavier imposts than those of another neighboring nation, should protect itself by tariffs13 against the competition of its rival, is a Sophism, which it is now my purpose to attack.
I have said more than once, that I am opposing only the theory of the protectionists, with the hope of discovering the source of their errors. Were I disposed to enter into controversy14 with them, I would say: Why direct your tariffs principally against England and Belgium, both countries more overloaded15 with taxes than any in the world? Have I not a right to look upon your argument as a mere16 pretext17? But I am not of the number of those who believe that prohibitionists are guided by interest, and not by conviction. The doctrine18 of Protection is too popular not to be sincere. If the majority could believe in freedom, we would be free. Without doubt it is individual interest which weighs us down with tariffs; but it acts upon conviction.
The State may make either a good or a bad use of taxes; it makes a good use of them when it renders to the public services equivalent to the value received from them; it makes a bad use of them when it expends19 this value, giving nothing in return.
To say in the first case that they place the country which pays them in more disadvantageous conditions for production, than the country which is free from them, is a Sophism. We pay, it is true, twenty millions for the administration of justice, and the maintenance of the police, but we have justice and the police; we have the security which they give, the time which they save for us; and it is most probable that production is neither more easy nor more active among nations, where (if there be such) each individual takes the administration of justice into his own hands. We pay, I grant, many hundred millions for roads, bridges, ports, railways; but we have these railways, these ports, bridges and roads, and unless we maintain that it is a losing business to establish them, we cannot say that they place us in a position inferior to that of nations who have, it is true, no taxes for public works, but who likewise have no public works. And here we see why (even while we accuse internal taxes of being a cause of industrial inferiority) we direct our tariffs precisely20 against those nations which are the most taxed. It is because these taxes, well used, far from injuring, have ameliorated the conditions of production to these nations. Thus we again arrive at the conclusion that the protectionist Sophisms not only wander from, but are the contrary—the very antithesis21 of truth.
As to unproductive imposts, suppress them if you can; but surely it is a most singular idea to suppose, that their evil effect is to be neutralized22 by the addition of individual taxes to public taxes. Many thanks for the compensation! The State, you say, has taxed us too much; surely this is no reason why we should tax each other!
A protective duty is a tax directed against foreign produce, but which returns, let us keep in mind, upon the national consumer. Is it not then a singular argument to say to him, "Because the taxes are heavy, we will raise prices higher for you; and because the State takes a part of your revenue, we will give another portion of it to benefit a monopoly?"
But let us examine more closely this Sophism so accredited23 among our legislators; although, strange to say, it is precisely those who keep up the unproductive imposts (according to our present hypothesis) who attribute to them afterwards our supposed inferiority, and seek to re-establish the equilibrium24 by further imposts and new clogs25.
It appears to me to be evident that protection, without any change in its nature and effects, might have taken the form of a direct tax, raised by the State, and distributed as a premium26 to privileged industry.
Let us admit that foreign iron could be sold in our market at eight francs, but not lower; and French iron at not lower than twelve francs.
In this hypothesis there are two ways in which the State can secure the national market to the home producer.
The first, is to put upon foreign iron a duty of five francs. This, it is evident, would exclude it, because it could no longer be sold at less than thirteen francs; eight francs for the cost price, five for the tax; and at this price it must be driven from the market by French iron, which we have supposed to cost twelve francs. In this case the buyer, the consumer, will have paid all the expenses of the protection given.
The second means would be to lay upon the public a tax of five francs, and to give it as a premium to the iron manufacturer. The effect would in either case be equally a protective measure. Foreign iron would, according to both systems, be alike excluded; for our iron manufacturer could sell at seven francs, what, with the five francs premium, would thus bring him in twelve. While the price of sale being seven francs, foreign iron could not obtain a market at eight.
In these two systems the principle is the same; the effect is the same. There is but this single difference; in the first case the expense of protection is paid by a part, in the second by the whole of the community.
I frankly27 confess my preference for the second system, which I regard as more just, more economical and more legal. More just, because, if society wishes to give bounties28 to some of its members, the whole community ought to contribute; more economical, because it would banish29 many difficulties, and save the expenses of collection; more legal, lastly, because the public would see clearly into the operation, and know what was required of it.
But if the protective system had taken this form, would it not have been laughable enough to hear it said, "We pay heavy taxes for the army, the navy, the judiciary, the public works, the schools, the public debt, etc. These amount to more than a thousand million. It would therefore be desirable that the State should take another thousand million, to relieve the poor iron manufacturers; or the suffering stockholders of coal mines; or those unfortunate lumber30 dealers31, or the useful codfishery."
This, it must be perceived, by an attentive32 investigation33, is the result of the Sophism in question. In vain, gentlemen, are all your efforts; you cannot give money to one without taking it from another. If you are absolutely determined34 to exhaust the funds of the taxable community, well; but, at least, do not mock them; do not tell them, "We take from you again, in order to compensate35 you for what we have already taken."
It would be a too tedious undertaking36 to endeavor to point out all the fallacies of this Sophism. I will therefore limit myself to the consideration of it in three points.
You argue that France is overburthened with taxes, and deduce thence the conclusion that it is necessary to protect such and such an article of produce. But protection does not relieve us from the payment of these taxes. If, then, individuals devoting themselves to any one object of industry, should advance this demand: "We, from our participation37 in the payment of taxes, have our expenses of production increased, and therefore ask for a protective duty which shall raise our price of sale;" what is this but a demand on their part to be allowed to free themselves from the burthen of the tax, by laying it on the rest of the community? Their object is to balance, by the increased price of their produce, the amount which they pay in taxes. Now, as the whole amount of these taxes must enter into the treasury, and the increase of price must be paid by society, it follows that (where this protective duty is imposed) society has to bear, not only the general tax, but also that for the protection of the article in question. But it is answered, let every thing be protected. Firstly, this is impossible; and, again, were it possible, how could such a system give relief? I will pay for you, you will pay for me; but not the less, still there remains38 the tax to be paid.
Thus you are the dupes of an illusion. You determine to raise taxes for the support of an army, a navy, the church, university, judges, roads, etc. Afterwards you seek to disburthen from its portion of the tax, first one article of industry, then another, then a third; always adding to the burthen of the mass of society. You thus only create interminable complications. If you can prove that the increase of price resulting from protection, falls upon the foreign producer, I grant something specious39 in your argument. But if it be true that the French people paid the tax before the passing of the protective duty, and afterwards that it has paid not only the tax, but the protective duty also, truly I do not perceive wherein it has profited.
But I go much further, and maintain that the more oppressive our taxes are, the more anxiously ought we to open our ports and frontiers to foreign nations, less burthened than ourselves. And why? In order that we may share with them, as much as possible, the burthen which we bear. Is it not an incontestable maxim40 in political economy, that taxes must, in the end, fall upon the consumer? The greater then our commerce, the greater the portion which will be reimbursed41 to us, of taxes incorporated in the produce, which we will have sold to foreign consumers; whilst we, on our part, will have made to them only a lesser reimbursement42, because (according to our hypothesis) their produce is less taxed than ours.
Again, finally, has it ever occurred to you to ask yourself, whether these heavy taxes which you adduce as a reason for keeping up the prohibitive system, may not be the result of this very system itself? To what purpose would be our great standing43 armies, and our powerful navies, if commerce were free?
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1
sophism
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| n.诡辩 | |
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neutralize
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| v.使失效、抵消，使中和 | |
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lesser
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| adj.次要的，较小的；adv.较小地，较少地 | |
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demonstration
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| n.表明，示范，论证，示威 | |
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recurs
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| 再发生，复发( recur的第三人称单数 ) | |
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fixed
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| adj.固定的，不变的，准备好的；(计算机)固定的 | |
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7
perfectly
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| adv.完美地，无可非议地，彻底地 | |
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8
impost
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| n.进口税，关税 | |
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fiscal
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| adj.财政的，会计的，国库的，国库岁入的 | |
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attained
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| （通常经过努力）实现( attain的过去式和过去分词 )； 达到； 获得； 达到（某年龄、水平、状况） | |
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treasury
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| n.宝库；国库，金库；文库 | |
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attainment
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| n.达到，到达；［常pl.］成就，造诣 | |
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13
tariffs
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| 关税制度； 关税( tariff的名词复数 )； 关税表； （旅馆或饭店等的）收费表； 量刑标准 | |
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controversy
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| n.争论，辩论，争吵 | |
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overloaded
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| a.超载的，超负荷的 | |
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16
mere
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| adj.纯粹的；仅仅，只不过 | |
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pretext
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| n.借口，托词 | |
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doctrine
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| n.教义；主义；学说 | |
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expends
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| v.花费( expend的第三人称单数 )；使用（钱等）做某事；用光；耗尽 | |
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precisely
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| adv.恰好，正好，精确地，细致地 | |
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antithesis
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| n.对立；相对 | |
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neutralized
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| v.使失效( neutralize的过去式和过去分词 )；抵消；中和；使（一个国家）中立化 | |
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accredited
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| adj.可接受的；可信任的；公认的；质量合格的v.相信( accredit的过去式和过去分词 )；委托；委任；把…归结于 | |
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equilibrium
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| n.平衡，均衡，相称，均势，平静 | |
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clogs
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| 木屐； 木底鞋，木屐( clog的名词复数 ) | |
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premium
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| n.加付款；赠品；adj.高级的；售价高的 | |
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frankly
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| adv.坦白地，直率地；坦率地说 | |
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bounties
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| （由政府提供的）奖金( bounty的名词复数 )； 赏金； 慷慨； 大方 | |
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banish
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| vt.放逐，驱逐；消除，排除 | |
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lumber
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| n.木材，木料；v.以破旧东西堆满；伐木；笨重移动 | |
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dealers
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| n.商人( dealer的名词复数 )；贩毒者；毒品贩子；发牌者 | |
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attentive
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| adj.注意的，专心的；关心(别人)的，殷勤的 | |
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investigation
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| n.调查，调查研究 | |
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determined
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| adj.坚定的；有决心的 | |
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compensate
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| vt.补偿，赔偿；酬报 vi.弥补；补偿；抵消 | |
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undertaking
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| n.保证，许诺，事业 | |
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participation
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| n.参与，参加，分享 | |
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remains
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| n.剩余物，残留物；遗体，遗迹 | |
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specious
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| adj.似是而非的；adv.似是而非地 | |
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40
maxim
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| n.格言，箴言 | |
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41
reimbursed
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| v.偿还，付还( reimburse的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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reimbursement
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| n.偿还，退还 | |
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standing
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| n.持续，地位；adj.永久的，不动的，直立的，不流动的 | |
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