In France municipal freedom outlived the feudal3 system. Long after the landlords were no longer the rulers of the country districts, the towns still retained the right of self-government. Some of the towns of France continued down to nearly the close of the seventeenth century to form, as it were, small democratic commonwealths4, in which the magistrates5 were freely elected by the whole people and were responsible to the people—in which municipal life was still public and animated—in which the city was still proud of her rights and jealous of her independence.
These elections were generally abolished for the first time in 1692. The municipal offices were then what was called put up to sale (mises en offices was the technical expression), that is to say, the King sold in each town to some of the inhabitants the right of perpetually governing all their townsmen.
This measure cost the towns at once their freedom and their well-being7; for if the practice of the sale of commissions for a public employment sometimes proved useful in its effects when applied8 to the courts of justice—since the first condition of the good administration of justice is the complete independence of the judge—this system never failed to be extremely mischievous9 whenever it was applied to posts of administrative duty, which demand, above all things, responsibility, subordination, and zeal10. The Government of the old French monarchy11 was perfectly12 aware of the real effects of such a system. It took great care not to adopt for itself the same mode of proceeding13 which it applied to the towns, and scrupulously14 abstained15 from putting up to sale the commissions of its own Intendants and Sub-delegates.
And it well deserves the whole scorn of history that this great change was accomplished16 without any political motive17. Louis XI. had curtailed18 the municipal liberties of the towns, because he was alarmed by their democratic character;[22] Louis XIV. destroyed them[37] under no such fears. The proof is that he restored these rights to all the towns which were rich enough to buy them back again. In reality, his object was not to abolish them, but to traffic in them; and if they were actually abolished, it was, without meaning it, by a mere19 fiscal20 expedient21. The same thing was carried on for more than eighty years. Seven times within that period the Crown resold to the towns the right of electing their magistrates, and as soon as they had once more tasted this blessing22, it was snatched away to be sold to them once more. The motive of the measure was always the same, and frequently avowed23. ‘Our financial necessities,’ says the preamble24 to an edict of 1722, ‘compel us to have recourse to the most effectual means of relieving them.’ The mode was effectual, but it was ruinous to those who bore this strange impost25. ‘I am struck with the enormity of the sums which have been paid at all times to purchase back the municipal offices,’ writes an Intendant to the Comptroller-General in 1764. ‘The amount of these sums spent in useful improvements would have turned to the advantage of the town, which has, on the contrary, felt nothing but the weight of authority and the privileges of these offices.’ I have not detected a more shameful26 feature in the whole aspect of the government of France before the Revolution.
It seems difficult to say with precision at the present time how the towns of France were governed in the eighteenth century; for, besides that the origin of the municipal authorities fluctuated incessantly27, as has just been stated, each town still preserved some fragments of its former constitution and its peculiar28 customs. There were not, perhaps, two towns in France in which everything was exactly similar; but this apparent diversity is fallacious, and conceals29 a general resemblance.[23]
In 1764 the Government proposed to make a general law on the administration of the towns of France, and for this purpose it caused reports to be sent in by the Intendants of the Crown on the existing municipal government of the country. I have discovered a portion of the results of this inquiry31, and I have fully32 satisfied myself by the perusal33 of it that the municipal affairs of all these towns were conducted in much the same manner. The distinctions are merely superficial and apparent—the groundwork is everywhere the same.
In most instances the government of the towns was vested in two assemblies. All the great towns were thus governed, and some of the small ones. The first of these assemblies was composed of[38] municipal officers, more or less numerous according to the place. These formed the executive body of the community, the corporation or corps34 de la ville, as it was then termed. The members of this body exercised a temporary power, and were elected when the King had restored the elective power, or when the town had been able to buy up its offices. They held their offices permanently35 upon a certain payment to the Crown, when the Crown had appropriated the patronage36 and succeeded in disposing of it by sale, which was not always the case; for this sort of commodity declined in value precisely37 in proportion to the increasing subordination of the municipal authority to the central power. These municipal officers never received any stipend38, but they were remunerated by exemptions39 from taxation40 and by privileges. No regular gradation of authority seems to have been established among them—their administration was collective. The mayor was the president of the corporation, not the governor of the city.
The second assembly, which was termed the general assembly, or as we should say in England the livery, elected the corporation, wherever it was still subject to election, and always continued to take a part in the principal concerns of the town.
In the fifteenth century this general assembly frequently consisted of the whole population. ‘This custom,’ said one of the authors of these Reports, ‘was consistent with the popular spirit of our forefathers41.’ At that time the whole people elected their own municipal officers; this body was sometimes consulted by the corporation, and to this body the corporation was responsible. At the end of the seventeenth century the same state of things might sometimes be met with.
In the eighteenth century the people acting42 as a body had ceased to meet in this general assembly; it had by that time become representative. But, it must be carefully remarked, that this body was no longer anywhere elected by the bulk of the community, or impressed with its spirit. It was invariably composed of notables, some of whom sat there in virtue43 of a personal right; others were deputed by guilds44 or companies, from which each of them received imperative45 instructions.
As this century rolled on, the number of these notables sitting in virtue of their own right augmented46 in the popular assembly; the delegates of the working guilds fell away or disappeared altogether. They were superseded47 by the delegates of the great companies, or, in other words, the assembly contained only burgesses and scarcely any artisans. Then the citizens, who are not so easily imposed on by the empty semblance30 of liberty as is sometimes[39] supposed, ceased everywhere to take an interest in the affairs of the town, and lived like strangers within their own walls. In vain the civic48 magistrates attempted from time to time to revive that civic patriotism49 which had done so many wonders in the Middle Ages. The people remained deaf. The greatest interests of the town no longer appeared to affect the citizens. They were asked to give their suffrages51 when the vain counterfeit52 of a free election had been retained; but they stood aloof53. Nothing is more frequent in history than such an occurrence. Almost all the princes who have destroyed freedom have attempted at first to preserve the forms of freedom, from Augustus to our own times; they flattered themselves that they should thus combine the moral strength which public assent54 always gives, with the conveniences which absolute power can alone offer. But almost all of them have failed in this endeavour, and have soon discovered that it is impossible to prolong these false appearances where the reality has ceased to exist.
In the eighteenth century the municipal government of the towns of France had thus everywhere degenerated55 into a contracted oligarchy56. A few families managed all the public business for their own private purposes, removed from the eye of the public, and with no public responsibility. Such was the morbid57 condition of this administration throughout the whole of France. All the Intendants pointed58 it out; but the only remedy they suggested was the increased subjection of the local authorities to the Central Government.
In this respect, however, it was difficult for success to be more complete. Besides the Royal edicts, which from time to time modified the administration of all the towns in France, the local by-laws of each town were frequently overruled by Orders in Council, which were not registered—passed on the recommendation of the Intendants, without any previous inquiry, and sometimes without the citizens of the towns themselves knowing anything of the matter.[24]
‘This measure,’ said the inhabitants of a town which had been affected59 by a decree of this nature, ‘has astonished all the orders of the city, who expected nothing of the kind.’
The towns of France at this period could neither establish an octroi on articles of consumption, nor levy60 a rate, nor mortgage, nor sell, nor sue, nor farm their property, nor administer that property, nor even employ their own surplus revenues, without the intervention61 of an Order in Council, made on the report of the Intendant. All their public works were executed in conformity[40] to plans and estimates approved by the Council. These works were adjudged to contractors62 before the Intendant or his Sub-delegates, and were generally intrusted to the engineers or architects of the State.
These facts will doubtless excite the surprise of those who suppose that the whole present condition of France is a novelty.
But the Central Government interfered63 more directly in the municipal administration of the towns than even these rules would seem to indicate; its power was far more extended than its right to exercise it.
I meet with the following passage in a circular instruction, addressed about the middle of the last century by a Comptroller-General to all the Intendants of the Kingdom: ‘You will pay particular attention to all that takes place in the municipal assemblies. You will take care to have a most exact report of everything done there and of all the resolutions taken, in order to transmit them to me forthwith, accompanied with your own opinion on the subject.’
In fact it may be seen, from the correspondence of the Intendant with his subordinate officers, that the Government had a finger in all the concerns of every town, the least as well as the greatest. The Government was always consulted—the Government had always a decided64 opinion on every point. It even regulated the public festivities, ordered public rejoicings, caused salutes65 to be fired, and houses to be illuminated66. On one occasion I observe that a member of the burgher guard was fined twenty livres by the Intendant for having absented himself from a Te Deum.
The officers of these municipal corporations had therefore arrived at a becoming sense of their own insignificance67. ‘We most humbly68 supplicate69 you, Monseigneur’ (such was the style in which they addressed the King’s Intendant), ‘to grant us your good-will and protection. We will endeavour not to show ourselves unworthy of them by the submission70 we are ready to show to all the commands of your Greatness.’ ‘We have never resisted your will, Monseigneur,’ was the language of another body of these persons, who still assumed the pompous71 title of Peers of the City.
Such was the preparation of the middle classes for government, and of the people for liberty.
If at least this close dependence6 of the towns on the State had preserved their finances! but such was not the case. It is sometimes argued that without centralisation the towns would ruin themselves. I know not how that may be, but I know that in the[41] eighteenth century centralisation did not prevent their ruin. The whole administrative history of that time is replete72 with their embarrassments73.
If we turn from the towns to the villages, we meet with different powers and different forms of government, but the same dependence.[25]
I find many indications of the fact, that in the Middle Ages the inhabitants of every village formed a community distinct from the Lord of the soil. He, no doubt, employed the community, superintended it, governed it; but the village held in common certain property, which was absolutely its own; it elected its own chiefs, and administered its affairs democratically.
This ancient constitution of the parish may be traced in all the nations in which the feudal system prevailed, and in all the countries to which these nations have carried the remnants of their laws. These vestiges74 occur at every turn in England, and the system was in full vigour75 in Germany sixty years ago, as may be demonstrated by reading the code of Frederic the Great. Even in France in the eighteenth century, some traces of it were still in existence.
I remember that, when I proceeded, for the first time, to ascertain76 from the archives of one of the old Intendancies of France, what was meant by a parish before the Revolution, I was surprised to find in this community, so poor and so enslaved, several of the characteristics which had struck me long ago in the rural townships of the United States, and which I had then erroneously conceived to be a peculiarity77 of society in the New World. Neither in the one nor in the other of these communities is there any permanent representation or any municipal body, in the strict sense of that term; both the one and the other were administered by officers acting separately under the direction of the whole population. In both, meetings were held from time to time, at which all the inhabitants, assembled in one body, elected their own magistrates and settled their principal affairs. These two parishes, in short, are as much alike as that which is living can be like that which is dead.
Different as have been the destinies of these two corporate78 beings, their birth was in fact the same.
Transported at once to regions far removed from the feudal system, and invested with unlimited79 authority over itself, the rural parish of the Middle Ages in Europe is become the township of New England. Severed80 from the lordship of the soil, but grasped[42] in the powerful hand of the State, the rural parishes of France assumed the form I am about to describe.
In the eighteenth century the number and the name of the parochial officers varied81 in the different provinces of France. The ancient records show that these officers were more numerous when local life was more active, and that they diminished in number as that life declined. In most of the parishes they were, in the eighteenth century, reduced to two persons—the one named the ‘Collector,’ the other most commonly named the ‘Syndic.’ Generally, these parochial officers were either elected, or supposed to be so; but they had everywhere become the instruments of the State rather than the representatives of the community. The Collector levied82 the taille, under the direct orders of the Intendant. The Syndic, placed under the daily direction of the Sub-delegate of the Intendant, represented that personage in all matters relating to public order or affecting the Government. He became the principal agent of the Government in relation to military service, to the public works of the State, and to the execution of the general laws of the kingdom.
The Seigneur, as we have already seen, stood aloof from all these details of government; he had even ceased to superintend them, or to assist in them; nay83 more, these duties, which had served in earlier times to keep up his power, appeared unworthy of his attention in proportion to the progressive decay of that power. It would at last have been an offence to his pride to require him to attend to them. He had ceased to govern; but his presence in the parish and his privileges effectually prevented any good government from being established in the parish in place of his own. A private person differing so entirely84 from the other parishioners—so independent of them, and so favoured by the laws—weakened or destroyed the authority of all rules.
The unavoidable contact with such a person in the country had driven into the towns, as I shall subsequently have occasion to show, almost all those inhabitants who had either a competency or education, so that none remained about the Seigneur but a flock of ignorant and uncultivated peasants, incapable85 of managing the administration of their common interests. ‘A parish,’ as Turgot had justly observed, ‘is an assemblage of cabins, and of inhabitants as passive as the cabins they dwell in.’
The administrative records of the eighteenth century are full of complaints of the incapacity, indolence, and ignorance of the parochial collectors and syndics. Ministers, Intendants, Sub-delegates, and even the country gentlemen, are for ever deploring[43] these defects; but none of them had traced these defects to their cause.
Down to the Revolution the rural parishes of France had preserved in their government something of that democratic aspect which they had acquired in the Middle Ages. If the parochial officers were to be elected, or some matter of public interest to be discussed, the village bell summoned the peasants to the church-porch, where the poor as well as the rich were entitled to present themselves. In these meetings there was not indeed any regular debate or any decisive mode of voting, but every one was at liberty to speak his mind; and it was the duty of the notary86, sent for on purpose, and operating in the open air, to collect these different opinions and enter them in a record of the proceedings87.
When these empty semblances88 of freedom are compared with the total impotence which was connected with them, they afford an example, in miniature, of the combination of the most absolute government with some of the forms of extreme democracy; so that to oppression may be added the absurdity89 of affecting to disguise it. This democratic assembly of the parish could indeed express its desires, but it had no more power to execute its will than the corporate bodies in the towns. It could not speak until its mouth had been opened, for the meeting could not be held without the express permission of the Intendant, and, to use the expression of those times, which adapted their language to the fact, ‘under his good pleasure.’ Even if such a meeting were unanimous, it could neither levy a rate, nor sell, nor buy, nor let, nor sue, without the permission of the King’s Council. It was necessary to obtain a minute of Council to repair the damage caused by the wind to the church steeple, or to rebuild the falling gables of the parsonage. The rural parishes most remote from Paris were just as much subject to this rule as those nearest to the capital. I have found records of parochial memorials to the Council for leave to spend twenty-five livres.
The inhabitants had indeed, commonly, retained the right of electing their parochial magistrates by universal suffrage50; but it frequently happened that the Intendant designated to this small electoral body a candidate who never failed to be returned by a unanimity90 of suffrages. Sometimes, when the election had been made by the parishioners themselves, he set it aside, named the collector and syndic of his own authority, and adjourned91 indefinitely a fresh election. There are thousands of such examples.
It is difficult to conceive a more cruel fate than that of these parochial officers. The lowest agent of the Central Government,[44] the Sub-delegate, bent92 them to every caprice. Often they were fined, sometimes imprisoned93; for the securities which elsewhere defended the citizens against arbitrary proceedings had ceased to exist for them: ‘I have thrown into prison,’ said an Intendant in 1750, ‘some of the chief persons in the villages who grumbled94, and I have made these parishes pay the expense of the horsemen of the patrol. By these means they have been easily checkmated.’ The consequence was, that these parochial functions were not considered as honours, but as burdens to be evaded95 by every species of subterfuge96.
Yet these last remnants of the ancient parochial government were still dear to the peasantry of France; and even at the present day, of all public liberties the only one they thoroughly97 comprehend is parochial freedom. The only business of a public nature which really interests them is to be found there. Men, who readily leave the government of the whole nation in the hand of a master, revolt at the notion of not being able to speak their mind in the administration of their own village. So much weight is there yet in forms the most hollow.
What has been said of the towns and parishes of France may be extended to almost all the corporate bodies which had any separate existence and collective property.
Under the social condition of France anterior to the Revolution of 1789, as well as at the present day, there was no city, town, borough98, village, or hamlet in the kingdom—there was neither hospital, church fabric99, religious house, nor college, which could have an independent will in the management of its private affairs, or which could administer its own property according to its own choice. Then, as now, the executive administration therefore held the whole French people in tutelage; and if that insolent100 term had not yet been invented, the thing itself already existed.
点击
收听单词发音
收听单词发音 |
1
administrative
|
|
| adj.行政的，管理的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
2
anterior
|
|
| adj.较早的；在前的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
3
feudal
|
|
| adj.封建的，封地的，领地的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
4
commonwealths
|
|
| n.共和国( commonwealth的名词复数 )；联邦；团体；协会 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
|
5
magistrates
|
|
| 地方法官，治安官( magistrate的名词复数 ) | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
6
dependence
|
|
| n.依靠，依赖；信任，信赖；隶属 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
7
well-being
|
|
| n.安康，安乐，幸福 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
8
applied
|
|
| adj.应用的；v.应用，适用 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
9
mischievous
|
|
| adj.调皮的，恶作剧的，有害的，伤人的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
10
zeal
|
|
| n.热心，热情，热忱 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
11
monarchy
|
|
| n.君主，最高统治者；君主政体，君主国 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
12
perfectly
|
|
| adv.完美地，无可非议地，彻底地 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
13
proceeding
|
|
| n.行动，进行，(pl.)会议录，学报 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
14
scrupulously
|
|
| adv.一丝不苟地；小心翼翼地，多顾虑地 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
15
abstained
|
|
| v.戒（尤指酒），戒除( abstain的过去式和过去分词 )；弃权（不投票） | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
16
accomplished
|
|
| adj.有才艺的；有造诣的；达到了的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
17
motive
|
|
| n.动机，目的；adv.发动的，运动的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
18
curtailed
|
|
| v.截断，缩短( curtail的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
19
mere
|
|
| adj.纯粹的；仅仅，只不过 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
20
fiscal
|
|
| adj.财政的，会计的，国库的，国库岁入的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
21
expedient
|
|
| adj.有用的，有利的；n.紧急的办法，权宜之计 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
22
blessing
|
|
| n.祈神赐福；祷告；祝福，祝愿 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
23
avowed
|
|
| adj.公开声明的，承认的v.公开声明，承认( avow的过去式和过去分词) | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
24
preamble
|
|
| n.前言；序文 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
25
impost
|
|
| n.进口税，关税 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
26
shameful
|
|
| adj.可耻的，不道德的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
27
incessantly
|
|
| ad.不停地 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
28
peculiar
|
|
| adj.古怪的，异常的；特殊的，特有的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
29
conceals
|
|
| v.隐藏，隐瞒，遮住( conceal的第三人称单数 ) | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
30
semblance
|
|
| n.外貌，外表 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
31
inquiry
|
|
| n.打听，询问，调查，查问 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
32
fully
|
|
| adv.完全地，全部地，彻底地；充分地 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
33
perusal
|
|
| n.细读，熟读；目测 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
34
corps
|
|
| n.(通信等兵种的)部队；(同类作的)一组 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
35
permanently
|
|
| adv.永恒地，永久地，固定不变地 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
36
patronage
|
|
| n.赞助，支援，援助；光顾，捧场 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
37
precisely
|
|
| adv.恰好，正好，精确地，细致地 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
38
stipend
|
|
| n.薪贴；奖学金；养老金 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
39
exemptions
|
|
| n.（义务等的）免除( exemption的名词复数 )；免（税）；（收入中的）免税额 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
40
taxation
|
|
| n.征税，税收，税金 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
41
forefathers
|
|
| n.祖先，先人；祖先，祖宗( forefather的名词复数 )；列祖列宗；前人 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
42
acting
|
|
| n.演戏，行为，假装；adj.代理的，临时的，演出用的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
43
virtue
|
|
| n.德行，美德；贞操；优点；功效，效力 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
44
guilds
|
|
| 行会，同业公会，协会( guild的名词复数 ) | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
45
imperative
|
|
| n.命令，需要；规则；祈使语气；adj.强制的；紧急的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
46
Augmented
|
|
| adj.增音的 动词augment的过去式和过去分词形式 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
47
superseded
|
|
| [医]被代替的，废弃的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
48
civic
|
|
| adj.城市的，都市的，市民的，公民的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
49
patriotism
|
|
| n.爱国精神，爱国心，爱国主义 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
50
suffrage
|
|
| n.投票，选举权，参政权 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
51
suffrages
|
|
| （政治性选举的）选举权，投票权( suffrage的名词复数 ) | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
|
52
counterfeit
|
|
| vt.伪造，仿造；adj.伪造的，假冒的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
53
aloof
|
|
| adj.远离的；冷淡的，漠不关心的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
54
assent
|
|
| v.批准，认可；n.批准，认可 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
55
degenerated
|
|
| 衰退，堕落，退化( degenerate的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
56
oligarchy
|
|
| n.寡头政治 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
57
morbid
|
|
| adj.病的；致病的；病态的；可怕的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
58
pointed
|
|
| adj.尖的，直截了当的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
59
affected
|
|
| adj.不自然的，假装的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
60
levy
|
|
| n.征收税或其他款项，征收额 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
61
intervention
|
|
| n.介入，干涉，干预 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
62
contractors
|
|
| n.（建筑、监造中的）承包人( contractor的名词复数 ) | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
63
interfered
|
|
| v.干预( interfere的过去式和过去分词 )；调停；妨碍；干涉 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
64
decided
|
|
| adj.决定了的，坚决的；明显的，明确的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
65
salutes
|
|
| n.致敬，欢迎，敬礼( salute的名词复数 )v.欢迎，致敬( salute的第三人称单数 )；赞扬，赞颂 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
66
illuminated
|
|
| adj.被照明的；受启迪的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
67
insignificance
|
|
| n.不重要；无价值；无意义 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
68
humbly
|
|
| adv. 恭顺地，谦卑地 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
69
supplicate
|
|
| v.恳求；adv.祈求地，哀求地，恳求地 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
70
submission
|
|
| n.服从，投降；温顺，谦虚；提出 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
71
pompous
|
|
| adj.傲慢的，自大的；夸大的；豪华的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
72
replete
|
|
| adj.饱满的，塞满的；n.贮蜜蚁 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
73
embarrassments
|
|
| n.尴尬( embarrassment的名词复数 )；难堪；局促不安；令人难堪或耻辱的事 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
74
vestiges
|
|
| 残余部分( vestige的名词复数 )； 遗迹； 痕迹； 毫不 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
75
vigour
|
|
| （=vigor）n.智力，体力，精力 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
76
ascertain
|
|
| vt.发现，确定，查明，弄清 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
77
peculiarity
|
|
| n.独特性，特色；特殊的东西；怪癖 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
78
corporate
|
|
| adj.共同的，全体的；公司的，企业的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
79
unlimited
|
|
| adj.无限的，不受控制的，无条件的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
80
severed
|
|
| v.切断，断绝( sever的过去式和过去分词 )；断，裂 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
81
varied
|
|
| adj.多样的，多变化的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
82
levied
|
|
| 征（兵）( levy的过去式和过去分词 )； 索取； 发动（战争）； 征税 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
83
nay
|
|
| adv.不；n.反对票，投反对票者 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
84
entirely
|
|
| ad.全部地，完整地；完全地，彻底地 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
85
incapable
|
|
| adj.无能力的，不能做某事的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
86
notary
|
|
| n.公证人，公证员 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
87
proceedings
|
|
| n.进程，过程，议程；诉讼(程序)；公报 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
88
semblances
|
|
| n.外表，外观（semblance的复数形式） | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
|
89
absurdity
|
|
| n.荒谬，愚蠢；谬论 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
90
unanimity
|
|
| n.全体一致，一致同意 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
91
adjourned
|
|
| （使）休会， （使）休庭( adjourn的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
92
bent
|
|
| n.爱好，癖好；adj.弯的；决心的，一心的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
93
imprisoned
|
|
| 下狱，监禁( imprison的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
94
grumbled
|
|
| 抱怨( grumble的过去式和过去分词 )； 发牢骚； 咕哝； 发哼声 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
95
evaded
|
|
| 逃避( evade的过去式和过去分词 )； 避开； 回避； 想不出 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
96
subterfuge
|
|
| n.诡计；藉口 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
97
thoroughly
|
|
| adv.完全地，彻底地，十足地 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
98
borough
|
|
| n.享有自治权的市镇；(英)自治市镇 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
99
fabric
|
|
| n.织物，织品，布；构造，结构，组织 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
100
insolent
|
|
| adj.傲慢的，无理的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
| 欢迎访问英文小说网 |