Of all the disorders which attacked the constitution of society in France, as it existed before the Revolution, and led to the dissolution of that society, that which I have just described was the most fatal. But I must pursue the inquiry3 to the source of so dangerous and strange an evil, and show how many other evils took their origin from the same cause.
If the English had, from the period of the Middle Ages, altogether lost, like the French, political freedom and all those local franchises4 which cannot long exist without it, it is highly probable that each of the different classes of which the English aristocracy is composed would have seceded5 from the rest, as was the case in France and more or less all over the continent, and that all those classes together would have separated themselves from the people. But freedom compelled them always to remain within reach of each other, so as to combine their strength in time of need.
It is curious to observe how the British aristocracy, urged even by its own ambition, has contrived6, whenever it seemed necessary, to mix familiarly with its inferiors, and to feign7 to consider them as its equals. Arthur Young, whom I have already quoted, and whose book is one of the most instructive works which exist on the former state of society in France, relates that, happening to be one day at the country-house of the Duc de la Rochefoucauld, at La Roche Guyon, he expressed a wish to converse8 with some of the best and most wealthy farmers of the neighbourhood. ‘The Duke had the kindness to order his steward9 to give me all the information I wanted relative to the agriculture of the country, and to speak to such persons as were necessary on points that he was in doubt about. At an English nobleman’s house there would have been three or four farmers asked to meet me, who would have dined with the family among ladies of the first rank. I do not[85] exaggerate when I say that I have had this at least an hundred times in the first houses of our islands. It is, however, a thing that in the present state of manners in France would not be met with from Calais to Bayonne, except by chance in the house of some great Lord, who had been much in England, and then not unless it were asked for. I once knew it at the Duke de Liancourt’s.’[43]
Unquestionably the English aristocracy is of a haughtier10 nature than that of France, and less disposed to mingle11 familiarly with those who live in a humbler condition; but the obligations of its own rank have imposed that duty upon it. It submitted that it might command. For centuries no inequality of taxation12 has existed in England, except such exemptions13 as have been successively introduced for the relief of the indigent16 classes. Observe to what results different political principles may lead nations so nearly contiguous! In the eighteenth century, the poor man in England enjoyed the privilege of exemption15 from taxation; the rich in France. In one country the aristocracy has taken upon itself the heaviest public burdens, in order to retain the government of the State; in the other the aristocracy retained to the last exemption from taxation as a compensation for the loss of political power.
In the fourteenth century the maxim17 ‘No tax without the consent of the taxed’—n’impose qui ne veut—appeared to be as firmly established in France as in England. It was frequently quoted; to contravene18 it always seemed an act of tyranny; to conform to it was to revert19 to the law. At that period, as I have already remarked, a multitude of analogies may be traced between the political institutions of France and those of England; but then the destinies of the two nations separated and constantly became more unlike, as time advanced. They resemble two lines starting from contiguous points at a slight angle, which diverge20 indefinitely as they are prolonged.
I venture to affirm that when the French nation, exhausted21 by the protracted22 disturbances23 which had accompanied the captivity24 of King John and the madness of Charles VI., suffered the Crown to levy25 a general tax without the consent of the people, and when the nobility had the baseness to allow the middle and lower classes to be so taxed on condition that its own exemption should be maintained, at that very time was sown the seed of almost all the vices26 and almost all the abuses which afflicted27 the ancient society of France during the remainder of its existence, and ended by causing its violent dissolution; and I admire the rare sagacity of Philippe[86] de Comines when he says, ‘Charles VII., who gained the point of laying on the taille at his pleasure, without the consent of the States of the Realm, laid a heavy burden on his soul and on that of his successors, and gave a wound to his kingdom which will not soon be closed.’
Observe how that wound widened with the course of years; follow step by step that fact to its consequences.
Forbonnais says with truth in his learned ‘Researches on the Finances of France,’ that in the Middle Ages the sovereigns generally lived on the revenues of their domains29; and ‘as the extraordinary wants of the State,’ he adds, ‘were provided for by extraordinary subsidies30, they were levied31 equally on the clergy32, the nobility, and the people.’
The greater part of the general subsidies voted by the three Orders in the course of the fourteenth century were, in point of fact, so levied. Almost all the taxes established at that time were indirect, that is, they were paid indiscriminately by all classes of consumers. Sometimes the tax was direct; but then it was assessed, not on property, but on income. The nobles, the priests, and the burgesses were bound to pay over to the King, for a year, a tenth, for instance, of all their incomes. This remark as to the charges voted by the Estates of the Realm applies equally to those which were imposed at the same period by the different Provincial33 Estates within their own territories.[44]
It is true that already, at that time, the direct tax known by the name of the taille was never levied on the noble classes. The obligation of gratuitous34 military service was the ground of their exemption; but the taille was at that time partially35 in force as a general impost36, belonging rather to the seignorial jurisdictions37 than to the kingdom.
When the King first undertook to levy taxes by his own authority, he perceived that he must select a tax which did not appear to fall directly on the nobles; for that class, formidable and dangerous to the monarchy38 itself, would never have submitted to an innovation so prejudicial to their own interests. The tax selected by the Crown was, therefore, a tax from which the nobles were exempt14, and that tax was the taille.
Thus to all the private inequalities of condition which already existed, another and more general inequality was added, which augmented41 and perpetuated42 all the rest. From that time this tax spread and ramified in proportion as the demands of the public Treasury43 increased with the functions of the central authority; it[87] was soon decupled, and all the new taxes assumed the character of the taille. Every year, therefore, inequality of taxation separated the classes of society and isolated44 the individuals of whom they consisted more deeply than before. Since the object of taxation was not to include those most able to pay taxes, but those least able to defend themselves from paying, the monstrous45 consequence was brought about that the rich were exempted46 and the poor burdened. It is related that Cardinal47 Mazarin, being in want of money, hit upon the expedient48 of levying49 a tax upon the principal houses in Paris, but that having encountered some opposition50 from the parties concerned, he contented51 himself with adding the five millions he required to the general brevet of the taille. He meant to tax the wealthiest of the King’s subjects; he did tax the most indigent; but to the Treasury the result was the same.
The produce of taxes thus unjustly allotted52 had limits; but the demands of the Crown had none. Yet the Kings of France would neither convoke53 the States-General to obtain subsidies, nor would they provoke the nobility to demand that measure by imposing54 taxes on them without it.
Hence arose that prodigious55 and mischievous56 fecundity57 of financial expedients58, which so peculiarly characterised the administration of the public resources during the last three centuries of the old French monarchy.
It is necessary to study the details of the administrative60 and financial history of that period, to form a conception of the violent and unwarrantable proceedings61 which the want of money may prescribe even to a mild Government, but without publicity62 and without control, when once time has sanctioned its power and delivered it from the dread63 of revolution—that last safeguard of nations.
Every page in these annals tells of possessions of the Crown first sold and then resumed as unsaleable; of contracts violated and of vested interests ignored; of sacrifices wrung64 at every crisis from the public creditor65, and of incessant66 repudiations of public engagements.[45]
Privileges granted in perpetuity were perpetually resumed. If we could bestow67 our compassion68 on the disappointments of a foolish vanity, the fate of those luckless persons might deserve it who purchased letters of nobility, but who were exposed during the whole of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries to buy over and over again the empty honours or the unjust privileges which they had already paid for several times. Thus Louis XIV.[88] annulled69 all the titles of nobility acquired in the preceding ninety-two years, though most of them had been conferred by himself; but they could only be retained upon furnishing a fresh subsidy70, all these titles having been obtained by surprise, said the edict. The same example was duly followed by Louis XV. eighty years later.
The militia-man was forbidden to procure71 a substitute, for fear, it was said, of raising the price of recruits to the State.
Towns, corporations, and hospitals were compelled to break their own engagements in order that they might be able to lend money to the Crown. Parishes were restrained from undertaking72 works of public improvement, lest by such a diversion of their resources they should pay their direct taxes with less punctuality.
It is related that M. Orry and M. Trudaine, of whom one was the Comptroller-General and the other the Director-General of Public Works, had formed a plan for substituting, for the forced labour of the peasantry on the roads, a rate to be levied on the inhabitants of each district for the repair of their thoroughfares. The reason which led these able administrators73 to forego that plan is instructive: they feared, it is said, that when a fund had been raised by such a rate it would be impossible to prevent the Treasury from appropriating the money to its own purposes, so that ere long the ratepayers would have had to support both the new money payment and the old charge of forced labour. I do not hesitate to say that no private person could have escaped the grasp of the criminal law who should have managed his own fortune as the Great Louis in all his glory managed the fortune of the nation.
If you stumble upon any old establishment of the Middle Ages which maintained itself with every aggravation74 of its original defects in direct opposition to the spirit of the age, or upon any mischievous innovation, search to the root of the evil—you will find it to be some financial expedient perpetuated in the form of an institution. To meet the pressure of the hour new powers were called into being which lasted for centuries.
A peculiar59 tax, which was called the due of franc-fief, had been levied from a distant period on the non-noble holders75 of noble lands. This tax established between lands the same distinction which existed between the classes of society, and the one constantly tended to increase the other. Perhaps this due of franc-fief contributed more than any other cause to separate the roturier and the noble, because it prevented them from mingling76 together in that which most speedily and most effectually assimilates men to each other—in the possession of land. A chasm77 was[89] thus opened between the noble landowner on the one hand, and his neighbour, the non-noble landowner, on the other. Nothing, on the contrary, contributed to hasten the cohesion78 of these two classes in England more than the abolition79, as early as the sixteenth century, of all outward distinctions between the fiefs held under the Crown and lands held in villenage.[46]
In the fourteenth century this feudal80 tax of franc-fief was light, and was only levied here and there; but in the eighteenth century, when the feudal system was well-nigh abolished, it was rigorously exacted in France every twenty years, and it amounted to one whole year’s revenue. A son paid it on succeeding his father. ‘This tax,’ said the Agricultural Society of Tours in 1761, ‘is extremely injurious to the improvement of the art of husbandry. Of all the imposts borne by the King’s subjects there is indisputably none so vexatious and so onerous81 to the rural population.’ ‘This duty,’ said another contemporary writer, ‘which was at first levied but once in a lifetime, is become in course of time a very cruel burden.’ The nobles themselves would have been glad that it should be abolished, for it prevented persons of inferior condition from purchasing their lands; but the fiscal82 demands of the State required that it should be maintained and increased.[47]
The Middle Ages are sometimes erroneously charged with all the evils arising from the trading or industrial corporations. But at their origin these guilds83 and companies served only as means to connect the members of a given calling with each other, and to establish in each trade a free government in miniature, whose business it was at once to assist and to control the working classes. Such, and no more, seems to have been the intention of St. Louis.
It was not till the commencement of the sixteenth century, in the midst of that period which is termed the Revival84 of Arts and Letters, that it was proposed for the first time to consider the right to labour in a particular vocation85 as a privilege to be sold by the Crown. Then it was that each Company became a small close aristocracy, and at last those monopolies were established which were so prejudicial to the progress of the arts and which so exasperated86 the last generation. From the reign28 of Henry III., who generalised the evil, if he did not give birth to it, down to Louis XVI., who extirpated87 it, it may be said that the abuse of the system of guilds never ceased to augment40 and to spread at the very time[90] when the progress of society rendered those institutions more insupportable, and when the common sense of the public was most opposed to them. Year after year more professions were deprived of their freedom; year after year the privileges of the incorporated trades were increased. Never was the evil carried to greater lengths than during what are commonly called the prosperous years of the reign of Louis XIV., because at no former period had the want of money been more imperious, or the resolution not to raise money with the assent88 of the nation more firmly taken.
Letrone said with truth in 1775—‘The State has only established the trading companies to furnish pecuniary89 resources, partly by the patents which it sells, partly by the creation of new offices which the Companies are forced to buy up. The Edict of 1673 carried the principles of Henry III. to their furthest consequences by compelling all the Companies to take out letters of confirmation90 upon payment for the same; and all the workmen who were not yet incorporated in some one of these bodies were compelled to enter them. This wretched expedient brought in three hundred thousand livres.’
We have already seen how the whole municipal constitution of the towns was overthrown91, not by any political design, but in the hope of picking up a pittance92 for the Treasury. This same want of money, combined with the desire not to seek it from the States-General of the kingdom, gave rise to the venality93 of public offices, which became at last a thing so strange that its like had never been seen in the world. It was by this institution, engendered94 by the fiscal spirit of the Government, that the vanity of the middle classes was kept on the stretch for three centuries and exclusively directed to the acquisition of public employments, and thus was the universal passion for places made to penetrate95 to the bowels96 of the nation, where it became the common source of revolutions and of servitude.
As the financial embarrassments97 of the State increased, new offices sprang up, all of which were remunerated by exemptions from taxation and by privileges; and as these offices were produced by the wants of the Treasury, not of the administration, the result was the creation of an almost incredible number of employments which were altogether superfluous98 or mischievous.[48] As early as 1664, upon an inquiry instituted by Colbert, it was found that the capital invested in this wretched property amounted to nearly five hundred millions of livres. Richelieu had suppressed, it was said, a hundred thousand offices: but they cropped out again under[91] other names.[49] For a little money the State renounced99 the right of directing, of controlling, and of compelling its own agents. An administrative engine was thus gradually built up so vast, so complicated, so clumsy, and so unproductive, that it came at last to be left swinging on in space, whilst a more simple and handy instrument of government was framed beside it, which really performed the duties these innumerable public officers were supposed to be doing.
It is clear that none of these pernicious institutions could have subsisted100 for twenty years if they could have been brought under discussion. None of them would have been established or aggravated101 if the Estates had been consulted, or if their remonstrances102 had been listened to when by chance they were still called together. Rarely as the States-General were convoked103 in the last ages of the monarchy, they never ceased to protest against these abuses. On several occasions these assemblies pointed104 out as the origin of all these evils the power of arbitrarily levying taxes which had been arrogated105 by the King, or, to borrow the identical terms employed by the energetic language of the fifteenth century, ‘the right of enriching himself from the substance of the people without the consent and deliberation of the Three Estates.’ Nor did they confine themselves to their own rights alone; they demanded with energy, and frequently they obtained, greater deference106 to the rights of the provinces and towns. In every session some voices were raised in those bodies against the inequality of the public burdens. They frequently demanded the abolition of the system of close guilds; they attacked with increasing vigour107 in each successive age the venality of public employments. ‘He who sells office sells justice, which is infamous,’ was their language. When that venality was established, they still complained of the abusive creation of offices. They denounced so many useless places and dangerous privileges, but always in vain. Three institutions had been previously108 established against themselves; they had originated in the desire not to convoke these assemblies, and in the necessity of disguising from the French nation the taxation which it was unsafe to exhibit in its real aspect.
And it must be observed that the best kings were as prone109 to have recourse to these practices as the worst. Louis XII. completed the introduction of the venality of public offices; Henry IV. extended the sale of them to reversions. The vices of the system were stronger than the virtues110 of those who applied111 it.
The same desire of escaping from the control of the States-General[92] caused the Parliaments to be entrusted112 with most of their political functions; the result was an intermixture of judicial39 and administrative offices, which proved extremely injurious to the good conduct of business. It was necessary to seem to afford some new guarantees in place of those which were taken away; for though the French support absolute power patiently enough, so long as it be not oppressive, they never like the sight of it; and it is always prudent113 to raise about it some appearance of barriers, which serve at least to conceal114 what they do not arrest.
Lastly, it was this desire of preventing the nation, when asked for its money, from asking back its freedom, which gave rise to an incessant watchfulness115 in separating the classes of society, so that they should never come together, or combine in a common resistance, and that the Government should never have on its hands at once more than a very small number of men separated from the rest of the nation. In the whole course of this long history, in which have figured so many princes remarkable116 for their ability, sometimes remarkable for their genius, almost always remarkable for their courage, not one of them ever made an effort to bring together the different classes of his people, or to unite them otherwise than by subjecting them to a common yoke117. One exception there is, indeed, to this remark: one king of France there was who not only desired this end, but applied himself with his whole heart to attain118 it; that prince—for such are the inscrutable judgments119 of Providence—was Louis XVI.
The separation of classes was the crime of the old French monarchy, but it became its excuse; for when all those who constitute the rich and enlightened portion of a nation can no longer agree and co-operate in the work of government, a country can by no possibility administer itself, and a master must intervene.
‘The nation,’ said Turgot, with an air of melancholy120, in a secret report addressed to the King, ‘is a community, consisting of different orders ill compacted together, and of a people whose members have very few ties among themselves, so that every man is exclusively engrossed121 by his personal interest. Nowhere is any common interest discernible. The villages, the towns, have not any stronger mutual122 relations than the districts to which they belong. They cannot even agree among themselves to carry on the public works which they require. Amidst this perpetual conflict of pretensions123 and of undertakings124 your Majesty125 is compelled to decide everything in person or by your agents. Your special injunctions are expected before men will contribute to the public[93] advantage, or respect the rights of others, or even sometimes before they will exercise their own.’
It is no slight enterprise to bring more closely together fellow-citizens who have thus been living for centuries as strangers or as enemies to each other, and to teach them how to carry on their affairs in common.
To divide them was a far easier task than it then becomes to reunite them. Such has been the memorable126 example given by France to the world. When the different classes which divided the ancient social system of France came once more into contact sixty years ago, after having been isolated so long, and by so many barriers, they encountered each other on those points on which they felt most poignantly127, and they met in mutual hatred128. Even in this our day their jealousies129 and their animosities have survived them.
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1
estrangement
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| n.疏远，失和，不和 | |
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disorders
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| n.混乱( disorder的名词复数 )；凌乱；骚乱；（身心、机能）失调 | |
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inquiry
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| n.打听，询问，调查，查问 | |
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franchises
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| n.（尤指选举议员的）选举权( franchise的名词复数 )；参政权；获特许权的商业机构（或服务）；（公司授予的）特许经销权v.给…以特许权，出售特许权( franchise的第三人称单数 ) | |
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seceded
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| v.脱离，退出( secede的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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contrived
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| adj.不自然的，做作的；虚构的 | |
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feign
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| vt.假装，佯作 | |
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converse
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| vi.谈话，谈天，闲聊；adv.相反的，相反 | |
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steward
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| n.乘务员，服务员；看管人；膳食管理员 | |
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haughtier
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| haughty（傲慢的，骄傲的）的比较级形式 | |
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mingle
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| vt.使混合，使相混；vi.混合起来；相交往 | |
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taxation
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| n.征税，税收，税金 | |
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exemptions
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| n.（义务等的）免除( exemption的名词复数 )；免（税）；（收入中的）免税额 | |
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exempt
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| adj.免除的；v.使免除；n.免税者，被免除义务者 | |
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exemption
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| n.豁免，免税额，免除 | |
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indigent
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| adj.贫穷的，贫困的 | |
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maxim
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| n.格言，箴言 | |
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contravene
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| v.违反，违背，反驳，反对 | |
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revert
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| v.恢复，复归，回到 | |
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diverge
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| v.分叉，分歧，离题，使...岔开，使转向 | |
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exhausted
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| adj.极其疲惫的，精疲力尽的 | |
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protracted
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| adj.拖延的；延长的v.拖延“protract”的过去式和过去分词 | |
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disturbances
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| n.骚乱( disturbance的名词复数 )；打扰；困扰；障碍 | |
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captivity
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| n.囚禁；被俘；束缚 | |
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levy
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| n.征收税或其他款项，征收额 | |
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vices
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| 缺陷( vice的名词复数 )； 恶习； 不道德行为； 台钳 | |
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afflicted
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| 使受痛苦，折磨( afflict的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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reign
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| n.统治时期，统治，支配，盛行；v.占优势 | |
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domains
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| n.范围( domain的名词复数 )；领域；版图；地产 | |
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subsidies
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| n.补贴，津贴，补助金( subsidy的名词复数 ) | |
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levied
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| 征（兵）( levy的过去式和过去分词 )； 索取； 发动（战争）； 征税 | |
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clergy
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| n.[总称]牧师，神职人员 | |
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provincial
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| adj.省的，地方的；n．外省人，乡下人 | |
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gratuitous
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| adj.无偿的，免费的；无缘无故的，不必要的 | |
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partially
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| adv.部分地，从某些方面讲 | |
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impost
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| n.进口税，关税 | |
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jurisdictions
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| 司法权( jurisdiction的名词复数 )； 裁判权； 管辖区域； 管辖范围 | |
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monarchy
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| n.君主，最高统治者；君主政体，君主国 | |
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judicial
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| adj.司法的，法庭的，审判的，明断的，公正的 | |
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augment
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| vt.(使)增大，增加，增长，扩张 | |
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Augmented
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| adj.增音的 动词augment的过去式和过去分词形式 | |
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perpetuated
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| vt.使永存（perpetuate的过去式与过去分词形式） | |
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treasury
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| n.宝库；国库，金库；文库 | |
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isolated
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| adj.与世隔绝的 | |
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monstrous
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| adj.巨大的；恐怖的；可耻的，丢脸的 | |
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exempted
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| 使免除[豁免]( exempt的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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cardinal
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| n.(天主教的)红衣主教；adj.首要的，基本的 | |
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expedient
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| adj.有用的，有利的；n.紧急的办法，权宜之计 | |
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49
levying
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| 征（兵）( levy的现在分词 )； 索取； 发动（战争）； 征税 | |
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50
opposition
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| n.反对，敌对 | |
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51
contented
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| adj.满意的，安心的，知足的 | |
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52
allotted
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| 分配，拨给，摊派( allot的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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53
convoke
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| v.召集会议 | |
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54
imposing
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| adj.使人难忘的，壮丽的，堂皇的，雄伟的 | |
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55
prodigious
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| adj.惊人的，奇妙的；异常的；巨大的；庞大的 | |
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56
mischievous
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| adj.调皮的，恶作剧的，有害的，伤人的 | |
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57
fecundity
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| n.生产力；丰富 | |
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58
expedients
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| n.应急有效的，权宜之计的( expedient的名词复数 ) | |
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59
peculiar
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| adj.古怪的，异常的；特殊的，特有的 | |
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60
administrative
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| adj.行政的，管理的 | |
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61
proceedings
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| n.进程，过程，议程；诉讼(程序)；公报 | |
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62
publicity
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| n.众所周知，闻名；宣传，广告 | |
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63
dread
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| vt.担忧，忧虑；惧怕，不敢；n.担忧，畏惧 | |
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64
wrung
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| 绞( wring的过去式和过去分词 )； 握紧（尤指别人的手）； 把（湿衣服）拧干； 绞掉（水） | |
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65
creditor
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| n.债仅人，债主，贷方 | |
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66
incessant
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| adj.不停的，连续的 | |
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67
bestow
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| v.把…赠与，把…授予；花费 | |
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68
compassion
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| n.同情，怜悯 | |
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69
annulled
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| v.宣告无效( annul的过去式和过去分词 )；取消；使消失；抹去 | |
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70
subsidy
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| n.补助金，津贴 | |
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71
procure
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| vt.获得，取得，促成；vi.拉皮条 | |
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72
undertaking
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| n.保证，许诺，事业 | |
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73
administrators
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| n.管理者( administrator的名词复数 )；有管理（或行政）才能的人；（由遗嘱检验法庭指定的）遗产管理人；奉派暂管主教教区的牧师 | |
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74
aggravation
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| n.烦恼，恼火 | |
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75
holders
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| 支持物( holder的名词复数 )； 持有者； （支票等）持有人； 支托（或握持）…之物 | |
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76
mingling
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| adj.混合的 | |
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77
chasm
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| n.深坑，断层，裂口，大分岐，利害冲突 | |
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cohesion
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| n.团结，凝结力 | |
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79
abolition
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| n.废除，取消 | |
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80
feudal
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| adj.封建的，封地的，领地的 | |
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81
onerous
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| adj.繁重的 | |
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82
fiscal
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| adj.财政的，会计的，国库的，国库岁入的 | |
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83
guilds
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| 行会，同业公会，协会( guild的名词复数 ) | |
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84
revival
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| n.复兴，复苏，（精力、活力等的）重振 | |
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85
vocation
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| n.职业，行业 | |
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86
exasperated
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| adj.恼怒的 | |
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87
extirpated
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| v.消灭，灭绝( extirpate的过去式和过去分词 )；根除 | |
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88
assent
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| v.批准，认可；n.批准，认可 | |
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89
pecuniary
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| adj.金钱的；金钱上的 | |
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90
confirmation
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| n.证实，确认，批准 | |
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91
overthrown
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| adj. 打翻的，推倒的，倾覆的 动词overthrow的过去分词 | |
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pittance
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| n.微薄的薪水，少量 | |
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venality
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| n.贪赃枉法，腐败 | |
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94
engendered
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| v.产生（某形势或状况），造成，引起( engender的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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95
penetrate
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| v.透(渗)入；刺入，刺穿；洞察，了解 | |
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bowels
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| n.肠，内脏，内部；肠( bowel的名词复数 )；内部，最深处 | |
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embarrassments
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| n.尴尬( embarrassment的名词复数 )；难堪；局促不安；令人难堪或耻辱的事 | |
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98
superfluous
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| adj.过多的，过剩的，多余的 | |
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99
renounced
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| v.声明放弃( renounce的过去式和过去分词 )；宣布放弃；宣布与…决裂；宣布摒弃 | |
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100
subsisted
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| v.（靠很少的钱或食物）维持生活，生存下去( subsist的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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101
aggravated
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| 使恶化( aggravate的过去式和过去分词 )； 使更严重； 激怒； 使恼火 | |
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102
remonstrances
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| n.抱怨，抗议( remonstrance的名词复数 ) | |
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103
convoked
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| v.召集，召开（会议）( convoke的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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104
pointed
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| adj.尖的，直截了当的 | |
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105
arrogated
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| v.冒称，妄取( arrogate的过去式和过去分词 )；没来由地把…归属（于） | |
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106
deference
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| n.尊重，顺从；敬意 | |
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107
vigour
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| （=vigor）n.智力，体力，精力 | |
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108
previously
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| adv.以前，先前（地） | |
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109
prone
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| adj.(to)易于…的，很可能…的；俯卧的 | |
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110
virtues
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| 美德( virtue的名词复数 )； 德行； 优点； 长处 | |
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111
applied
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| adj.应用的；v.应用，适用 | |
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112
entrusted
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| v.委托，托付( entrust的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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113
prudent
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| adj.谨慎的，有远见的，精打细算的 | |
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114
conceal
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| v.隐藏，隐瞒，隐蔽 | |
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115
watchfulness
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| 警惕，留心； 警觉（性） | |
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116
remarkable
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| adj.显著的，异常的，非凡的，值得注意的 | |
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117
yoke
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| n.轭；支配；v.给...上轭，连接，使成配偶 | |
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118
attain
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| vt.达到，获得，完成 | |
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119
judgments
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| 判断( judgment的名词复数 )； 鉴定； 评价； 审判 | |
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120
melancholy
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| n.忧郁，愁思；adj.令人感伤（沮丧）的，忧郁的 | |
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121
engrossed
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| adj.全神贯注的 | |
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122
mutual
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| adj.相互的，彼此的；共同的，共有的 | |
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123
pretensions
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| 自称( pretension的名词复数 )； 自命不凡； 要求； 权力 | |
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124
undertakings
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| 企业( undertaking的名词复数 )； 保证； 殡仪业； 任务 | |
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125
majesty
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| n.雄伟，壮丽，庄严，威严；最高权威，王权 | |
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126
memorable
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| adj.值得回忆的，难忘的，特别的，显著的 | |
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127
poignantly
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128
hatred
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| n.憎恶，憎恨，仇恨 | |
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129
jealousies
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| n.妒忌( jealousy的名词复数 )；妒羡 | |
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