The Egyptian garrison12 of Berber at first consisted only of the 350 men of the IXth Soudanese, and two companies of the Camel Corps13, who arrived on the 16th of September, having marched across the desert from Merawi. But the proximity14 of Osman Digna at Adarama made it necessary speedily to strengthen the force.
During the latter part of September MacDonald's brigade, with the exception of half the 3rd Egyptians, was moved south from Abu Hamed, and by the end of the month the infantry15 in Berber were swollen16 to three and a half battalions17. This was further increased on the 11th of October by the arrival of the XIIIth Soudanese and the remaining half of the 3rd Egyptians, and thereafter the place was held by five battalions (3rd, IXth, Xth, XIth, XIIIth), No. 2 Field Battery, and two companies of the Camel Corps. As all the Dervishes on the right bank of the Nile had fled to the south of the Atbara, it was found possible to establish a small advanced post of Camel Corps and friendly Arabs in the village of Dakhila, at the confluence19 of the rivers. From this humble20 beginning the Atbara fort with its great entrenchment21 was soon to develop.
The effect of the occupation of Berber upon the tribes around Suakin was decisive, and the whole country between these towns became at once tranquil22 and loyal. Osman Digna's influence was destroyed. The friendly villages were no longer raided. The Governor of the town became in reality, as well as in name, the Governor of the Red Sea Littoral23. The route from Suakin to Berber was opened; and a Camel Corps patrol, several small caravans24 of traders, and a party of war correspondents—who might boast that they were the first Europeans to make the journey for thirteen years—passed safely along it.
It is now necessary to look to the enemy. Had the Khalifa allowed the Emir Mahmud to march north immediately after the destruction of the Dervish outpost in Abu Hamed, the course of the operations would have been very different. Mahmud would certainly have defended Berber with his whole army. The advance of the Expeditionary Force must have been delayed until the Desert Railway reached the river, and probably for another year. But, as the last chapter has described, the sudden seizure26 of Abu Hamed, the defection of the riverain tribes, and the appearance of the gunboats above the Fourth Cataract27 persuaded Abdullah that the climax28 of the war approached, and that he was about to be attacked in his capital. He accordingly devoted29 himself to his preparations for defence, and forbade his lieutenant30 to advance north of Metemma or attempt any offensive operations. In consequence Berber fell, and its fall convinced the Khalifa that his belief was well founded. He worked with redoubled energy. An elaborate system of forts armed with artillery31 was constructed outside the great wall of Omdurman along the river-bank. The concentration of Arab and black soldiery from Gedaref, Kordofan, and Darfur continued. Large quantities of grain, of camels and other supplies, were requisitioned from the people of the Ghezira (the country lying between the Blue and White Niles) and stored or stabled in the city. The discontent to which this arbitrary taxation32 gave rise was cured by a more arbitrary remedy. As many of the doubtful and embittered33 tribesmen as could be caught were collected in Omdurman, where they were compelled to drill regularly, and found it prudent34 to protest their loyalty35. The strength and tenacity36 of the ruler were surprisingly displayed. The Khalifa Sherif, who had been suspected of sympathising with the Jaalin, was made a prisoner at large. The direst penalties attended the appearance of sedition37. A close cordon38 around the city, and especially towards the north, prevented much information from reaching the Egyptian troops; and though small revolts broke out in Kordofan in consequence of the withdrawal39 of Mahmud's army, the Dervish Empire as a whole remained submissive, and the Khalifa was able to muster40 all its remaining force to meet the expected onslaught of his enemies.
During the first week in October the Sirdar decided41 to send the gunboats—which now plied42, though with some difficulty, up and down the Fifth Cataract—to reconnoitre Metemma and discover the actual strength and position of Mahmud's army. On the 14th the Zafir, Fateh, and Naser steamed south from Berber, under Commander Keppel, each carrying, besides its ordinary native crew, fifty men of the IXth Soudanese and two British sergeants43 of Marine44 Artillery. Shortly after daybreak on the 16th the flotilla approached the enemy's position. So silently had they moved that a small Dervish outpost a few miles to the north of Shendi was surprised still sleeping, and the negligent45 guards, aroused by a splutter of firing from the Maxim46 guns, awoke to find three terrible machines close upon them. The gunboats pursued their way, and, disdaining47 a few shots which were fired from the ruins of Shendi, arrived, at about seven o'clock, within range of Metemma. The town itself stood more than a thousand yards from the Nile, but six substantial mud forts, armed with artillery, lined and defended the riverside. Creeping leisurely48 forward along the east bank, remote from the Dervish works, the flotilla came into action at a range of 4,000 yards. The fire was at first concentrated on the two northern forts, and the shells, striking the mud walls in rapid succession or bursting in the interior, soon enveloped49 them in dust and smoke. The Dervishes immediately replied, but the inferiority of their skill and weapons was marked, and, although their projectiles50 reached the flotilla, very few took effect. One shell, however, crashed through the deck of the Zafir, mortally wounding a Soudanese soldier, and two struck the Fateh. After the long-range bombardment had continued for about an hour the gunboats moved forward opposite to the enemy's position, and poured a heavy and continuous fire of shrapnel and double shell into all the forts, gradually subduing51 their resistance. The fugitives52 from the batteries, and small parties of Baggara horse who galloped53 about on the open plain between the works and the town, afforded good targets to the Maxims54, and many were licked up even at extreme ranges.
No sooner had the gunboats passed the forts than the Dervish fire ceased entirely55, and it was discovered that their embrasures only commanded the northern approach. As the guns could not be pointed56 to the southward, the flotilla need fear nothing from any fort that had been left behind. The officers were congratulating themselves on the folly57 of their foes58, when danger threatened from another quarter. The boats had hugged the eastern bank as closely as possible during their duel59 with the forts. They were scarcely a hundred yards from the shore, when suddenly a sharp fire of musketry was opened from twenty or thirty Dervish rifle-men concealed60 in the mimosa scrub. The bullets pattered all over the decks, but while many recorded narrow escapes no one was actually hit, and the Maxim guns, revolving61 quickly on their pivots62, took a bloody63 vengeance64 for the surprise. The flotilla then steamed slowly past the town, and, having thoroughly65 reconnoitred it, turned about and ran down stream, again exchanging shells with the Dervish artillery. All firing ceased at half-past two; but six sailing-boats containing grain were captured on the return voyage, and with these the gunboats retired66 in triumph to a small island six miles north of Metemma, where they remained for the night.
It being now known that bombarding the Dervishes was no less enjoyable than exciting, it was determined67 to spend another day with them; and at four o'clock the next morning the flotilla again steamed southward, so as to be in position opposite Metemma before daylight. Fire was opened on both sides with the dawn, and it was at once evident that the Dervishes had not been idle during the night. It appeared that on the previous day Mahmud had expected a land attack from the direction of Gakdul, and had placed part of his artillery and nearly all his army in position to resist it. But as soon as he was convinced that the gunboats were unsupported he moved several of the landward guns into the river forts, and even built two new works, so that on the 17th the Dervishes brought into action eleven guns, firing from eight small round forts. The gunboats, however, contented68 themselves with keeping at a range at which their superior weapons enabled them to strike without being struck, and so, while inflicting69 heavy loss on their enemies, sustained no injury themselves. After four hours' methodical and remorseless bombardment Commander Keppel considered the reconnaissance complete, and gave the order to retire down stream. The Dervish gunners, elated in spite of their losses by the spectacle of the retreating vessels70, redoubled their fire, and continued hurling71 shell after shell in defiance72 down the river until their adversaries73 were far beyond their range. As the gunboats floated northward74 their officers, looking back towards Metemma, saw an even stranger scene than the impotent but exulting75 forts. During the morning a few flags and figures had been distinguished76 moving about the low range of sandhills near the town; and as soon as the retirement77 of the flotilla began, the whole of the Dervish army, at least 10,000 men, both horse and foot, and formed in an array more than a mile in length, marched triumphantly78 into view, singing, shouting, and waving their banners amid a great cloud of dust. It was their only victory.
The loss on the gunboats was limited to the single Soudanese soldier, who died of his wounds, and a few trifling79 damages. The Arab slaughter80 is variously estimated, one account rating it at 1,000 men; but half that number would probably be no exaggeration. The gunboats fired in the two days' bombardment 650 shells and several thousand rounds of Maxim-gun ammunition81. They then returned to Berber, reporting fully82 on the enemy's position and army.
As soon as Berber had been strongly occupied by the Egyptian troops, Osman Digna realised that his position at Adarama was not only useless but very dangerous. Mahmud had long been imperiously summoning him to join the forces at Metemma; and although he hated the Kordofan general, and resented his superior authority, the wary83 and cunning Osman decided that in this case it would be convenient to obey and make a virtue84 of necessity. Accordingly about the same time that the gunboats were making their first reconnaissance and bombardment of Metemma, he withdrew with his two thousand Hadendoa from Adarama, moved along the left bank of the Atbara until the tongue of desert between the rivers became sufficiently85 narrow for it to be crossed in a day, and so made his way by easy stages to Shendi.
When the Sirdar heard of the evacuation of Adarama he immediately determined to assure himself of the fact, to reconnoitre the unmapped country in that region, and to destroy any property that Osman might have left behind him. On the 23rd of October, therefore, a flying column started from Berber under the command of General Hunter, and formed as follows: XIth Soudanese (Major Jackson), two guns, one company of the Camel Corps, and Abdel-Azim and 150 irregulars. Lightly equipped, and carrying the supplies on a train of 500 camels, the small force moved rapidly along the Nile and reached the post at the confluence on the 24th, and arrived at Adarama on the 29th, after a journey of eighty-four miles. The report that Osman Digna had returned to the Nile proved to be correct. His former headquarters were deserted86, and although a patrol of sixty of the Camel Corps and the Arab irregulars scouted87 for forty miles further up the river, not a single Dervish was to be seen. Having thus collected a great deal of negative information, and delaying only to burn Adarama to the ground, the column returned to Berber.
It was now November. The Nile was falling fast, and an impassable rapid began to appear at Um Tiur, four miles north of the confluence. The Sirdar had a few days in which to make up his mind whether he would keep his gunboats on the upper or lower reach. As in the latter case their patrolling limits would have been restricted, and they would no longer have been able to watch the army at Metemma, he determined to leave them on the enemy's side of the obstruction88. This involved the formation of a depot89 at Dakhila ['Atbara Fort'], where simple repairs could be executed and wood and other necessities stored. To guard this little dockyard half the 3rd Egyptian battalion18 was moved from Berber and posted in a small entrenchment. The other half-battalion followed in a few weeks. The post at the confluence was gradually growing into the great camp of a few months later.
A regular system of gunboat patrolling was established on the upper reach, and on the 1st of November the Zafir, Naser, and Metemma, under Commander Keppel, again steamed south to reconnoitre Mahmud's position. The next day they were joined by the Fateh, and on the 3rd the three larger boats ran the gauntlet of the forts. A brisk artillery duel ensued, but the Dervish aim was, as usual, erratic90, and the vessels received no injury. It was observed that the position of the Dervish force was unchanged, but that three new forts had been constructed to the south of the town. The gunboats continued on their way and proceeded as far as Wad Habeshi. The Arab cavalry91 kept pace with them along the bank, ready to prevent any landing. Having seen all there was to be seen, the flotilla returned and again passed the batteries at Metemma. But this time they were not unscathed, and a shell struck the Fateh, slightly wounding three men.
No other incident enlivened the monotony of November. The Khalifa continued his defensive92 preparations. Mahmud remained motionless at Metemma; and although he repeatedly begged to be allowed to advance against the force near Berber he was steadily93 refused, and had to content himself with sending raiding parties along the left bank of the Nile, and collecting large stores of grain from all the villages within his reach. Meanwhile the railway was stretching further and further to the south, and the great strain which the sudden occupation of Berber had thrown upon the transport was to some extent relieved. The tranquillity94 which had followed the advance to Berber was as opportune95 as it was unexpected. The Sirdar, delighted that no evil consequences had followed his daring move, and finding that he was neither attacked nor harassed96 in any way, journeyed to Kassala to arrange the details of its retrocession.
The convenient situation of Kassala—almost equally distant from Omdurman, Berber, Suakin, Massowa, and Rosaires—and the fertility of the surrounding region raise it to the dignity of the most important place in the Eastern Soudan. The soil is rich; the climate, except in the rainy season, not unhealthy. A cool night breeze relieves the heat of the day, and the presence of abundant water at the depth of a few feet below the surface supplies the deficiency of a river. In the year 1883 the population is said to have numbered more than 60,000. The Egyptians considered the town of sufficient value to require a garrison of 3,900 soldiers. A cotton mill adequately fitted with machinery97 and a factory chimney gave promise of the future development of manufacture. A regular revenue attested98 the existence of trade. But disasters fell in heavy succession on the Eastern Soudan and blighted99 the prosperity of its mud metropolis100. In 1885, after a long siege and a stubborn resistance, Kassala was taken by the Dervishes. The garrison were massacred, enslaved, or incorporated in the Mahdi's army. The town was plundered101 and the trade destroyed. For nearly ten years an Arab force occupied the ruins and a camp outside them. Kassala became a frontier post of the Dervish Empire. Its population perished or fled to the Italian territory. This situation might have remained unaltered until after the battle of Omdurman if the Dervishes had been content with the possession of Kassala. But in 1893 the Emir in command of the garrison, being anxious to distinguish himself, disobeyed the Khalifa's instructions to remain on the defensive and attacked the Europeans at Agordat. The Arab force of about 8,000 men were confronted by 2,300 Italian troops, protected by strong entrenchments, under Colonel Arimondi. After a fierce but hopeless attack the Dervishes were repulsed102 with a loss of 3,000 men, among whom was their rash leader. The engagement was, however, as disastrous103 to Italy as to the Khalifa. The fatal African policy of Signor Crispi received a decided impetus104, and in the next year, agreeably to their aspirations105 in Abyssinia, the Italians under General Baratieri advanced from Agordat and captured Kassala. The occupation was provisionally recognised by Egypt without prejudice to her sovereign rights, and 900 Italian regulars and irregulars established themselves in a well-built fort. The severe defeat at Adowa in 1896, the disgrace of Baratieri, the destruction of his army, and the fall of the Crispi Cabinet rudely dispelled106 the African ambitions of Italy. Kassala became an encumbrance107. Nor was that all. The Dervishes, encouraged by the victory of the Abyssinians, invested the fort, and the garrison were compelled to fight hard to hold what their countrymen were anxious to abandon. In these circumstances the Italian Government offered, at a convenient opportunity, to retrocede Kassala to Egypt. The offer was accepted, and an arrangement made. The advance of the Khedivial forces into the Dongola province relieved, as has been described, the pressure of the Dervish attacks. The Arabs occupied various small posts along the Atbara and in the neighbourhood of the town, and contented themselves with raiding. The Italians remained entirely on the defensive, waiting patiently for the moment when the fort could be handed over to the Egyptian troops.
The Sirdar had no difficulty in coming to a satisfactory arrangement with General Caneva, the Italian commander. The fort was to be occupied by an Egyptian force, the stores and armament to be purchased at a valuation, and a force of Italian Arab irregulars to be transferred to the Egyptian service. Sir H. Kitchener then returned to the Nile, where the situation had suddenly become acute. During November Colonel Parsons, the 16th Egyptian Battalion, and a few native gunners marched from Suakin, and on the 20th of December arrived at Kassala. The Italian irregulars—henceforth to be known as the Arab battalion—were at once despatched to the attack of the small Dervish posts at El Fasher and Asubri, and on the next day these places were surprised and taken with scarcely any loss. The Italian officers, although a little disgusted at the turn of events, treated the Egyptian representatives with the most perfect courtesy, and the formal transference of Kassala fort was arranged to take place on Christmas Day.
An imposing109 ceremonial was observed, and the scene itself was strange. The fort was oblong in plan, with mud ramparts and parapets pierced for musketry. Tents and stores filled the enclosure. In the middle stood the cotton factory. Its machinery had long since been destroyed, but the substantial building formed the central keep of the fort. The tall chimney had become a convenient look-out post. The lightning-conductor acted as a flagstaff. The ruins of the old town of Kassala lay brown and confused on the plain to the southward, and behind all rose the dark rugged110 spurs of the Abyssinian mountains. The flags of Egypt and of Italy were hoisted111. The troops of both countries, drawn112 up in line, exchanged military compliments. Then the Egyptian guard marched across the drawbridge into the fort and relieved the Italian soldiers. The brass113 band of the 16th Battalion played appropriate airs. The Italian flag was lowered, and with a salute114 of twenty-one guns the retrocession of Kassala was complete.
Here, then, for a year we leave Colonel Parsons and his small force to swelter in the mud fort, to carry on a partisan115 warfare116 with the Dervish raiders, to look longingly117 towards Gedaref, and to nurse the hope that when Omdurman has fallen their opportunity will come. The reader, like the Sirdar, must return in a hurry to the Upper Nile.
Towards the end of November the Khalifa had begun to realise that the Turks did not mean to advance any further till the next flood of the river. He perceived that the troops remained near Berber, and that the railway was only a little way south of Abu Hamed. The blow still impended118, but it was delayed. As soon as he had come to this conclusion, he no longer turned a deaf ear to Mahmud's solicitations. He knew that the falling Nile would restrict the movements of the gunboats. He knew that there were only 2,000 men in Berber—a mere120 handful. He did not realise the tremendous power of rapid concentration which the railway had given his enemies; and he began to think of offensive operations. But Mahmud should not go alone. The whole strength of the Dervish army should be exerted to drive back the invaders121. All the troops in Omdurman were ordered north. A great camp was again formed near Kerreri. Thousands of camels were collected, and once more every preparation was made for a general advance. At the beginning of December he sent his own secretary to Mahmud to explain the plan, and to assure him of early reinforcements and supplies. Lastly, Abdullah preached a new Jehad, and it is remarkable122 that, while all former exhortations123 had been directed against 'the infidel'—i.e., those who did not believe in the Mahdi—his letters and sermons on this occasion summoned the tribes to destroy not the Egyptians but the Christians124. The Khalifa had no doubts as to who inspired the movement which threatened him. There were at this time scarcely 150 Europeans in the Soudan; but they had made their presence felt.
The Sirdar was returning from Kassala when the rumours125 of an intended Dervish advance began to grow. Every scrap126 of information was assiduously collected by the Intelligence Department, but it was not until the 18th of December, just as he reached Wady Halfa, that the General received apparently127 certain news that the Khalifa, Mahmud, all the Emirs, and the whole army were about to march north. There can be no doubt that even this tardy128 movement of the enemy seriously threatened the success of the operations. If the Dervishes moved swiftly, it looked as if a very critical engagement would have to be fought to avoid a damaging retreat. Sir H. Kitchener's reply to the Khalifa's open intent was to order a general concentration of the available Egyptian army towards Berber, to telegraph to Lord Cromer asking for a British brigade, and to close the Suakin-Berber route.
The gunboat depot at the confluence, with only a half-battalion escort, was now in an extremely exposed position. The gunboats could not steam north, for the cataract four miles below the confluence was already impassable. Since they must remain on the enemy's side, so must their depot; and the depot must be held by a much stronger force. Although the Sirdar felt too weak to maintain himself even on the defensive without reinforcements, he was now compelled to push still further south. On the 22nd of December Lewis's brigade of four battalions and a battery were hurried along the Nile to its junction129 with the Atbara, and began busily entrenching130 themselves in a angle formed by the rivers. The Atbara fort sprang into existence.
Meanwhile the concentration was proceeding131. All the troops in Dongola, with the exception of scanty132 garrisons133 in Merawi, Korti, and Debba, were massed at Berber. The infantry and guns, dropping down the river in boats, entrained at Kerma, were carried back to Halfa, then hustled134 across the invaluable135 Desert Railway, past Abu Hamed, and finally deposited at Railhead, which then (January 1) stood at Dakhesh. The whole journey by rail from Merawi to Dakhesh occupied four days, whereas General Hunter with his flying column had taken eight—a fact which proves that, in certain circumstances which Euclid could not have foreseen, two sides of a triangle are together shorter than the third side. The Egyptian cavalry at Merawi received their orders on the 25th of December, and the British officers hurried from their Christmas dinners to prepare for their long march across the bend of the Nile to Berber. Of the eight squadrons, three were pushed on to join Lewis's force at the position which will hereinafter be called 'the Atbara encampment,' or more familiarly 'the Atbara'; three swelled136 the gathering138 forces at Berber; and two remained for the present in the Dongola province, looking anxiously out towards Gakdul Wells and Metemma.
The War Office, who had been nervous about the situation in the Soudan since the hasty occupation of Berber, and who had a very lively recollection of the events of 1884 and 1885, lost no time in the despatch108 of British troops; and the speed with which a force, so suddenly called for, was concentrated shows the capacity for energy which may on occasion be developed even by our disjointed military organisation139. The 1st Battalions of the Royal Warwickshire Regiment140, of the Lincoln Regiment, and of the Cameron Highlanders were formed into a brigade and moved from Cairo into the Soudan. The 1st Battalion of the Seaforth Highlanders was brought from Malta to Egypt, and held in immediate25 readiness to reinforce the troops at the front. Other battalions were sent to take the places of those moved south, so that the Army of Occupation was not diminished.
The officer selected for the command of the British brigade was a man of high character and ability. General Gatacre had already led a brigade in the Chitral expedition, and, serving under Sir Robert Low and Sir Bindon Blood had gained so good a reputation that after the storming of the Malakand Pass and the subsequent action in the plain of Khar it was thought desirable to transpose his brigade with that of General Kinloch, and send Gatacre forward to Chitral. From the mountains of the North-West Frontier the general was ordered to Bombay, and in a stubborn struggle with the bubonic plague, which was then at its height, he turned his attention from camps of war to camps of segregation141. He left India, leaving behind him golden opinions, just before the outbreak of the great Frontier rising, and was appointed to a brigade at Aldershot. Thence we now find him hurried to the Soudan—a spare, middle-sized man, of great physical strength and energy, of marked capacity and unquestioned courage, but disturbed by a restless irritation142, to which even the most inordinate143 activity afforded little relief, and which often left him the exhausted144 victim of his own vitality145.
By the end of January a powerful force lay encamped along the river from Abu Hamed to the Atbara. Meanwhile the Dervishes made no forward movement. Their army was collected at Kerreri; supplies were plentiful146; all preparations had been made. Yet they tarried. The burning question of the command had arisen. A dispute that was never settled ensued. When the whole army was regularly assembled, the Khalifa announced publicly that he would lead the faithful in person; but at the same time he arranged privately147 that many Emirs and notables should beg him not to expose his sacred person. After proper solicitation119, therefore, he yielded to their appeals. Then he looked round for a subordinate. The Khalifa Ali-Wad-Helu presented himself. In the Soudan every advantage and honour accrues148 to the possessor of an army, and the rival chief saw a chance of regaining149 his lost power. This consideration was not, however, lost upon Abdullah. He accepted the offer with apparent delight, but he professed150 himself unable to spare any rifles for the army which Ali-Wad-Helu aspired151 to lead. 'Alas152!' he cried, 'there are none. But that will make no difference to so famous a warrior153.' Ali-Wad-Helu, however, considered that it would make a great deal of difference, and declined the command. Osman Sheikh-ed-Din offered to lead the army, if he might arm the riverain tribes and use them as auxiliaries154 to swell137 his force. This roused the disapproval155 of Yakub. Such a policy, he declared, was fatal. The riverain tribes were traitors—dogs—worthy only of being destroyed; and he enlarged upon the more refined methods by which his policy might be carried out. The squabble continued, until at last the Khalifa, despairing of any agreement, decided merely to reinforce Mahmud, and accordingly ordered the Emir Yunes to march to Metemma with about 5,000 men. But it was then discovered that Mahmud hated Yunes, and would have none of him. At this the Khalifa broke up his camp, and the Dervish army marched back for a second time, in vexation and disgust, to the city.
It seemed to those who were acquainted with the Dervish movements that all offensive operations on their part had been definitely abandoned. Even in the Intelligence Department it was believed that the break-up of the Kerreri camp was the end of the Khalifa's determination to move north. There would be a hot and uneventful summer, and with the flood Nile the expedition would begin its final advance. The news which was received on the 15th of February came as a great and pleasant surprise. Mahmud was crossing the Nile and proposed to advance on Berber without reinforcements of any kind. The Sirdar, highly satisfied at this astounding156 piece of good fortune, immediately began to mass his force nearer the confluence. On the 21st the British at Abu Dis were instructed to hold themselves in readiness. The Seaforths began their journey from Cairo, and the various battalions of the Egyptian army pressed forward towards Berber and Atbara fort. On the 25th, Mahmud being reported as having crossed to the right bank, the general concentration was ordered.
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alluvial
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| adj.冲积的；淤积的 | |
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fixed
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| adj.固定的，不变的，准备好的；(计算机)固定的 | |
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tract
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| n.传单，小册子，大片(土地或森林) | |
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alleys
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| 胡同，小巷( alley的名词复数 )； 小径 | |
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foul
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| adj.污秽的；邪恶的；v.弄脏；妨害；犯规；n.犯规 | |
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excavated
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| v.挖掘( excavate的过去式和过去分词 )；开凿；挖出；发掘 | |
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enthusiasts
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| n.热心人，热衷者( enthusiast的名词复数 ) | |
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miserable
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| adj.悲惨的，痛苦的；可怜的，糟糕的 | |
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destitute
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dwellings
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elegance
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| n.优雅；优美，雅致；精致，巧妙 | |
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garrison
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| n.卫戍部队；驻地，卫戍区；vt.派(兵)驻防 | |
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corps
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| n.(通信等兵种的)部队；(同类作的)一组 | |
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proximity
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| n.接近，邻近 | |
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infantry
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swollen
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| adj.肿大的，水涨的；v.使变大，肿胀 | |
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battalions
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| n.（陆军的）一营（大约有一千兵士）( battalion的名词复数 )；协同作战的部队；军队；（组织在一起工作的）队伍 | |
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battalion
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| n.营；部队；大队(的人) | |
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confluence
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| n.汇合，聚集 | |
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humble
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| adj.谦卑的，恭顺的；地位低下的；v.降低，贬低 | |
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entrenchment
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| n.壕沟，防御设施 | |
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22
tranquil
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| adj. 安静的, 宁静的, 稳定的, 不变的 | |
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littoral
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| adj.海岸的；湖岸的；n.沿（海）岸地区 | |
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24
caravans
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| （可供居住的）拖车（通常由机动车拖行）( caravan的名词复数 )； 篷车； （穿过沙漠地带的）旅行队（如商队） | |
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25
immediate
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| adj.立即的；直接的，最接近的；紧靠的 | |
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26
seizure
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| n.没收；占有；抵押 | |
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27
cataract
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| n.大瀑布，奔流，洪水，白内障 | |
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28
climax
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| n.顶点；高潮；v.(使)达到顶点 | |
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29
devoted
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| adj.忠诚的，忠实的，热心的，献身于...的 | |
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30
lieutenant
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| n.陆军中尉，海军上尉；代理官员，副职官员 | |
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31
artillery
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| n.(军)火炮，大炮；炮兵(部队) | |
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32
taxation
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| n.征税，税收，税金 | |
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33
embittered
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| v.使怨恨，激怒( embitter的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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34
prudent
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| adj.谨慎的，有远见的，精打细算的 | |
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35
loyalty
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| n.忠诚，忠心 | |
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36
tenacity
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| n.坚韧 | |
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37
sedition
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| n.煽动叛乱 | |
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38
cordon
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| n.警戒线，哨兵线 | |
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39
withdrawal
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| n.取回，提款；撤退，撤军；收回，撤销 | |
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40
muster
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| v.集合，收集，鼓起，激起；n.集合，检阅，集合人员，点名册 | |
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41
decided
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| adj.决定了的，坚决的；明显的，明确的 | |
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42
plied
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| v.使用（工具）( ply的过去式和过去分词 )；经常供应（食物、饮料）；固定往来；经营生意 | |
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43
sergeants
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| 警官( sergeant的名词复数 )； （美国警察）警佐； （英国警察）巡佐； 陆军（或空军）中士 | |
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44
marine
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| adj.海的；海生的；航海的；海事的；n.水兵 | |
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45
negligent
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| adj.疏忽的；玩忽的；粗心大意的 | |
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46
maxim
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| n.格言，箴言 | |
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47
disdaining
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| 鄙视( disdain的现在分词 )； 不屑于做，不愿意做 | |
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48
leisurely
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| adj.悠闲的；从容的，慢慢的 | |
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49
enveloped
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| v.包围，笼罩，包住( envelop的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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50
projectiles
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| n.抛射体( projectile的名词复数 )；（炮弹、子弹等）射弹，（火箭等）自动推进的武器 | |
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51
subduing
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| 征服( subdue的现在分词 )； 克制； 制服； 色变暗 | |
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52
fugitives
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| n.亡命者，逃命者( fugitive的名词复数 ) | |
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53
galloped
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| （使马）飞奔，奔驰( gallop的过去式和过去分词 )； 快速做[说]某事 | |
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54
maxims
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| n.格言，座右铭( maxim的名词复数 ) | |
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55
entirely
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| ad.全部地，完整地；完全地，彻底地 | |
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56
pointed
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| adj.尖的，直截了当的 | |
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57
folly
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| n.愚笨，愚蠢，蠢事，蠢行，傻话 | |
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58
foes
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| 敌人，仇敌( foe的名词复数 ) | |
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59
duel
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| n./v.决斗；(双方的)斗争 | |
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60
concealed
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| a.隐藏的，隐蔽的 | |
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61
revolving
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| adj.旋转的，轮转式的；循环的v.（使）旋转( revolve的现在分词 )；细想 | |
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62
pivots
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| n.枢( pivot的名词复数 )；最重要的人（或事物）；中心；核心v.（似）在枢轴上转动( pivot的第三人称单数 )；把…放在枢轴上；以…为核心，围绕（主旨）展开 | |
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63
bloody
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| adj.非常的的；流血的；残忍的；adv.很；vt.血染 | |
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64
vengeance
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| n.报复，报仇，复仇 | |
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65
thoroughly
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| adv.完全地，彻底地，十足地 | |
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66
retired
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| adj.隐退的，退休的，退役的 | |
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67
determined
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| adj.坚定的；有决心的 | |
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68
contented
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| adj.满意的，安心的，知足的 | |
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69
inflicting
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| 把…强加给，使承受，遭受( inflict的现在分词 ) | |
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70
vessels
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| n.血管( vessel的名词复数 )；船；容器；（具有特殊品质或接受特殊品质的）人 | |
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71
hurling
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| n.爱尔兰式曲棍球v.猛投，用力掷( hurl的现在分词 )；大声叫骂 | |
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72
defiance
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| n.挑战，挑衅，蔑视，违抗 | |
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73
adversaries
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| n.对手，敌手( adversary的名词复数 ) | |
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74
northward
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| adv.向北；n.北方的地区 | |
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75
exulting
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| vi. 欢欣鼓舞，狂喜 | |
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76
distinguished
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| adj.卓越的，杰出的，著名的 | |
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77
retirement
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| n.退休，退职 | |
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78
triumphantly
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| ad.得意洋洋地；得胜地；成功地 | |
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79
trifling
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| adj.微不足道的；没什么价值的 | |
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80
slaughter
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| n.屠杀，屠宰；vt.屠杀，宰杀 | |
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81
ammunition
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| n.军火，弹药 | |
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82
fully
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| adv.完全地，全部地，彻底地；充分地 | |
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83
wary
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| adj.谨慎的，机警的，小心的 | |
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84
virtue
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| n.德行，美德；贞操；优点；功效，效力 | |
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85
sufficiently
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| adv.足够地，充分地 | |
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86
deserted
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| adj.荒芜的，荒废的，无人的，被遗弃的 | |
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87
scouted
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| 寻找，侦察( scout的过去式和过去分词 )； 物色（优秀运动员、演员、音乐家等） | |
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88
obstruction
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| n.阻塞，堵塞；障碍物 | |
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89
depot
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| n.仓库，储藏处；公共汽车站；火车站 | |
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90
erratic
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| adj.古怪的，反复无常的，不稳定的 | |
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91
cavalry
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| n.骑兵；轻装甲部队 | |
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92
defensive
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| adj.防御的；防卫的；防守的 | |
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93
steadily
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| adv.稳定地；不变地；持续地 | |
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94
tranquillity
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| n. 平静, 安静 | |
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95
opportune
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| adj.合适的，适当的 | |
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96
harassed
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| adj. 疲倦的，厌烦的 动词harass的过去式和过去分词 | |
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97
machinery
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| n.(总称)机械，机器；机构 | |
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98
attested
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| adj.经检验证明无病的，经检验证明无菌的v.证明( attest的过去式和过去分词 )；证实；声称…属实；使宣誓 | |
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99
blighted
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| adj.枯萎的，摧毁的 | |
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100
metropolis
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| n.首府；大城市 | |
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101
plundered
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| 掠夺，抢劫( plunder的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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102
repulsed
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| v.击退( repulse的过去式和过去分词 )；驳斥；拒绝 | |
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103
disastrous
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| adj.灾难性的，造成灾害的；极坏的，很糟的 | |
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104
impetus
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| n.推动，促进，刺激；推动力 | |
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105
aspirations
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| 强烈的愿望( aspiration的名词复数 )； 志向； 发送气音； 发 h 音 | |
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106
dispelled
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| v.驱散，赶跑( dispel的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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107
encumbrance
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| n.妨碍物，累赘 | |
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108
despatch
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| n./v.(dispatch)派遣；发送；n.急件；新闻报道 | |
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109
imposing
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| adj.使人难忘的，壮丽的，堂皇的，雄伟的 | |
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110
rugged
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| adj.高低不平的，粗糙的，粗壮的，强健的 | |
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111
hoisted
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| 把…吊起，升起( hoist的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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112
drawn
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| v.拖，拉，拔出；adj.憔悴的，紧张的 | |
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113
brass
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| n.黄铜；黄铜器，铜管乐器 | |
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114
salute
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| vi.行礼，致意，问候，放礼炮；vt.向…致意，迎接，赞扬；n.招呼，敬礼，礼炮 | |
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115
partisan
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| adj.党派性的；游击队的；n.游击队员；党徒 | |
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116
warfare
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| n.战争(状态)；斗争；冲突 | |
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117
longingly
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| adv. 渴望地 热望地 | |
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118
impended
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| v.进行威胁，即将发生( impend的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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119
solicitation
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| n.诱惑；揽货；恳切地要求；游说 | |
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120
mere
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| adj.纯粹的；仅仅，只不过 | |
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121
invaders
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| 入侵者，侵略者，侵入物( invader的名词复数 ) | |
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122
remarkable
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| adj.显著的，异常的，非凡的，值得注意的 | |
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123
exhortations
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| n.敦促( exhortation的名词复数 )；极力推荐；（正式的）演讲；（宗教仪式中的）劝诫 | |
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124
Christians
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| n.基督教徒( Christian的名词复数 ) | |
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125
rumours
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| n.传闻( rumour的名词复数 )；风闻；谣言；谣传 | |
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126
scrap
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| n.碎片；废料；v.废弃，报废 | |
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127
apparently
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| adv.显然地；表面上，似乎 | |
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128
tardy
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| adj.缓慢的，迟缓的 | |
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129
junction
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| n.连接，接合；交叉点，接合处，枢纽站 | |
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130
entrenching
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| v.用壕沟围绕或保护…( entrench的现在分词 )；牢固地确立… | |
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131
proceeding
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| n.行动，进行，(pl.)会议录，学报 | |
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132
scanty
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| adj.缺乏的，仅有的，节省的，狭小的，不够的 | |
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133
garrisons
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| 守备部队，卫戍部队( garrison的名词复数 ) | |
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134
hustled
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| 催促（hustle的过去式与过去分词形式） | |
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135
invaluable
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| adj.无价的，非常宝贵的，极为贵重的 | |
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136
swelled
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| 增强( swell的过去式和过去分词 )； 肿胀； （使）凸出； 充满（激情） | |
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137
swell
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| vi.膨胀，肿胀；增长，增强 | |
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138
gathering
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| n.集会，聚会，聚集 | |
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139
organisation
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| n.组织，安排，团体，有机休 | |
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140
regiment
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| n.团，多数，管理；v.组织，编成团，统制 | |
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141
segregation
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| n.隔离，种族隔离 | |
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142
irritation
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| n.激怒，恼怒，生气 | |
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143
inordinate
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| adj.无节制的；过度的 | |
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144
exhausted
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| adj.极其疲惫的，精疲力尽的 | |
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145
vitality
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| n.活力，生命力，效力 | |
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146
plentiful
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| adj.富裕的，丰富的 | |
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147
privately
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| adv.以私人的身份，悄悄地，私下地 | |
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148
accrues
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| v.增加( accrue的第三人称单数 )；（通过自然增长）产生；获得；（使钱款、债务）积累 | |
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149
regaining
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| 复得( regain的现在分词 )； 赢回； 重回； 复至某地 | |
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150
professed
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| 公开声称的，伪称的，已立誓信教的 | |
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151
aspired
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| v.渴望，追求( aspire的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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152
alas
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| int.唉(表示悲伤、忧愁、恐惧等) | |
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153
warrior
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| n.勇士，武士，斗士 | |
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154
auxiliaries
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| n.助动词 ( auxiliary的名词复数 )；辅助工，辅助人员 | |
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155
disapproval
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| n.反对，不赞成 | |
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156
astounding
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| adj.使人震惊的vt.使震惊，使大吃一惊astound的现在分词) | |
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