The hazards which were courted by the daring occupation of Berber have been discussed in the last chapter. From October to December the situation was threatening. In December it suddenly became critical. Had the Emir Mahmud advanced with the Dervishes at Metemma even as late as the middle of January, he might possibly have re-captured Berber. If the great Omdurman army had taken the field, the possibility would have become a certainty. The young Kordofan general saw his opportunity, and begged to be allowed to seize it. But it was not until the Khalifa had sent his own army back into the city that, being very badly informed of the numbers and disposition6 of the Egyptian force, he allowed the Metemma Dervishes to move.
Mahmud received permission to advance at the end of January. He eagerly obeyed the longed-for order. But the whole situation was now changed. The Egyptian army was concentrated; the British brigade had arrived; the railway had reached Geneinetti; the miserable7 hamlet of Dakhila, at the confluence8, had grown from a small depot9 to a fort, and from a fort to an entrenched10 camp, against which neither Dervish science nor strength could by any possibility prevail. Perhaps Mahmud did not realise the amazing power of movement that the railway had given his foes11; perhaps he still believed, with the Khalifa, that Berber was held only by 2,000 Egyptians; or else—and this is the most probable—he was reckless of danger and strong in his own conceit12. At any rate, during the second week in February he began to transport himself across the Nile, with the plain design of an advance north. With all the procrastination13 of an Arab he crawled leisurely14 forward towards the confluence of the rivers. At El Aliab some idea of the strength of the Atbara entrenchment15 seems to have dawned upon him. He paused undecided. A council was held. Mahmud was for a continued advance and for making a direct attack on the enemy's position. Osman Digna urged a more prudent17 course. Many years of hard fighting against disciplined troops had taught the wily Hadendoa slaver the power of modern rifles, and much sound tactics besides. He pressed his case with jealous enthusiasm upon the commander he detested18 and despised. An insurmountable obstacle confronted them. Yet what could not be overcome might be avoided. The hardy19 Dervishes could endure privations which would destroy the soldiers of civilisation20. Barren and inhospitable as was the desert, they might move round the army at the Atbara fort and so capture Berber after all. Once they were behind the Egyptians, these accursed ones were lost. The railway—that mysterious source of strength—could be cut. The host that drew its life along it must fight at a fearful disadvantage or perish miserably21. Besides, he reminded Mahmud—not without reason—that they could count on help in Berber itself.
The agreement of the Emirs, called to the council, decided16 the Dervish leader. His confidence in himself was weakened, his hatred22 of Osman Digna increased. Nevertheless, following the older man's advice, he left Aliab on the 18th of March, and struck north-east into the desert towards the village and ford23 of Hudi on the Atbara river. Thence by a long desert march he might reach the Nile and Berber. But while his information of the Sirdar's force and movements was uncertain, the British General was better served. What Mahmud failed to derive24 from spies and 'friendlies,' his adversary25 obtained by gunboats and cavalry26. As soon, therefore, as Sir H. Kitchener learned that the Dervishes had left the Nile and were making a detour27 around his left flank, he marched up the Atbara river to Hudi. This offered Mahmud the alternative of attacking him in a strong position or of making a still longer detour. Having determined28 upon caution he chose the latter, and, deflecting29 his march still more to the east, reached the Atbara at Nakheila. But from this point the distance to Berber was far too great for him to cover. He could not carry enough water in his skins. The wells were few, and held against him. Further advance was impossible. So he waited and entrenched himself, sorely troubled, but uncertain what to do. Supplies were running short. His magazines at Shendi had been destroyed as soon as he had left the Nile. The Dervishes might exist, but they did not thrive, on the nuts of the dom palms. Soldiers began to desert. Osman Digna, although his advice had been followed, was at open enmity. His army dwindled30.
And all this time his terrible antagonist31 watched him as a tiger gloats on a helpless and certain prey32—silent, merciless, inexorable. Then the end came suddenly. As soon as the process of attrition was sufficiently33 far advanced to demoralise the Dervish host, without completely dissolving them, the Sirdar and his army moved. The victim, as if petrified34, was powerless to fly. The tiger crept forward two measured strides—from Ras-el-Hudi to Abadar, from Abadar to Umdabia—crouched for a moment, and then bounded with irresistible35 fury upon its prey and tore it to pieces.
Such is a brief strategic account of the Atbara campaign; but the tale must be told in full.
On the 23rd of January the Khalifa, having learned of the arrival of British troops near Abu Hamed, and baffled by the disputes about the command of his army, ordered Kerreri camp to be broken up, and permitted his forces to return within the city, which he continued to fortify36. A few days later he authorised Mahmud to advance against Berber. What he had not dared with 60,000 men he now attempted with 20,000. The course of action which had for three months offered a good hope of success he resolved to pursue only when it led to ruin. He forbade the advance while it was advisable. When it was already become mad and fatal he commanded it. And this was a man whose reputation for intelligence and military skill had been bloodily37 demonstrated!
The gunboats ceaselessly patrolled the river, and exchanged shots with the Dervish forts. Throughout January nothing of note had happened. The reports of spies showed the Khalifa to be at Kerreri or in Omdurman. Ahmed Fedil held the Shabluka Gorge38, Osman Digna was at Shendi, and his presence was proved by the construction of two new forts on that side of the river. But beyond this the Dervishes had remained passive. On the 12th of February, however, it was noticed that their small outpost at Khulli had been withdrawn39. This event seemed to point to a renewal40 of activity. It was felt that some important movement impended41. But it was not until the 15th that its nature was apparent, and the gunboats were able to report definitely that Mahmud was crossing to the east bank of the Nile. The flotilla exerted itself to harass42 the Dervishes and impede43 the transportation; but although several sailing-boats and other river craft were captured, Mahmud succeeded in moving his whole army to Shendi by the 28th of February. His own headquarters were established at Hosh-ben-Naga, a little village about five miles further south. A delay of more than a fortnight followed, during which the gunboats exercised the utmost vigilance. The Suakin-Berber road was again closed for caravans44, and the Sirdar himself proceeded to Berber. On the 11th of March the remnants of the Jaalin tribe, having collected at Gakdul, re-occupied the now abandoned Metemma, to find its streets and houses choked with the decaying bodies of their relations. On the 13th the Egyptian look-out station, which had been established on Shebaliya island, was attacked by the Dervishes, and in the skirmish that ensued Major Sitwell was wounded. On the same day the enemy were reported moving northwards to Aliab, and it became evident that Mahmud had begun his advance.
He started from Shendi with a force which has been estimated at 19,000 souls, but which included many women and children, and may have actually numbered 12,000 fighting men, each and all supplied with a month's rations45 and about ninety rounds of ammunition46. The Sirdar immediately ordered the Anglo-Egyptian army, with the exception of the cavalry and Lewis's Egyptian brigade—which, with three squadrons, held the fort at the confluence—to concentrate at Kunur. Broadwood, with the remaining five squadrons, marched thither47 on the 16th; and the whole cavalry force, with the Camel Corps48 in support, on the three subsequent days reconnoitred twenty miles up the Nile and the Atbara.
Meanwhile the concentration was proceeding49 apace. The two Soudanese brigades, formed into a division under command of Major-General Hunter, with the artillery50, reached Kunur on the night of the 15th. The British brigade—the Lincolns, the Warwicks, and the Camerons—marched thither from Dabeika. The Seaforth Highlanders, who on the 13th were still at Wady Halfa, were swiftly railed across the desert to Geneinetti. Thence the first half-battalion51 were brought to Kunur in steamers. The second wing—since the need was urgent and the steamers few—were jolted52 across the desert from Railhead on camels, an experience for which neither their training nor their clothes had prepared them. By the 16th the whole force was concentrated at Kunur, and on the following day they were reviewed by the Sirdar. The first three days at Kunur were days of eager expectation. Rumour53 was king. The Dervish army had crossed the Atbara at Hudi, and was within ten miles of the camp. Mahmud was already making a flank march through the desert to Berber. A battle was imminent54. A collision must take place in a few hours. Officers with field-glasses scanned the sandy horizon for the first signs of the enemy. But the skyline remained unbroken, except by the wheeling dust devils, and gradually the excitement abated55, and the British brigade began to regret all the useful articles they had scrupulously56 left behind them at Dabeika, when they marched in a hurry and the lightest possible order to Kunur.
On the 19th of March the gunboats reported that the Dervishes were leaving the Nile, and Mahmud's flanking movement became apparent. The next day the whole force at Kunur marched across the desert angle between the rivers to Hudi. The appearance of the army would have been formidable. The cavalry, the Camel Corps, and the Horse Artillery covered the front and right flank; the infantry57, with the British on the right, moved in line of brigade masses; the transport followed. All was, however, shrouded58 in a fearful dust-storm. The distance, ten miles, was accomplished59 in five hours, and the army reached Hudi in time to construct a strong zeriba before the night. Here they were joined from Atbara fort by Lewis's brigade of Egyptians—with the exception of the 15th Battalion, which was left as garrison60—and the troops at the Sirdar's disposal were thus raised to 14,000 men of all arms. This force was organised as follows:
Commander-in-Chief: THE SIRDAR
British Brigade: MAJOR-GENERAL GATACRE
" " Lincolnshire Regiment
" " Seaforth Highlanders
" " Cameron Highlanders
Egyptian Infantry Division: MAJOR-GENERAL HUNTER
1st Brigade 2nd Brigade 3rd Brigade
LIEUT.-COL. MAXWELL LIEUT.-COL. MACDONALD LIEUT.-COL. LEWIS
8th Egyptians 2nd Egyptians 3rd Egyptians
XIIth Soudanese IXth Soudanese 4th "
XIIIth " Xth " 7th "
XIVth " XIth "
Cavalry: LIEUT.-COL. BROADWOOD
8 squadrons
Camel Corps: MAJOR TUDWAY
6 companies
Artillery: LIEUT.-COL. LONG
Detachment, No. 16 Company, E Division R.A.,
with 6 five-inch B.L. howitzers
Egyptian Horse Battery (6 guns)
Nos. 1, 2, and 3 Field Batteries Egyptian Army (18 guns)
British Maxim Battery (4 guns)
Rocket Detachment (2 sections)
Mahmud had early intelligence of the movement of the Anglo-Egyptian army. His original intention had been to march to Hudi. But he now learned that at Hudi he would have to fight the Sirdar's main force. Not feeling strong enough to attack them, he determined to march to Nakheila. The mobility63 of the Arabs was now as conspicuous64 as their dilatory65 nature had formerly66 been. The whole Dervish army—horse, foot, and artillery, men, women, children, and animals—actually traversed in a single day the forty miles of waterless desert which lie between Aliab and Nakheila, at which latter place they arrived on the night of the 20th. The Sirdar's next object was to keep the enemy so far up the Atbara that they could not possibly strike at Berber or Railhead. Accordingly, at dawn on the 21st, the whole force was ordered to march to Ras-el-Hudi, five miles nearer the Dervishes' supposed halting-place. The detour which the Arabs would have to make to march round the troops was nearly doubled by this movement. The utter impossibility of their flank march with a stronger enemy on the radius67 of the circle was now apparent.
The movement of the Anglo-Egyptian force was screened by seven squadrons of cavalry and the Horse Artillery, and Colonel Broadwood was further instructed to reconnoitre along the river and endeavour to locate the enemy. The country on either bank of the Atbara is covered with dense68 scrub, impassable for civilised troops. From these belts, which average a quarter of a mile in depth, the dom palms rise in great numbers. All the bush is leafy, and looks very pretty and green by contrast with the sombre vegetation of the Nile. Between the trees fly gay parrots and many other bright birds. The river itself above Ras-el-Hudi is, during March and April, only a dry bed of white sand about 400 yards broad, but dotted with deep and beautifully clear pools, in which peculiarly brilliant fish and crocodiles, deprived of their stream, are crowded together. The atmosphere is more damp than by the Nile, and produces, in the terrible heat of the summer, profuse69 and exhausting perspiration70. The natives dislike the water of the Atbara, and declare that it does not quench71 the thirst like that of the great river. It has, indeed, a slightly bitter taste, which is a strong contrast with the sweet waters of the Nile. Nevertheless the British soldiers, with characteristic contrariness, declared their preference for it. Outside the bush the ground undulated gently, but the surface was either stony72 and uneven73 or else cracked and fissured74 by the annual overflow75. Both these conditions made it hard for cavalry, and still more for artillery, to move freely; and the difficulties were complicated by frequent holes and small khors full of long grass.
Amid such scenes the squadrons moved cautiously forward. Having made the ground good for fifteen miles from Hudi, Colonel Broadwood halted his force at Abadar, an old fort, and sent one squadron under Captain Le Gallais seven miles further. At two o'clock this squadron returned, having met a few of the enemy's scouts76, but no formed bodies. While the force watered by turns at the river Captain Baring's squadron was extended in a line of outposts about a mile and a quarter to the south-east. But the reconnoitring squadron had been followed homeward by several hundred Dervish horsemen. Creeping along through the dense bush by the bank and evading77 the vedettes, these suddenly fell on the picket78 line and drove in all the outposts. In this affair eight troopers were killed and seven wounded. Thirteen horses were also lost, as, having rid themselves of their riders on the broken ground, they galloped79 off after the Arab mares on which the Dervishes were mostly mounted.
The news of an attack on Adarama was received on this same afternoon. It appeared that the Arabs had been repulsed81 by the Abyssinian irregulars raised by Colonel Parsons. Glowing details were forthcoming, but I do not propose to recount the Homeric struggles of the 'friendlies.' Little in them is worthy82 of remembrance; much seeks oblivion.
For more than a week the Anglo-Egyptian force remained halted at Ras-el-Hudi, waiting for privation to demoralise Mahmud's army or to exasperate83 him into making an attack. Every morning the cavalry rode out towards the enemy's camp. All day long they skirmished with or watched the Baggara horse, and at night they returned wearily to camp. Each morning the army awoke full of the hopes of battle, waited during the long hours, and finally retired84 to sleep in deep disgust and profound peace. And while the army halted, the camp began to assume a more homely85 appearance. The zeriba grew stronger and thicker, the glacis wider, the field kitchens more elaborate, the pools of the Atbara more dirty. Over all the sun beat down in merciless persistence86, till all white men quivered with weary suffering when in the open air, and even under the grass huts or improvised87 tents the temperature always registered 115° during the hottest hours of the day. The nights were, however, cool and pleasant.
But although the main part of the force found the days long and tedious, the time which the army spent at Ras-el-Hudi was by no means uneventful. The work of the squadrons was hard, and ceased only with the night. The continual patrolling told severely88 on men and horses; and the fact that the Dervishes were far stronger in the mounted arm than the Sirdar's army necessitated89 the utmost vigilance of the cavalry commander. Employment was also found for the gunboats.
When Mahmud had left the Nile he had established a sort of depot at Shendi, in which the wives of the Emirs and the surplus stores had been deposited. This treasure house was protected only by a slender garrison of 700 riflemen and twenty-five horsemen. On ordinary military grounds, and also since the event might infuriate the Arabs, it was decided to capture this place and disperse90 its defenders91. Accordingly, on the afternoon of the 24th the 3rd Egyptian Battalion from Lewis's brigade marched from Ras-el-Hudi to Atbara fort and relieved the 15th Egyptians then in garrison, and a small force under Commander Keppel—consisting of the 15th Egyptians under Major Hickman, two field-guns of Peake's battery, and 150 Jaalin irregulars—was embarked92 on, or in boats towed by, the three gunboats Zafir, Naser, and Fateh, and started the same night for Shendi.
At dawn on the 27th the flotilla appeared off Shendi. The Dervishes had been apprised93 of its approach and prepared to offer resistance. But the force against them was overwhelming. Under cover of the gunboats the infantry and guns were landed. The artillery then came into action, but after they had discharged two shells, the Arabs fled, firing their rifles with little effect. Shendi was occupied by the Egyptians. The pursuit was left to the Jaalin, and in it they are said to have killed 160 men—a revenge which must have been doubly sweet since it was consummated94 so near to the scene of the destruction of their tribe, and was also attended by scarcely any danger. Loot of all kinds fell to the victors, and the gunboats were soon laden95 with a miscellaneous spoil. The wives of the important Emirs made their escape to Omdurman, but upwards96 of 650 women and children of inferior rank were taken prisoners and transported to the Atbara, where in due course they contracted new family ties with the Soudanese soldiery and, as far as can be ascertained97, lived happily ever afterwards. There were no casualties among the troops, but the Jaalin lost a few men in their pursuit. The force then returned to the Atbara.
The 3rd of April was the last day the army spent at Ras-el-Hudi. The period of waiting was over. The enemy's position had been duly reconnoitred. His strength was believed to be sufficiently impaired98 for a successful attack to be made. The camp at Hudi was becoming very insanitary. Moreover, the situation, satisfactory though it was, was not one which the commander could view without anxiety. All the time that the army was operating on the Atbara it drew its supplies from the fort at the confluence. Between this and the camp, convoys99, protected only by a handful of Camel Corps, passed once in every four days. Only the idiotic100 apathy101 of the Dervishes allowed the communications to remain uninterrupted. Mahmud was strong in cavalry. It will be evident to anyone who looks at the map how easily a force might have moved along the left bank to attack the convoys. Such tactics would have occurred to most savage102 tribes. But in their last campaigns the Dervishes thought only of battles, and disregarded all smaller enterprises. Had they assailed103 the communications, the Sirdar might have been forced to build a chain of forts and to guard his convoys with strong infantry escorts. The fighting force would have been weakened, the troops have been wearied, and the result must have been delayed. The Dervishes had as yet attempted nothing. But there was no reason why they should not at any moment become enterprising. It was time to make an end. On the 4th of April the whole force moved to Abadar, and established themselves in a new camp five miles nearer the enemy. The tiger was tired of watching: he had taken his first stride towards his prey.
Although the information as to the enemy's strength and position was accurate and complete, the Sirdar decided to order a final reconnaissance on the 5th of April.
Starting at four o'clock Broadwood cut off the sharp angle which the Atbara forms at Umdabia, and, avoiding the thick bush, soon approached the Dervish camp. Not a sign of the enemy was seen during the march. The bush by the Atbara appeared deserted104. The camp gave no sign of life; an ominous105 silence prevailed. The squadrons moved forward at a walk, keeping about 1,200 yards away from the enemy's zeriba and almost parallel to it. Presently, as they did so, a large force of cavalry became visible in front. It was difficult to estimate their strength, but they appeared to be superior in numbers to the reconnaissance. The Dervish horsemen continued to retire towards the south-east, always reaching round the Egyptian left flank.
And while the Egyptian force advanced, as soon as they were opposite the southern end of the zeriba, another considerable body of Dervish horse issued from the northern side and threatened the line of retreat. At the same time the camp began to swarm106 with men, and crowds of tiny figures were observed clambering on to the entrenchments and gun emplacements, eagerly watching the development of the fight. The cavalry had by this time approached to within 1,000 yards of the zeriba, and the Arab artillery began to fire occasional round shot and clumsily fused shells.
At nine o'clock, the enemy's position having been again sketched107 and the approaches reconnoitred, Colonel Broadwood ordered the retirement108 to begin. The Maxims109 and artillery were in the centre, supported by Colonel Broadwood and three squadrons. Captain Baring with three squadrons watched the left flank, now in retirement become the right. Captains Le Gallais and Persse guarded the river flank.
The cavalry retired by alternate wings in measured fashion. But the enemy pressed on impetuously, and their horsemen, soon completely enveloping110 the desert flank of the Egyptians, began to threaten a charge. To meet this Colonel Broadwood sent one of his squadrons from the centre to join those under Captain Baring, so that at about a quarter to ten the reconnoitring force was formed with four squadrons towards the desert, two with the guns, and two towards the river. The weakness of the river flank of the troops encouraged the Dervish horse lurking111 in the scrub to make a bold attempt to capture the guns. The movement was shrewd and daring, but the cavalry commander met it with admirable skill. The springing-up of dust-clouds hardly 300 yards away was his only warning. He immediately took command of the two squadrons under Persse and Le Gallais, and ordered them to 'right about wheel' and charge. Thus headed by Broadwood himself, and with their British officers several horse-lengths in front, the Egyptians broke into a gallop80 and encountered the Baggara line, which numbered not fewer than 400 men but was in loose order, with firmness. They struck them obliquely112 and perhaps a third of the way down their line, and, breaking through, routed them utterly113.
While this dashing operation was carried out on the river flank the Dervish cavalry, following up the retirement, also delivered an attack towards the guns. Thereupon Captain Baring with two squadrons galloped from the desert flank across the front of the artillery, and, riding through the advancing enemy, repulsed them with loss. The charge was good and effective, but the shock and confusion broke both squadrons, and, although successful, they came through the Dervishes and back on to the river flank in some disorder114. Persse and Le Gallais, who had just rallied, at once dismounted their men and opened carbine fire on the retreating Dervishes. Their action not only checked the enemy, but prevented, by getting the troopers off their horses, any chance of their being involved in the disorder of the squadrons who had just charged.
Although their horsemen were thus sharply checked, the Dervish infantry continued in spite of losses to advance rapidly, and for a few minutes a hot musketry fire was exchanged by the Arab riflemen and the two dismounted squadrons. Captain Persse was severely wounded, and several other casualties occurred. But the whole force was drawing away from the enemy, and by eleven o'clock it had passed through the gap to the north-east and had shaken off all pursuit. The casualties in the operation were fortunately small. One British officer was wounded; six Egyptian troopers were killed and ten wounded; and about thirty horses were lost or disabled.
The details of the enemy's defences were now known; his strength was estimated from trustworthy information. It was evident from the frequent desertions that his army was disheartened, and from his inactivity that he was scarcely hopeful of success. The moment for destroying him had arrived. At daybreak on the morning of the 6th the whole army broke camp at Abadar and marched to the deserted village of Umdabia, where they bivouacked close by a convenient pool of the Atbara and seven miles nearer the Dervish camp.
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1
paramount
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| a.最重要的，最高权力的 | |
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haphazard
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| adj.无计划的，随意的，杂乱无章的 | |
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contemplate
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| vt.盘算，计议；周密考虑；注视，凝视 | |
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thoroughly
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| adv.完全地，彻底地，十足地 | |
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culminate
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| v.到绝顶，达于极点，达到高潮 | |
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disposition
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| n.性情，性格；意向，倾向；排列，部署 | |
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miserable
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| adj.悲惨的，痛苦的；可怜的，糟糕的 | |
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confluence
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| n.汇合，聚集 | |
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depot
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| n.仓库，储藏处；公共汽车站；火车站 | |
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entrenched
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| adj.确立的，不容易改的(风俗习惯) | |
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foes
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| 敌人，仇敌( foe的名词复数 ) | |
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conceit
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| n.自负，自高自大 | |
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procrastination
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| n.拖延，耽搁 | |
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leisurely
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| adj.悠闲的；从容的，慢慢的 | |
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entrenchment
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| n.壕沟，防御设施 | |
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decided
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| adj.决定了的，坚决的；明显的，明确的 | |
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prudent
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| adj.谨慎的，有远见的，精打细算的 | |
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detested
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| v.憎恶，嫌恶，痛恨( detest的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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hardy
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| adj.勇敢的，果断的，吃苦的；耐寒的 | |
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civilisation
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| n.文明，文化，开化，教化 | |
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miserably
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| adv.痛苦地；悲惨地；糟糕地；极度地 | |
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hatred
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| n.憎恶，憎恨，仇恨 | |
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Ford
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| n.浅滩，水浅可涉处；v.涉水，涉过 | |
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derive
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| v.取得；导出；引申；来自；源自；出自 | |
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adversary
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| adj.敌手，对手 | |
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cavalry
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| n.骑兵；轻装甲部队 | |
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detour
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| n.绕行的路，迂回路；v.迂回，绕道 | |
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determined
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| adj.坚定的；有决心的 | |
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deflecting
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| （使）偏斜， （使）偏离， （使）转向( deflect的现在分词 ) | |
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dwindled
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| v.逐渐变少或变小( dwindle的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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antagonist
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| n.敌人，对抗者，对手 | |
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prey
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| n.被掠食者，牺牲者，掠食；v.捕食，掠夺，折磨 | |
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sufficiently
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| adv.足够地，充分地 | |
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petrified
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| adj.惊呆的；目瞪口呆的v.使吓呆，使惊呆；变僵硬；使石化(petrify的过去式和过去分词) | |
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irresistible
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| adj.非常诱人的，无法拒绝的，无法抗拒的 | |
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36
fortify
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| v.强化防御，为…设防；加强，强化 | |
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37
bloodily
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| adv.出血地；血淋淋地；残忍地；野蛮地 | |
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38
gorge
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| n.咽喉，胃，暴食，山峡；v.塞饱，狼吞虎咽地吃 | |
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39
withdrawn
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| vt.收回；使退出；vi.撤退，退出 | |
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40
renewal
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| adj.(契约)延期，续订，更新，复活，重来 | |
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41
impended
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| v.进行威胁，即将发生( impend的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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42
harass
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| vt.使烦恼，折磨，骚扰 | |
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43
impede
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| v.妨碍，阻碍，阻止 | |
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44
caravans
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| （可供居住的）拖车（通常由机动车拖行）( caravan的名词复数 )； 篷车； （穿过沙漠地带的）旅行队（如商队） | |
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45
rations
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| 定量( ration的名词复数 )； 配给量； 正常量； 合理的量 | |
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46
ammunition
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| n.军火，弹药 | |
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47
thither
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| adv.向那里；adj.在那边的，对岸的 | |
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48
corps
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| n.(通信等兵种的)部队；(同类作的)一组 | |
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49
proceeding
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| n.行动，进行，(pl.)会议录，学报 | |
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50
artillery
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| n.(军)火炮，大炮；炮兵(部队) | |
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51
battalion
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| n.营；部队；大队(的人) | |
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52
jolted
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| （使）摇动， （使）震惊( jolt的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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53
rumour
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| n.谣言，谣传，传闻 | |
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54
imminent
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| adj.即将发生的，临近的，逼近的 | |
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55
abated
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| 减少( abate的过去式和过去分词 )； 减去； 降价； 撤消（诉讼） | |
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scrupulously
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| adv.一丝不苟地；小心翼翼地，多顾虑地 | |
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57
infantry
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| n.[总称]步兵(部队) | |
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58
shrouded
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| v.隐瞒( shroud的过去式和过去分词 )；保密 | |
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accomplished
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| adj.有才艺的；有造诣的；达到了的 | |
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60
garrison
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| n.卫戍部队；驻地，卫戍区；vt.派(兵)驻防 | |
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regiment
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| n.团，多数，管理；v.组织，编成团，统制 | |
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maxim
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| n.格言，箴言 | |
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63
mobility
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| n.可动性，变动性，情感不定 | |
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conspicuous
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| adj.明眼的，惹人注目的；炫耀的，摆阔气的 | |
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dilatory
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| adj.迟缓的，不慌不忙的 | |
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formerly
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| adv.从前，以前 | |
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radius
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| n.半径，半径范围；有效航程，范围，界限 | |
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dense
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| a.密集的，稠密的，浓密的；密度大的 | |
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profuse
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| adj.很多的，大量的，极其丰富的 | |
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perspiration
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| n.汗水；出汗 | |
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quench
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| vt.熄灭，扑灭；压制 | |
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72
stony
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| adj.石头的，多石头的，冷酷的，无情的 | |
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uneven
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| adj.不平坦的，不规则的，不均匀的 | |
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fissured
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| adj.裂缝的v.裂开( fissure的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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overflow
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| v.(使)外溢，(使)溢出；溢出，流出，漫出 | |
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76
scouts
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| 侦察员[机，舰]( scout的名词复数 )； 童子军； 搜索； 童子军成员 | |
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evading
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| 逃避( evade的现在分词 )； 避开； 回避； 想不出 | |
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picket
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| n.纠察队；警戒哨；v.设置纠察线；布置警卫 | |
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galloped
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| （使马）飞奔，奔驰( gallop的过去式和过去分词 )； 快速做[说]某事 | |
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gallop
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| v./n.(马或骑马等)飞奔；飞速发展 | |
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repulsed
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| v.击退( repulse的过去式和过去分词 )；驳斥；拒绝 | |
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82
worthy
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| adj.(of)值得的，配得上的；有价值的 | |
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83
exasperate
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| v.激怒，使（疾病）加剧，使恶化 | |
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84
retired
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| adj.隐退的，退休的，退役的 | |
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85
homely
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| adj.家常的，简朴的；不漂亮的 | |
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86
persistence
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| n.坚持，持续，存留 | |
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87
improvised
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| a.即席而作的,即兴的 | |
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88
severely
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| adv.严格地；严厉地；非常恶劣地 | |
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89
necessitated
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| 使…成为必要，需要( necessitate的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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90
disperse
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| vi.使分散；使消失；vt.分散；驱散 | |
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defenders
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| n.防御者( defender的名词复数 )；守卫者；保护者；辩护者 | |
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embarked
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| 乘船( embark的过去式和过去分词 )； 装载； 从事 | |
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93
apprised
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| v.告知，通知( apprise的过去式和过去分词 )；评价 | |
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consummated
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| v.使结束( consummate的过去式和过去分词 )；使完美；完婚；（婚礼后的）圆房 | |
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95
laden
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| adj.装满了的；充满了的；负了重担的；苦恼的 | |
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96
upwards
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| adv.向上，在更高处...以上 | |
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97
ascertained
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| v.弄清，确定，查明( ascertain的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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impaired
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| adj.受损的；出毛病的；有（身体或智力）缺陷的v.损害，削弱( impair的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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99
convoys
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| n.（有护航的）船队( convoy的名词复数 )；车队；护航（队）；护送队 | |
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100
idiotic
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| adj.白痴的 | |
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101
apathy
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| n.漠不关心，无动于衷；冷淡 | |
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102
savage
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| adj.野蛮的；凶恶的，残暴的；n.未开化的人 | |
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103
assailed
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| v.攻击( assail的过去式和过去分词 )；困扰；质问；毅然应对 | |
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104
deserted
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| adj.荒芜的，荒废的，无人的，被遗弃的 | |
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105
ominous
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| adj.不祥的，不吉的，预兆的，预示的 | |
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106
swarm
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| n.(昆虫)等一大群；vi.成群飞舞；蜂拥而入 | |
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107
sketched
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| v.草拟（sketch的过去式与过去分词形式） | |
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108
retirement
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| n.退休，退职 | |
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109
maxims
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| n.格言，座右铭( maxim的名词复数 ) | |
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110
enveloping
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| v.包围，笼罩，包住( envelop的现在分词 ) | |
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111
lurking
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| 潜在 | |
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112
obliquely
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| adv.斜； 倾斜； 间接； 不光明正大 | |
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113
utterly
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| adv.完全地，绝对地 | |
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114
disorder
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| n.紊乱，混乱；骚动，骚乱；疾病，失调 | |
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