Doctor and saint, and heard great argument
About it and about, but evermore
Came out by the same door wherein I went."
OMAR KHAYYAM.
These pages, which have chronicled a variety of small incidents, have hitherto concerned themselves little with the great matters out of which those incidents have arisen. As an opening chapter should lead the reader to expect the considerations that the book contains, so the conclusion should express the opinion he might form from the perusal2. When, at an earlier period, I refrained from discussing the question of frontier policy, I declared that its consideration was only postponed3 until a more propitious4 moment. That moment now presents itself. There will not be wanting those who will remind me, that in this matter my opinion is not supported by age or experience. To such I shall reply, that if what is written is false or foolish, neither age nor experience should fortify5 it; and if it is true, it needs no such support. The propositions of Euclid would be no less indisputable were they propounded6 by an infant or an idiot.
The inquirer sees the vast question unfold itself with feelings like those with which the fisherman in the old story watched the genius he had unwittingly released, rise from the bottle in clouds of smoke, which overspread the whole sky. Every moment the subject appears not only wider but deeper. When I reflect on the great number of diverse and often conflicting facts which may be assembled under every head—military, economic, political or moral—and consider the accumulations of specialised and technical knowledge necessary for their proper appreciation7, I am convinced that to compass the whole is beyond the mind and memory of man. Of such a question it is difficult to take broad views, and dangerous to generalise. Still less is it possible, as many people appear to imagine, to settle it with a phrase or an epigram. A point is reached where all relation between detail and proportion is lost. It is a picture of such great size that to see it all, it is necessary to stand so far off that neither colours nor figures are distinguishable. By constantly changing the point of view, some true perspective is possible, and even then the conception must be twisted and distorted, by the imperfections of the mental mirror.
Sensible of the magnitude of the task, and conscious of my own weakness, I propose to examine in a spirit of cautious inquiry9 and of tolerance10 the present "Forward Policy," and thence to approach the main question, to the answer of which that policy is only a guess.
I must revert11 to a period when the British power, having conquered the plains of India and subdued13 its sovereigns, paused at the foot of the Himalayas and turned its tireless energy to internal progress and development. The "line of the mountains" formed a frontier as plain and intelligible14 as that which defines the limits of the sea. To the south lay the British Empire in India; to the north were warlike tribes, barbarous, unapproachable, irreclaimable; and far beyond these, lay the other great Power of Asia.
It was long the wisdom of Anglo-Indian statesmen to preserve a situation which contained so many elements of finality, and so many guarantees of peace. When the northern savages15, impelled16 by fanaticism17 or allured18 by plunder20, descended21 from the mountains and invaded the plains, they were met by equal courage and superior discipline, and driven in disorder22 to their confines. But this was found to be an inadequate23 deterrent24, and the purely25 defensive26 principle had to be modified in favor of that system of punitive27 expeditions which has been derided28 as the policy of "Butcher and Bolt."
Gradually, as the circumstances altered, the methods of dealing29 with them changed. The punitive expeditions had awakened30 an intense hostility31 among the tribesmen. The intrigues33 of Russia had for some time been watched with alarm by the Indian Government. As long as the border could remain a "No-man's land"—as it were a "great gulf34 fixed"—all was well; but if any power was to be supreme35, that power must neither be Russia nor Afghanistan. ["We shall consider it from the first incumbent36 upon the Government of India to prevent, at any cost, the establishment within this outlying country of the political preponderance of any other power."—Letter from Government of India to the Secretary of State, No.49, 28th February, 1879.] The predominance of Russian influence in these territories would give them the power to invade India at their discretion37, with what chances of success need not be here discussed. The predominance of Afghan influence would make the Amir master of the situation, and enable him to blackmail38 the Indian Government indefinitely. A change of policy, a departure from the old frontier line, presented itself with increasing force to responsible men. To-day we see the evils that have resulted from that change. The dangers that inspired it have been modified.
For some years the opinion in favour of an advance grew steadily39 among those in power in India. In 1876 a decisive step was taken. Roused by the efforts of the Amir to obtain the suzerainty of the Pathan tribes, Lord Lytton's Government stretched a hand through Cashmere towards Chitral, and the Mehtar of that State became the vassal40, nominally41 of the Maharaja of Cashmere, but practically of the Imperial Government. The avowed42 object was to ultimately secure the effectual command of the passes of the Hindu Kush. [Despatch43 No.17, 11th June, 1877.] The British Ministry44, the famous ministry of Lord Beaconsfield, approved the action and endorsed45 the policy. Again, in 1879, the Vice-regal Government, in an official despatch, declared their intention of acquiring, "through the ruler of Cashmere, the power of making such political and military arrangements as will effectually command the passes of the Hindu Kush." [Despatch No.49, 28th February, 1879.] "If," so runs the despatch, "we *extend and by degrees consolidate46 our influence* [The italics are mine] over this country, and if we resolve that no foreign interference can be permitted on this side of the mountains or within the drainage system of the Indus, we shall have laid down a natural line of frontier, which is distinct, intelligible and likely to be respected." [Despatch No.49, 28th February, 1879.]
No declaration of policy or intention could have been more explicit47. The words to "extend and consolidate our influence" can, when applied48 to barbarous peoples, have no other meaning than ultimate annexation50. Thus the scheme of an advance from the plains of India into the mountain region, which had long been maturing in men's minds and which was shaped and outlined by many small emergencies and expedients51, was clearly proclaimed. The forward movement had begun. A fresh and powerful impulse was imparted after the termination of Lord Ripon's viceroyalty. The open aggression52 which characterised the Russian frontier policy of '84 and '85 had been met by a supine apathy53 and indifference54 to the interests of the State, which deserved, and which, had the issues been less important, might have received actual punishment. It was natural that his immediate55 successors should strive to dissociate themselves from the follies56 and the blunders of those years. The spirit of reaction led to the final abandonment of the venerable policy of non-intervention. Instead of the "line of the mountains," it was now maintained that the passes through them must be held. This is the so-called "Forward Policy." It is a policy which aims at obtaining the frontier—Gilgit, Chitral, Jelalabad, Kandahar.
In pursuance of that policy we have been led to build many frontier forts, to construct roads, to annex49 territories, and to enter upon more intimate relations with the border tribes. The most marked incident in that policy has been the retention57 of Chitral. This act was regarded by the tribesmen as a menace to their independence, and by the priesthood as the prelude58 to a general annexation. Nor were they wrong, for such is the avowed aim of the "Forward Policy." The result of the retention of Chitral has been, as I have already described, that the priesthood, knowing that their authority would be weakened by civilisation59, have used their religious influence on the people to foment60 a general rising.
It is useless to discuss the Chitral question independently. If the "Forward Policy" be justified61, then the annexation of Chitral, its logical outcome, is also justified. The bye and the main plots stand or fall together.
So far then we have advanced and have been resisted. The "Forward Policy" has brought an increase of territory, a nearer approach to what is presumably a better frontier line and—war. All this was to have been expected. It may be said of the present system that it precludes62 the possibility of peace. Isolated63 posts have been formed in the midst of races notoriously passionate64, reckless and warlike. They are challenges. When they are assailed65 by the tribesmen, relieving and punitive expeditions become necessary. All this is the outcome of a recognised policy, and was doubtless foreseen by those who initiated66 it. What may be called strange is that the forts should be badly constructed—cramped, as the Malakand positions; commanded, like Chakdara; without flank defences, as at Saraghari; without proper garrisons68, as in the Khyber. This is a side issue and accidental. The rest of the situation has been deliberately69 created.
The possibility of a great combination among the border tribes was indeed not contemplated70. Separated by distance, and divided by faction71, it was anticipated they could be dealt with in detail. On this point we have been undeceived.
That period of war and disturbance72 which was the inevitable73 first consequence of the "Forward Policy" must in any case have been disturbed and expensive. Regarded from an economic standpoint, the trade of the frontier valleys will never pay a shilling in the pound on the military expenditure74 necessary to preserve order. Morally, it is unfortunate for the tribesmen that our spheres of influence clash with their spheres of existence. Even on the military question, a purely technical question, as to whether an advanced frontier line is desirable or not, opinion is divided. Lord Roberts says one thing; Mr. Morley another.
There is no lack of arguments against the "Forward Policy." There are many who opposed its initiation75. There are many who oppose it now; who think that nothing should have lured19 the Government of India beyond their natural frontier line, and who maintain that it would have been both practical and philosophic76 had they said: "Over all the plains of India will we cast our rule. There we will place our governors and magistrates77; our words shall be respected and our laws obeyed. But that region, where the land rises like the waves of a sea, shall serve us as a channel of stormy waters to divide us from our foes78 and rivals."
But it is futile79 to engage in the controversies80 of the past. There are sufficient in the present, and it is with the present we are concerned.
We have crossed the Rubicon. In the opinion of all those who know most about the case, the forward movement is now beyond recall. Indeed, when the intense hostility of the Border tribes, the uncertain attitude of the Amir, the possibilities of further Russian aggression and the state of feeling in India are considered, it is difficult to dispute this judgment81. Successive Indian Administrations have urged, successive English Cabinets have admitted, the necessity of finding a definite and a defensible frontier. The old line has been left, and between that line and an advanced line continuous with Afghan territory, and south of which all shall be reduced to law and order, there does not appear to be any prospect82 of a peaceful and permanent settlement.
The responsibility of placing us in this position rests with those who first forsook83 the old frontier policy of holding the "line of the mountains." The historian of the future, with impartial84 pen and a more complete knowledge, must pronounce on the wisdom of their act. In the meantime it should be remembered of these great men, that they left their public offices amid the applause and admiration85 of their contemporaries, and, "in the full tide of successful experiment." Nor can so much be said of all those who have assailed them. Those who decided86, have accepted the responsibility, and have defended their action. But I am inclined to think that the rulers of India, ten years ago or a hundred years ago, were as much the sport of circumstances as their successors are to-day.
Let us return to the present and our own affairs. We have embarked87 on stormy and perilous88 waters. The strong current of events forbids return. The sooner the farther shore is reached, the sooner will the dangers and discomforts89 of the voyage be over. All are anxious to make the land. The suggestions as to the course are numerous. There are some, bad and nervous sailors perhaps, who insist upon returning, although they are told it is impossible, and who would sink the ship sooner than go on, were they not outnumbered by their shipmates. While they are delaying, the current bears us towards more disturbed waters and more rocky landing places.
There are others who call out for "Full steam ahead," and would accomplish the passage at once, whatever the risks. But alas90! The ship is run out of coal and can only spread its sails to the varying breezes, take advantage of favorable tides, and must needs lie to when the waves are high.
But the sensible passenger may, though he knows the difficulties of the voyage and the dangers of the sea, fairly ask the man at the wheel to keep a true and constant course. He may with reason and justice insist that, whatever the delays which the storms or accidents may cause, the head of the vessel91 shall be consistently pointed92 towards the distant port, and that come what will she shall not be allowed to drift aimlessly hither and thither93 on the chance of fetching up somewhere some day.
The "Full steam ahead" method would be undoubtedly94 the most desirable. This is the military view. Mobilise, it is urged, a nice field force, and operate at leisure in the frontier valleys, until they are as safe and civilised as Hyde Park. Nor need this course necessarily involve the extermination95 of the inhabitants. Military rule is the rule best suited to the character and comprehension of the tribesmen. They will soon recognise the futility96 of resistance, and will gradually welcome the increase of wealth and comfort that will follow a stable government. Besides this, we shall obtain a definite frontier almost immediately. Only one real objection has been advanced against this plan. But it is a crushing one, and it constitutes the most serious argument against the whole "Forward Policy." It is this: we have neither the troops nor the money to carry it out.
The inevitable alternative is the present system, a system which the war has interrupted, but to which we must return at its close; a system of gradual advance, of political intrigue32 among the tribes, of subsidies97 and small expeditions.
Though this policy is slow, painful and somewhat undignified, there is no reason that it should not be sure and strong. But it must be consistently pursued. Dynamite98 in the hands of a child is not more dangerous than a strong policy weakly carried out. The reproach which may be justly laid upon the rulers of India, whether at home or abroad, is that while they recognise the facts, they shrink from the legitimate99 conclusions.
They know they cannot turn back. They fully100 intend to go on. Yet they fear to admit the situation, to frankly101 lay their case before the country, and trust to the good sense and courage of an ancient democracy. The result is, that they tie their hands by ridiculous and unnecessary proclamations, such as that which preceded the Chitral expedition of 1895. The political officers who watch the frontier tribes are expected to obtain authority by force of personal character, yet strictly102 according to regulations, and to combine individuality with uniformity. And sometimes this timidity leads to such dismal103 acts of folly104 as the desertion of the Khyber forts.
But in spite of all obstacles and errors there is a steady advance, which may be accelerated, and made easier, by many small reforms. These questions of detail approach so near the province of the specialist, that I shall not attempt to enumerate105 or discuss them. It is suggested among other things that wider powers should be given to the political officers, in their ordinary duties of peace. Others advocate occasional demonstrations106 of troops, to impress the tribesmen with the fact that those they see are not the full strength of the Sirkar. Bolder minds have hinted at transplanting young Pathans, and educating them in India after the custom of the Romans. But this last appears to be suitable to a classic rather than a Christian107 age.
From a general survey of the people and the country, it would seem that silver makes a better weapon than steel. A system of subsidies must tend to improve our relations with the tribes, enlist108 their interests on the side of law and order, and by increasing their wealth, lessen109 their barbarism. In the matter of the supply of arms the Government would find it cheaper to enter the market as a purchaser, and have agents to outbid the tribesmen, rather than to employ soldiers. As water finds its own level, so the laws of economics will infallibly bring commodities to the highest bidder110. Doubtless there are many other lessons which the present war will have taught. These may lighten a task which, though long and heavy, is not beyond the powers or pluck of the British people.
We are at present in a transition stage, nor is the manner nor occasion of the end in sight. Still this is no time to despair. I have often noticed in these Afghan valleys, that they seem to be entirely111 surrounded by the hills, and to have no exit. But as the column has advanced, a gap gradually becomes visible and a pass appears. Sometimes it is steep and difficult, sometimes it is held by the enemy and must be forced, but I have never seen a valley that had not a way out. That way we shall ultimately find, if we march with the firm but prudent112 step of men who know the dangers; but, conscious of their skill and discipline, do not doubt their ability to deal with them as they shall arise. In such a spirit I would leave the subject, with one farewell glance.
Looking on the story of the great frontier war; at all that has been told, and all that others may tell, there must be many who to-day will only deplore113 the losses of brave soldiers and hard-earned money. But those who from some future age shall, by steady light of history, dispassionately review the whole situation, its causes, results and occasion, may find other reflections, as serious perhaps, but less mournful. The year 1897, in the annals of the British people, was marked by a declaration to the whole world of their faith in the higher destinies of their race. If a strong man, when the wine sparkles at the feast and the lights are bright, boasts of his prowess, it is well he should have an opportunity of showing in the cold and grey of the morning that he is no idle braggart114. And unborn arbiters115, with a wider knowledge, and more developed brains, may trace in recent events the influence of that mysterious Power which, directing the progress of our species, and regulating the rise and fall of Empires, has afforded that opportunity to a people, of whom at least it may be said, that they have added to the happiness, the learning and the liberties of mankind.
APPENDIX.
EXTRACTS FROM OFFICIAL DESPATCHES.
THE ATTACK ON THE MALAKAND.
26th July — 1st August, 1897.
FROM THE DESPATCH OF BRIGADIER-GENERAL W.H. MEIKLEJOHN, C.B., C.M.G.
FORWARDED TO THE ADJUTANT-GENERAL IN INDIA BY SIR BINDON BLOOD.
43. All have done well, but I should like to bring before His Excellency for favorable consideration the following names of officers and men:—
Lieut.-Colonel J. Lamb, who, on the first alarm being sounded on the night of the 26th July, had taken prompt action in reinforcing the outpost line held by his regiment118, and later was of great assistance in directing the defence of the central enclosure, till he was severely119 wounded.
Captain H.F. Holland showed great courage in assisting to drive a number of the enemy out of the central enclosure, and was severely wounded in doing so.
I would especially wish to mention Lieutenant121 S.H. Climo, who commanded the 24th Punjaub Infantry after Lieut.-Colonel Lamb and Captain Holland had been wounded. This officer has shown soldierly qualities and ability of the highest order. He has commanded the regiment with dash and enterprise, and shown a spirit and example which has been followed by all ranks. I trust His Excellency will be pleased to favourably122 notice Lieutenant Climo, who has proved himself an officer who will do well in any position, and is well worthy123 of promotion124.
Lieutenant A.K. Rawlins has behaved well all through. I would recommend him to His Excellency for the plucky125 way in which he went to the fort on the 26th July to bring reinforcements, and again for the dash he showed in leading his men on the 27th and 28th, of which Lieutenant Climo speaks most highly.
Lieutenant E.W. Costello, 22nd Punjaub Infantry, temporarily attached to the 24th Punjaub Infantry, has behaved exceedingly well, and is the subject of a separate recommendation.
31st Punjaub Infantry.
Major M.I. Gibbs, who commanded the regiment in the absence of Major O'Bryen, with skill and in every way to my satisfaction.
Lieutenant H.B. Ford116, Acting126-Adjutant, 31st Punjaub Infantry, rendered valuable assistance in helping127 to bring in a wounded Sepoy during the withdrawal128 from north camp. He also behaved with courage in resisting an attack of the enemy on the night of the 28th, when he was severely wounded.
Surgeon-Lieutenant J.H. Hugo, attached to 31st Punjaub Infantry, rendered valuable service on the night of the 28th in saving Lieutenant H.B. Ford from bleeding to death. Lieutenant Ford was wounded and a branch of an artery129 was cut. There were no means of securing the artery, and Surgeon-Lieutenant Hugo for two hours stopped the bleeding by compressing the artery with his fingers. Had he not had the strength to do so, Lieutenant Ford must have died. Early in the morning, thinking that the enemy had effected an entrance into camp, Surgeon-Lieutenant Hugo picked up Lieutenant Ford with one arm, and, still holding the artery with the fingers of the other hand, carried him to a place of safety.
45th (Rattray's) Sikhs.
Colonel H.A. Sawyer was away on leave when hostilities130 broke out, but he returned on the 29th and took over command of the regiment from Lieut.-Colonel McRae, and from that time rendered me every assistance.
I would specially120 bring to the notice of His Excellency the Commander-in-chief the name of Lieut.-Colonel H.N. McRae, who commanded the regiment on the 26th, 27th and 28th. His prompt action in seizing the gorge131 at the top of the Buddhist132 road on the night of the 26th, and the gallant133 way in which he held it, undoubtedly saved the camp from being rushed on that side. For this, and for the able way in which he commanded the regiment during the first three days of the fighting, I would commend him to His Excellency's favorable consideration.
Also Lieutenant R.M. Barff, Officiating-Adjutant of the regiment, who, Lieut.-Colonel McRae reports, behaved with great courage and rendered him valuable assistance.
The Guides.
I also wish to bring the name of Lieut.-Colonel R.B. Adams of the Guides to His Excellency's notice. The prompt way in which the corps134 mobilised, and their grand march, reflect great credit on him and the corps. Since arrival at the Malakand on the 27th July and till the morning of the 1st August, Lieut.-Colonel Adams was in command of the lower camp, i.e., that occupied by central and left position, and in the execution of this command, and the arrangements he made for improving the defenses, he gave me every satisfaction. I have also to express my appreciation of the way in which he conducted the cavalry135 reconnaissance on the 1st August, on which occasion his horse was shot under him.
Great credit is due to Lieutenant P.C. Eliott-Lockhart, who was in command of the Guides Infantry, for bringing up the regiment from Mardan to Malakand in such good condition after their trying march.
Captain G.M. Baldwin, D.S.O., behaved with great courage and coolness during the reconnaissance of the 1st August, and though severely wounded by a sword cut on the head, he remained on the ground and continued to lead his men.
Lieutenant H.L.S. Maclean also behaved with courage, and displayed an excellent example on the night of the 28th July, when he was severely wounded.
11th Bengal Lancers.
Major S. Beatson commanded the squadron, 11th Bengal Lancers, which arrived at Malakand on the 29th, and led them with great skill and dash on the occasion of the reconnaissance on the 1st August.
No.8 Bengal Mountain Battery.
Lieutenant F.A. Wynter was the only officer with No.8 Bengal Mountain Battery from the 26th till the 30th July, and he commanded it during that time, when all the severest of the fighting was going on, with great ability, and has proved himself a good soldier. I should like especially to mention him for His Excellency's consideration. The battery did excellent work all through.
No.5 Company Queen's Own Madras Sappers and Miners.
Lieutenant A.R. Winsloe, R.E., commanded the company from the 27th July till the 1st August to my entire satisfaction. His services in strengthening the defences were invaluable136.
Lieutenant F.W. Watling, R.E., was in command of the company in the absence of Captain Johnson on the 26th, and commanded it well until he was wounded in gallantly137 trying to resist a charge of the enemy. After Lieutenant Watling was wounded the command of the company for the remainder of the night of the 26th, and till Lieutenant Winsloe returned on the 27th, devolved on Lieutenant E.N. Manley, R.E. He performed his duties with great credit, and afterwards was of great assistance, by his zeal138 and his exertions139, to Lieutenant Winsloe.
Medical Staff.
Brigade-Surgeon-Lieut.-Colonel F.A. Smyth was most zealous141, and performed his duties to my satisfaction. He volunteered to perform the duties of Provost Marshal, and did so for a short time during the illness of Lieutenant H.E. Cotterill.
The arrangements made by Surgeon-Major S. Hassand, Senior Medical Officer, 38th Native Field Hospital, and the indefatigable142 attention and care with which he devoted143 himself to the wounded, deserve great praise. The list of casualties is large, and Surgeon-Major Hassand has been untiring in his exertions for their relief. I hope His Excellency will think fit to consider his services favourably.
Surgeon-Captain T.A.O. Langston, 38th Native Field Hospital, rendered valuable assistance in attending to the wounded under a heavy fire on the night of the 26th and each following night, and behaved with courage and devotion in carrying out his duties under very exceptional circumstances. Surgeon-Lieutenant W. Carr has worked night and day in the hospitals, in trying to alleviate144 the sufferings of the wounded, and has most ably and efficiently145 aided Surgeon-Major Hassand.
Brigade Staff.
Major L. Herbert, my Deputy Assistant Adjutant and Quartermaster-General, was of the greatest assistance to me by the zeal and energy with which he performed his duties from the moment the news of the approach of the enemy was received till he was severely wounded while standing146 next to me in the enclosure of the Sappers and Miners' camp on the night of the 26th. Since being wounded, he has carried on all his office duties on his bed. I would wish to commend his gallant conduct for the favorable consideration of the Commander-in-Chief.
Although Major H.A. Deane is in no way under my authority, I feel I am under a great obligation to him for the valuable assistance he rendered me with his advice and for volunteering to put himself at my disposal with the object of carrying on the active duties of Deputy Assistant Adjutant-General, when Major Herbert was wounded. He was indefatigable in assisting me in every way he could, and I am anxious to put on record my grateful appreciation of the services he rendered me.
44. The above list of names may appear to be somewhat long; but I would point out that the fighting was almost constant for a week, and was of such a close nature as to demand incessant147 exertion140 from every officer in the force, and to elicit148 constant acts of courage and gallant example which cannot be overlooked.
45. I would not like to close this despatch without paying a tribute to the memory of a fine soldier, and charming companion whose death the whole force deplores149.
Major W.W. Taylor had behaved with the greatest gallantry and dash in meeting the enemy's first charge with Lieut.-Colonel McRae, and, had he lived, he would undoubtedly distinguished150 himself in his career. His loss in a heavy one to his regiment, and to the Service, and there is no one in the brigade who does not mourn him as a friend.
I have also to deplore the death of Honorary-Lieutenant L. Manley, who as my Commissariat Officer had rendered me great assistance, and who died fighting manfully. His loss is a very serious one to the brigade.
46. I attach separately, for favorable consideration, a list of native officers, non-commissioned officers and men, who have done especially good service; some of whom I have therein recommended for the order of merit.
I trust these recommendations will meet with the favorable consideration of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief.
THE RELIEF OF CHAKDARA
2ND AUGUST, 1897
FROM THE DESPATCH OF MAJOR-GENERAL
SIR BINDON BLOOD, K.C.B.
19. I have the honour to invite the special attention of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief in India to the good services of the following officers during the operations described above, namely:—
Brigadier-General W.H. Meiklejohn, C.B., C.M.G., carried out his duties in command of the force which relieved Chakdara Fort with great gallantry and judgment.
Colonel A.J.F. Reid, Officiating Colonel on the Staff, Malakand Brigade, afforded me valuable assistance by carrying out the rearrangement of the defensive posts at the Malakand on the 1st August, after the Relieving Force had been drawn151 from them, and in making the preparations for Colonel T.H. Goldney's attack on the 2nd.
Colonel T.H. Goldney, 35th Sikhs, disposed and led the troops on the morning of the 2nd in the successful attack on the hill, since named after him, in a most judicious152 and satisfactory manner.
Major E.A.P. Hobday, R.A., was most energetic and indefatigable in assisting Colonel A.J.F. Reid and me in carrying out the multifarious work which had to be done at the Malakand, and in the Swat Valley on the 1st, 2nd and 3rd.
Brigadier-General Meiklejohn reports favourably on the following officers who were under his command during the operations above detailed153, viz:—
Captain G.F.H. Dillon, 40th Pathans, who acted as Staff Officer to the Relieving Force, showed great readiness and resource, and his assistance was of the utmost value.
Lieutenants154 C.R. Gaunt, 4th Dragoon Guards, Orderly Officer, and E. Christian, Royal Scots Fusiliers, Signalling Officer, carried out their duties most satisfactorily.
Lieut.-Colonel R.B. Adams, Queen's Own Corps of Guides, commanded the cavalry (four squadrons) with the Relieving Force in the most gallant and judicious manner.
The following officers commanding units and detachments of the Reliving Force are stated by Brigidier-General Meiklejohn to have carried out their duties in a thoroughly155 capable and satisfactory manner, viz.:—
Colonel H.A. Sawyer, 45th Sikhs.
Major Stuart Beatson, 11th Bengal Lancers.
Captain A.H.C. Birch, R.A. (8th Bengal Mountain Battery).
Lieutenant G. de H. Smith, 2nd Regiment, Central India Horse, attached to Queen's Own Corps of Guides (cavalry).
Lieutenant A.R. Winsloe, R.E. (No.5 Company Queen's Own Sapper's and Miners).
Lieutenant P.C. Eliott-Lockhart, Queen's Own Corps of Guides (infantry).
Surgeon-General H.F. Whitchurch, V.C., attended to the wounded under fire throughout the fighting.
The following officers under Colonel T.H. Goldney's command led their detachments under my own observation with gallantry and judgment, viz.:—
Lieut.-Colonel L.J.E. Bradshaw, 35th Sikhs.
Captain L.C.H. Stainforth, 38th Dogras.
Jemader Nawab, who commanded two guns of No.8 Bengal Mountain Battery in support of Colonel Goldney's attack, attracted my favorable notice by his smartness, quickness and thorough knowledge of his work.
I would also wish to bring to His Excellency's notice the good work done by Major H. Burney, Gordon Highlanders, Assistant Adjutant-General; Major H. Burney, Gordon Highlanders, Assistant Adjutant-General; Major H. Wharry, D.S.O., Chief Commissariat Officer, and Captain A.B. Dunsterville, 1st Battalion157 East Surrey Regiment, my Aide-de-Camp; the only officers of the Divisional Staff of my force who had arrived at the Malakand on the 2nd August. These officers worked very hard and were of great use to me.
20. Major H.A. Deane, C.S.I., Political Agent, Dir and Swat, was not in any way under my orders during the operations above described, but notwithstanding, I hope I may be permitted to express the obligations under which I lie to him for valuable information and general assistance which he gave me.
THE DEFENCE OF CHAKDARA.
26TH JULY—2ND AUGUST, 1897.
FROM THE DESPATCH OF MAJOR-GENERAL
SIR BINDON BLOOD, K.C.B.
15. During the fighting above described, the conduct of the whole of the garrison67, whether fighting men, departmental details, or followers158, is reported to have been most gallant. Not the least marked display of courage and constancy was that made by the small detachment in the signal tower, who were without water for the last eighteen hours of the siege. The signallers, under No.2729, Lance-Naik Vir Singh, 45th Sikhs, who set a brilliant example, behaved throughout in a most courageous159 manner; one of them, No.2829, Sepoy Prem Singh, climbing several times out of a window in the tower with a heliograph, and signaling outside to the Malakand under a hot fire from sungars in every direction.
16. I would beg to recommend all the British and native officers who took part in the defence I have described for the favorable consideration of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief as under, viz.:—
Captain H. Wright, 11th Bengal Lancers, who, with his detachment of forty sabres of his regiment, made the gallant ride through the enemy from the Malakand to Chakdara Fort, on the morning of the 27th July, and commanded the garrison from that morning till its relief on the 2nd August.
Captain D. Baker160, 2nd Bombay Infantry, who rode to Chakdara Fort with Captain Wright, and made himself most useful. Lieutenant H.B. Rattray, 45th Sikhs, who commanded the garrison from the commencement of the attack on the 26th July till the arrival of Captain Wright the next day, and is reported by that officer to have been the life and soul of the defence. 2nd Lieutenant J.L. Wheatley, 45th Sikhs, had charge of the gun and Maxim161 detachments, and it was largely owing to his care and judgment that these weapons were so effective in the defence.
Lieutenant A.B. Minchin, 25th Punjaub Infantry, Assistant Political Agent, was in the fort throughout the siege, and was most useful.
Ressaidar Tilok Singh, 11th Bengal Lancers, accompanied Captain Wright in his ride of the 27th July, and is very favorably mentioned by that officer.
Jemadar Sudama commanded the detachment of the 21st Bengal Lancers who were at Chakdara Fort on the 26th July, and was present throughout the siege, and is also very favorably reported on.
Subadar Jwala Singh, 45th Sikhs, was present throughout the siege, and showed great intelligence and readiness of resource, as well as courage and coolness, under fire.
Jemadar Ala Singh, 45th Sikhs, had command of the sections on the parapet of the river fort, and showed conspicuous162 courage and coolness under heavy fire.
Lieutenant Rattray reports that No.522 Hospital Assistant Piara Singh, 11th Bengal Lancers, rendered valuable assistance, not only in the sortie on the 2nd, and at other times in bringing up ammunition163, etc., to the men on the parapets under fire.
17. I shall further have the honor, in a separate communication, to submit, for the favorable consideration of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, the names of several non-commissioned officers and men who distinguished themselves during the siege of Chakdara Fort, in view of their being granted the order of merit, should His Excellency think them deserving of that distinction.
From Major-General Sir B. Blood, K.C.B., Commanding the Malakand
Field Force, to the Adjutant-General in India,—No.5, "Despatches,
Malakand Field Force,"—Dated 27th October, 1897.
I regret to find that in my report, "Despatches, Malakand Field Force," No.3, of the 20th August, 1897, I omitted to include the name of Surgeon-Captain E.V. Hugo, Indian Medical Service, amongst those of the officers recommended to the favorable consideration of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief for their services during the recent defence of Chakdara Fort. I now have great pleasure in stating that Surgeon-General Hugo served with distinction throughout the defence in question, and in recommending him for favorable consideration accordingly.
ACTION OF LANDAKAI AND EXPEDITION
INTO UPPER SWAT.
AUGUST, 1987.
FROM THE DESPATCHES OF MAJOR-GENERAL
SIR BINDON BLOOD, K.C.B.
32. In concluding this part of my report, I would wish to express my admiration of the fine soldierly qualities exhibited by all ranks of the special force which I led into Upper Swat. They fought the action at Landakai in a brilliant manner, working over high hills, under a burning sun, with the greatest alacrity164, and showing everywhere the greatest keenness to close with the enemy. They carried out admirably the trying duties necessitated165 by marching in hot weather with a transport train of more than 2000 mules166, and they endured with perfect cheerfulness the discomforts of several nights' bivouac in heavy rain. The officers of the Divisional Staff and of by personal staff who were with me, [Major H.H. Burney, Assistant Adjutant-General (Gordon Highlanders); Lieut.-Colonel A. Masters, Assistant Quartermaster-General (2nd Regiment Central India Horse); Captain H.E. Stanton, Deputy Assistant Quartermaster-General, Intelligence Branch (Royal Artillery167); Colonel W. Aitken, Colonel on the Staff, Royal Artillery; Captain H.D. Grier, Adjutant, R.A.; Major E. Blunt, Senior Officer of Royal Engineers; Captain E.W.M. Norie, Superintendent168, Army Signalling (Middlesex Regiment); Captain C.G.F. Edwards, Provost Marshal (5th Punjaub Cavalry); Captain A.B. Dunsterville, A.D.C. (1st Battalion East Surrey Regiment); Captain A.R. Dick, Orderly Officer. BRIGADE STAFF.—Major E.A.P. Hobday, Deputy Assistant Adjutant-General (Royal Artillery); Captain G.F.H. Dillon, Deputy Assistant Quartermaster-General (40th Bengal Infantry); Captain C.H. Beville, Commissariat Transport Department; Captain J.M. Camilleri, in charge of Transport (13th Bengal Infantry); Surgeon-Lieut.-Colonel J.T.B. Bookey, I.M.S.; Lieutenant C.R. Gaunt, Orderly officer, 4th Dragoon Guards. COMMANDING OFFICERS OF DIVISIONAL TROOPS.—Lieut.-Colonel R.B. Adams, Queen's Own Corps of Guides; Major C.A. Anderson, 10th Field Battery, Royal Artillery; Major M.F. Fegan, No.7 Mountain Battery, Royal Artillery; Captain A.H.C. Birch, No.8 Bengal Mountain Battery; Captain E.P. Johnson, No.5 Company Queen's Own Sappers and Miners.] Brigadier-General W.H. Meiklejohn, C.B., C.M.G., and his staff, and the several heads of departments and commanding officers of Divisional Troops, all carried out their duties in an entirely satisfactory manner.
Major H.A. Deane, Political Agent, and his assistant, Lieutenant A.B. Minchin, gave valuable assistance in collecting intelligence and supplies.
33. While the operations above described were in progress, a diversion was made towards the southern border of the Buner country from Mardan by the 1st Reserve Brigade, which, on its headquarters leaving Mardan, came under my command as the 3rd Brigade, Malakand Field Force.
34. A force [1st Battalion Highland156 Light Infantry, under Lieut.-Colonel R.D.B. Rutherford; 39th Garhwal Rifles, under Lieut.-Colonel B.C. Greaves; No.3 Company Bombay Sappers and Miners, under Captain C.E. Baddeley, R.E.; one squadron 10th Bengal Lancers, under Captain W.L. Maxwell; two guns No.1 Mountain Battery, Royal Artillery, under Lieutenant H.L.N. Beynon, R.A.] under Brigadier-General J. Wodehouse, C.B., C.M.G., was concentrated on the 17th August at Rustum, eighteen miles north-east of Mardan, and about four miles from the Buner border, with the object of acting as a containing force, and so preventing the sections of the Bunerwhals who had not already committed themselves against us from joining in opposition169 to our advance into Upper Swat.
35. The presence of this force had the desired effect, and Brigadier-General Wodehouse and his staff made good use of the time they spent at Rustum in acquiring valuable information about several of the passes in the neighborhood.
36. Brigadier-General Wodehouse states that throughout the operations of his force, which involved considerable fatigue170 and exposure to heat and rain, the spirit of his troops left nothing to be desired. He makes special mention of the work of No.3 Company Bombay Sappers and Miners, under Captain C.E. Baddeley, R.E. He also reports very favourably on the assistance given him by Lieutenant C.P. Down, Assistant Commissioner171, and has expressed to me a high opinion of that officer's abilities and acquirements, particularly of his proficiency172 in the local vernacular173.
THE ACTION OF 16TH SEPTEMBER.
FROM SIR BINDON BLOOD'S DESPATCH
CONTAINING THE SUMMARY OF BRIGADIER-GENERAL JEFFREY'S
REPORT OF THE ACTION
27. The behavior of the troops throughout this trying day was very good. The steadiness and discipline shown by the 1st Battalion of the Buffs, under Lieu.-Colonel Ommnanney, were admirable, while Brigadier-General Jeffreys has specially commended the gallantry with which the Guides Infantry, under Major Campbell, brought off Captain Ryder's detachment of the 35th Sikhs, carrying the wounded on their backs under a heavy fire. He has further strongly endorsed Major Campbell's favourable174 mention of the courage and judgment shown by Captain G.B. Hodson, and Lieutenant H.W. Codrington, of the Guides, who commanded the companies of the battalion which were chiefly in contact with the enemy; the gallantry of Surgeon-Captain J. Fisher, Indian Medical Service, who made a most determined175, though unsuccessful, attempt to take medical aid to the wounded of Captain Ryder's detachment through a hot fire; of Surgeon-Lieutenant E.L. Perry, Indian Medical Service; of Jemadar Sikander Khan of the Guides, and of several non-commissioned officers and Sepoys of the same corps, regarding whom I have had the honour to make a separate communication.
28. Brigadier-General Jeffreys has also described in very favorable terms the gallant and valuable work done on this day by Captain Cole and his squadron of the 11th Bengal Lancers. He has commended the conduct of Captain W.I. Ryder and Lieutenant O.G. Gunning, 35th Sikhs, who were both wounded, and of Jemadar Narayan Singh, Havildar Ram8 Singh and Sepoy Karram Singh [This man's case has formed the subject of a separate communication.] of the same regiment. He has also brought to notice a gallant act of Captain A.H.C. Birch, R.A., commanding No.8 Bengal Mountain Battery, and his trumpeter, Jiwan, in rescuing a wounded Sepoy of the 35th Sikhs, as well as the distinguished gallantry of Jemadars Nawab and Ishar Singh and several non-commissioned officers and men of the same battery, in regard to which I have made separate communications to you.
29. Brigadier-General Jeffreys further refers in the strongest terms of commendation to the gallant conduct of Lieutenants T.C. Watson [twice wounded in attempting to clear the village] and J.M.C. Colvin, R.E., and of the handful of men of the Buffs and No.4 Company Bengal Sappers and Miners, who spent the night of the 16th-17th with him in the village of Bilot. The conduct of these officers and men [of whom six were killed and eighteen wounded on this occasion, out of a total of fifty-four] in entering the village several times in the dark in face of a heavy fire directed upon them at close quarters, seems deserving of the highest recognition, and I have consequently made a special communication to you on the subject. Brigadier-General Jeffreys has also commended the gallant conduct of his Deputy Assistant Adjutant-General, [The remainder of Brigadier-General Jeffrey's staff was with the main body when it got separated from them.] Major E.O.F. Hamilton, 1st Battalion the Queen's Royal West Surrey Regiment; and finally, he has praised the courage and resolution of Lieutenant W.L.S. Churchill, 4th Hussars, the correspondent of the Pioneer Newspaper with the force, who made himself useful at a critical moment.
OPERATIONS OF THE MALAKAND FIELD FORCE
FROM THE CONCLUDING DESPATCH OF
MAJOR-GENERAL SIR BINDON BLOOD, K.C.B.
58. The commissariat arrangements under Major H. Wharry, D.S.O., were most successful. The rations1 were always abundant, and of uniformly good quality; and I may here observe that in five previous campaigns I have never seen the supply of bread anything like so continuously good, as it has been throughout the operations of the Malakand Field Force. No doubt the excellence176 of the commissariat arrangements has had a great deal to do with the good state of health of the troops, which I have remarked upon.
59. The transport was most efficient throughout the operations under reference, and its management, under the direction of Captain C.G.R. Thackwell, Divisional Transport Officer, who was most ably and energetically assisted by Veterinary-Captain H.T.W. Mann, Senior Veterinary Officer, was most successful. In proof of this I will cite a report just made to me by Brigadier-General Jeffreys, commanding the 2nd Brigade of my force, that this morning, on inspecting 1265 mules attached his brigade, which have just returned from seven weeks in the field, he found fourteen sore backs, and four animals otherwise unfit for work, or a total of only eighteen disabled animals in all.
60. The medical service was carried out in a very satisfactory manner. Some difficulties arose on the transfer of officers and material to the Tirah Expeditionary Force on its formation, especially as large convoys177 of sick and wounded were on the line of this force at the time, but these difficulties were successfully overcome by Colonel A.J.F. Reid, commanding the Malakand Brigade, who was in charge of the Line, and matters were ultimately restored to smooth working on the arrival of Surgeon-Colonel J.C.G. Carmichael, Indian Medical Service, who is now Principal Medical Officer of the Force.
61. The telegraph arrangements were well carried out by Lieutenant W. Robertson, R.E., under the direction of Mr. C.E. Pitman, C.I.E. The postal178 service under Mr. H.C. Sheridan was also satisfactory.
62. The working of the several departments of the Headquarters' staff was most satisfactory and successful. The heads of departments were:—
Major H.H. Burney, Gordon Highlanders, Assistant Adjutant-General.
Lieutenant-Colonel A. Masters, 2nd Regiment Central India Horse, Assistant Quartermaster-General.
Captain H.E. Stanton, D.S.O., R.A., Deputy Assistant Quartermaster-General (Intelligence).
Captain E.W.M. Norie, Middlesex Regiment, Superintendent, Army Signalling.
Surgeon-Colonel J.C.G. Carmichael, Indian Medical Service, Principal Medical Officer.
Lieutenant-Colonel W. Aitken, C.B., R.A., Commanding Royal Artillery.
Colonel J.E. Broadbent, R.E., Commanding Royal Engineers—relieved early in October by Lieutenant-Colonel W. Peacocke, C.M.G., R.E.
Captain W.E. Banbury, 25th Madras Infantry, Field Treasure Chest Officer.
Major H. Wharry, D.S.O., Staff Corps, Chief Commissariat Officer.
Veterinary-Captain H.T.W. Mann, [Wounded in action, 20th September, 1897.] Army Veterinary Department, Senior Veterinary Officer.
Captain C.L. Robertson, R.E., Survey officer.
Captain C.G.F. Edwards, 5th Punjaub Cavalry, Provost Marshal.
Lieutenant W. Robertson, R.E., in charge of Telegraphs.
63. I am under great obligations to my personal staff—Captain A.B. Dunsterville, 1st Battalion East Surrey Regiment, Aide-de-Camp; Captain A.R. Dick, 2nd Punjaub Cavalry, and Lieutenant Viscount Fincastle, 16th (The Queen's) Lancers.
64. It will have been gathered from the foregoing narrative180 that the three brigades of the force were ably commanded by Brigadier-Generals W.H. Meiklejohn, C.B., C.M.G., 1st Brigade; P.D. Jeffreys, [Wounded in action, 16th September, 1897.] C.B., 2nd Brigade, and J.H. Wodehouse, C.B., C.M.G., [Wounded in action, 20th September, 1897.] 3rd Brigade, who were efficiently seconded by their staffs. The Line of Communications and the Base were also most efficiently managed by Colonel A.J.F. Reid, Commanding the Malakand Brigade, and by Lieut.-Colonel A.V. Schalch, 11th Bengal Infantry, the Base Commandant, and their respective staffs.
65. In my final report on the conclusion of the operations of the force, I shall have the honour to bring the services of the officers above briefly181 referred to more fully to the notice of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief.
66. Major H.A. Deane, C.S.I., Political Agent, Dur, Chitral and Swat, was in separate and independent charge of the political arrangements connected with the operations I have described, as far as Nawagai. He accompanied my headquarters to Ghosam, where I left him on the 12th September, and rejoined me at Inayat Kila on the 4th October. He gave much assistance in arranging for the collection of local supplies.
67. Mr. W.S. Davis was my political officer throughout the operations beyond Nawagai, and in the Mamund Valley prior to Major Deane's return to my headquarters on the 4th October. He carried out his duties to my complete satisfaction. His native assistant, Khan Bahadur Ibrahim Kham, also made himself very useful.
The End
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rations
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| 定量( ration的名词复数 )； 配给量； 正常量； 合理的量 | |
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perusal
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| n.细读，熟读；目测 | |
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postponed
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| vt.& vi.延期，缓办，（使）延迟vt.把…放在次要地位；[语]把…放在后面（或句尾）vi.（疟疾等）延缓发作（或复发） | |
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propitious
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| adj.吉利的；顺利的 | |
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fortify
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propounded
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| v.提出（问题、计划等）供考虑[讨论]，提议( propound的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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appreciation
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| n.评价；欣赏；感谢；领会，理解；价格上涨 | |
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ram
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| (random access memory)随机存取存储器 | |
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inquiry
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| n.打听，询问，调查，查问 | |
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tolerance
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| n.宽容；容忍，忍受；耐药力；公差 | |
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revert
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| v.恢复，复归，回到 | |
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rev
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| v.发动机旋转，加快速度 | |
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subdued
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| adj. 屈服的，柔和的，减弱的 动词subdue的过去式和过去分词 | |
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intelligible
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| adj.可理解的，明白易懂的，清楚的 | |
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savages
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| 未开化的人，野蛮人( savage的名词复数 ) | |
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impelled
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| v.推动、推进或敦促某人做某事( impel的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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fanaticism
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allured
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| 诱引，吸引( allure的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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lured
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plunder
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| vt.劫掠财物，掠夺；n.劫掠物，赃物；劫掠 | |
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descended
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disorder
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| n.紊乱，混乱；骚动，骚乱；疾病，失调 | |
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inadequate
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deterrent
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purely
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defensive
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| adj.防御的；防卫的；防守的 | |
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punitive
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| adj.惩罚的，刑罚的 | |
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derided
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dealing
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| n.经商方法，待人态度 | |
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awakened
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| v.（使）醒( awaken的过去式和过去分词 )；（使）觉醒；弄醒；（使）意识到 | |
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hostility
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intrigue
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| vt.激起兴趣，迷住；vi.耍阴谋；n.阴谋，密谋 | |
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intrigues
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| n.密谋策划( intrigue的名词复数 )；神秘气氛；引人入胜的复杂情节v.搞阴谋诡计( intrigue的第三人称单数 )；激起…的好奇心 | |
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gulf
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supreme
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incumbent
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| adj.成为责任的，有义务的；现任的，在职的 | |
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discretion
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blackmail
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| n.讹诈，敲诈，勒索，胁迫，恫吓 | |
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steadily
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| adv.稳定地；不变地；持续地 | |
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vassal
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| n.附庸的；属下；adj.奴仆的 | |
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nominally
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| 在名义上，表面地； 应名儿 | |
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avowed
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| adj.公开声明的，承认的v.公开声明，承认( avow的过去式和过去分词) | |
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despatch
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| n./v.(dispatch)派遣；发送；n.急件；新闻报道 | |
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ministry
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endorsed
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| vt.& vi.endorse的过去式或过去分词形式v.赞同( endorse的过去式和过去分词 )；在（尤指支票的）背面签字；在（文件的）背面写评论；在广告上说本人使用并赞同某产品 | |
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consolidate
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explicit
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| adj.详述的，明确的；坦率的；显然的 | |
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applied
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| adj.应用的；v.应用，适用 | |
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annex
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| vt.兼并，吞并；n.附属建筑物 | |
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annexation
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expedients
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aggression
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| n.进攻，侵略，侵犯，侵害 | |
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apathy
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| n.漠不关心，无动于衷；冷淡 | |
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indifference
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| n.不感兴趣，不关心，冷淡，不在乎 | |
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immediate
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| adj.立即的；直接的，最接近的；紧靠的 | |
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follies
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| 罪恶，时事讽刺剧； 愚蠢，蠢笨，愚蠢的行为、思想或做法( folly的名词复数 ) | |
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retention
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prelude
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civilisation
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foment
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justified
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precludes
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| v.阻止( preclude的第三人称单数 )；排除；妨碍；使…行不通 | |
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63
isolated
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| adj.与世隔绝的 | |
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passionate
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| adj.热情的，热烈的，激昂的，易动情的，易怒的，性情暴躁的 | |
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65
assailed
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| v.攻击( assail的过去式和过去分词 )；困扰；质问；毅然应对 | |
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66
initiated
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| n. 创始人 adj. 新加入的 vt. 开始，创始，启蒙，介绍加入 | |
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67
garrison
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| n.卫戍部队；驻地，卫戍区；vt.派(兵)驻防 | |
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68
garrisons
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| 守备部队，卫戍部队( garrison的名词复数 ) | |
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69
deliberately
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| adv.审慎地；蓄意地；故意地 | |
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70
contemplated
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| adj. 预期的 动词contemplate的过去分词形式 | |
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71
faction
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| n.宗派，小集团；派别；派系斗争 | |
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72
disturbance
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| n.动乱，骚动；打扰，干扰；(身心)失调 | |
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73
inevitable
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| adj.不可避免的，必然发生的 | |
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74
expenditure
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| n.(时间、劳力、金钱等)支出；使用，消耗 | |
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75
initiation
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| n.开始 | |
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76
philosophic
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| adj.哲学的，贤明的 | |
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77
magistrates
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| 地方法官，治安官( magistrate的名词复数 ) | |
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78
foes
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| 敌人，仇敌( foe的名词复数 ) | |
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79
futile
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| adj.无效的，无用的，无希望的 | |
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80
controversies
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| 争论 | |
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81
judgment
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| n.审判；判断力，识别力，看法，意见 | |
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82
prospect
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| n.前景，前途；景色，视野 | |
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83
forsook
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| forsake的过去式 | |
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84
impartial
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| adj.(in,to)公正的，无偏见的 | |
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85
admiration
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| n.钦佩，赞美，羡慕 | |
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86
decided
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| adj.决定了的，坚决的；明显的，明确的 | |
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87
embarked
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| 乘船( embark的过去式和过去分词 )； 装载； 从事 | |
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88
perilous
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| adj.危险的，冒险的 | |
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89
discomforts
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| n.不舒适( discomfort的名词复数 )；不愉快，苦恼 | |
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90
alas
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| int.唉(表示悲伤、忧愁、恐惧等) | |
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91
vessel
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| n.船舶；容器，器皿；管，导管，血管 | |
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92
pointed
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| adj.尖的，直截了当的 | |
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93
thither
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| adv.向那里；adj.在那边的，对岸的 | |
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94
undoubtedly
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| adv.确实地，无疑地 | |
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95
extermination
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| n.消灭，根绝 | |
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96
futility
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| n.无用 | |
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97
subsidies
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| n.补贴，津贴，补助金( subsidy的名词复数 ) | |
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98
dynamite
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| n./vt.(用)炸药(爆破) | |
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99
legitimate
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| adj.合法的，合理的，合乎逻辑的；v.使合法 | |
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100
fully
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| adv.完全地，全部地，彻底地；充分地 | |
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101
frankly
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| adv.坦白地，直率地；坦率地说 | |
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102
strictly
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| adv.严厉地，严格地；严密地 | |
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103
dismal
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| adj.阴沉的，凄凉的，令人忧郁的，差劲的 | |
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104
folly
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| n.愚笨，愚蠢，蠢事，蠢行，傻话 | |
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105
enumerate
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| v.列举，计算，枚举，数 | |
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106
demonstrations
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| 证明( demonstration的名词复数 )； 表明； 表达； 游行示威 | |
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107
Christian
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| adj.基督教徒的；n.基督教徒 | |
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108
enlist
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| vt.谋取(支持等)，赢得；征募；vi.入伍 | |
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109
lessen
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| vt.减少，减轻；缩小 | |
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110
bidder
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| n.(拍卖时的)出价人，报价人，投标人 | |
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111
entirely
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| ad.全部地，完整地；完全地，彻底地 | |
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112
prudent
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| adj.谨慎的，有远见的，精打细算的 | |
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113
deplore
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| vt.哀叹，对...深感遗憾 | |
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114
braggart
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| n.吹牛者；adj.吹牛的，自夸的 | |
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115
arbiters
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| 仲裁人，裁决者( arbiter的名词复数 ) | |
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116
Ford
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| n.浅滩，水浅可涉处；v.涉水，涉过 | |
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117
infantry
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| n.[总称]步兵(部队) | |
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118
regiment
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| n.团，多数，管理；v.组织，编成团，统制 | |
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119
severely
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| adv.严格地；严厉地；非常恶劣地 | |
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120
specially
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| adv.特定地；特殊地；明确地 | |
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121
lieutenant
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| n.陆军中尉，海军上尉；代理官员，副职官员 | |
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122
favourably
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| adv. 善意地，赞成地 =favorably | |
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123
worthy
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| adj.(of)值得的，配得上的；有价值的 | |
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124
promotion
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| n.提升，晋级；促销，宣传 | |
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125
plucky
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| adj.勇敢的 | |
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126
acting
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| n.演戏，行为，假装；adj.代理的，临时的，演出用的 | |
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127
helping
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| n.食物的一份&adj.帮助人的，辅助的 | |
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128
withdrawal
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| n.取回，提款；撤退，撤军；收回，撤销 | |
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129
artery
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| n.干线，要道；动脉 | |
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130
hostilities
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| n.战争；敌意(hostility的复数)；敌对状态；战事 | |
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131
gorge
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| n.咽喉，胃，暴食，山峡；v.塞饱，狼吞虎咽地吃 | |
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132
Buddhist
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| adj./n.佛教的，佛教徒 | |
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133
gallant
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| adj.英勇的，豪侠的；(向女人)献殷勤的 | |
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134
corps
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| n.(通信等兵种的)部队；(同类作的)一组 | |
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135
cavalry
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| n.骑兵；轻装甲部队 | |
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136
invaluable
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| adj.无价的，非常宝贵的，极为贵重的 | |
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137
gallantly
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| adv. 漂亮地，勇敢地，献殷勤地 | |
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138
zeal
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| n.热心，热情，热忱 | |
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139
exertions
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| n.努力( exertion的名词复数 )；费力；（能力、权力等的）运用；行使 | |
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140
exertion
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| n.尽力，努力 | |
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141
zealous
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| adj.狂热的，热心的 | |
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142
indefatigable
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| adj.不知疲倦的，不屈不挠的 | |
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143
devoted
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| adj.忠诚的，忠实的，热心的，献身于...的 | |
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144
alleviate
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| v.减轻，缓和，缓解(痛苦等) | |
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145
efficiently
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| adv.高效率地，有能力地 | |
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146
standing
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| n.持续，地位；adj.永久的，不动的，直立的，不流动的 | |
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147
incessant
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| adj.不停的，连续的 | |
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148
elicit
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| v.引出,抽出,引起 | |
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149
deplores
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| v.悲叹，痛惜，强烈反对( deplore的第三人称单数 ) | |
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150
distinguished
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| adj.卓越的，杰出的，著名的 | |
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151
drawn
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| v.拖，拉，拔出；adj.憔悴的，紧张的 | |
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152
judicious
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| adj.明智的，明断的，能作出明智决定的 | |
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153
detailed
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| adj.详细的，详尽的，极注意细节的，完全的 | |
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154
lieutenants
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| n.陆军中尉( lieutenant的名词复数 )；副职官员；空军；仅低于…官阶的官员 | |
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155
thoroughly
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| adv.完全地，彻底地，十足地 | |
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156
highland
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| n.(pl.)高地，山地 | |
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157
battalion
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| n.营；部队；大队(的人) | |
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158
followers
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| 追随者( follower的名词复数 )； 用户； 契据的附面； 从动件 | |
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159
courageous
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| adj.勇敢的，有胆量的 | |
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160
baker
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| n.面包师 | |
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161
maxim
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| n.格言，箴言 | |
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162
conspicuous
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| adj.明眼的，惹人注目的；炫耀的，摆阔气的 | |
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163
ammunition
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| n.军火，弹药 | |
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164
alacrity
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| n.敏捷，轻快，乐意 | |
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165
necessitated
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| 使…成为必要，需要( necessitate的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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166
mules
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| 骡( mule的名词复数 )； 拖鞋； 顽固的人； 越境运毒者 | |
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167
artillery
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| n.(军)火炮，大炮；炮兵(部队) | |
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168
superintendent
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| n.监督人，主管，总监；(英国)警务长 | |
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169
opposition
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| n.反对，敌对 | |
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170
fatigue
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| n.疲劳，劳累 | |
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171
commissioner
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| n.（政府厅、局、处等部门）专员，长官，委员 | |
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172
proficiency
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| n.精通，熟练，精练 | |
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173
vernacular
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| adj.地方的，用地方语写成的；n.白话；行话；本国语；动植物的俗名 | |
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174
favourable
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| adj.赞成的，称赞的，有利的，良好的，顺利的 | |
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175
determined
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| adj.坚定的；有决心的 | |
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176
excellence
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| n.优秀，杰出，(pl.)优点，美德 | |
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177
convoys
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| n.（有护航的）船队( convoy的名词复数 )；车队；护航（队）；护送队 | |
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178
postal
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| adj.邮政的，邮局的 | |
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179
ordnance
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| n.大炮，军械 | |
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180
narrative
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| n.叙述，故事；adj.叙事的，故事体的 | |
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181
briefly
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| adv.简单地，简短地 | |
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