If the selfish, or the politic11, or the supine do not care to take sides with right, they have no cause to complain if the triumph of wrong involves them in discredit12 or disaster. But whatever be their fate, I am not concerned with them. What I am concerned with is the omission13 of all information of what may follow to him who shall take the right side. These consequences ought never to be out of sight.
It is too often forgotten that in this world virtue14 has its price as well as vice15, and neither can be bought cheap. Vice can be bought on the "hire system," by which a person gets into debt pleasantly—which introduces shiftlessness into life. Wrong is a money-lender, whose concealed16 charges and heavy interest have to be paid one day at the peril18 of ruin. Right doing may be said to pay as it goes along, which implies conscience, effort, and often sacrifice of some immediate19 pleasure. But independence lies that way, and no other. Right principle incurs20 no deferred21 obligation. Debt is a chain by which the debtor22 binds23 himself to someone else. The connection may be disregarded, but the chain can never be broken, except by restitution24. Many persons are beguiled25 into doing right under the impression that it is as pleasant as doing wrong. This is not so, and the concealment26 of the fact has injurious consequences. When a person who has been, as it were, betrayed into virtue, without being instructed as to the inconvenience which may attend it, when he encounters them, he suspects he has been imposed upon, and thinks he had better give vice a turn. It was this that made Huxley declare that the hardest as well as the most useful lesson a man could learn, was to do that which he ought to do, whether he liked it or not. Character, which can be trusted, comes that way, and that way alone. He who enters on that path reaps reward daily in the pleasure and strength which duty imparts, while sooner or later follow advantage and honour. The most useful character George Eliot drew was that of Tito, who was wrecked27 because he had no sense that there was strength and safety in truth. The only strength he trusted to lay in his ingenuity28 and dissimulation29. The world is pretty full of Titos, who all come to one end, and nobody mourns them.
A few instances may be relevantly given in which rightness has been attended by disadvantages, when wrongness appeared to have none—yet wrongness was found to bring great unpleasantness in the end.
When there were petitions before the House of Commons to change the oath which excluded Jews, and petitions to permit persons to make affirmations who had conscientious30 objections to taking an oath, it was represented to me that if both claims were kept before Parliament at the same time both would be rejected. The Jewish claim was the older, and concerned the enfranchisement31 of a race. I therefore caused the omission for several years of any petition for affirmation—though my disability of being unable to take the oath excluded me from justice and rendered me an outlaw32.
When the Jews had obtained their relief, Sir Julian Goldsmid, a Jew, became a candidate at Brighton. Mr. Matthews, a political friend of mine in the town, went to Sir Julian and asked whether, as Mr. Holyoake and those of his way of thinking had deferred their claim for affirmation that the Jews might become eligible34 for Parliament, would he vote for the Affirmation Bill? He said, "No! he would not" Mr. Matthews then wrote to ask me whether he and others who were in favour of Affirmation should vote for Sir Julian. I answered, "Certainly, if he in other respects was the best candidate before the constituency. However strongly we might be persuaded our own claim was just, we had no right to prefer it to the general interest of the State."
Speaking one night with Mr. John Morley when we both happened to be guests of Mr. Chamberlain at Highbury, Birmingham, I remarked that Cobden and Bright, without intending it, had introduced more immorality35 into politics than any other politicians in my time. Mr. Morley naturally demanded to be informed when, and in what way. I answered, "When they advised electors to vote for any candidate, irrespective of their political opinion, who would vote against the Corn Laws. This incited36 every party to vote for its own hand—the priest for the church, the brewers for the barrel, and the teetotalers for the teapot, the anti-vaccinators for those who were against the lancet. Even women proposed to vote for any candidate who would give them the suffrage37, regardless whether they put out a Ministry38 of Progress and put in a Ministry of Reaction. This was ignoring the general good in favour of a personal measure. The error of the great Anti-Corn Law advocates lay in their not making it plain to the country that when the population were deteriorating39 and dying from want of sufficient food, politics must give way to the claims of existence. That was the justification40 of Cobden and Bright, and had it been stated, smaller politicians with narrower aims could never then have pleaded their example for crowding the poll with rival claims in which the larger interests of the State are forgotten. Like Bacon's maxim41 that 'speaking the truth was so excellent a habit, that any departure from that wholesome42 rule should be noted43.' The Anti-Corn Law League election policy needed noting."
However many instances may be given of the kind before the reader, the moral will be the same. Taking sides involves some penalty which enthusiasts44 are apt to overlook, and when it arrives ruddy eagerness is apt to turn pale and change into ignoble45 prudence46. Taking the side of honesty or fraud, unpleasantness may come. But on the side of right the consciousness of integrity mitigates47 regret and commands respect; while the penalties of deceit are intensified48 by shame and scorn. Many think there is safety in a judicious49 mixture of good faith and bad, but when the bad is discerned, distrust and contempt are the unevadable consequences. Besides, it takes more trouble to conceal17 a sinister50 life than to act uprightly. It is true, an evil policy often succeeds, but the interest of society is to take care that he who does evil shall be overtaken by evil. As this sentiment grows, the chances of illicit51 success continually decrease. Rascality—refined or coarse—would have fewer adherents52 if society took as much trouble to secure that the rightdoer shall prosper53, as it takes to render the career of the knave54 precarious55.
The point of importance, I repeat, is—that persons should remember, or be taught to remember, that the course of right, like the course of wrong, is attended by consequences. Many who are honourably56 attracted by the right are disappointed at finding that it has its duties as well as its pleasures—which, had they known at first, they would have made up their minds to do them; but not being apprised57 of them, when they first encounter inconvenience, they think they have been deceived, falter58, and sometimes turn from a noble course upon which they had entered.
Any one would think there was no great peril to be encountered by taking sides with veracity59. Let him avoid the sin of pretension60, and see what will happen.
The sin I referred to is not the common one of declaring that to be true which you know to be untrue—that has long been known by an appropriate name, and does not require any new epithet61 to denote its scandalousness. The sin of pretension in question consists in assuming, or declaring that to be true, which one does not know to be true. Years ago this was a very common sin, and everybody committed it. You heard it in the pulpit more frequently than on the stage. Nobody complained of it, or rebuked62 it, or resented it. It was not until the middle of the last century that public attention was drawn63 to it. It was Huxley who first raised the question of intellectual veracity, and he devised the term Agnostic (which merely means limitation) to express it. Limitationism does not mean disbelief, but the limitation of assertion to actual knowledge. The theist used to declare—without misgiving—the absolute certainty of the existence of an independent, active Entity64, to whom Nature is second-hand65, and not much at that. The anti-theist—also without misgiving—denied that there was such separate Potentiality. The Limitationist, more modest in averment, not having sufficient information to be positive, simply says he does not know. He does not say that others may not have sufficient knowledge of a primal66 cause of things; but lacking it himself, he concludes that veracity in statement may be a virtue where omniscience67 is denied. There may be belief founded on inference. But inference is not knowledge. The Limitationist withholds68 assertion from lack of satisfying evidence. He is neutral—not because he wishes not to believe, or desires to deny, but because serious language should be measured by the standard of proof and conviction.
So strange did this precaution in speech seem in my time, that it was believed that reticence69 was not honest precaution, but prudent70 concealment of actual conviction, intended to evade71 orthodox anger. On problems relating to infinite existence and an unknown future, it requires infinite knowledge to give an affirmative answer. No one said he had infinite information, but everybody declaimed as though he had. It appeared not to have occurred to many that there was a state of the understanding in which lack of conviction was owing to lack of evidence. Where the desire to believe is hereditary72, it is difficult to realise that there are questions upon which certainty may, to many minds, be unattainable, and that an honest man who felt this was bound to say so. An American journal, which needed forbearance from its readers for its own heresy74, published the opinion that Huxley was a "dodger75" in philosophy. Whereas Huxley was for integrity in thought and speech. He was for scientific accuracy as far as attainable73. His own outspokenness76 was the glory of philosophy and science in his day. He never denied his convictions; he never apologised for them; he never explained them away. Is it over his noble tomb that we are to write, "Here lies a Dodger," because he invented an honest term to denote the measured knowledge of honest thinkers? Dogmatism is not demonstration78, but when I was young nobody seemed to suspect it. It used to be said that "Darwin, Huxley, and Spencer were not really in a state of unknowingness concerning the great problem of the universe"—which meant that these eminent79 thinkers, upon whose lives no shadow of unveracity ever rested, described themselves as Limitationists when they were not so. They were not to be believed upon their word. The term was a mask. Such are the social penalties for taking sides with veracity.
The public has begun to discover that veracity of speech is not a mask, but a duty. None can calculate the calamities80 which arise in society from the perpetual misdirections disseminated81 by those who make assertions resting merely upon their inherited belief or prepossessions, with no personal knowledge upon which they are founded. This is the sin of pretension, which recedes83 before the integrity of science and reason, just as wild beasts recede82 before the march of civilisation84.
Few would be prepared to believe that, in my polemical days, the desire to avoid committing the sin of pretension was supposed to indicate desperation of character, of which suicide would be the natural end. This was a favourite argument, for a heterodox principle was held to be for ever confuted, if he who held it hanged himself. The best proclaimed champion of orthodox tenets, whom I met on many platforms, went about declaring that I intended suicide, and it was generally believed that I had committed it. The certainty of it, sooner or later, was little doubted, whereas it was not at all in my way.
The suicide of Eugene Aram, to escape the ignominy of an inevitable85 execution, is intelligible86. If Blanco White, whose dying and hopeless sufferings excited the sympathy even of Cardinal87 Newman, had done the same thing, it would have been condonable. Suicide proceeding88 from disease of the mind is always pitiable. When Italian prisoners were given belladonna by their Austrian gaolers, to cause them to betray, unconsciously, their comrades, some committed suicide to prevent this, which was honourable89 though deplorable. When a murderer, knowing his desert, becomes his own executioner, he is not censurable90 though still infamous91, since it saves society the expense of terminating his dangerous career. But in other cases, self-slaughter, to avoid trouble or the performance of inconvenient92 duty, is cowardly and detestable.
In my controversial days (which I hope are not yet ended) the clergy93 did not hesitate to say that if a man began to think for himself, he would end by killing94 himself.
When I thought the doctrine95 had died out, an instance recurred96 which led me to address the following letter to the Rev2. R. P. Downes, LLD. (May 18, 1899), who thought the doctrine valid:—
"Dear Dr. Downes,—It has been reported to me that in Wesley Place Chapel97, Tunstall (March 20, 1899), you, when preaching on the 'Roots of Unbelief,' illustrated98 that troublesome subject by saying that 'when Mr. Holyoake was imprisoned99 at Birmingham, he attempted suicide.' This is not true, nor was it in Birmingham, but in Gloucester where the imprisonment100 occurred. I never attempted suicide—it was never in my mind to do it. I had no motive101 that way. I experienced no moment of despair. Better men than I had been imprisoned before, for being so imprudent as to protest against intolerance and error. Besides, I never liked suicide. I was always against it Blowing out your brains makes an ill-conditioned splatter. Cutting your throat is a detestable want of consideration for those who have to efface102 the stains. Drowning is disagreeable, as the water is cold and not clean. Hanging is mean and ignominious103, and I have always heard unpleasant The French charcoal104 plan makes you sick. Indeed, every form of suicide shows want of taste; and worse than that, it is a cowardly thing to flee from evils you ought to combat, and leave others, whom you may be bound to cherish and protect, to struggle unaided. So you see what you allege105 against me is not only irrelevant—it implies defect of taste, which is serious in the eyes of society, which will condone106 crime more readily than vulgarity.
"I am against your discourse107 because of its bad taste. Suicide is no argument against the truth of belief. Christians108 are continually committing it, and clergymen also. The Society for the Propagation of Christian109 Knowledge used to bring this argument from suicide forward in their tracts110 against heresy. But being educated gentlemen they abandoned it long ago, and it is now only used by the lower class of preachers. I do not mean to suggest that you belong to that class—only that you have condescended111 to use an argument peculiar112 to uncultivated reasoners.
"Personally, I have great respect for several eminent preachers of Wesleyan persuasion113, but they think it necessary to inquire into the truth of an accusation114 before they make it You must have borrowed yours from the Rev. Brewin Grant, with whom in his last illness I had friendly communications, and he had long ceased to repeat what he said in days when it was not thought necessary to be exact in imputations against adversaries115.
"I do not remember to have written before in refutation of the statement you made. No one who knows me would believe it for a moment; but as you are a responsible, and I understand a well-regarded, preacher, I inform you of the error, especially as it gives me the opportunity of putting on record not only my disinclination, but my dislike and contempt for suicide, and for those who, not being hopelessly diseased or insane, commit it."
Dr. Downes sent me a gentlemanly and candid33 letter, owning that the Rev. Brewin Grant, B.A., was the authority on which he spoke77, whose representations he would not repeat, and I have reason to believe he has not.
Such are the vicissitudes116 of taking sides. He has to pay who takes the right, but he has honour in the end. But he pays more who takes the wrong side consciously, and with it comes infamy117.
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manly
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| adj.有男子气概的；adv.男子般地，果断地 | |
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rev
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| v.发动机旋转，加快速度 | |
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cowardice
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| n.胆小，怯懦 | |
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discretion
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| n.谨慎；随意处理 | |
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dexterous
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| adj.灵敏的；灵巧的 | |
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discomfort
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| n.不舒服，不安，难过，困难，不方便 | |
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outlay
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| n.费用，经费，支出；v.花费 | |
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8
simile
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| n.直喻，明喻 | |
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interferes
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| vi. 妨碍，冲突，干涉 | |
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advancement
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| n.前进，促进，提升 | |
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politic
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| adj.有智虑的；精明的；v.从政 | |
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discredit
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| vt.使不可置信；n.丧失信义；不信，怀疑 | |
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omission
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| n.省略，删节；遗漏或省略的事物，冗长 | |
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virtue
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| n.德行，美德；贞操；优点；功效，效力 | |
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vice
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| n.坏事；恶习；[pl.]台钳，老虎钳；adj.副的 | |
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concealed
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| a.隐藏的，隐蔽的 | |
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conceal
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| v.隐藏，隐瞒，隐蔽 | |
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peril
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| n.(严重的)危险；危险的事物 | |
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immediate
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| adj.立即的；直接的，最接近的；紧靠的 | |
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incurs
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| 遭受，招致，引起( incur的第三人称单数 ) | |
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deferred
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| adj.延期的，缓召的v.拖延，延缓，推迟( defer的过去式和过去分词 )；服从某人的意愿，遵从 | |
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debtor
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| n.借方，债务人 | |
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binds
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| v.约束( bind的第三人称单数 )；装订；捆绑；（用长布条）缠绕 | |
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restitution
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| n.赔偿；恢复原状 | |
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beguiled
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| v.欺骗( beguile的过去式和过去分词 )；使陶醉；使高兴；消磨（时间等） | |
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concealment
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| n.隐藏, 掩盖，隐瞒 | |
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wrecked
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| adj.失事的，遇难的 | |
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ingenuity
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| n.别出心裁；善于发明创造 | |
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dissimulation
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| n.掩饰，虚伪，装糊涂 | |
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conscientious
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| adj.审慎正直的，认真的，本着良心的 | |
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enfranchisement
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| 选举权 | |
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outlaw
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| n.歹徒，亡命之徒；vt.宣布…为不合法 | |
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candid
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| adj.公正的，正直的；坦率的 | |
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eligible
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| adj.有条件被选中的；(尤指婚姻等)合适(意)的 | |
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immorality
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| n. 不道德, 无道义 | |
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incited
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| 刺激，激励，煽动( incite的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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suffrage
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| n.投票，选举权，参政权 | |
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ministry
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| n.(政府的)部；牧师 | |
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deteriorating
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| 恶化，变坏( deteriorate的现在分词 ) | |
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justification
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| n.正当的理由；辩解的理由 | |
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maxim
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| n.格言，箴言 | |
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wholesome
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| adj.适合；卫生的；有益健康的；显示身心健康的 | |
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noted
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| adj.著名的，知名的 | |
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enthusiasts
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| n.热心人，热衷者( enthusiast的名词复数 ) | |
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ignoble
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| adj.不光彩的，卑鄙的；可耻的 | |
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prudence
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| n.谨慎，精明，节俭 | |
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mitigates
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| v.减轻，缓和( mitigate的第三人称单数 ) | |
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intensified
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| v.（使）增强， （使）加剧( intensify的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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judicious
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| adj.明智的，明断的，能作出明智决定的 | |
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sinister
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| adj.不吉利的，凶恶的，左边的 | |
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illicit
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| adj.非法的，禁止的，不正当的 | |
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adherents
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| n.支持者，拥护者( adherent的名词复数 )；党羽；徒子徒孙 | |
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prosper
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| v.成功，兴隆，昌盛；使成功，使昌隆，繁荣 | |
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knave
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| n.流氓；（纸牌中的）杰克 | |
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precarious
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| adj.不安定的，靠不住的；根据不足的 | |
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honourably
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| adv.可尊敬地，光荣地，体面地 | |
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apprised
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| v.告知，通知( apprise的过去式和过去分词 )；评价 | |
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falter
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| vi.(嗓音)颤抖，结巴地说；犹豫；蹒跚 | |
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59
veracity
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| n.诚实 | |
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pretension
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| n.要求；自命，自称；自负 | |
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epithet
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| n.（用于褒贬人物等的）表述形容词，修饰语 | |
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rebuked
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| 责难或指责( rebuke的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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drawn
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| v.拖，拉，拔出；adj.憔悴的，紧张的 | |
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entity
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| n.实体，独立存在体，实际存在物 | |
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second-hand
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| adj.用过的，旧的，二手的 | |
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primal
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| adj.原始的；最重要的 | |
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omniscience
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| n.全知，全知者，上帝 | |
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68
withholds
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| v.扣留( withhold的第三人称单数 )；拒绝给予；抑制（某事物）；制止 | |
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reticence
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| n.沉默，含蓄 | |
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prudent
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| adj.谨慎的，有远见的，精打细算的 | |
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evade
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| vt.逃避，回避；避开，躲避 | |
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hereditary
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| adj.遗传的，遗传性的，可继承的，世袭的 | |
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attainable
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| a.可达到的，可获得的 | |
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74
heresy
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| n.异端邪说；异教 | |
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75
dodger
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| n.躲避者；躲闪者；广告单 | |
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outspokenness
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spoke
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| n.（车轮的）辐条；轮辐；破坏某人的计划；阻挠某人的行动 v.讲，谈（speak的过去式）；说；演说；从某种观点来说 | |
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demonstration
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| n.表明，示范，论证，示威 | |
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eminent
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| adj.显赫的，杰出的，有名的，优良的 | |
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calamities
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| n.灾祸，灾难( calamity的名词复数 )；不幸之事 | |
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disseminated
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| 散布，传播( disseminate的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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recede
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| vi.退(去)，渐渐远去；向后倾斜，缩进 | |
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recedes
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| v.逐渐远离( recede的第三人称单数 )；向后倾斜；自原处后退或避开别人的注视；尤指问题 | |
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civilisation
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| n.文明，文化，开化，教化 | |
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inevitable
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| adj.不可避免的，必然发生的 | |
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intelligible
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| adj.可理解的，明白易懂的，清楚的 | |
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cardinal
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| n.(天主教的)红衣主教；adj.首要的，基本的 | |
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proceeding
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| n.行动，进行，(pl.)会议录，学报 | |
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honourable
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| adj.可敬的；荣誉的，光荣的 | |
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censurable
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| adj.可非难的，该责备的 | |
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infamous
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| adj.声名狼藉的，臭名昭著的，邪恶的 | |
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inconvenient
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| adj.不方便的，令人感到麻烦的 | |
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clergy
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| n.[总称]牧师，神职人员 | |
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killing
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| n.巨额利润；突然赚大钱，发大财 | |
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doctrine
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| n.教义；主义；学说 | |
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recurred
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| 再发生，复发( recur的过去式和过去分词 )； 治愈 | |
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chapel
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| n.小教堂，殡仪馆 | |
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illustrated
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| adj. 有插图的，列举的 动词illustrate的过去式和过去分词 | |
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imprisoned
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| 下狱，监禁( imprison的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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100
imprisonment
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| n.关押，监禁，坐牢 | |
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motive
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| n.动机，目的；adv.发动的，运动的 | |
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efface
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| v.擦掉，抹去 | |
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103
ignominious
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| adj.可鄙的，不光彩的，耻辱的 | |
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charcoal
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| n.炭，木炭，生物炭 | |
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allege
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| vt.宣称，申述，主张，断言 | |
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condone
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| v.宽恕；原谅 | |
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107
discourse
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| n.论文，演说；谈话；话语；vi.讲述，著述 | |
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Christians
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| n.基督教徒( Christian的名词复数 ) | |
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Christian
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| adj.基督教徒的；n.基督教徒 | |
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tracts
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| 大片土地( tract的名词复数 )； 地带； （体内的）道； （尤指宣扬宗教、伦理或政治的）短文 | |
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111
condescended
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| 屈尊，俯就( condescend的过去式和过去分词 )； 故意表示和蔼可亲 | |
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peculiar
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| adj.古怪的，异常的；特殊的，特有的 | |
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113
persuasion
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| n.劝说；说服；持有某种信仰的宗派 | |
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114
accusation
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| n.控告，指责，谴责 | |
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115
adversaries
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| n.对手，敌手( adversary的名词复数 ) | |
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116
vicissitudes
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| n.变迁，世事变化；变迁兴衰( vicissitude的名词复数 )；盛衰兴废 | |
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117
infamy
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| n.声名狼藉，出丑，恶行 | |
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