'To quote authors,' says Harris, in his preface to his Hermes,' 'who have lived in various ages, and in distant countries; some in the full maturity5 of Grecian and Roman literature; some in its declension; and others in periods still more barbarous and depraved; may afford, perhaps, no unpleasing speculation6, to see how the same reason has at all times prevailed; how there is one truth like one sun, that has enlightened human intelligence through every age, and saved it from the darkness both of sophistry7 and error.' This is the assurance which right reason will ever impart. Underneath8 all the change after which we pant, amid all the variety which surrounds us, and seem the very aliment of our nature, lies the instinct after the permanent. It is the province of sound logic to guarantee this in conclusion.
The novelty, change, fluctuation9, which scientific discovery has brought, and will yet bring, into the formerly10 settled worlds of opinion and social condition, will unsettle men's minds, and pave the way to an age of scepticism. Sound logic is necessary to provide that this doubt is transitional and not ultimate.
Scepticism is of two kinds, that of Pyrrho, and that of examination. The followers11 of Pyrrho, it is said, made doubting a profession, until at last they doubted whether they did doubt. This is the scepticism of the scorner and trifler.
He did not know that he did not know it, and if he did know it it was more than he knew. This is as far as the philosopher, of this school can go. Dickens has drawn12 the portrait of these, logicians in Mr. Tigg:—
'When a man like Slyme,' said Mr. Tigg, 'is detained for such a thing as a bill' I reject the superstition13 of ages, and believe nothing. I don't even believe that I don't believe, curse me if I do.'
Hood14 is ironical15 on the professors of uncertainty16. 'On a certain day of a certain year, certain officers went, on certain information, to a certain court, in a certain city, to take up a certain Italian for a certain crime. What gross fools are they who say there is nothing certain in this world.'
But scepticism is not capable of disturbing the well-grounded repose17 of the wise; for when the sceptic thinks he has involved everything in doubt, everything is still left in as much certainty as his scepticism.
In the great maze18 of conflicting opinion, it matters little that we are cautioned that reason is not all-sufficient—it is the best sufficiency we have. If reason will not serve us well, will anything serve us better? Bishop19 Berkeley may demonstrate that we are not sure of matter's existence—but are we more sure of any thing else? We are not thus to be cajoled. But it is right to say that Mr. J. S. Mill contends that Berkeley has been misunderstood—but if he did argue, as popularly believed, to such argument, the answer of Byron is sufficient—
When Berkeley said there was no matter,
It was no matter what he said.
If all is delusion20, the delusion is very orderly—it observes regular laws, and we proceed in logical method to inform each other, how the delusion of things appears to our understandings or affects our fortunes.
Where nothing is, and all things seem,
And we the shadows of a dream,
We discuss the seemings with the same gravity as realities.' If a man seems to do wrong, and I seem to prevent him, and the wrong, therefore, seems not to be done, I am satisfied.
The 'wise considerate scepticism' of inquiry21 has been well expressed by Emerson, in his recent lecture on Montaigne.—'Who shall forbid a wise scepticism, seeing that there is no practical question on which anything more than a proximate solution is to be had? Marriage itself is an open question: those "out" wish to be "in:" those "in" to be "out."
The state. With all its obvious advantages, nobody loves it. Is it; otherwise with the Church? Shall the young man enter trade or a profession without being vitiated? Shall he stay on shore or put out to sea? There is much to be said on both sides. Then there is competition and the attractions of the co-operative system. The labourer has a poor hut, is without knowledge, virtue22, civilisation23. If: we say, "Let us have culture," the expression awakens24 a new indisposition; for culture destroys spontaneous and hearty25 unencumbered action. Let us have a robust26 manly27 life; let us have to do with realities, not with shadowy ghosts. Now this precisely28 is the right ground of the sceptic; not of unbelief, denying or doubting—least of all of scoffing29 and profligate30 jeering31 at what is stable and good. He is the considerer. He has, too many enemies around him to wish to be his own. The position of the sceptic is one taken up for defence; as we build a house not too high or too low; under the wind, but out of the dust. For him the Spartan32 vigour33 is too-austere. St. John too thin and aerial. The wise sceptic avoids to be fooled by any extreme; he wishes to, see the game. He wishes to see all things, but mainly men. Really our life in this world not of so easy interpretation34 as preachers and school-books are accustomed to describe it.' These have not so efficiently35 solved the problem, that the sceptic should yield himself contentedly36 to their interpretation. True, he does not wish to speak harshly of what is best in us,—to turn himself into a "devil's attorney." But he points out the room there is for doubt;—the power of moods;—the power of complexion37, and so forth38. Shall we, then, because good-nature inclines us to virtue's side, smoothly39 cry: "There are no doubts!"—and lie for the right? We ask whether life is to be led in a brave or a cowardly way: whether the satisfaction of our doubts be not essential to all manliness40: whether the name of virtue is to be a barrier to that which is virtue? The sceptic wants truth, wants to have things made plain to him, and has a right to be convinced in his own way. In such scepticism there is no malignity41; it is honest, and does not hinder his being convinced; and this hard-headed man, once convinced will prove a giant in defence of his faith. The true and final answer in which all scepticism is lost is the moral sentiment: that never forfeits42 the supremacy43. It is the drop that balances the universe.'
Science and logic have so far advanced as to abridge44 the field of doubtful questions. When syllogism4 answered syllogism, uncertainty reigned45 absolute—but now that the appeal is to facts, we can, wherever facts can be had, weigh or number them, and decide on one side or the other.
When Ali Pacha was at Janina, the case of a poor woman, who accused a man of the theft of all her property, was brought before him; but the plaintiff having no witnesses, the case was discharged, as the other asserted his innocence46, and insisted as a proof, that he had not a farthing in the world. On their leaving his presence, Ali ordered both to be weighed, and then released them without further notice. A fortnight afterwards, he commanded both into his presence, and again weighed them; the accuser had lost as much as the defendant47 had gained in weight. The thing spoke48 for itself, and Ali decided49 that the accusation50 was just. Ali Pacha was the Burlamiqui of justice. Induction51, too, has its scales, and seldom leaves us in doubt when it gets truth and falsehood in them. Scepticism is now happily restricted to those questions resting on conjectures52, and which do not pertain53 to the practical affairs of this life. On matter-of-fact questions, only the weak are perplexed54. After men have been in deliberation till the time of action approach, if it be not then manifest what is best to be done, it is a sign the difference of motives55 the one way and the other is not great; therefore, not to resolve then is to lose the occasion by weighing of trifles, which is pusillanimity56.
Quaint57 old Bunyan tells us, that when he had completed his 'Pilgrim's Progress' he took the opinions of various friends on the propriety58 of publishing it. Some said 'John, do;' others 'John, don't.' But solid old John was not to be thus confounded. 'Then I will print it,' said he, 'and thus the case decide.' To this good sense the public owe that immortal59 dream.
In the great field of physical investigation60, science has conquered doubt. 'Contingency61 and versimilitude are the offspring of human ignorance, and, with an intellect of the highest order, cannot be supposed to have any existence.'*
*Edinburgh Review, September 1814, article Probabilities
'Probability,' says Laplace,' has reference partly to our ignorance, and partly to our knowledge.'
'Chance,' observes Mr. Mill, 'is usually spoken of in direct antithesis62 to law; whatever (it is supposed) cannot be ascribed to law, If attributed to chance. It is, however, certain, that whatever happens is the result of some law; is an effect of causes, and could have been predicted from a knowledge of the existence of those causes, and from their laws. If I turn up a particular card, that is a consequence of its place in the pack. Its place in the pack was a consequence of the manner in which the cards were shuffled63, or of the order in which they were played in the last game; which, again, were the effects of prior causes. At every stage, if we had possessed64 an accurate knowledge of the causes in existence, it would have been abstractedly possible to foretell65 the effect.'*
'In the domain66 of morals, too, a certainty, not dreamed of in past times, now prevails. However much man, as an individual, may be an enigma67, in the aggregate68 he is a mathematical problem.'**
In the great world of opinion it is the duty of honest reasoners to endeavour to find out the truth, and take sides, undeterred by the philosophical69 frivolity70 now growing fashionable. If men are silent concerning objects and principles, it is said they have none, and it is impatiently asked 'where is their bond of union?' And no sooner is it explained than they are told 'it is very unphilosophical to think of setting up a creed71.' Where the alternatives are thus put against them they should take their own course. Creeds72 are the necessary exponents73 of conviction. The creedless philosopher is out on the sea of opinion, without compass or chart. To bind74 yourself for the future to present opinions is doubtless unwise, but he who has inquired to any purpose has come to some conclusion, affirmative, negative, or neutral; and it is the province of a creed to avow75 the actual result, and the consequent; conduct intended to be followed. It is the vice76 of free thinking that it spreads universal uncertainty, and assumes right and wrong to be so protean77 that no man can tell one hour what opinion he shall hold the next. Logic should correct this unsatisfactory extreme, and extirpate78 the tiresome79 race whom Shelley described in Peter Bell:—
He is no Whig, he is no Tory;
But is so subtle, that to be
Nothing is all his glory**
* Logic, pp. 57-8, vol. 2
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1
logic
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| n.逻辑(学)；逻辑性 | |
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inflexible
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| adj.不可改变的，不受影响的，不屈服的 | |
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premises
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| n.建筑物，房屋 | |
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syllogism
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| n.演绎法，三段论法 | |
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maturity
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| n.成熟；完成；(支票、债券等)到期 | |
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speculation
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| n.思索，沉思；猜测；投机 | |
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sophistry
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| n.诡辩 | |
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underneath
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| adj.在...下面，在...底下；adv.在下面 | |
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fluctuation
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| n.(物价的)波动，涨落；周期性变动；脉动 | |
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formerly
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| adv.从前，以前 | |
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followers
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| 追随者( follower的名词复数 )； 用户； 契据的附面； 从动件 | |
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drawn
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| v.拖，拉，拔出；adj.憔悴的，紧张的 | |
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superstition
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| n.迷信，迷信行为 | |
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hood
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| n.头巾，兜帽，覆盖；v.罩上，以头巾覆盖 | |
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ironical
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| adj.讽刺的，冷嘲的 | |
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uncertainty
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| n.易变，靠不住，不确知，不确定的事物 | |
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repose
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| v.(使)休息；n.安息 | |
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maze
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| n.迷宫，八阵图，混乱，迷惑 | |
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bishop
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| n.主教，（国际象棋）象 | |
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delusion
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| n.谬见，欺骗，幻觉，迷惑 | |
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inquiry
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| n.打听，询问，调查，查问 | |
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virtue
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| n.德行，美德；贞操；优点；功效，效力 | |
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civilisation
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| n.文明，文化，开化，教化 | |
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awakens
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| v.（使）醒( awaken的第三人称单数 )；（使）觉醒；弄醒；（使）意识到 | |
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hearty
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| adj.热情友好的；衷心的；尽情的，纵情的 | |
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robust
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| adj.强壮的，强健的，粗野的，需要体力的，浓的 | |
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manly
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| adj.有男子气概的；adv.男子般地，果断地 | |
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precisely
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| adv.恰好，正好，精确地，细致地 | |
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scoffing
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| n. 嘲笑, 笑柄, 愚弄 v. 嘲笑, 嘲弄, 愚弄, 狼吞虎咽 | |
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profligate
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| adj.行为不检的；n.放荡的人，浪子，肆意挥霍者 | |
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jeering
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| adj.嘲弄的，揶揄的v.嘲笑( jeer的现在分词 ) | |
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spartan
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| adj.简朴的，刻苦的；n.斯巴达；斯巴达式的人 | |
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vigour
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| （=vigor）n.智力，体力，精力 | |
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interpretation
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| n.解释，说明，描述；艺术处理 | |
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efficiently
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| adv.高效率地，有能力地 | |
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contentedly
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| adv.心满意足地 | |
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complexion
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| n.肤色；情况，局面；气质，性格 | |
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forth
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| adv.向前；向外，往外 | |
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smoothly
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| adv.平滑地，顺利地，流利地，流畅地 | |
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manliness
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| 刚毅 | |
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malignity
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| n.极度的恶意，恶毒；（病的）恶性 | |
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forfeits
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| 罚物游戏 | |
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supremacy
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| n.至上；至高权力 | |
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abridge
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| v.删减，删节，节略，缩短 | |
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reigned
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| vi.当政，统治（reign的过去式形式） | |
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innocence
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| n.无罪；天真；无害 | |
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defendant
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| n.被告；adj.处于被告地位的 | |
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spoke
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| n.（车轮的）辐条；轮辐；破坏某人的计划；阻挠某人的行动 v.讲，谈（speak的过去式）；说；演说；从某种观点来说 | |
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decided
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| adj.决定了的，坚决的；明显的，明确的 | |
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accusation
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| n.控告，指责，谴责 | |
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induction
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| n.感应，感应现象 | |
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conjectures
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| 推测，猜想( conjecture的名词复数 ) | |
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pertain
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| v.(to)附属，从属；关于；有关；适合，相称 | |
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perplexed
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| adj.不知所措的 | |
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motives
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| n.动机，目的( motive的名词复数 ) | |
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pusillanimity
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| n.无气力，胆怯 | |
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quaint
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| adj.古雅的，离奇有趣的，奇怪的 | |
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propriety
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| n.正当行为；正当；适当 | |
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immortal
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| adj.不朽的；永生的，不死的；神的 | |
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investigation
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| n.调查，调查研究 | |
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contingency
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| n.意外事件，可能性 | |
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antithesis
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| n.对立；相对 | |
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shuffled
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| v.洗（纸牌）( shuffle的过去式和过去分词 )；拖着脚步走；粗心地做；摆脱尘世的烦恼 | |
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possessed
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| adj.疯狂的；拥有的，占有的 | |
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foretell
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| v.预言，预告，预示 | |
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domain
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| n.(活动等)领域，范围；领地，势力范围 | |
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enigma
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| n.谜，谜一样的人或事 | |
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aggregate
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| adj.总计的，集合的；n.总数；v.合计；集合 | |
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philosophical
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| adj.哲学家的，哲学上的，达观的 | |
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frivolity
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| n.轻松的乐事，兴高采烈；轻浮的举止 | |
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creed
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| n.信条；信念，纲领 | |
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creeds
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| （尤指宗教）信条，教条( creed的名词复数 ) | |
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exponents
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| n.倡导者( exponent的名词复数 )；说明者；指数；能手 | |
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bind
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| vt.捆，包扎；装订；约束；使凝固；vi.变硬 | |
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avow
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| v.承认，公开宣称 | |
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vice
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| n.坏事；恶习；[pl.]台钳，老虎钳；adj.副的 | |
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protean
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| adj.反复无常的；变化自如的 | |
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extirpate
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| v.除尽，灭绝 | |
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tiresome
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| adj.令人疲劳的，令人厌倦的 | |
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hue
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| n.色度；色调；样子 | |
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Christian
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| adj.基督教徒的；n.基督教徒 | |
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vestiges
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| 残余部分( vestige的名词复数 )； 遗迹； 痕迹； 毫不 | |
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