We should be prepared to dare all things for truth. If the 'very hopes of man, the thoughts of his heart, the religion of nations, the manners and morals of mankind, are all at the mercy of a new generalisation,' we should be prepared to risk them. If we must choose between truth and repose3, we ought not to hesitate. There is danger in having the truth—philosophers are obliged to conceal4 it. Mankind vaunt their love of truth, but they are not to be trusted. From interest or ignorance they always persecute5, and often kill, the discoverer. Still the pursuit of truth is a duty, and we must find consolation6 in the heroic reflection of Burke, that in all exertions7 of duty there it something to be hazarded. But intellectual daring will never be common while it is so generally believed to be criminal. We will, therefore, quote some considerations touching8 the rightfulness of inquiry9.
Without inquiry it is impossible for us to know whether our opinions are true or false, and various are the pretences10 employed for declining investigation11: frequently they are masked under vague and metaphorical12 phrases: "inquiry implies the weighing of evidence, and might lead to doubt and perplexity"—"to search into a subject might shake the settled convictions of the understanding"—to examine opposite arguments, and contradictory13 opinions, might contaminate the mind with false views.
'Every one who alleges15 pretexts16 like these for declining inquiry, must obviously begin by assuming that his own opinions are unerringly in the right. Nothing could justify17 a man for declining the investigation of a subject involving important opinions, but the possession of an understanding free from liability of error. Not gifted with infallibility, in what way, except by diligent18 inquiry, can he obtain any assurance that he is not pursuing a course of injurious action? If he holds any opinion, he must have acquired it either by examination, by instillation19, rote20, or some other process. On the supposition that he has acquired it by proper examination, the duty on which I am now insisting has been discharged, and the matter is at an end—but if he has acquired it in any other manner, the mere21 plea, that his mind might become unsettled, can be no argument against the duty of investigation. For anything he can allege14 to the contrary, his present opinions are wrong—and, in that case, the disturbance22 of his blind convictions, instead of being an evil, is an essential step towards arriving at the truth.
'It may possibly be assigned, as a further reason for his declining inquiry, that he may come to some fallacy which he cannot surmount23, although convinced of its character. If he is convinced of its character, he must either have grounds for that conviction or not. If he has grounds, let him examine them, draw them out, try if they are valid24, and then the fallacy will stand exposed. If he has no grounds for suspecting a fallacy, what an irrational25 conclusion he confesses himself to have arrived at! But perhaps he will reply—he may be unable to solve the difficulty; his mind may become perplexed26, and the issue may prove, after all, that it would have been much better had he remained in his former strong, though unenlightened, conviction. Why better? If he is in perplexity let him read, think, consult the learned and the wise, and in the end he will probably reach a definite opinion on one side or the other. But if he should still remain in doubt, where is the harm? or rather, why is it not to be considered a good? The subject is evidently one which admits strong probabilities on opposite sides. Doubt is therefore the proper sentiment for the occasion—it is the result of the best exercise of the faculties27—and either positively28 to believe, or positively to disbelieve, would imply an erroneous appreciation29 of evidence.
In the minds of some people a strong prejudice appears to exist against that state of the understanding which is termed doubt. A little reflection, however, will convince any one that on certain subjects "doubt" is as appropriate a state of the reasoning faculties as belief or disbelief on others. There are doctrines30, propositions, facts, supported and opposed by every degree of evidence, and amongst them by that degree of evidence of which the proper effect is to leave the understanding in an equipoise between two conclusions. In these cages "doubt" is the appropriate result, which there can be no reason to shrink from or lament31. But it may be further urged, that inquiry might contaminate the understanding with false views—and, therefore, It is wise and laudable to abstain32 from it.
'We can comprehend what is meant by contaminating a man's habits or disposition33, or even imagination. But there is no analogy on these points in reference to the understanding. There is contamination, there is evil, in preposterous34 and obscene images crowding before the intellectual vision, notwithstanding a full and distinct perception of their character—but there is no contamination, no evil, in a thousand false arguments coming before the understanding, if their quality is clearly discerned. The only possible evil in this case is mistaking false for true—but the man who shrinks from investigation lest he should mistake false for true, can have no reason for supposing himself free from that delusion35 in his actual opinions. Besides these objections to inquiry, there are other prejudices of a similar character, forming serious impediments to the attainment36 of truth.
'One of these is a fear that we may search too far, and become chargeable with presumption37 in prying38 into things we ought not to know. A few words will suffice to prove that nothing can be more irrational and absurd. We have already shown that true opinions are conducive39 to the welfare of mankind—and the prosecution40 of inquiry is therefore a process from which we have everything to hope and nothing to fear, and to which there are no limits but such as the nature of our own faculties pre scribes.
'A second prejudice—that we may contract guilt41, if, in the course of our researches, we miss the right conclusion, and had therefore better let inquiry alone—is still more influential42 in preventing those investigations43 which it is our duty to make. As our opinions on any subject are not voluntary acts, but involuntary effects, in whatever conclusions our researches terminate they can involve us in no culpability44. All that we have to take care of is, to bestow45 on every subject an adequate and impartial46 attention. Having done this, we have discharged our duty; and it would be irrational and unmanly to entertain any apprehension47 for the result.
'In fact, there is the grossest inconsistency in the prejudice now under consideration. If we may contract guilt by searching after truth, wo may equally do so by remaining in our present state The reason alleged48 in the prejudice itself, and the only reason which can be assigned with any plausibility49, why we may commit an offence by embarking50 in any inquiry, is that we may, by so doing, miss the right conclusion, or, in other words, fall into error—for no one would seriously contend that we incur51 any moral culpability by an investigation which conducts us to the truth. But it is obvious that we may equally miss the right conclusion by remaining in our actual opinions. It is, then, incumbent52 on us to ascertain53 whether we are committing an offence by remaining in them—in other words, it is necessary to examine whether those opinions are true. Thus the reasons assigned for not inquiring, lead to the conclusion that it is necessary to inquire.
'The third prejudice is that acquiescence54 in received opinions, or forbearing to think for ourselves, shows a degree of humility55 highly proper and commendable—if closely examined will be found usually to evince nothing but a great degree of indolent presumption, or intellectual cowardice56. There is often, in truth, as great a measure of presumption in this species of acquiescence as in the boldest hypothesis which human invention can start. That received and established opinions are true, is one of those sweeping57 conclusions which would require very strong reasons, and often elaborate research, to justify. On what grounds are they considered to be true by one who declines investigation? Because (on the most favourable58 supposition) they have been handed down to us by our predecessors59, and have been held with unhesitating faith by a multitude of illustrious men. But what comprehensive reasons are these? What investigation would it require to shew that they were valid? As the whole history of mankind teems60 with instances of the transmission of the grossest errors from one generation to another, and of their having been countenanced61 by the concurrence62 of the most eminent63 of our race—how, without examination, can we show that this particular instance is an exception from the general lot?
'From the necessity of using our own judgment64, or, in other words, of arriving at a conclusion for ourselves, we cannot be absolved65. Far from being a virtue66, blind acquiescence in the opinions of others is, in most cases, a positive vice67, tending to stop all advancement68 in knowledge, and all improvement in practice.
From the preceding it is evident that the inquirer may enter on his task with full confidence that he is embarking in no criminal, or forbidden, or presumptuous69 enterprise, but is, on the contrary, engaging in the discharge of a duty. Let him be as circumspect70 as he pleases in collecting his facts and deducing his conclusions, cautious in the process, but fearless in the result. Let him be fully71 aware of his liability to error, of the thousand sources of illusions, of the limited powers of the individual, of the paramount72 importance of truth—but let him dismiss all apprehensions73 of the issue of an investigation conducted with due application of mind and rectitude of purpose.'*
* Extracts of Summary, by Aliquis. of arguments on the Duty
of Inquiry, from the 'Pursuit of Truth, and other Essays, by
S. Bailey, in Reasoner No. 12.
Marcus Antoninus, indeed, said 'I seek after truth, by which no man yet was ever injured.' But there is a great practical mistake here. There is danger in truth—-and the admission should be plainly made. Men, where forewarned, make the choice more manfully. We have been wisely told by Emerson, that the cherished thoughts and institutions of mankind are at the mercy of a new generalisation—rest, commodity, reputation. Inconvenience, and suspense74, are the consequences of the partizanship of truth. Certain political truths annihilate75 the interests of whole classes. Certain social truths war with life-cherished prejudices. Certain sanitary76 truths reduce the value of all city property. Certain scientific truths ruin the working classes by thousands. In a wiser state of society this could be prevented, but our present business is with what is. It is therefore idle to conceal the truth—that there is danger in truth. Pope's dictum, that party is the madness of many for the gain of a few, is inversely77 true of truth. Truth is the ultimate benefit of many, but the immediate78 ruin of the few. Here, however, comes to our aid the wise and far-seeing aphorism79 of Burke—'In all exertions of duty there is something to be hazarded'—and the brave man and wise friend of mankind will risk the fate which surely awaits him—the fate of Galileo, Newton, Salomon de Caus, Volta, Fulton, Winser, Arkwright, Gall80, and all who present themselves, with truth in their hands, at the door of this great bedlam81 called the world—the fate of being received with stones and hisses82.
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1
asylum
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| n.避难所，庇护所，避难 | |
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quail
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| n.鹌鹑；vi.畏惧，颤抖 | |
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repose
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| v.(使)休息；n.安息 | |
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conceal
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| v.隐藏，隐瞒，隐蔽 | |
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persecute
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| vt.迫害，虐待；纠缠，骚扰 | |
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consolation
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| n.安慰，慰问 | |
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exertions
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| n.努力( exertion的名词复数 )；费力；（能力、权力等的）运用；行使 | |
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touching
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| adj.动人的，使人感伤的 | |
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inquiry
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| n.打听，询问，调查，查问 | |
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pretences
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| n.假装( pretence的名词复数 )；作假；自命；自称 | |
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investigation
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| n.调查，调查研究 | |
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metaphorical
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| a.隐喻的，比喻的 | |
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contradictory
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| adj.反驳的，反对的，抗辩的；n.正反对，矛盾对立 | |
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allege
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| vt.宣称，申述，主张，断言 | |
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alleges
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| 断言，宣称，辩解( allege的第三人称单数 ) | |
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pretexts
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| n.借口，托辞( pretext的名词复数 ) | |
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justify
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| vt.证明…正当(或有理)，为…辩护 | |
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diligent
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| adj.勤勉的，勤奋的 | |
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instillation
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| n.灌输，滴，滴下 | |
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rote
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| n.死记硬背，生搬硬套 | |
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mere
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| adj.纯粹的；仅仅，只不过 | |
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disturbance
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| n.动乱，骚动；打扰，干扰；(身心)失调 | |
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surmount
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| vt.克服；置于…顶上 | |
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valid
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| adj.有确实根据的；有效的；正当的，合法的 | |
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irrational
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| adj.无理性的，失去理性的 | |
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perplexed
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| adj.不知所措的 | |
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faculties
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| n.能力( faculty的名词复数 )；全体教职员；技巧；院 | |
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positively
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| adv.明确地，断然，坚决地；实在，确实 | |
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appreciation
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| n.评价；欣赏；感谢；领会，理解；价格上涨 | |
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doctrines
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| n.教条( doctrine的名词复数 )；教义；学说；（政府政策的）正式声明 | |
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lament
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| n.悲叹，悔恨，恸哭；v.哀悼，悔恨，悲叹 | |
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abstain
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| v.自制，戒绝，弃权，避免 | |
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disposition
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| n.性情，性格；意向，倾向；排列，部署 | |
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preposterous
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| adj.荒谬的，可笑的 | |
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delusion
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| n.谬见，欺骗，幻觉，迷惑 | |
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attainment
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| n.达到，到达；［常pl.］成就，造诣 | |
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presumption
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| n.推测，可能性，冒昧，放肆，[法律]推定 | |
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prying
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| adj.爱打听的v.打听，刺探（他人的私事）( pry的现在分词 )；撬开 | |
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conducive
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| adj.有益的，有助的 | |
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prosecution
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| n.起诉，告发，检举，执行，经营 | |
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guilt
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| n.犯罪；内疚；过失，罪责 | |
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influential
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| adj.有影响的，有权势的 | |
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investigations
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| （正式的）调查( investigation的名词复数 )； 侦查； 科学研究； 学术研究 | |
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culpability
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| n.苛责，有罪 | |
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bestow
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| v.把…赠与，把…授予；花费 | |
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impartial
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| adj.(in,to)公正的，无偏见的 | |
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apprehension
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| n.理解，领悟；逮捕，拘捕；忧虑 | |
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alleged
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| a.被指控的，嫌疑的 | |
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plausibility
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| n. 似有道理, 能言善辩 | |
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50
embarking
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| 乘船( embark的现在分词 )； 装载； 从事 | |
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incur
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| vt.招致，蒙受，遭遇 | |
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52
incumbent
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| adj.成为责任的，有义务的；现任的，在职的 | |
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ascertain
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| vt.发现，确定，查明，弄清 | |
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acquiescence
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| n.默许；顺从 | |
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humility
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| n.谦逊，谦恭 | |
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cowardice
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| n.胆小，怯懦 | |
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sweeping
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| adj.范围广大的，一扫无遗的 | |
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favourable
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| adj.赞成的，称赞的，有利的，良好的，顺利的 | |
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predecessors
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| n.前任( predecessor的名词复数 )；前辈；（被取代的）原有事物；前身 | |
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teems
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| v.充满( teem的第三人称单数 )；到处都是；（指水、雨等）暴降；倾注 | |
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countenanced
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| v.支持，赞同，批准( countenance的过去式 ) | |
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concurrence
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| n.同意；并发 | |
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eminent
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| adj.显赫的，杰出的，有名的，优良的 | |
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judgment
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| n.审判；判断力，识别力，看法，意见 | |
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absolved
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| 宣告…无罪，赦免…的罪行，宽恕…的罪行( absolve的过去式和过去分词 )； 不受责难，免除责任 [义务] ,开脱（罪责） | |
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virtue
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| n.德行，美德；贞操；优点；功效，效力 | |
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vice
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| n.坏事；恶习；[pl.]台钳，老虎钳；adj.副的 | |
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advancement
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| n.前进，促进，提升 | |
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presumptuous
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| adj.胆大妄为的，放肆的，冒昧的，冒失的 | |
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circumspect
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| adj.慎重的，谨慎的 | |
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fully
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| adv.完全地，全部地，彻底地；充分地 | |
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paramount
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| a.最重要的，最高权力的 | |
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apprehensions
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| 疑惧 | |
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suspense
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| n.（对可能发生的事）紧张感，担心，挂虑 | |
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annihilate
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| v.使无效；毁灭；取消 | |
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sanitary
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| adj.卫生方面的，卫生的，清洁的，卫生的 | |
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inversely
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| adj.相反的 | |
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immediate
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| adj.立即的；直接的，最接近的；紧靠的 | |
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aphorism
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| n.格言，警语 | |
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gall
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| v.使烦恼，使焦躁，难堪；n.磨难 | |
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bedlam
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| n.混乱，骚乱；疯人院 | |
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hisses
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| 嘶嘶声( hiss的名词复数 ) | |
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