With France the case was very different. Algeria was adjacent to the territories of the Sultan of Morocco, and, if the wild tribes on the frontier were stirred up against the infidel, the most important French colony was threatened with serious disturbance10. It was all-important for France, therefore, that there should be a government at Fez strong enough and enlight[203]ened enough to keep peace on the border. Clemenceau, who had always been so stern an opponent of colonial adventures, and had overthrown11 several Cabinets which he considered were prone13 to encourage harmful exploits, had himself spoken out very plainly about Morocco. Long before capitalist interests were involved on any large scale the French ownership of Algeria necessitated15 a definite Moroccan policy. This again brought with it the obligation of constant pressure upon the Sultan to induce him to consider French interests. These interests could be harmonised with those of Spain and Great Britain, and were so settled by special agreements in April, 1904, just a year before the German Emperor’s coup17 de théatre startled the world. France’s special interests in Morocco were thus recognised all round, and Germany, far from raising any objection, expressly disclaimed18 any desire to interfere19, so long as “the open door” was left for German goods. But the general antagonism20 between France and Germany was a matter of common knowledge.
It was natural, therefore, that the Sultan of Morocco, alarmed lest French attempts to introduce “order” and “good government” into his realm might end, as it had always done elsewhere, by destroying his independence, should appeal to the Kaiser, who had proclaimed his sympathy for the Moslem21, to help him against the less sympathetic infidel. For a long time these appeals fell upon deaf ears. Even when the Kaiser visited Gibraltar, after an interview with the King of Spain, he refused pressing invitations to cross the Straits and meet envoys22 of the Moroccan potentate24 at Tangier. This was in March, 1904. But in March, 1905, when everything looked peaceful, the Kaiser went to Tangier in the Hohenzollern, landed with an imposing25 suite26, met the uncle of the Sultan, who came as a special envoy23 to the German Emperor, and addressed him in the following terms:—
“I am to-day paying my visit to the Sultan in his quality of independent sovereign. I hope that under the sovereignty of the Sultan a free Morocco will remain open to the peaceful[204] competition of all nations, without monopoly and without annexation27, on the footing of absolute equality. The object of my visit to Tangier is to make known that I have decided28 to do all in my power to effectually safeguard the interests of Germany in Morocco. Since I consider the Sultan an absolutely free sovereign, it is with him that I desire to come to an understanding on suitable measures for safeguarding these interests. As to the reforms that the Sultan intends to make, it seems to me that he must proceed with much caution, having regard to the religious feelings of the population, so that public order may not be disturbed.”
Such was the declaration of the German Emperor. What gave special point to his address was the fact that at that very moment a French delegation29 was at the capital, Fez, in order to obtain necessary reforms from the Sultan, and was meeting week after week the most obstinate30 resistance from him and his Government. It was obviously open support of the Sultan in his refusal to accept French representations, and a declaration of hostility31 to France on the part of the Kaiser. Nothing more arrogant33 or offensive can well be imagined. France, from the Socialist34 point of view, was wrong in her attempt to instruct the Sultan how to deal with a state of things which undoubtedly35 threatened the peace of Algeria, but the Kaiser’s intervention36 after such a fashion was wholly unwarrantable, and threatened the peace of the world.
What was the meaning of this extraordinary display of Imperial diplomacy37 and Prussian direct action? There were statesmen—Sir Charles Dilke was one—who believed that the German Emperor was really devoted38 to peace, and that no war could take place in Europe so long as he lived. There was a general feeling in England to the same effect, largely engineered by Lord Haldane and others of like nature, whose spiritual or political home was in Germany. But all can see now that this was an illusion. The only difference between the Kaiser and the most aggressive and bloodthirsty Junker or pan-German was as to the time and season when the tremendous[205] Central European and partially39 Mohammedan combination that he had formed should commence the attack. William II wished to wait until the road had been so completely prepared for the aggressive advance that victory on every side would be practically certain. The Junker party, with which the Crown Prince identified himself, were in a hurry, and the Emperor could only keep them in good humour by these periodical outbursts which enabled him to pose as the dictator of Europe.
All through, the Kaiser’s real ambition was that which he occasionally disclosed in a well-known drawing-room in Berlin. He would not die happy unless he had ridden at the head of the Teutonic armies as the Charlemagne of modern Europe. But this megalomania was only indulged in with his intimates. Elsewhere he stood forth40 as the rival of his uncle as the Prince of Peace. According to him, therefore, it was M. Delcassé who forced him to act in this peremptory41 way at Tangier; and efforts were made to convince all the Governments in Europe that the French Minister of Foreign Affairs had tried to boycott42 Germany out of Morocco. France, rather than take up the challenge, got rid of M. Delcassé. Thus the Emperor displayed his power for the appeasement43 of his Junkers, established a permanent source of difficulty on the flank of France, and gave the Mohammedan world to understand once more that Germany, not England, was the champion of Islam.
Meanwhile, German political, financial and commercial influence of every kind was making astounding44 advances, not only in France itself, but also in every country that might at the critical moment be able to help either France or Russia; while German armaments, military and naval45, and German alliances for war were being worked up to the point which, if carried on for ten, or perhaps even for five years more, would have rendered the German power almost, if not quite, irresistible46 by any combination that could have been made in time against it. The Kaiser, in short, was playing a successful game of world-peace in order to make sure of playing at the right moment a successful game of world-war. Desperate as the[206] conflict has been, it may have been fortunate for mankind that the Junkers, his son and the General Staff forced the Emperor’s hand.
When, consequently, Clemenceau took the lead in French affairs, he soon found that the sacrifice of M. Delcassé, the friend of Edward VII, to the pretended German injury had been made in vain. There was no intention whatever, either then or later, of coming to a really permanent settlement of outstanding grievances47 against France, although the position in Morocco was eventually used to gain great advantages in other parts of Africa. Germany was, in fact, a permanent menace to the peace of Europe and the world; but those who said so, and adduced plain facts to justify48 their contentions49, were unfortunately denounced both by capitalists and Socialists50 in every country as fomenters of war. This insidious51 propaganda, which tended to the advantage of Germany in every respect, was already going on in 1906, when M. Clemenceau joined M. Sarrien’s Cabinet, and when he formed a Cabinet of his own. This was publicly recognised.
This is what M. Clemenceau said at Hyères, after some furious attacks had been made upon France in the German official newspapers; no German newspapers being allowed to print comments on foreign affairs without the consent of the Foreign Office: “No peace is possible without force. When I took office I myself was persuaded that all European nations were of one mind in wishing for peace. But almost immediately, without any provocation53 whatever from us, a storm of calumny54 and misrepresentation broke out upon us, and we were compelled to ask ourselves, ‘Are we prepared?’”
On October 23rd of the same year, M. Sarrien resigned, and M. Clemenceau formed his Cabinet. It comprised, among others, Messrs. Pichon (Foreign Affairs), Caillaux (Finance), Colonel Picquart (War), Briand (Justice and Education), Viviani (Labour), and Donmergue (Commerce). A more peaceful Cabinet could hardly be. M. Pichon, who took the place from which M. Delcassé had been forced to resign because[207] he too strongly opposed German influence in Morocco and refused a European Conference on the subject as wholly unnecessary, was an old friend and co-worker with Clemenceau on La Justice, and had gone into diplomacy at Clemenceau’s suggestion. He had since held positions in the East and in Tunis, and he and Clemenceau were believed to be entirely55 at one in abjuring56 all adventurous57 colonial policy. M. Caillaux, at the head of the Department of Finance—people are apt to forget that M. Caillaux, now in gaol58 under serious accusation59, was thus trusted by Clemenceau—was certainly not opposed to Germany, but even at that time was favourable60 to a close understanding with that power. Colonel Picquart, who now received his reward for having, though personally an anti-Semite, destroyed all his own professional prospects61 in his zeal62 to obtain justice for the Jew Dreyfus, was certainly as pacific a War Minister as could have been appointed. But what was more significant still, M. Briand, himself a Socialist, and the hero of the great inquiry63 into the separation of Church and State which had now become inevitable64, was placed in a position to carry that important measure to its final vote and settlement; and M. Viviani, likewise a Socialist, became head of the new department, the Ministry65 of Labour. When I saw these two men, Briand, whom I remembered well as a vehement66 anarchist, and Viviani, who was a vigorous Socialist speaker and writer, in the Cabinet of which Clemenceau was the chief, I could not but recall the conversation I had with the French Premier sixteen years before.
Seated comfortably in his delightful67 library, surrounded by splendid Japanese works of art, of which at that time he was an ardent68 collector, M. Clemenceau had spoken very freely indeed. Of course, he knew quite well that I was no mere69 interviewer for Press purposes, and, indeed, I have always made it a rule to keep such conversations, except perhaps for permitted indiscretions here and there, entirely to myself. There is no need for me to enlarge upon his quick and almost abrupt70 delivery, his apt remarks and illustrations, his bright, clever,[208] vigorous face and gestures. I put it to him that Socialism was the basis of the coming political party in France and that, vehement individualist as he might be himself, it was impossible for him to resist permanently71 the current of the time, or to remain merely a supremely72 powerful critic and organiser of overthrow12. Sooner or later he must succumb73 to the inevitable and take his seat as President of Council, and to do this with any hope of success or usefulness he would have to rely in an increasing degree upon Socialist and semi-Socialist support.
To this Clemenceau answered that he was quite contented74 with his existing position; that he had no wish to enter upon office with its responsibilities and corrupting75 influence; while, as to Socialism, that could never make way in France in his day.
“Looking only at the towns,” he said, “you may think otherwise, though even there I consider the progress of Socialism is overrated. But the towns do not govern France. The overwhelming majority of French voters are country voters. France means rural France, and the peasantry of France will never be Socialists. Nobody can know them better than my family and I know them. Landed proprietors76 ourselves—my father’s passion for buying land to pay him three per cent. with borrowed money for which he had to pay four per cent. would have finally ruined him, but that our wholesome77 French law permits gentle interference in such a case—we have ever lived with and among the peasantry. We have been doctors from generation to generation, and have doctored them gratuitously78, as I did myself, both in country and in town. I have seen them very close, in birth and in death, in sickness and in health, in betrothal79 and in marriage, in poverty and in well-being80, and all the time their one idea is property; to possess, to own, to provide a good portion for the daughter, to secure a good and well dot-ed wife for the son. Always property, ownership, possession, work, thrift81, acquisition, individual gain. Socialism can never take root in such a soil as this. North or south, it is just the same. Preach nationalisation of the land in a French village, and you would barely[209] escape with your life, if the peasants understood what you meant. Come with me for a few weeks’ trip through rural France, and you will soon understand the hopelessness of Socialism here. It will encounter a personal fanaticism82 stronger than its own. Your Socialists are men of the town; they do not understand the men and women of the country.”
Now the same M. Clemenceau, after a long struggle side by side with the Socialist Party, first in the Dreyfus case and then in the anti-Clericalist and Separation of Church and State movement, finds that events have moved so fast, in a comparatively short space of time, that he is practically compelled to take two active Socialists into his own Cabinet. This, too, in spite of the fact that his action in calling in the troops at Courrières and insisting upon liberty for non-strikers or black-legs had turned the Socialist Party, as a party, definitely against him. No more significant proof of the advance of Socialist influence could well have been given. That it was entirely on the side of peace and a good understanding with Germany cannot be disputed.
But this did not make the Morocco affair itself any less complicated or threatening. Notwithstanding the Conference which Germany succeeded in having convoked83 at Algeciras, and the settlement arrived at in April, 1906, after a sitting of more than three months, the condition of Morocco itself had not improved. The fact that the Conference gave France the preference in the scheme of reforms proposed and in the political management of Morocco, against the efforts of Germany and Austria, suited neither the Sultan nor the Kaiser. Troubles arose of a serious character. The French considered themselves forced to intervene. The old antagonism broke out afresh. So much so that the French Premier spoke14 with more than his usual frankness in an interview with a German newspaper in November:—
“The Germans have one great fault. They show us extreme courtesy to-day and marked rudeness the day after. Before this Morocco affair, feeling in France had much improved.[210] Many of us thought an understanding with Germany very desirable, and I freely admit your Emperor did a good deal to engender84 this feeling. Then, although we had dismissed Delcassé, the German press attacked us. It went so far as to declare that you were to extort85 from us the milliards of francs necessary to finance an Anglo-German war. . . . I do not want to have any war, and if we desire no war we necessarily wish to be on good terms with our neighbours. If, also, our relations are unsatisfactory, we are anxious to improve them. Such is my frame of mind. Moreover, if I have a chance of doing so, I shall be glad to act on these lines. Of course it is imperatively86 necessary for us to be always strong and ready for all eventualities. That, however, does not mean that we want war: quite the contrary. To wish for war would mean that we were mad. We could not possibly carry on a war policy. If we did, Parliament would soon turn us out, as it did Delcassé.”
Nothing could be clearer than that. And what made the pronouncement more important even than the strong but sober language used was the fact that, after as before the Conference of Algeciras, there was really a great disposition87 among certain sections in France to come to terms with Germany, rather than to strengthen the understanding with England. The expression of this opinion could be frequently heard among the people. It was fostered, even in the face of the German press campaign against the Clemenceau Administration, by powerful financial interests and by Clerical reactionary88 elements which were at this time less hostile to Germany than to England.
Throughout, however, Clemenceau stood for the Entente89 with the latter power as the only sound policy for his country. In this respect he was at one with the old statement of Gambetta that a breach90 of the alliance with England would be fatal to France. For Clemenceau, therefore, who had more than once in his career suffered so severely91 for his friendship for England, to state that an understanding with Germany had been seriously contemplated92 was a striking testimony93 to the immediate52 tendency of the time at that juncture94. Whether the whole of[211] this fitful friendliness95 on the side of Germany was simulated in order to foster that remarkable96 policy of steady infiltration97 of German interests, German management, and German goods into France, with far other than peaceful aims, is a question which can be much more confidently answered now than at the period when this peaceful offensive was going on. Enough to say that the Clemenceau Ministry was not, at first, at all averse98 from a permanent arrangement for peace with Germany, so long as English animosity was not aroused.
It must be admitted, nevertheless, that French policy in Morocco was, in the long run, quite contrary to the views on colonial affairs which Clemenceau had so strongly expressed and acted upon hitherto. Whatever excuse may be made on account of the proximity99 of Morocco to Algeria, and the necessity for France to protect her own countrymen and secure peace on the border, the truth remains100 that the French Republic was allowed by her statesmen to drift into what was virtually a national and capitalist domination of that independent country, backed up by a powerful French army. Clemenceau in his defence of these aggressions recites those familiar apologies for that sort of patriotism102 which consists in love of another people’s country and the determination to seize it, which we Englishmen have become so accustomed to in our own case. If we didn’t take it, somebody else would. If we leave matters as they are, endless disturbances103 will occur and will spread to our own territory. A protectorate must be established.
But a protectorate must have a powerful armed force behind it, or there can be no real protection. National capital is being invested under our peaceful penetration104 for the benefit of the protected people. The rights of investors105 must be safe-guarded. Our countrymen—in this instance Frenchmen—have been molested106 and even murdered by the barbarous folk whom we have been called upon to civilise. Such outrages107 cannot be permitted to go unpunished. Towns bombarded. Villages burnt. Peace re-established. More troops. “Security of life and property” ensured by a much larger army and the[212] foundation of civilised Courts. Protection develops insensibly into possession. The familiar progression of grab is, in short, complete.
That is pretty much what went on with Morocco, whose entire independence as a sovereign State had only just been internationally acknowledged. What is more, it went on under M. Clemenceau’s own Government, consisting of the same peaceful politicians enumerated108 above. No doubt the action of Germany against France and French interests, on the one side, and the support by England of France and French interests, on the other, hastened the acceptance of the “white man’s burden” which her capitalists and financiers were so eager to undertake; if only to upset the schemes of the Brothers Mannesmann in the troublous Mohammedan Sultanate. But it is strange to find Clemenceau in this galley109. For, unjustifiable as were the proceedings110 of Germany at the beginning and all through, it is now obvious that France, by her own policy, put arguments into the mouth of the peace-at-any-price and pro-German advocates; that also she played the game of the Kaiser and his unscrupulous agent Dr. Rosen. This worthy had been in the employment of Prince Radolin, who thus described him: “He is a Levantine Jew whose sole capacity is intriguing111 to increase his own importance.” It was disgraceful of Germany to make use of such a man to stir up Morocco against France. But it was certainly most unwise, as well as contrary to international comity112, for France to put herself in the wrong by an aggressive policy in that State. Especially was this the case when such a terrible menace still overhung her Eastern frontier, and, as events proved, not a man could be spared for adventures in Morocco or elsewhere.
The war between rival Sultans and the attack upon the French settlers at Casablanca could not justify such a complete change of front. Jaurès, in fact, was in the right when he denounced the advance of General Amadé with a strong French army as a filibustering113 expedition, dangerous in itself and provocative towards Germany. But Clemenceau supported his[213] Foreign Minister, Pichon, in the occupation of Casablanca, which had been heavily bombarded beforehand, and, on February 25th, declared that France did not intend to evacuate114 Morocco, neither did she mean to conquer that country. He had, he averred115, no secrets, and, as in the matter of the anarchist rising in the South, said he was ready to resign. This was evidence of impatience116, which was harmful at such a critical period in French home and foreign affairs. It looked as if Clemenceau had been so accustomed to turn out French Governments that he could not discriminate117 even in favour of his own! But the Chamber118 gave him a strong vote of confidence, and he remained at his post.
There were two important developments in foreign affairs going on during this year, 1908, of which the difficulties in Morocco, serious as they were, constituted only a side issue. The one was open and above-board: the other was known only to those who kept very closely in touch with German politics.
The first was the rapid improvement in the relations between France and Great Britain, for which Clemenceau himself and King Edward VII were chiefly responsible. We are now so accustomed to regard the Entente as part and parcel of English foreign policy that it is not easy to understand how bitter the feeling was against Great Britain which led important Frenchmen to take the view of an agreement with Germany spoken of above. English domination in Egypt, to the practical exclusion119 of French influence and control even over the Suez Canal; English conventions with Japan, checking, as was thought, that legitimate120 French expansion in Asia by which M. Jules Ferry had hoped to counterbalance the defeats of 1870-71; English settlement of the irritating Newfoundland Fisheries question; English truculence121 and unfairness in the infamous122 Boer War; English antagonism to Russia, France’s trusted ally and heavy debtor—all these things stood in the way of any cordial understanding. It may well be that only Clemenceau’s strong personal influence, supported by his nominee123 President Fallières, prevented steps being taken which[214] would have been fatal to the revival124 of genuine good feeling between the Western Powers. The following passage in the Encyclop?dia Britannica does no more than justice to Clemenceau’s services in this direction:
“M. Clemenceau, who only late in life came into office and attained126 it when a better understanding with England was progressing, had been throughout his long career, of all public men in all political groups, the most consistent friend of England. His presence at the head of affairs was a guarantee of amicable127 Anglo-French relations, so far as they could be protected by statesmanship.” This tribute in a permanent work of reference is thoroughly128 well deserved.
Happily, too, his efforts had been earnestly supported long before, and even quietly during, the Boer War, by Edward VII, as Prince of Wales and as King. But this very connection between the French Radical statesman and the English monarch129 was the subject of most virulent130 attacks. It was, in fact, made the groundwork of an elaborate accusation of treachery against Clemenceau, who was represented as the mere tool of Edward VII in promoting the permanent effacement131 of France. The King was an English Machiavelli, constantly plotting to recover for the British Empire, at the expense of France, that world-wide prestige which the miserable132 Boer War and the rise of German power on land and sea, in trade and in finance, had seriously jeopardised. A book by the well-known M. Flourens, written at this time to uphold that thesis, went through no fewer than five editions. Here is the pleasing picture of the late King presented for the contemplation of the Parisian populace by this virulent penman:
“Edouard VII montait sur le tr?ne à l’age où, si l’on consulte les statistiques, 75% des rois sont déjà descendus dans la tombe. Il sortait d’une longue oisiveté pour entrer dans la vie active a l’époque où, dans toutes les carrières et fonctions publiques, les hommes font valoir leurs droits à la retraite.
“S’il y avait un conseil de revision pour les rois, comme il y en a un pour les conscrits, il e?t été déclaré impropre au service.
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“L’obésité déformait son corps134, alourdissait sa marche, semblait, sous le développement des tissus adipeux, paralyser toute activité physique, toute force intellectuelle. Sa figure, contractée par32 la douleur, trahissait, par moment, les souffrances qu’une volonté de fer s’efforcait de ma?triser, pour dissimuler aux yeux de ses sujets la maladie qui, à cet instant même, mena?ait sa vie.
“A voir sa corpulence maladive, on ne pouvait s’empêcher de se rappeler les paroles que Shakespeare met dans la bouche d’un de ses ancêtres, à l’adresse du fameux Falstaff, le compagnon dissolu des égarements de sa jeunesse: ’songe à travailler, a diminuer ton ventre et a grossir ton mérite—quitte ta vie dissolue! Regarde la tombe, elle ouvre, pour toi, une bouche trois fois plus large que pour les autres hommes!’
“De tous c?tés, les lanceurs de prédictions, depuis le fameux archange Gabriel jusqu’à la non moins fameuse Mme. de Thèbes, s’accordaient pour entourer son avènement des plus sinistres prévisions, pour annoncer sa fin16 prochaine et l’imminence d’une nouvelle vacance du tr?ne d’Angleterre.
“Sympt?me plus grave! Les oracles135 de la science n’étaient pas moins mena?ants que les prophéties des devins. Deux fois, les pompes de son couronnement durent être décommandées, deux fois les fêtes ajournées et les lampions éteints. Les h?tes princiers, convoqués a grands frais de tous les points du globe, pour participer à ces réjouissances, attendirent, dans l’angoisse, l’annonce d’une cérémonie plus lugubre.
“La volonté d’Edouard VII triumpha de toutes ces résistances. Il déclara avec une indomptable énergie que, co?te que co?te, il était décidé a ne pas descendre dans la tombe avant d’avoir posé sur sa tête, avec tout133 l’éclat, avec toute la solennité traditionnels, aux yeux des représentants émerveillés de tout son vaste empire, aux yeux de l’Univers jaloux, la couronne de ses Pères, sa double couronne de Roi et d’Empereur, que les mains avides de la mort semblaient vouloir lui disputer.”
His account of Edward VII reads curiously136 to-day, the[216] more so when we recall the fact that M. Emile Flourens was at one time French Minister of Foreign Affairs, and that, at the moment when the book first appeared, the King was frequently in Paris, and on good terms with Republicans of all sections.
After pointing out how scrupulously137 he had as Prince of Wales suppressed his political opinions, during his mother’s lifetime, even when his power, had he exerted it, might have been advantageous138 to his country, the French critic gives him full credit for having made the best of his life in many ways. He had travelled all over the world, had studied humanity and society in all shapes, had “warmed both hands before the fire of life” in every quarter of the globe. But, though his features as a private personage were familiar to everybody, he remained a sphinx, mysterious and unfathomable, even to his friends, in public affairs. He was well known to Parisians everywhere, and was as popular in working-class centres as in the most aristocratic salons139. Paris was, in fact, the only city where he was at his ease and at home, where, in fact, he was himself. By far the most sympathetic Briton to Parisians who ever was in Paris, he exercised a real influence over all classes. They were kept carefully informed as to his tastes, his manners, his intimates, his vices125 and his debts, and were the more friendly to him on account of them. The warmest partisans141 of his accession, however, were his creditors142, who were mortally afraid that his habits would not give him the opportunity for discharging his liabilities out of his mother’s accumulations.
The description of the position of the British Empire at the close of the Boer War was less flattering even than the personal sketch143 of its King and Emperor. “At this moment the astounded144 peoples had felt the Britannic colossus totter145 on its foundation, this colossus with feet of clay which weighs down too credulous146 nations by its bluff147, by its arrogance148, by rapine, by insatiable rapacity149, which already grips the entire globe like a gigantic cuttle-fish and sucks its marrow150 through the numberless tentacles151 of its commerce, until the day when it shall subjugate152 the whole planet to its domination—always provided[217] that it does not encounter on its way another still more powerful octopus153 of destruction which will attack and destroy it.”
Needless to say that this challenger of the British supremacy154 was the rising power of Germany. As an Englishman I admit the infamy155 of the Boer War, and recognise that our rule in India and Ireland has been anything but what it ought to have been. M. Clemenceau knew all that as well as we British anti-Imperialists do. But even in 1907-8 much had happened since 1900. Democracy was slowly making way in Great Britain likewise, and freedom for others would surely follow emancipation156 for herself. It was not to be expected that all Frenchmen should see or understand this. A nation which has under its flag a fourth of the population and more than a seventh of the habitable surface of the world can scarcely expect that another colonial country, whose colonies the British have largely appropriated, in the East and in the West, will admit the “manifest destiny” of the union Jack157 to wave of undisputed right over still more territory. There was a good deal to be said, and a good deal was said, about British greed and British unscrupulousness: nor could the truth of many of the imputations be honestly denied.
It called, therefore, for all Edward VII’s extraordinary knowledge of Paris, his bonhomie, shrewd common sense, and uncanny power of “creating an atmosphere” to overcome the prejudice thus created against himself as a master of intrigue158, and Clemenceau as his willing tool. Matters went so far that at one moment the King’s reception in his favourite capital seemed likely to be hostile, and might have been so, but for the admirable conduct of the high-minded, conservative patriot101, M. Déroulède. But, luckily for France, Great Britain and the world at large, these difficulties had been overcome; and almost the only good feature in the trouble with Morocco was the vigorous diplomatic help France received from England—a good feature because it helped to wipe away the bitter memories of the past from the minds of the French people. The extremely cordial reception of President Fallières and M. Clemenceau in[218] London, and the King’s own exceptional courtesy at all times to M. Delcassé, whom the French public regarded as the victim of German dictatorial159 demands, tended in the same direction. All the world could see that Clemenceau’s Administration had so far strengthened the Anglo-French Entente as to have brought it almost to the point of an alliance: nor thereafter was the Triple Entente with Russia, as opposed to the Triple Alliance, very far off.
At this same time, however, matters were going so fast in Germany towards an open breach that the only wonder is that the truth of the situation was not disclosed, and that Germany, quite ready, and determined160 to be more ready, for war at any moment, was allowed to continue her policy of pretended peace.
England and, to a large extent, France still believed in the pacific intentions of the Fatherland. Yet a meeting was held in Berlin of the heads of all the departments directly or indirectly161 connected with war, at which the Kaiser delivered a speech which could only mean one thing: that Germany and her Allies would enter upon war so soon as the opportunity presented itself, and the preparations, including the completion of the Kiel Canal (or perhaps before that great work had been accomplished), gave promise of a short and decisive campaign. Rumours162 of this address reached those who were kept informed as to what was being contemplated by the Kaiser, his Militarist Junker entourage and the Federal Council. Unfortunately, when the statement was challenged, a strong denial was issued, and the pacifists and pro-Germans, honest and dishonest, laughed at the whole story as a baseless scare.
How far it was baseless could be learnt from deeds that spoke much louder than words. Even thus early great accumulations of munitions163 of war were being made at Cologne, and the military sidings and railway equipments, which could only serve for warlike and not commercial purposes, were being completed. Six years before the war, all the work necessary for an aggressive descent on the West and for the passage through Belgium had been done.
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Europe was comfortably seated over a powder magazine. M. Clemenceau might well discuss in London, when he came over to Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman’s funeral, as Premier of France, how many hundred thousand men, fully140 equipped for war, England could land within a fortnight in North-Eastern France, should a sudden and unprovoked attack be made. But he got no satisfactory answer.
It is evident, therefore, that what with strikes, anarchist outbreaks, the troubles in Morocco, the menacing attitude of Germany—who, as Clemenceau put it, said, “Choose between England and us”—and the attempts to form an enduring compact with England, Clemenceau as President of Council, with all his energy, determination and versatility164, had enough on his hands to occupy all his thoughts. But this did not exhaust the catalogue of his labours during his term of premiership.
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anarchist
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| n.无政府主义者 | |
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premier
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| adj.首要的；n.总理，首相 | |
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radical
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| n.激进份子，原子团，根号；adj.根本的，激进的，彻底的 | |
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folly
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| n.愚笨，愚蠢，蠢事，蠢行，傻话 | |
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5
strife
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| n.争吵，冲突，倾轧，竞争 | |
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6
humiliation
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| n.羞辱 | |
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7
hostilities
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| n.战争；敌意(hostility的复数)；敌对状态；战事 | |
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8
provocative
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| adj.挑衅的，煽动的，刺激的，挑逗的 | |
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9
worthy
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| adj.(of)值得的，配得上的；有价值的 | |
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10
disturbance
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| n.动乱，骚动；打扰，干扰；(身心)失调 | |
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11
overthrown
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| adj. 打翻的，推倒的，倾覆的 动词overthrow的过去分词 | |
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12
overthrow
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| v.推翻，打倒，颠覆；n.推翻，瓦解，颠覆 | |
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13
prone
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| adj.(to)易于…的，很可能…的；俯卧的 | |
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14
spoke
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| n.（车轮的）辐条；轮辐；破坏某人的计划；阻挠某人的行动 v.讲，谈（speak的过去式）；说；演说；从某种观点来说 | |
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15
necessitated
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| 使…成为必要，需要( necessitate的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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16
fin
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| n.鳍；(飞机的)安定翼 | |
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17
coup
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| n.政变；突然而成功的行动 | |
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18
disclaimed
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| v.否认( disclaim的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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19
interfere
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| v.(in)干涉，干预；(with)妨碍，打扰 | |
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20
antagonism
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| n.对抗，敌对，对立 | |
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21
Moslem
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| n.回教徒，穆罕默德信徒；adj.回教徒的，回教的 | |
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22
envoys
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| 使节( envoy的名词复数 )； 公使； 谈判代表； 使节身份 | |
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23
envoy
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| n.使节，使者，代表，公使 | |
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24
potentate
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| n.统治者；君主 | |
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25
imposing
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| adj.使人难忘的，壮丽的，堂皇的，雄伟的 | |
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26
suite
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| n.一套(家具)；套房；随从人员 | |
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27
annexation
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| n.吞并，合并 | |
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28
decided
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| adj.决定了的，坚决的；明显的，明确的 | |
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29
delegation
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| n.代表团；派遣 | |
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30
obstinate
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| adj.顽固的，倔强的，不易屈服的，较难治愈的 | |
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31
hostility
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| n.敌对，敌意；抵制［pl.］交战，战争 | |
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32
par
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| n.标准，票面价值，平均数量；adj.票面的，平常的，标准的 | |
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33
arrogant
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|
| adj.傲慢的，自大的 | |
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34
socialist
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| n.社会主义者；adj.社会主义的 | |
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35
undoubtedly
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| adv.确实地，无疑地 | |
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36
intervention
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| n.介入，干涉，干预 | |
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37
diplomacy
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|
| n.外交；外交手腕，交际手腕 | |
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38
devoted
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| adj.忠诚的，忠实的，热心的，献身于...的 | |
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39
partially
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| adv.部分地，从某些方面讲 | |
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40
forth
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| adv.向前；向外，往外 | |
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41
peremptory
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| adj.紧急的，专横的，断然的 | |
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42
boycott
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|
| n./v.(联合)抵制，拒绝参与 | |
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43
appeasement
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| n.平息，满足 | |
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44
astounding
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| adj.使人震惊的vt.使震惊，使大吃一惊astound的现在分词) | |
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45
naval
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| adj.海军的，军舰的，船的 | |
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46
irresistible
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| adj.非常诱人的，无法拒绝的，无法抗拒的 | |
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47
grievances
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| n.委屈( grievance的名词复数 )；苦衷；不满；牢骚 | |
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48
justify
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| vt.证明…正当(或有理)，为…辩护 | |
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49
contentions
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| n.竞争( contention的名词复数 )；争夺；争论；论点 | |
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50
socialists
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| 社会主义者( socialist的名词复数 ) | |
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51
insidious
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| adj.阴险的，隐匿的，暗中为害的，（疾病）不知不觉之间加剧 | |
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52
immediate
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| adj.立即的；直接的，最接近的；紧靠的 | |
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53
provocation
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| n.激怒，刺激，挑拨，挑衅的事物，激怒的原因 | |
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54
calumny
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| n.诽谤，污蔑，中伤 | |
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55
entirely
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| ad.全部地，完整地；完全地，彻底地 | |
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56
abjuring
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| v.发誓放弃( abjure的现在分词 )；郑重放弃（意见）；宣布撤回（声明等）；避免 | |
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57
adventurous
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| adj.爱冒险的；惊心动魄的，惊险的，刺激的 | |
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58
gaol
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| n.(jail)监狱；(不加冠词)监禁；vt.使…坐牢 | |
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59
accusation
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| n.控告，指责，谴责 | |
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60
favourable
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| adj.赞成的，称赞的，有利的，良好的，顺利的 | |
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61
prospects
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| n.希望，前途(恒为复数) | |
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62
zeal
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| n.热心，热情，热忱 | |
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63
inquiry
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| n.打听，询问，调查，查问 | |
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64
inevitable
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| adj.不可避免的，必然发生的 | |
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65
ministry
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| n.(政府的)部；牧师 | |
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66
vehement
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| adj.感情强烈的；热烈的；(人)有强烈感情的 | |
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67
delightful
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| adj.令人高兴的，使人快乐的 | |
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68
ardent
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| adj.热情的，热烈的，强烈的，烈性的 | |
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69
mere
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| adj.纯粹的；仅仅，只不过 | |
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70
abrupt
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| adj.突然的，意外的；唐突的，鲁莽的 | |
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71
permanently
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| adv.永恒地，永久地，固定不变地 | |
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72
supremely
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|
| adv.无上地，崇高地 | |
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73
succumb
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|
| v.屈服，屈从；死 | |
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74
contented
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|
| adj.满意的，安心的，知足的 | |
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75
corrupting
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|
| （使）败坏( corrupt的现在分词 )； （使）腐化； 引起（计算机文件等的）错误； 破坏 | |
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76
proprietors
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| n.所有人，业主( proprietor的名词复数 ) | |
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77
wholesome
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| adj.适合；卫生的；有益健康的；显示身心健康的 | |
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78
gratuitously
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| 平白 | |
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79
betrothal
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| n. 婚约, 订婚 | |
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80
well-being
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| n.安康，安乐，幸福 | |
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81
thrift
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|
| adj.节约，节俭；n.节俭，节约 | |
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82
fanaticism
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| n.狂热，盲信 | |
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83
convoked
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| v.召集，召开（会议）( convoke的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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84
engender
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| v.产生，引起 | |
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85
extort
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| v.勒索，敲诈，强要 | |
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86
imperatively
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| adv.命令式地 | |
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87
disposition
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| n.性情，性格；意向，倾向；排列，部署 | |
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88
reactionary
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|
| n.反动者，反动主义者；adj.反动的，反动主义的，反对改革的 | |
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89
entente
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| n.协定；有协定关系的各国 | |
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90
breach
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| n.违反，不履行；破裂；vt.冲破，攻破 | |
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91
severely
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| adv.严格地；严厉地；非常恶劣地 | |
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92
contemplated
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| adj. 预期的 动词contemplate的过去分词形式 | |
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93
testimony
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| n.证词；见证，证明 | |
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94
juncture
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| n.时刻，关键时刻，紧要关头 | |
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95
friendliness
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| n.友谊，亲切，亲密 | |
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96
remarkable
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|
| adj.显著的，异常的，非凡的，值得注意的 | |
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97
infiltration
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| n.渗透；下渗；渗滤；入渗 | |
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98
averse
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| adj.厌恶的；反对的，不乐意的 | |
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99
proximity
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| n.接近，邻近 | |
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100
remains
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| n.剩余物，残留物；遗体，遗迹 | |
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101
patriot
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| n.爱国者，爱国主义者 | |
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102
patriotism
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| n.爱国精神，爱国心，爱国主义 | |
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103
disturbances
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| n.骚乱( disturbance的名词复数 )；打扰；困扰；障碍 | |
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104
penetration
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| n.穿透，穿人，渗透 | |
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105
investors
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| n.投资者，出资者( investor的名词复数 ) | |
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106
molested
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| v.骚扰( molest的过去式和过去分词 )；干扰；调戏；猥亵 | |
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107
outrages
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| 引起…的义愤，激怒( outrage的第三人称单数 ) | |
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108
enumerated
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| v.列举，枚举，数( enumerate的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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109
galley
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| n.（飞机或船上的）厨房单层甲板大帆船；军舰舰长用的大划艇； | |
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110
proceedings
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| n.进程，过程，议程；诉讼(程序)；公报 | |
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111
intriguing
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| adj.有趣的；迷人的v.搞阴谋诡计(intrigue的现在分词)；激起…的好奇心 | |
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112
comity
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| n.礼让，礼仪；团结，联合 | |
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113
filibustering
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| v.阻碍或延宕国会或其他立法机构通过提案( filibuster的现在分词 )；掠夺 | |
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114
evacuate
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| v.遣送；搬空；抽出；排泄；大(小)便 | |
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115
averred
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| v.断言( aver的过去式和过去分词 )；证实；证明…属实；作为事实提出 | |
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116
impatience
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| n.不耐烦，急躁 | |
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117
discriminate
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| v.区别，辨别，区分；有区别地对待 | |
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118
chamber
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| n.房间，寝室；会议厅；议院；会所 | |
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119
exclusion
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| n.拒绝，排除，排斥，远足，远途旅行 | |
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120
legitimate
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| adj.合法的，合理的，合乎逻辑的；v.使合法 | |
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121
truculence
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| n.凶猛，粗暴 | |
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122
infamous
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| adj.声名狼藉的，臭名昭著的，邪恶的 | |
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123
nominee
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| n.被提名者；被任命者；被推荐者 | |
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124
revival
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| n.复兴，复苏，（精力、活力等的）重振 | |
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125
vices
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| 缺陷( vice的名词复数 )； 恶习； 不道德行为； 台钳 | |
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126
attained
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| （通常经过努力）实现( attain的过去式和过去分词 )； 达到； 获得； 达到（某年龄、水平、状况） | |
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127
amicable
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|
| adj.和平的，友好的；友善的 | |
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128
thoroughly
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| adv.完全地，彻底地，十足地 | |
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129
monarch
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| n.帝王，君主，最高统治者 | |
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130
virulent
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| adj.有毒的，有恶意的，充满敌意的 | |
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131
effacement
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| n.抹消，抹杀 | |
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132
miserable
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|
| adj.悲惨的，痛苦的；可怜的，糟糕的 | |
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133
tout
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| v.推销，招徕；兜售；吹捧，劝诱 | |
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corps
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| n.(通信等兵种的)部队；(同类作的)一组 | |
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135
oracles
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| 神示所( oracle的名词复数 )； 神谕； 圣贤； 哲人 | |
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curiously
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| adv.有求知欲地；好问地；奇特地 | |
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scrupulously
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| adv.一丝不苟地；小心翼翼地，多顾虑地 | |
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advantageous
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| adj.有利的；有帮助的 | |
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139
salons
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| n.（营业性质的）店( salon的名词复数 )；厅；沙龙（旧时在上流社会女主人家的例行聚会或聚会场所）；（大宅中的）客厅 | |
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fully
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| adv.完全地，全部地，彻底地；充分地 | |
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141
partisans
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| 游击队员( partisan的名词复数 )； 党人； 党羽； 帮伙 | |
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142
creditors
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| n.债权人，债主( creditor的名词复数 ) | |
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143
sketch
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| n.草图；梗概；素描；v.素描；概述 | |
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144
astounded
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| v.使震惊(astound的过去式和过去分词)；愕然；愕；惊讶 | |
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totter
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| v.蹒跚， 摇摇欲坠；n.蹒跚的步子 | |
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146
credulous
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| adj.轻信的，易信的 | |
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bluff
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| v.虚张声势，用假象骗人；n.虚张声势，欺骗 | |
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arrogance
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| n.傲慢，自大 | |
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rapacity
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| n.贪婪，贪心，劫掠的欲望 | |
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150
marrow
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| n.骨髓；精华；活力 | |
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151
tentacles
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| n.触手( tentacle的名词复数 )；触角；触须；触毛 | |
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152
subjugate
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| v.征服；抑制 | |
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153
octopus
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| n.章鱼 | |
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supremacy
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| n.至上；至高权力 | |
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155
infamy
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| n.声名狼藉，出丑，恶行 | |
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emancipation
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| n.（从束缚、支配下）解放 | |
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157
jack
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| n.插座，千斤顶，男人；v.抬起，提醒，扛举；n.（Jake）杰克 | |
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intrigue
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| vt.激起兴趣，迷住；vi.耍阴谋；n.阴谋，密谋 | |
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159
dictatorial
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| adj. 独裁的，专断的 | |
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determined
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| adj.坚定的；有决心的 | |
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161
indirectly
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| adv.间接地，不直接了当地 | |
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162
rumours
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| n.传闻( rumour的名词复数 )；风闻；谣言；谣传 | |
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163
munitions
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| n.军火，弹药；v.供应…军需品 | |
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versatility
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| n.多才多艺，多样性，多功能 | |
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